Huifeng 2014

Shi huifeng: Dependent Origination = EmptinessNgrjunas Innovation?
1
Dependent Origination = Emptiness
Ngrjunas Innovation?
An Examination of the Early and
Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources
Sh hifng
Abstract
It is claimed that one of the innovative contributions of Ngrjuna
in his Madhyamaka thought was establishing the equivalence of
emptiness (P: suat, Skt: nyat; kng , kngxng ) and
dependent origination (P: paicca samuppda, Skt: prattya samutpda;
Ch: ynyn , ynq ). This study examines early and
mainstream Buddhist textual sources to discover what relationship
between emptiness and dependent origination was established before
Ngrjuna.
In Part 1, we broadly outline the near paradigmatic modern Buddhist
studies discourse on the teachings of emptiness. We then focus on the
role of Ngrjunas Madhyamaka within this discourse. Lastly, this
study rounds of with a literature review of studies on emptiness and
dependent origination before Ngrjuna.
Part 2 covers the early teachings found in the Pli Nikyas and
(Chinese translations of) the gamas. It fnds that the term emptiness
was sometimes used independently to refer to the process of dependent
arising as sasric dissatisfaction and cause, and also as dependent
cessation into nirva. Emptiness as the profound also described
these two complementary processes as a whole.
Part 3 continues with the broad range of mainstream sectarian stra
and stra literature. Here, the previous relationships are made more
frm and explicit. There is greater association with the two doctrines as
rejection of extreme views based on a self. The two are also brought
within the Abhidharma methodology of analysis into conventional
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or ultimate truths, and classifcation as conditioned or unconditioned
phenomena.
Part 4 concludes, that while already nascent in the early literature, the
relation or equation of emptiness with dependent origination, along
with related terms, was quite well developed in pre-Ngrjunian
sectarian literature, and is strongest in the Sarvstivdin literature.
We recommend that aspects of the academic discourse on emptiness
should be rectifed as a result of these fndings.
Keywords: emptiness, dependent origination, Ngrjuna,
Madhyamaka, early Buddhism, sectarian Buddhism
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1. Emptiness, Dependent Origination & Ngrjuna
Modern Buddhist studies has an already established academic
discourse and narrative with regard to the teaching of the empty
or emptiness (P: sua, suat, Skt: nya, nyat; Ch: kng /
kngxng ). Although this general position on emptiness is seldom
stated as a discourse or narrative, and is moreover not a position
held universally by all scholars, it is nonetheless fairly common, a
default position as it were. The fact of the lack of need to express it
as an academic discourse or narrative is perhaps further indication of
its paradigmatic status. Its lines of development and argument often
begin from middle to late Mahyna, and then work backwards through
history showing how each stage difered from the previous. This is
because it tends to (quite erroneously) argue that emptiness is largely
a Mahyna doctrine. This form of teleological approach, whereby
earlier forms are only investigated in as much as they are relevant for
later forms, obviously leads to numerous distortions.
Here, however, we shall use the more natural diachronic presentation
in a natural forward historical sequence, noting some of the modern
scholars who support the respective elements of the discourse:
1. It is stated that early Buddhism as found in the Nikyas and gamas
also did not consider the doctrine of emptiness as particularly
important.
1.1. Time period is from the Buddha to the schism of the Sagha,
approximately 5
th
to 3
rd
century bce.
1.2. More often than not, the sutta (and to a much lesser extent the
vinaya) canon of the Pli Theravdin tradition alone is used to
represent the doctrines of early Buddhism.
1.3. What little early Buddhism so defned does say regards
emptiness, is by and large merely a synonym for not self.
2. Slightly later, mainstream sectarian Buddhism, as typifed by the
Abhi dharma, referred to with the polemic term Hnayna, also
did not consider the teaching of emptiness as particularly important.
2.1. The alleged time period is from the schism of the Sagha to
the dominance of the Mahyna, approximately 3
rd
century
bce to 2
nd
century ce.
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2.2. It is shown that the Abhidharma dharmavda system considers
phenomena as a plurality of really existent entities. Although
rejecting a self (tman) in the person (pudgala), known as
pudgala nairtmya or pudgala nyat, they considered the
dharmas to in fact exist.
2.3. The Northern Abhidharma koa and Southern Visuddhi magga
are perhaps the most commonly referred to texts of this period,
despite their providence of c. 5
th
cty, quite some centuries after
the advent of the Mahyna.
3. In contradistinction to the above two historical stages, the notion
of emptiness is an extremely important doctrine in Mahyna
Buddhism, especially the Prajpramit.
3.1. Spans from the turn of the millennia 0 ce on, for several
centuries.
3.2. As opposed to the Hnayna view espoused above, it is
claimed that the Mahyna notion of emptiness encompasses
both the emptiness of the person (pudgala nyat, pudgala-
nairtmya) and also the emptiness of the phenomenal
(dharma nyat, dharma nairtmya).
3.3. This is considered at least a direct refutation against the
Abhidharma systems, if not mainstream sectarian Buddhism
as a whole.
3.4. Standard explanations of the Prajpramit Sutras are
often based on much later Indian commentaries which have
been preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan, particularly the
Abhisamaylakrloka of Haribhadra.
4. The defnitive Mahynic meaning of emptiness is usually sourced
from the Madhyamaka texts of Ngrjuna and his doctrinal heirs.
4.1. From the time of Ngrjuna, 2
nd
to 3
rd
century ce.
4.2. Sometimes Ngrjuna is given the status of a founder or
inspiration for the Mahyna as a whole, or at least its principal
systematizer.
4.3. In particular, Ngrjunas seminal text, the Mlamadhymaka-
krik, is taken as defnitive, if not exclusively.
4.4. Often his expression of emptiness is considered revolutionary
when compared to the realist or substantialist positions of
Abhidhamma Buddhism, or more specifcally, the teachings of
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5
the Pudgalavdins and the Abhidharma of the Sarvstivda.
This was the emptiness doctrine (nyat vda) against the
own-nature doctrine (svabhva vda). Some consider the
early teachings to also be his target.
4.5. Later commentaries on the Mlamadhyamaka krik,
especially those preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan, such as
Candrakrti, are used to explain Ngrjunas key stra in turn.
5. It is commonly said that Ngrjuna received the inspiration for his
formulation on emptiness from the Praj pramit Stras.
5.1. The relationship between these stras and stras is sometimes
explained as Ngrjunas Madhyamaka emptiness being a
systematic philosophical expression of the Praj pramit
Stras religious teaching of emptiness.
It was mainly a number of earlier studies, by the likes of Murti (1955),
Stcher batSky (1968) and conze (1962), who frst established this
modern discourse of emptiness through detailed scholastic studies
focusing on the source materials available at the time. Recently,
WeSterhoff has provided a survey of The Philosophical Study of
Ngrjuna in the West, laying out three phases: First is the Kantian
phase, then the analytic phase, and fnally a post-Wittgensteinian one
(WeSterhoff 2009: 9f). It is noteworthy that StcherbatSky and Murti,
for instance, fall within the Kantian phase, and that conze has strong
Hegelian credentials. The above discourse is an outline of some of the
key points, as exemplifed in major writings by a number of Buddhist
studies scholars, far too many to list individually here.
For now, we would like to point out that as a whole, the discourse of
emptiness so established is a very useful general outline which may
serve as is when laying out the broad picture of the development of
Indian Buddhist thought. However, it is not without some problems.
Over the last few decades, several scholars have shown more nuanced
approaches and proposed amendments to various parts of the discourse,
which are worth noting.
1.1. Ngrjunas Madhyamaka as Emptiness and Dependent Origination
We shall not here attempt to discuss the discourse on emptiness
in its entirety, which would be a huge project encompassing much
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6
of Buddhism in India and beyond. However, we would like to draw
attention to certain aspects of it, which while being commonly accepted
as paradigmatic, are still nonetheless somewhat problematic. Of the fve
main elements of the discourse outlined above, we would like to refect
on the general position of Ngrjunas Madhyamaka. In the last few
years a number of excellent studies in this area have been published,
such as those by WeSterhoff (2009), Seyfort ruegg (2010) and
SideritS & katSura (2013). However, focusing mainly on Ngrjunas
philosophy, rather than as historical development of Buddhist thought,
the Madhyamaka role within the broader discourse is only briefy
touched upon. But despite the progress in fnding more appropriate
ways to read and understand Ngrjuna, in particular his Mla-
madhyamaka krik, certain approaches have remained unchanged.
Candrakrti, for example, remains the default commentator of choice,
and the use of Tibetan sources far exceeds that of the Chinese sources
(see Discourse point 4.5). More importantly for our essay here, is the
continued great emphasis placed upon Krik verse 24:18:
y prattyasamutpda nyat t pracakmahe,
s prajaptir updya pratipat saiva madhyam,,
That dependent origination, we declare it is emptiness; It is
designation on a basis, it is indeed the middle way.
With emptiness already the accepted core of Ngrjunas Madhyamaka
thought, this verse now directly associates emptiness with dependent
origination (P: paicca samuppda, Skt: prattya samutpda; Ch:
ynyn , ynq ). A large number of scholars indicate
that this verse was not only crucial for a number of classic Buddhist
traditions, but also themselves continue to consider it as central to the
text itself. For example, garfield states that It is generally, and in my
view correctly, acknowledged that chapter 24, the examination of the
Four Noble Truths, is the central chapter of the text and the climax of
the argument (garfield 2002: 26). Similar claims have been made
by kalupahana (1986: 28f, 31-7), garfield (1994; 2002: 69-85),
WeSterhoff (2009: 91-127), and SideritS & katSura (2013: 13f),
among others. The four noble truths are themselves a locus classicus of
the principle of dependent arising. The import of this fundamental law
of arising in dependence is further strengthened with reference to the
very opening verses of the Kriks, which state:
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7
anirodham anutpdam anucchedam avatam,
anekrtham annrtham angamam anirgamam,,
ya prattyasamutpda prapacopaama ivam,
deaymsa sabuddhas tavande vadat varam,,
I prostrate to the fully awakened one, the best of speakers,
who has taught dependent origination, the appeasement of
conceptual proliferation, the auspicious, which is not cessation,
not production, not annihilation, not eternalism, not singularity,
not plurality, not coming, not going.
As such, the two aspects, namely emptiness and dependent origination,
as well as the relationship or even equivalence between them, have
long been considered by most scholars to be of central concern for
Ngrjuna and the Madhyamaka as a whole. Again, we see this attitude
in a large number of studies, such as those of kalupahana (1986: 28f,
31-7); garfield (1994; 2002: 69-85); WeSterhoff (2009: 91-127); and
SideritS & katSura (2013: 13f).
The discourse on emptiness has largely given the Praj pramit Stras
as the source of Ngrjunas teachings on emptiness, though much less
so for dependent arising (see Discourse point 5). This naturally ftted
with his status as one of the founders of the Mahyna and a number
of its philosophical systems, not just the Madhyamaka. In ftting with
the classical Mahyna vs Hnayna polemic, it was not only thought
that his teachings on emptiness (and dependent origination) were not
derived from the so-called Hnayna sources, but must be in active
opposition to them (see Discourse point 4.4).
This notion has been challenged in the last decades, with several
scholars frst questioning the Mahyna status of either Ngrjuna
himself, or of the Kriks. The citation of the Nikya and gama
teaching to Katyyana in Ngrjunas Kriks 15:7f is well known (eg.
kalupahana 1991: 232f; SideritS & katSura 2013: 159f). Several
decades ago, Warder heralded a change in English language studies
when he challenged this fundamental assumption, asking Is Ngrjuna
a Mahynist? (Warder 1973). Later, he stated the accepted tradition,
yet pointed out the fact of the Mlamadhyamaka Krik as referencing
only Tripiaka materials (Warder 1998: 138). Others have since
followed or countered this thesis. However, over half a century ago
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in China, ynShn had already considered that Ngrjunas seminal
work was written based on the gamas, not Mahyna stras. In the
introduction to his book An Investigation into Emptiness (Kng zh
tnju ), ynShn refected on statements that he had made
decades before Warder and others (1985: i; cf. ynShn 1949: 18, 24):
In the last few years, when I was reading the Prajpramit
Stras for writing my book The Origins and Development of
Early Mahyna Buddhism [1980], I thought of my views in
Modern Discussion on the Madhyamaka over thirty years before
[1949]: The Madhyamaka stra is a treatise to elucidate the
gamas; and the Madhyamaka stra takes the perspective of
the Mahyna scholars and selectively develops the profound
meaning of dependent origination in the gamas, and frmly
establishes the right view of (Mahyna) Buddha Dharma on
the key-stone of dependent origination, the middle way.
This pithy summary again highlights scholars perceived relationship
between emptiness and dependent origination in Ngrjunas thought,
in particular verse 24:18. Since such recent revisions, some eforts
have been made to seek sources for Ngrjunas thought from earlier
sources. However, as our outline of the discourse shows, these have
sometimes been fraught with source bias issues, in both the early
Buddhism and mainstream sectarian Buddhism periods.
Most studies and conclusions regarding early Buddhism rely solely
on the Pli canon of the Theravda, and seldom investigate the gamas.
The Pli Theravda here referred to is that of the r Lankan Mahvihra,
located some distance from the central lands of Gagetic North India.
Seldom are the gamas of other schools used, such as those Chinese
translations of gamas from the Sarvstivda, the Dharmagupta and
Mahsaghika. ynShn (1985) and choong (1999) are exceptions
here, though laMotte (2001) also makes mention of gama sources.
Given the relative dominance of the latter schools in mainstream Indian
Buddhism, their texts and doctrines are more relevant to the greater
picture of mainstream Indic Buddhist, whereas the Theravda was
geographically more removed. Yet even using these Nikyas or gamas
outright is problematic, for they belong to a given Buddhist mainstream
school. The issue of using these to identify early Buddhism, if not the
teachings of the historical Buddha himself, or even a repre sentation
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9
of those teachings and tenets held before the various schools split apart,
is a very complex and difcult matter.
As for such problems in early Buddhism, likewise too for the
mainstream period Abhi dharma and commentarial literature. Often
it is the 5
th
cty Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhus
5
th
cty Abhidharma koa and Bhya which are cited as representing
the non-Mahyna traditions. But neither the Northern or Southern
Abhidharma traditions began as the alleged fully fedged reifed or
substantialist positions that may be found in these two works. The
substantialist theories which are the supposed target of the Mahyna
according to the discourse on emptiness only reached this state perhaps
even after the early Mahyna and Praj pramit around the turn of
the millennium was established. How can one anachronistically argue
that the earlier Praj pramit and / or Madhyamaka is a refutation
or reaction against later Abhidharma substantialism, when the sources
cited have such an historical relationship? Another important point is
that such Abhidharma theories, in either early or later form, do not
represent the entirety of pre- and non-Mahyna Buddhist thought.
The Theravda and Sarvstivda were originally closely related as
Sthavra schools, and likewise too, the Pudgala vdins. The plethora of
schools at this time period show a huge range of positions on a wide
range of subjects. This includes Mahsghika infuenced works such
as the Satyasiddhi stra, and other non-Mahyna content from the
Mah praj pramit Upadea (see ynShn 1985: 132f; 92f).
By studying the precedents to Ngrjunas Madhyamaka thought
with these problems unresolved, it is little wonder that claims of
revolutionary thought and innovation are made with respect to his
teachings on emptiness and dependent arising. But as we have shown,
for examining these ideas in both early and mainstream Buddhism,
the Pli canon alone will simply not sufce, even if their Abhidhamma
and commentarial texts are included, nor will the Abhidharma koa as
sole representative of the Northern traditions. A deeper understanding
of the teaching of emptiness across a broad range of mainstream
schools is required. For this, the large number of Chinese sources need
be utilized to their full extent. Moreover, closer care to the historical
sequence and relationships of texts and doctrines is essential. Only then
will we be in a position to ascertain the signifcance of Ngrjunas
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Madhyamaka teachings on emptiness and dependent origination as a
stage of Buddhist doctrinal development within their own historical
context.
1.2. Literature Review
Despite the aforementioned problems of source biases and anachronisms,
even sole use of the Pli canon is already sufcient to show that empty
and emptiness were not frst coined by the Mahyna, or Ngrjuna.
One of the earliest demon strations of this can be seen in karunaratne,
who as per the academic discourse equated early Buddhist emptiness
with absence of self or what pertains to self (1956, 1988: 169). While
written in 1956, which would have made it a perfect foil for Murti as
much as against StcherbatSkys earlier writings, this was unfortunately
only published in 1988. As such, it has been largely overlooked.
For early Buddhism, also working exclusively from the Pli sources
for emptiness in early Buddhism, we also have shorter essays such
as gMezs Proto-Mdhya mika in the Pli Canon (1976), and Vlez
de ceas Emptiness in the Pli Suttas and the Question of Ngrjunas
Orthodoxy (2005), both of which show scholars great interest in
Ngrjunas Madhyamaka. They largely take emptiness as a philosophy,
rather than as a matter of meditation, which is the main feature of
emptiness in the early texts (see choong 1999: 43-84; ynShn 1985:
1-78). Though these attempts to trace earlier sources and contexts for
Ngrjuna are commendable, by relying only on the Pli canon and
neglecting other schools contemporary with it, the results are limited.
In the end, though Vlez de cea very clearly sees the problems of
modern scholarship in this area, he really only shows that Ngrjuna
would probably not disagree with some basic tenets of the Nikyas
and gamas. This would be greatly assisted by broadening the source
material from which comparisons are made.
One of the few more comprehensive studies in English directly related
to emptiness in early Buddhism is The Notion of Emptiness in Early
Buddhism, by choong (1999). Although the title explicitly states early
Buddhism as the scope, he curiously states in his aims that he shall
argue that the teaching of emptiness is not a creation of early Mahyna,
but that it has clear antecedents in early Buddhism, and his very last
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11
words on the matter are: emptiness is genuinely a teaching of
the Buddha himself, and not simply a creation of the Mahyna (pg.
2, 88). It has rather the tone of a Mahyna apologetic in the face of
modern Buddhist studies text-historical criticisms.
Another, diferent kind of apologetic, is found in dhaMMajothis
The Concept of Emptiness in Pli Literature (2008), which seeks to
examine the relation between the concept of sua in early Buddhism
and emptiness in Madhyamaka (pg. iii). He appears to wish to defect
the criticisms of Ngrjuna and others away from the Theravda, and
towards other mainstream groups (pg. iii, 163). However, again, due
to being specially focused on the Pli Tipiaka, and the Visuddhi-
magga (pg. iii; pp. 100-120), this quite disorganized study can only be
seen as representing the Theravda, and neither early Buddhism or
the entirety of mainstream Buddhism. Thus, while the author wishes
to defect Madhyamaka criticisms against the Theravdin tradition,
those same criticisms remained unexamined as to their true target and
precedents, and the Hnayna bogeyman remains hidden.
It is to be admitted, lamentably, that there are even fewer systematic and
dedicated studies into the doctrine of emptiness within the mainstream
Buddhist period. This in turn refects the general status of studies in
this period, wherein there has been little research into specifc doctrinal
issues. However, let us examine these few relevant studies in order.

