EN BANC

[G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990.]

NEPTALI A. GONZALE, ERNETO !. !ACE"A,
ALBERTO G. RO!#LO, $E$ERON T. AL%AREZ,
E"GAR"O &. ANGARA, AGAPITO A. A'#INO, TEO(ITO
T. G#INGONA, &R., ERNETO (. $ERRERA, &OE ".
LINA, &R., &O$N O!E)A, %ICENTE T. PATERNO, RENE
A. AG#IAG, LETICIA RA!O*$A$ANI, !A!INTAL
AB"#L &. TA!ANO, +IGBERTO E. TA)A"A, &O%ITO R.
ALONGA, ORLAN"O . !ERCA"O, &#AN PONCE
ENRILE, &OEP$ ETRA"A, OTERO LA#REL,
A'#ILINO PI!ENTEL, &R., ANTANINA RA#L, %ICTOR
ZIGA, Petitioners, v. $ON. CATALINO !ACARAIG, &R.,
$ON. %ICENTE &A,!E, $ON. CARLO "O!ING#EZ,
$ON. (#LGENCIO (ACTORAN, $ON. (IORELLO
ET#AR, $ON. LO#R"E '#I#!BING, $ON. RA#L
!ANGLAP#, $ON. AL(RE"O BENGON, $ON. &OE
CONCEPCION, $ON. L#I ANTO, $ON. !ITA PAR"O
"E TA%ERA, $ON. RAINERIO RE,E, $ON. G#ILLER!O
CARAG#E, $ON. ROALINA CA&#CO! -./ $ON.
E#(E!IO C. "O!INGO, Respondents.
Go.0-1e2, B-3411er, B41o5 6 A22o74-3e2 8or 9e3434o.er2.
" E C I I O N
!ELENCIO*$ERRERA, J.:
Ths consttutona controversy between the egsatve and
executve departments of government stemmed from
Senate Resouton No. 381, adopted on 2 February 1989,
"Authorzng and Drectng the Commttee on Fnance to
Brng n the Name of the Senate of the Phppnes the
Proper Sut wth the Supreme Court of the Phppnes
contestng the Consttutonaty of the Veto by the Presdent
of Speca and Genera Provsons, partcuary Secton 55, of
the Genera Appropraton B of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and
For Other Purposes."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Pettoners are thus before us as members and ex-omco
members of the Commttee on Fnance of the Senate and as
"substanta taxpayers whose vta nterests may be ahected
by ths case."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Respondents are members of the Cabnet tasked wth the
mpementaton of the Genera Appropratons Act of 1989
and 1990, some of them ncumbents, whe others have
aready been repaced, and ncude the Natona Treasurer
and the Commsson on Audt Charman, a of whom are
beng sued n ther omca
capactes.chanrobes.com:craaw:red
The Background Facts
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House B No.
19186, or the Genera Appropratons B for the Fsca Year
1989. As passed, t emnated or decreased certan tems
ncuded n the proposed budget submtted by the Presdent.
Pursuant to the consttutona provson on the passage of
bs, Congress presented the sad B to the Presdent for
consderaton and approva.
On 29 December 1988, the Presdent sgned the B nto
aw, and decared the same to have become Rep. Act No.
6688. In the process, seven (7) Speca Provsons and
Secton 55, a "Genera Provson," were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, n the same Resouton No.
381 mentoned at the outset, further
expressed:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"WHEREAS, Be t Resoved, as t s hereby Resoved, That the
Senate express ts sense that the veto by the Presdent of
1
Secton 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the Genera
Appropraton B of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) s
unconsttutona and, therefore, vod and wthout any force
and ehect; hence, the aforesad Secton 55 remans;
"x x x"
Thus t s that, on 11 Apr 1989, ths Petton for Prohbton/
Mandamus was ed, wth a prayer for the ssuance of a Wrt
of Premnary In|uncton and Restranng Order, assang
many the consttutonaty or egaty of the Presdenta
veto of Secton 55, and seekng to en|on respondents from
mpementng Rep. Act No. 6688. No Restranng Order was
ssued by the Court.
The Comment, submtted by the Soctor Genera on 25
August 1989 (after severa extensons granted), was
consdered as the Answer to the Petton and, on 7
September 1989, the Court Resoved to gve due course to
the Petton and to requre the partes to submt ther
respectve Memoranda. Pettoners ed ther Memorandum
on 12 December 1989. But, on 19 |anuary 1990, they ed a
Moton for Leave to Fe and to Admt Suppementa Petton,
whch was granted, bascay rasng the same ssue as n
the orgna Petton, ths tme questonng the Presdents
veto of certan provsons, partcuary Secton 16, of House
B 26934, or the Genera Appropratons B for Fsca Year
1990, whch the Presdent decared to have become Rep. Act
No. 6831.chanrobes vrtuaawbrary
chanrobes.com:chanrobes.com.ph
The Soctor Generas Comment on the Suppementa
Petton, on behaf of respondent pubc omcas, was
submtted on 24 Apr 1990. On 15 May 1990, the Court
requred the partes to e smutaneousy ther consodated
memoranda, to ncude the Suppementa Petton, wthn an
nextendbe perod of thrty (30) days from notce. However,
because the orgna Resouton of 15 May 1990 merey
requred the ng of a memorandum on the Suppementa
Petton, a revsed Resouton requrng consodated
memoranda, wthn thrty (30) days from notce, was
reeased on 28 |une 1990.
The Consodated Memoranda were respectvey ed on 26
|une 1990 by pettoners, and on 1 August 1990 by
respondents. On 14 August 1990, both Memoranda were
Noted and the case was deemed submtted for deberaton.
On 11 September 1990, the Court heard the case on ora
argument and requred the submtta of suppementa
Memoranda, the ast of whch was ed on 26 September
1990.
The Vetoed Provsons and Reasons Therefor
Secton 55 of the Appropratons Act of 1989 (Secton 55 |FY
89| herenafter), whch was vetoed by the Presdent,
reads:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"SEC. 55. Prohbton Aganst the Restoraton or Increase of
Recommended Appropratons Dsapproved and/or Reduced
by Congress: No tem of appropraton recommended by the
Presdent n the Budget submtted to Congress pursuant to
Artce VII, Secton 22 of the Consttuton whch has been
dsapproved or reduced n ths Act sha be restored or
ncreased by the use of appropratons authorzed for other
purposes by augmentaton. An tem of appropraton for any
purpose recommended by the Presdent n the Budget sha
be deemed to have been dsapproved by Congress f no
correspondng appropraton for the specc purpose s
provded n ths Act."craaw vrtua1aw brary
We quote beow the reason for the Presdenta
veto:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"The provson voates Secton 25 (5) of Artce VI of the
Consttuton. If aowed, ths Secton woud nufy not ony
the consttutona and statutory authorty of the Presdent,
but aso that of the Presdent of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatves, the Chef |ustce of the
2
Supreme Court, and Heads of Consttutona Commssons,
to augment any tem n the genera appropratons aw for
ther respectve omces from savngs n other tems of ther
respectve appropratons. A carefu revew of the egsatve
acton on the budget as submtted shows that n amost a
cases, the budgets of agences as recommended by the
Presdent, as we as those of the Senate, the House of
Representatves, and the Consttutona Commssons, have
been reduced. An unwanted consequence of ths provson s
the nabty of the Presdent, the Presdent of the Senate,
Speaker of the House of Representatves, the Chef |ustce of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Consttutona
Commssons to augment any tem of appropraton of ther
respectve omces from savngs n other tems of ther
respectve appropratons even n cases of caamty or n the
event of urgent need to acceerate the mpementaton of
essenta pubc servces and nfrastructure pro|ects.
