1

G.R. No. 192828 November 28, 2011

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6,
JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S.
BALAJADIA, Respondents.


Facts:
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002, the respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and
Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources
Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon)
and his successors-in-interest.
They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph
Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes
Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The
respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was
adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators
identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for murder filed against him.

On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's
entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the
respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended Complaint?

Held:
Deny the instant petition.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.

2
G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009
LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER, Respondents.


Facts:
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor
Montaer-Dalupan are their children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims,
filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court.

In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the
late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow
of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the
properties comprising the estate of the decedent. Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among
others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of
the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no
jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed
to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish
filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court held that
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.


Issue:
Respondent Sharia District Court Marawi City did not acquire jurisdiction over the estates and properties of the late Alejandro
Montaner, Sr. which is not a natural or juridical person with capacity to be sued?


Held:
The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in
which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has
definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party
seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status,
right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not
being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to
determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same

3
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

Facts:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file
their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for
agent's commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by
petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on
the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why
the money claim was not filed and served personally.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping.
He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Issue:
Did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to
his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

Held:
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that
a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent
are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be
barred, subject to certain exceptions.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

4
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET
AL., petitioners, vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent

Facts:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for
probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the
will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an
opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the
presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
The court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence
of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it
more specific.
To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the
decision of the probate court is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200.000.00

Issue:
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Held:
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the amount
in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents
(herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the
entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the
marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse

Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special
proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special
proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings.
5
[G.R. No. L-26751. January 31, 1969.]
JOSE S. MATUTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division) and MATIAS S. MATUTE,
respondents.


Facts:
When Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias
S. Matute, filed in special proceeding a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos')
appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that "for a period of more than two years from the date of his appointment, said
Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his administration," and that he "is not only
incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas on account of a
criminal charge for murder filed against him which is occupying most of his time."
The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence, the certiorari. The respondent
contends that the disputed order removing him as co-administrator is a patent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner
advances the reason in support of the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the respondent all the opportunity to
adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence

Issue:
Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to special proceedings such that its disregard
by the probate court amounts to grave abuse of discretion

Held:
Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The application of the above cited Rule in special
proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by the Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued
the controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own
evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial
of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted
grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.

6
Ventura vs Ventura
7
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M.
TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and
IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

Facts:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived
by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M.
Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda
Manalo, who are all of legal age.
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of
Tarlac.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition
with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila

of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and
for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
Regional Trial Court of Manila

of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment
of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
Trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners therein on March 16, 1993

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which
denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate?

Held:
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of
the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be
emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of
collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action

8
G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008
OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C.
REYES, respondents.


Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent were siblings together with two others, namely Pedro and Anastacia, in a family business
established as Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), from which they owned shares of stocks. The Pedro and Anastacia
subsequently died. The former had his estate judicially partitioned among his heirs, but the latter had not made the same in her
shareholding in Zenith. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against
petitioner (1) a derivative suit to obtain accounting of funds and assets of Zenith, and (2) to determine the shares of stock of
deceased Pedro and Anastacia that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar, and were unaccounted for]. In his
answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied the illegality of the acquisition of shares of Anastacia and questioned the jurisdiction
of SEC to entertain the complaint because it pertains to settlement of [Anastacias] estate. The case was transferred to.
Petitioner filed Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and must be dismissed. RTC denied the motion.
The motion was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, but was again
denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that should be dismissed under the Interim Rules of
Procedure of Intra-Corporate Controversies?


Held:
Yes. The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action and must specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. These rules find
specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or
misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the stockholders.
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that, without
supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of
action. Fraud and mistake are required to be averred with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert the
particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake. Tested against these standards, charges of fraud against Oscar
were not properly supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly
committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial courts
jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of
shares can be characterized as illegal and fraudulent were not explained nor elaborated on. The case must be dismissed.

9
G.R. No. 177066 September 11, 2009
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner,
vs.
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent.

Facts:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003,
petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against
respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving
heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed
that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from
1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.


On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a decision ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect
the corporate books.
According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth
certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno

Issue:
WON CA erred in ruling that filiation of Joselito Puno, is not duly proven or established?

Held:
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights
and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate
proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation.
The doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an
heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the
latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
action, as in a case for the recovery of property.
10
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.

Facts:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo
mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte.
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law.
More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank.
Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of
them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the
new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by
the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the
subject lot from the Bank.
Herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA and ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject
property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of
the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by
the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the
Bank.

Held:
The court is not persuaded.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively
owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties
during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in
favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was
issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive
ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of
his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim.
Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
11
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS,
ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.

Facts:
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew
George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y.
Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
decedent. The trial court, sitting as probate court, granted the motion of the private respondents. Subsequently, Rufina filed an
amended complaint alleging that the real properties included in the inventory were acquired by Pastor during his marriage with
petitioner making these properties conjugal in nature. The trial court then ruled in favor of Rufina, setting aside its earlier order.
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald
Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim. Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari, with
an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents.

Issue:
Whether the trial court, sitting as a probate court, may pass upon the issue of ownership of the properties the privaterespondents
seek to exclude from the inventory of the estate of the deceased.


Held:

NO.

A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare
assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the
inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registeredin the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct fromtheir stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents
should stand undisturbed.
12
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION
CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
respondents.