Given the supposed Mahyna vs Hnayna polemical claims on
emptiness within the discourse, it is not at all surprising that there
are even fewer studies on this topic centered on mainstream sectarian
material (source biases aside). In one of the many sub-essays within
his epic fve volume translation of the Mah praj pramit Upadea
(Dzhd ln ), laMotte breaks the main stream Buddhist
schools into three types: 1. The personalists, such as the Pudgala-
vdin Vts putryas and Samittyas; 2. The realists, namely the
Thera vda and Sarvsti vda bhidharmikas; and 3. The nominalists,
for instance, the Mah sghika Prajaptivdins, and possibly non-
Abhidharma Sthavira groups. Concerning their respective positions
on emptiness, laMotte establishes two basic positions, which refect
an earlier statement in the Upadea on the meaning of praj: The
teaching of emptiness is the emptiness of beings (pudgala nyat) and
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the emptiness of dharmas (dharma nyat) (laMotte 2001: 836f,
1650f). Due to the focus of this work, there is barely any discussion on
these texts themselves. In his frst two volumes of translation (1944 &
1949), laMotte considered what he at the time called the stra to
be a work of Ngrjuna. Though he changed his position on this in the
third volume (1970), now considering it an Upadea and authored
by anonymous Indic Madhyamaka convert scholar, he still thought it a
Madhyamaka work doctrinally faithful to that of Ngrjuna.
Working directly with the philosophy rather than the text of the Upadea,
raManans (1966) Ngrjunas Philosophy: As Presented in the Mah-
Praj pramit-stra, also considered Ngrjuna the author of this
work, following laMottes frst two volumes. Regarding emptiness
in mainstream schools, he outlined three groups, albeit diferent from
those of laMotte (raManan 1966: 53f): 1. The pluralist linethe
Sarvstivda. He states that: The Vibh admits dharm tm while it
denies pudgal tm, and: The Sarvsti vdins admit nyat. For them
this means that among the basic elements of existence there is no tman,
no eternal substantial entity called I. They interpret the Middle Way
so as to make it agree with their doctrine of elements. 2. The line in
betweenVts putryas, Smityas, Sautrntikas (Sakrantivdins)
and Mahsakas. (Note: all Sthavira groups.) 3. The absolutist line
the Mahs ghikas: The credit of having kept alive the emphasis on
the ultimacy of the unconditioned reality by drawing attention to the
non-substantiality of the basic elements of existence (dharma nyat)
belongs to the Mahsghikas; [t]hese were the teachings of
nyat of the composite as well as the incomposite, the absence of
self-being in things and the peace of Nirva. We would like to the
point out, however, that this last point was also accepted by most of the
Sthaviras too (ynShn 1985: 104, 113), though the Pudgalavdins may
be an exception (bareau 2005: 116 #38).
This brings us fnally to ynShns work An Investigation into Emptiness
(Kng zh Tnju ) (1985), and excellent study unfortunately
almost unknown outside of the sphere of Buddhist studies in Chinese
language.
1
It covers the doctrine of emptiness as it developed through
four stages. 1. Early Buddhism of the gamas and Nikyas; 2. The
Abhidharma or Nikya period; 3. The early Mahyna period of the
Praj pramit literature; and 4. The Madhyamaka philosophy of
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Ngrjuna, including the Mah praj pramit Upadea, which is
traditionally attributed to him. As such, it is one of the most complete
modern studies on the theme of emptiness. Structurally, it does
follow the broad historical categories of the discourse, but avoids the
anachronistic use of material, and draws on numerous lines of textual
tradition. For early Buddhism, ynShn uses both classic Chinese
translations and modern Chinese translations of the Pli canon, and for
the mainstream period, has mastery over the entire range of sectarian
literature well preserved in Chinese, in addition to modern translations
of Pli Abhidhamma and para canonical material.
As can be seen, previous studies into the broader question of pre-
Mahyna teachings on emptiness are few and often apologetic in
nature. Very little has been at all on the more specifc question of how
emptiness relates to dependent origination. As such, the notion within
the academic discourse on emptiness, which itself works backwards
from the accepted idea that Ngrjunas teachings were rather innovative
in the light of the early and mainstream Hnayna positions, remains
unexamined and unchallenged. The next two sections of this essay
will thus examine the pre-Ngrjunian literature on emptiness and
dependent origination in two general historical periods, namely early
Buddhism (Section 2) and main stream Buddhism (Section 3).
The distinction between these periods is as much for convenience as
representing a clear cut historical division, and itself partly follows
the modern academic discourse attitude toward phases of Buddhist
doctrinal qua historical development.
2. Emptiness & Dependent Origination in Early Buddhism
We will frst examine the canonical texts of early Buddhism to understand
the relationship between empty / emptiness and dependent origination.
By early we do not mean to imply original, the philological holy
grail of establishing the original words of the historical Buddha now
being somewhat out of vogue. We do believe that by cross comparison
of parallel texts from a number of early Buddhism schools will reveal
in their commonalities those basic teachings that existed before the
division into such schools occurred. Taking the frst basic schism of
the Buddhist community into the Sthaviras and Mahsghika to have
occurred during the time of Aoka, ie. circa 268-232 bce, with later
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splits continuing subsequently, we can give an approximate date for
early Buddhism from the time of the Buddha himself up to the 3
rd
or
perhaps even the 2
nd
century bce. This is almost universally regarded
as well before the start of the Mahyna, and many centuries before the
time of Ngrjuna himself.
The extant texts of the earliest stra discourses are the fve Nikyas of
the Pli canon, and also the Chinese translations of the four gamas.
The fve Pli Nikyas are: 1. The Samyutta Nikya (SN); 2. The Majjhima
Nikya (MN); 3. The Dgha Nikya (DN); 4. The Anguttara Nikya
(AN); and 5. The Khuddhaka Nikya (KN), which itself contains a range
of material, wherein the Dhamma pada and Sutta nipta are considered
the oldest strata. This tradition is what is now commonly known as
the Theravda. The Chinese gama translations are:
2
1. The Sayukta
gama (S, T99), translated 435-443 ce (two fascicles are missing).
There is also the Alternative Translation Sayukta gama (AltS,
T100), possibly from the Kyapya school. 2. The Madhyama gama
(M, T26), translated 397-398 ce. These gamas are considered to
belong to the Sarvstivda traditions. 3. The Drgha gama (D, T1),
translated 413 ce, of Dharmagupta origins. 4. The Ekottara gama (E,
T125), translated 397 ce and later revised. This is from a late sect of
the Mahsghika and already contains some Mahynic philosophy.
3