"Furthermore, ths provson s nconsstent wth Secton 12
and other smar provsons of ths Genera Appropratons
Act."craaw vrtua1aw brary
A substantay smar provson as the vetoed Secton 55
appears n the Appropratons Act of 1990, ths tme crafted
as foows:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"B. GENERAL PROVISIONS
"Sec. 16. Use of Savngs. - The Presdent of the Phppnes,
the Presdent of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatves, the Chef |ustce of the Supreme Court, the
Heads of Consttutona Commssons under Artce IX of the
Consttuton and the Ombudsman are hereby authorzed to
augment any tem n ths Act for ther respectve omces
from savngs n other tems of ther appropratons:
PROVIDED, THAT NO ITEM OF APPROPRIATION
RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII,
SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS BEEN
DISAPPROVED OR REDUCED BY CONGRESS SHALL BE
RESTORED OR INCREASED BY THE USE OF APPROPRIATIONS
AUTHORIZED FOR OTHER PURPOSES IN THIS ACT BY
AUGMENTATION. AN ITEM OF APPROPRIATION FOR ANY
PURPOSE RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE
BUDGET SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPROVED
BY CONGRESS IF NO CORRESPONDING APPROPRIATION FOR
THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE IS PROVIDED IN THIS ACT."craaw
vrtua1aw brary
It shoud be noted that n the 1989 Appropratons Act, the
"Use of Savngs" appears n Secton 12, separate and apart
from Secton 55; whereas n the 1990 Appropratons Act,
the "Use of Savngs" and the vetoed provson have been
commnged n Secton 16 ony, wth the vetoed provson
made to appear as a condton or restrcton.
Essentay the same reason was gven for the veto of
Secton 16 (FY 90), thus:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"I am vetong ths provson for the reason that t voates
Secton 25 (5) of Artce VI of the Consttuton n reaton to
Sectons 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No.
6670 whch authorzes the Presdent to use savngs to
augment any tem of appropratons n the Executve Branch
of the Government.
"Parenthetcay, there s a case pendng n the Supreme
Court reatve to the vadty of the Presdents veto on
Secton 55 of the Genera Provsons of Repubc Act No.
6688 upon whch the amendment on ths Secton was
based. Incuson, therefore, of the provso n the ast
sentence of ths secton mght pre|udce the Executve
Branchs poston n the case.
"Moreover, f aowed, ths Secton woud nufy not ony the
consttutona and statutory authorty of the Presdent, but
aso that of the omcas enumerated under Secton 25 (5) of
Artce VI of the Consttuton, to augment any tem n the
genera appropratons aw for ther respectve
appropratons.
3
"An unwanted consequence of ths provson woud be the
nabty of the Presdent, the Presdent of the Senate,
Speaker of the House of Representatves, the Chef |ustce of
the Supreme Court, and heads of Consttutona
Commssons to augment any tem of appropraton of ther
respectve omces from savngs n other tems of ther
respectve appropratons even n cases of natona
emergency or n the event of urgent need to acceerate the
mpementaton of essenta pubc servces and
nfrastructure pro|ects."craaw vrtua1aw brary
The fundamenta ssue rased s whether or not the veto by
the Presdent of Secton 55 of the 1989 Appropratons B
(Secton 55 FY 89), and subsequenty of ts counterpart
Secton 16 of the 1990 Appropratons B (Secton 16 FY
90), s unconsttutona and wthout
ehect.chanrobes.com:craaw:red
The Contendng Vews
In essence, pettoners cause s anchored on the foowng
grounds: (1) the Presdents ne-veto power as regards
appropraton bs s mted to tem/s and does not cover
provson/s; therefore, she exceeded her authorty when she
vetoed Secton 55 (FY 89) and Secton 16 (FY 90) whch are
provsons; (2) when the Presdent ob|ects to a provson of
an appropraton b, she cannot exercse the tem-veto
power but shoud veto the entre b; (3) the tem-veto
power does not carry wth t the power to strke out
condtons or restrctons for that woud be egsaton, n
voaton of the doctrne of separaton of powers; and (4) the
power of augmentaton n Artce VI, Secton 25 |5| of the
1987 Consttuton, has to be provded for by aw and,
therefore, Congress s aso vested wth the prerogatve to
mpose restrctons on the exercse of that power.
The Soctor Genera, as counse for pubc respondents,
counters that the ssue at bar s a potca queston beyond
the power of ths Court to determne; that pettoners had a
potca remedy, whch was to overrde the veto; that
Secton 55 s a "rder" because t s extraneous to the
Appropratons Act and, therefore, merts the Presdents
veto; that the power of the Presdent to augment tems n
the appropratons for the executve branches had aready
been provded for n the Budget Law, speccay Sectons
44 and 45 of Pres. Decree No. 1177, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the Presdent s
empowered by the Consttuton to veto provsons or other
"dstnct and severabe parts" of an Appropratons B.
|udca Determnaton
Wth the Senate mantanng that the Presdents veto s
unconsttutona, and that charge beng controverted, there
s an actua case or |ustcabe controversy between the
Upper House of Congress and the executve department that
may be taken cognzance of by ths Court.
"Indeed, where the egsature or the executve branch s
actng wthn the mts of ts authorty, the |udcary cannot
and ought not to nterfere wth the former. But where the
egsature or the executve acts beyond the scope of ts
consttutona powers, t becomes the duty of the |udcary to
decare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do as vod. Ths s the essence of |udca power
conferred by the Consttuton n one Supreme Court and n
such ower courts as may be estabshed by aw |Art. VIII,
Secton 1 of the 1935 Consttuton; Art. X, Secton 1 of the
1973 Consttuton and whch was adopted as part of the
Freedom Consttuton, and Art. VIII, Secton 1 of the 1987
Consttuton| and whch power ths Court has exercsed n
many nstances" (Demetra v. Aba, G.R. No. 71977, 27
February 1987, 148 SCRA 209).
We take note as we of what pettoners stress as the
"mperatve need for a dentve rung by ths Court as to
the exact parameters of the exercse of the tem-veto power
of the Presdent as regards appropraton bs . . . n order to
obvate the recurrence of a smar probem whenever a
4
genera appropratons b s passed by Congress." Indeed,
the contextua reteraton of Secton 55 (FY 89) n Secton 16
(FY 90) and agan, ts veto by the Presdent, underscore the
need for |udca arbtrament. The Court does not thereby
assert ts superorty over or exhbt ack of respect due the
other co-ordnate departments but dscharges a soemn and
sacred duty to determne essentay the scope of
ntersectng powers n regard whch the Executve and the
Senate are n dspute.chanrobes.com : vrtua aw brary
Pettoners have aso brought ths sut as taxpayers. As rued
n Sandad v. COMELEC (No. L-44640, 12 October 1976, 73
SCRA 333), ths Court en|oys the open dscreton to entertan
taxpayers suts or not. In Toentno v. COMELEC (No. L-
34150, 16 October 1961, 41 SCRA 702), t was aso hed that
a member of the Senate has the requste personaty to
brng a sut where a consttutona ssue s rased.craawnad
The potca queston doctrne nether nterposes an
obstace to |udca determnaton of the rva cams. The
|ursdcton to demt consttutona boundares has been
gven to ths Court. It cannot abdcate that obgaton
mandated by the 1987 Consttuton, athough sad provson
by no means does away wth the appcabty of the
prncpe n approprate cases.
"SECTION 1. The |udca power sha be vested n one
Supreme Court and n such ower courts as may be
estabshed by aw.
|udca power ncudes the duty of the courts of |ustce to
sette actua controverses nvovng rghts whch are egay
demandabe and enforceabe, and to determne whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of dscreton amountng to
ack or excess of |ursdcton on the part of any branch or
nstrumentaty of the Government."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Nor s ths the rst tme that the consttutonaty of a
Presdenta veto s rased to the Court. The two oft-cted
cases are Bengson v. Secretary of |ustce (62 Ph. 912
|1936|), penned by |ustce George A. Macom, whch uphed
the veto questoned before t, but whch decson was
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court n the same entted
case n 292 U.S. 410, nfra, essentay on the ground that an
Appropratons B was not nvoved. The second case s
Bonao Eectroncs v. Vaenca (G.R. No. L-20740, 30 |une
1964, 11 SCRA 486), nfra, whch re|ected the Presdents
veto of a condton or restrcton n an Appropratons B.
The Extent of the Presdents Item-veto Power
The foca ssue for resouton s whether or not the Presdent
exceeded the tem-veto power accorded by the Consttuton.
Or dherenty put, has the Presdent the power to veto
"provsons" of an Appropratons B?