Facts:
Senator Cuenco died and was survived by widow (petitioner) and 2 sons residing at Quezon City; and by his children of first
marriage (respondents) residing in Cebu. Respondent filed Petition for Letters of Administration with CFI Cebu, which set it for
hearing, but ordered that it was premature since there was yet publication of notice of hearing. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with
CFI Quezon probate of deceased's last will and for issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Having learned of intestate proceeding in CFI Cebu, petitioner opposed petition of appointment of special administrator and filed
Motion to Dismiss. CFI Cebu deferred to probate proceedings in CFI Quezon. Respondent did not oppose in CFI Cebu, but in
CFI Quezon the probate; assailed jurisdiction of CFI Quezon due to lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. CFI Quezon
denied Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration and admitted to probate the will.
Respondents filed special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored
respondents since CFI Cebu had jurisdiction first. Petitioner's MR was denied; hence, petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not CFI Quezon is the proper venue.?

Held:
YES. Court with whom petition is first filed, must first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts (R73 of Rules of Court).
Implicit in CFI Cebu's order was that if will was admitted to probate by CFI Quezon, then it would decline to take cognizance of
intestate petition which would be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to CFI Quezon to the exclusion of all
other courts. In effect, CFI Quezon will determine decedent's residence and whether he did leave a will upon which would
depend the proper venue of estate proceedings.
13
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

Facts:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who was previously the governor of the Province of
Laguna. During the lifetime of Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit who
predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, who later obtained a decree
granting absolute divorce before the family court of Hawaii. The third marriage was with the respondent, Felicidad Sagalongos,
who he lived with for 18 years up to the time of his death.
After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and the settlement of the estate. A
petition for administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati City.
The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) venue was improperly laid
since the petition should be filed in Laguna where Felicisimo was the elected governor; (2) Respondent does not have legal
capacity to sue because her marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the decree of absolute decree is not binding in the
Philippines.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Issue:

1. Whether venue was properly laid.
2. Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Held:
1. Venue was properly laid. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate should be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v.
CA, we laid down the rule that for determining venue, the residence of the decedent is determining. Residence for
settlement of estate purposes means his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence of place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It
is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
2. The divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Corwin, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse. However, the respondent was not
able to provide sufficient documentation to prove the decree of divorce obtained in Hawaii.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties acquired during their cohabitation.

14
Fule vs. Court of Appeals, SCRA 189

Facts:

On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with
CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and exparte appointment as special administratix over the estate. Motion was
granted anf there was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio. Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in behalf of
their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as
a mere illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeed from him4.CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule
Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.

Issue:
WON the venue is proper?

Held:

Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of
Laguna was improper. Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse. However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred by
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the place of residence of the deceased.

RULE 79 SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and
should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person
who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
15
TOMAS TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.


Facts:



Issue:



Held:

16
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

Facts:
Efraim Santibanez and his son Edmund entered into 2 loan agreements with First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC).
February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator
of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them
was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC.On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. USMB then made demand letters to Edmund and
Florence for their debts with FCCC.
Edmund was nowhere to be found (he went to the US) so all demands went to Florence. USMB stated that since she and
Edmund executed a joint agreement for the partition of the estate, she is liable for the debts. Florence said alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her
brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the
joint agreement. The TC denies the claim of USMB for lack of merit.

Issue:
Can USMB file a claim against Florence and the estate since the estate was already partitioned between Edmund and her?

Held:
NO.
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no
valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated: USMB should have filed its claim with the probate court as
provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null
and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. The Court notes that the loan was contracted
by the decedent. USMB, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the
probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether itis a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute theresidue. Perusing the records of the case,
nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. Claim denied.

17
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.

Facts:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-
9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.
7
Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
12
dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its
discretion.


Issue:
WON lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedict

Held:
Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be
entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89
concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate
residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed
by the petitioners.

18
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR
YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title,
leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of petitioners who are
Magdalenos collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdalenos lawful heirs.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was
proper?

Held:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.
This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

19
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.


Facts:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents
who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer). Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.
3
In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise
claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other
The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in

Issue:
CA erred in affirming that petition for letter of administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Pinas?

Held:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed
in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed.
Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
14

Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant.
20
A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P)
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant,
vs.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent.


Facts:
The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was
occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate.
On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11
leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorneys fees, expenses and costs.
3
At the time, respondent was the Clerk of
Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12
Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondents offer in view of an application to purchase already filed by the actual
occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval of
Offers
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed between respondent and the Hodges
Estate represented by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R. Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to respondent on installment for
the total purchase price of P50,000.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new certificate
of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued on December 5, 1994. Lot 11 was later subdivided into two
lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which the corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468), also in the name of respondent,
were issued on February 28, 1997.

Issue:



Held:

21
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, claimants-appellees.

Facts:
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession a homestead,
consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.


Issue:



Held:

22
G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009
PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners, , the instant petition is DENIED
vs.
FE S. FACTOR, Respondent.

Facts:
Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in Almanza, Las Pias City. The
ownership of the land originated from respondents paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor who
had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the land even before
1906.
The children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor filed a Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation of
Imperfect Title to the said parcel of land.
The children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor thereafter sold seven (7) hectares of the Factor family property
during the same year.
When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor compound including the subject rest house and
other residential houses for lease was transferred and entrusted to Enriques eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao.
Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fes claim of ownership of the subject property and the alleged prior ownership of her father
Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property was owned by Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband.
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 79 ruled in favor of Fe S. Factor.
The RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 198, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC


Issue:
The Honorable court of appeals seriously erred when it misappreciated the fact that the respondent has a better right of physical
and material possession of the subject property?

Held:
The right of respondents predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to uphold respondents right to
possession over the same. Respondents right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their
fathers death. As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.
Such rights are enforced and protected from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent
acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.

23
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Facts:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without
Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio;
and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation,
Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh.
5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment
of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.

Issue:
Whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23 of
the same court?

Held:
We find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia
Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings
for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission
and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close
the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties