Brief Report

Can young children be more accurate predictors of their

recall performance?
Amanda R. Lipko-Speed

Department of Psychology, The College at Brockport, State University of New York, Brockport, NY 14420, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 26 March 2012
Revised 12 September 2012
Available online 1 November 2012
Keywords:
Metacognition
Development
Overcondence
Recall memory
Prediction accuracy
Preschoolers
a b s t r a c t
Preschoolers persistently predict that they will perform better than
they actually can perform on a picture recall task. The current
investigation sought to explore a condition under which young
children might be able to improve their predictive accuracy.
Namely, children were asked to predict their recall twice for the
same set of items. Childrens second predictions were signicantly
less overcondent than their initial predictions for a set of items.
However, between trials (when the stimulus items changed), chil-
drens initial predictions remained persistently overcondent.
Children appear to have some understanding that past perfor-
mance can predict future performance when predicting for the
same set of items, but they fail to apply this understanding to
new sets of stimuli.
2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Imagine watching a 4-year-old perform a simple memory task. She names and briey studies 10
pictures, and an experimenter asks her, How many of these pictures do you think you can remember
once I cover them up? She predicts that she will remember 9 pictures but then recalls only 3. Like this
child, previous research has demonstrated that children are overcondent and say that they can
remember more pictures than they will actually be able to remember (e.g., Cunningham & Weaver,
1989; Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970; Lipko, Dunlosky, Lipowski, & Merriman, 2012; Lipko, Dunlosky,
& Merriman, 2009; Schneider, 1998; Shin, Bjorklund, & Beck, 2007; Stipek, Roberts, & Sanborn, 1984).
Can children be more accurate predictors of their recall performance under certain conditions? This
question represents the core of the current investigation. Before discussing the specics of how the
0022-0965/$ - see front matter 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2012.09.012

Fax: +1 585 395 2116.

E-mail address: alipko@brockport.edu
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 114 (2013) 357363
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current investigation attempts to answer this question, previous research and theory in the area is
reviewed.
Overcondence and children: previous research
Several studies have investigated young childrens overcondence, and the most relevant ones are
summarized here. One of the rst studies was conducted by Flavell et al. (1970), who examined young
childrens prediction accuracy. Using a performance prediction paradigm, children in nursery school,
kindergarten, second grade, and fourth grade were asked to predict how many out of 10 pictures they
could remember. On each trial, a single picture was added to a strip of paper (up to 10 pictures), and
children were asked whether they would be able to remember the pictures. Childrens predicted mem-
ory span was dened as the longest series of pictures they said they would be able to remember. In all
age groups, the childrens predicted memory span was higher than their actual memory span.
However, the nursery school children and kindergarteners were more overcondent than were the
second- and fourth-graders. In fact, 57% of the nursery school children and 64% of the kindergarteners
predicted that they could remember more pictures than they were actually able to remember (see also
Yussen & Levy, 1975).
Shin et al. (2007) asked kindergarteners, rst-graders, and third-graders to predict picture recall in
a supraspan task. Participants predicted how many pictures they would recall after studying 15 pic-
tures and then were tested for how well they could actually recall 15 pictures. As in the previous stud-
ies, kindergarteners and rst-graders signicantly overestimated their recall, and they were
signicantly more overcondent than third-graders. Lipko et al. (2009, Experiment 1) replicated these
ndings using a similar method. Specically, 4- and 5-year-olds named and studied 10 familiar pic-
tures. Next, they predicted how many they would be able to recall once the pictures were covered.
On all three trials, children made predictions that were well above their actual performance level. Pre-
dictions declined in value across trials, but childrens nal predictions remained overcondent. In
additional experiments, Lipko and colleagues found that childrens overcondence persisted across
ve trials of the same picture recall task.
