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OKHRANA

The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police


Ben B. Fischer
History Staff Center for the Stuy
of Intelli!ence
Central Intelli!ence A!ency
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Table of Contents
Fore%or
Preface
From Paris to Palo Alto
CIA Interest in the Okhrana Files
Origins of the Okhrana and Its Paris Office
Foreign Operations
Change and Continuity
DramatisPersonae
Conclusions
Articles &y 'Rita T. Kronen&itter'
Paris Okhrana 1885-195
!he Illustrious Career of Arkadiy "arting
!he #herlock "olmes of the $e%olution
Okhrana Agent &olin
!he Okhrana's Female Agents--Part I( $ussian )omen
!he Okhrana's Female Agents--Part II( Indigenous $ecruits
$e%ie* of +d*ard +llis #mith, The Young Stalin, -y "arry .elman
Commentary -y $ita !/ 0ronen-itter
For%ar
Author/Compiler's Note: This is a first in a planned series of thematic collections of articles that
appeared previously in classified editions of the 0ntelligence $ommunity (ournal Studies in
Intelligence, ;hich is published at $03. 3s part of its <openness< policy, $03 has declassified
more than 4,+,, articles from the first ., years of Studies. *e e!pect to compile and publish
more collections of this type that address single intelligence9related themes or topics. *e believe
readers ;ill find these articles interesting, informative, and colorful.
The author=compiler, >en >. ?ischer, ;ould li6e to than6 the follo;ing people for reading an
earlier draft to the 'reface, offering comments and criticisms, and identifying additional sources:
@ay #liver, Robert 'ringle, Aames >ruce, David Thomas, and Aohn DBia6. Than6s are also due to
lena Danielson and $arole )eadenham of the Coover 0nstitution at Stanford University for
ta6ing an interest in this pro(ect and supporting it. Ric6 CernandeB of Stanford University did a
fine (ob ;ith research assistance.
Preface
O(hrana) The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial
Police
From Paris to Palo Alto
!he first si1 articles reprinted -elo* *ere pu-lished in Studies in Intelligence -et*een
1925 and 1923/ !hey descri-e foreign operations of the $ussian Imperial Police,
commonly referred to as the Okhrana, in the late 19th and early 4th centuries/ (1) Also
included are a letter from the author of these articles to Studies in Intelligence and the
-ook re%ie* that prompted the letter, -oth of *hich discuss the still-de-ated issue of
*hether 5osef #talin *as an Okhrana agent/
The 4118 opening of a 'aris office 6no;n as the Zagranichnaia okhranka or agentura *+, ;as a
sign of both success and failure on the part of the tsarist authorities. 0t reflected their success in
having driven many revolutionaries, terrorists, and nationalists out of RussiaD it also underscored
their failure to stem an upsurge in Russian subversive activity based abroad. >y the 411,s, the
Russian emigre community in ?rance had gro;n to some -,,,, people, most of them in the 'aris
area. *-, The $ity of )ight had become the hub for Russian revolutionary groups operating in
much of urope.
The #6hrana's initial assumption99that e!ile in urope rather than Siberia or some other remote
place ;ould act as a safety valve for such groups99proved erroneous. Russian emigrants did not
assimilate quic6ly or easily, and some discovered that relatively greater freedom in the *est gave
them broad opportunities to engage in antiregime activities.
These essays portray not only the officials ;ho ran the #6hrana's foreign bureau, but also the
colorful agents, double agents, and agents provocateurs ;ho ;or6ed for and against it99
sometimes simultaneously. Eany of these characters could have stepped out of the pages of a
$onrad story or a le $arrF novel, but their deeds ;ere real and ;ere recorded in the 'aris officeGs
files, ;hich ;ere hidden a;ay for almost 8, years at the Coover 0nstitution on the campus of
Stanford University.
The story of ho; these files made their ;ay from 'aris to 'alo 3lto is an intriguing tale. *hen
Russian revolutionaries overthre; the 8,,9year9old Romanov dynasty in Earch 4:47, they
quic6ly turned their attention to their foes in the #6hrana. 3 multiparty committee ;as formed to
investigate tsarist secret police offices and practices inside the mpire in St. 'etersburg, Eosco;,
and *arsa;99as ;ell as in 'aris99;ith a vie; to prosecuting police officials of the ousted regime.
The last imperial ambassador to ?rance, >asil Ea6la6ov, closed his mission in 'aris and sealed
its secret files, but he reopened them ;hen the official inquiry began. 3fter the short9lived
'rovisional Government fell to )enin and the >olshevi6s in /ovember 4:47, Ea6la6ov resealed
the files and ;aited for further instructions.
?rance refused to resume relations ;ith the radical ne; government in Eosco;. 0t ;ithheld
recognition until 4:+., ;hen the USSR ;as formed. Ea6la6ov, mean;hile, ;as not idle. Ta6ing
advantage of the confusion in Eosco;, he placed the #6hrana files in si!teen -,,9pound
pac6ing crates, ;hich ;ere then bound ;ith ;ire and sealed.
*hen the >olshevi6s finally got around to as6ing for <their< files in 4:+-, Ea6la6ov99;ho had
codenamed his concealment and removal operation <Tagil< after a Siberian village99s;ore he had
burned them. The files, ho;ever, remained intact and ;ere a;aiting shipment to the Unites
States. The ambassador convinced $hristian Certer, then associated ;ith Cerbert CooverGs
3merican Relief 3dministration and later Secretary of State under 'resident isenho;er, to help.
Certer had a house in 'aris, ;here the crates ;ere stashed, and he later helped get them through
?rench and US customs99;ith seals intact. *.,
0t too6 t;o more years to arrange for the files to be moved from the eastern United States to
$alifornia. Ea6la6ov signed an agreement ;ith the Coover 0nstitution stipulating that the crates
;ould remain sealed until his death and ;ould not be made public for another three months
thereafter. The e!9ambassador no doubt feared retaliation from the >olshevi6sG dreaded
intelligence service, the Cheka, ;hich presumably ;ould have sought to 6ill him if it had
discovered ;hat he had done ;ith the 'aris files.
