Cold War

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For other uses, see Cold War (disambiguation).

Photograph of the Berlin Wall taken from the West side. The Wall was built in 1961 to prevent East Germans from fleeing and to stop an
economically disastrous drain of workers. It was an iconic symbol of the Cold War and its fall in 1989 marked the approaching end of the
war.

Part of a series on the
History of the Cold War
Origins of the Cold War
World War II
(Hiroshima and Nagasaki)
War conferences
Eastern Bloc
Western Bloc
Iron Curtain
Cold War (194753)
Cold War (195362)
Cold War (196279)
Cold War (197985)
Cold War (198591)
Frozen conflicts
Timeline Conflicts
Historiography
The Cold War was a state of political and military tension after World War II between powers in
the Western Bloc (theUnited States, its NATO allies and others such as Japan) and powers in
the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact).
Historians have not fully agreed on the dates, but 19471991 is common. It was "cold" because
there was no large-scale fighting directly between the two sides, although there were major
regional wars in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan that the two sides supported. The Cold War
split the temporary wartime alliance against Nazi Germany, leaving the USSR and the US as
two superpowers with profound economic and political differences: the former being a single-
party MarxistLeninist state, and the latter being a capitalist state with generally free elections. A
self-proclaimed neutral bloc arose with the Non-Aligned Movement founded by Egypt, India,
and Yugoslavia; this faction rejected association with either the US-led West or the Soviet-led
East. The two superpowers never engaged directly in full-scale armed combat but they each
armed heavily in preparation of an all-out nuclear World War III. Each side had a nuclear
deterrent that deterred an attack by the other side, on the basis that such an attack would lead to
total destruction of the attacker: the doctrine of mutually assured destruction or MAD. Aside from
the development of the two sides' nuclear arsenals, and deployment of conventional military
forces, the struggle for dominance was expressed via proxy wars around the globe, psychological
warfare, propaganda and espionage, and technological competitions such as the Space Race.
The first phase of the Cold War began in the first two years after the end of the Second World
War in 1945. The USSR consolidated its control over the states of the Eastern Bloc while the
United States began a strategy of global containmentto challenge Soviet power, extending
military and financial aid to the countries of Western Europe (for example, supporting the anti-
Communist side in the Greek Civil War) and creating the NATO alliance. The Berlin
Blockade (194849) was the first major crisis of the Cold War.
With victory of the Communist side in the Chinese Civil War and the outbreak of the Korean
War (195053), the conflict expanded. The USSR and USA competed for influence in Latin
America and decolonizing states of Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was stopped by the Soviets. The expansion and escalation
sparked more crises, such as the Suez Crisis (1956), the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962. Following this last crisis a new phase began that saw the Sino-Soviet
split complicate relations within the Communist sphere while US allies, particularly France,
demonstrated greater independence of action. The USSR crushed the 1968Prague
Spring liberalization program in Czechoslovakia and the Vietnam War (19551975) ended with a
defeat of the US-backed Republic of South Vietnam, prompting further adjustments.
By the 1970s both sides had become interested in accommodations to create a more stable and
predictable international system, inaugurating a period of dtente that saw Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks and the US opening relations with the People's Republic of China as a strategic
counterweight to the Soviet Union. Dtente collapsed at the end of the decade with the Soviet
war in Afghanistan beginning in 1979.
The early 1980s were another period of elevated tension, with the Soviet downing of Korean Air
Lines Flight 007 (1983), and the "Able Archer" NATO military exercises (1983). The United States
increased diplomatic, military, and economic pressures on the Soviet Union, at a time when the
communist state was already suffering from economic stagnation. In the mid-1980s, the new
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the liberalizing reforms
of perestroika ("reorganization", 1987) and glasnost ("openness", ca. 1985) and ended Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan. Pressures for national independence grew stronger in Eastern
Europe, especially Poland. Gorbachev meanwhile refused to use Soviet troops to bolster the
faltering Warsaw Pact regimes as had occurred in the past. The result in 1989 was a wave of
revolutions that peacefully (with the exception of the Romanian Revolution) overthrew all of the
Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. The Communist Party of the Soviet
Union itself lost control and was banned following an abortive coup attempt in August 1991. This
in turn led to the formal dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 and the collapse of
Communist regimes in other countries such as Mongolia, Cambodia and South Yemen. The
United States remained as the world's only superpower.
The Cold War and its events have left a significant legacy, and it is often referred to in popular
culture, especially in media featuring themes of espionage (such as the internationally
successful James Bond film series) and the threat of nuclear warfare.

What was the Cold War?
The Cold War is the name given to the relationship that developed primarily between the USA and
the USSRafter World War Two. The Cold War was to dominate international affairs for decades and
many major crises occurred - the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Hungary and the Berlin Wall being
just some. For many, the growth in weapons of mass destruction was the most worrying issue.

A clash of very different beliefs and ideology - capitalism versus communism - each held with almost
religious conviction, formed the basis of an international power struggle with both sides vying for
dominance, exploiting every opportunity for expansion anywhere in the world.
Note that USSR in 1945 was Russia post-1917 and included all the various countries that now exist
individually (Ukraine, Georgia etc) but after the war they were part of this huge country up until the
collapse of the Soviet Union (the other name for the USSR).
Logic would dictate that as the USA and the USSR fought as allies during World War Two, their
relationship after the war would be firm and friendly. This never happened and any appearance that
these two powers were friendly during the war is illusory.
Before the war, America had depicted the Soviet Union as almost the devil-incarnate. The Soviet
Union had depicted America likewise so their friendship during the war was simply the result of
having a mutual enemy - Nazi Germany. In fact, one of Americas leading generals, Patton, stated that
he felt that the Allied army should unite with what was left of the Wehrmacht in 1945, utilise the military
genius that existed within it (such as the V2s etc.) and fight the oncoming Soviet Red Army. Churchill
himself was furious that Eisenhower, as supreme head of Allied command, had agreed that the Red
Army should be allowed to get to Berlin first ahead of the Allied army. His anger was shared by
Montgomery, Britains senior military figure.
So the extreme distrust that existed during the war, was certainly present before the end of the
war..and this was between Allies. The Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, was also distrustful of the
Americans after Truman only told him of a new terrifying weapon that he was going to use against the
Japanese. The first Stalin knew of what this weapon could do was when reports on Hiroshima got
back to Moscow.
So this was the scene after the war ended in 1945. Both sides distrusted the other. One had a vast
army in the field (the Soviet Union with its Red Army supremely lead by Zhukov) while the other, the
Americans had the most powerful weapon in the world, the A-bomb and the Soviets had no way on
knowing how many America had.
So what exactly was the Cold War?
In diplomatic terms there are three types of war.
Hot War : this is actual warfare. All talks have failed and the armies are fighting.
Warm War : this is where talks are still going on and there would always be a chance of a peaceful
outcome but armies, navies etc. are being fully mobilised and war plans are being put into operation
ready for the command to fight.
Cold War : this term is used to describe the relationship between America and the Soviet Union 1945
to 1980. Neither side ever fought the other - the consequences would be too appalling - but they did
fight for their beliefs using client states who fought for their beliefs on their behalf e.g. South
Vietnam was anticommunist and was supplied by America during the war while North Vietnam was
pro-Communist and fought the south (and the Americans) using weapons from communist Russia or
communist China. InAfghanistan, the Americans supplied the rebel Afghans after the Soviet Union
invaded in 1979 while they never physically involved themselves thus avoiding a direct clash with the
Soviet Union.
The one time this process nearly broke down was the Cuban Missile Crisis.
So why were these two super powers so distrustful of each other?
America Soviet Union
Free elections No elections or fixed
Democratic Autocratic / Dictatorship
Capitalist Communist
Survival of the fittest Everybody helps everybody
Richest world power Poor economic base
Personal freedom
Society controlled by the
NKVD (secret police)
Freedom of the media Total censorship
This lack of mutually understanding an alien culture, would lead the world down a very dangerous path
- it led to the development of weapons of awesome destructive capability and the creation of some
intriguing policies such as MAD - Mutually Assured Destruction.
Causes of the Cold War in 1945
* American fear of communist attack
* Trumans dislike of Stalin
* USSRs fear of the American's atomic bomb
* USSRs dislike of capitalism
* USSRs actions in the Soviet zone of Germany
* Americas refusal to share nuclear secrets
* USSRs expansion west into Eastern Europe + broken election promises
* USSRs fear of American attack
* USSRs need for a secure western border
* USSRs aim of spreading world communism
This feeling of suspicion lead to mutual distrust and this did a great deal to deepen the Cold
War

The causes of the Suez Canal War of 1956
In 1956 the Suez Canal was nationalised by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Suez Canal Crisis of
1956 effectively ended the political career of Sir Anthony Eden but it served to greatly
advance the already very high standing Nasser had in the Arab world. However, what were
the causes of the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis?