Similar ndings exist for physical and psychomotor tasks. For example, Stipek et al. (1984) asked 4-
year-olds to predict how well they themselves could use a pulley to move a cart up a tower without a
marble on the cart falling off. Children tended to overpredict their own performance on this task. Both
Schneider (1998, Experiment 1) and Powel and colleagues (Powel, Bolich, & Stewart, 1993; Powel,
Morelli, & Nusbaum, 1994) have replicated Stipek and colleagues (1984) ndings using throwing
tasks. Specically, 4- to 6-year-olds were asked to predict how many balls or bean bags they could
throw into a basket. In both studies, the older children made more accurate predictions than the youn-
ger children, but all childrens predictions exceeded actual performance.
A number of theoretical explanations have been offered as to why young childrens overcondence
is so persistent. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Rather, each one may help to provide
partial understanding of young childrens overcondence. One such explanation is the wishful think-
ing hypothesis, which posits that children base their predictions on how they desire to perform rather
than on how they think they will actually perform (Stipek et al., 1984). Thus, their predictions are
based on their wishes rather than on true estimates of their performance. Stipek et al. (1984) found
that 4-year-olds overpredicted their own performance on the tower task described earlier by a greater
margin than they did for the performance of another child. This result is consistent with the wishful
thinking hypothesis, assuming that childrens desired level of performance for themselves exceeds
that which they desire for other children. When Schneider (1998, Experiment 1) asked 4- and 6-
year-olds to predict how many balls they would shoot into a basket, he too found that both groups
made self-predictions that exceeded their predictions for others. In further support of this hypothesis,
the number of shots that one group of children predicted they would make on each trial was compa-
rable to the number that another group of children indicated they wished to make on each trial. Inter-
estingly, memory tasks have not yielded the same supportive results for the wishful thinking
hypothesis (Lipko et al., 2009; Schneider, 1998), leading to the conclusion that the hypothesis provides
only a partial explanation for childrens overcondence.
358 A.R. Lipko-Speed/ Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 114 (2013) 357363
Another explanation for young childrens persistent overcondence is the monitoring deciency
hypothesis (Schneider, 1998). According to this hypothesis, young children do not accurately monitor
their performance on a task. As a result, they continue to give predictions that are well above their
demonstrated performance level. Schneider (1998) evaluated this hypothesis by asking 4- and 6-
year-olds to make postdictions of their performance on a nal trial of a location memory task. These
postperformance judgments were quite accurate, suggesting that children were aware of how they
had performed. Lipko et al. (2009, Experiment 3) replicated Schneiders ndings with their picture re-
call task, with 4- and 5-year-olds naming and studying 10 different pictures on each trial. Following
the study period, children were asked to report howmany of the pictures they recalled on the previous
trial (trial n 1). Immediately after, children were also asked to predict how many pictures they
would be able to recall on the current trial (trial n). Across trials, childrens performance monitoring
was excellent in that children could accurately remember how many pictures they had been able to
recall on the previous trial. Yet, their predictions remained overcondent and were not signicantly
different from those of children who had not been asked to report about recall on previous trials.
Why did the childrens predictions remain overcondent? Answers to this question follow from
two hypotheses that isolate childrens difculties in improving their accuracy with task experience.
One hypothesis is that children do not understand that past memory performance predicts future per-
formance on memory tasks. The alternative hypothesis claims that they do have this basic under-
standing, yet they fail to apply this knowledge to new lists. Put differently, they realize that they
would have difculty in recalling words from a list with which they had just recalled a few items,
but they do not realize that their poor performance on one list is relevant to their performance on
a new list. Research conducted by Powel et al. (1993) provides suggestive evidence to support this
hypothesis. Namely, children remained overcondent across multiple trials of a bean-bag tossing task
despite being aware of their previous poor performance. More important, when asked to report
whether a discrepancy occurred between their predictions and actual performance, children who were
aware of their overcondence (vs. those who were unaware) were no more likely to incorporate this
knowledge into their future predictions. Thus, children failed to apply their knowledge of their past
performance to their predictions of their future performance.
