Metatheory and Metamethodology in Marketing: A Lakatosian Reconstruction

Author(s): Siew Meng Leong

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Marketing, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 23-40
Published by: American Marketing Association
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Siew
Meng Leong
Metatheory
and
Metamethod ology in
Marketing:
A Lakatosian
Reconstruction
The Lakatosian
sophisticated method ological
falsification frameworkis
introd uced , compared
with
other
philosophies
of science, and
applied
to reconstruct
marketing
science. Fromthisthe location and
intensity
of extanttheoreticalconflictsare
pinpointed
and
explained , marketing's
scientificstatusevaluated , and
implications
forresearch
method ology
in the
d iscipline
d iscussed .
W HEN Converse
(1945),
A ld erson and Cox
(1948),
and Bartels
(1951)
fired the
opening
salvos
concerning
the scientificstatusof
marketing,
little d id
they
realize thatthe
resulting
d ebate would
rage
foranotherfourd ecad es. Muchof the contro-
versy
hasfocused on the
appropriate subject
matter
and bread thforthe
marketing d iscipline (c.f.
A rd t
1981). However,
this
d ialog
has
recently
been over-
shad owed
by
an even more fund amental
d ispute
over
the metatheoretical
und erpinnings
of
marketing
sci-
ence. Resolution of thisd ebate isessentialforfuture
progress
in
marketing
because the
ad option
of a
par-
ticular
philosophicalperspective
affects what
facts,
theories,
and
method ologies
will
subsequently
be ac-
ceptable
to the
d iscipline.
Some
scholars,
notably
Hunt
(1983a, 1984),
have
urged
the
perpetuation
of
logicalempiricism,
while
otherssuchas
Zaltman, LeMasters,
and
Heffring
Siew
Meng Leong
isad octoral
cand id ate, University
of Wisconsin-Mad -
ison, on leave fromthe Schoolof
Management,
National
University
of
Singapore.
The author wishesto thankPaul
Busch, Gilbert A .
Churchill,
Jr., Deborah Roed d er
John, George John, and the JM reviewers and
ed itorfor
helpful
comments.
Special
thanks are extend ed to J. PaulPe-
terand Ronald Serlin fortheircontributions ateach
stage
of the
writing
of thisarticle.
Journalof
Marketing
Vol. 49 (Fall1985), 23-40.
(1982),
Peterand Olson
(1983),
and A nd erson
(1983)
have
argued persuasively
forthe
ad option
of arela-
tivistic
perspective. Logicalempiricism
assumesthat
science is
objective
and
emphasizesrigorous
mea-
surementand
hypothesistesting.
In
contrast, relativ-
ismtend sto
emphasize
the
subjective
and creative as-
pects
of science. The time seems
ripe
forsome form
of a
Hegelian
d ialectical
synthesis
between the
ap-
parentlypolar
extremes
represented by
the
logical
em-
piricist
thesisand the relativistantithesis
respectively.
Id eally,
thisnew
perspective
should
incorporate
the
bestthatcan be offered
by
boththese
philosophies
while
minimizing
theird rawbacks.
One
potential
cand id ate for
accomplishing
thistask
is
sophisticated method ological
falsification
(SMF)
proposed by
the late Imre Lakatos
(1978)
in his at-
tempt
to resolve asimilar
controversy
between
phi-
losophers
ThomasKuhn and Karl
Popper.
Kuhn
(1970)
had
proposed
amod elof scientific
progress
found ed
on the notion of a
parad igm.
Science is viewed
by
Kuhn to
progress
in a
cycle commencing
fromone
parad igmaccepted throughout
a
particular
scientific
community
and researched
extensivelyd uring
a
pe-
riod of "normalscience." A sanomalies
accumulate,
acrisis
stage mayresult,
followed
by
the fallof the
old
parad igm
and the
emergence
of anotherin a"sci-
entificrevolution."
Metatheory
and
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing
/ 23
While
parad igms
d ealwiththe
proper
d omain of
a
science,
what research
questions
are to be ad -
d ressed ,
and the rulesto follow in the
interpretation
of
results, severalcriticismshave been d irected at
Kuhn'sthesis. Masterman
(1970), among others, has
noted thatKuhn usesthe term
parad igm
in a
variety
of d ifferent
ways,
whichlead sto varied
interpreta-
tions. For
example,
A rd t
(1983)
classified the
polit-
ical
economy
mod elasa
parad igm,
butin 1985 con-
sid ersita
metaphor
und erthe
sociopoliticalparad igm.
A nother
point
of d ifference iswhether
marketing
sci-
ence hasbeen
guid ed by
a
single parad igm.
Most
scholars
(A rd t 1985,
Carman
1980,
O'Shaughnessy
and
Ryan 1979,
Roberts
1984)
have
suggested
that
marketing
hasno central
exemplarparad igm.
In the
Kuhnian
sense,
the
d iscipline
isin a
preparad igmatic
stage.
If thisis the
case,
then the
sociopolitical(or
anyother) "parad igm"
cannotbe labeled assuch.
Most
importantly, Popper(1970)
has
questioned
the Kuhnian
representation
of scientific
enterprise
as
asuccession of bold
parad igms
and theird ramatic
overthrows.
Popper
hold sthatscientific
progressmay
be viewed asthe
proliferation
of rival
theories, that
is,
of revolution in
permanence.
In
resolving
thiscon-
troversy,
Lakatos
(1978)
introd uced the notion of a
research
program.
Instead of the
multiple
d efinitions
associated withthe term
parad igm,
the Lakatosian no-
tion is
unambiguous
with
respect
to its constituent
characteristics. The Lakatosian
(SMF) perspective urges
the existence and
d esirability
of
multiple
theoretical
found ationsin a
d iscipline,
aformulation consistent
with
Popperian
and
Feyerabend ian (1980)
tenetsand
the
contemporary
structure of
marketing
science. Within
eachresearch
program,
the Lakatosian
perspective
re-
tainsthe Kuhnian notion of
solving specificproblems
(puzzles)
withassociated
(mid d le-range)
theories.
Moreover,
as willbe later
d etailed ,
the Lakatosian
perspective
blend s
together
bothtrad itionaltenetsof
empiricism(i.e., falsification)
aswellasmore con-
temporary
relativistnotions
(i.e.,
contextin research
in the formof research
programs).
Italso
recognizes
the
myopic
nature of
d ogmatic
falsification that
ig-
noresthe
tenacity
withwhichscientifictheoriesare
held in the face of
seeminglyd isconfirming
evid ence
and
rejects
Kuhn'snotion of a
single
d ominant
par-
ad igm
in a
d iscipline.
Thus,
the firstand
primarypurpose
of thisarticle
is to reconstruct
marketing
science fromthe
sophis-
ticated
method ological
falsification
perspective.
Through
this
process
itis
hoped
thatsome of the
ap-
parentd isarray
within the
d iscipline
can be
system-
atically
accounted forand
marketing's
scientificstatus
evaluated . A
second aryobjective
isto extend the Lak-
atosian frameworkto the
analysis
of researchmeth-
od ology
in
marketing.
Extant
philosophicalperspec-
tives
suggest
a
range
of
method ologicald irection,
from
the use of a
specificapproach
suchasstructural
equa-
tions
mod eling,
to
method ologicalanarchy.
The Lak-
atosian
perspective
ad vocates
method ologicalplural-
ism,
the need to more
d eeply
examine researchmethod s
in
marketing,
and the
ad option
of researchmethod s,
bothstatisticaland
qualitative,
that
(1) expose
theo-
riesto severe threatsof
refutation, and
(2)
aid in the
d iscovery
of new
find ings
in the
d iscipline.
The remaind erof thisarticle is
organized
asfol-
lows:The nextsection will
provid e
ahistorical
per-
spective
on the
d evelopment
of falsification. In
par-
ticular,
the three
major
versionsof falsification will
be d etailed . Withthatas
background ,
a
comparative
analysis
of various
approaches
in the
philosophy
of
science willbe
presented ,
withaview toward sad -
vocating
the Lakatosian
perspective
asa
possible
means
of
reconciling
d ifferencesbetween
empiricism
and
relativism.
Marketing
science willthen be recon-
structed fromaLakatosian
perspective
to
id entify
and
explain
the location and
intensity
of extanttheoretical
conflictsin the
d iscipline
and to evaluate itsscientific
status. The second
part
of this article willad d ress
method ological
issuesfromaLakatosian
perspective.
The need for
method ologicalpluralism
is
d iscussed ,
followed
by
an examination of researchmethod s-
bothstatisticaland
qualitative-from
the Lakatosian
perspective.
Limitationsof the Lakatosian
perspective
are then
presented ,
followed
by
some
conclud ing
comments.
Falsification
Itwas
Popper(1959, 1962)
who first
d eveloped
fal-
sification asan alternative method of
theoryjustifi-
cation aimed at
overcoming
severald ifficultiesasso-
ciated with
logicalempiricism.
Falsificationists
argue
thatscientific
practice
cannotbe
rationally
d efend ed
if it
proceed sind uctively,
and thatallscientificthe-
oriesare hence
equallyunprovable
and
improbable
(Serlin
and
Lapsley1985).
The three
major
versions
of falsification are
d ogmaticfalsification,
naive meth-
od ologicalfalsification,
and
sophisticated
method o-
logical
falsification.
Dogmatic
Falsification
Dogmatic
falsification assertsthatonce a
theory
is
d isproved by
the
d iscovery
of a
single refuting
in-
stance,
itshould be eliminated fromthe
bod y
of sci-
entifictheories
(Serlin
and
Lapsley1985).
While all
theoriesare d eemed
fallible,
d ogmatic
falsificationists
assume the existence of an infallible
empirical
basis.