Britain had ruled Egypt for all of the Twentieth Century. This gave Britain joint control over
the Suez Canal along with the French which had been described as the jugular vein of
the Empire. The Suez Canal cut a vast number of miles off a sea journey from Europe to
Asian markets and vice-versa and made a journey around the volatile Cape of Good Hope
unnecessary. However, the British presence in Egypt was not welcome by many Egyptians
as they were made to feel second class citizens in their own country.

The Middle East was a key area within the Cold War context and within the Middle East the
Suez Canal was seen as vital. By 1951 the British had 80,000 troops stationed along the
Suez Canal making it the largest military base in the world. To many in Britain the Suez
Canal was a sign of Britains overseas power to many Egyptians it was an emblem of an
empire that harkened back to former times that many believed should have gone when World
War Two ended. Egyptians needed permission from the British to even go near to the canal
and resistance to the British occupation of Egypt quickly grew.

Colonel Nasser wanted to take advantage of this situation. First he was aware that many
Egyptians were deeply unhappy with the British being in Egypt. Second, he was also aware
that corruption was rife in senior positions within Egypt and this was most epitomised by the
life style of King Farouk. Nasser founded the Free Officers. Members of it wanted the
overthrow of old Egypt to be followed by the removal of all British influence in Egypt.

By 1952, attacks on British troops in Egypt got worse. Between 1951 and 1952, thirty had
been killed and over sixty had been wounded. The Egyptian police, who were meant to be
supporting troops in maintaining law and order, were feeding information to the resistance
movement of British troop whereabouts etc. This made life extremely difficult for the British
Army in Egypt and in 1952 Operation Eagle was introduced. This was a full crackdown on
the Egyptian police. However, it only took one incident to spark off a full-scale rebellion and
this happened at Ismailia.

The Third Infantry Brigade surrounded the police headquarters at Ismailia and called on the
men inside it to surrender. After brief talks, the police within the building refused to do so and
made it plain that they were prepared to fight. The British brought in Centurion tanks and
other armoured vehicles and attacked. The police headquarters was taken over. There were
some British casualties but fifty Egyptian police were killed and many more were wounded.
Over 800 men were arrested and taken into custody. A local man photographed what he saw
and the photos, when published, only served to inflame an already very tense situation.

What happened at Ismailia angered many throughout the whole of Egypt. The men in the
police headquarters were armed with World War Two Lee Enfield rifles while the British used
tanks to smash their way into the building. The next day after the British attack, Black
Saturday, there were riots throughout Egypt. The Union Flag was burned and foreign shops
were destroyed. In Cairo expatriate accommodation was attacked as was the iconic
Shepherds Hotel a base for British expatriates. At the exclusive Turf Club in Cairo,
expatriate members were beaten to death and the club was destroyed. In all over 700
buildings were destroyed and 9 British and 26 other Westerners were killed. It is generally
accepted that this outbreak of violence was not planned but was a spontaneous outpouring
of anger by people who had been treated as second class citizens within their own country.
Few Egyptians could afford luxuries that existed at places like the Shepherds Hotel or the
Turf Club. Those who could were invariably associated with the corrupt government of King
Farouk.

Anthony Eden wanted 40,000 troops moved into Egypt within 24 hours to restore order and
to protect the British there. The army made it plain to Eden that this was simply not possible
from a logistical point of view. While it was a clear sign that Eden had little understanding of
issues such as logistics, the issue was left with army chiefs being told that they were leaving
British citizens unprotected.

What happened at Ismailia and what followed, gave Nasser and the Free Officers exactly
the right opportunity to over throw Farouk. The king was peacefully removed from his palace,
taken to Alexandria where he boarded his yacht and left Egypt to a 21-gun salute. Nasser
immediately set up the Revolutionary Command Council. Though Nasser did not head the
Council, it was obvious that the most potent force in it was Nasser.

This all happened against a background when the British government was having major
financial troubles at home. The cost of the military commitment to Egypt was huge and one
that the Treasury could have done without. Eden took the decision to start negotiations with
the Revolutionary Command Council to withdraw British troops from the Suez Canal. The so-
called Suez Group in the Conservative Party was furious when his plan was announced.
Led by Julian Amery, the Suez Group argued that a withdrawal would be the end of the
Empire and that it would reward violence against British troops. Regardless of their
objections, Eden went ahead with the negotiations.

However, the speed of the negotiations was not quick enough for Egyptian nationalists.
Attacks on British troops continued but a new dynamic was added with attacks on the
families of troops occurring. With 27,000 British citizens in Egypt, this was a new and
worrying development. The resistance leaders used the talks to their advantage. When the
British seemed to be stalling the attacks got worse; when the British appeared to be more
conciliatory, they slackened off. In 1954 an agreement was reached that stated that British
troops would leave Egypt within twenty months of the signing of the agreement. The signing
of this agreement ended the attacks on British troops.

Nasser and Eden met for the first and last time in February 1955. Eden arrived in Cairo with
two objectives. The first was for Egypt to stop its anti-British radio broadcasts and the second
was to get Egypt to join the recently formed Baghdad Pact an anti-communist pro-western
alliance of Middle East states that Egypt had not joined. He failed on both counts. Even the
dinner put on for Nasser at the British Embassy was a failure as Nasser arrived in military
uniform to be greeted by Eden in full evening dress Nasser was unaware that the dinner
was to be formal and he concluded that it had been done to show him up in public. There is
no evidence that this was the case it just seems to have been a genuine misunderstanding.
But within the context of what was going on then, to those Egyptians who had access to the
information via the radio channel Voice of Egypt, it was a deliberate attempt to humiliate
Nasser.

One week after the meeting between Eden and Nasser, Israel raided Egyptian territory in
Gaza killing over thirty people. This raid exposed Egypts military weakness and Nasser
attempted to buy weapons abroad. His attempt to buy weapons from Britain failed and the
Americans were also unwilling to accommodate him. Therefore, Egypt turned to the Soviet
Bloc. To the Russians, this expansion of influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East was
a major coup.

To modernise Egypt, Nasser wanted to build a dam at Aswan to harness the awesome
power of the River Nile. Clearly Egypt did not have the money to fund this. $200 million came
from the World Bank while, in an effort to re-establish some influence in the area, both Britain
and America agreed to financially support the project.

However, Eden did not trust Nasser. In a public broadcast he had stated that Nasser is not a
man to be trusted to keep an agreement. MI6 provided Eden, now Prime Minister, with
reports that Nasser was becoming more pro-Moscow. There was little evidence for this
despite the Soviet Union providing Egypt with weapons both seemed to be using the other
for its own purposes. However the MI6 reports only served to anger Eden who did not want
to gain an Atlee reputation for appeasement.

When British troops finally left Egypt, it ended seventy four years of occupation. Nasser
became president of Egypt and his status in the Arab world could not have been higher.
However, without any reference to Britain, America suddenly announced that it was no
longer going to financially support the Aswan Dam project. Britain followed the Americans
example. Nasser announced that such treatment of Egypt was an insult and a humiliation.
To Nasser the dam would be a symbol of Arab pride and he was determined to go ahead
with its building. The Russians provided the necessary engineering knowledge, while the
Suez Canal would provide the necessary finance.

In 1956, Nasser announced to his inner council that he was going to nationalise the Suez Canal on
behalf of the Egyptian people. In Operation Dignity and Glory the offices of the Suez Canal Company
were taken over. It was a bloodless affair that was joyously received in Egypt when news of what had
occurred was announced. Ironically, government lawyers for the Conservative government 1951-1953
had foreseen this and had assessed whether it was a legal move. They decided that under
international law it was legal to nationalise the Suez Canal as long as they suitably compensated
share holders and allowed ships of all nationalities through the canal. When Eden was shown the
report at his first meeting after Dignity and Glory, staff there claimed he shouted This is no f***ing
good and threw the report across the room.

What followed were diplomatic talks - some secret - that all led to the invasion of Port Said in
November 1956.