It must thus be used cautiously in any context of early Buddhism.
Before we examine the texts, a note on the topic of dependent arising,
the Buddhist law of causality, is in order, for it is a theme which strongly
underlies much of early Buddhist texts. In fact, there is much evidence
to suggest that the entirety of the Buddhas teachings can be subsumed
under this general principle.
4
From the SN in particular, we fnd terms
such as stability of Dhamma (dhamma hitat), certainty (or law)
of Dhamma (dhamma niymat), specifc conditionality (idap-
paccayat) and Dhammic nature (dhammat) to describe dependent
origination, with the S providing an even greater number of such
synonyms.
5
Therefore, here we shall only focus on this doctrine as far
as it is directly related to emptiness and related doctrines.
2.1. Profound, Connected with Emptiness
x H x H v bH XXXY
15
One of the more pithy and explicit connections between emptiness and
dependent origination, is that found in SN 20:7 A or S 1258. In
it, the Buddha states that his disciples should study those discourses
taught by the Tathgata that are profound, profound in meaning,
transmundane, connected with emptiness, rather than those texts
which are mere poetry composed by poets, beautiful in words and
phrases, created by outsiders.
6

The term profound or deep (gambhra) was originally imbued with
a simple prosaic sense, such as the deep ocean. Here, and elsewhere
in the Pli texts, it is used to describe the Dhamma realized by the
Buddha, as expressed in SN 6:1 and MN 26 and 27:
7

Profound, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful and sublime,
not within the sphere of reasoning, subtle, to be experienced
by the wise. For such a generation this state is hard to see,
that is, specifc conditionality, dependent origination. And this
state too is hard to see, that is, the stilling of formations, the
relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving,
dispassion, cessation, nibbna.
This is a complement to the statement that seeing dependent origination
is seeing the Dharma itself. The gama equivalent of these Pli texts
either do not have this passage, or show only an abbreviated form.
8

However, this two-fold meaning of profound as both the law of
conditionality and also pacifed liberation does appear in S 293, which
states that these two dharmas are known as the conditioned (saskta)
and the unconditioned (asaskta).
9
The sense of the law of dependent
arising as profound is further emphasized in DN 15 Mah nidna Sutta,
and corresponding M 97 and D 13, where nanda on contem plating
dependent co-arising states that it is wonderful and marvelous, how
this dependent origination is profound and appears profound. Yet, to
myself, I see it as clear as clear can be, and was thus berated by the
Buddha for under-estimating the profundity of this Dhamma.
10

One way to understand this dual aspect of the profound, is to consider
it in terms of dependent origination and also dependent cessation,
the former as the arising which is sasra or dissatisfactionthe
conditioned, the latter as its cessation or nibbnathe unconditioned.
These correspond to the two complementary aspects of the standard
x H x H v bH XXXY a
JCBSSL VOL. XI
16
formula in Udna 1:1-3: When this is, that is; When this arises, that
arises; and When this is not, that is not; When this ceases, that
ceases.
11

2.2 Emptiness of Self in Dependent Cosmogenesis
Why does SN 20:7 A and S 1258 thus make such an emphatic
statement on what seems to imply the identity of dependent arising
and emptiness? A clear candidate to answer this derives from some
recent research by jureWicz into the idea of the Buddhas twelve-fold
dependent origination as a response to Vedic cosmogenetic theories of
the g Veda (X 129), and other pre-Buddhist Brhmaic literature, such
as the atapatha Brhmaa, Bhad rayaka, Aitareya, Taittirya and
Chndogya Upaniads (see jureWicz 2000: 171).
The Vedic cosmogonies all revolve around what we may call the
transformations of the tman, whereas for the Buddhist twist to this
theory, jureWicz considers that the Buddha chose those cosmogonic
descriptions which met two conditions: frst, they explicitly express
the cosmogony as transformations of the tman; second, they preserve
their cognitive meaning, even if they are taken out of the Vedic content
(jureWicz 2000: 80). Likewise says SchulMan (2008: 297): Rather
than relating to all that exists, dependent origination related originally
only to processes of mental conditioning. It was an analysis of the self,
not of reality, embedded in the Upaniadic search for the tman.
For the Vedic tradition, nidna referred to the connection between the
world at large and the microcosm represented in the sacrifcial fre, and
this connection was the tman. But for the Buddhas nidna, there
is no tman The negation of the ontological nidna constitutes the
Buddhas mahnidna (jureWicz 2000: 100). The various twelve links
are broken down by jureWicz into small consec utive groups, each of
which is closer to some or other passage in the various Brhmaic texts
listed above. Despite this, the tman idea is seen throughout them all,
whereas other phenonema such as the purua, fre and so forth, have
more or less importance at diferent stages of the dependent arising
process. jureWicz envisages the Buddha using the terminology of the
Vedic cosmogony, only to conclude: Thats right, this is how the whole
process develops. However, the only problem is that no one undergoes
x H x H v bH XXXYaX
17
a transformation here! This is to deny the tman as the metaphysical
basis of all cosmogonic transformations as well as its fnal forms
(jureWicz 2000: 101). Rather than the creative power of the soul, it was
an absurd and pointless cycle of death and rebirth.
As goMbrich rightly concludes, jureWiczs interpretation through the
light of ancient pre-Buddhist theories, which were no doubt known
to both the Buddha and much of his more learned audiences, shows
its function of adding substance and detail to the Buddhas no soul
doctrine (goMbrich 2003: 14; also 2009: 133f). Thus, references
to either not self or emptiness in the many expositions on dependent
origination, would have simply been unnecessary for the Buddha at
that time. It would have been implicitly understood that he thus taught
sasric arising without a soul. The process of dependent arising is
empty.
2.3. Causality and the Middle Way
We fnd other examples of how the Buddha expressly rejects an
actor agent in favour of the doctrine of dependent origination in,
for example, SN 12:12 or S 372. Here, when asked about agency,
as Who consumes the nutrient of cognition? makes contact?
feels? craves?, the Buddha declares that the question is invalid.
Rather than who?, the question should be For what is the nutriment
cognition [a condition]? etc.
12

In the teaching given by nanda to Channa (SN 22:90 Channa, S
262 Chanda ), which brought about the latters break through into
the Dhamma, is for all purposes a verbatim repetition of that famous
discourse given by the Buddha himself to Kaccnagotta (SN 12:15)
avoiding the two extreme views of existence and non-existence, and
pursuing the middle way which is the dependent origination and
cessation of dissatis faction.
13
The connection in S 262 between
emptiness and absence of (extreme) views is oblique, apart from
emptiness as mere absence itself, and is via the doctrine of dependent
origination. The implication being that the views of either existence
or non-existence, of body and soul as identical or diferent, etc. are
incompatible with the Buddhas unique teaching of conditionality.
x H x H v bH XXXYaY
JCBSSL VOL. XI
18
The rejection of arising from any one or other of the four categories
of self, other, both or neither (non-causality), all types of extremes to
be avoided, is a recurring theme throughout SN 12 Nidna samyutta.
14

Rejection of arising from self can be seen as further expressions
of emptiness as not self (or what pertains to self), as the usual self-
view predominant in non-Buddhist Indian religious-philosophical
systems was one of existence. For example, in saccid-nanda, and
the uncaused cause. Rejection of arising from other is in efect just
another self. With these two rejected, naturally arising from both is
also out of the question. Yet the Buddhas strong emphasis on causality
also meant that an outright rejection of all causality, things being
uncaused, was also totally out of the question.
2.4. Nirva as Empty Pacifcation
Where the cosmogenetic causality of the preceding sections represents
the world and its coming into beingdissatisfaction (dukha), the
goal is the cessation of this worldthe liberated release entailing
extinguishing the fre of afictions (P: nibbna, Skt: nirva).
A well known passage in SN and S states that the destruction of
desire, aversion, delusionthis friend is called nibbna,
the unconditioned (asakhata) or the fruition of a worthy
one (arahanta phala).
15
The second defnition here, that of the
unconditioned, elsewhere has another similar statement again in S
262, which gives a list of defnitive terms as follows:
16

the empty pacifcation (nya amatha) of all conditionings,
their non-apprehension (anupalabhyate), the destruction of
craving, the fading away of desirenirva.
Given that the equivalent sutta in SN has merely the pacifcation
(samatha) of all formations ,
17
one may question both the Chinese
translators here and their use of the term , and also our English
translation as empty pacifcation. Should not the Chinese phrase
really just be pacifcation or appeasement (amatha)? We think
not. As ynShn astutely notes, the Yogcra bhmi stra on citing
this text verifes that in fact the Sarvstivdin S did indeed use the
term empty pacifcation (nya amatha) here. It explains this very
stra passage as The term empty means the forsaking of all the
x H x H v bH XXXYaZ
19
deflements (see ynShn 1985: 118).
18
Thus while there is the implied
sense of absence of afictions and their resultant dissatisfaction
in unconditioned release, the S, at least, explicitly refers to this as
empty (nya).
2.5. The Emptiness Samdhi as Absence of Causes
Here, a term in early Buddhism which later became almost synonymous
for the path to liberation as a whole, is that of mental release (P: ceta-
vimutti) or mental meditation (Skt: *ceto samdhi; ). There is
also a connection here between emptiness and causation.
The Pli Nikya term mental release, which appears in the gamas
as mental meditation, is the common name given to a set of four
practices analyzed by several of the Buddhas great disciples in several
texts.
19
Also, at times the Pli also does use ceto samdhi, rather than
just ceto vimutti, but only for the signless, and not for the other three
immeasurables.
20
For example, in MN 43, when the question is asked as
to What is the signless mental release? (-vimutti), the actual answer
is given in terms of the signless mental concentration (-samdhi).
21

The gamas, on the other hand, do not seem to use the equivalent ceto-
vimukti (*) for the four immeasurables, though this term itself is
used in other contexts.
According to SN and S, the four are: 1. Immeasurable (appama-,
aprama-; ) mental release / meditation; 2. Nothingness
(kicaa-, kicanya-; ) mental release / meditation;
3. Emptiness (suat-, nyat-; ) mental release / meditation;
and 4. Signless mental release / meditation (animitta-; ).
22
In
response to a question, they are all explained in two senses, frstly as
diferent in meaning and also diferent in phrasing, and secondly as
one in meaning and diferent only in phrasing. There are some slight
diferences between answers in the Pli and gama readings, but we
wish to draw attention to the second set of answers, where they are
alike in meaning and difer only in expression.
As for the four being synonyms, one in meaning and diferent only in
phrasing, it is explained that: 1. Desire, aversion and ignorance are
makers of measurement (or limit) (pama karaa), their absence
x H x H v bH XXXYa[
JCBSSL VOL. XI
20
(sua) is the immeasurable (or unlimited) release; 2. These same
three deflements are causes for something (kicana), a synonym
for sasric becoming, the absence (sua) of something-ness is
hence the nothingness release; 3. The emptiness mental release is
not explained here, but is a generic term for all three (see below); 4.
The three deflements are also makers of signs (nimitta karaa), their
absence (sua) is the signless release.
The unifying theme through #1, #2 and #4, is actually #3, the emptiness
mental release. While its unifying function is not explained explicitly,
it is obviously referred when the other three are described in terms
of being empty (sua) of deflements. That is to say, of the other
three, their ultimate culmination is the immovable mental release (P:
akuppa; Skt: akopya) in SN, or non-confict (araa; ) in S.
23