Ea6la6ovGs contract ;ith the Coover 0nstitution and his longevity99he died in S;itBerland in
4:-7 at age 15996ept the archive under ;raps for more than three decades. The 0nstitution opened
the pac6ing crates at a gathering of reporters and photographers on +1 #ctober 4:-7. */, 0t too6
the privately supported 0nstitution five more years to find funds and assemble a staff to organiBe
and catalogue the files. 3 team headed by Dr. 3ndre; @obal and under the supervision of
Coover assistant director 'rofessor *.S. S;ora6o;s6i began ;or6ing in Aune 4:5+ and finished
in early 4:5.. *0, The archive attracted international scholarly interest, and Life magaBine ran a
feature story about it.
Professor 1.S. S%ora(o%s(i and an unidentified assistant at the oover Institution check
unopened crates containing the !khrana files in "#$%& 'he shipping tag indicates that the crates
(ere stored in )ashington, *C, +efore +eing shipped to California& Courtes, of the oover
Institution&
3ccording to Coover records, the archive contains +,5 bo!es, +5 scrapboo6s, 45.,,,, cards, and
eight linear feet of photographs. The complete archive is available on -,: reels of microfilm. 0t is
a veritable ;hoGs ;ho of the Russian revolution and includes files on and photographs of Stalin,
Eolotov, and Trots6y.
CIA Interest in the O(hrana Files
The author of the si! articles, ;ho used the pseudonym <Rita T. @ronenbitter,< ;rote them at the
request of the $03Gs $ounterintelligence Staff. <@ronenbitter< ;as among the first researchers to
display an interest in the #6hrana files. The articles originally ;ere classified <confidential,<
presumably to avoid revelation of the $03Gs interest in the #6hrana records.
*hy ;as $03 counterintelligence interested in ;hat the Coover 0nstitutionGs press release hailed
as a <mother lode of 6no;ledge on crucial years leading to the overthro; of the Romanovs in
Earch 4:47<H The Coover archive ;as the only comprehensive collection of pre94:47 Russian
police and intelligence files in the *est. During the Soviet era, some specialists vie;ed these
unique files as being of more than historical interest. >ritish espionage historian Richard Deacon
suggested ;hy the #6hrana ;as of interest long after its demise ;hen he ;rote that the Russian
police agency <;as, in fact, a comprehensive, coordinated espionage and counterespionage
organiBation, the most total form of espionage devised in the latter part of the 4:th century and
still forming the +asis of Soviet espionage and counterespionage toda,&< *$, Iemphasis addedJ
$03Gs $ounterintelligence Staff apparently believed these files ;ould yield data on RussiaGs
intelligence <culture< and methods that could provide ne; insights into Eosco;Gs Soviet9era
operations. Some at $03 challenged this notion, claiming that the @G> ;as a qualitatively ne;
organiBation employing a different tradecraft. *2, Kears later, former @G> officers #leg
Gordievs6y and #leg @alugin asserted that the @G> had used #6hrana manuals in training and
lecture courses ;hen they ;ere @G> trainees in the late 4:-,s and early 4:5,s. @alugin claims
that use of #6hrana materials continued into the 4:1,s. *#,
Ori!ins of the O(hrana an Its Paris Office
The #6hrana ;as created in 4114 in response to the assassination of 3le!ander 00. 0ts primary
mission ;as to protect the tsar, the royal family, and the Russian autocracy itself. *"3, #ver time
this evolved into an mpire9;ide campaign against revolutionaries, terrorists, and assorted
national minority groups see6ing independence. Some revolutionaries ;anted the tsarGs headD
others simply ;anted to be free of his iron hand.
The opening in 4118 of the #6hrana's ?oreign >ureau, centered in 'aris, ;as prompted by the
shift of Russian revolutionary activity from the Russian mpire to *estern and $entral urope.
The ne; >ureau occupied t;o modest offices in the Russian 0mperial $onsulate at :7 -ue de
.renelle. /ever very large "see the first reprinted article belo;, entitled, <'aris #6hrana 411-9
4:,-<&, the 'aris bureau nonetheless proved effective. 0t adopted and refined modern police and
detective methods9as ;ell as human intelligence agent operations9to achieve its ob(ectives. *"",
The #6hrana sa; 'aris as the most advantageous place to base its foreign operations. Russian
police officials admired the ?rench internal security service, the S/ret0 .enerale99generally
regarded as among the best in the ;orld99and sought access to its files through both official
liaison and unofficial channels. The #6hrana even hired ?rench, >ritish, and other detectives to
help run its operations. ?rom 'aris, moreover, the #6hrana could monitor its agenturas in >erlin
and other uropean cities. Eost of the 6ey Russian revolutionaries in the ?rench capital had
contacts in other countries and cities. $onsequently, penetrations of revolutionary groups in 'aris
often yielded leads to Russian dissident organiBations and individuals outside ?rance.
The #6hrana's relations ;ith the S/ret0 ;ere symbiotic. The #6hrana reduced the S/ret0 's
;or6load and provided employment for retired ?rench detectives. The ?rench police did not see
the 'aris bureau as a threat to ?rench national interests or to the S/ret0's organiBational equities.