The current experiment investigated both hypotheses discussed above by asking children to make
two predictions for each list: one prediction immediately after the list had been studied and another
prediction for the same list but immediately after the list had been recalled. For the second prediction,
children were asked to predict how many items they would recall of the same list if they needed to
recall it again, and immediately after making this second prediction, they were asked to recall the
words from the same list again. The expectations from the two hypotheses are straightforward. If chil-
dren understand that past memory performance predicts future performance for the same list, then
their second prediction should be lower than their rst prediction. If they fail to apply this knowledge
to the next list, then the rst prediction should remain high and, just as important, the rst prediction
of trial n should be higher than the second prediction of trial n 1. By contrast, if children do not have
a rm understanding that the past predicts future memory performance, then their rst and second
predictions should not differ across trials.
Method
Participants
A total of 27 preschoolers (mean age = 4 years 6 months, range = 4 years 0 months to 5 years
5 months) who attended preschools in the Rochester, New York, area in the northeastern United States
were tested individually at the preschool.
Materials, design, and procedure
Before beginning the task, children were asked to give their verbal assent. Next, the experimenter
provided instructions for a version of the task used in Lipko and colleagues (2009) study. Here,
A.R. Lipko-Speed / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 114 (2013) 357363 359
10 pictures were individually presented and were named by the children. After all pictures had been
presented, children were given 10 s to study them. Next, children were asked, How many of these
pictures do you think you are going to be able to remember once I cover them up? The pictures were
then covered, and children were given 60 s to recall the pictures. The experimenter then told children
the number of pictures they had recalled. Next, the experimenter instructed children that they would
be asked to try to remember the same pictures again. Specically, the experimenter said, I am going
to ask you to try to remember the pictures hiding underneath the paper again. How many of these pic-
tures will you be able to remember this time? The experimenter pointed to the pictures that were
covered to help children understand that their recall prediction was about the same set of pictures
they had just tried to recall. After providing their recall prediction, children had 60 s to recall the pic-
tures. The pictures were uncovered, and the experimenter informed children of how many they had
recalled. The entire procedure was repeated three more times with new pictures for each trial set.
Results and discussion
Analyses were rst conducted with gender as a factor, but the main effect of gender and all inter-
actions including it were not signicant, so it is not discussed further.
Judgment accuracy
Mean prediction accuracy (predicted recall actual recall) was computed for each participant (see
Table 1). Note that each participant made two predictions and two recall attempts for each trial. A 2
(Task: rst prediction or second prediction)? 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, or 4) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA)
of childrens prediction accuracy yielded only a signicant main effect of task, F(1, 25) = 12.33, p < .01,
partial g
2
= .33. Namely, childrens second predictions were signicantly more accurate than their ini-
tial predictions, supporting the hypothesis that children understand that the past predicts the future
and can incorporate this information into their predictions. Prediction accuracy for both rst and sec-
ond predictions was signicantly greater than zero across all trials, ts > 3.25, ps < .01, Cohens (1988)
ds > 1.20, indicating that all predictions (even the second on each trial) were overcondent.
Recall magnitudes
Mean recall magnitudes are reported in Table 1. To compare the rst and second recall values
across trials, a 2 (Recall Timing: rst or second)? 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, or 4) mixed ANOVA yielded signicant
Table 1
Mean prediction and recall values across trials.
Prediction Recall Accuracy
a
Trial 1
First 8.41 (0.44) 4.33 (0.37) 4.08
Second 6.55 (0.66) 3.78 (0.30) 2.77
Trial 2
First 7.70 (0.54) 3.48 (0.29) 4.22
Second 4.70 (0.53) 2.44 (0.30) 2.26
Trial 3
First 7.59 (0.49) 2.78 (0.27) 4.81
Second 4.81 (0.55) 1.85 (0.26) 2.96
Trial 4
First 7.46 (0.53) 2.96 (0.27) 4.50
Second 3.89 (0.50) 2.00 (0.25) 1.89
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. On each trial, children made two predictions and recall attempts for the same set of
pictures. First refers to the rst prediction and recall attempt on a trial. Second refers to the second prediction and recall
attempt on a trial.
a
Accuracy = prediction recall, with a value of zero representing perfect accuracy.