Pettoners contend that Secton 55 (FY 89) and Secton 16
(FY 90) are provsons and not tems and are, therefore,
outsde the scope of the tem-veto power of the
Presdent.chanrobes awbrary : rednad
The veto power of the Presdent s expressed n Artce VI,
Secton 27 of the 1987 Consttuton readng, n fu, as
foows:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Sec. 27. (1) Every b passed by the Congress sha, before
t becomes a aw, be presented to the Presdent. If he
approves the same, he sha sgn t; otherwse, he sha veto
t and return the same wth hs ob|ectons to the House
where t orgnated, whch sha enter the ob|ectons at arge
n ts |ourna and proceed to reconsder t. If, after such
reconsderaton, two-thrds of a the Members of such House
sha agree to pass the b, t sha be sent, together wth the
ob|ectons, to the other House by whch t sha kewse be
reconsdered, and f approved by two-thrds of a the
Members of that House, t sha become a aw. In a such
cases, the votes of each House sha be determned by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members votng for or aganst
sha be entered n ts |ourna. The Presdent sha
communcate hs veto of any b to the House where t
5
orgnated wthn thrty days after the date of recept
thereof; otherwse, t sha become a aw as f he had sgned
t.
"(2) The Presdent sha have the power to veto any
partcuar tem or tems n an appropraton, revenue, or
tarh b, but the veto sha not ahect the tem or tems to
whch he does not ob|ect."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Paragraph (1) refers to the genera veto power of the
Presdent and f exercsed woud resut n the veto of the
entre b, as a genera rue. Paragraph (2) s what s referred
to as the tem-veto power or the ne-veto power. It aows
the exercse of the veto over a partcuar tem or tems n an
appropraton, revenue, or tarh b. As speced, the
Presdent may not veto ess than a of an tem of an
Appropratons B. In other words, the power gven the
executve to dsapprove any tem or tems n an
Appropratons B does not grant the authorty to veto a
part of an tem and to approve the remanng porton of the
same tem.
Orgnay, tem veto excusvey referred to veto of tems of
appropraton bs and rst came nto beng n the former
Organc Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Ths
was foowed by the 1935 Consttuton, whch contaned a
smar provson n ts Secton 11(2), Artce VI, except that
the veto power was made more expansve by the ncuson
of ths sentence:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
". . . When a provson of an appropraton b ahects one or
more tems of the same, the Presdent can not veto the
provson wthout at the same tme vetong the partcuar
tem or tems to whch t reates . . ."craaw vrtua1aw brary
The 1935 Consttuton further broadened the Presdents
veto power to ncude the veto of tem or tems of revenue
and tarh bs.
Wth the advent of the 1973 Consttuton, the secton took a
more smpe and compact form, thus:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Secton 20 (2). The Prme Mnster sha have the power to
veto any partcuar tem or tems n an appropraton,
revenue, or tarh b, but the veto sha not ahect the tem
or tems to whch he does not ob|ect."craaw vrtua1aw
brary
It s to be noted that the counterpart provson n the 1987
Consttuton (Artce VI, Secton 27 |2|, supra), s a verbatm
reproducton except for the pubc omca concerned. In
other words, aso emnated has been any reference to the
veto of a provson. The vta queston s: shoud ths
excuson be nterpreted to mean as a dsaowance of the
power to veto a provson, as pettoners urge?
The terms tem and provson n budgetary egsaton and
practce are concededy dherent. An tem n a b refers to
the partcuars, the detas, the dstnct and severabe parts .
. . of the b (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It s an ndvsbe sum
of money dedcated to a stated purpose (Commonweath v.
Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The
Unted States Supreme Court, n the case of Bengzon v.
Secretary of |ustce (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L.
Ed., 312) decared "that an tem of an appropraton b
obvousy means an tem whch n tsef s a specc
appropraton of money, not some genera provson of aw,
whch happens to be put nto an appropraton b."craaw
vrtua1aw brary
It s our consdered opnon that, notwthstandng the
emnaton n Artce VI, Secton 27 (2) of the 1987
Consttuton of any reference to the veto of a provson, the
extent of the Presdents veto power as prevousy dened
by the 1935 Consttuton has not changed. Ths s because
the emnated provso merey pronounces the basc
prncpe that a dstnct and severabe part of a b may be
the sub|ect of a separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of
|ustce, 62 Ph., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, |oaqun, S.|.,
The Consttuton of the Repubc of the Phppnes, 1st ed.,
6
154-155, |1988|).
The restrctve nterpretaton urged by pettoners that the
Presdent may not veto a provson wthout vetong the
entre b not ony dsregards the basc prncpe that a
dstnct and severabe part of a b may be the sub|ect of a
separate veto but aso overooks the Consttutona mandate
that any provson n the genera appropratons b sha
reate speccay to some partcuar appropraton theren
and that any such provson sha be mted n ts operaton
to the appropraton to whch t reates (1987 Consttuton,
Artce VI, Secton 25 |2|). In other words, n the true sense
of the term, a provson n an Appropratons B s mted n
ts operaton to some partcuar appropraton to whch t
reates, and does not reate to the entre b.chanrobes aw
brary
Pettoners further submsson that, snce the exercse of the
veto power by the Presdent partakes of the nature of
egsatve powers t shoud be strcty construed, s negatve
by the foowng dctum n Bengzon, supra,
readng:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"The Consttuton s a mtaton upon the power of the
egsatve department of the government, but n ths
respect t s a grant of power to the executve department.
The Legsature has the amrmatve power to enact aws; the
Chef Executve has the negatve power by the consttutona
exercse of whch he may defeat the w of the Legsature. It
foows that the Chef Executve must nd hs authorty n
the Consttuton. But n exercsng that authorty he may not
be conned to rues of strct constructon or hampered by
the unwse nterference of the |udcary. The courts w
nduge every ntendment n favor of the consttutonaty of
a veto the same as they w presume the consttutonaty of
an act as orgnay passed by the Legsature"
(Commonweath v. Barnett |1901|, 199 Pa., 161; 55 L.R.A.,
882; Peope v. Board of Councmen |1892|, 20 N.Y.S., 52;
Fumore v. Lane |1911|, 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State
|1927|, 53 A.L.R., 258 |at 917|).
Inapproprateness of the so-caed "Provsons"
But even assumng arguendo that provsons are beyond the
executve power to veto, we are of the opnon that Secton
55 (FY 89) and Secton 16 (FY 90) are not provsons n the
budgetary sense of the term. Artce VI, Secton 25 (2) of the
1987 Consttuton provdes:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Sec. 25 (2) No provson or enactment sha be embraced n
the genera appropratons b uness t reates speccay to
some partcuar appropraton theren. Any such provson or
enactment sha be mted n ts operaton to the
appropraton to whch t reates."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Expct s the requrement that a provson n the
Appropratons B shoud reate speccay to some"
partcuar appropraton" theren. The chaenged
"provsons" fa short of ths requrement. Frsty, the vetoed
"provsons" do not reate to any partcuar or dstnctve
appropraton. They appy generay to a tems dsapproved
or reduced by Congress n the Appropratons B. Secondy,
the dsapproved or reduced tems are nowhere to be found
on the face of the B. To dscover them, resort w have to
be made to the orgna recommendatons made by the
Presdent and to the source ndcated by pettoners
themseves, .e., the "Legsatve Budget Research and
Montorng Omce" (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petton). Thrdy, the
vetoed Sectons are more of an expresson of Congressona
pocy n respect of augmentaton from savngs rather than a
budgetary appropraton. Consequenty, Secton 55 (FY 89)
and Secton 16 (FY 90) athough abeed as "provsons,"
are actuay napproprate provsons that shoud be treated
as tems for the purpose of the Presdents veto power.
(Henry v. Edwards |1977| 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)
"|ust as the Presdent may not use hs tem-veto to usurp
consttutona powers conferred on the egsature, nether
can the egsature deprve the Governor of the
consttutona powers conferred on hm as chef executve
7
omcer of the state by ncudng n a genera appropraton
b matters more propery enacted n separate egsaton.