Thiscleard emarcation between factsand theories
per-
mitsthe
unequivocalappeal
to "hard facts" in eval-
uating
fallible theories.
There are several
shortcomings
of the
d ogmatic
falsificationist
perspective. First,
ithasbeen
posited
24
/
Journal of
Marketing,
Fall1985
thatthere isno strict
psychologicalbound aryd iffer-
entiating
factfrom
theory(Kuhn 1970,
Polanyi 1958).
A s Lakatos
(1978,
his
emphasis)
asserts, ". ..
there
can be no sensations
unimpregnated byexpectations,
and
therefore
there isno naturald emarcation
between
observationaland theoretical
propositions" (p. 15).
Second ,
itis
impossible
to
conclusively
refute athe-
ory
because realistictestsituations
d epend
on much
more than the
theory
und er
investigation (Duhem1953).
Lakatos
(1978) argues
that
anyempirical
test
involves
assumptions
aboutinitial
cond itions,
measuring
in-
struments,
and
auxiliaryhypothesesconstituting
the
ceteris
paribus
clause. A n
alleged
refutation of the
theory
can be
easily
d eflected
bysuggesting
that
something
else in the ceteris
paribus
clause caused the
result
(Laud an 1977).
In other
word s,
since alltheo-
riescontain aceteris
paribusclause,
itisa
theoryplus
the ceteris
paribus
clause thatis
subjected
to
empirical
testing.
Since itis
alwayspossible
to
replace
the cet-
eris
paribusclause, anysingle
testof a
theory
is of
little
consequence,
thus
lead ing
to the uncomfortable
conclusion thatalltheoriesare not
onlyequally
un-
provable
and
improbable
butalso
equallyund isprov-
able
(Serlin
and
Lapsley1985).
Naive
Method ological
Falsification
Popper's(1962)
naive
method ological
falsification
perspective attempts
to rescue science from
skepti-
cism
byd emonstrating
thatscience isnot
only
acor-
pus
of assertionsbutalso a
system
of conventions.
The
empiricaltesting process
is
recognized
to be im-
possible
without
making
aseriesof
method ological
d ecisions. Since no
pure
observations
exist, whatare
to be
regard ed
asfactsmustbe
conventionallyagreed
upon
in
light
of a". . . 'relevant
technique'
suchthat
'anyone
who haslearned it' willbe able to d ecid e that
the statementis
'acceptable'" (Lakatos1978,
p. 22).
Hence,
potential
theoreticalfalsifiersare
granted
ob-
servationalstatus
by
d ecision. The truth-value of such
observationsisarrived at
by
arelevantresearchmethod .
Popperian falsificationists
recognize
that research
method sand scientifictheoriesare
fallible, but,
by
d ecision, assume that
they
constitute
unproblematic
background
knowled ge
subsumed
by
the ceteris
par-
ibusclause.
While thiscircumventsthe
problem
of how factis
d emarcated from
theory,
there isstillthe
problem
of
how,
given
the ceteris
paribusclause,
a
specific
the-
ory
is
subjected
to refutation.
Popper
maintainsthat
thisis achieved
bymaking
another
method ological
d ecision. The researcherd ecid es before an
experi-
mentiscond ucted whatstate of affairsisd eemed ac-
ceptable
asafalsification of the
theory
und er
test,
ir-
respective
of ceteris
paribus. Thus,
the
Popperian
perspective recognizesthattheoriescannotbe sub-
jected clearly
to
empiricaltesting
because of ceteris
paribus
and
auxiliary
theories. However, to
permit
"objective" assessment, aresearchermust
stipulate in
ad vance whatevents would constitute falsification
withoutad hoc
appeals
to ceteris
paribus. Thus, the
Popperian perspective
hand lesthe
auxiliary-theory
is-
sue in
theorytesting bymaking
a
public, conventional
d ecision to consid era
theory
falsified
given
the ob-
servation of
specified
outcomes.
Even
so,
the
Popperian
reconstruction of science
has
rarely
been in accord withthe actual
history
of
scientific
progress.
Lakatos
(1978) points
outthat
many
scientifictheorieshave ad vanced
d espite apparent
ref-
utations
byempiricald ata,
thus
testifying
to the te-
nacity
withwhichtheoriesare held in the face of
seeminglyd isconfirming
evid ence.
Sophisticated Method ological Falsification
The
sophisticated method ological
version of falsifi-
cation
appears
to offeramore
powerful
reconstruction
of science.
Sophisticated method ological
falsification
(SMF)
hold sthatwhile science cannot
prove
theories
orestablishtheir
probabilityusing probability
calcu-
lus,
it
can, withthe mod us
tollens,1
d isprove
them
(Serlin
and
Lapsley1985). However,
in the SMF
framework,
mere criticismvia
refuting
evid ence is
neversufficientfor
theoryfalsification,
since one never
evaluatesa
single theory
butaseriesof theorieswithin
research
programs.
Thisview of science
argues
thataresearch
pro-
gram
containsa"hard core" of fund amental
assump-
tionsand theoretical
propositionsaccepted
asincon-
trovertible
by
scientistswithin the research
program.
Scientistsare
posited
to insulate thishard core from
refutation witha
"protective
belt" of
auxiliary
theo-
ries. This
"negative
heuristic" stemsfromameth-
od ological
d ecision to cord on off the core of theirre-
search
program
fromthe threatof refutation. That
is,
the mod ustollensis forbid d en to be d irected atthe
hard core
but, instead ,
itisthe
auxiliary
theoriesthat
are
subjected
to
rigoroustesting.
In contrastto the
negative
heuristicwhichtellssci-
entistswhat
path
not to
follow, research
programs
contain a
"positive
heuristic" which
guid es
the d irec-
tion of research. The
positive
heuristicis
composed
of asetof
guid ing
research
questions
and
specifies
the formtheorieswillassume and what
they
willlook
like. The
positive
heuristic
proceed s
in the face of
counterevid ence and
refutation,
and there isno need
to consid erthe
presence
of
empirical
anomaliesas
being
d ecisive.
Thus, refutationsare not
ignored
butare
consid ered inconclusive untilthe
positive
heuristicis
able to confrontthe
d isconfirming
evid ence. The
SMF
'The
mod us tollens is the
logical
formof
Popper's (1959) falsifi-
cation criterion which
permits
the d ed uctive
testing
of theories. It
may
be
represented
asfollows: A
implies B; not
B; therefore, notA .
Metatheory
and
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing /
25
perspective
thusaccountsforthe relative
autonomy
and
tenacity
of scientificresearch
programs.
A band onmentof aresearch
program
is
onlypos-
sible when
(1)
there existsarivalresearch
program
powerfulenough
to accountforallthe "facts" of the
former
program, (2)
thatrivalresearch
program
offers
novel,
excess
empirical
contentoverthe former
pro-
gram,
some of whichshould be
corroborated ,
and
(3)
the former
program
isno
longerprogressive (i.e., is
d egenerative)
in thatits
positive
heuristicisno
longer
able to
generate
novel
find ings.
Letusillustrate the d istinction between the criti-
cismof aresearch
program
and itsaband onmentwith
an
example. Recently,
concern hasbeen raised on the
neglect
of mood and emotion in
cognition (Taylor1980)
and the almost
ubiquitousregard
of affectas
being
postcognitive by
information
processing
theorists
(Za-
jonc1980, 1984; Zajonc
and Markus
1982).
Similar
sentimentshave been echoed
by
consumerresearchers
who
question
the
assumption
that
purchase
behavior
is
necessarilypreced ed by
choice and d ecision
pro-
cesses
(Kassarjian 1978,
Olshavsky
and Granbois
1979,
Sheth
1982).
More
recently, however,
there have been
growing
ind icationsthatthe
positive
heuristicof the informa-
tion
processing
research
programappearsread y
to
confrontthese issuesand
problems.
Lazarus
(1984)
has
proposed
that
"cognitive
formulationsshould
specify
how various
personalagend as
. . .
shape
cognitive appraisal, and ,
in so
d oing,
affectthe
pro-
pensity
to
experience
certain emotionsin
particular
environmentalcontexts"
(p. 129).
In this
connection,
Bower
(1981)
has
proposed
an associative network
theory
in whichan emotion servesasa
memory
unit
thatcan enterinto associationswithcoincid entevents.
The activation of thisemotion unitis
posited
to aid
retrievalof eventsassociated withitand also
primes
emotionalthemataforuse in free
association,
fanta-
sies,
and
perceptualcategorization. Similarly,
Fiske
(1982) argues
forthe
implication
of schematic
pro-
cesses in
interpersonal
affective
responses.
In her
mod el,
affectisassumed to be stored withthe
generic
knowled ge
structure and isthusavailable
immed iately
upon categorization. Hence,
evaluationsand affectare
cued
byfitting
an instance to aschema.
Otherresearchershave
investigated
how affect
may
influence
d ecision-making strategies
and
risk-taking
tend encies
(Isen
etal.
1982).
In consumer
research,
Holbrookand Hirschman
(1982)
ad vocate thatthe in-
formation
processing approach
be enriched
by
an ex-
perientialperspective
whichconsid ersconsumerfan-
tasies,
feelings,
and fun.
Moreover,
Petty
and
Cacioppo
(1981)
have
proposed
an Elaboration Likelihood Mod el
of attitud e
change incorporating
the trad itionalinfor-
mation
processing assumption
of
d iligent
consid era-
tion of information
(centralroute)
as wellas less
thoughtful
meansof
persuasion
via
simple cue asso-
ciation
(peripheralroute).