MLA Citation/Reference
"The causes of the Suez Canal War of 1956". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2006. Web.
The diplomatic background to the Suez Crisis of 1956
Nasser having nationalised the Suez Canal waited to see what would happen. Nasser
confidently predicted that Britain would not use military force to reclaim the Suez Canal and
that diplomacy would not work. Therefore he concluded that his gamble over the Suez Canal
had worked.

On August 8
th
,1956 Anthony Eden went on television to explain his policy towards Egypt. He
told the British public that Our quarrel is not with Egypt, still less with the Arab world. It is
with Colonel Nasser. He is not a man who can be trusted to keep an agreement. During the
speech, Eden compared Nasser to the recent Fascist leaders of Europe a comparison that
did not go down well in the Arabic world.

In August 1956, 20,000 reservists were called up in Britain. Men were sent to Malta and
Cyprus as the two obvious forward military bases. Britain drew up, in secret, plans to re-
capture the Suez Canal and to force through a change of regime in Egypt. Edens main
advisor at the Foreign Office on Egyptian issues was Adam Watson. He got the clear
impression that Eden believed that the Egyptian people would welcome a strong but
benevolent British government in Egypt a throwback to the days of the British Empire at its
peak.

The United States of America made it clear that it was against any form of military action and
Dwight Eisenhower made this clear in communications with Eden. The American Secretary
of State at the time was John Foster Dulles. It was Dulles who had frequent contact with
Eden and his messages to the Prime Minister were ambivalent and far from clear. If Eden
believed that America was not against military action as a result of his meetings with Dulles,
this may well have encouraged him to not only think about it but also to actively follow it up.

Eden got the full backing of France for action against Egypt, especially from the French
Foreign Minister Christian Pireau. Nasser had helped Algerian rebels against the ruling
French government in Algiers and this Pireau could not tolerate. Nasser backed up his
stance when he publicly stated It is our duty to help our Arab brothers.

A third nation covertly made its feeling plan on the topic of Egypt Israel. Officials from
France and Israel met in secret to discuss what could be done against Egypt. Israel was
greatly concerned by Egypts military power that was becoming greater as a result of Czech
military imports. On July 27
th
, France had openly asked Israel if they were considering
attacking Egypt in what would be a pre-emptive strike attack before being attacked.
Shimon Peres told the French that an Israeli attack could take place within two weeks of the
27
th
but that modern weapons were needed. In response to this, France secretly exported to
Israel modern weaponry. Because of a trade embargo on military equipment to the Middle
East, the landing of this equipment took place at night Moshe Dayan was there to observe
the landings near Haifa.

As a result of his concern for what was going on in the Middle East, Eisenhower ordered U2
spy planes to fly over the Israel/Egypt area to give US Intelligence more of a clear picture as
to what military equipment both sides had. The results greatly angered Eisenhower. The
photos showed that Israel had been equipped with sixty French Mystere fighter planes
whereas the French government had told Eisenhower that they had only handed over to
Israel twelve Mysteres. Eisenhower saw the planes as changing the balance of power in the
region and that such a move could provoke a response.

On October 13
th
, Eden addressed the Conservative Party conference at Llandudno. Eden
clearly stated that he did not rule out the use of military force. However, he also knew that he
had to do something decisive as little had been seemingly done since the nationalisation of
the Suez Canal in July.

On October 14
th
, Eden met the French Deputy Chief of Staff at Chequers. It was at this
meeting that there was the first mention of a possible military input by the Israelis. The
French plan was to get Israel to attack Egypt across the Sinai Desert. As Israel moved
nearer to the Suez Canal, Britain and France would call on both forces to withdraw ten miles
both sides of the Suez Canal (Egypt to the west and Israel to the east) and both nations
would send in troops to ensure the safety of this vital international waterway. On October
16
th
Eden told the French that the plan had his support. Secrecy was paramount and America
was not told.

The three nations involved met at a remote villa at Sevres near Paris. Ben Gurion, Shimon
Peres and Moshe Dayan made the secret journey from Israel to the villa while the British
representative there was the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd. The meeting did not go well.
Gurion wanted Britain to promise to intervene in the region 72 hours earlier than Britain had
planned to do so. Lloyd refused to give such an assurance and Ben Guiron was all for
leaving the meeting. He was stopped when Shimon Peres told him that their plane had
developed mechanical problems and that they would have to stay at the villa to ensure that
their presence there remained secret. As a result, the talk continued.

On October 23
rd
, Pineau flew to London to see Eden to sort out the problems. On the
following day, Eden sent Patrick Dean to Paris. Dean was the chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Committee and his task was to ensure that any Israeli attack actually seemed as
if it was going to threaten the Suez Canal. Therefore, in the eyes of the world, Britain and
France would be justified in sending in troops. Dean signed a document that confirmed all
the details. He brought a copy back to Eden who was horrified that anything had been put in
writing as this, Eden believed, jeopardised the whole secrecy of the mission.

On October 28
th
, Israel launched a secret strike on Egypt so secret that for years the
Egyptians had no idea as to what had happened. Israeli intelligence had found out via a spy
when and where an aeroplane carrying senior Egyptian military commanders would be flying.
It was shot down killing all on board. Many in Egypt believed it to have been a tragic
accident.

At the same time, twelve French fighter jets flew from Cyprus to Israel. Dayan was
concerned about the aerial strength of the Egyptian air force and the French fighters were a
guarantee against this. The fighter planes were given Israeli markings and the French pilots
given the appropriate documentation.

On October 29
th
, 395 Israeli paratroopers were dropped in the Sinai Desert about twenty
miles from the Suez Canal. Eden had expected a larger force and the attack even puzzled
Nasser who was informed that the Israelis seemed to be going from one sand hill to another
with no obvious strategic cohesion to what they were doing.

On October 30
th
, Eden informed the House of Commons and the Queen of what had
happened in the Sinai. The Israeli and Egyptian ambassadors were summoned and told to
inform their respective governments that both forces should withdraw ten miles either side of
the Suez Canal to ensure that the canal was not damaged. Nasser rejected this and it was
this that gave Britain and France the excuse to start an attack.

The United Nations called on all sides not to use violence in the attempts to solve the
problem. Britain used its right of veto in the Security Council to reject this.

Britain started its attack when RAF bombers attacked the international airport in Cairo.
Eisenhower was furious and he made his anger known in public when he said We believe
these actions to be taken in error. However, his comments did not stop the bombings. On
November 1
st
, more British aerial bombings destroyed many Mig 15 fighters on the ground.

In Britain, Eden faced embarrassment from one of his own MPs William Yates. He had found out
about the secret plan to attack Egypt. However, Yates had no details about it if he had, Eden could
have been in far more political trouble than he was as it would have been obvious that Britain and
France were trying to precipitate a situation in which they could attack as opposed to avoiding one.

The attack on Egypt was scheduled for November 5th.

MLA Citation/Reference
"The diplomatic background to the Suez Crisis of 1956". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2006. Web.
The diplomatic background to the Suez Crisis of 1956
Nasser having nationalised the Suez Canal waited to see what would happen. Nasser
confidently predicted that Britain would not use military force to reclaim the Suez Canal and
that diplomacy would not work. Therefore he concluded that his gamble over the Suez Canal
had worked.

On August 8
th
,1956 Anthony Eden went on television to explain his policy towards Egypt. He
told the British public that Our quarrel is not with Egypt, still less with the Arab world. It is
with Colonel Nasser. He is not a man who can be trusted to keep an agreement. During the
speech, Eden compared Nasser to the recent Fascist leaders of Europe a comparison that
did not go down well in the Arabic world.

In August 1956, 20,000 reservists were called up in Britain. Men were sent to Malta and
Cyprus as the two obvious forward military bases. Britain drew up, in secret, plans to re-
capture the Suez Canal and to force through a change of regime in Egypt. Edens main
advisor at the Foreign Office on Egyptian issues was Adam Watson. He got the clear
impression that Eden believed that the Egyptian people would welcome a strong but
benevolent British government in Egypt a throwback to the days of the British Empire at its
peak.

The United States of America made it clear that it was against any form of military action and
Dwight Eisenhower made this clear in communications with Eden. The American Secretary
of State at the time was John Foster Dulles. It was Dulles who had frequent contact with
Eden and his messages to the Prime Minister were ambivalent and far from clear. If Eden
believed that America was not against military action as a result of his meetings with Dulles,
this may well have encouraged him to not only think about it but also to actively follow it up.

Eden got the full backing of France for action against Egypt, especially from the French
Foreign Minister Christian Pireau. Nasser had helped Algerian rebels against the ruling
French government in Algiers and this Pireau could not tolerate. Nasser backed up his
stance when he publicly stated It is our duty to help our Arab brothers.