The Governors consttutona power to veto bs of genera
egsaton . . . cannot be abrdged by the carefu pacement
of such measures n a genera appropraton b, thereby
forcng the Governor to choose between approvng
unacceptabe substantve egsaton or vetong tems of
expendture essenta to the operaton of government. The
egsature cannot by ocaton of a b gve t mmunty from
executve veto. Nor can t crcumvent the Governors veto
power over substantve egsaton by artfuy draftng
genera aw measures so that they appear to be true
condtons or mtatons on an tem of appropraton.
Otherwse, the egsature woud be permtted to mpar the
consttutona responsbtes and functons of a co-equa
branch of government n contraventon of the separaton of
powers doctrne . . . We are no more wng to aow the
egsature to use ts appropraton power to nfrnge on the
Governors consttutona rght to veto matters of
substantve egsaton than we are to aow the Governor to
encroach on the consttutona powers of the egsature. In
order to avod ths resut, we hod that, when the egsature
nserts napproprate provsons n a genera appropraton
b, such provsons must be treated as tems for purposes
of the Governors tem veto power over genera
appropraton bs.
x x x
". . . Legsatve contro cannot be exercsed n such a
manner as to encumber the genera appropraton b wth
veto-proof ogrong measure, speca nterest provsons
whch coud not succeed f separatey enacted, or rders,
substantve peces of egsaton ncorporated n a b to
nsure passage wthout veto. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Inapproprateness of the so-caed "Condtons/Restrctons"
Pettoners mantan, however, that Congress s free to
mpose condtons n an Appropratons B and where
condtons are attached, the veto power does not carry wth
t the power to strke them out, ctng Commonweath v.
Dodson (11 SE, 2d 130, supra) and Bonao Eectroncs
Corporaton v. Vaenca (No. L-20740, |une 30, 1964, 11
SCRA 486). In other words, ther theory s that Secton 55
(FY 89) and Secton 16 (FY 90) are such
condtons/restrctons and thus beyond the veto
power.chanrobes vrtua awbrary
There can be no denyng that nherent n the power of
appropraton s the power to specfy how money sha be
spent; and that n addton to dstnct "tems" of
appropraton, the Legsature may ncude n Appropraton
Bs quacatons, condtons, mtatons or restrctons on
expendture of funds. Setted aso s the rue that the
Executve s not aowed to veto a condton or provso of an
appropraton whe aowng the appropraton tsef to stand
(Fared v. Foster, supra, at 320). That was aso the rung n
Bonao, supra, whch hed that the veto of a condton n an
Appropratons B whch dd not ncude a veto of the tems
to whch the condton reated was deemed nvad and
wthout ehect whatsoever.
However, for the rue to appy, restrctons shoud be such n
the rea sense of the term, not some matters whch are
more propery deat wth n a separate egsaton (Henry v.
Edwards, La, 346, So 2d 153). Restrctons or condtons n
an Appropratons B must exhbt a connecton wth money
tems n a budgetary sense n the schedue of expendtures.
Agan, the test s approprateness.
"It s not enough that a provson be reated to the nsttuton
or agency to whch funds are approprated. Condtons and
mtatons propery ncuded n an appropraton b must
exhbt such a connexty wth money tems of appropraton
that they ogcay beong n a schedue of expendtures . . .
the utmate test s one of approprateness" (Henry v.
Edwards, supra, at 158).
8
Tested by these crtera, Secton 55 (FY 89) and Secton 16
(FY 90) must aso be hed to be napproprate "condtons."
Whe they, partcuary, Secton 16 (FY 90), have been
"artfuy drafted" to appear as true condtons or mtatons,
they are actuay genera aw measures more approprate for
substantve and, therefore, separate egsaton.
Further, nether of them shows the necessary connecton
wth a schedue of expendtures. The reason, as expaned
earer, s that tems reduced or dsapproved by Congress
woud not appear on the face of the enroed b or
Appropratons Act tsef. They can ony be detected when
compared wth the orgna budgetary submttas of the
Presdent. In fact, Sectons 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90)
themseves provde that an tem "sha be deemed to have
been dsapproved by Congress f no correspondng
appropraton for the specc purpose s provded n ths
Act."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Consderng that the vetoed provsons are not, n the
budgetary sense of the term, condtons or restrctons, the
case of Bonao Eectroncs Corporaton v. Vaenca (supra),
nvoked by pettoners, becomes nappcabe. In that case, a
pubc works b contaned an tem appropratng a certan
sum for assstance to teevson statons, sub|ect to the
condton that the amount woud not be avaabe to paces
where there were commerca teevson statons. Then
Presdent Macapaga approved the appropraton but vetoed
the condton. When chaenged before ths Court, t was
hed that the veto was nehectua and that the approva of
the tem carred wth t the approva of the condton
attached to t. In contrast wth the case at bar, there s no
condton, n the budgetary sense of the term, attached to
an appropraton or tem n the appropraton b whch was
struck out. For obvousy, Sectons 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY
90) partake more of a curtament on the power to augment
from savngs; n other words, "a genera provson of aw,
whch happens to be put n an appropraton b" (Bengzon
v. Secretary of |ustce, supra).
The Power of Augmentaton and The Vadty of the Veto
The Presdent prompty vetoed Secton 55 (FY 89) and
Secton 16 (FY 90) because they nufy the authorty of the
Chef Executve and heads of dherent branches of
government to augment any tem n the Genera
Appropratons Law for ther respectve omces from savngs
n other tems of ther respectve appropratons, as
guaranteed by Artce VI, Secton 25 (5) of the Consttuton.
Sad provson reads:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Sec. 25. (5) No aw sha be passed authorzng any transfer
of appropratons; however, the Presdent, the Presdent of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatves,
the Chef |ustce of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Consttutona Commssons may, by aw, be authorzed to
augment any tem n the genera appropratons aw for ther
respectve omces from savngs n other tems of ther
respectve appropratons" (Emphass ours).
Noteworthy s the fact that the power to augment from
savngs es dormant unt authorzed by aw.
Ths Court uphed the vadty of the power of augmentaton
from savngs n Demetra v. Aba, whch
rued:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
". . . to ahord the heads of the dherent branches of the
government and those of the consttutona commssons
consderabe exbty n the use of pubc funds and
resources, the consttuton aowed the enactment of a aw
authorzng the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmentng an tem from savngs n another tem n the
appropraton of the government branch or consttutona
body concerned. The eeway granted was thus mted. The
purpose and condtons for whch funds may be transferred
were speced, .e., transfer may be aowed for the purpose
of augmentng an tem and such transfer may be made ony
f there are savngs from another tem n the appropraton
of the government branch or consttutona body" (G.R. No.
9
71977, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 214).
The 1973 Consttuton contaned an dentca authorty to
augment from savngs n ts Artce VIII, Secton 16 (5),
except for menton of the Prme Mnster among the omcas
vested wth that power. 1
In 1977, the statutory authorty of the Presdent to augment
any appropraton of the executve department n the
Genera Appropratons Act from savngs was speccay
provded for n Secton 44 of Presdenta Decree No. 1177,
as amended (RA 6670, 4 August 1988), otherwse known as
the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." It
reads:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Sec. 44. . . .
"The Presdent sha, kewse, have the authorty to augment
any appropraton of the Executve Department n the
Genera Appropratons Act, from savngs n the
appropratons of another department, bureau, omce or
agency wthn the Executve Branch, pursuant to the
provsons of Art. VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the Consttuton (now
Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI)" (Emphass ours), (N.B.: The rst
paragraph decared vod n Demetra v. Aba, supra, has
been deeted).
Smary, the use by the Presdent of savngs to cover
dects s speccay authorzed n the same Decree.
Thus:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Sec. 45. Authorty to Use Savngs n Appropratons to
Cover Dects. Except as otherwse provded n the Genera
Appropratons Act, any savngs n the reguar appropratons
authorzed n the Genera Appropratons Act for programs
and pro|ects of any department, omce or agency, may, wth
the approva of the Presdent be used to cover a dect n
any other tem of the reguar appropratons: ". . .