A sa
consequence
of these
d evelopments,
few re-
searcherswould ad vocate the
complete
aband onment
of the information
processing
research
program. For,
even if anew research
programemerges
thatcan ac-
countforallits
find ings,
the
positive
heuristicof the
information
processing
research
programappears
at
present
to be able to
generate
novel
find ings.
Comparative A nalysis
of the
Various
A pproaches
Itisnow
appropriate
to
compare
the SMF framework
withalternative
approaches
in the
philosophy
of sci-
ence. Suchan
analysis
would
provid e
a
properper-
spective
forlaterd iscussion of the
implications
of the
SMF frameworkfor
marketing
and its
application
to
the reconstruction of
marketing
science. To facilitate
this
comparison,
Table 1 summarizessome of the
conflicting
views of
positivists/empiricists(column
1)
and
relativists/constructionists(column 4)
as
per-
ceived
by
Peterand Olson
(1983).
Column 2
d epicts
aview of science called mod er
empiricismby
Hunt
(1984),
while the SMF frameworkisfeatured in Col-
umn 3.2
The
layout
of Table 1 is notaccid ental. A t the
extremesare the trad itional
positivistic
view and the
more
contemporaryrelativistic/constructionist
per-
spective.
In between are the more mid d le-of-the-road
positions
ad vocated
by
mod er
empiricism
and so-
phisticated method ological
falsification. The location
of the SMF
perspective along
thiscontinuumis
par-
ticularlypertinent
to the extentthatit is a
hybrid
blend ing together
severald ifferent
trad itions,
viz. em-
piricism, conventionalism,
and the Kantian activitist
approach
to the
theory
of
knowled ge.
Ind eed ,
the SMF
perspective may
offera
possible
reconciliation between mod ern
empiricism
and rela-
tivismin thatit
assigns
the
objectivity
and
rationality
of scientificresearchto alevelof abstraction d ifferent
fromthatof theoreticalcommitment. A s
points
1 and
4 of Table 1
show,
the SMF framework
d istinguishes
the world of
propositions
and id easfromthe world of
mental
states, beliefs,
and
consequences. Logicalpos-
itivismand mod er
empiricismgenerally
ad d ressthe
former,
while relativismisconcerned withthe latter
levelof abstraction.
2Except
forthe Lakatosian
perspective,
the otherclassifications in
Table 1 are notconsensus ones.
Nonetheless, since these classifica-
tionshave been
previously
used
bymarketing researchers, they
are
probably
the ones most familiarto us.
Moreover, they
seemto be
ad equate
forthe
presentexposition.
Interested read ers
may
referto
Suppe (1977), Brown
(1977), Chalmers
(1976),
and Lakatos and
Musgrave (1970) ford etailed
comparative analyses
of
specificphi-
losophers
of science.
26
/
Journal of
Marketing,
Fall1985
TA BLE 1
Major
Differences between
LogicalPositivism, Mod ern
Empiricism, Sophisticated Method ological
Falsification,
and Relativism
LogicalPositivism/
Empiricism
Mod ern
Empiricism
(Peterand Olson 1983) (Hunt1984)
1. Science d iscovers
the true nature of
reality.
2.
Only
the
logic
of
justification
is
need ed to
und erstand science.
3. Science can be
und erstood without
consid ering cultural,
social, political,
and
economicfactors.
4. Science is
objective.
5. Scientific
knowled ge
isabsolute and
cumulative.
6. Science is
capable
of
d iscovering
universallawsthat
govern
the external
world .
There is arealworld and ,
although
science
attempts
to d iscoverthe nature of
reality,
the "true" nature
of
reality
can neverbe
known with
certainty.
Itis usefulto
d istinguish
between the
proced ures
thatscience uses to
d iscoverits
knowled ge-
claims fromthose that
science uses to
accept
or
reject(justify)
its
knowled ge-claims.
The
acad emic
d iscipline
of
philosophy
of science
historically
focused on
issues in
justification.
The
proced ures
that
science uses to
justify
its
knowled ge-claims
should
be
ind epend ent
of
cultural,
social, political,
and
economicfactors.
A lthoughcomplete
objectivity
is
impossible,
science is more
objective
in
justifying
its
knowled ge-
claimsthan
nonsciences,
e.g.
med icalscience is
more
objective
than
palmistry.
Scientific
knowled ge
is
neverabsolute. Muchof
scientific
knowled ge
is
cumulative, i.e., we
really
d o know more aboutthe
causes of infectious
d iseases
tod ay
than we
d id 100
years ago.
Science
attempts
to
d iscover
regularities
among
the
phenomena
in
the realworld . Some of
these
regularities
are
stated in universalform
and others are stated in
probabilisticform.
Sophisticated
Method ological
Falsification
(Lakatos1978)
The d irection of science is
d etermined
mainlyby
human creative
imagination
and notthe
universe of facts. Thus, the
rationalreconstruction of
scientific
progress
occurs
in the world of id eas.
The
process by
which
research
programs
are
established , justified ,
and
accepted throughout
a
scientific
community
are
need ed to
appreciate
science.
Criticismof scientific
theories is based on
empiricalevid ence, but
aband onment of a
research
program
involves
extra-experimental
consid erations.
The d emarcation of
science from
pseud oscience
is
objective
in the world of id eas and
propositions.
Theoretical
commitment is an issue of
the world of mental
states,
beliefs, and
consequences.
Scientific
knowled ge
is
neverabsolute.
A ppraisal
must involve aseries of
theories; anypart
of the
bod y
of science is
replaceable
but
only
in a
"progressive" way, i.e.,
substitutes must
successfullyanticipate
novelfacts.
Whethera
proposition
is a
factora
proposition
in a
test situation
d epend s
on a
scientist's
method ological
d ecision within the context
of aresearch
program.
Relativism/
Constructionism
(Peterand Olson 1983)
Science creates
many
realities.
The
process by
which
theories are created ,
justified ,
and d iffused
through
aresearch
community
are need ed to
und erstand science.
Science is asocial
process
and cannot be und erstood
without
consid ering
cultural, social, political,
and economicfactors.
Science is
subjective.
Scientific
knowled ge
is
relative to a
particular
context and
period
of time
in
history.
Science creates id eas that
are
context-d epend ent, i.e.,
relative to aframe of
reference.
Metatheory
and
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing /
27
TA BLE 1 (continued )
Sophisticated
LogicalPositivism/ Method ological Relativism/
Empiricism Mod ern
Empiricism Falsification
Constructionism
(Peterand Olson 1983) (Hunt1984) (Lakatos1978) (Peterand Olson
1983)
7. Science prod uces Muchof scientific
theoriesthatcome
closerand closerto
absolute truth.
8. Science is rational
since itfollows
formalrulesof
logic.
9. There are scientific
rulesfor
d oing
science
valid ly(e.g.,
falsification).
10. Scientists
subject
theirtheories to
potential
falsification
throughrigorous
empiricaltesting.
11. Measurement
proced ures
d o not
influence whatis
measured .
12. Data
provid e
objective,
ind epend ent
benchmarksfor
testing theories.
knowled ge
iscumulative.
A bsolute truthis not
knowable
byscience.
Science is rationalsince its
purpose
isto increase our
und erstand ing
of the
world . Itd oes so
through
d eveloping theories,
mod els, lawlike
generalizations,
and
hypotheses
which
purport
to
d escribe, explain,
and
pred ictphenomena.
There are normsfor
d oing
good
science. For
example,
theories should be
testable, measures should
exhibit
reliability
and
valid ity,
and d atashould
notbe fabricated or
otherwise
fraud ulently
collected .
Theoriesare
subjected
to
the
empiricaltesting
process.
A bsolute
perfection
in
measurement
proced ures
is
impossible.
The
empiricaltesting
process provid esgood
ground s
for
accepting
some
knowled ge-claims
and
rejecting
others.
A bsolute truth
may
not be
achievable
byscience, but
scientificresearch
programsmayyet
in the
long
run lead to evermore
true and fewerfalse
consequences and , thus,
have
increasing
verisimilitud e.
If science aims at
truth,
it
mustaimat
maintaining
consistency
as an
importantregulative
principle. Inconsistency
must be seen as a
problem
to be resolved .
There are normsfor
d oing
good
science. In ad d ition
to Hunt'scriteria, research
programs
must be
evaluated
by
theirheuristic
power-how many
new
facts d o
theyprod uce
and
how
capable
are
they
in
explaining
refutations
d uring
their
d evelopment.
A
theory
is "scientific"
only
if ithas corroborated
excess
empirical
content
overits
rival, i.e., only
if it
lead s to the
d iscovery
of
novel"facts."
While
experience
still
remainsan
impartial
arbiterin scientific
(measurement)
controversy,
the
importance
of d ecisions in
method ology
should not
be
neglected .
The
empiricaltesting
process provid es
the
ultimatelynecessary
but
neversufficient
ground s
forrefutation. No
experiment, observation
state, orwell-corroborated
low-level
falsifying
hypothesis
can lead to
falsification withoutthe
emergence
of better
theories. A historical
emphasis
is
required .
Truthis a
subjective
evaluation thatcannot be
properly
inferred outsid e
of the context
provid ed by
the
theory.
Science is rationalto the
d egree
thatitseeks to
improve
ind ivid ualand
societal
well-being by
following
whatevermeans
are usefulfor
d oing
so.
There are
manyways
of
d oing
science
valid ly
that
are
appropriate
in d ifferent
situations.
Scientists seek
supportive,
confirmatory
evid ence in
ord erto markettheir
theories.
Nothing
can be measured
without
changing
it.
Dataare created and
interpreted by
scientists in
terms of a
variety
of
theories, and thus are
theory-lad en.