This is the absence (suat) of the three root deflements which act
as makers of measure-limits and signs, and are the basis for becoming.
These three termslimit (pama), somethingness (kicana) and sign
(nimitta)all refer to deflements and their causes, and emptiness,
here given as nothingness, is their forsaking.
2.6. The Three Dharma Seals and Characteristics
At the end of the early period, when sectarian doctrines already start
to make their appearance in the Nikyas and gamas, we shall turn to
material that quickly developed into standard criteria for the authentic
Dharma, namely the Dharma seals (mudra) and characteristics
(lakkhaa). In many ways, the colloquial use of the term seal (mudr)
is similar to both nimitta and lakkhaa in the objective sense, the
special mark or sign, often of an important ofcial, a classic example
being the royal seal (rj mudd) (see PTSD 570).
There are several early texts which provided the implicit principles
behind the later systematized and explicit formation of the three
Dharma seals. We shall deal with the Sarvstivdin S, as it is the
only one to use the term in an early textS 80, the *rya dharma-
mudr jna daraa-viuddhi Stra.
24
This is perhaps the only early
stra which discusses the dharma seals (dharma mudr) in direct
relation to the three samdhis, headed by the nyat samdhi. Indeed,
the Pli tradition uses the term three characteristics (ti lakkahaa)
x H x H v bH XXXYa
21
for a slightly diferent set of statements with similar overall intention,
albeit without the direct association to emptiness. S 80 also deals
with the three samdhis of emptiness, nothingness and the signless. It
explains that the emptiness samdhi is required before proceeding to
nothingness and the signless, and that each of the three has a specifc
contemplation:
One, in the emptiness samdhi they contemplate that each of the
aggregates is impermanent and subject to cessation and not solid
or stable, but subject to change, they then become detached from
desire. This is actually more of a contemplation of impermanence
than not self, which is the more common gloss for emptiness.
Two, in the signless samdhi they forsake the signs of the six sensory
objects, form, sound, etc.. This is exactly the same as the earliest idea of
non-attention to all signs, as found in the exegetical stra M 211.
25

This conforms to the position of S 80 here, as it does not reify the
signless into an object to which one can direct attention, unlike parallel
text MN 43 Mahvedalla.
26

Three, in the nothingness samdhi they forsake the signs of the three
root defle ments of desire, aversion and delusion. Again, the early
explanation of the defle ments as somethings, causes for existence in
sasra. Thus, up to this point in S 80, the signless and nothingness
basically match SN 41:7 and S 567, which were the precursors to the
exegeses in MN 43 and M 211.
However, and more pertinent for our discussion of emptiness and
dependent arising here, after these three contemplations,
27

one investigates that [notions of] I and mine arise from
either what is seen, or heard, or smelt, or tasted, or touched,
or cognized. Moreover, they investigate in this manner: By
whatever cause or whatever condition that cognition arises, those
causes and those conditions are all impermanent. Moreover,
when those causes and those conditions of that [cognition]
are all impermanent, how could the cognition itself which has
arisen from them be permanent? Whatever is impermanent is
conditioned (saskta), a form ation (abhi saskra), arisen
x H x H v bH XXXYa]
JCBSSL VOL. XI
22
from conditions (prattya sautpanna); is subject to decay
(vaya dharma), subject to cessation (kaya dharma); subject to
fading away (virga dharma), subject to cessation (nirodha-
ja dharma). This is known as the purity of gnosis and vision
of the ryan dharma seals.
So, what exactly here does the phrase dharma seals in S 80 refer
to? Here, dharma is used in the sense of being subject to some or
other principle, as per SN 12:34,
28
for which bodhi has: subject to
destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation (bodhi 2000: 573).
Parts of the Chinese gama, when read alone, are slightly ambiguous.
29

These principles mainly refer to cessation, but this is in turn one aspect
of causal conditionality.
Thus, S 80 is using a fairly standard set of terms used to describe
conditioned phenomena, almost implying the realized goal as the natural
state of conditioned phenomena. The list is headed by phenomena
being dependently originated, showing the underlying principle behind
the arising and ceasing of dharmas, their conditionality. The remaining
four basically synonymous terms indicate the impermanence of
conditioned phenomena. These are contemplations used to eradicate
the view of a self or what pertains to self. Thus, the purity of gnosis and
vision of the ryan dharma seals is largely about eliminating internal
and external deflements, including self view and self conceit, through
various forms of contemplation.
2.7. Summary
Between the aforementioned Nikya and gama explanations,
emptiness and dependent origination were related as a key part of the
Dharma from its inception. The previous six sections can perhaps be
divided into three broad groups.
In the frst category, sections 2.1 and 2.6, emptiness relates to both
the process of dependent arising and also cessation. We have seen
that the notion of profound or deep (gambhra) as referring to
both dependent origination and also dependent cessationnibbnic
releasewas present though not overly strong in the very early canon.
However, the Sthavira traditions considered it important enough at quite
an early date, texts and statements which appear to be specifc to both
x H x H v bH XXXYa
23
the Theravda and Sarvstivda schools. Our examination of the three
dharma seals is from the later stages of the early tradition. The texts
still explicitly connect this to dependent origination, that phenomena
are subject to arise and cessation. As seals of conditioned dharmas,
there is a gradually movement toward universality.
The second group, in sections 2.2 and 2.3, we see how the Sarvstivda
in particular used the term emptiness to refer to dependent arising
in a broad sense. While this mainly focuses on its forward sasric
process, there is still a connection with the reversal into nirva. Recent
studies by jureWicz provide a key connection between the implied
sense of lack of self, ie. emptiness, within the Buddhas standard twelve
limb form of dependent origination, and other expressions thereof, as a
parody of Brahmanic cosmogenesis. Included within this broader sense
of causality, was the middle way of the absence of extreme views, which
were considered counter to the position of the Dharma as dependent
origination itself.
Lastly, a third group consisting of sections 2.4 and 2.5 makes
stronger the relationship between dependent arising and emptiness
as nirvna. Again, it is the Sarvstivdin tradition that makes the
explicit connection of release as empty pacifcation. But both this
school and the Theravda use the emptiness medita tion or mind release
(respectively) as a catch all term for the practices that bring about the
total elimination of afictions as causal factors.
3. Emptiness & Dependent Originationin Mainstream Buddhism
We can now move from the early period, to that of the subsequent
mainstream sectarian period. From the last section (2.6) in particular,
it is important to recall that this historical distinction is a simple heuristic
rather than a hard delineated fact.
As we underscored in our criticisms of the modern academic discourse
of emptiness in the introduction, there are several methodological
problems with regards to the mainstream period, in particular source
biases and anachronist explanations of doctrinal relations and development.
Regarding source biases, there is the heavy usage of later Abhidharma
literature, particularly that of Vasu bandhus Abhi dharma koa bhya
x H x H v bH XXXYa_
JCBSSL VOL. XI
24
and Buddhaghosas Visuddhi magga, as repre sentative of this period as
a whole. This refects a more general bias towards viewing only the
extant Pli and Sanskrit literature as of value in the study of Indian
Buddhism. With respect to historical anachron isms, the Mahyna position
is typifed by the doctrine of emptiness from the Praj pramit and
systematized by Ngrjuna, and the aforementioned Abhi dharma texts
represent the mainstream period. However, the former texts both hail
from the 5
th
century, whereas the latter are from the 1
st
to 3
rd
centuries
how can the latter be a critical response to the former?
Therefore, in this section, we must pay close attention to textual sources
that are deemed to date from before Ngrjunas time (2
nd
3
rd
cty ce),
and even then, be aware of their relative historic relationships. The
previous section on early Buddhism spanned up to the 3
rd
, or at the
latest, the 2
nd
century bce, as noted at the start of the previous section.
Our material here begins with the latter end of this period, when the
Nikyas and gamas were still being compiled by each of the schools.
Therefore, though we shall naturally cite stra sources which are
more obviously afliated with a given school, we shall frst cite several
stras. These are texts which appear in the gamas of some schools, but
are not necessarily found in or approved by other schools, thus lying
outside of our basic criteria for textual sources of early Buddhism.
In particular, this includes several stras for which we have Chinese
translations in the Sarvstivdin S and the later Mahyna infuenced
Mahsghika E (both discussed previously in 2), in addition to the
listamba Stra.
For the mainstream sectarian period, it is admittedly more natural
to refer to the Abhidhamma or Abhidharma literature. The various
schools disagreed as to whether or not it was recited at the frst
convocation. The Mahsghika and two Vibhajyavda schools, the
Mahsaka and Theravda, did not mention its recitation there in their
respective Vinayas, but only spoke of it as the third Piaka in their later
commentarial traditions. The Sarvstivda, Haimavata, Dharmagupta
and Mla sarvstivda did include it, but difered in their details. In
the commentarial literature, both the Theravda and Sarvstivda
stated that the Abhidhamma / Abhidharma was in fact the word of
the Buddha (see ynShn 1968: 9-11). However, the Theravda meant
x H x H v bH XXXYa
25
this in the literal sense, whereas the Sarvstivda had a more fgurative
explanation.
The core Abhidharma literature thus became even while the Nikyas
and gamas were being compiled and fnalized, up to the 2
nd
century
bce. This is still a century or two before the early Mahyna, giving
it sufcient time to be propagated broadly across the Indian sub-
continent. Of the two Abhidharma schools, the Pli Theravda has
seven core texts: 1. Dhamma saga; 2. Vibhaga; 3. Dhtu kath; 4.
Puggala paatti; 5. Yamaka; 6. Pahna; and 7. Kath vatthu.
30
The
other Abhidharma school, the Sarvstivda, also had seven Abhidharma
stras, albeit diferent to the above: 1. Dharma skandha pda stra
(T1537 ); 2. Sagti paryya stra (T1536 ); 3.
Prajapti stra (T1538 ); 4. Vijna kya stra (T1539
); 5. Jna prasthna stra (T1543 ) and (T1544
); 6. Prakaraa pda stra (T1541 ) and (T1542 );
and 7. Dhtu kaya pda stra (T1540 ).
31
Additionally, there
is the riputra Abhidharma stra (T1548 ). This is
also a Vibhajyavdin work, exhibiting clear structural parallels with
the Vibhaga and Dharma skandha pda stra, and also the Dhamma-
saga and Prakaraa pda, from the other two Abhidharma traditions.
It is believed that the riputra Abhidharma stra was probably shared
with the early Vtsputryas, Dharmaguptas, and other more central
Indian Sthavira Vibhajya vdin schools.
32

What we now have of the Theravda commentarial tradition by
Buddhaghosa in the Aha kaths is a summary of earlier material. We
still have the Northern Sarvsti vdin commentarial Vibha literature
in Chinese translation, most notably the Abhidharma Mahvibha
stra (T1545 ), with variants Abhi dharma Vibha
stra (T1546 ) and Vibha stra (T1547 ).
This Vaibhika standard was likely compiled by a large number of
Abhidharma scholars over the course of centuries, in order to establish
orthodoxy within their own ranks, as well as counter the views of other
schools, and reached its basic fnal form in the mid 2
nd
cty ce (see
ynShn 1968: 209-220; dhaMMa joti 2007: 65).
x H x H v bH XXXYaa
JCBSSL VOL. XI
26
As such, the Mahvibha is the last pre-Ngrjunian material that we
shall examine here. Citing material later than Ngrjuna would endanger
our goal here by potentially falling into anachronistic arguments as
discussed earlier in the discourse on emptiness above. However, this time
period coincides with the formative period of the incipient Mahyna
movement, and we can feel the currents of mainstream school notions
of the bodhisattvahere referring to kyamuniinfuencing the new
movement, even while these mainstream bhidharmika commentaries
did not seem to be aware of the Mahyna as a distinct school in its own
right. We shall see how mainstream notions of the bodhisattva, and
how they involve both emptiness and dependent origination, may have
developed in these texts in Section 3.4, below.
3.1. Ultimate EmptinessNeither Coming Nor Going
The frst sectarian stra under consideration is the Paramrtha nyat
Stra, extant as S 335 and E 37:7.
33
If we only compared with the
Pli to fnd no equivalent of this stra, we may be tempted to classify
it as a text of mainstream school origins. However, the fact that the
Sthavira Sarvstivdin version is nearly word for word identical with
the Mahsghika E versionwith the exception of some juxta-
posing of paragraphs which is negligible in terms of contentsuggests
that the text could also possibly be considered early. It is possible
that the Theravda tradition may have lost their own version of this text
at some point in time. The Paramrtha nyat Stra (S 335) states:
34

when the eye arises, it does not come from any location;
when [the eye] ceases, it does not go to any location. In this
way, the eye is unreal, yet arises; and on having arisen, it ends
and ceases. There is action (karma) and result (vipka), and yet
no actor agent (kraka). On the cessation of these skandhas,
another set of aggregates continues elsewhere (anyatra). There
are merely dharmas classifed as conventional, ie. the ear, nose,
tongue, physical body and mind, are also declared as such.
Here, the parallel text E 37:7 also adds These six sense faculties
are also not created by a person (puria, pudgala).
35
This further
emphasizes the absence of an agent. According to karunadaSa, such
statements on neither coming nor going are also found in the later
Theravdin commentarial literature: There is no store (sannidhi) from
x H x H v bH XXXZXX
27
which they come and there is no receptacle (sannicaya) to which they
go;
36
and If they appear it is not that they come from somewhere (na
kuto ci gacchanti); if they disappear it is not that they go anywhere
(na kuhici gacchanti) (karunadaSa 2010: 30-31).
37
This is the same
basic gloss the commentaries also give to SN 35:246 V (= S 1169),
which uses a simile of how the music of a lute is dependent on a number
of parts and factors.
38