A third nation covertly made its feeling plan on the topic of Egypt Israel. Officials from
France and Israel met in secret to discuss what could be done against Egypt. Israel was
greatly concerned by Egypts military power that was becoming greater as a result of Czech
military imports. On July 27
th
, France had openly asked Israel if they were considering
attacking Egypt in what would be a pre-emptive strike attack before being attacked.
Shimon Peres told the French that an Israeli attack could take place within two weeks of the
27
th
but that modern weapons were needed. In response to this, France secretly exported to
Israel modern weaponry. Because of a trade embargo on military equipment to the Middle
East, the landing of this equipment took place at night Moshe Dayan was there to observe
the landings near Haifa.

As a result of his concern for what was going on in the Middle East, Eisenhower ordered U2
spy planes to fly over the Israel/Egypt area to give US Intelligence more of a clear picture as
to what military equipment both sides had. The results greatly angered Eisenhower. The
photos showed that Israel had been equipped with sixty French Mystere fighter planes
whereas the French government had told Eisenhower that they had only handed over to
Israel twelve Mysteres. Eisenhower saw the planes as changing the balance of power in the
region and that such a move could provoke a response.

On October 13
th
, Eden addressed the Conservative Party conference at Llandudno. Eden
clearly stated that he did not rule out the use of military force. However, he also knew that he
had to do something decisive as little had been seemingly done since the nationalisation of
the Suez Canal in July.

On October 14
th
, Eden met the French Deputy Chief of Staff at Chequers. It was at this
meeting that there was the first mention of a possible military input by the Israelis. The
French plan was to get Israel to attack Egypt across the Sinai Desert. As Israel moved
nearer to the Suez Canal, Britain and France would call on both forces to withdraw ten miles
both sides of the Suez Canal (Egypt to the west and Israel to the east) and both nations
would send in troops to ensure the safety of this vital international waterway. On October
16
th
Eden told the French that the plan had his support. Secrecy was paramount and America
was not told.

The three nations involved met at a remote villa at Sevres near Paris. Ben Gurion, Shimon
Peres and Moshe Dayan made the secret journey from Israel to the villa while the British
representative there was the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd. The meeting did not go well.
Gurion wanted Britain to promise to intervene in the region 72 hours earlier than Britain had
planned to do so. Lloyd refused to give such an assurance and Ben Guiron was all for
leaving the meeting. He was stopped when Shimon Peres told him that their plane had
developed mechanical problems and that they would have to stay at the villa to ensure that
their presence there remained secret. As a result, the talk continued.

On October 23
rd
, Pineau flew to London to see Eden to sort out the problems. On the
following day, Eden sent Patrick Dean to Paris. Dean was the chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Committee and his task was to ensure that any Israeli attack actually seemed as
if it was going to threaten the Suez Canal. Therefore, in the eyes of the world, Britain and
France would be justified in sending in troops. Dean signed a document that confirmed all
the details. He brought a copy back to Eden who was horrified that anything had been put in
writing as this, Eden believed, jeopardised the whole secrecy of the mission.

On October 28
th
, Israel launched a secret strike on Egypt so secret that for years the
Egyptians had no idea as to what had happened. Israeli intelligence had found out via a spy
when and where an aeroplane carrying senior Egyptian military commanders would be flying.
It was shot down killing all on board. Many in Egypt believed it to have been a tragic
accident.

At the same time, twelve French fighter jets flew from Cyprus to Israel. Dayan was
concerned about the aerial strength of the Egyptian air force and the French fighters were a
guarantee against this. The fighter planes were given Israeli markings and the French pilots
given the appropriate documentation.

On October 29
th
, 395 Israeli paratroopers were dropped in the Sinai Desert about twenty
miles from the Suez Canal. Eden had expected a larger force and the attack even puzzled
Nasser who was informed that the Israelis seemed to be going from one sand hill to another
with no obvious strategic cohesion to what they were doing.

On October 30
th
, Eden informed the House of Commons and the Queen of what had
happened in the Sinai. The Israeli and Egyptian ambassadors were summoned and told to
inform their respective governments that both forces should withdraw ten miles either side of
the Suez Canal to ensure that the canal was not damaged. Nasser rejected this and it was
this that gave Britain and France the excuse to start an attack.

The United Nations called on all sides not to use violence in the attempts to solve the
problem. Britain used its right of veto in the Security Council to reject this.

Britain started its attack when RAF bombers attacked the international airport in Cairo.
Eisenhower was furious and he made his anger known in public when he said We believe
these actions to be taken in error. However, his comments did not stop the bombings. On
November 1
st
, more British aerial bombings destroyed many Mig 15 fighters on the ground.

In Britain, Eden faced embarrassment from one of his own MPs William Yates. He had found out
about the secret plan to attack Egypt. However, Yates had no details about it if he had, Eden could
have been in far more political trouble than he was as it would have been obvious that Britain and
France were trying to precipitate a situation in which they could attack as opposed to avoiding one.

The attack on Egypt was scheduled for November 5th.

MLA Citation/Reference
"The diplomatic background to the Suez Crisis of 1956". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2006. Web.
Dwight Eisenhower and Suez
America and Great Britain shared differing views on how the 1956 Suez Crisis should
be handled, as a letter written in September by President Dwight Eisenhower to
Prime Minister Anthony Eden made very clear.


We have a grave problem confronting us in Nassers reckless adventure with the
canal, and I do not differ from you in your estimate of his intentions and purposes.
The place where we apparently do not agree is on the probable effects in the Arab
world of the various possible reactions by the Western World. You seem to believe
that any long, drawn out controversy will inevitably make Nasser an Arab hero. This, I
think, is a picture too dark. I believe we can expect the Arabs to rally firmly to
Nassers support if there should be a resort to force without thoroughly exploring and
exhausting every possible peaceful means of settling the issue. Nasser thrives on
drama. If we let some of the drama go out of the situation and concentrate upon
deflating him through slower but sure processes (such as economic pressures, Arab
rivalries, a new pipeline to Turkey, more oil for Europe from Venezuela. I assure you
we are not blind to the fact that eventually there may be no escape from the use of
force. But to resort to military action when the world believes there are other means
available would set in motion forces that could lead to the most distressing results.

Why did Eisenhower take this view especially in view of the fact that Great Britain was probably
Americas closest ally in NATO? Various theories have been forwarded for Eisenhowers approach.
One was that America acquired relatively little oil through the Suez Canal (about 15% of their national
requirement in 1956) and the economic importance to America of the nationalisation of the canal was
minimal. US investments in the Suez Canal Company was also negligible. Another theory is that
Eisenhower wanted to be seen as a man who could broker peace at an international level in regions
that could be described fragile in terms of peace. 1956 was election year in America. One of the more
accepted views is that Eisenhower feared a huge backlash amongst the Arab nations if Egypt suffered
a humiliating defeat at the hands of the British, French and Israelis as seemed likely. Would this
push Egypt more and more towards Moscow? Would other Arab nations then follow? It was well
known that the USSR wanted a permanent warm water naval base in the Mediterranean Sea, which
her Black Seas fleet could use. Would Nassers rejection of the West lead to a much greater Soviet
influence in this important diplomatic zone? Eisenhowers fears came true. Soviet money financed the
dam at Aswan and the Egyptian military received Soviet equipment.

MLA Citation/Reference
"Dwight Eisenhower and Suez". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2010. Web.
The Suez Crisis of 1956
Events in Egypt, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the increasing heroic status
of Nasser, made conflict looked inevitable. On November 3
rd
1956, Anthony Eden prepared to
address the nation. By now it was clear to those around him, that Edens health was
suffering. The director of the broadcast, David Attenborough, stated He looked dreadful,
very ill. At the start of his address, Eden stated:

All my life I have been a man of peace. I still have the same devotion to peace.

However, in the same speech, Eden then went on that now was the right time to stand firm
and that action was required to undo what Nasser had done with regards to the Suez Canal.

In Egypt, civilians were given rifles in an effort to produce a makeshift militia that would
support the army. The military in Cairo fully expected a full-scale Anglo-French invasion and
wanted as many to help as was physically possible.

On November 4
th
, a major demonstration was held in London with regards to the military
build-up. The demonstration was organised by the Labour Party and the most common
banner on display was Law Not War. The main speaker at Trafalgar Square was Aneurin
Bevan. The man credited with founding the National Health Service said:

If he is sincere in what he is saying, then he is too stupid to be Prime Minister.