28
/
Journalof
Marketing,
Fall1985
In
regard
to the nature of scientific
knowled ge
(points
5
through
8 in Table
1),
allbutthe
logical
positivistperspective
ad vocate thatscientific
knowl-
ed ge
isneverabsolute. While the
sophisticated meth-
od ological
falsificationist
agrees
withthe mod emem-
piricist
thatscientific
knowled ge
is
mainlycumulative
(points
5 and
7), he/she
is
cognizant
that
scientific
researchinvolves
method ological
d ecisionsset
within
a
particularcontext, i.e.,
thatof aresearch
program.
Moreover,
while the
empiricistposition
in column
2
simply
statesthatscientific
knowled ge
is
cumulative,
the Lakatosian
perspective provid es
a
d escription of
the
und erlying d ynamics
of
why
science is
progres-
sive in
stating
thatthe
appraisal
of research
programs
involvesaseriesof
theories,
and thatold theoriescan
only
be aband oned when new ones
emerge
thatsuc-
cessfullyanticipate
new facts.
The mod em
empiricist
and the
sophisticated
meth-
od ological
falsificationistare mostin
agreement
in re-
gard
to the role of
empiricaltesting
of theories
(points
9
through12).
While the mod em
empiricist
makesa
rather
vague
claimthatthe
empiricaltesting process
provid es"good ground s"
for
acceptance
of knowl-
ed ge claims,
the
sophisticated method ological
falsi-
ficationistclarifiesthis
position byasserting
thatthe
empiricaltesting proced ure
is
ultimatelynecessary
but
neversufficient
ground s
forrefutation
(point12).
Fal-
sification and
subsequent
aband onmentis
onlypos-
sible withthe
emergence
of bettertheorieswithexcess
empirical
contentovertheir
rivals,
a
point
not ad -
d ressed
by
the mod em
empiricist(point10).
In
sum,
the Lakatosian
perspective mayprovid e
the vehicle of
sophisticated method ological
falsifica-
tion to the mod em
empiricist
and
brid ge
the
gap
be-
tween relativistsand
empiricists
in
emphasizing
the
rolesof contextin researchin the formof aresearch
program
and the
importance
of
method ological
d eci-
sionsin research.
Marketing
Science Reconstructed
Thissection is concerned withaLakatosian recon-
struction of
marketing
science
(see Figure 1).
Itis
proposed
that
marketing
science be consid ered amas-
terresearch
programcomprising
a
collectivity
of d is-
tinctbutrelated research
programsforming
its
pro-
tective belt.
Further,
the Lakatosian reconstruction is
extend ed here to
incorporate
the notion of amid d le-
range theory(Merton 1957)
atthe nextlevel. A mid -
d le-range theory
isone whichis "intermed iate to the
minor
working hypotheses
evolved in abund ance d ur-
ing
the
d ay-to-d ay
routinesof
research,
and the all-
inclusive
speculations
comprising
amaster
conceptual
scheme"
(pp. 5-6).
Finally,
atthe outer
periphery
of
the
proposed
scheme are the
working hypotheses
of
ind ivid ualresearcheffortsof marketers.
FIGURE 1
Mod ified Lakatosian Reconstruction of
Marketing
Science
A = hard core
(guid ing
research
questions, generalproposi-
tions/assumptions, integrated mod els, and classification
schemas)
B =
protective belt(research
programs)
C =
mid d le-range
theories
D =
working hypotheses
Hard Core and Protective Belt
Perhaps
the mostd ifficult
aspect
of the reconstruction
isthe d elineation of the hard core of
marketing
sci-
ence.
However, we
may
be fortunate in thatmuchof
the infrastructure
necessary
in
d etermining
the basic
tenetsand
propositions
of
marketing
science hasre-
cently
been
presented . Hence, Hunt
(1983b)
views
marketing
asthe behavioralscience
seeking
to
explain
exchange relationships
between
buyers
and sellersand
provid es
fourfund amental
explanand a
thatcan serve
asthe centraltenetsof
marketing
science in the re-
construction:
*
Buyersengage
in behaviord irected atconsum-
mating exchanges.
* Sellers
engage
in behaviord irected atconsum-
mating exchanges.
* Institutionalframeworksexist whichare d i-
rected at
consummating and /orfacilitating
ex-
changes.
* The consummation and facilitation of
exchange
between
buyers, sellers,
and institutionalmech-
anismsaffect
society.
Metatheory
and
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing /
29
Beyond
a
listing
of the basictenetsof
marketing
science,
the SMF framework
requires
thatthe
prop-
ositions/assumptionsgenerallyaccepted
within ad is-
cipline
be d efined . Fern and Brown
(1984) provid e
initial
insight
forthis
purpose. They
reviewed 20
gen-
eral
marketing
textsand found some 193
marketing
"principles."
Fromthese
theyd eveloped
three
prop-
ositions
generalizable
acrossind ustrialand consumer
contexts. These
generalpropositions
centeron how
buyer
behavior
(e.g., frequency
of
purchase,
levelof
knowled ge,
and the numberof
buyers
in the
market)
affects sellerbehaviorand the institutionalframe-
worksthatexistto consummate
and /or
facilitate
ex-
changes. A lthough
itis
beyond
the
scope
of this
ar-
ticle to
d evelop
an exhaustive set of such
general
propositions,
the Fern and Brown
approach
offers
in-
teresting possibilities
forthe construction of market-
ing theory,
forits
premise
is thatonce afacthas
achieved "textbookstatus" ittend sto become
part
of
a
d iscipline'sbod y
of
knowled ge.
Itisnow
possible
to
explicate
the
positive
heuris-
ticof the
marketing d iscipline.
Hunt
(1983b, p. 13)
provid es
asetof
guid ing
research
questions
associated
witheachof the centraltenets:
*
Why
d o which
buyerspurchase
what
theyd o,
where, when,
and how?
*
Why
d o whichsellers
prod uce, price, promote,
and d istribute what
theyd o, where, when,
and
how?
*
Why
d o whichkind sof institutions
d evelop
to
engage
in whatkind sof functionsoractivities
to consummate
and /or
facilitate
exchanges,
and
when willthese institutions
d evelop, where,
and
how?
*
Why
d o whichkind sof behaviorsof
buyers,
sellers,
and institutionshave whatkind sof con-
sequences
on
society,
when
theyd o, where,
and
how?
The
positive
heuristicalso containsa
prescription
forwhatformthe theories
d eveloped
fromthe
guid ing
research
questions
willassume and what
they
willlook
like. Based on current
theorizing,
these willinclud e
integrated
mod elsand classification schemasthat
por-
tray
the
exchange
behaviorof and between
humans,
institutions,
and
society.
Eachmustbe
well-ground ed
in one ormore of the
marketing d iscipline's
richthe-
oreticalbases that includ e
psychology, sociology,
economics,
organizationaltheory,
and
political
sci-
ence. In
ad d ition, classification schemasshould meet
Hunt's
(1983a)
five criteriaof
specification ad equacy,
ad equacy
of characteristicsused in
classification,
mu-
tualexclusivenessand collective exhaustivenessof
categories,
and
utility
to the
marketing community.
The
protective
beltof research
programs
in mar-
keting
are those in
buyerbehavior, sellerand com-
petitive behavior, institutional
behavior, and environ-
mentalbehavior. These includ e the
politicaleconomy,
microeconomic,
conflict
resolution, generalsystems,
functionalist,
social
exchange,
behavior
mod ification,
and information
processing
research
programs.
A san
illustration,
Figure
2 outlinesthe structure of the in-
formation
processing
research
program.
The d ashed
linesind icate thatthere are no
rigid
bound ariesbe-
tween the various
mid d le-range
theoriesand
working
hypotheses. Figure
2 isnotintend ed to be exhaustive
or
d efinitive
butis
presented
to
id entifyexamples
from
varioussubfield sof
marketing
affected
by
this
partic-
ularresearch
program.
Similarreconstructionscan be
mad e forotherresearch
programs
in
marketing.
A tleasttwo
points
come to mind in
analyzing Fig-
ure 2.
First,
while the information
processing
research
programprimarily
ad d resses
problems
in the areasof
buyer
behaviorand
promotionalstrategy,
italso af-
fectsothersubfield sin
marketing.
For
example,
the
transactionscosts
approach(Williamson 1975)
used
in the
marketing
channelsand
strategy
areahasbound ed
rationality
asone of itsbehavioral
postulates.
Thisas-
sumption
isfound ed on the notion thathumanshave
limited information
processing capacity. Second ,
in
ad d ition to the
competition
between research
pro-
grams
d iscussed
below,
there isalso
competition
be-
tween
mid d le-range
theorieswithin aresearch
pro-
gram.
For
example,
the issue
concerning knowled ge
representation
in
memory
can be viewed fromacat-
egorical
versusaschematic
perspective (Mand ler1979).
Itisin the
protective
beltthatsome of the conflict
between marketershasarisen.
Yet,
based on the Lak-
atosian
reconstruction,
thisis
precisely
where
points
of
d isagreement
should
emerge. Thus,
und erthe SMF
framework,
the rival
explanations
of consumerbe-
havioroffered
by
behaviorism
(McSweeney
and Bier-
ley1984,
Nord and Peter
1980,
Peterand Nord
1982)
and information
processing (Bettman 1979; Lachman,
Lachman,
and Butterfield
1979; Sterthaland
Craig
1982)
is not
unexpected . Ind eed ,
the
generation
of
counter-instances
by
one
conceptualization against
the
otherd oesnotthreaten the refutation of one orthe
othernorof the hard core of
marketing
itself. More-
over,
the
rivalry
is not
necessarilyd ysfunctional
as
long
asboth
conceptual
accountsare
progressive
in
the sense thatboth
generate
new
find ings
and no other
account
emerges
thatis
sufficientlypowerful
to ex-
plain
allthe factsthat
they
d o.