The phrase in translation (dharmas classifed as
conventional) poses some problems for interpretation. We must
examine the various versions of this stra and also parallels of the
passage in other texts. The phrase appears in the Bimbisra Stra, which
is in turn cited in the Mla sarvstivdin Vinaya.
39
Subsequently, in the
Koa and Bhya.
40
we conclude that the original term was dharma-
sakheta, which we translate as dharmas classifed as conventional.
This is akin to phenomena being nominal here, though semantically
at least, it difers from the Abhidharma usage of prajapti as
designation, and the implications of it be vis--vis paramrtha, the
ultimate sense.
The S version of the stra then continues, stating:
41
Dharmas classifed as conventional, that is to sayWhen this
exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises the arising of
this sheer great mass of dissatisfaction. MoreoverWhen
this does not exist, that does not exist; when this ceases, that
ceases the cessation of this sheer great mass of dissatisfaction.
O monks! this is named the Dharma Discourse on Ultimate
Emptiness (Paramrtha nyat dharma Stra).
It is thus clear that dharmas classifed as conventional refers to the
dharmas which comprise the limbs of dependent arising itself. This
is not only in the for ward order of arising, but also the reversal into
cessation. The cessation of dis satisfaction is nirvna, the unconditioned.
Is it any particular one of these aspects which is ultimate emptiness?
It is difcult to say, but the overall sense appears that it is the totality
of this situation, the Dharma law of dependent arising and cessation
of conventional or nominal dharmas as phenomena, all of which takes
place without recourse to an agent or actor, that is ultimate emptiness.
It could be possible to then read this through the two truths system
x H x H v bH XXXZXY
JCBSSL VOL. XI
28
so popular in the mainstream sectarian period, utilized by both the
Abhidharma systems as well as the Madhyamaka. In that way, the
ultimate could be juxtaposed against the designated (prajapti),
giving the underlying principle of dependent origination as the former,
whereas the phenomena are the latter.
3.2. Great EmptinessNeither Identity Nor Plurality
The second sectarian stra is another Sarvstivdin text, S 297
Mah nyat Dharma paryya.
42
Without a Pli equivalent, ynShn
(1971: 651) locates it in the Nidna sayukta, which is supported by
the content and surrounding stras. It has a similar teaching format
to S 262, above. As we would thus expect, it explicitly uses the
standard twelve link formula of dependent arising. However, it also
ties dependent origination in with emptiness:
43

What is the Dharma Discourse on Great Emptiness? It is this
When this exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises. Which
isFormations are conditioned by ignorance; cognitions are
conditioned by formations; and so forth, up to; the amassing of
this sheer mass of dissatisfaction.
Then follows a refutation of several positions which appear in the ten
or fourteen unanswered questions (avykta), all of which are forms
of self-view (tma di), such as life (jva) and body are diferent
or identical. A very similar statement occurs in SN 12:35,
44
lending
further support to placing S 297 in the Nidna sayukta. The stra
stresses dependent origination as the middle path between these
extremes of view based around the idea of a self (as jva).
45
The
connection between these questions and the rest of the text is most
likely that such questions are basically predicated on the notion of a
self, though often under the guise of the term tathgata (karuna
daSa 2005). As we have already seen from jureWiczs studies above,
this is obviously one of the key points that the Buddhas formulation of
dependent origination seeks to reject.
The reverse process, the destruction of the dependent cessation process
in reverse sequence (pratilomika), is given as the stra ends with:
46

With the fading away (virakt) of ignorance (avidy),
knowledge (vidy) arises; on the cessation of ignorance, there
x H x H v bH XXXZXZ
29
is the cessation of conditionings; up to; the cessation of the
sheer, great mass of dissatisfaction. This is named the Dharma
Discourse on Great Emptiness.
Together, these show that existence is dependent arising in forward
order (anuloma) from self view and desire, and also dependent cessation
through the reverse order (pratiloma) of this process. In the text it is
not altogether clear whether the term emptiness applies to both, or
merely one of, these two processes. However, we have shown earlier
how empty was used as a description of conditioned phenomena,
along with impermanence, dissatisfactoriness and not self, and also, that
the absence of the deflements is given as the transmundane meaning
of emptiness elsewhere. Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the
terms empty and emptiness refer to both processes.
3.3. Seeing Dependent Origination as Dharma, as Buddha
A third sectarian stra of note is the listamba Stra. This is often
claimed to be a Mahyna stra. While the titles of the earliest recensions
in Chinese are simply listamba, the later Sanskrit recension title
is prefxed with Madhyamaka-. However, as reat clearly shows,
content and structure much of which is found scattered through the
Pli suttas, all suggest as the date of the listamba Stra as a whole,
200 bce plus or minus 100 years (reat 1993: 4-5).
47
It thus actually
pre-dates the already self-identifying form of the Mahyna, but was
later widely cited by Mahyna scholars, and formed an important
basis for their presentation of dependent origination. Note that unlike
the previous two sectarian stras, however, it is not associated with
the S or the Sarvstivda in general. The stra famously states that:
Whoever sees dependent origination sees the Dharma. Who sees the
Dharma, sees the Buddha.
48
This is most likely a combination of two
statements concerning seeing the dharma found in the gamas.
49

The text has a four-fold structure, considering cause (hetu) and
condition (pratyaya) in relation to internal and external phenomena.
The predominant simile is that of the growing of a seed, hence the
name li-stamba which means rice-stalk, which also hints at a
distinction between seed as cause, and other factors as conditions.
x H x H v bH XXXZX[
JCBSSL VOL. XI
30
The diference between cause and condition is somewhat akin to that
between the causal nature of own nature (sabhva) and other nature
(parabhva) in the Theravdin Peak opadesa and Nettip pakaraa (see
Warder in aMoli 1982b: xvii). It is a distinction also found in the
Sarvstivda.
According to the earliest version of the stra,
50

living beings do not go from this life to another life but there
is action (karma) and result, causally conditioned retribution
without any loss.
There are other paraphrases of statements found in the early stras.
There are passages in the earlier recensions with a variety of terms
as direct adjectives for dependent arising, which include not
conditioned, not abiding, unconditioned, not an object of mind,
pacifed, cessation, signless.
51
In the later Sanskrit, this is expanded
to include impermanence, dissatisfaction, emptiness, absence of
self.
52
The terms of this common pericope are often very closely
associated with emptiness, in fact, emptiness is often the frst term on
the list, indicating its predominance over the others.
53
This means that
the correct contemplation of dependent origination ensures that the
practitioner will not arise various deluded views about their existence
in the past or future. They will remove all the heterodox views which
are based on theories of a soul (tma vda), living being (sattva-), life
principle (jva-), person (pudgala-), and so forth.
54
The implied sense
is that of the emptiness of the Self.
The stra fnally concludes with statements that one who correctly
enters into receptivity of the Dharma of dependent origination will in
fact become a fully awakened buddha.
55
As this statement is found in
most recensions of the text, it is at present difcult to assess whether
this statement is a later addition or original. Similar to statements in the
Mah vibha stra indicate that dependent arising was the object of
contemplation for the bodhisattva(s), a point which we shall examine in
further detail below, via the comments of the Vaibhika Master Parva.
x H x H v bH XXXZX
31
3.4. Abhidharma stra and Mahvibha Exegesis
In addition to the obvious connection that the Sarvstivdin stras
place upon considering dependent origination as emptiness, their
Abhidharma also makes this connection. We shall examine this from
the ancient Dharma skandha pda stra, and the later orthodox stan-
dard, the Mahvibha stra.
The Dharma skandha pda is perhaps the earliest of the Northern
Abhidharma literature, hailing from around 300 bce, contemporary
with the Pli Vibhaga. The text cites a stra which discusses both the
Dharma law of dependent origination ([]) as well as dependently
originated dharmas as phenomena ().
56
The stra cited,
Prattya samutpda dharma (), appears to be our previously
encountered S 296, a parallel of the Pli SN 12:20 Paccayo. Dealing
with causality (nidna), it suggests a text from the oldest strata of S
and SN, the Nidna sayukt. This same stra is also cited by perhaps
the oldest of all the Abhidharma literature, the riputra Abhidharma,
but without elaboration.
57

After elucidating both the Dharma principle of the causal relationships
between the phenomen ological dharma events, and the actual dharmas
themselves, it is stated that for one who knows and sees this as it really
is, it is impossible that they will fall into various forms of thought such
as Did I exist in the past?, Will I exist in the future, and so forth.
Both the S stra itself and also the Dharma skandha pda usage of it,
(but neither the Pli sutta itself nor the riputra Abhidharma stra
citation,) then expressly state that this is because for one who knows
and sees, they have totally removed all these various conceptualizations
which are connected with the view of a self, a living being and so
forth.
58
This is thus akin to the points of view rejected in the Mah-
nyat Dharma paryya and the listamba Stra (above).
Together, this is a very strong indicator that vision of dependent
arising, and thus not self, was the considered the factor which made
one an ryan. This is supported by earlier material such as S 347 and
SN 12:70 Susma, which explains that one frst realizes gnosis of the
stability of Dharma (dharma sthitat), and then gnosis of nirva.
But despite this seemingly important statement, the Dharma skandha-
p p n Z PPPRPU
JCBSSL VOL. XI
32
pda commentary resigns itself to merely mechanically explaining
the twelve links, and remains silent as these various tman based
views. Of approximately the same historical period, the Theravdin
Paisambhid magga also explains this gnosis of stability of Dhamma
(dhamma hitat) as knowledge of the various dependently related
conditions.
59

The same stra cited by Dharma skandha pda also provides us with a
number of terms for dependent origination which indicate its position
as a kind of natural and immutable law. The S version adds several
terms over and above the Pli, including suchness of Dharma (;
dharma tathat), Dharmic nature (; dharmat), factuality
(; bhtat), and others.
60
Elsewhere in the Dharma skandha-
pda, a strikingly similar description which indicates a kind of eternal
principle, hinting at an unconditioned nature, is also given for the ryan
truths.
61
A shortened list featuring only dharma sthitit and dharmat
appears in the Mahvibha. Here the authors wish to refute the
Vibhajya vdin view that dependent origination is an unconditioned
(asaskta) dharma, by stating that unlike the unconditioned cessation,
etc., dependent origination is still within the sphere of the past, present
and future, and thus conditioned, despite it being a fxed and eternal
principles.
62
All this quite possibly has its roots in the Dharma skandha-
pda passages cited above.
As shown in the Dharma skandha pda, although both the Dharma of
dependent arising itself and dependently originated dharmas are of
one substance, they are still diferent objects.
63
The Vaibhika
master Vasumitra, in presenting the statement Whosoever sees
dependent origination sees the Dharma, where dependent origination
is explicitly given in the twelve causal links (nidna) format, claims that
some [masters] state that realization through the emptiness entrance
to release is a case of seeing dharmas but not seeing dependent
origination; whereas realization through the intentionless entrance
to release is seeing both dharmas and dependent origination.
64

This would mean that the emptiness release described by Vasumitra
refers to the various dharmas themselves, but not their mutual causal
relationships.
x H x H v bH XXXZX
33
Moving ahead several centuries we arrive at the critical Northern
Abhidharma commentarial tome, the Mahvibha. Completed in the
middle of the 2
nd
century ce, it certainly precedes Ngrjuna (2
nd
3
rd

century ce), and would doubtlessly have been a major doctrinal force
across much of mainland Indian Buddhism during his lifetime. In the
Mah vibha, the Susma Stra was again cited for discussion, but now
the above position of the Dharma skandha pda became just one of
many explanations, to be fnally supplanted by an explanation more in
tune with the developing Vaibhika system.
65

In the Mahvibha, Parva analyses various personality types, and
states that the bodhisattvas who are followers by desire (tnusrin)
who take the result as the entrance, and also the followers by
views (dy anusrin) who take the cause as the entrance, both
contemplate the Dharma of dependent origination, and based on the
emptiness samdhi, they enter into certitude of perfection.
66
This is
further shown by a verse which states:
67