#n the eve of *orld *ar 0 the ?rench security service declared: <0t is impossible, on any
ob(ective assessment, to deny the usefulness of having a Russian police IforceJ operating in
'aris, ;hether officially or not, ;hose presence is to 6eep under surveillance the activities of
Russian revolutionaries.< *"+, 3t the same time, socialist and radical deputies in the ?rench
3ssembly, ;ho ;ere more sympathetic to the Russian revolutionaries than to the police, pressed
the ?rench and Russian Governments to shut do;n the #6hrana office. 0n 4:48 the Russian
regime formally complied by announcing the officeGs closure. >ut this ;as a subterfugeD the
Russian police continued operating under the cover of the Agence 1int et Sam+ain, a private
detective agency. #ne of the t;o proprietors, Cenri >int, ;as a former employee of both the
S/ret0 and the #6hrana. *"-,
Forei!n Operations
The ?oreign >ureauGs operational methods evolved through three distinct phases. 0nitially, the
#6hrana men believed they could 6eep tabs on Russian revolutionaries by hiring local
surveillance teams and e!amining S/ret0 files. This <e4ternal' sur5eillance "in Russian:
naru2hnoe na+ludenie& proved inadequate. ?rench officials ;ere reluctant to share their files, and
?rench detectives hired by the Russians sometimes proved to be more loyal to their former
employer "the S/ret0& than to their ne; paymaster. ven more important, ?rench operatives
could not penetrate the inner cores of Russian revolutionary and terrorist groups. #nly Russian
revolutionaries could.
0n the second phase, the use of <internal< surveillance99penetration of subversive groups by
recruiting agents from among their ran6s or by sending in double agents99mar6ed the #6hrana's
transition from police methods to classic intelligence operations. "The Russians used the term
vnutrenniaia agentura, or <internal agency,< to refer collectively to the agents and double agents
controlled by #6hrana units.&
The #6hrana succeeded in penetrating many anti9tsarist organiBations. 0t acquired agents
throughout Russia and urope. Some of these people spied because they ;ere monarchistsD
others did so because they ;ere romantic adventurers or simply mercenaries. The most
interesting ;ere the agents ;ho began as real revolutionaries, ;ere arrested, and then ;ere
<doubled< or <turned< by the #6hrana. Some responded to #6hrana blandishments because they
feared (ail or e!ile in Siberia99or ;orse99but for others it ;as simply a ne; career opportunity.
Eany ;ho completed their undercover assignments <retired< and then ;ere given good civilian
(obs.
The third method of operation99the use of agents provocateurs--;as the most controversial. The
sub(ect ;as so sensitive that the #6hrana officially denied it had run agents ;ho organiBed and
participated in sanctioned revolutionary acts. "This type of activity ;as the focus of the
'rovisional GovernmentGs 4:47 inquiry into the #6hrana.&
0n its 8.9year e!istence, the #6hrana's 'aris office had only four chiefs, giving it greater stability
and continuity than its headquarters organiBation in St. 'etersburg. 3s a result, the 'aris bureau
also en(oyed considerable autonomy in running its affairs, ;hich included planning and
e!ecuting operations, liaison ;ith local and foreign police departments, agent recruitment and
handling, and evaluation and reporting of information to the #6hrana's elite Special Section "see
belo;&. *".,
The 'aris operatives developed rudimentary tradecraft for meeting and debriefing their agents99
called sekretn,e sotrudniki "secret collaborators& or seksoti for short99in safehouses. 3t its pea6
the 'aris bureau had about ., detectives on its payroll and some 8, agents in 'aris and else;here
in urope. The #6hrana ran a ma(or mail intercept program at home and abroad that yielded
substantial information. /ot for nothing ;as Russia 6no;n as the <gendarme of urope.<
>et;een 4:,5 and 4:4. the police succeeded in crushing popular opposition and penetrating99
and in some cases even controlling99opposition political parties at home and abroad. *"/,
3ccording to one historian, <virtually nothing that related to these parties remained a secret from
the government.< *"0, @ey targets of surveillance and agent operations included:
6migr7 and re%olutionary groups a-road/
$e%olutionaries arri%ing from $ussia/
0no*n centers of conspiratorial acti%ity/
8nderground pu-lishers and forgers 9of passports, false identities, and so forth:/
;om--manufacturing <factories/<
)eapons and e1plosi%es smugglers/
$ussians *ith ties to +uropean socialists and socialist organi=ations/
The #6hrana also provided 20' security for the royal family, other influential persons, and senior
officials traveling abroad. *"$,
The #6hrana's Special Section ;as an elite unit. 0t recruited e!clusively from the Russian army.
Successful candidates ;ere assigned to the armyGs <Separate $orps of Gendarmes.< *"2,
'rospective candidates ;ere carefully screened and ;ell trained. Tradecraft instruction included
agent recruitment and agent handlingD secret ;ritingD <flaps and seals< "surreptitious reading of
correspondence&D reports ;ritingD civil and criminal la;D surveillance and investigative
techniquesD and the history of the Russian revolutionary movement. 3ssisting the officers ;ere
the filier,33detectives or surveillance men, most of ;hom ;ere former army /$#s. *"#,
The #6hrana also ;as capable of devastating blunders. The most notorious e!ample ;as
<>loody Sunday< of ++ Aanuary 4:,-. *hen ?ather George Gapon, an #6hrana agent ;ho had
organiBed a police9sponsored ;or6ersG group, led a demonstration of peasants and ;or6ers to the
*inter 'alace in St. 'etersburg, the .endarmerie, ;ithout the tsarGs authoriBation or advance
6no;ledge, charged the cro;d, 6illing or ;ounding at least 4,, persons. This ;as a seminal
event in the eventual demise of the Romanov dynasty and Russian autocracyD it set in motion the
first revolution of 4:,- and ultimately led to the events of 4:47. *+3,
Chan!e an Continuity
!amination of the #6hrana invites comparison ;ith its Soviet successors from )eninGs Cheka to
StalinGs /@2D to the @G>. There are common threads as ;ell as important differences. The
#6hrana, li6e the Cheka, ;as an internal security and counterintelligence agency par e4cellence&
0ts foreign operations ;ere essentially an e!tension of its domestic security mission. The Soviet
services before *orld *ar 00 focused heavily on actual and putative threats emanating from
FmigrF groups, and ;ell into the $old *ar the @G> and its ast uropean satellite services
continued devoting considerable resources to the same target, even though they had other
priorities.