The demonstration turned more unpleasant and the police were needed to restore order near
10, Downing Street.

In Cairo, Nasser saw images of the demonstration. He turned to a colleague and said Eden
is weak, weak in character.

Diplomatically, the course of events seemed to be turning against Eden. It appeared as if the
Israelis were going to accept a United Nations proposal for a ceasefire. Even Edens cabinet
was split on what course of action should be taken. The main opponent to military action was
the Leader of the House, Rab Butler. When it became clear that Israel was not going to
accept the UNs ceasefire proposal, the cabinet decided that military action would start. In
theory, the action by the armed forces should have been easy, as the Israelis had tied up a
lot of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai.

On November 5
th
, ironically Gunpowder Plot day in Britain, men from the 3
rd
Battalion of the
Parachute Regiment took off for El Gamil airfield, to the west of Port Said. At 05.00, the first
men landed at the airfield 668 paratroopers were to parachute into El Gamil in total. The
paratroopers faced a mixture of civilians and army fighters. French paratroopers, with some
British in support, landed to the west of Port Said. At El Gamil, the resistance put up by the
Egyptians was greater than expected and 3 Para took more casualties than had been
anticipated. From El Gamil, 3 Para moved on Port Said itself at the mouth of the Suez Canal.
The Royal Air Force gave the men fighter cover as they moved. Despite fierce resistance in a
cemetery near Port Said, the British force had a successful first day.

However, on that day a letter was received in London but not shown to the sleeping Eden
until the following day from Bulganin, the Soviet Unions Prime Minister. As Suez was
played out in the background of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, seeming Soviet involvement
was a worrying occurrence. Bulganin made it clear that the Soviet Union would take action
against any aggressors in Egypt.

In the era of the Cold War and with the world reeling from the Soviet invasion of Hungary, it
would have been expected that Britains primary ally at the time the United States of
America would have rallied to support Great Britain. This did not happen in fact, the
opposite happened. Dwight Eisenhower, Americas president, was campaigning to be re-
elected as President of America. The global image of an American ally acting like an imperial
bully against a nation that probably could not protect itself against such a force was
unacceptable to Eisenhower. He had already told Eden that the use of force was
unacceptable to the Americans. In a letter to Eisenhower, Eden wrote:

History alone can judge whether we have made the right decision.

Militarily, Day One went as well as could have been expected. Diplomatically, things were not
going well for Eden.

On November 6
th
, the sea landings took place in support of the paratroopers on the ground.
At 04.00, guns from Royal Navy ships started to pound known defences in Port Said. At
04.45, men from 40 and 42 Commandos, Royal Marines, started their assault on Port Said.
45 Commando went in via helicopters. Faced with a combination of British and French
paratroopers, British commandos and the Israeli Army in Sinai, it seemed obvious to many
that the Egyptian forces would not last for long.

However, on the same day, politics started to take its toll. The Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Harold McMillan, told a cabinet meeting that there was a run on sterling, especially in New
York and the Britain faced the real prospect of having to devalue sterling and also face the
possibility of an Arab oil embargo. Both would have a major negative impact on the British
economy. This was also coupled with the prospect ofUnited Nation sanctions. Eisenhower
had also made it clear to his cabinet that America would not do anything to prop up sterling
until Britain and France had started to withdraw their forces from Egypt.

Faced with the possibility of a major dent in the UK economy, the cabinet took the decision to
order a ceasefire.

By the end of November 6
th
, Port Said had been taken and the military estimated that full
control of the Suez Canal would only take another 24 hours. However, they were ordered to
stop fighting at midnight on the same day.

By November 7
th
, casualty figures could be assessed. It is believed that about 650 Egyptians
were killed including civilians, with 2,000 wounded.

The Anglo-French forces lost 26 men killed and 129 wounded included in these figures
were Royal Marines killed and wounded in a friendly-fire incident involving the RAF.

There was little doubt that Britain had been humiliated on the international scene. However,
Eden remained defiant. On November 17
th
he said:

We make no apology and will never make one for the actions which we took.

On December 20
th
, in the House of Commons, Eden was asked if he had ever had prior
knowledge of an Israeli attack preceding a British/French one. Eden told the House that he
had not clearly misleading the House on what he actually did know. However, his health
was failing.

British troops started to withdraw on December 23
rd
.

On January 8
th
, 1957, Eden addressed his cabinet for the last time. He gave his reason for
resigning as increasingly poor health. The Queen accepted his resignation on January 9th
and Harold McMillan succeeded him.

In Egypt and in the whole Arab world, Nasser became a hero idolised by millions. He was seen as the
man who had stood up to the imperial ambitions of Britain and France and had defeated them.

MLA Citation/Reference
"The Suez Crisis of 1956". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2006. Web.
Britain and the cold war
The forgotten war
The impact of the cold war on Britain is just beginning to receive serious consideration from historians
Nov 11th 1999 | From the print edition



LADY THATCHER was conspicuous by her absence in Berlin this week. As George Bush, Helmut Kohl and
Mikhail Gorbachev reminisced on a stage together about the fall of the Berlin Wall, the woman who earned the
sobriquet iron lady because of her resolute stance in the cold war remained in Britain. Some said it was because
her presence in Berlin was inappropriate, given her deep misgivings about the unification of Germany. Others
said it was simply a scheduling conflict. But whatever the real cause of the iron lady's absence, it captured the
insousiance with which Britain is commemorating the end of the cold war.
Nobody disputes that the end of the cold war was a defining moment for the United Statesand even more
obviously for Germany and the Soviet Union. But when it comes to Britain there has been strikingly little reflection
about how things changed in 1989. Historians and commentators have tended to regard the cold war as
something that happened somewhere else; and to regard the defining questions for post-war Britain as the loss of
empire, or the endless prevarication about Europe.
But, in fact, it was the cold war, more than any other event, that determined Britain's approach to the post-war
world. Martin Longden of the University of Leeds points out that at the end of the second world war, the new
Labour government was hoping to place Britain at the head of a new European block. Labour's foreign secretary,
Ernest Bevin, told the Foreign Office in August 1945 that Britain's aim was extensive political, economic and
military co-operation throughout Western Europe, with an Anglo-French alliance as a corner-stone.
In this section
Drop by drop
A general theory of spin doctors
The forgotten war
Young toddlers
Loyalty test
Foot off the escalator
Ping pong
Go forth and multiply
Auld lang syne
Reprints
Related topics
Government and politics
Politics
World politics
Political parties
British politics
However, his ambitions were thwarted by increasing tensions between the old wartime allies; Britain and the
United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. The French, with communists in General de
Gaulle's government, were thought politically unreliable. And Britain's dire economic problems undermined its
ability to ensure European security, in the face of what was perceived to be an immediate Soviet threat. So it
became Britain's overriding aim to tie the Americans into Europe. The closeness of Anglo-American military and
intelligence ties, driven by the cold war, became a defining feature of British foreign policyand a source of
tension between Britain and France, which led de Gaulle twice to veto British membership of the then European
Economic Community, on the grounds of Britain's irremediable Atlanticism.
The cold war also had a huge impact on the British economy. David Edgerton, professor of the history of science
at Imperial College, London, is the author of The Rise of the British Warfare State, to be published next year. He
argues that it would be more accurate to describe post-war Britain as a warfare state than as a welfare state.
Despite the creation of the National Health Service, Britain's spending on welfare as a proportion of GDP was
actually low compared with its main European allies, whereas its spending on defence and warfare was the
highest of the big European powers. After the immediate post-war disarmament, Britain began to rearm at a faster
rate than at any time in its peacetime history. Come the early 1950s and the first set-piece cold war confrontation
in Korea, Britain was spending almost 10% of its GDP on defence. Although by the 1980s this figure had halved,
Britain still spent more on defence than any of the NATO allies except America.
Arguably, the rearmament of the early 1950s used up skilled labour and machinery at a crucial time, when Britain
was struggling to recover from the second world war. There was an enormous concentration by government on
defence-related research and development, which crowded out what might otherwise have been more productive
research. Needless to say, several of these weapons programmes were costly flops, such as the Blue Streak
missile and the TSR2 jet, both cancelled in the 1960s. By the early 1960s it was clear that Germany and France
were beginning to pull clear of Britain economically. Could it have been, in part, because they did not have the
defence burden as a drag on their economies?
Harriet Jones, director of the Institute of Contemporary British History, argues that the cold war also had a
profound effect on domestic politics. In the 1951 election, the Tories used posters with the slogan Socialism
leads to Communism against a background of an atomic mushroom cloud. In the 1980s, the Tories again skilfully
exploited Labour's links to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Ms Jones suggests that the cold war
environment was essential to the success of post-war conservatism, and that it was no coincidence that the
Tories fell into disarray in the 1990s, without the glue of anti-communism to hold them together.
Discussing the legacy of the cold war has become a mini-industry in much of the United States and Eastern
Europe. Britain is only just realising thatfor all the concentration on empire and Europefor almost 50 years it
was the cold war which shaped Britain, for good, perhaps, but also probably for ill.
How Significant Was The British Role In The Early Cold War?
An essay looking into the role Britain played in the creation and subsequent continuation of the Cold War
Date: 30/09/2013

Author Information
Uploaded by: Sarah
Uploaded on: 30/09/2013
Subject: History
How significant was the British role in the early Cold War?