The fully awakened ones (sabuddha) of the three periods of
time, break the poison of sorrow, they all emphasize the true
Dharma (saddharma), always abiding in the nature of Dharma
(dharmat).
While this appears to be specifcally just for those on the bodhisattva
path to eventual full awakening, elsewhere other statements seem to
imply that ryans as a whole all realize dharmat.
68
But despite
this, the connection between realiza tion of this dependent arising
and the ryan stages appears to have become gradually weaker over
time. Perhaps it was more the case that this sort of release through the
emptiness samdhi which contemplates dependent origination as per
dharmat as their object, was a special case for the bodhisattva.
Statements in the Mahvibha stra which explicitly connect the
emptiness samdhi to dependent arising are few,
69
when compared with
the extremely common format of this practice being contem plation on
the not self and emptiness aspects of the four truths. In the opening
passages of the Mahvibha, the connection between knowledge of
not self (emptiness is not mentioned) and dependent origin ation is
made explicit, as perception of the former gives rise to the latter.
70

Rather than a vision of dependent origination, insight into those fxed
x H x H v bH XXXZX_
JCBSSL VOL. XI
34
laws that indicated how specifc dharmas arise and cease due to specifc
conditions as being the frst stage of ryan status, there was a shift
towards vision of just the dharmas themselves.
Both Parvas position vis--vis the bodhisattva(s), which is no doubt
based on the notion that it was just such a contemplation that led to
kyamunis own awakening universally extended to all bodhisattva
candidates, and also Vasumitras older source for dependent arising,
hint at the antiquity of these two scholars who have a tendency towards
the earlier works over the later commentarial stras. Both would have
been approximately 100 years before Ngrjunas own time (circa 2
nd
3
rd
centuries ce), around the period of the newly forming Mahyna.
3.5. Un/conditioned Status of Dependent Origination
At this point, we would like to leave aside the citation of individual
texts, and turn to a broader issue. Up to this point, we have seen that
the Abhidharma method ology of classifcation of dharma(s) as either
conditioned (saskta) or unconditioned (asaskta) dharma gradually
became more signifcant as time progressed. While this dharma vda
approach should be more narrowly confned to dharmas (plural) as
phenomena, it appears that the use of dharma (singular) as a law or
principle, was unable to escape such analysis. It thus came to be that the
question of whether or not the very principle of dependent origination
(prattya samutpda dharma) was conditioned or unconditioned,
and not just those things that were dependently originated (prattya-
samutpanna dharmni), came about. As we have already seen in
the Nikyas and gamas themselves, there were a number of terms
commonly taken as synonyms for dependent arising, such as stability
of Dharma (dharma sthitit) and suchness (tathat). These were also
drawn into the range of this debate, though as we shall see below, they
were not necessarily seen as exact equivalents.
Drawing from the excellent study of bareau on the jungle of views
that makes up sectarian Buddhism, we may tabulate the attribution of
conditioned or uncondi tioned status to these three notionsdependent
origination, the stability of Dharma, and suchnessas advocated by
various schools (from bareau 2005: 287):
71

x H x H v bH XXXZX
35
Conditioned (saskta) Unconditioned (asaskta)
Dependent
Origination
Stability
of
Dharma
Suchness
Dependent
Origination
Stability
of
Dharma
Suchness
Vtsputriya (#38)
Theravda (#55) (#21) (#186)
Sarvstivda (#6, #28) (#6) (#6)
riputra
Abhidharma
(#10) (#10) (#10)
Mahsghika (#43) (#43) (#43)
Mahsaka (#19) (#19) (#19)
Uttarpathaka (#32*)

(#32*)
Dharmagupta (#13)
Prvaaila (#9)
Vibhajyavda (#8)
On one side, there were the schools which tended towards considering
dependent origination, etc., as conditioned: These are notably the earlier
Sthavira schools with bhidharmika tendencies, such as the Theravda,
Vtsputriya and Sarvstivda. We would probably expect to see the
riputra Abhidharma stra among this group, but out of the three
they only considered suchness as conditioned. For the conditioned
status of the stability of Dharma and suchness, there was also support
from the Mahsghikas and Mahsakas, and a qualifed afrmation
from the Uttarpathakas.
On the other side, there were also those who inclined to an interpretation
of these as unconditioned: The Mahsghikas and riputra
Abhidharma stra had a shared list of nine unconditioned, including:
8. The self-nature of the members of conditioned production (prattya-
samutpdga svabhva); and 9. The self-nature of the factors of the
Path (mrgga svabh).
72
However, according to bareaus sources
at least, both the Mah sghikas and the riputra Abhi dharma
stra otherwise considered that suchness itself is conditioned. Were
there diferent forms of suchness, such that some were conditioned
x H x H v bH XXXZXa
JCBSSL VOL. XI
36
and others not? The Mahsaka also had nine unconditioned, on
a slightly diferent list, although also including: 8. The suchness
of the Path (mrga tathat); and 9. The suchness of dependent
origination (prattya samutpda tathat).
73
The Dharma guptakas upheld
unconditioned status regards dependent origination alone, but there is
no mention of their position vis--vis stability of Dharma or suchness.
74

The Prvaailas agreed, simply on the basis of a stra, which was most
probably their equivalent of SN 12:20 / S 296.
75
They also considered
that the four ryan truths themselves were unconditioned, for basically
the same reasons.
76
The otherwise unelucidated agreement of so-called
Vibhajyavdins,
77
makes them appear to be any group other than the
three early Sthavira Abhidharma schools.
In addition to the above points, we also fnd some other related doctrinal
positions of the Sthavira traditions. The Katthvatthu states a position
of the Theravdins against the Andhakas, namely that the former
consider that emptiness (along with the signless and intentionless)
is not included in the aggregate of the mental formations.
78
On the
grounds that whatever is a formation (saskra) is also conditioned
(saskta), this would seem to mean that the Andhakas considered
even emptiness itself to be conditioned.
The category of the unconditioned has always been a standard of
bhidharmika analysis based on the early stras. However, the very
notion of anything being unconditioned has always been problematic
for Buddhists who were loathe to run up against their core doctrine of
not self or non-self, ie. emptiness. Here we have seen how it related to
dependent arising, and its synonyms. But it obviously also extended to
the notion of emptiness, as some form of equivalence had already been
established. This difculty can be seen, for example, in Ngrjunas
under standing of the emptiness of emptiness, the argument that to
turn emptiness itself into a reifedunconditioned, not dependent
phenomena, is to make perhaps the greatest mistake of all. Much of
the discourse on the emptiness of emptiness has been an ontological
one, which has often failed to look to its earlier precedents. It appears to
have its roots in seeing as empty the very insight contemplation which
perceives the emptiness of phenomena. This is quite a diferent matter
altogether, but unfortunately beyond our scope here.
x H x H v bH XXXZYX
37
3.6. Summary
The frst two subjects for discussion of emptiness and dependent
origination in mainstream sectarian Buddhism involved citing two
Sayuktgama stras, the Paramrtha nyat (Section 3.1) and
Mah nyat (Section 3.2) stras. Both of these two stras not only
directly related emptiness described as ultimate or great emp-
tiness to dependent origination, in the simple format When this
exists, that exists, etc., or in the later standardized twelve limb format.
Further more, the two texts raise the not ions of neither coming nor
going and neither identity nor plurality, respectively, to describe de-
pendent arising. These two statements would appear to be sources for
four of the famous eight negations that make up the opening verses
of Ngrjunas Kriks. This fact has been noted by ynShn in his
Investigations, Chp. 4.2, where he also provides early (and sectarian)
sources for the other two sets of negations, neither arising nor ceas-
ing and neither eternalism nor nihilism (ynShn 1985: 210f). We
have omitted detailed discussion of these sources here, as while highly
implying a relation to emptiness, they do not mention it explicitly.
79

ynShn concludes that We have no doubts that teaching dependent
origination based on the eight negations has its source in the Samyukta
gama stras (1985: 210f). Most of these texts have Pli equiva lents,
though E parallels are available. As such, they are seldom if ever
raised in the usual discourse on emptiness which relies excessively on
Pli material. While stras, they still most likely represent notions from
the early sectarian period, rather than any so-called primitive or early
Buddhism.
The listamba Stra provides further early sectarian material from
other than Sarvsti vdin sources (in Section 3.3). We know that this
text was later fully adopted by the Madhyamaka and other Mahyna
scholars. Similar to Ultimate Emptiness and Great Emptiness,
much attention is given to describing dependent origination in terms
that avoid the extremes that result from views of a Self, or other
synonymous entity. The system of causality distinguishing primary
cause from supportive conditions began to develop, whereas earlier
these terms were for all purposes simply synonymous. This development
also suggests just how early the systems that appear as Ngrjunas
x H x H v bH XXXZYY
JCBSSL VOL. XI
38
model for analysis in Chp. 1 of the Kriks may be. This system may
thus not necessarily be restricted to the Vaibhikas.
By the actual Abhidharma stras themselves, and the later fully
developed Vaibhika system, we see the continued reference and
citation to the gamas, albeit interpreting them through the Abhidharma
method (Section 3.4). In particular, the analysis into real existent
dharmas and designations (prajapti), and their being condi tioned
or unconditioned (Section 3.5). This basic method posed problems,
however, when inter preting both the principle (dharmasingular) or
dependent origination and those phenomena (dharmasplural) which
were dependently originated. Various schools were split along lines
where the bhidharmikas generally considered both conditioned, but
others, most notably the Mahs ghikas and those they infuenced,
considering the principle itself as unconditioned.
4. Emptiness = Dependent Origination
Ngrjunas Innovation?
In Section 1, we began our examination from the broad context of
the academic discourse on emptiness. This fairly standard and often
paradigmatic scholastic narrative of the teaching of emptiness usually
starts from Ngrjunas Mahyna Madhyamaka which it extols as a
novel and creative if not revolutionary teaching, only then moving
back through mainstream sectarian Hnayna schools, and fnally
to early Buddhism. But the earlier historical stages are often only
there to explain the Madhyamaka, giving the approach something
of a teleological favor. But besides this difculty, source biases and
anachronistic arguments are also highly problematic. The source biases
are mainly the heavy if not sole use of Pli and Sanskrit material,
ignoring translations of important Indic texts preserved only in Chinese
translation. The anachronistic arguments are that lines of doctrinal
development often use post-Ngrjunian classic Theravdin and
Sarvstivdin cum Sautrntika commentarial literature to represent the
targets of the Madhyamaka critique. That Madhyamaka critique is, in a
word, emptiness (nyat). Or, in a verse, that emptiness is dependent
origination, designation on a basis, and the middle way (as per Mla-
madhyamaka kriks, v. 24:18), and also the opening verses of praise of
the Kriks, upon which the academic discourse places such a heavy
x H x H v bH XXXZYZ
39
weight. While the discourse of emptiness is a very broad topic, we
have chosen to focus upon this latter particular aspect of it. That is,
we have asked: is Ngrjunas direct relationship of equivalence or
near equivalence between emptiness and dependent origination, an
innovation on his part?
In the light of the source biases and anachronistic arguments mentioned
above, we have chosen a relatively simple approach here. The stronger
that equivalences or relationships between emptiness and dependent
origination can be shown in the literature prior to Ngrjuna (circa 2
nd

to 3
rd
century ce), the weaker the argument that this is an innovation
on his part, is clear. Thus we have examined the material utilizing two
heuristically functional historical periods of early Buddhism (up
to circa 3
rd
century bce), and mainstream sectarian Buddhism (3
rd