The #6hrana pioneered many methods that the Soviet successor organs adapted and perfected.
Systematic registration of politically suspect persons ;as accomplished in Eosco; by the turn
of the century and in St. 'etersburg bet;een 4:,5 and 4:,1. *+", Use of internal passports and
mandatory registration of residences started ;ith the #6hrana, not the Soviet intelligence and
security agencies. The #6hrana99li6e its Soviet and /aBi counterparts99relied heavily on agents,
co9optees, and busybodies in the general population to 6eep an eye on things. The organiBation
of rural communities and urban apartment d;ellers by city bloc6s ;as the same in Russia as in
the Soviet Union99(ust more efficient in the latter.
0n addition, the #6hrana33li6e the @G>, the .estapo, and the ast German Stasi33used its
sources to monitor privately e!pressed vie;s and popular moods and to prepare classified studies
of latent popular attitudes that could not be freely voiced. The utiliBation of <blac6 chambers< "an
internationally used term that refers to facilities, often located in post offices, for mail and
message interception, decoding, and decryption& began in Russia and reached its apogee in ast
Germany, ;here the Stasi read virtually all international correspondence and much of the
domestic variety.
>ut the differences bet;een the #6hrana and the later organiBations are stri6ing. 3s one
authority notes, <;hat seems clear it that an unbro6en patrimony bet;een tsarist repression and
Soviet terror cannot be claimed.< *++, *hile secret police organiBations served under tsars and
commissars ali6e as the state security apparatus of the e!ecutive branch99and of the personal ;ill
of the Russian leader of the time99in the tsarist era there ;ere substantial legal, political, and
even ethical constraints. The #6hrana could order summary e!ecutions by hanging or firing
squad, but only in e!traordinary situations such as peasant uprisings and then only after Eosco;
had declared martial la;. 3lthough the #6hrana could deport political prisoners to Siberia, these
and other administrative decisions ;ere sub(ect to (udicial revie;. During the reign of 3le6sandr
00 "41--914& some .,,,, people ;ere detained and interrogated in connection ;ith political
crimes, but fe; ;ere e!ecuted. *+-, ?rom the mid9415,s to the mid941:,s, in fact, only ..
e!ecutions too6 place in Russia, and all ;ere prompted by assassinations or assassination
attempts against members of the royal family or government officials.
>y contrast, on the day after )enin launched the Red Terror in September 4:41, the Cheka
e!ecuted -,, people. *+., During StalinGs rule, the murderous /@2D acted as (udge, (ury, and
e!ecutioner. The Red Terror under Stalin became the Great TerrorD bet;een 4:8- and 4:.4 some
4, million people disappeared into the Gulag and three million ;ere e!ecuted. *+/,
Richard 'ipes noted three restraints on the #6hrana: private property, inefficiency, and the
imperial political eliteGs desire to be seen as culturally <*estern.< *+0, Under the >olshevi6s
these restraints vanished.
The #6hrana never aspired to the territorial and economic empire and e!tensive military and
paramilitary forces commanded by the /@2D. ven the @G>99supposedly a 6inder, gentler
version of the /@2D operating under <socialist legality<99;as more ruthless than its Russian
antecedent. 3 comparison of 3le6sandr 000Gs treatment of )eo Tolstoy and >reBhnevGs handling of
dissidents such as 3le6sandr SolBhenitsyn illustrates the point. /ovelist Tolstoy ;as the best9
6no;n dissident of his day, and the police 6ept him under surveillance and censored his ;or6.
>ut they did not imprison him or prevent him from traveling and publishing abroad. During
StalinGs reign, by contrast, SolBhenitsyn, li6e other dissidents, simply disappeared into the harsh
internal e!ile system that he later dubbed the Gulag 3rchipelago. ven under StalinGs successors,
intellectuals and political activists ;ho dissented99including SolBhenitsyn and 3ndrei Sa6harov99
;ere sub(ected to inhumane treatment considered unacceptable by *estern standards. *+$,
3lthough the #6hrana ;as not as ruthless as the Cheka or the /@2D, in an ironic ;ay it
inspired them. )enin and Stalin seemed to have concluded from their underground years that the
tsarist police ;ere too lenient. *+2, 3fter all, for all its success until 4:4., the #6hrana had not
been able to prevent a small group of radicals from seiBing po;er three years later.
The >olshevi6s also learned ho; easy it had been for the #6hrana to plant agents ;ithin their
inner circle. Dr. Aacob Lhitomirs6y ;as a leading >olshevi6 and )enin confidant before he ;as
discovered. *+#, 3n even more dramatic e!ample ;as the tsarist agent Roman Ealinovs6y99
leader of the >olshevi6 deputies in the fourth state *uma, a central committee member, and
)eninGs chief lieutenant ;hile the latter ;as still in e!ile. *-3, *hen 2ladimir >urtsev finally
convinced )enin that Lhitomirs6y might be a double agent, the >olshevi6 leader ordered
Ealinovs6y to conduct an investigation. *-", Such e!periences ;ere, perhaps, at the root of
>olshevi6 paranoia99the urge to see enemies every;here and eliminate them99that reached its
bloody apogee under Stalin.
The #6hrana's penetration of the >olshevi6 party ;as so e!tensive and so thorough that the
police files constitute the most complete "and only reliable& record of the conspiratorial partyGs
early history, internal organiBation, membership, and deliberations99an unintentional contribution
to future historians. *-+, This ;as not the only unintended consequence. >y penetrating the
radical groups, the tsarist police ;ere using a classic divide9and9conquer tactic to prevent
formation of a unified opposition. 0ronically, this tactic ;as most successful in preventing the
emergence of an open opposition party ;ith a mass base, and thus it helped to create an
environment in ;hich )eninGs small monolithic party of professional revolutionaries could
flourish.