A more recent grant s found n Secton 12 of the Genera
Appropratons Act of 1989, the text of whch s repeated n
the rst paragraph of Secton 16 (FY 90). Secton 12
reads:chanrobes vrtua awbrary
"Sec. 12. Use of Savngs. - The Presdent, the Presdent of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatves,
the Chef |ustce of the Supreme Court, the heads of the
Consttutona Commssons, and the Ombudsman are
hereby authorzed to augment any tem n ths Act for ther
respectve omces from savngs n other tems of ther
respectve appropratons."craaw vrtua1aw brary
There shoud be no queston, therefore, that statutory
authorty has, n fact, been granted. And once gven, the
heads of the dherent branches of the Government and
those of the Consttutona Commssons are ahorded
consderabe exbty n the use of pubc funds and
resources (Demetra v. Aba, supra). The doctrne of
separaton of powers s n no way endangered because the
transfer s made wthn a department (or branch of
government) and not from one department (branch) to
another (CRUZ, Isagan A., Phppne Potca Law |1989| p.
155).
When Sectons 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90), therefore,
prohbt the restoraton or ncrease by augmentaton of
appropratons dsapproved or reduced by Congress, they
mpar the consttutona and statutory authorty of the
Presdent and other key omcas to augment any tem or any
appropraton from savngs n the nterest of expedency and
emcency. The exercse of such authorty n respect of
dsapproved or reduced tems by no means vests n the
Executve the power to rewrte the entre budget, as
pettoners contend, the eeway granted beng demted to
transfers wthn the department or branch concerned, the
sourcng to come ony from savngs.
More mportanty, t strkes us, too, that for such a speca
power as that of augmentaton from savngs, the same s
merey ncorporated n the Genera Appropratons B. An
10
Appropratons B s "one the prmary and specc am of
whch s to make appropraton of money from the pubc
treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary of |ustce, 292 U.S., 410, 57
S.Ct. 252). It s a egsatve authorzaton of recepts and
expendtures. The power of augmentaton from savngs, on
the other hand, can by no means be consdered a specc
appropraton of money. It s a non-appropraton tem
nserted n an appropraton measure.chanrobes aw
brary : red
The same thng must be sad of Secton 55 (FY 89), taken n
con|uncton wth Secton 12, and Secton 16 (FY 90), whch
prohbt the restoraton or ncrease by augmentaton of
appropratons dsapproved and/or reduced by Congress.
They are non-appropraton tems, an appropraton beng a
settng apart by aw of a certan sum from the pubc
revenue for a specc purpose (Bengzon v. Secretary of
|ustce, 62 Ph. 912, 916 |1936|). It bears repeatng that
they are more of a substantve expresson of a egsatve
ob|ectve to restrct the power of augmentaton granted to
the Presdent and other key omcas. They are actuay
matters of genera aw and more propery the sub|ect of a
separate egsaton that w embody, dene and demt the
scope of the speca power of augmentaton from savngs
nstead of beng nappropratey ncorporated annuay n the
Appropraton Act. To sancton ths practce woud be to gve
the Legsature the freedom to grant or wthhod the power
from the Executve and other omcas, and thus put n yeary
|eopardy the exercse of that power.
If, ndeed, by the ater enactments of Secton 55 (FY 89)
and Secton 16 (FY 90), Congress, as pettoners argue,
ntended to amend or repea Pres. Decree No. 1177, wth a
the more reason shoud t have so provded n a separate
enactment, t beng basc that mped repeas are not
favored. For the same reason, we cannot subscrbe to
pettoners aegaton that Pres. Decree No. 1177 has been
revoked by the 1987 Consttuton. The 1987 Consttuton
tsef provdes for the contnuance of aws, decrees,
executve orders, procamatons, etters of nstructons, and
other executve ssuances not nconsstent wth the
Consttuton unt amended, repeaed, or revoked (1987
Consttuton, Artce XVIII, Secton 3).
If, ndeed, the egsature beeved that the exercse of the
veto powers by the executve were unconsttutona, the
remedy ad down by the Consttuton s crysta cear. A
Presdenta veto may be overrden by the votes of two-
thrds of members of Congress (1987 Consttuton, Artce VI,
Secton 27|1|, supra). But Congress made no attempt to
overrde the Presdenta veto. Pettoners argument that the
veto s nehectua so that there s "nothng to overrde"
(ctng Bonao) has ost force and ehect wth the executve
veto havng been heren uphed.
As we see t, there need be no future conct f the
egsatve and executve branches of government adhere to
the sprt of the Consttuton, each exercsng ts respectve
powers wth due deference to the consttutona
responsbtes and functons of the other. Thereby, the
decate equbrum of governmenta powers remans on
even kee.
WHEREFORE, the consttutonaty of the assaed
Presdenta veto s UPHELD and ths Petton s hereby
DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Bdn, Sarmento, Gro-Aquno,
Medadea and Regaado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Fecano, J., s on eave.
e9-r-3e O94.4o.2
11
GUTIERREZ, |R., J., dssentng:chanrob1es vrtua 1aw brary
I regretfuy dssent from the Courts opnon n ths case
because fundamenta prncpes underyng the doctrne of
separaton of powers were voated when the Presdent
vetoed certan provsons of the 1989 and 1990
Appropraton Bs.chanrobes vrtuaawbrary
chanrobes.com:chanrobes.com.ph
I am dsturbed by the consequences of the Courts act of
egtmaton, among them the foowng:chanrob1es vrtua
1aw brary
(1) The tradtona power of Congress over the pubc purse
s negated f functons or omces t has aboshed or reduced
are restored through the grant of carte banche authorty to
shft savngs from one department or agency to another.
What the Court s sustanng s no onger augmentaton
wthn the purvew of the Consttuton. It s aready fund
|uggng aganst the express command of the body n whom
sca power s vested.
(2) The Court s, n ehect, aowng a moded ump sum
appropraton for the entre Executve Branch. The Executve
s annuay gven appropratons rangng from Two Hundred
Bon Pesos to Two Hundred Ffty Bon Pesos. Whenever
the Presdent cas on a Departments to ehect ten percent
(10%) savngs, compance mmedatey foows. There s
thus a but n excess of Two Bon Pesos. Ths tremendous
amount can now be used to nance pro|ects whch Congress
decares mprovdent or of ow prorty. Secretares of
executve departments can thumb ther noses at the
egsature and, by askng for the Presdents argesse,
mpement even that whch has been nterdcted.
(3) The Consttuton does not grant sca autonomy to the
Executve Branch. There s no comparson between the
appropratons for the |udcary and other consttutona
omces on one hand and for the Executve Branch on the
other. There s reason to gve exbty n the use of funds
for the |udcary and other consttutona creatures.
However, tght congressona contro over the way executve
programs of government are funded s part of a responsbe
presdenta system of government.
(4) The power to augment s ntended for functons, pro|ects,
and omces where both Congress and the Presdent expressy
or mpedy concur, not where one speccay exercses ts
consttutona power to reguate or modfy the expendtures
of the other. In the same way that Congress cannot ncrease
the budgetary proposas of the Executve, nether shoud the
Executve restore that whch Congress has expressy
aboshed or reduced.
(5) The Consttuton grants the Presdent power to veto any
partcuar tem or tems of an appropraton b. The
Consttuton wthhods the power to veto provsons from the
Presdent. We are rewrtng the Consttuton to restore what
the framers have emnated when we gnore the dherence
between an tem and a provson.
The Court s nterpretng the power to augment under
Secton 25 (5), Artce VI of the Consttuton as a grant of
near untrammeed authorty to shft savngs from
approprated funds for functons and pro|ects never
ntended by the awmakers to be funded and worse, for
functons and pro|ects whch Congress has expressy stated
shoud not be benecares of pubc funds for a specc
year.chanrobes aw brary
Wth a budget of over Two Hundred Bon Pesos
(P200,000,000,000.00) annuay gven to the Executve
Department, the mpcatons of the Courts rung are
extremey serous, to say the east. The Courts
nterpretaton of the power of augmentaton ehectvey
corrodes the power of Congress over a functon whch by ts
nature s nherenty egsatve. I dont beeve the
Consttuton ever ntended to gve carte banche authorty to
12
the Presdent to suppress certan actvtes n the Executve
Department aready agreed upon wth Congress and from
the funds thus saved, transfer varous amounts to pro|ects
and omces whch Congress decares must be aboshed or
reduced. Why not smpy gve the Presdent a ump sum
aocaton of P250 Bon and et t be spent as the Executve
ws?