Mid d le-Range
Theories and
Working
Hypotheses
A tthe nextlevelof the
proposed
scheme are the mid -
d le-range
theorieswhichconstitute another
major
source
of d ebate and
controversy.
The
d egree
of
fragmen-
30
/
Journalof
Marketing,
Fall1985
FIGURE 2
Illustrative Structure of the Information
Processing
Research
Program
Central
Buyers
and sellers
Buyers
and sellers
Buyer
and seller
Buyersand sellers
Tenets process and acton store and
represent
behaviorresultsfromhave limited
information received information
they the interaction of information processing
and attend ed to. process in
memoryfor innate information capabilities whichmay
laterretrievaland use.
processing capacities
resultin the use of
and
learning
heuristics in
problem
experiences. solving
and d ecision
making.
Guid ing
How d o
buyers
and How d o
buyers
and What
cognitive
skills Whatare the
Research sellers
acquire,
sellers
represent
d o
buyers
and sellers information
processing
Questions
integrate,
and acton information in
possess, and how are
capabilities
of
buyers
information
presented memory,
and how d o these
d eveloped
and and sellers? Whatare
to them?
they
retrieve itfrom refined ? the heuristics used and
memory? in what situations are
theyapplied ?
How d o
these affect behavior?
T
Mid d le-range Signal
d etection.
Single vs. multistore
Message learning Jud gmentalheuristics.
Theories Information 'mod els of
memory. theories. Information overload .
integration. Categorical
vs.
Stage theories of skill A ttribution.
Reasoned action. schematicmod els of learning. Low involvement.
Cognitive response. memory Developmental
representation.
theories of
cognitive
A nalogical
vs.
'processes.
propositional
representationsof
knowled ge.
1 4, 1 1
i1
Working Buyerperception
of
,Recognition vs. recall Effectsof
familiarity Illusorycorrelation and
Hypotheses and attention toward of
prod uct
information 'and expertise on the
price-prod uct
ad vertisements. 'and ad vertisement 'choice
strategies.
qualityrelationship.
A d d ing
vs.
averaging
content. Effectsof
learning
Vivid ness effect and
of information.
Schema-triggered
goals on
memory
,the effects of case vs.
Compensatory
vs. :affect. retrievaland choice statisticalinformation
noncompensatory
'Information
processing
behaviorin
purchase
in ad vertisements.
approaches
to
buyer 'of picturesand text in :situations.
:A vailability-valence
and sellerd ecision ad vertisements. Proced uraland 'hypothesis and the
making. d eclarative
knowled ge foot-in-the-d ooreffect.
Effectsof context on
and theireffects on Effectsof bound ed
information
acquisition ad aptive selling rationalityand
in consumerand
'behavior. information
ind ustrial
buying
'
impacted ness
on
behavior.
vertical
integration
issues.
tation and
inconsistency
is more intense atthis level.
One reason forthis is thatthere are
simply
a
greater
numberof
mid d le-range
theories
(both
within and across
research
programs) compared
to
higher
levelresearch
programs. Second ,
much
empirical
researchis nec-
essarily
restricted in
scope, examining only
selected
aspects
of a
theory(Bagozzi 1984),
thus
giving
rise
to the
d iversity
of
topics
stud ied .
For
example,
consumer behavior
may
be inter-
preted
in terms of a
cognitive response, message
learning,
oracombinational
approach
within the in-
formation
processing
research
program(Petty
and Ca-
cioppo 1981). In ad d ition, it
may
be consid ered from
the behaviormod ification research
program
in terms
of aclassical
cond itioning, operant cond itioning,
or
vicarious
learning approach(Nord
and Peter
1980).
In
the
marketing
channels and
strategyarea,
the mid d le-
range
theories subsumed
by
the
politicaleconomy
re-
search
programinclud e the transactions costs
ap-
proach(Williamson 1975),
the
agency
cost mod el
(Jensen and
Meckling 1976),
Pfeffer and Salancik's
(1978) resource
d epend encyperspective,
and A nd er-
son's (1982)
constituency-based theory
of the firm.
A tthe lowest levelin the
proposed
scheme are the
Metatheory and
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing / 31
working hypotheses.
In the SMF
framework, few ex-
periments
concerned with
testing
ind ivid ual
working
hypotheses
are consid ered
cruciallyimportant. In-
d eed ,
the extentof
fragmentation
isatits
heightfor,
in ad d ition to the vastnumberof
hypothesesgener-
ated ,
there isthe
problem
thatfew of themare so well-
articulated that
they
issue froma
single mid d le-range
theory.
The latterthus
gives
rise to
possible multiple
interpretations
of the same d ata. For
example,
both
self-perception
and
cognitive
d issonance
theory
have
been
proposed
to
explain whypeople change
theirat-
titud es
(Petty
and
Cacioppo 1981, pp. 170-171). On
the issue of
pricing through
ad istribution
channel, al-
ternative accountshave been
provid ed concerning
the
function of
quantity
d iscounts. These includ e the
transferof
inventory/prod uction costs,
channelco-
ord ination,
and
price
d iscrimination
(Jeuland and
Shugan 1983).
The
problem
of
multiple interpreta-
tionsof the same d atacan be alleviated if
potential
falsifiersare
specified
in
ad vance,
thus
preventing
re-
course to alternative
explanations
subsumed und erthe
ceteris
paribus
clause.
However,
und erthe SMF
framework,
itis
inap-
propriate
to
suggest
thata
theoryhaving
"seven facts
forit
against
three
against
itis notin
good shape"
(Meehl1978, p. 823).
Und erthe SMF
framework,
theoriesare
pitted against
each
other,
withconfir-
mationsalso
provid ing
outcomesof interest
(Serlin
and
Lapsley1985). Ind eed ,
the
history
of
physics
is re-
plete
with
subsequently
successfulresearch
programs
that
proceed ed
in "oceansof anomalies" and d iscon-
firming
evid ence
(Lakatos1978).
It is too rashto
overthrow a
theory
because of arecalcitrant
fact,
and
few researcherswould d o so in
any
of the mature sci-
encesorin
marketing.
Und erthe SMF
framework,
the rational
proced ure
is to examine
empiricald iscrepanciesbythorough
testing
of the ceteris
paribus
clause and
applying
the
positive
heuristicto uncovernew facts. Given
this,
the
variety
of
mid d le-range
theoriesd erived from
higher
levelresearch
programs
in the
"protective
belt" of the
marketing d iscipline
should be in aconstantstate of
contemporary
and historicalevaluation
(Savitt1980).
None can be refuted withoutthe
emergence
of a
supersed ing theorysatisfying
the criteriaof
offering
novel,
excess
information,
some of whichshould be
corroborated .
Hence,
theoryproliferation
is
encouraged
und er
the Lakatosian
framework,
as
competition
between
research
programs
and
mid d le-range
theoriesis es-
sentialforscientific
progress.
On this
point,
Lakatos
isin
agreement
with
Popper(1970)
and
Feyerabend
(1980)
in
arguing
thatKuhn
(1970)
wasincorrectto
suggest
thatthe benefitsof theoretical
monopoly
ex-
ceed ed thatof theoretical
pluralism. However,
the SMF
frameworkd oesnotand isnotmeantto
provid e
sanc-
tuary
forthose theoriesthatd o notd erive fromwithin
the
d iscipline'spositive
heuristic. Further, it
grants
no
philosophical
license forthe retention of those theo-
riesthat
prod uce d egenerative program
shiftsin the
long run,
particularly
withthe
emergence
of
superior
explanations.
Two
implications
for
marketing
science
emerge.
First,
itcan be observed that
many
of the
mid d le-range
theorieshave been borrowed
(e.g.,
in
Figure 2, from
psychology).
This
points
to the need for
build ing
more
ind igenoustheoryguid ed by
the
d iscipline'spositive
heuristicand
issuing
fromatleastone of itsresearch
programs.
This
may
take the formof
synthesizing
or
extend ing
extant
mid d le-range
theoriesthat
may
be
borrowed fromrelated
d isciplines. Second , care should
be exercised in
borrowing
theoriesfromotherd isci-
plines.
The six
principles
of
borrowing provid ed by
Robertson and Ward
(1973) may
be usefulin thisre-
gard .
These
principles
callforthe need to
(1) justify
whatis
borrowed , (2)
examine the relevance of bor-
rowed theoriesfor
explaining marketing behavior, (3)
examine the
legitimacy
of the borrowed
theory
in terms
of
supportive
evid ence in its
originald iscipline, (4)
examine the contextualfitof the borrowed
theory, (5)
recognize
the
complexity
of the behavioralsciences
and the available
competing theories,
and
(6) recog-
nize the situationalconstraintsof the borrowed the-
ory.
Marketing
as aScience
Has
marketing
achieved scientificstatus? Und erthe
Lakatosian
framework,
the answerisa
qualified yes.
In itsfavoris the
argument
thatno othermasterre-
search
program
has
emerged
that
possesses
excess
empirical
contentover
marketing. Moreover, market-
ing
researchershave satisfied thiscriterion to the ex-
tentthatnew d imensionsto theoriesborrowed from
other
d isciplines
have been ad d ed . One
example
isthe
explication
of the Fishbein and
A jzen (1975)
attitu-
d inalmod el. So muchresearchhasbeen accumulated
forthis
mid d le-range theory
thatmulti-attribute atti-
tud e mod elshave been the
subject
of atleastthree
major
review articles
(Lutz
and Bettman
1977,
Ryan
and Bonfield
1975, Wilkie and Pessemier
1973).