360 A.R. Lipko-Speed/ Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 114 (2013) 357363
main effects of recall timing, F(1, 25) = 34.03, p < .01, partial g
2
= .57, and trial, F(3, 75) = 17.03, p < .01,
partial g
2
= .40, but no signicant interactions. Across all four trials, children recalled signicantly
more pictures on their rst recall attempt than on their second recall attempt on the same trial,
ts > 2.37, ds > 0.92. The mean number of pictures recalled on the rst recall attempt on Trial 1 was sig-
nicantly greater than the mean number of pictures recalled on the rst recall attempt on Trials 2, 3,
and 4, ts > 2.14, p < .01, ds > 0.83. The mean number of pictures recalled on the second recall attempt
on the rst trial was signicantly greater than the mean number of pictures recalled on the second
recall attempt on Trials 2, 3, and 4, ts > 4.17, p < .01, ds > 1.62. The mean number of pictures recalled
on the second recall attempt of the second trial was also signicantly greater than the mean number of
pictures recalled on the second recall attempt on the third trial, t(26) = 2.13, p < .05, d = 0.84.
Prediction magnitudes
Mean prediction magnitudes are reported in Table 1. To compare the rst and second prediction
values across trials, a 2 (Prediction Timing: rst or second)? 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, or 4) mixed ANOVA
yielded signicant main effects of prediction timing, F(1, 25) = 36.23, p < .01, partial g
2
= .59, and trial,
F(3, 75) = 5.95, p < .01, partial g
2
= .19, but no signicant interactions. On each trial, childrens rst pre-
dictions on a trial were signicantly higher in value than their second predictions, ts > 2.36, ds > 0.92.
Thus, children predicted that they could recall more pictures the rst time they made a prediction for a
set of pictures compared with the second time they made a prediction for the same set of pictures.
First predictions did not signicantly differ across trials, ts < 1.79. However, the mean second predic-
tion on the rst trial was signicantly greater than the mean second prediction on the last trial,
t(25) = 3.20, p < .01, d = 1.25, and the mean second prediction on the second trial t(26) = 2.30,
p < .05, d = 0.90. Taken together, the entire pattern of data supports the hypothesis that even though
young children seem to have the knowledge that past performance predicts future performance, they
do not apply this knowledge between stimulus sets.
General discussion
A focal issue of this research was whether young childrens accuracy in their performance predic-
tions can be improved, and results indicated that it can be. In particular, childrens second predictions
made for a set of pictures after attempting to recall them were signicantly less overcondent than
their initial predictions, although all predictions were overcondent. The fact that childrens second
predictions were much closer to their actual performance suggests that they have some understanding
that the past predicts the future. Consistent with this interpretation, children can accurately remem-
ber their recall performance on previous trials of this picture recall task (e.g., Lipko et al., 2009). Inter-
estingly, childrens substantial overcondence returned when they were asked to study and make a
prediction for new pictures. Thus, childrens overcondence persists even with practice and is local-
ized to a failure in applying knowledge that the past can predict the future to new sets of pictures.
Why do young children fail to apply this important knowledge? One explanation involves wishful
thinking, which was discussed above in detail (e.g., Lipko et al., 2009; Stipek et al., 1984). According to
this hypothesis, young childrens predictions are based on their wishes rather than on their actual
expectations. In Lipko and colleagues (2009) study, the wishful thinking hypothesis was not sup-
ported as an explanation for young childrens persistent overcondence on the picture recall task,
but it is possible that wishful thinking may inuence childrens judgments differently under the con-
ditions of the current experiment. More specically, when asked to predict their recall for the same set
of pictures immediately after recalling and receiving feedback on their recall of them, childrens pre-
dictions may be more inuenced by their actual performance expectations. However, when asked to
make a prediction about a new set of pictures, wishful thinking may again become a more potent fac-
tor and override their knowledge that past performance predicts future performance.