The #6hrana targeted liberals and revolutionaries ali6e, seeing both groups as threats to the
Russian autocracy. >ut the t;o groups dre; different lessons from their persecution at the hands
of the tsarist police. *hen the 'rovisional Government came to po;er, it convened a special
commission to investigate the organiBation, operations, and methods of the tsarist police99not to
emulate them, but to correct past abuses and prevent their repetition. *--, )enin and the
>olshevi6s also studied the #6hrana, and so did @G> recruits decades later, to learn from and
improve on the tsarist policeGs repressive methods.
Dramatis Personae
Agent provocateur is a ?rench term, but the Russians perfected the art. 0n fact, the primary
purpose of the ?oreign >ureauGs provocations ;as to scare the ?rench into ta6ing action against
Russian radicals and cooperating ;ith the #6hrana. The most notorious provocation occurred in
'aris in 41:,, ;hen 3r6adiy Carting "a.6.a. 3braham Ge6elGman or )andeBen& organiBed a ;ell9
armed team of bombthro;ers and then betrayed them to the 'aris police. These heavily
publiciBed arrests helped persuade the ?rench public of the dangers posed by Russian
revolutionaries in ?rance. The episode also convinced officials in St. 'etersburg that republican
?rance could get tough on Russian radicals and ma6e a good ally. To some e!tent, at least, this
helped diminish mutual suspicions and created an atmosphere on both sides conducive to
negotiation of the ?ranco9Russian alliance of 41:4.
6laimir Burtse57 leading counterespionage specialist in the -ussian revolutionar, opposition
to the tsarist government& Courtes, of the oover Institution&
Carting may be the most interesting character in the essays "see the second reprinted article
belo;, entitled <The 0llustrious $areer of 3r6adiy Carting<&. Ce rose from informer to master
spy to spymaster, eventually becoming chief of the 'aris office. 3s noted above, his top agent,
Lhitomirs6y, penetrated )eninGs inner circle during the >olshevi6 partyGs underground days.
>efore he quit the espionage business in 4:,: follo;ing his e!posure by the ?rench press as a
Russian spy, Carting had served tsarist Russia, imperial Germany, and republican ?rance,
receiving decorations from all three.
Carting met his match in 2ladimir >urtsev "see the third reprinted article, entitled <The Sherloc6
Colmes of the Revolution<&. >urtsev ;as a revolutionary by profession but a counterespionage
e!pert by talent. Ce organiBed ;hat in effect ;as a highly professional counterespionage bureau
for Russian radicals. 0n 4:,: >urtsev personally unmas6ed a ma(or #6hrana agent, vno 3Bef.
3lso in 4:,:, after years of relentless effort, >urtsev succeeded in proving that a terrorist 6no;n
as <)andesen<, ;ho had escaped from the ?rench police in 41:,, actually ;as Carting. This ;as
lea6ed to the press, prompting Carting to flee to >russels, ;here he ;ent into hiding and ;as
never heard from again. *-.,
CartingGs case officer ;as 'yotr Rach6ovs6y, probably the ablest head of the #6hranaGs ?oreign
>ureau. Rach6ovs6y ;as a pioneer. Ce refined the art of ;hat ;e today call active measures or
perceptions management techniques. Ce paid subsidies to (ournalists ;illing to ;rite articles
favorable to Russian interests, and he purchased or subsidiBed such periodicals as -evue -usse
and Le Courier 5ranco3-usse. During his tenure "411.94:,+&, (ournalists on the #6hrana payroll
began planting articles in the ?rench press that ;ere favorable to Russian interests. Rach6ovs6y
also created the Ligue pour le Salut de la 6atrie -usse, ;hich promoted positive vie;s to;ard
Russia among ?rench citiBensD this group ;as a forerunner of Soviet front organiBations and
<friendship societies.<
3ccording to one authority, Rach6ovs6y ;as a <born intriguer< ;ho <delighted< in forging
documents. Ce allegedly ;as among those responsible for the anti9Semitic 6rotocols of the
7lders of Zion, perhaps the most infamous political forgery of the +,th century. *-/,
Rach6ovs6yGs tactic of e!ploiting anti9Semitism for political purposes ;as used repeatedly
during the Soviet era99for e!ample, in Cungary in 4:-5, in $Bechoslova6ia in 4:51, and in
'oland in the 4:1,s. Such scapegoating also ;as evident in the so9called <Doctors 'lot< in the
early 4:-,s, ;hen a group of Ae;ish doctors ;as accused of plotting to 6ill Stalin and other
Soviet leaders.
Rach6ovs6y ;as a model for subsequent Soviet practice in another regard. Ce ;as an advocate
of ?ranco9Russian rapprochement and served as the tsarGs personal emissary in secret
negotiations leading to the Dual 3lliance of 41:49:. and its modification in 41::.
The practice of using foreign intelligence officers on sensitive international assignments,
bypassing the foreign ministry and regular diplomatic channels, ;as a standard Soviet modus
operandi. Stalin used his head of foreign intelligence, 2ladimir De6anoBov, to set the stage for
his pre9*orld *ar 00 alliance ;ith Citler. )ater, @hrushchev relied on a @G> officer under
(ournalistic cover to establish a direct lin6 to the @ennedy *hite Couse. 3fter this emissary
discredited himself by lying to the @ennedy brothers about the presence of Soviet missiles in
$uba, @hrushchev turned to the @G> resident to open another channel to the *hite Couse
through 3>$ ne;sman Aohn ScaliD proposals that ;ere floated through this channel eventually
resolved the #ctober 4:5+ missile crisis. 0n 4:5: >reBhnev and 3ndropov assigned t;o senior
@G> German e!perts to open a bac6 channel to the ne; Social Democratic9led coalition
government in >onn. *-0, The result ;as secret negotiation of a series of bilateral and
multilateral agreements that transformed Soviet relations ;ith *est Germany and the rest of
urope.