A n
illustration atthe research
program
levelcan be found
in
marketing
channelsresearchwhichhas
increasingly
shifted
away
fromthe
behaviorally
based conflictres-
olution research
program(Ster 1969)
toward sthe
po-
litical
economy
research
program(A chrol, Reve,
and
Ster 1983; A rd t 1979, 1983;
Frazier
1983;
Ster and
Reve
1980).
To the extentthatthe
politicaleconomy
framework
integrates
both
sociopolitical
and eco-
nomicstructure and
processes,
it
may
be
argued
that
ithas
greaterexplanatorypower
in
analyzing
inter-
organizational
exchanges
in marketing channels.
(Ini-
tial
empiricalfind ings(Reve 1982), however, seem
32
/
Journalof
Marketing,
Fall1985
to ind icate thatthe two research
programsmay
be more
complementary
than
competing,
withcentralization of
powerbeing
a
majord iscriminating element.)
Whatabout
marketing
asa
d iscipline
itself? His-
tory
hasitthatitevolved outof economics.
However,
itisevid entthat
marketing
hasnot
replaced
its
orig-
inal
parentd iscipline. Ind eed ,
based on the SMF
per-
spective,
this willnot occurunless economics be-
comesa
d egenerative bod y
of research
programs.
The
shift
away
fromso-called received microeconomic
theory
withitsalmosttotal
d epend ence
on axiomatic
mod elsthatare not
empirically
valid ated toward snew
theorieswitha
strategic
orientation
(e.g.,
in infor-
mation economics and ind ustrial
organization
eco-
nomics)
seemsto ensure a
progressive bod y
of re-
search
programs
in economics.
Moreover, the
relationship
between
marketing
and economics has
grad ually
evolved froma
superior-subord inate
basis
toward sacoworkerbasis. For
example,
the interface
and cross-fertilization of id easbetween
marketing
and
economicshas
recently
been
highlighted (Horsky
and
Sen
1980)
with
particular
reference to
pricing (Hauser
1984,
Nagle 1984).
However,
marketing
has
yet
to become amature
science in the Lakatosian
sense,
foramature science
containsasetof research
programs
"in whichnot
only
novelfacts
but,
in an
importantsense,
also novelaux-
iliarytheories,
are
anticipated ;
mature science-un-
like
ped estrian
trial-and -error-has'heuristic
power'"
(Lakatos1978, p. 88).
A sd etractorsof
marketing
have
asserted ,
the
d iscipline
hasitsshare of
"patched -up,
unimaginative
seriesof
ped estrian 'empirical' ad just-
ments" whichhave ". .. no
unifying id ea,
no heu-
ristic
power,
no
continuity" (Lakatos1978, p. 88).
Suchformsof researchhave been cond emned as
being
shotgun,
atheoreticalexercisesin fact
gathering
and
d atacollection
(Jacoby1978,
Olson
1982).
Conse-
quently,
it
may
nothave been too
surprising
forLeone
and Schultz
(1980)
to remarkthatscientific
general-
izationshave been ratherelusive in
marketing.
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing
The focusof d iscussion now shiftsfrom
marketing's
metatheoretical
und erpinnings
toward its
method olog-
icalorientation. In contrastto the
vigorousd ialog
con-
cerning
the
d iscipline'sphilosophicalallegiance,
d e-
batesaboutmethod atametalevelhave been more
infrequent(Sauer,
Nighswonger,
and Zaltman
1982).
Deshpand e (1983, p. 104)
hasremarked thatless at-
tention hasbeen focused on "the
implications
of mar-
keting theory
for
marketing
researchmethod ."
Essentially,
this issue turnson the
question
of
whether
marketing's
metatheoretical
perspective
biases
itsresearch
method ologies.
A nd erson
(1983)
hasnoted
thatthe
d iscipline'slogicalempiricistperspective is
characterized
by
itsreliance on the ind uctive statisti-
calmethod
exemplified by
the PIMS stud ies, while
Deshpand e (1983)
hascommented on its
neglect
of
qualitative
method s. Ind eed , Bagozzi (1984) hasad -
vocated thatstructural
equationsmod eling
be the
ap-
propriate
researchmethod for
marketing.
While itis
not
d isputed
thatstructural
equationsmod eling
hasa
rightfulplace
in
marketing research, there is
d anger
in
being overlyd epend ent
on a
particular
method . Box
(1976)
labels this
method ologicalsingularism
as
cookbookery
orthe
tend ency
"to force all
problems
into the mold sof one ortwo routine
techniques,
in-
sufficient
thoughtbeing given
to the real
objectives
of
the
investigation
orto the relevance of the
assump-
tions
implied by
the
imposed
method "
(p. 797).
Method ological
Pluralism
The SMF
framework,
in
contrast,
calls forameth-
od ologicalpluralism
in the
d iscipline-a
view con-
sistentwiththe Lakatosian tenetof
trying
to lookat
thingseclectically.
The
proliferation
of rivaltheories
thusextend sto research
method ologies. However,
the
SMF
perspective
d oes not sanction
method ological
anarchy(Feyerabend 1980)
withits
"anything goes"
prescription
thatseemsto
suggestmaintaining
an in-
ventory
of research
techniquessimply
forthe sake of
variety. Rather,
itcallsforthe need to more
d eeply
examine the
limitations,
assumptions,
and relevance
of researchmethod s
employed
in
marketing
research.
Recentreviewsof factor
analysis(Stewart1981),
repeated
measures
analysis(LaTour
and Miniard
1983),
stepwise multiple regression (McIntyre
etal.
1983),
cluster
analysis(Punj
and Stewart
1983),
d iscriminant
analysis(Crask
and Perreault
1977),
canonicalcor-
relation
(Lambert
and Durand
1975), conjointanaly-
sis
(Green
and Srinivasan
1978),
statistical
signifi-
cance
testing (Sawyer
and Peter
1983),
and structural
equationsmod eling (Bagozzi 1980, Fornell
1983)
representattempts
at
accomplishing
this
objective
as
wellas
pointing
out
possible misapplications
of are-
searchmethod .
Moreover,
sucheffortshave
impli-
cationsata
d eeper, metamethod ological
level.
Hence,
if
marketing
science should aimto seek
knowled ge
for
the sake of
knowled ge
and
d e-emphasize
itstieswith
the
marketing manager(A nd erson 1983,
Hunt
1984),
the
argument
thatmarketersneed
onlyapply
research
method sis
consid erably
weakened .
A ttempts
atas-
sessing
the
problem-solving efficacy, ad vantages,
and
limitationsof researchmethod sshould therefore be
encouraged , particularly
in
light
of their
growing
so-
phistication (Helgeson
etal.
1984). Furthermore,
in
the SMF
framework,
the researchmethod would con-
stitute an
integralpart
of the ceteris
paribus
clause
whenevera
theory
is
put
to test. Hence, itisessential
to
thoroughly
examine the researchmethod in
testing
Metatheory
and
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing
/ 33
the ceteris
paribus
clause before
anyanomaly
can be-
come a
refuting
instance.
In so
d oing, however, marketing
researchersshould
resistthe
temptation
termed
by
Box
(1976)
asmath-
ematistry,
whichisa
tend ency
to red efine ratherthan
solve astatistical
problem. "Typically,
there hasonce
been astatistical
problem
withscientificrelevance
but
thishas
long
since been lost
sight
of"
(Box 1976, p.
797).
Box
argues
that
mathematistry
is harmful
be-
cause researcherswho are notthemselvesstatisticians
may
become
"(O)verawed by
what
they
d o notun-
d erstand ,
..
.mistakenly
d istrusttheirown common
sense and
ad optinappropriate proced ures
d evised
by
mathematicians withno scientific
experience" (p. 798).
Clearly,
this
implies
the need for
applied
and math-
ematicalstatisticiansaswellas
d esigners
of investi-
gations
and d ata
analysts
in the
d iscipline.
Further,
consistentwiththe viewsof
Popper(1959)
and Laud an
(1984),
the SMF
perspective argues
that
itisreasonable to
ad optonly
those method sthatmar-
keting
researcherscan
rationally
d efend as
being likely
to achieve their
objectives.
Itis contend ed thatthe
method ologicalobjectives
of
marketing
researchers
based on SMF tenetsare:
(1)
to
subject
theoriesto
strong
threatsof
refutation,
and
(2)
to
apply
researchmeth-
od swiththe
greatestproblem-solving efficacy
to un-
covernew
find ings.
Boththese
objectives
willcon-
tribute to
marketing'sachieving
statusas amature
science
byaid ing
the
d evelopment
and valid ation of
theoriesin the
d iscipline.
Severalmod er research
method sin
marketing
willnow be examined
along
SMF
tenets,
includ ing
nulland
range hypothesistesting,
structural
equationsmod eling,
and various
qualitative
method s.
StatisticalMethod s
The d ominantd ata
analytictechnique
in
marketing
is
the classicaltestof statistical
significance.
Forex-
ample,
Peter
(1983) reports
that
many
consumerre-
searchersoften
rely
on statistical
significance
teststo
provid e
evid ence forthe
valid ity
of theirresearch
hy-
potheses.
Severalscholarsin
psychology(Meehl1967,
1978),
ed ucation
(Carver1978),
and
marketing (Peter
1983, Sawyer
and Peter
1983)
have faulted itsuse.
Meehl
(1978)
asserts that". .. the almost universal
reliance on
merelyrefuting
the null
hypothesis
asthe
stand ard method for
corroborating
substantive theo-
riesisaterrible
mistake,
is
basicallyunsound ,
poor
scientific
strategy,
and one of the worst
things
that
ever
happened
in the
history
of
psychology" (p. 817).
