Darahman bin Ibrahim & Ors v Majlis Mesyurat Kerajaan Negeri Perlis & Ors

CITATION: [2008] 4 MLJ 309

COURT: Court of Appeal
LOCATION: Lubuk Sireh, Perlis
CASE SUMMARY:
The appellants were displaced from their respective village and resettled in Lubuk Sireh, Perlis as a
result of the decision of Kerajaan Negeri Perlis (the 2
nd
respondent) to build the Timah Tasoh dam
project. Pursuant to Land Acquistion Act 1960, the appellants were promised a plot of land each at
Lubuk Sireh and also participation in the FELCRA (the 3
rd
respondent) agricultural scheme as
compensation. However, later in 2000, the appellants were informed via letter that they were no
longer members of the Koperasi Peserta-Peserta Rancangan FELCRA Lubuk Sireh. Pf contended that
they have been promised participation in the FELCRA scheme as consideration for them moving to
Lubuk Sireh, and they have been accepted and recognised as participants as well. The court held the
decision by FELCRA to terminate Aps membership was void due to the violation of natural justice
and the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been established.
ANALYSIS:
With all respect, I do not see this case being related much to the land acquisition issue per se. At
most, it is related to it only with regards to the award of compensation has indeed been granted as
the appellants did received a plot of land for the loss of land, pursuant to LAA 1960. The decision
was mainly on the participation issue, which is related to the doctrine of legitimate expectation and
natural justice under administrative law. Although one can argue the promise of participation was
part of the compensation under LAA, but the court did not decide on the issue based on LAA. Thus,
this case will not be much of relevance in discussing land acquisition.

Jalang anak Paran & Anor v Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor

CITATION: [2007] 1 MLJ 412
COURT: High Court (Kuching)
LOCATION: Ulu Batang Tatau, Bintulu
YEAR: 2006 (The direction was issued in 1997, it took a long time to reach the court, hmm)
CASE SUMMARY: The plaintiffs native customary rights were extinguished by th 1
st
defendant
thorugh the minister in a direction dated February 1997. The plaintiffs thus challenged the
constitutionality of the said direction, based on the grounds that enabling section of the Land Code
Cap 81 for the direction are invalid as it infringe the Federal Constitution.
HELD:
1. Native customary rights can be taken away by laws, provided that the language of the
provisions are clear and unambiguous and also compensation is paid. Since the enabling
sections, which are s5(3) and (4) of the Land Code provides for payment of compensation, it
cannot be attacked for being unconstitutional as it has complied with the requirement of
compensation pursuant to article 13(2) of FC.
2. One can imply that a minister is under a duty to disclose the reason of the extinguishment of
the NCR and failure to do so would be a breach of statutory duty on the part of the minister.
3. By referring to the use of a Mill Site at the land, he has complied with that duty. There is
no necessity to state that the Mill Site is for public purpose. Whether or not the intended
purpose is a public purpose is subject to challenge in courts by Pf.
The court also stated that the Land Code empowers the minister to form his opinion on what is
pubic purpose and the PF need to show evidence of abuse of powers or bad faith to impugn
that opinion. The court dismissed the Pfs claim.
ANALYSIS:
In relation to native customary rights, it is arguable that the compensation afforded is not adequate
as the nature of NCR is different from those of ordinary lands. The unique aspect of NCR is the
natives depended on the land as it is their living place and also their livelihood. This must be
extinguished from ordinary landowner in this sense. Thus, it is submitted with respect that the
compensation of acquisition of NCR need to be assessed in a different way, or in most cases, it is
inadequate. On the other hand, while the court decided that the minister has a duty to disclose the
reason for the extinguishment, the fact that he still have discretion to decided what is public
purpose is indeed worrisome However, as held by the court, in the event of any abuse, the affected
person can challenge it in the court. This showed that in land acquisition matters, in arguing whether
the acquisition is for public purpose, one can challenge it in court by bringing sufficient evidence.

Joint Management Body of Gurney Park Condominium v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau
Pinang

CITATION: [2013] 10 MLJ 600
COURT: Appeal Board (Pulau Pinang)
LOCATION: Persiaran Gurney, Penang
CASE SUMMARY:
(A/N: There was no issue of land acquisition at all, in fact, the phrase Land Acqusition only appears
as the member of the Appeal Board tried to explain how the statutory interpretation works in this
case. So, I skipped the case summary and analysis of this case. The relevant passage is as quoted
below.)
An enabling provision conferring rights may of course qualify the same by removing some of the
rights in given circumstances. In order to do so, however, clear language must be used, short of
which it should not invite a construction that rights are both conferred and partly removed in the
same breath. As an illustration, a prohibitory intention that is derived from the use of clear language
can be found in s 38(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, which states that every application under
subsection (1) shall state fully the grounds on which objection to the award is taken, and at any
hearing in Court no other grounds shall be given in argument, without leave of the Court. That
would be how a legislative intention of prohibition is conveyed;


Syed Hussain bin Syed Junid & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Negeri Perlis and another
appeal

CITATION: [2013] 6 MLJ 626
COURT: Federal Court
LOCATION: Sungai Adam, Perlis.
YEAR: 2013
CASE SUMMARY:
The appellants (co-owners of three lots of land) were unhappy with the amount of compensation
that was awarded to them pursuant to the acquisition of their land, which happened in year 2004.
Thus, the appellants required the Land Administrator to refer the matter to the High Court. After the
High Court decided on the compensation, the appellants, still unsatisfied with the additional
compensation, appealed to the Court of Appeal, where their appeal was dismissed. While filing their
appeal to the Federal Court, the appellants applied for leave to appeal but later argued the appeal
hearing for the leave is not required under s49(1) of LAA.
HELD:
Pursuant to s49(10, the appellants need not to apply for leave to appeal. However, whilst s 49(1) of
the Act allowed any interested person to appeal against a decision of the High Court to the Court of
Appeal, s 40D restricted the ambit of such an appeal. Under s 40D(3), any decision as to the amount
of compensation awarded shall be final and there shall be no further appeal to a higher court on the
matter. This non-appealable provision of s 40D(3) was further reinforced by the proviso to s 49(1)
which read: 'Provided that where the decision comprises an award of compensation there shall be
no appeal therefrom'. From this it was very clear that Parliament intended to preclude any party
from appealing against an order of compensation made by the High Court.
ANALYSIS:
This recent decision from the Federal Court showed that when the High Court has decided on the
issue of compensation, it is final and no longer appealable. In my opinion, this point has both pros
and cons. The merit is since land acquisition is for public purpose, thus it makes sense that any
further legal dispute should not be extended or the proposed development may be delayed.
Moreover, since both government and private assessors are available at the hearing in High Court, it
is sufficient to say that the compensation that was awarded by the High Court is adequate and was
assessed in a proper way. However, the prohibition of further appeal may result in unjust decision as
well, as compensation issue is indeed very important. This is due to the fact that by acquiring a land,
the state is depriving someone from his own property, thus measures need to be taken to ensure
the owner did receive the compensation he rightfully deserved.