The British role in the Cold War has often been overlooked as ever having any importance in what is
primarily described as a bipolar war between America and the Soviet Union. More recently however
historians such as Anne Deighton have looked at the role of Britain and concluded that its role in the Cold
War was a lot more significant than first thought. Some will go further, like John Kent, and say that they had
a big part in actually starting the Cold War. This is hardly surprising seeing as Russia and Britain have a
long history of rivalry. This had initially been based on mutual fears of expansionism but after 1917, this was
combined with ideological differences too. America was relatively new to this rivalry and so Britain took it
upon themselves as being the educator in their Anglo-American relationship. The significance of the British
role during the Cold War can be assessed by seeing how much influence they had on certain key events,
how much they influenced America and finally by whether or not they can be described as initiators of the
aggression at the start of the Cold War. Also when the Cold War started is in itself something that is open to
interpretation as it depends on how you judge it but for the purpose of this essay, the early Cold War years
will be defined as the period directly after the Second World War until the Suez crisis in 1956 as this event
is a good indicator on how significant Britain's role was.

Primarily though it is necessary to look through this historic rivalry between the two powers. They had been
rivals for a long time. A lot of the events and issues between Britain and the Soviet Union during the Cold
War had been issues for them in the early nineteenth century, for example, Britain had to get involved in
Greece twice to counteract Russian power and expansionism just like they had had to in 1944. They had
always been against them ideologically, for example, Britain was against the Holy Alliance in 1815 as
Britain had felt that Russia was standing in the way of liberalism so there was always this hostility and
friction between the two over beliefs. Furthermore the policy of rollback and containment, techniques used
by America during the Cold War, were techniques that Britain had been using initially against Russia for
centuries. It was only in the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 that the British reason for mistrusting Russia
changed slightly as their ideology had but this hostility was still present between them . Communism was a
massive threat to the entire Western world but Churchill was a massive opposer of anything communist and
he often shared this view with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman whenever he could.

Winston Churchill was Prime Minister during the Second World War and even though he had tried for
cooperation with Stalin initially, he still hated communism and would often send messages to Roosevelt
warning him of the perils communism could bring and how Stalin could not be trusted. Rasor argues that it
was in fact Churchill that started the Cold War with his overly aggressive attitude towards the Soviet Union
which was emulated by the new, impressionable President, Harry Truman . Churchill wanted the
intensification of the Anglo-American relationship as he felt this was the best way to combat the Soviet
threat. Through this intensification, Harbutt argues that Churchill was able to inspire the timing of the
reversal of American policy from trying to cooperate with the Soviet Union to being harsher . Churchill was
seen by Truman as being more experienced on European affairs than him. Deighton would argue that
Britain shaped the Cold War and that Churchill was a massive authority with his 1946 'Iron Curtain' speech ,
which it has been stated had a massive influence on the creation of the Truman Doctrine which would
further cement the two camps (Reynolds) .

Churchill's views were not the only ones that were influential in the shaping of the Cold War though. Kent
mentions how Ernest Bevin, Foreign Minister in 1945, unlike Atlee was very concerned with being an
imperial power separate from America and the Soviet Union and that this was motivated by economic
interests. Bevin wanted to keep their influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and it was through
this that tensions between the Soviet Union and Britain grew in 1945 . However, this foreign policy had
failed in many respects as Britain needed money they did not have so their foreign policy had to be tweaked
slightly . Bevin was now more concerned with building up Anglo-American relations, a lot like Churchill was.
This would be significant as Bevin's policy would affect how the Cold War would be carried out. Reynolds
argues that there was a pattern of Britain proposing policies and America carrying them out which obviously
shows how influential Britain was. He says that Bevin's contributions to the Marshall Plan, the Brussels Pact
and NATO were invaluable. It was Bevin who requested that discussions were set up to discuss the
possibility of an Atlantic pact. Furthermore, if Bevin had not partaken in trying to build up Western Europe so
much, Congress in America would not have passed the acts that they did as they needed the evidence that
Europe could help itself before agreeing to support them financially.

There is a strong argument for the idea of it being Britain either developing the idea that led to key events in
the Cold War or at least having a major influence on them. America had always been isolationist but Bevin
saw that American intervention was necessary if they wanted to fight off the Soviet threat. Reynolds comes
up with the argument that America had to get more involved in the Cold War due to Britain contracting
power in a lot of areas that were susceptible to Soviet influence . Even though this does not show how
Britain was actively trying to influence the Cold War, it still shows that they were significant. They did not
have the economy to support all of their sphere of influence. They had to pull out of the Greek Civil War due
to the lack of funds and they could not financially support their zone of divided Germany. America then had
to step in. The Truman Doctrine, and later the Marshall Plan, was introduced to support the Greek fight
against communism and Britain and to combat their financial problems in Germany Britain proposed the
idea of merging the two German zones and creating Bizonia. This would be breaking the Potsdam
Agreement and, combined with the Truman Doctrine, would lead to Stalin being more hostile and exercising
tighter control in his sphere of influence in the East (footnote). Frazier explains his view on this argument by
saying that this contraction of power in Greece was a conscious decision made by Britain in order to secure
American intervention. Frazier says that they were financially in trouble but that they could have managed
to stay in Greece if they had wanted to. They knew America would intervene if Britain pulled out of Greece
and as mentioned, they knew they would need America if they were to successfully fight communism. This
intervention took the form of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and Frazier believes this to be the
first event in the division of the two camps so he is effectively suggesting that it was Britain that started the
Cold War .

There is also the argument that America needed Britain as well. American strength was not enough to beat
the Soviet Union so it was essential to them to cooperate with Britain . Furthermore, America was so far
away from the Soviet Union that they needed a power in the middle to help bridge this gap. Moreover,
America had adopted the policy of defence in depth and so relied on Britain to provide air bases that they
had accumulated across their empire .

Now that the argument for why their role was significant has been outlined, it is necessary to see what other
historians think. Firstly, it has been argued that it was due to Britain that a lot of key events took place, for
example, Bizonia. The problem is that it places too much influence on Britain. Bizonia came into creation
based on more than just British suggestion. American initiative and want for integration in the first place was
just as important and that maybe Britain suggesting it acted as a trigger for its creation. Britain was just a
middle ranking power who depended a lot on America. There is a reason that a lot of historians describe the
war as being a bipolar affair. This is because of the amount of power that America and the Soviet Union had
compared to Britain and the rest of Europe. If they did have any significance, it was because America
allowed them to have it. America introduced a lot of other programmes that perhaps influenced the Cold
War more and they were also happy to exclude Britain when they wanted to, for example the Manhattan
Project and the development of nuclear weapons.

There is one massive event that happened in 1956 that effectively shows how insignificant the British role
was during the Cold War and this was the Suez Crisis. Eden, the Prime Minister at the time, was very
concerned about Nasser's intentions for the Middle East after he had nationalised the canal. Doing this
restricted British access to the Mediterranean Sea and there was the worry that Nasser was acting
alongside Stalin who Eden feared was trying to dislodge the West from the Middle East and gain territory in
Africa . Instead of trying to resolve the issue peacefully, Eden, along with France who were certain that
Nasser was helping the rebels fight for independence in Algeria, wanted to exert force. Eisenhower was
against this idea from the start and remained this way throughout the whole crisis. Eden still wanted to go
ahead with his plan and so held secret meetings and basically colluded against Egypt and America. They
would get Israel to attack Egypt and then Britain and France would have to get involved by occupying the
canal under the pretence that they were trying to separate the two opposing forces . Once Eisenhower
heard about this, he was angry and wanted Eden to explain himself. Eden said that appeasement had not
worked against Hitler and they had had to basically wait until he acted before they could react, he did not
want this to happen again so was acting before it was too late . After calls for peace and continuous
attempts from Eisenhower to convince Eden to call a ceasefire, he had to put pressure on Britain to pull
them out of Egypt. This took various forms, one of them being that he stopped exports of oil entering the
Western hemisphere to make up for the loss they were receiving from the Middle East. This led to Eden
surrendering in Egypt and giving into Eisenhower's wishes straight away .