Likewise,
Peter
(1983)
remarksthatstatistical
signif-
icance tests ". .. taken
alone,
as
theyfrequently
are
in consumer
research,
provid e
an insufficienthurd le
for
jud ging
research
find ings" (p. 391).
These criticisms
point
to the d eleteriouseffectthat
trad itional
null-hypothesistesting
hashad on the d e-
tection of
progress
and the accumulation of knowl-
ed ge
in
marketing. Thus, if we are to avoid
being
d rowned "in amassof
meaningless
and
potentially
mislead ing junk" (Jacoby1978, p. 87), marketing
re-
searchersmustreevaluate thismethod foritsuseful-
nessin
generating
and
accepting knowled ge.
Thisis
because und erfalsificationist
tenets, scientifictheo-
riesmustbe
continuallysubjected
to severe tests. If
marketing
is
incapable
of
generating
suchtestsand
cannot
expose
itstheoriesto
strong
testsof refutation
(even
with
increasing
measurement
precision),
then
its
objective
of
achieving
the statusof amature sci-
ence
might
be
seriously
und ermined .
The basic
problem
with
null-hypothesistesting
proced ures
lieswiththe inferencesaboutsubstantive
theoriesmad e fromthe statisticalinformation
they
provid e (Meehl1967).
The
appraisal
of asubstantive
theory
T entailssome constraint on the
population
value
of the statistical
parameter
JL.
However,
the con-
straintson
pL
in
marketing
are said to be weak
(since
we test
against
the straw man
competitor, zero).
Sta-
tistical
precision provid es
information for
d rawing
in-
ferencesabouthow
ad equately
aresearcherhases-
tablished the actualvalue of
pL
and withwhat
d egree
of confid ence conclusions
regard ing
T can be mad e
(Serlin
and
Lapsley1985).
The crucial
question is,
having
arrived atan es-
timate of
pL,
even with
perfectprecision,
how d oes
thisaffectthe
plausibility
of T? Meehl
(1967)
would
argue
thatthe
typicalnull-hypothesis
testin
marketing
is so weakasto be worthlesswhen
passed .
Thisis
true notbecause of
anyuncertaintyregard ing
the
pos-
teriorestimation of the tested
parameter's
value but
because the
priorparameter
constraintis so
meager.
In
short,
the initialconstrainton
tL
in
marketing
would
be so weakthatthe statisticaltestcannot
speak
mean-
ingfully
to the
plausibility
of T. The reason forthis
isthatthe null
hypothesis
in
marketing
haslittle to d o
with
point
valuesorfunction formsd erived fromthe-
ory.
A s
such,
rejection
of the null-which is
quasi-
always
false
(Meehl1967, 1978)
and can almostal-
ways
be assured withsufficientstatistical
power-
provid es
an
easy
observationalhurd le fortheoriesin
marketing.
Bagozzi (1984)
offersan alternative method for
theory
construction and
testing
in
marketing
based on
the structural
equation approach.
In contrastto the re-
jection-support
formof trad itional
null-hypothesis
testing,
where
rejection
of the null
impliesempirical
support
forthe
theorybeing tested ,
the structural
equation
method isan
example
of the
acceptance-sup-
port
formof
hypothesistesting.
Und erthe
latter,
the
role of the research
hypothesis
is reversed
(Fornell
1983),
and itisthe
acceptance
of the null
hypothesis
(d erived fromsubstantive
theory)
that
provid es
em-
piricalsupport
forthe
theory
und ertest. The
good -
34
/ Journal of
Marketing,
Fall1985
ness-of-fittestin the structural
equationsapproach
has
asits null
hypothesis
there
being
no d ifference
be-
tween the
hypothesized
mod eland the d ata.
Empirical
support
forthe mod elisobtained
bynonrejection
of
thisnull
hypothesis.
Thisformof
hypothesistesting
isnotwithoutits
flaws. Recallthatwithsufficient
power
the nullisal-
most
alwaysrejected .
Forthe
rejection-support
form
of
hypothesistesting,
thismeansthat
empiricalsup-
port
forone's
theory
is
conceivablyalways
forthcom-
ing,
whichin turn
implies
thatfew
(if any)
theories
willbe invalid ated . Forthe
acceptance-support
form
of
hypothesistesting,
sufficient
power
willensure that
the substantive
theory(hypothesized mod el)
und ertest
willbe refuted withthe almost
guaranteed rejection
of the null. Thisfurther
implies
thatone can con-
ceivably
neverfind
empiricalsupport
forone's
theory
and ,
in
turn,
a
d iscipline may
be leftwithout
any
the-
ory
whatsoever.3
One solution to this
problem
lies in
ad opting
a
method thatis consistentwiththe SMF
perspective
and
that,
even withinfinite
sample size,
d oesnotal-
waysreject
the null
hypothesis.
A sMeehl
(1978)
has
noted ,
when ascientistexaminesan
experimental
re-
sult, he/she
consid ersthe
d egree
to whichitisin rea-
sonablygood
accord with
theory.
Suchascientisthas
therefore setstand ard sthatind icate whatkind sof ex-
perimental
outcomesare
good enough.
In
effect,
this
imposes
asetof constraintson the statistical
param-
etersto be estimated from
sample
d ata. Itis an ex-
tension of the falsificationistd emand thatscientists
establish,
in
ad vance,
what
they
will
accept
asare-
futing
instance.
Serlin and
Lapsley(1985)
recommend a
hypoth-
esis
testing proced ure
based on this
"Good -Enough
Principle." Essentially,
their
proced ure
involvesthe
replacement
of the trad itionalnull
hypothesis
of no
d ifference
by
a
complex range
null
hypothesisstipu-
lating
a
region
of effects of triviald ifference.4 The
magnitud e
of this
"good -enough
belt"
may
be ex-
pressed
in termsof effectsizesormeasuresof asso-
ciation. When the
experiment
is
performed ,
astatis-
'Conversely, empiricalsupportmay
be obtained
given sufficiently
low
power.
Note thatthe
d egrees
of freed omforthe likelihood ratio
chi-square
statisticused in structural
equationsmod eling
are notbased
on
sample
size. However,
large samples
are
required
because small
samples
tend to
prod uce
unstable results. The reversalof the role of
the research
hypothesispresents
another
problem:
the
ability(power)
to
reject
the research
hypothesis
is notknown
(Fornell1983).
4The
logic
behind thisisthat
hypothesistesting
allows inferencesto
be d rawn
onlyfollowing rejection
of the
null, since researchershave
tight
statisticalcontrolover
Type
I
error, i.e., the rate of false the-
oretical
support. Thus, to
implementgood -enoughhypothesistesting,
researchersmustfirstd etermine whatd ifference would be consid ered
substantivelyimportant
and
empirically
relevantand then
specify
its
complement(i.e., ad ifference of less than substantive
significance)
asthe null
hypothesis. Rejection
of the
null, therefore, provid es
sub-
stantive
support
forthe
theory
und ertest.
ticaltestisused to establishif the
expected
value of
the
d epend ent
variable iswithin the
good -enough
belt.
If the d ataind icate
so, then the null
hypothesis
isnot
rejected
and
empiricalsupport
forthe
theory
is not
obtained . Note thatthe effectsof increased
sample
size
are not
problematic,
since withincreased
precision
the
imprecision
involved in
estimating
the
population
value
isred uced . In the limitof infinite
precision,
theoret-
ical
support
isobtained
byfind ing
a
sample
value out-
sid e the
good -enough
belt. Lackof such
support
is
evid enced
by
a
sample
value found within the
good -
enough
belt.
Thus,
even withinfinite
sample size, the
null
hypothesis
witha
good -enough
beltisnot
always
false. Foramore d etailed
exposition
and anumerical
illustration of the statistical
proced ure
used to accom-
panygood -enoughhypothesistesting,
see Serlin and
Lapsley(1985).
Several
suggestions
have
recently
been forward ed
to overcome the
problems
in structural
equations
mod eling (e.g., Fornelland Bookstein
1982, Forell
and Larcker
1981).
One suchmethod
proposed by
Bentlerand Bonnett
(1980)
seemsto be
particularly
consistentwiththe tenetsof
good -enoughhypothesis
testing. Briefly,
theirmethod involves hierarchical
comparisons
and the use of normed and nonnormed
incrementalfit ind ices thatred uce the
problem
of
sample
size and eliminate that
concerning
the reversal
of the role of the research
hypothesis.
The Bentlerand Bonnett
(1980) approach
is still
open
to
potential
abuse in the case where mod elsthat
would be
rejected
on an overall
chi-square
test
may
be
accepted
because
theyrepresent
a
statisticallysig-
nificant
improvement
overan alternative and
highly
unlikely
nullmod el. Based on the
good -enoughprin-
ciple, however,
thisd rawbackcan be alleviated since
aresearcherwould be
required
to
stipulate
in ad vance
a
good -enough
nullmod eld erived fromsubstantive
theory
aswellasthe incremental
improvements
in fit
thatwould be consid ered
acceptable. Ind eed , it
sug-
gests
thatresearchersalso
specify
a
priori
the alter-
native mod elsthatwillbe used in hierarchicalcom-
parison. By
so
d oing, competing
mod elsare tested
against
eachotherand not
merelyagainst
d ata. More-
over,
ex
post
facto
analyses(e.g., examining partial
d erivativesormod ification
ind ices)
that
represent
a
source of
ped estrian empiricalad justment
d iscussed
earlierare
prevented .
A s Cliff
(1983) cautions,
once
aresearcherstarts
ad justing
amod elin
light
of the
d ata,
"the mod ellosesitsstatusasa
hypothesis,
and
thatmod el
finally
chosen
represents
in
practice
amuch
more unstable
picture
of whatis
reallygoing
on"
(p.