2entsion Eoiseev9Eosh6ov Dolin ;as a classic double agent. "Running double agents has long
been a quintessentially Russian s6ill, practiced before, during, and after the Soviet period.& Dolin
began his career as an #6hrana penetration of anarcho9communist groups "see the fourth
reprinted article, <#6hrana 3gent Dolin<&. #n the eve of *orld *ar 0 he began ;or6ing for
German military intelligence99or so the Germans thought. Ce ;as in fact a double agent ;ho had
remained loyal to Russia. *ith help from the #6hrana, Dolin organiBed <successful< sabotage
operations inside Russian ;eapons and munitions factories99operations that ;ere <documented<
in press articles.
The Germans ;ere so pleased ;ith Dolin that they as6ed him to conduct psychological ;arfare
operations aimed at stirring up Russian ;or6ers to overthro; the monarchy and ta6e Russia out
of the ;ar. <@ronenbitter< neglects to mention that ;hen DolinGs efforts fell short of
e!pectations, the Germans turned to another Russian agent on their payroll by the name of
2ladimir )enin. Ce ;as more successful, and the rest, as they say, is history.
The #6hrana ;as, in a limited sense, ahead of its time as an equal opportunity employer. 0t
recruited people of all nationalities9and especially ;omen9as agents. *-$, *omen, in fact, ;ere
crucial to its operations and ;ere paid as ;ell or better than their male counterparts "see the fifth
and si!th reprinted articles99<The #6hrana's ?emale 3gents,< 'arts 0 and 00&. *omen, ho;ever,
;ere not permitted to become staff officers or managers9only agents.
The ;omen ;ere at least as colorful as the men99maybe more so. #ne e!ample ;as <?rancesco,<
the ;ife of a respected Eosco; physician. *hile a student at Eosco; University, she made
three vo;s: to love her husband, to help 6ill the tsar, and to ;or6 for the #6hrana. #nly the last
promise ;as 6ept.
3nother interesting female operative ;as 6no;n only as La 6etite. 3s a 489year9old mil6maid,
she spied for 'olish nationalists ;hile delivering mil6 to the #6hrana office in *arsa;. Cer
target: office trash cans that sometimes contained copies of secret messages and names of
informants in 'oland. During *orld *ar 0 she ;or6ed for the Russians against the 3ustro9
Cungarian mpire, posing as an 3ustrian citiBen. 3fter the ;ar she retired to Eonte $arlo, ;here
she ;as 6no;n as L'3utrichienne.
Conclusions
The @ronenbitter collection reveals the #6hrana's foreign operations through anecdote, not
analysis. The articles are entertaining and yet still inform in a loosely structured ;ay. ?or
historians they suggest possibilities for more in9depth studies of Russian intelligence and
counterintelligence operations in their formative period. *-2, ?or observers of the contemporary
scene they give insight into the apparent parado! of the <ne;< Russia, ;hich, recent events have
demonstrated, still gives high priority to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
The Soviet Union and the $ommunist 'arty and even the @G> are gone, but Russia <retains a
strong intelligence profile and a traditional intelligence culture that are distinct from and even
alien to our o;n.< *-#, Ea(or9po;er espionage and counterespionage today have a less
ideological rationale than during the $old *ar, but the Russians do set forth a (ustification,
couched in terms of vital national interests and security. The #6hrana story illustrates ;hat
history, even narrative history that is not primarily analytical, can offer99namely, events and
insights from the past that have implications for the present and the future.
The vie;s e!pressed in this 'reface are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the
vie;s of the $entral 0ntelligence 3gency or any other US Government entity.
*", Russian contemporaries as ;ell as present9day historians have used the term #6hranato refer
generically to the Einistry of 0nteriorGs Department of State 'olice, ;hich ;as created in 411,
and renamed Department of 'olice in 4118. Strictly spea6ing, ho;ever, the term referred
specifically to the security detail assigned to the tsar and the royal family.
The Department of 'olice included a unit 6no;n as the Special Section "!so+, !tdel or ##&,
;hich dealt ;ith political crimes and sensitive investigations. The ## ;as a clandestine service,
organiBationally and physically separate from the regular police apparatus, but located on the
fifth floor of the police headquarters at 45 ?ontan6a Muai, St. 'etersburg. The ## formally
commanded so9called okhranoe otdelenie or security sections from ;hich the colloquial term
#6hrana;as derived, although in practice the subordinate units ;ere more or less independent.
"?ull title: otdelenie po okhraneniiu o+shchestvennoi +e2opastnosti i poriadka, or section for
maintaining public security and order.& The first three security sections ;ere created in St.
'etersburg, Eosco;, and *arsa;. >y 4:44 there ;ere 7- sections at the provincial, city, and
oblast levels. See llis Tennant Ipseudonym of d;ard llis SmithJ, comp. and ed., <The
Department of 'olice 4:4494:48 from the Recollections of /i6olai 2ladimirovich 2eselago,< in
d;ard llis Smith $ollection, bo! 4, Coover 0nstitution 3rchives passimD ?rederic S.
Luc6erman, <2ladimir >urtsev and the Tsarist 'olitical 'olice,< 8ournal of Contemporar,
istor,, 2ol. 4+ "Aanuary 4:77&, p. +4-n44 and 'he 'sarist Secret 6olice in -ussian Societ,,
"99:3"#"% "/e; Kor6 University 'ress, /e; Kor6, 4::5&, p. !ivD George )eggett, 'he Cheka:
Lenin's 6olitical 6olice "/e; Kor6: #!ford University 'ress, 4:14&, p. !!iiiD $hristopher
3ndre; and #leg Gordievs6y, ;.1: 'he Inside Stor, of Its 5oreign !perations from Lenin to
.or+achev "/e; Kor6: Carper9$ollins6u+lishers, 4::,&, pp. +, ffD and Richard 'ipes, -ussia
<nder the !ld -egime "/e; Kor6: $ollier >oo6s=Eacmillan 'ublishing $ompany, 4::.&, p.
8,4.