The rasng of funds for the expenses of Government s a
egsatve prerogatve. The egsatve power aso
determnes through Appropraton Acts how the revenues
coected sha be spent and for what purpose. Congress
aone has the power to gve the Presdent the necessary
funds to mpement Government programs. Ths vested
power of Congress over the nanca ahars of Government
underes and coors a nterpretatons of budgetary
provsons and appropraton aws.
Because of the hgh proe of Maacaang n the
dsbursement of funds for pubc needs, peope tend to
forget that t s ony mpementng the aw as passed by
Congress. The Presdent has no power to enact or amend
statutes, most speccay appropraton statutes. The
Executve merey proposes and submts recommendatons.
It s Congress whch decdes.
In the same way that Congress creates pubc omces, t can
aso abosh them whenever, n ts opnon, bona de
smpcty, economy, and emcency woud be acheved. By
aowng the Presdent through augmentaton to re-create
pubc omces aboshed or reduced by Congress, the Court s
treadng upon tme-tested doctrnes, the ehects of whch
may, n the future, be regretted.
It s mseadng for the respondents to te up the Presdents
augmentaton authorty wth the same authorty gven to the
Chef |ustce and the heads of Consttutona Commssons.
The |udcary and these Commssons en|oy sca autonomy.
Ther roes n the consttutona scheme ca for
ndependence and exbty n the use of approprated
funds. Most of ther expendtures are xed and recurrng.
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) prunes
ther requests for funds to the bone such that when the
budget s presented to Congress, there s nothng more to
abosh or reduce. The |udcary and Commssons are
usuay negected f not forgotten when the nanca pe s
sced. Thus the |udcary wth around 23,000 |ustces,
|udges, Cerks of Court, awyers, and other supportng
personne s generay aocated a mnscue one (1%)
percent of the natona budget by DBM proposas. In the
aborted 1991 proposas, the percentage was owered to
00.67 percent or a tte over one-haf percent. Any savngs
are qute modest and usuay resut from non-ng of
|udca postons. The Consttutona Commssons have the
same probems. The Court now vadates the free use of
savngs by the Executve aganst the express w of
Congress. Snce these coud easy amount not to one
percent but to ten percent or more of the gargantuan
budget for the Executve Branch, the mpcatons are
extremey dsturbng.
As for the power gven to the Senate Presdent and Speaker,
t s Congress whch enacts the aw and the need for
augmentaton s not reay sgncant.
The same s not true for the Presdent where the amount
from whch savngs are generated s aways beyond P200
Bon. The argument that the eeway granted s demted
to transfers wthn the department or branch overooks the
fact that amost the entre budget of the Government s
eaten up by the Executve Branch. It s reatvey easy for
the Omce of the Presdent, for exampe, to get P100 Mon
from funds aocated as assstance to oca governments or
constructon of ma|or pubc works and augment another
tem anywhere n the entre Executve Branch. Ths s ndeed
the power to rewrte the entre budget. It s not the
egsatve power over the pubc purse whch aone s
dengrated. The power to scaze government expenses s
equay dmnshed.
13
The consttutona hstory of the Presdents tem veto power
shows that t shoud not be nterpreted to ncude the
vetong of provsons. It must be mted to tems.
The 1935 Consttuton granted the power to veto
"provsons" provded the partcuar tem or tems to whch
the provson reates are aso vetoed.craawnad
The 1973 Consttuton removed the power to veto
"provsons." The Chef Executve was gven the power to
veto ony "any partcuar tem or tems" n an appropraton,
revenue, or tarh b.
The 1987 Consttuton foows the 1973 formua. The
Presdent may veto any partcuar tem or tems n an
appropraton, revenue, or tarh b but the veto sha not
ahect the tem or tems to whch he does not ob|ect.
The ma|orty opnon correcty concedes that the terms tem
and provson n budgetary egsaton and practce are
dherent.
If that s so, I fa to see how we can rue that the power of
the Presdent under the 1935 Consttuton to veto
"provsons" remans even f t was expressy emnated
from both the 1973 and 1987 Consttutons. Where the
Consttuton says "tems," the veto power must be mted to
"tems." It cannot ncude "provsons" whch was expressy
strcken out.
As a genera rue, aws passed by Congress can be vetoed
by the Presdent ony n ther entrety or none at a. She
cannot seect provsons and sectons she does not ke and
veto them whe approvng the rest of the statute. The
Consttuton aows a mted power of veto ony when t
comes to appropraton, revenue or tarh bs. The power s
mted to tems. It shoud not be nterpreted by ths Court to
mean the expanded power to aso veto "provsons."craaw
vrtua1aw brary
To state t n another way, the Presdent may veto a dstnct
and severabe part of a b ony - (1) f that severabe part
s an tem and not a provson, and (2) f that severabe part
beongs to an appropraton, revenue or tarh b. A other
bs must be vetoed n ther entrety.
Regardng the ctaton from Bengzon v. Secretary of |ustce
(299 U.S. 410, 414 |1936|) for a bera constructon, the
veto power s nterpreted n favor of vadty ony when t s
mted to the tems t covers. No amount of bera
nterpretaton, for nstance, can aow the Presdent to veto
any tem, part, or secton of a b whch has nothng to do
wth appropratons, revenues, or tarhs.
I must emphasze that the provsons vetoed by the
Presdent are not napproprate and dentey are not rders.
There can be no dspute that Congress has the power to
reduce the budgetary proposas prepared by the Executve.
If Congress aboshes, removes, or reduces a pro|ect,
functon, or actvty by cuttng the funds proposed for t, a
provson enforcng that aboton, remova, or reducton s
approprate and germane to the part thus strcken out. It
woud be absurd to requre that t shoud appear n separate
egsaton.
A rder s a provson whch s aen to the b to whch t s
attached. An exampe s the Spooner Amendment whch
transferred government powers over the Phppnes n 1901
from the mtary to the cv government, from the Executve
to Congress. Ths secton had nothng to do wth the Army
Appropraton B n whch t was ncuded. On the other
hand, the vetoed provsons n the nstant case speccay
refer to appropratons whch were dsapproved or reduced
n those very same bs.
In fact, the vetoed provsons of the 1989 and 1990
Appropraton Acts are not ony germane to these Acts but
are precsey authorzed under Secton 25 (5) of Artce VI of
14
the Consttuton. Under Secton 25 (5), the Presdent, Senate
Presdent, Speaker, Chef |ustce and heads of Consttutona
Commssons are by aw authorzed to augment tems n the
genera appropratons aw for ther respectve omces from
savngs n other tems. As stated by the ma|orty opnon,
the power to augment from savngs es dormant unt
authorzed by aw. When Congress exercses that dormant
power and by aw authorzes these omcas to augment
tems, certany t has the power to aso state what tems
may not be augmented. I fa to see how the exercse of ths
power can be termed an napproprate rder.
The grant of the power to augment ncudes the authorty to
specfy what matters are not part of the granted power. I
cannot agree that the 1977 authorty to augment
appropratons from savngs can preva over 1989 and 1990
provsons to the contrary. The 1989 grant of the power to
augment n Secton 12 of the 1989 Appropratons Acts s
necessary crcumscrbed by the wthhodng of that power
n the provsons egay vetoed. One part cannot reman f
a reated part s vetoed.chanrobes aw brary : red
In cosng, I repeat that the Courts opnon aows the
Presdent to dengrate and render nehectve a cear and
postve expresson of egsatve pocy on how the funds of
Government sha be spent. Where Congress expressy
states that our mted funds shoud not be spent on a
partcuar functon or omce, we shoud not gve the
Presdent the power to approprate through transfers of
funds the money to mantan the aboshed or greaty
reduced functon or omce. The power of augmentaton s
ntended to save programs or pro|ects agreed upon by both
the Presdent and Congress where the funds aocated turn
out to be nadequate. It was never conceved to render
nute the egsatve power over the purse. The power to
determne how pubc funds shoud be spent shoud reman
odged where t rghtfuy beongs.
Paras, J., dssents.