century bce to mid 2
nd
century ce), respectively. Now, to what degree
has a pre-Ngrjunian relationship between these two doctrines been
shown?
In short, a direct and explicit connection between emptiness and
dependent origin ation has been present in Buddhist literature from
the early period. While this may not be particularly strong in the Pli
texts, it can be seen more clearly in the Chinese translations of the
gamas, in particular the Sarvstivdin Sayuktgama and (probably)
Mahsghika Ekottargama. The connection also continues into the
sectarian period, as can be seen from examination of translations of
the Sarvsti vdin Abhidharma stras and commentarial literature.
Such use of early and mid-period Indian Buddhist literature outside of
the usual Pli and Sanskrit recensions should be standard practice for
Buddhist studies. We can no longer justify the source biases that often
occur when such alternate material is ignored.
The relationship between the notions of emptiness and dependent
arising found in the early texts that we have examined here works on
a number of levels: 1. As demonstrated in Sections 2.1 and 2.6, the
frst is where emptiness refers to a lack of a Self or what pertains to
Self, the usual gloss of the discourse for early teachings on emptiness.
The process of the arising and coming into being of phenomena,
sasric becoming, is one which takes place with recourse to such
a Self entity. This fnding is quite to be expected, a core thread
x H x H v bH XXXZY[
JCBSSL VOL. XI
40
that winds from most likely the Buddha himself through the texts
and commentaries, to Ngrjuna, and beyond. 2. But in addition
to this is the sense wherein emptiness refers to the state of nirva
itself, the absence of afiction, as shown in Sections 2.3 and 2.3.
The complementary aspect is not dependent arising, but, if we may
coin a neo logism, dependent cessation. 3. A position tending toward
universalization of the aforementioned two levels begins to emerge,
as per Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Both the principle dependent arising
and the state of appeasement, two otherwise radically diferent sense of
emptiness, are profound. Thus this becomes almost a catch phrase
for the totality of the Buddhas teachings, a notion which develops into
the idea of dharma seals or dhamma characteristics during the end
phase of the early texts and the start of the mainstream schools. That
all phenomena are empty, be they conditioned or unconditioned,
sasra or nirva, is a hall mark of not just the phenomena (dharmas)
themselves, but the principle (Dharma) that connects them, and the
teaching (Dharma) that elucidates both aspects.
The mainstream period continues this trend, where Abhidharma
methodology such as analysis into conditioned and unconditioned,
conventional and ultimate truths, and so forth, further clarifes the ever
more signifcant role of emptiness. 1. First, in the Sayuktgama
texts on Ultimate Emptiness (Paramrtha nyat) and Great
Emptiness (Mah nyat), there is the equation wherein emptiness is
explicitly described in terms of both aspects of dependent origination
and cessation (in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). The Sarvstivdins, at
least, elevated emptiness to have a similar status as imperma nence,
dissatisfaction and absence of Self. By making it one of the sixteen
fundamental aspects (kra), a characteristic shared by all phenomena
(samnya lakaa), this was further strengthened. 2. Outside this school,
the alistamba Stra (see Section 3.3), which was later to be adopted
by the Madhyamaka Mahyna, further pushed dependent origination
to the fore by identifying it as a universal truth. This occurred both
abstractly, as the Dharma, and anthropo morphi cally as the Buddha.
3. While the Abhidharma had its own methodology, it was still bound
to a greater or lesser degree, to conform to the early texts. When faced
with early stra (and probably vinaya) that described the Bodhisattva
Gautamas awakening in terms of insight into dependent origination,
the notion that this was a particular practice for cultivation for those
x H x H v bH XXXZY
41
on the bodhisattva path (as opposed to rvakas and pratyeka buddhas),
became more formalized (Section 3.4). An incipient Mahyna
tradition, drawing much from the institutionally large and philosophical
powerful traditions such as the Sarvstivda, would no doubt be
infuenced by such doctrinal lineages. The infuence need not be one of
mere acceptance and continuation thereof, and could just as likely be
one of dialectical opposition and transformation.
As can now be clearly seen, the connection between emptiness and
dependent origination is not an innovation or creation of Ngrjuna. In
the still narrower sense of the relationship being an equation of the two,
namely that emptiness is just dependent origination itself, this has also
been well established before Ngrjunas time. In addition, there are
numerous other doctrinal positions that associate the two one way or
another. But while we have shown in the introduction of this essay how
infuential the notion of Ngrjunas equation between emptiness and
dependent origination is on academic narrative, we have not detailed
what Ngrjuna actually meant by this. But this has been amply
discussed elsewhere, so we need not cover old ground here. What we
have aimed to do is provide earlier material, letting the texts speaks for
themselves, as they say. Although this textual analysis demonstrates
that relating and connecting emptiness and dependent origination is not
an innovation of Ngrjuna, no doubt new doctrinal interpretations of
these core ideas have been made by him. The next task would then be to
compare the material presented here with that of Ngrjuna to further
understand what his specifc developments were exactly.
x H x H v bH XXXZY]
JCBSSL VOL. XI
42
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Notes
1 Full disclosure: The author here is presently working on a full English translation
of this work, to be titled An Investigation into Emptiness, to be published by
Noble Path Publishing, USA.
2 Refer also ynShn (1971: 89-102).
3 See ynShn (1971: 755); though Mizuno (2003: 561ff) is less sure about its
sectarian afliation.
4 The usual generic formula is given as that in Ud 1:1-3: Iti imasmi sati
ida hoti, imassuppd ida uppajjati, imasmi asati ida na hoti, imassa
nirodh ida nirujjhati; ireland (1997: 13f); also SN ii 28, 65, 70, 78f, 95f,
v 388; bodhi (2000: 552, 575, 579, 585f, 596f); and MN 38 i 262f, ii 32, iii 63;
aMoli & bodhi (1995: 355f, 655, 927); AN v 184. bodhi (2000: 517) states:
Dependent origination is one of the central teachings of early Buddhism, so
vital to the teaching as a whole that the Buddha is quoted elsewhere as saying,
One who sees dependent origination see the Dhamma, and one who sees the
Dhamma sees dependent origination (MN i 190-191); Vutta kho paneta
bhagavatyo paicca samup pda passati so dhamma passati, yo dhamma
passati so paiccasamuppda passat ti. See kalupahana (1975), Causality:
The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, for an in depth examination of this teaching
in early Buddhism.
5 Such as those seen in SN 12:20, ii 25: Katamo ca, bhikkhave, paiccasamuppdo.
Uppd v tathgatna anuppd v tathgatna, hitva s dhtu
dhammahitat dhamma niymat idappaccayat; and SN 6:2, i 140 for
dhammat as the content realized by all the Buddhas, which they in turn
reverence; bodhi (2000: 550f, 235). In equivalent S 296
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, b14-26), we see the addition of the generalized
formula at the start (cf. Ud 1:1-3).
6 SN 20:7 i ii 267: ye te suttant tathgata bhsit gambhr gambhiratth
lokuttar suat paisayutt ; bodhi (2000: 709). Also SN 55:53
Dhammadinna v 407; bodhi (2000: 1833f). Parallel in S 1258
47(CBETA, T02, no. 99,
p. 345, b13-14), and also S 293 12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 83,
c4-6); which has no Pli equivalent.
7 SN 6:1 i 136: Adhigato kho myya dhammo gambhro duddaso duranubodho
santo pato atakkvacaro nipuo paita vedanyo, layarm kho panya
paj layarat laya sammudit layarmya kho pana pajya layaratya
laya sammuditya duddasa ida hna yadida idap paccayat paicca-
samuppdo. Idampi kho hna yadida sabba sakhra samatho sabbpadhi-
painissaggo tahk khayo virgo nirodho nibba.; bodhi (2000: 231). A
largely identical Pli passage in MN 26 i 167 and MN 72 i 487; see aMoli &
bodhi (1995: 260, 593)
8 SN 6:1, paralleled by E 19:1 1019 (CBETA,
x H x H v bH XXXZZX
47
T02, no. 125, p. 593, a25-27), where dependent origination is not mentioned,
however. MN 26 and parallel M 204 which lacks this passage altogether. MN
72 and parallel S 962 which merely has 34
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 246, a10): it cannot be
fathomed, it is most deep, vast, immeasurable, incalculable, eternal cessation,
refering to the extinction of the frenirva.
9 S 293 12
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 83, c13-15) No equivalent in SN, though possibly
around SN 12 given the relation of other adjacent stra / sutta. Similar to both
SN 6:1, above, and also the opening of DN 15 Mahnidna Sutta, ii 55.
10 DN 15 ii 55: acchariya bhante, abbhuta bhante, yvagambhro
cya bhante, paicca samuppdo gambhravabhso ca. Atha ca pana me
uttnakuttnako viya khyatti. M heva nanda avaca, m heva nanda
avaca, gambhro cya nanda paiccasamuppdo gambhrvabhso ca.; see
WalShe (1987: 223); bodhi (1984: 45). Same as M 97 Mah nidna Stra
244
(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 578, b13-17). Also D

13 () Mah nidna upya Stra and DN 15 Mah nidna Sutta, are
largely similar. Note that for nandas comments, Pli has clear as clear can
be, whereas M has shallow as shallow can be, ie. opposite of profound.
11 Udna 1:1-3 1f: imasmi sati ida hoti, imassppd ida uppajjati, imasmi
asati ida na hoti, imassa nirodh ida nirujjhati.; English in ireland (1997:
13f). See also S stras 296-30212 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p.
84, b12 p. 86, b23); etc.
12 SN 12:12 ii 13f; bodhi (2000: 541f). S 372 15 (CBETA,
T02, no. 99, p. 102, a12-b17).
13 S 262 10 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 66, c25-p. 67, a8). SN 12:15
Kaccna gotta Sutta; SN ii 17; bodhi (2000: 544). Or S 301
12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 85, c17-p. 86, a3).
14 On causality, see suttas SN 12:15, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26 and 67; and for other extreme
views, SN 12:46, 47 and 48.
15 For nibbna in SN 38:1f iv 251f: Yo kho vuso rgakkhayo dosakkhayo
mohakkhayo ida vuccati nibbnanti; bodhi (2000: 1294f). Parallel in S 490
18
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 126, b3-4). As a defnition
of the unconditioned (asakhata) in SN 43 Asakhata Sayutta iv 359f:
Katamaca bhikkhave asakhata: yo bhikkhave rgakkhayo dosakkhayo
mohakkhayo, ida vuccati bhikkhave asakhata; bodhi (2000: 1372f).
Parallel in S 890 31
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 224, b1-3).
Also as a defnition for the fruition of an arhat in S 1129 4
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 299, a5-7); the stra other paralleled
by SN 55:55-58 v 410-411; bodhi (2000: 1836-7), but the Pli lacks this phrase.
x H x H v bH XXXZZY
JCBSSL VOL. XI
48
16 S 262 10
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 66, b17-18; c10-11) Unlike the SN version, the
S states that this occurred not long after the [Buddhas] parinirva. Pli is
SN 22:90 Channa iii 133 (see below).
17 SN 22:90 Channa iii 133: Atha ca pana me sabba sakhra samathe sabbpadhi-
pai nissagge taha kkhaye virge nirodhe nibbne citta na pakkhandati
nappasdati na santihati ndhi muccati paritassan updna uppajjati,
paccudvattati mnasa, atha kho carahi me attti, na kho paneva dhamma
passato hoti ko nu kho me tath dhamma deseyya yathha dhamma
passeyyanti. Refer bodhi (2000: 946).
18 Yogcra bhmi stra 83
(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, p. 766, a22-26): The term empty

means forsaking all the deflements. The term non-obtainment means being
separated from the signs of any existence. The term destruction of craving
means not seeking anything in the future. The term forsaking of desire means
not delighting in present experiences. The term cessation means abandoning
remaining deflements. The term nirva means no remaining substratum.
19 SN 41:7 Godatta; SN iv 295f; bodhi (2000: 1325f), which has the Citta and
Godatta; parallel is S stra 567 (T02, no. 99, p. 149, c6 p. 150, a15), which
has instead Citra and Ngadatta. Also MN 43 Mahvedalla Sutta, MN i 292;
aMoli & bodhi (1995: 387f); with Mahkohita and Sriputta; parallel is
AN 6:175 Kohita; and M 211; paralleled by S 251. The SN and both S
versions are the shortest, while the MN and M versions have become more
extensive exegeses.
20 SN 40:9 Animitta; PTS SN iv 268; bodhi (2000: 1308). Here, it is also given as
non-attention to all signs. The only other Pli uses of ceto samdhiseems not
directly related to any of the four immeasurables, such as DN Brahmajla i 13f;
DN Mahpadna ii 100; DN Pthika iii 30; AN ii 54, iii 51; etc.
21 MN 43 Mahvedalla; PTS MN i 298; = aMoli & bodhi (1995: 395).
22 SN 41:7 Godatta; SN iv 295f; bodhi (2000: 1325f). Parallel in S 567
21
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 149, c13-14).
23 Possibly, as ynShn states, simply shorthand for non-confict meditation
(araa samdhi;) (ynShn 1985: 22).
24 S 80 *rya dharma mudr jna daraa viuddhi Stra ()
3 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 20, a25-b27).
25 M 211 58
(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p.
792, b18-20).
26 MN 43 Mahvedalla Sutta, MN i 296-297: Tayo kho vuso paccay animittya
cetovimuttiy hitiy: sabba nimittnaca amanasikro, animittya ca dhtuy
manasikro pubbeva abhisakhro ...; English in aMoli & bodhi (1995:
393): there are two conditions for the persistence of the signless deliverance
of mind: non-attention to all signs, attention to the signless element, and the
x H x H v bH XXXZZZ
49
prior determination [of its duration].
27 S 80 3
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 20, a29-b25).