The Suez Crisis is the best example for a point previously made about how if Britain did have any
significance in the Cold War; it was because America let them. It shows Britain trying to protect their
interests and pretending to be the great world superpower it thought it was but then getting denied this by
America. They wanted to stop expansionism happening from both Nasser and Stalin and affecting their
interests in the Middle East but because America did not agree with their method, they had to stop. They
had no real choice in the matter. Baylis elaborates on this idea by saying that there would be no future for
Britain without close collaboration with America
The British see their role in the Cold War as crucial because without them America would not have got
involved. They are under the impression that US foreign policy after the war did not involve the Soviet Union
but Leffler shows us how this assumption is untrue. America had been against the Soviet Union as well
since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution so it is wrong to assume that it was British rhetoric that brought them
into the Cold War alone.

Another important point to make is the fact that there are not many sources that say that Britain had a key
role in the Cold War and those that do argue this point are British so are bound to have biased opinions that
contrast what the majority of historians say about the origins of the Cold War. Deighton's article, where she
says that Britain carried the same responsibility for starting the Cold War as America and the Soviet Union,
is based on British archives but this does not necessarily mean that what is written is true . Moreover,
Frazier's article which states that Britain deliberately pulled out of Greece in order to bring America into the
war but this is based on nothing more than opinion. There is no real factual evidence to support this and
Frazier himself admits to this. His article is based around a biography written about Bevin which Frazier
admits was based on little fact.

In conclusion, it seems fair to say that Britain did have some role in the shaping of the Cold War but that this
was very minimal. Britain was in very bad times economically and so this led to greater American
involvement which may not necessarily have happened if this had not have been the case. For example, it
is difficult to say if the Truman Doctrine, which is often described as the starting point for the Cold War,
would have happened if Britain had not have pulled out of Greece and Turkey. It does seem to be
reasonable to argue that, when looking at certain events during the early Cold War, Britain did value the
'special relationship' they had with America and that through this they were able to perhaps manipulate what
happened, for example, the creation of Bizonia as this had once again been done to combat Britain's poor
financial circumstances. However, America would not have done anything that they did not agree with or
they saw as beneficial to them as well as the Suez Crisis shows. If anything, it can be debated that America
only intervened in what they did because it protected them and their interests. The creation of Bizonia was
not done just because of Britain, it was done because it would help their economic markets as well. This
conclusion is hardly surprising as America have ever only acted when it has affected them as they have a
history of isolationism.
The Cambridge Spies
By Phillip Knightley
Last updated 2011-02-17

If Communism had not fallen, the full story of four remarkable pro-Soviet spies would perhaps never have been told. Today, however, the
tale can be examined in a clear light, and raises the question of whether the spying game has ever been worth the candle.
On this page
A world of shadows
The early years
Failure to trust
Looking for discrepancies
Dealing with suspicion
Find out more
Print this page
A world of shadows
The hardest and most bitterly fought confrontation between the Soviet Union and the western democracies during the 50 years of the Cold
War was on the espionage front. In this arena the KGB, the 'sword and the shield' of the USSR, pitted its wits against its principal adversaries
- the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).
...all of whom operated in a world of shadows, where deception and betrayal flourished.
The aim of each was to steal the secrets of the other side, to try to peer inside the mind of the enemy, to fathom his intentions, and to
neutralise them before they could be executed. The soldiers in this war were the spymasters, the spies and their agents, all of whom operated
in a world of shadows where deception and betrayal flourished.
KGB headquarters, Moscow During the spy war it was impossible to write authoritatively about it.
The present author once wrote that the truth could not be told 'until the files of the KGB, the CIA and the SIS are all opened to public
scrutiny' - little dreaming that this would ever happen.
But when Communism collapsed and the Cold War ended, this is exactly what did occur, and thus it became possible to tell the story of the
four most remarkable spies of the Cold War, four larger-than-life Englishmen: HAR (Kim) Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and
Anthony Blunt, all of whom betrayed their country to spy for Moscow.
In the new political climate, it became possible to tell the story both from Britain's point of view and through the eyes of the KGB. And from
this tale we can draw some startling conclusions about the nature of espionage and its real value in the modern world.
Top
The early years
Anthony Blunt In the early 1930s, the democratic world appeared to be in trouble. The Great Depression had
caused widespread unemployment. Fascism was on the march in Germany and Italy. To many young students at Cambridge University,
privileged though they were, this was worrying and unacceptable.
Four of them - Philby, Burgess, Maclean and Blunt - wanted to do something about it. They believed that the democracies would prove too
weak to stand up to Hitler and Mussolini, and they knew that many people in Britain did indeed admire these leaders. They also thought that
only the Soviet Union would be powerful enough to defeat Fascism. So, when they were approached by a recruiter from Moscow, the four
young men agreed to serve the KGB.
The KGB believed that recruiting clever people from a respected university was a good game plan, because the chances were that sometime
in the future these young men would be among Britain's rulers and well placed to betray their country's secrets.
This is how it turned out. By the time World War Two was underway, Maclean was climbing the ladder in the Foreign Office, Burgess was
an intimate of prominent politicians, and Blunt was an officer in the Security Service - MI5. Even more astoundingly, Philby was an officer
in the SIS. And all the while they were establishing themselves in these positions, these four men were reporting to Moscow.
Put together, their information should have been of inestimable value to Moscow.
It got better for the KGB. Just before the war ended, Philby was appointed head of the SIS's anti-Soviet section, so that the man who was
charged with running operations against the Russians, was a Russian agent. Blunt, meanwhile, had been on the distribution list for material
from the war's most secret operation, Ultra, decoded German radio traffic.
Then, as the Cold War got under way, Philby became SIS liaison officer with the newly formed CIA in Washington, where Maclean was first
secretary at the British embassy, sitting on a committee that dealt with atomic bomb matters.
Burgess at this time was with the Foreign Office news department. Put together, their information should have been of inestimable value to
Moscow. But the KGB files on these dedicated Soviet agents show a different picture.
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Failure to trust
Guy Burgess Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution, when a British secret service plot nearly brought down the
new Communist government, the KGB had regarded the SIS as the most sophisticated and ingenious of all the capitalist intelligence services,
capable of all sorts of duplicity and convoluted conspiracies.
So although the KGB had recruited four young Englishmen who appeared dedicated to their cause, was it just possible that the SIS had
deliberately placed these men in the path of the Russian recruiter? Was it possible that although the KGB believed that these four agents had
penetrated the British establishment, the very opposite was the case - Philby, Burgess, Maclean and Blunt had instead penetrated the KGB?
And all the while the KGB wasted the agents' valuable time by trying to trip them up...
The KGB files show that a powerful section of the KGB believed that this was the case. Officers argued that it had been all too easy for the
Cambridge ring. Could the British authorities be so stupid to as to allow men of such left-wing backgrounds into positions of trust in the
establishment? How could Philby, who had helped Communists escape from Vienna and had then married a Viennese Communist, get
through the security checks that the SIS must carry out on all those it recruited?
This suspicion tainted the KGB careers of all four. None of them was entirely trusted. None of the important information they sent to
Moscow was accepted at face value, unless it could be confirmed from other sources.
Moscow's spymasters argued that they could not be sure they were not having disinformation deliberately fed to them, with the intention of
misleading the KGB. And all the while the KGB wasted the agents' valuable time by trying to trip them up, trying to prove that their loyalty
really lay with Britain.
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Looking for discrepancies
HAR (Kim) Philby With the Germans at the gates of Moscow in 1941, the KGB bombarded Philby with
orders to write his autobiography yet again, hoping to find in the new version some discrepancy with which to tax him. Even the patient
Philby, who is never known to have once said a bad word about the KGB, to anyone who spoke to him, got fed up.
His controller reported to Moscow: 'We've recently raised the issue with 'S' [Philby] about his submitting a summarising, complete and
detailed autobiography, with notes on all his contacts, all his work with us, the English institutions, and the like. But 'S' says that he doesn't
have the time, that in his opinion, now is the time that attention should be paid primarily to getting information, and not to writing various
biographies. We pointed out the error of his conclusions to 'S'.'
...the KGB concluded that this was evidence that Blunt was... a British plant...
And when Philby was not writing and re-writing reports about himself, the KGB wanted him to find out the names of Soviet citizens who
might have been recruited by the SIS station chief in Moscow. When Philby looked at the SIS files, and reported that the SIS had not
recruited anybody yet, the KGB asked Blunt the same question. When he confirmed Philby's reply, the KGB concluded that this was
evidence that Blunt was, like Philby, a British plant, and the British conspiracy to penetrate was more widespread that the KGB had
imagined.
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Dealing with suspicion
Donald Maclean Once the KGB had convinced itself that the Cambridge spy ring was most likely a British
conspiracy against the Soviet Union it faced a difficult decision. How was it to handle this?
If it cut off all contact with the Cambridge ring and it later turned out that its agents were genuinely loyal to the USSR, then the KGB would
be blamed. Those officers running the Cambridge ring might be accused of sabotage. They might be shot. All right, then, Moscow reasoned,
let's pretend that nothing has happened and do our best to reinforce Philby's conviction that we trust him and his ring completely.
...a dirty bogus business, riddled with deceit, manipulation and betrayal...
And so the game of deceit and double-dealing continued. The Cambridge spies were deceiving their colleagues, their service, their families
and their country. They did this in the sincere belief that they were serving a greater cause, through an elite intelligence service, the KGB,
which fathered and mothered them and appeared to trust them totally. But the KGB, in turn, was deceiving the Englishmen, because it really
believed that they were playing a treble game and were all traitors to the Communist cause.
The conclusion from all this is that the main threat to intelligence agents comes not from the counter-intelligence service of the country in
which they are operating, but from their own centre, their own people.
In a dirty bogus business, riddled with deceit, manipulation and betrayal, an intelligence service maintains it sanity by developing its own
concept of what it believes to be the truth. Those agents who confirm this perceived truth - even if it is wrong - prosper. Those who deny it -
even if they are right - fall under suspicion.
From that moment on, the better that agent's information, the greater the suspicion with which he or she is treated. When other agents offer
confirmation, the suspicion spreads, until the whole corrupt concern collapses, only for a new generation of paranoid personalities to start
afresh.
Knowing this, anyone interested in the spy world should reflect on the moral problems of espionage, and how they might be confronted.
Perhaps one way would to be to consider whether we need intelligence services in the 21st century. They are only a comparatively recent
phenomenon (the SIS dates from 1911, the KGB from 1917, and the CIA from as recently as 1947). It could be that nations have been the
victim of a vast confidence trick to deceive us about the necessity and the value of spies.
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Find out more
Books
The Private Life of Kim Philby 1999 by Rufina Philby (St Ermin's Press)
The Faber Book of Treachery edited by Nigel West (Faber and Faber)
No Other Choice by George Blake (Jonathan Cape, 1990)
The Philby Files by Genrikh Borovik (Little,Brown, 1994)
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About the author
Phillip Knightley is the author of The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist and
Whore (Pimlico) and Philby: KGB Masterspy (Vintage). In 30 years of writing about espionage, he has met just
about every major spy and spymaster from all sides in the espionage wars.
What was the Lusitania and how did it impact the war?
The Lusitania is a British passenger ship that was carrying US weapons on the bottom so Germany
torpedoed it; Germany agrees to stop attacking neutral ships