CRUZ, J., dssentng:chanrob1es vrtua 1aw brary
Mme. |ustce Herrera has wrtten another opnon that
commends tsef for ts ogc and ucdty. Regrettaby, there
are certan concusons n the ponenca that I cannot share.
In |ustfyng her veto, the Presdent says that "the provson
voates secton 25(5) of Artce VI of the Consttuton," as f
to suggest that she derves her power of augmentaton
drecty from ths secton. She does not, of course. Ths s
not a sef-executng provson. The sad secton states that
she and the other omcas mentoned theren "may, by aw,
be authorzed to augment any tem n the genera
appropratons aw for ther respectve omces . . ." Ths
means she needs statutory authorty before she can
augment.
The Presdent says nevertheess that she has that authorty
and ponts to Secton 440 of PD No. 1177, otherwse known
as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977, as amended.
Sgncanty, the provson she nvokes s precsey the
secton moded by Congress n the Genera Appropratons
Act of 1989 (and aso of 1990). In vetong Secton 55 of that
aw, the Presdent s n ehect sayng that the authorzaton
earer gven her cannot be revoked.
The authorty to augment s not such an extraordnary
endowment that, once gven, becomes sacrosanct and
rrevocabe. What the Legsature has conferred n ts
dscreton, t can aso reca n the exercse of that same
dscreton. The ony excepton I know to the prncpe that
Congress cannot pass rrepeaabe aws s the mparment
cause, and even that s fast osng ground.
I am not persuaded that Secton 55 of the Genera
Appropratons Law of 1989 s a rder as contended by the
respondents. A rder s a provson not germane to the
sub|ect or purpose of the b where t s ncuded, Secton 55
s not rreevant to the Genera Appropratons Act of 1989 as
t deas, qute obvousy, wth appropratons. Its purpose s
15
n fact to mt the powers of the Presdent n the dsposton
of the funds approprated n that measure.
I suggest t s Secton 44 of the Budget Reform Decree and
not Secton 55 of the Genera Appropratons Act of 1989
that s the rder. Secton 44 s extraneous to the sub|ect and
purpose of PD No. 1177, whch deas ony wth "the form,
content and manner of preparaton of the budget" that are
requred to "be prescrbed by aw" under Artce VI, Sec.
25(1) of the Consttuton. The budget s ony a
recommendaton of appropratons, not the appropraton
tsef. The authorty to augment gven by Secton 44 of PD
No. 1177 beongs n the Genera Appropratons Act and has
no pace n the Budget Reform Decree.
The ponenca says that to sancton the ncuson of Secton
55 n the Genera Appropratons Act "woud be to gve the
Legsature the freedom to grant or wthhod the power from
the Executve and other omcas and thus put n yeary
|eopardy the exercse of that power" to augment. I
respectfuy submt that the freedom s not ours to gve. It
was vested n Congress by the Consttuton tsef, and we
ourseves have no authorty to grant or wthhod t.
It s needess to debate whatever dstncton there may be
between the tem and the provson. The mportant
consderaton s that, whatever ts nature, Secton 55 of the
Genera Appropratons Act cannot be vetoed n any case
because t seeks to wthdraw a deegated power.
The power of the purse beongs to Congress and has been
tradtonay recognzed n the consttutona provson that
"no money sha be pad out of the Treasury except n
pursuance of an appropraton made by aw." The transfer of
funds from one tem to another n the Genera
Appropratons Act s part of that power, except that the
Consttuton aows Congress to deegate t by aw to the
Presdent, the Senate Presdent, the Speaker of the House of
Representatves, the Chef |ustce and the heads of the
Consttutona Commssons. When exercsng ths authorty,
the aforementoned omcas act not by vrtue of ther own
competence but ony as agents of Congress.
There shoud be no queston that the agency conferred on
these omcas can be revoked by Congress at any tme and
for any reason t sees t. The deegates cannot chaenge
ths wthdrawa and nsst on hodng on to the authorzaton
that the egsature had the dscreton to wthhod from them
n the rst pace. The authorty to augment nvoves the
eement of condence. Shoud Congress choose to wthdraw
t, a becomng respect for the doctrne of separaton of
powers, f not anythng ese, shoud persuade the deegates
to yed to the wsh of the prncpa.
The chaenge to the vadty of Secton 55 s to me pan
qubbng. To argue that no reca has been made s to gnore
the obvous. What matters s the ntenton of Congress,
whch shoud be cear enough f ony the respondents woud
not muddy the waters. The pan and unmstakabe ntenton
of Congress s to wthdraw from the Presdent, for ts own
reasons, the deegated power to
augment.chanrobesvrtuaawbrary
The foowng observatons n the Emergency Power Cases,
92 Ph. 603, are approprate:chanrob1es vrtua 1aw brary
Athough House B No. 727 had been vetoed by the
Presdent and dd not thereby become a reguar statute, t
may at east be consdered as a concurrent resouton of the
Congress formay decarng the termnaton of the
emergency powers. To contend that the B needed
presdenta acquescence to produce ehect woud ead to
the anomaous, f not absurd, stuaton that, whe Congress
mght deegate ts powers by a smpe ma|orty, t mght not
be abe to reca them except by two-thrds vote. In other
words, t woud be easer for Congress to deegate ts
powers than to take them back. Ths s not rght and s not,
and ought not, to be the aw.
I thnk t woud have been more characterstc of the
16
Presdent f she had gracousy respected the w of the
Legsature and so agan recognzed her roe n the
consttutona scheme of the Repubc.
Paras, J., dssents.
PADILLA, J., dssentng:chanrob1es vrtua 1aw brary
I dssent many for two (2) reasons:chanrob1es vrtua 1aw
brary
Frst: the questoned veto has no consttutona bass.
Artce VI, Secton 27 of the 1987 Consttuton
provdes:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Sec. 27. (1) Every b passed by the Congress sha, before
t becomes a aw, be presented to the Presdent. If he
approves the same, he sha sgn t; otherwse, he sha veto
t and return the same wth hs ob|ectons to the House
where t orgnated, whch sha enter the ob|ectons at arge
n ts |ourna and proceed to reconsder t. If, after such
reconsderaton, two-thrds of a the Members of such House
sha agree to pass the b, t sha be sent, together wth the
ob|ectons, to the other House by whch t sha kewse be
reconsdered, and f approved by two-thrds of a the
Members of that House, t sha become a aw. In a such
cases, the votes of each House sha be determned by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members votng for or aganst
sha be entered n ts |ournas. The Presdent sha
communcate hs veto of any b to the House where t
orgnated wthn thrty days after the date of recept
thereof; otherwse, t sha become a aw as f he had sgned
t.
(2) The Presdent sha have the power to veto any partcuar
tem or tems n an appropraton, revenue, or tarh b, but
the veto sha not ahect the tem or tems to whch he does
not ob|ect."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Secton 27 (1) refers to a genera veto, where the Presdent
ob|ects to an entre b approved by Congress and returns t
to Congress for ts reconsderaton. The stuaton at bar s
admttedy not a genera veto of the appropraton acts for
1989 and 1990, Secton 27 (1) does not, therefore, appy.
The ma|orty opnon postons the veto questoned n ths
case wthn the scope of Secton 27 (2) above-quoted. I do
not see how ths can be done wthout dong voence to the
consttutona desgn. The dstncton between an tem-veto
and a provson-veto has been tradtonay recognzed n
consttutona tgaton and budgetary practce. As stated by
Mr. |ustce Sutherand, speakng for the U.S. Supreme Court
n Bengzon v. Secretary of |ustce, 299 U.S. 410-
416:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
". . . An tem of an appropraton b obvousy means an
tem whch n tsef s a specc appropraton of money, not
some genera provsons of aw whch happens to be put nto
an appropraton b. . . ."craaw vrtua1aw brary
When the Consttuton n Secton 27 (2) empowers the
Presdent to veto any partcuar tem or tems n the
appropraton act, t does not confer - n fact, t excudes -
the power to veto any partcuar provson or provsons n
sad act.