*+, The term #6hran6a, ;hich ;as sometimes used interchangeably ;ith #6hrana, ;as
frequently used to refer to the 'aris office. The term agentura means agency or bureau, but it
also referred to an agent net;or6. Zagranichnaia means <foreign.< See d;ard llis Smith ;ith
Rudolf )ednic6y, ='he !khrana=: 'he -ussian *epartment of 6olice: A 1i+liograph, "Stanford,
$3: The Coover 0nstitution on *ar, Revolution and 'eace, 4:57&, p. +54. There ;ere t;o
foreign bureaus99the other one ;as in >ucharest99and both had satellite offices. The 'aris office,
for e!ample, oversa; a subordinate unit in >erlin. Together the 'aris and >ucharest offices ran
all tsarist police and intelligence operations ;orld;ide.
*-, Ronald Cingley, 'he -ussian Secret 6olice: >uscovite, Imperial, and Soviet 6olitical
Securit, !perations "/e; Kor6: Simon N Schuster, 4:7,&, p. 7+.
*., CerterGs role is being divulged here for the first time. 0n 4:-7 Certer ;as 3cting Secretary of
State, and the Coover 0nstitution thought it best not to reveal his role.
*/, Stanford University /e;s Service, #ctober 8,, 4:-7 in Coover 0nstitution Records, bo!
47:3D 3rchives Sub(ect ?ile 3,4, folder: #6hrana 'ro(ect 4:5+. See also <$Barist Dossiers on
Reds #pened,< Ne( ?ork 'imes, #ctober 8,, 4:-7, p. 4,.
*0, Draft press release in Coover 0nstitution Records, bo! 47:3, 3rchives Sub(ect ?ile 3,4,
folder: #6hrana 'ro(ect 4:5+.
*$, Richard Deacon, A istor, of the -ussian Secret Service ")ondon: ?rederic6 Euller )td.,
4:7+&, p. 15.
*2, During Aames Aesus 3ngletonGs tenure from 4:-. to 4:7-, the $03Gs $ounterintelligence Staff
regularly studied historical cases of Soviet intelligence operations, loo6ing for insights into
contemporary operations and methods. $ritics complained that 3ngletonGs staff ;asted time and
resources ree!amining cases such as the 'rest "Trust& deception operation of the 4:+,s and the
-ote ;apelle "Red #rchestra& espionage net;or6 of the *orld *ar 00 era. They argued that the
@G>99created in 4:-.99;as an entirely ne; organiBation ;ith ne; missions and tradecraft. See
Tom Eangold, Cold )arrior: 8ames 8esus Angleton: 'he CIA's >aster Sp, unter "/e; Kor6:
Simon N Schuster, 4::4&, pp. 5,954, 8+.98+-, 88, passim. The same critics presumably ;ould
have been even more critical of studies of the pre9Soviet #6hrana. 0n fact, ho;ever, the historical
literature on Russian and Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence is not particularly rich and
in some cases is not reliable, so even <historical< studies ;ere ;elcome to the counterintelligence
specialists.
*#, See 3ndre; and Gordievs6y, ;.1, p. ++ and #leg @alugin, @id s Lu+ianki: =*elo= 1,vshego
.enerala ;.1 "Eosco;: /eBavisimoe 0BdatelGstvo, 4::,&, p. 8-, as cited in #rlando ?iges, A
6eople's 'raged,: A istor, of the -ussian -evolution "/e; Kor6: 2i6ing, 4::5&, p. 5.-n. 0n an
nglish9language memoir, #leg @alugin notes that his training class read a detailed account of
agent recruitment methods prepared by /icholas 00Gs chief of counterintelligence. See #leg
@alugin ;ith ?en Eontaigne, 'he 5irst *irectorate: >, AB ?ears in Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Against the )est "/e; Kor6: St. EartinGs 'ress, 4::.&, p. 47.
*"3, $reation of the #6hrana mar6ed the emergence of the modern secret or political police
apparatus. 0ts predecessor, the Third Section, ;as more in the tradition of a praetorian or palace
guard aimed at th;arting plots and intrigues against the tsars by Russian aristocrats and nobles,
especially at court and in the military. The #6hrana's main mission ;as dealing ;ith the rise of
the revolutionary intelligentsia in the latter part of the 4:th century. See Richard A. Aohnson,
=Zagranichnaia Agentura: The Tsarist 'olitical 'olice in urope,< in Contemporar, istor,, 2ol.
7 "Aanuary93pril 4:7+&, p. +++.
*"", There is no comprehensive history of the #6hrana's foreign operations. ?or a list of boo6s
and articles that describe its organiBation and methods, see Smith, =The #6hrana=, pp. 5-957 and
+8,9+.+.
*"+, $ited in 3ndre; and Gordievs6y, ;.1, pp. +89+..
*"-, I+id., p. +..
*"., Aohnson, <Zagranichaia Agentura,< p. ++5.
*"/, D.$. >. )ieven, <The Security 'olice, $ivil Rights, and the ?ate of the Russian mpire,
41--94:47,< in #lga $risp and )inda dmondson, eds., Civil -ights in Imperial -ussia
"$larendon 'ress: #!ford, 4:1:&, p. +.5. Cingley claims that by 4:,: the #6hranahad 4-,
agents inside the Socialist Revolutionary, >olshevi6, and Eenshevi6 socialist parties and even in
the less9threatening liberal @adet party. Cingley, 'he -ussian Secret 6olice, p. 4,,.
*"0, )ieven, <The Security 'olice, $ivil Rights, and the ?ate of the Russian mpire, 41--94:47,<
p. +.7.
*"$, Aohnson, <Zagranichaia Agentura,< p. +8+.
*"2, Soldiers ;ere considered reliable because they had s;orn allegiance to the tsar.
*"#, Tennant, <The Department of 'olice 4:4494:48 from the Recollections of /i6olai
2alidimirovich 2eselago,< p. 41.