Why did Germany resume sinking ships in 1917
Germany figures that they will provoke America to join the war, but they assume they will have
defeated the Allies before the US can get involved

What role did the Bolshevik Revolution play in the war
The Bolshevik Revolution was a revolution in Russia that caused Germany to think that they were
going to win because they didn't have to split up their troops between France and Great Britain and
Russia anymore

What was the Zimmerman Telegram
The Zimmerman Telegram was a telegram that Germany sent to Mexico to encourage them to attack
us; Mexico showed it to the US

What was happening on the US's home front during World War One
A draft starts which causes an increase of war protests; there are a lot of Anti-German hate crimes
targeted at German Americans

What are the parts of Wilson's 14 Point Plan
End secret agreements; Freedom of the seas; Free trade (no tariffs); Limit to arms; Peaceful
settlement of colonial disputes; League of Nations

What does the Treaty of Versailles cause
The Treaty of Versailles causes the conditions for World War Two

What is Authoritarian government (include example)
A single person controls the government and every aspect of people's lives (Italy and Mussolini,
USSR and Stalin, etc.)

What is Totalitarian government (include example)
A single party controls the government and every aspect of people's lives (Germany and Nazis, etc.)

What is Democracy (include example)
Any form of government that is by the will of the people (US, France, Great Britain, etc.)

What is Capitalism (include example)
An economic system where production and distribution are privately or corporately owned based on
supply and demand (Italy, etc.)

What is Socialism (include example)
An economic system where production and distribution is owned collectively or by a government and
based on need (USSR, etc.)

What is Communism (include example)
An economic system where there is collective ownership of property and people work for the good of
everyone (early Catholic churches)

What is a mixed economy (include example)
The mixture of two or more forms of economy (US, France, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, etc.)

What "isms" impact the actions of Germany "getting grabby" during World War Two
imperialism- Germany annexes nearby land
nationalism- Hitler claims that they are taking the land because German people lived there

What "isms" impact the actions of Japan "getting uppity" in World War Two
imperialism- Japan invades China and continues through the South Pacific
militarism- they invade China to increase their Navy

Who were the Axis powers in World War Two
Germany, Italy, Japan, and 6 other nations

Who were the Allied powers in World War Two
Britain, France, China, USSR (eventually), US (eventually), and 45 other nations

What is the Lend-Lease Act
allows the sale of materials to any country that the President thinks helping will help us

What is the Atlantic Charter
Roosevelt and Churchill outline their post-war goals (including no land gain, no more imperialism,
and a League of Nations replacement)

How did the US enter World War Two
The bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941

Why do we invade North Africa during World War Two
We adopt "beat Hitler first" policy and are trying to split German troops because Germany controls
most of North Africa

What happens in 1943
Allies invade Italy from African bases and help Italy overthrow Mussolini; the Soviet army pushes
German forces back (brutal winter)

What happened on D-Day
3 million allied troops invade France and, on June 6, take the beach at Normandy

What led to V-E day
April 1945- Germany is collapsing
April 30- Hitler commits suicide
May 7- Germany surrenders
May 8- V-E day

What did we learn at the Battle of Midway
We learned to island hop

What did we do to force Japan to surrender
We warned them to surrender "or else" and dropped leaflets telling people to evacuate before we
dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima (Aug 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (Aug 9, 1945)

Why were the Japanese so determined
They would rather die honorably in battle than go home and disgrace their families; Kamikaze
(divine wind) would crash their planes into base of ships to sink them after they were out of other
options

Who was the Cold War between
The US and their allies and the USSR and their allies

How did the Cold War begin
The Cold War started when we dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki

What are Satellite Nations
Nations dominated politically and economically by a more powerful nation

What was the containment policy
the goal was to keep communism from spreading so we surrounded the communistic countries

What was the Marshall Plan
US gives Europe $12.4 billion to rebuild Europe, we make a lot of money

What was the Berlin Airlift
After the USSR blockaded Berlin the US and GB sent in everything they needed every day for a year

What was the Berlin Wall
A wall put in place by the USSR to keep people from leaving East Berlin

What was the UN
the replacement for the League of Nations

What was NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; designed to help the US set up to defend western Europe from
USSR

What was the Warsaw Pact
USSR set up with satellite nations to counter NATO

What happens in 1949
USSR tests atomic bomb and China becomes communist which causes our containment plan to fail

What happened in the Korean War
North Korea invades South Korea and takes over the country so the US and UN get involved to push
North Korea back and China gets involved to push the US and UN back. Fighting is stalemate until
1952; 2 million Koreans and 54,000 Americans die

What are the three patterns throughout the war
1. Proxi Wars
2. Arms Race
3. Points of suspense where there might be a nuclear war (Cuban Missile Crisis)

What is McCarthyism
Sen. McCarthy claims that the country is infiltrated by "commies" and the US begins to hunt for
"spies"

When does the Cold War end
In 1989, after USSR get a new President, Michel Gorbachav and Russia finally accepts Capitalism,
which does not help their problems