Another possible explanation for why children fail to apply their knowledge is that they inconsis-
tently rely on the memory for past test heuristic. According to this heuristic, a prediction that occurs
on a second trial is based on memory for performance on a prior test trial (England & Serra, 2012; Finn
A.R. Lipko-Speed / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 114 (2013) 357363 361
& Metcalfe, 2007, 2008). Recently, Lipko et al. (2012) asked children of different ages to make recall
predictions for the same pictures across multiple trials and found that kindergarteners did not consis-
tently rely on this heuristic, whereas third-graders did consistently use it. Thus, younger childrens
predictions remained overcondent across multiple trials involving the same set of pictures, whereas
third-graders predictions became accurate and at times undercondent.
In the current investigation, childrens predictions between trials were made for different sets of
pictures; nevertheless, preschoolers still could have used recall performance on one trial to adjust
their rst prediction on the next trial. To evaluate whether memory for past test performance had
any inuence on their rst prediction for each trial, correlations between the second recall attempt
on one trial and the rst prediction on the next trial were computed. The Pearson r correlations were
.08, .24, and .10 on Trials 2, 3, and 4, respectively. These nonsignicant correlations are in the
opposite direction as would be expected if the children were using their memory for prior recall at-
tempts when making their predictions on subsequent trials. In addition, the second recall on one trial
was positively related to recall on the next trial (rs = .44, .52, and .54 for Trials 2, 3, and 4, respectively,
ps < .05), indicating that past test performance was a diagnostic cue for predicting subsequent perfor-
mance. Thus, it appears that preschoolers underuse the memory for past test heuristic, and in the cur-
rent case failing to use it partly contributed to their overcondence.
So, the answer to the question posed in the title of this article is yes, children can be more accurate
predictors of their memory recall under certain conditions. Based on the current investigation, chil-
drens predictive accuracy improves when they are predicting their recall for the same set of items
more than once. Children appear to have some awareness that it is wise to lower their second judg-
ments for a set of pictures they have already recalled once, but they do not seem to lower them sys-
tematically and certainly underuse memory for past test performance, as demonstrated by the fact
that even second predictions on each trial were overcondent. At times, they rely on knowledge that
the past can predict the future, but their reliance is inconsistent and other factors likely inuence their
predictions as well. One such factor may be task instructions. Requesting a second prediction for the
same set of pictures may have cued children on some trials to lower their predictions to a more real-
istic value. They may have interpreted the request as a signal that their rst predictions had been too
high.
Future investigations should examine whether asking children to predict their recall for the same
set of items more than twice would result in additional improvement in prediction accuracy.
Although in the current study second predictions for a set of items were signicantly less overcon-
dent than rst predictions for a set of items, they never were fully accurate. Perhaps additional expe-
rience with a set of items would lead young children to become accurate predictors of their own
recall. Note also that childrens persistent overcondence between trials and reduced overcondence
within trials may serve an important purpose. According to the adaptivity hypothesis, various aspects
of cognitive immaturity such as overcondence in young children can be explained evolutionarily
and, thus, serve an important purpose in childrens success (e.g., Bjorklund & Green, 1992; Bjorklund,
Perris, & Causey, 2009). Overcondence is expected to be benecial because it can lead to persistence
on a task. When children rst try a new task, their performance is often subpar. By remaining over-
condent in their low performance, they may be more likely to keep trying. If children are motivated
to continue a task, they will subsequently gain practice, which itself may lead to increased overall
performance (Shin et al., 2007). However, remaining overcondent in the face of feedback can lead
to persistent failure on some tasks, especially if young children believe that the amount of effort they
exert on a task is directly predictive of their success (Stipek & MacIver, 1989). Believing that effort,
rather than their previous performance, is a good indicator of future performance, children are likely
to remain overcondent and might not seek to improve their performance. In such cases, children
might not appropriately adapt their behavior to improve task performance and might not seek help
from teachers, peers, or parents when necessary. Accordingly, an interesting direction for future re-
search would be to conduct training studies in which young children are taught how to incorporate
the knowledge that the past can predict the future when they predict performance across different
tasks.
362 A.R. Lipko-Speed/ Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 114 (2013) 357363
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