124).
In
sum,
the
good -enoughprinciple
servesatleast
three
purposes:(1)
the a
priori specification
of what
effects(mod els) are of substantive
significance fol-
lowsfalsificationisttenetsof
d efining
whatascientist
Metatheory
and
Metamethod ology
in
Marketing /
35
will
accept
as
"facts"; (2) provid es
amore
powerful
testof a
theorybyinsisting
thatscientists
quantita-
tivelyspecify
in ad vance whatd ifference
(incremental
improvement
in
fit)
willbe consid ered cred ible
and
empiricallyrelevant;
and
(3) bystiffening
the
obser-
vational
hurd le,
red ucesthe numberof theories-of-the-
monthwhile
d eveloping
a
bod y
of
good -enoughthe-
ories.
Qualitative Method s
Recently,
interesthasbeen rekind led
regard ing
the
role
of
qualitative
method sin
marketing (Deshpand e 1983,
Droge
and Calantone
1984).
Based on the SMF
per-
spective,
the
key
issue
appears
to be whether
quali-
tative method scan
help provid e
ad d itional
insights
beyond
that furnished
by quantitative (statistical)
method s. This
appears
to be the case.
First,
qualita-
tive method s
may
aid in
d iscovering
new
propositions
or
hypotheses(Reichard t
and Cook
1979)
suchasthe-
ories-in-use
(Zaltman, LeMasters,
and
Heffring 1982).
Since thisisawell-d ocumented benefitof
qualitative
method s,
we shallnot
pursue
itin
greater
d etailhere.
Second ,
qualitative
method s
may
be
employed
for
rigoroustheorytesting. Campbell(1975),
forexam-
ple,
d iscussed how to create
"d egrees
of freed om" in
case
stud ies,
arguing
for
capitalizing
on the richness
of d etailwithin a
single
case
bylooking
for
multiple
implications
of the theoreticalid eas
being
tested . The
single
case thusbecomesasetof d iverse manifesta-
tionsof a
theory.
Eachmanifestation ratherthan each
case can be
thought
of asaunitof
analysis
in which
a
particular
effect
may
be
present.
When examined as
a
whole,
the
single
case hasmore observationsthan
variables. Thiscreatessufficient
d egrees
of freed om
fortestsof substantive
hypotheses.
A n
interesting
ex-
ample
of
Campbell's
method isWilson's
(1980)
case
stud y
of the New
England
freshfishmarketwhich
tested
implications
d rawn fromWilliamson's
(1975)
transactionscosts
approach.
McClintock,
Brannon,
and
Maynard -Mood y(1983)
extend ed
Campbell's(1975) proposal
in three
signif-
icant
ways
in
introd ucing
theircase clustermethod .
These includ e:
(1)
using surveysampling proced ures
and the
optional
ad d ition of
quantified
measurement
and multivariate statistical
techniques
to
qualitative
approaches
ford ata
analysis; (2)
d efining implement-
able unitsof
analysis
thatare both
sufficiently
stable
for
sampling purposes
and lend themselvesto the
pos-
sible
application
of stand ard ized
cod es;
and
(3) having
key
informantsassistin the enumeration of a
sampling
frame,
a
proced ure
somewhat
analogous
to snowball
sampling.
This
approach
isan
example
of how statis-
ticaland
qualitative
method scan be
fruitfully
com-
bined in
theorytesting.
Boththe case
stud y
and case
clustermethod thus
appear
to be amenable to classical
aswellas
range hypothesistesting.
A notherareaof contribution for
qualitative meth-
od sliesin theiruse for
triangulation purposes(Desh-
pand e 1983).
The effectivenessof
triangulation
isbased
on the
premise
thatthe weaknessesof one method will
be offset
by
the
counterbalancing strengths
of another.
Jick
(1983) d elineated five
important
benefitsof trian-
gulation:(1)
itallowsresearchersto be more confi-
d entof their
results; (2)
itstimulatesthe creation of
inventive method sand new
ways
of
capturing
a
prob-
lemto balance withconventionald atacollection tech-
niques; (3)
it
helps
to uncoverd eviantd imensionsof
a
phenomenon
outof whichold theoriesare mod ified
ornew theories
d eveloped ; (4)
it
synthesizes
orinte-
gratesexisting theories;
and
(5)
itservesasatestfor
competing
theories.
A final
ad vantage implicit
in the d iscussion sur-
round ing qualitative
method sliesin their
variety.
Van
Maanen, Dabbs, and Faulkner
(1982) provid e
ad is-
cussion of various
qualitative
method s
includ ing
case
stud ies,
participantobservation, content
analysis,
for-
maland informal
interviewing,
archivald ata
surveys,
historical
analysis,
frame
analysis,
and ethnomethod -
ology. However, just
as withstatistical
method s,
method ological
assessmentsneed to be carried outto
d etermine the
problem-solving efficacy
of
qualitative
method s. Initialworkon the
key
informant
technique
(e.g.,
Houston and Sud man
1975,
John and Reve
1982,
Phillips1981)
and focus
groups(Cald er1977)
seems
to be
promising.
Limitations
A firstlimitation of the SMF
perspective
is the ac-
ceptability
of itsmid d le-of-the road characteristic
by
ad herentsof
empiricism
and relativism.
Ind eed ,
Lak-
atoshasbeen criticized fornot
being enough
of arel-
ativistoran
empiricist(Berkson 1976,
Toulmin
1976).
Thus,
a
possible
limitation is
marketing's
reluctance
to
accept
the Lakatosian mid d le-of-the-road charac-
teristic.
A second criticismof the SMF
perspective
isthat
it
provid es
no
specific
measure of scientific
progress
so thatitisd ifficultto d etermine if researchersin a
d iscipline
are
making
betterorworse choices
(Suppe
1977, Toulmin
1976).
In its
d efense, the SMF
per-
spective
offerssound criteriaforthe evaluation of the
progressivity
of research
programs(e.g.,
internalcon-
sistency, originality, unifying potential,
and heuristic
power).
Evid ence forthis
may
be found
byexamining
the numberand
quality
of
mid d le-range
theoriesand
the extentof research
activity
atthe levelof
working
hypotheses
in a
particular
research
program.
More-
over, to the extentthatresearchers
pursue
aresearch
program
based on some sortof a
cost/benefit
com-
putation (Laud an 1977),
aresearch
program'spro-
gressivity
can be
"measured "
by
its
ability
to attract
36
/
Journal of
Marketing,
Fall1985
and retain the
brightest
and most creative
researchers
in the
d iscipline.
These researcherswould be the ones
most
capable
of
extend ing
the
positive
heuristicof a
research
program
and
ensuring
its
continuity.
A third criticismleveled at the SMF
perspective
is thatthe hard core of aresearch
program
d oes not
constitute scientific
reality(Berkson 1976).
In other
word s,
researchers are seen to
freely
and
easily
shift
their
allegiance
fromone research
program
to another.
However,
it is
posited
that this
process
is farfrom
easy.
A s an
illustration,
few behaviorists would sub-
scribe to the information
processing
research
program
overnight,
and vice versa. The Lakatosian
explanation
is
that,
as
long
asthe
positive
heuristicof behaviorism
continues to
generate
novel
facts,
bothresearch
pro-
grams
would continue to be
pursued .
A finalcriticismd irected toward s the SMF
per-
spective
is thatitd oes not
emphasize
the creative as-
pects
of
theory
construction
(Toulmin 1976).
In his
d efense,
Lakatos intend ed to extend
Popper's
falsifi-
cationist
perspective
in a
progressive
mannerwithhis
notion of the research
program.
A s
such,
it was not
his
objective
to
suggest explicit
meansof
creating
the-
ories.
However,
byad vocating
ahistoricalview of
science,
it
may
be
argued
thatLakatos
ind irectly
ad -
d resses issues in the
(so-called ) logic
of
d iscovery.
Moreover,
the SMF
perspective argues
forthe
ad op-
tion of
techniques
that
may
lead to the construction
of new theories.
The
alleged
limitations of SMF seemto be out-
weighed by
its
potential
benefits to the
d iscipline.
To
reiterate,
these benefits includ e: (1) encouraging both
theoreticaland
method ological pluralism,
thus mini-
mizing
the
possibilities
of
conceptualmyopia
and biases
in the choice of researchmethod s; (2) furnishing stan-
d ard sof
quality
controlfor
evaluating
research
pro-
grams
and
hopefully ensuring
a
stead yad vancement
of
marketing science; (3) suggesting method ological
objectives
that
provid e
useful criteriafor
assessing
present
and
potential
research
method s; and (4) pro-
vid ing
areconstruction of
marketing
science consis-
tentwiththe
contemporary
structure of the
d iscipline.
FinalRemarks
In
conclusion,
the SMF frameworkisboth
d escriptive
and
prescriptive.
Itis
d escriptive
when
applied
to the
rationalreconstruction of
marketing
science. In so
d oing
itis
prescriptive,
since itoffers
general
stand ard sfor
a
maturing d iscipline.
Withthe
growing
numberof
d ivergent philosophical
views of
marketing science,
researchers in the
d iscipline
can now
freely
choose
froma
largerarray
of metatheoretical
perspectives.
However, just
as with
competing
research
programs,
the selection of an
appropriate
metatheoretical
per-
spective
should be d etermined
by
its
long-termprob-
lem-solving efficacy
and
capability
of
initiating
in-
quiry
into new areas. Forwhile it is
important
for
marketing
researchersto d isseminate theirtheoretical
contributionsto otherscientific
communities,
itis their
perceptions
of whatis and whatis
good
fortheird is-
cipline
that
ultimately
affects
d ay-to-d ay
research.
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