In an earer case, Sarmento v. Mson, Et A., 156 SCRA 549,
ths Court referred to ts duty to construe the Consttuton,
not n accordance wth how the executve or the egsatve
woud want t construed, but n accordance wth what t says
and provdes. When the Consttuton states that the
Presdent has the power to veto any partcuar tem or tems
n the appropraton act, ths must be taken as a component
of that decate baance of power between the executve and
the egsatve, so that, for ths Court to construe Sec. 27 (2)
of the Consttuton as aso empowerng the Presdent to veto
any partcuar provson or provsons n the appropraton
act, s to oad the scae n favor of the executve, at the
expense of that decate baance of power.
17
Stated dherenty, to stretch the power of the Presdent to
veto any tem n the appropraton act so as to ncude the
power to veto any partcuar provson n the same act,
wthout any concusve ndcaton that the same was the
ntent of the consttutona framers and the peope who
adopted the 1987 Consttuton, s for the Court to nduge n
spata consttutona aerobcs smpy to |ustfy what, to my
mnd, s an ndefensbe presdenta veto.
Second: Secton 55 (FY 1989) and Secton 16 (FY 1990) are
founded on prncpes of sound reason and pubc pocy; the
attempt to "veto" them s a grave abuse of dscreton
amountng to ack or excess of |ursdcton.
To begn wth, Artce VI, Secton 25, par. 5 of the 1987
Consttuton provdes:chanrobes vrtuaawbrary
chanrobes.com:chanrobes.com.ph
"(5) No aw sha be passed authorzng any transfer of
appropratons; however, the Presdent, the Presdent of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatves, the
Chef |ustce of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Consttutona Commssons may, by aw, be authorzed to
augment any tem n the genera appropratons aw for ther
respectve omces from savngs n other tems of ther
respectve appropratons."craaw vrtua1aw brary
It w be at once noted that the fundamenta pocy of the
Consttuton s aganst transfer of appropratons even by
aw, snce ths "|uggng of funds s often a rch source of
unbrded patronage, abuse and ntermnabe corrupton.
However, the same provson aows the enactment of a aw
that woud authorze the Presdent of the Phppnes, the
Presdent of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chef
|ustce of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Consttutona Commssons to augment from savngs
reazed from any appropratons for ther respectve omces,
any other tem of appropraton aso for ther omces. In
accordance wth ths Consttutona eave, Secton 12 of the
appropraton act of 1989 (aso Secton 16 (1st part) of the
appropraton act of 1990) provdes:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"Sec. 12. Use of Savngs. - The Presdent, the Presdent of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatves,
the Chef |ustce of the Supreme Court, the Heads of the
Consttutona Commssons, and the Ombudsman are
hereby authorzed to augment any tem n ths Act for ther
respectve omces from savngs n other tems of ther
respectve appropratons."craaw vrtua1aw brary
Thus, a transfer from savngs s aowed to augment any
appropraton pertanng to the omce whch ehects the
savngs.
And yet, Congress as the appropratng and fundng
department of the Government has seen t to pace a
condton or a quacaton n the authorty to augment, from
savngs, any appropraton n the omces concerned. It
requres that no such savngs can be used to augment an
appropraton prevousy dsapproved by Congress or to
restore an appropraton prevousy reduced by Congress.
I can see no vad reason, n ogc or n sound management,
why such a condton can not be accepted. It ony makes
certan that congressona acton dsapprovng an
appropraton or reducng the amount of an appropraton, s
not rendered nute or meanngess by a transfer of savngs
n an appropraton to such other tems aready dsapproved
or reduced by Congress.
It can hardy be dsputed that the condton, restrcton or
quacaton emboded n Sectons 55 and 16, here
dscussed, was enacted by Congress n the exercse of ts
egsatve power to approprate funds for government
operatons. The exercse of that egsatve power, n the rst
nstance, shoud be accorded due respect and, as I see t,
the veto of the sad condton s an undue encroachment by
the executve on a propery exercsed egsatve power. Ths
18
Court, n deneatng power boundares between the
dherent departments of government, sady expands, n ths
case, the bounds of an aready too-powerfu executve, at
the expense of egsatve prerogatve. The ma|orty appear
to have overooked that the power to approprate and set
reasonabe condtons ncdenta thereto s a functon
entrusted by the Consttuton n the egsature and ony n
the egsature.
In Bonao v. Vaenca, G.R. No. L-20740, 30 |une 1964, 11
SCRA 486, ths Court aready had occason to uphod a
condton ad down by the egsatve n an appropraton
measure, to the extent of decarng a presdenta veto of
such condton as ega f made separatey from the
appropraton tsef. Ths Court hed:|gc:chanrobes.com.ph
"It may be observed from the wordngs of the Appropratons
Act that the amount approprated for the operaton of the
Phppne Broadcastng Servce was made sub|ect to the
condton that the same sha not be used or expended for
operaton of teevson statons n Luzon, where there are
aready exstng commerca teevson statons. Ths gves
rse to the queston of whether the Presdent may egay
veto a condton attached to an appropraton or tem n the
appropraton b. But ths s not a nove queston. A tte
ehort to research on the sub|ect woud have yeded enough
authorty to gude acton on the matter. For, n the eadng
case of State v. Hoder, t was aready decared that such
acton by the Chef Executve was ega. Ths rung, that
the executves veto power does not carry wth t the power
to strke out condtons or restrctons, has been adhered to
n subsequent cases. If the veto s unconsttutona, t foows
that the same produced no ehect whatsoever, and the
restrcton mposed by the appropraton b, therefore,
remans. Any expendture made by the ntervenor PBS, for
the purpose of nstang or operatng a teevson staton n
Mana, where there are aready teevson statons n
operaton, woud be n voaton of the express condton for
the reease of the appropraton and, consequenty, nu and
vod. . . ."craaw vrtua1aw brary
By cear anaogy, the Presdent coud not veto Sectons 55
(FY 1989) and 16 (FY 1990) as condtons, wthout vetong
the tems or appropratons whch are ahected by sad
condtons, meanng the entre appropraton bs.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petton and to decare
the presdenta veto of Secton 55 (FY 1989) and Secton 16
(FY 1990) as nu and vod and of no ehect whatsoever, for
beng ceary unconsttutona. It foows that Sectons 55 (FY
1989) and 16 (FY 1990) reman as bndng condtons n the
dsposton of savngs n appropratons covered by the
appropraton acts for 1989 and 1990.chanrobes.com :
vrtua aw brary
Paras, J., dssents.
Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an
Appropriation Bill
Gonzaes, together w/ 22 other senators, assaed the
consttutonaty of Corys veto of Secton 55 of the 1989
Appropratons B (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequenty of ts
counterpart Secton 16 of the 1990 Appropratons B (Sec
16 FY 90). Gonzaez averred the foowng: (1) the
Presdents ne-veto power as regards appropraton bs s
mted to tem/s and does not coverprovson/s; therefore,
19
she exceeded her authorty when she vetoed Secton 55 (FY
89) and Secton 16 (FY 90) whch are provson; (2) when
the Presdent ob|ects to a provson of an appropraton b,
she cannot exercse the tem-veto power but shoud veto the
entre b; (3) the tem-veto power does not carry wth t the
power to strke out condtons or restrctons for that woud
be egsaton, n voaton of the doctrne of separaton of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentaton n Artce VI,
Secton 25 |5| of the 1987 Consttuton, has to be provded
for by aw and, therefore, Congress s aso vested wth the
prerogatve to mpose restrctons on the exercse of that
power.
I#E: Whether or not the Presdent exceeded the tem-
veto power accorded by the Consttuton. Or dherenty put,
has the Presdent the power to veto `provsons of an
Appropratons B.
$EL": SC rued that Congress cannot ncude n a genera
appropratons b matters that shoud be more propery
enacted n separate egsaton, and f t does that, the
napproprate provsons nserted by t must be treated as
"tem," whch can be vetoed by the Presdent n the exercse
of hs tem-veto power. The SC went one step further and
rues that even assumng arguendo that "provsons" are
beyond the executve power to veto, and Secton 55 (FY 89)
and Secton 16 (FY 90) were not "provsons" n the
budgetary sense of the term, they are "napproprate
provsons" that shoud be treated as "tems" for the
purpose of the Presdents veto power.
20