*+3, 3s a result of >loody Sunday, the tsar did not appear in public again until 4:48, the
tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty. 0n the months follo;ing the incident in St. 'etersburg, the
entire country, already suffering the strains of a losing ;ar ;ith Aapan, e!perienced uprisings and
revolts by ;or6ers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors. #ne result ;as the creation of the State Duma,
;hich convened in 4:,5, but by and large political and social reforms ;ere too little and too late.
ven though /icholas 00 did not authoriBe the police crac6do;n, >loody Sunday helped destroy
the centuries9old peasant image of the tsar as the godfather and savior of Russia. GaponGs
demonstrators had gathered for the time9honored tradition of petitioning the tsar for relief from
their manifold problems. See ?iges, A 6eople's 'raged,, pp. 894-.
*+", )ieven, <The Security 'olice, $ivil Rights, and the ?ate of the Russian mpire, 41--94:47,<
p. +.7.
*++, Aohn A. DBia6, Chekist,: A istor, of the ;.1 ")e!ington, E3: )e!ington >oo6s=D.$.
Ceath and $ompany, 4:11&, p. 84.
*+-, 'ipes, -ussia under the !ld -egime, p. 84-.
*+., I+id., p. 847.
*+/, Aohn $hannon ;ith Rob Cudson, 'he 6enguin Atlas of -ussia ")ondon: 'enguin, 4::-&, p.
448.
*+0, 'ipes, -ussia under the !ld -egime, p. 84+.
*+$, During the late 4:5,s and 4:7,s the Soviet politburo and the @G>, led by Kuri 3ndropov,
;aged a campaign of terror, repression, and disinformation against SolBhenitsyn. #ne e!ample:
the @G> detained and so brutally interrogated one of the authorGs typists, liBaveta
2oronyans6aya, that she bro6e do;n and divulged ;here a copy of 'he .ulag Archipelago ;as
hidden. 0n despair, she committed suicide. She ;as secretly buried to cover up the @G>Gs crime.
DoBens of official documents on the anti9SolBhenitsyn campaign ;ere translated and edited in
Eichael Scammell, ed., 'he Sol2henits,n 5iles: Secret Soviet *ocuments -eveal !ne >an's
5ight Against the >onolith "$hicago: edition q, inc., 4::-&.
*+2, ?iges argues that the #6hrana's mistreatment of imprisoned revolutionaries brutaliBed them
and ;hetted their appetite for revenge once the political tables ;ere turned. <#ne can dra; a
straight line from the penal rigors of the tsarist regime to the terrorism of the revolutionaries and
indeed to the police state of the >olshevi6s.< A 6eople's 'raged,, p. 4+.. There may be some
truth to this, but the >olshevi6s, in quic6ly creating a police apparatus of their o;n, seemed
motivated more by a desire to maintain po;er than by any quest for revenge against their former
tormentors.
*+#, Cistorian >ertram D. *olfe claims that Carting and Lhitomirs6y ;ere one and the same, but
the latter ;as actually the formerGs agent. >ertram D. *olfe, 'hree )ho >ade a -evolution: A
1iographical istor, ">oston: >eacon Cill 'ress, 4:--&, p. -85.
*-3, 0bid., pp -8-9--7
*-", DBia6, Chekist,, p. -.
*-+, )eggett ;rites: <The e!tent of the #6hrana's penetration of the >olshevi6 'arty ;as such
that not only ;as it minutely informed about the membership, structure, and activities of the
party "one of the best sources of the pre94:47 >olshevi6 'arty history is a collection of Eosco;
#6hrana documents&, but it ;as also in a position to influence >olshevi6 tactics.< "'he Cheka, p.
!!iv.&
*--, Tennant, <The Department of 'olice 4:44 9 4:48 from <Recollections of /i6olai
2ladimirovich 2eselago,< p. 1.
*-., ?or more on >urtsevGs e!ploits against the #6hrana, ;hich for a time almost leveled the
playing field for the revolutionaries, see Luc6erman, <2ladimir >urtsev and the Tsarist 'olitical
'olice,< pp. 4:89+4:.
*-/, /orman $ohn, )arrant for .enocide: 'he >,th of the 8e(ish )orld Conspirac, and the
6rotocols of the 7lders of Zion "/e; Kor6: Carper and Ro;, 4:57&, pp. 1,914.
*-0, See 2yacheslav @evor6ov, 'he Secret Channel: >osco(, the ;.1 and 1onn's 7astern
6olic, Iin GermanJ ">erlin: Ro;ohlt, 4::-&.
*-$, 3nna Geifman notes that as the turn of the century approached, ;omen, especially those
from upper9 and middle9class bac6grounds, became involved in underground politics and even in
e!tremist acts: <3s a result of rapidly changing family relations and the spread of literacy, self9
assertive girls and young ;omen could no longer be confined to the home. 3t the same time,
ho;ever, they ;ere denied higher education, along ;ith any role in the political process, and in
general ;ere offered little opportunity to realiBe their intellectual ambitions. This drove a number
of them into the ran6s of the radical outcasts, ;here their male comrades ;ere ;illing to give
them greater recognition than could reasonably be e!pected ;ithin the traditional establishment. .
. .To a large e!tent, this accounts for the fact that ;omen comprised nearly one9third of the SR
ISocialist RevolutionaryJ $ombat #rganiBation, and appro4imatel, one3fourth of all -ussian
terrorists at the +eginning of the centur,.< Iemphasis addedJ 3nna Geifman, 'hou Shalt ;ill:
-evolutionar, 'errorism in -ussia, "9#C3"#"% "'rinceton: 'rinceton University 'ress, 4::5&, p.
4+. This involvement also made ;omen natural targets of police surveillance and recruitment.
*-2, ?or an e!ample of solid scholarship based in part on the #6hrana $ollection at the Coover
0nstitution, see GeifmanGs boo6 cited in the previous footnote.
*-#, Aames Sherr, <$ultures of Spying,< 'he National Interest, /o. 81 "*inter 4::.=:-&, p. 5,.

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