28 SN 12:20, ii 26; SN 12:34, ii 60; SN 22:21, iii 24; SN 36:8, iv 214f; MN i
500: anicc sakhat paiccasamuppann khayadhamm vayadhamm
virgadhamm nirodhadhamm (slight variants); bodhi (2000: 551, 573,
871, 1268f); aMoli & bodhi (1995: 605f): impermanent, conditioned,
dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away and ceasing
(with slight variants).
29 However, it appears that the Chinese reads *virga dharma or *virakta-
as literally forsake desire dharma (), which seems out of place in that
it suggests that all formations (abhi saskra) have thus forsaken desire.
Also, forsake knowledge dharma (; *nirodha jna dharma) does not
match the Pli subject to cessation (nirodha dhamma). It is hard to ascertain
whether this reading is part of the Sarvstivda tradition, or translator error.
A similar translation appears in the riputra Abhidharma stra
11 (CBETA, T28, no. 1548, p. 606, a2-12; and ibid. p. 654, c9-10):
= teaching on pacifcation, cessation, the dharma of forsaking desire, the
true path towards nirva. However, another sense of dharma as teaching
appears in the Mahvibha stra 161
(CBETA, T27,
no. 1545, p. 816, c3-5): = Moreover, although some practitioners of meditation
(yogcrin) have revulsion towards the dissatisfaction of the desire realm
and seek the [meditative] bliss of forsaking sensual craving, however, they are
negligent and do not cultivate the dharma of forsaking desire. There may be
some confation of various senses of dharma here, eg. teaching, principle or
law, phenomenon, etc.
30 These are listed in accepted order of compilation (from gethin 1998: 205).
31 These are listed in accepted order of compilation, for a full list see ynShn
(1968: 121-171), and using dhaMMajotis system of abbreviations (2007: x-xii,
98f).
32 See ynShn (1968: 20f, 69f, 127f); WilleMen, deSSein & cox (1998: 164);
bareau (2005: 289f); and Mizuno (2003: 389-416) for details of the riputra
Abhidharma stra in this role.
33 S 335 13 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c12-26); and E 27:7
3037 (CBETA, T02, no. 125, p. 713, c12-p.
714, b12). Similar passages are also given in: E 38:9 32
(CBETA, T02, no. 125, p. 724, b12-18); and E 51:84951
(CBETA, T02, no. 125, p. 819, c5-25), (which otherwise parallel to
MN 143 Anthapiikovda, but the Pli lacks the passage here).
34 S 335 13

JCBSSL VOL. XI
50
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16-25). No
Pli equivalent.
35 E 37:7 3037
(CBETA,
T02, no. 125, p. 713, c12-p. 714, b12).
36 From Vibhaga ahakath 68; also compare PsA 371.
37 From Visuddhi magga 410; also Abhidhammattha viksin 417.
38 Cf. SN 35 Sayatana Sayutta SN 35:246 V (CBETA and akanuMa have
35:205 which is incorrect); = bodhi (2000: 1253f); SN iv 195f. S 1169
43 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 312, c6-16).
39 For the Sanskrit Mlasarvstivda Vinaya Saghabhedavastu, (gnoli A 407b,
SBV I 158): nnyatra dharmasakett, tatrya dharma saketo yadutsmin
satda bhavati, . For the Chinese version of the Bimbisra Stra:
1 (CBETA, T01, no. 41, p. 826, b5-10); which has
and for dharma sakhetd, lit. from those dharma perceptions.
Also M 116
(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 498, b9-14), which gives a stronger sense of dependency.
40 Abhidharma koa verse 3:17-18, and Bhya: asti karmsti vipka, krakas
tu nopalabhyate ya im ca skandhn nikipati any ca skandhn prati-
sandadhty anyatra dharma sakett, tatrya dharmasaketo yadutsmin
satda bhavatti vistarea prattya samutpda, An English translation can
be found in de la Valle pouSSin, trs. pruden (1991: Vol II, 399); though the
meaning seems lost in translation.
41 S 335 13
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16-25). No

Pli equivalent.
42 This text is strictly speaking a paryya, and not to be confused with MN 121 /
M 190 Mah nyat Stra.
43 S 297 12
..(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p.
84, c14 p. 85, a1-9) For a Sanskrit re-construction of this text, see trphi in
choong (1999: 91f).
44 SN 12:35 Avijjpaccay, ii 60f; see bodhi (2000: 60f).
45 S 297 12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, c14p. 85, a1-9).
46 S 297 12
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, c14 p.
85, a1-9).
47 Although reats study is excellent, it is unfortunate that apart from the Sanskrit
and Tibetan sources for the stra and comparisons with the Pli, more attention
was not given to the Chinese sources and extant gama literature.
48 See reat (1993: 28); Vaidya (1961: 100): yo bhikava prattya samutpda
payati, sa dharma payati , yo dharma payati, sa buddha payati iti;
Chinese listamba Stra 1[23]
x H x H v bH XXXZZ
51
(CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 816, c24-25) [23]
; and other Chinese translations.
49 The two statements are found in MN 28 i 190-1 and SN 22:87 iii 120 respectively.
50 listamba Stra 1
|9](CBETA,
T16, no. 709, p. 818, b20-26) [9]. Compare
with Sanskrit in reat (1993: 64 v36); and Vaidya (1961: 105): tatra na kacid
dharmo smllokt paraloka sakrmati, asti ca karma phala prativijapti,
hetu pratyaynm avaikalyt,.
51 listamba Stra 1
(CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 817, a11-17).
52 reat (1993: 32, 70); and Vaidya (1961: 100-1, 106): asata tucchata
riktata asrata rogata gaata alyata aghata anityata dukhata
nyata antmata samanupayati.
53 See S 259 10 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 65, b14-15); SN
22 Khandha sayutta has aniccato dukkhato rogato gaato sallato aghato
bdhato parato palokato suato anattato .... Other references include S 104
(= SN 22:85 Yamaka); S 259 (= SN 22:122 Sla); S 265 (= SN 22:95 Phea);
S 291 (= SN 12:66 Sammasa); S 864, 867, 869, 870; S 1175 (= SN 35:204
Kisuk); etc.
54 listamba Stra 1
(CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 818, c6-13); see reat (1993: 70-2);
listamba Stra (Vaidya 1961: 106): tmavda pratisayuktni sattvavda-
pratisayuktni jvavda pratisayuktni pudgala vda pratisayuktni kautuka-
magalavda- pratisayuktni ,,. This passage is from the end of SN 12:20
or S 296,
55 listamba Stra 1 (CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 818, c13-
16). See reat (1993: 72-73); Vaidya (1961: 106): yo bhadanta riputra
evavidha dharmaknti samanvita prattya samutpda samyag avagacchati,
tasya tathgato rhan samyak sabuddho samyak sabodhi vykaroti
samyak sabuddho buddho bhaviyasti ,.
56 Dharma skandha pda 1121 (CBETA,
T26, no. 1537, p. 505, a9-b13).
57 riputra Abhidharma stra 12(CBETA,
T28, no. 1548, p. 606, b17-25).
58 Dharma skandha pda 1121
(CBETA, T26,
no. 1537, p. 505, b6-10). The parallel passage in S 296 12
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, c3-7).
59 Ps i 50-52; English in aMoli (1982b: 50-52).
60 S 296 12
(dharma sthitit)( *dharma niyma; see ynShn 1944: 18)

(dharma tathat)(dharmat)(dharma viparta tathat)
x H x H v bH XXXZZ]
JCBSSL VOL. XI
52
(dharm vipartathat)(bhtat)(satyat / tattva)
(avipary ayat)(CBETA, T02,
no. 99, p. 84, b14-26). The passage in Dharma skandha pda
1121
(dharma sthitit)(dharma dhtu)
(dharmat)(dharma niyma)
(dharma naya / -yukti)(dharma gati)(tattva)(bhtat)
(satyat)(tathat)(avitathat)(amat)
(avipartat)(avipary ayat)(CBETA, T26, no. 1537, p.
505, a16-22).
61 Dharma skandha pda 610 (CBETA,
T26, no. 1537, p. 480, c23-29; p. 481, a19-25; p. 481, b25-c2; p. 482, a14-20);
four paralleled statements, one for each of the four ryan truths.
62 Mahvibha stra 23 (CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p.
116, b28-c22).
63 Dharma skandha pda 1121
(CBETA,
T26, no. 1537, p. 505, b14-19). Assuming, of course, that Vasumitra adheres
to the Dharma skandha pda. This portion at the beginning of the chapter is
unfortunately not within the recently discovered and edited Sanskrit fragments
of the Dharma skandha pda.
64 Vasumitra Bodhisattva Sagraha stra 2
(CBETA, T28, no. 1549, p. 735, a27-b14);

and ibid. 2
(CBETA, T28, no. 1549, p. 736, a25-28).

65 Mahvibha stra 110 (CBETA, T27, no.
1545, p. 572, b16-c27).
66 Mahvibha stra 24(CBETA, T27, no. 1545,
p. 123, c1-p. 124, a8); and also at Vb 133
(CBETA, T28, no. 1546, p. 97, b9-13).
67 Mahvibha stra 183
(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 917, b9-10).
68 Mahvibha stra 126
(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 658, b17-21).
69 Mahvibha stra 33
(CBETA, T27, no.
1545, p. 173, a28-29): = Fearless is from having skillfully penetrated into
the Dharma of dependent origination, from having skillfully cultivated the
emptiness entrance to release, they no longer fear evil destinites and the pains of
birth and death. Also in variant Vibha stra 184
(CBETA, T28, no. 1546, p. 131, b8-12).
x H x H v bH XXXZZ
53
70 Mahvibha stra 2(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p.
7, a24-b2).
71 See bareau (2005: 287) for the basic theses of each school on these three
issues. The thesis numbers (#) are those given in bareaus lists, and are found
respectively on pages: Theravda #21, #55, #186 (pp. 222, 226, 242); Vtsputrya
#38 (pg. 116); Sarvstivda #6 (pg. 137); riputra Abhidharma #10 (pg. 199);
Mahsghika #43 (pg. 56); Mahsaka #19 (pg. 188); Dharmagupta #13 (pg.
197); Prvaaila #9 (p. 94); Uttarpathaka #32 (pg. 258)note that they are split
on both sides; and the Vibhajyavda #8 (pg. 175).
72 bareau (2005: 56 n130): Vasumitra, thesis 40. Vintadeva, thesis 25; and
ibid. (2005: 199 n1066): Taish 1548, 633ab. Given that the source below
for the Mahsaka is from the Pli where the sources here are all from the
Chinese, bareaus rendering here of -svabhva from should probably
be -tathat (as below), or at least -t.
73 bareau (2005: 188 n995): Vasumitra, thesis 17; Vintadeva, thesis 8.
Kathvatthu, II, 11; VI, 2 and 6.
74 bareau (2005: 197 n1052): Taish 1545, p. 198a.
75 bareau (2005: 94 n374): Kathvatthu, VI, 2.
76 bareau (2005: 94 n375): Kathvatthu, VI, 3.
77 bareau (2005: 175 n917): Taish 1545, p. 116c. Cf. L. V. P.: Koa, III p. 77. See
thesis 9 of the Prvaailas.
78 Katth vatthu 19:2 578: Suat sakhra kkhandha pariypannti. mant.
Suat na vattabbsakhra kkhandha pariypann ti. Na heva
vattabbe; etc.. See bareau (2005: 242).
79 Neither arising nor ceasing: See S 293 12 (CBETA, T02,
no. 99, p. 83, c13-17); no equivalent in SN, though possibly around SN 12
given the relation of other adjacent stras. It is similar to both SN 6:1, and also
the opening of DN 15 Mahnidna Sutta, DN ii 55. Neither eternalism nor
nihilism: See S 300 12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 85, c11-13);
= SN 12:46 Aatara (Another); refer bodhi (2000: 583); SN ii 76.
x H x H v bH XXXZZ_
JCBSSL VOL. XI
54
x H x H v bH XXXZZ

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Shi huifeng: Dependent Origination = EmptinessNgrjunas Innovation?

(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 578, b13-17). Also D

(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, p. 766, a22-26): The term empty

(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 20, a29-b25).

(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16-25). No

(dharma sthitit)( *dharma niyma; see ynShn 1944: 18)

(CBETA, T28, no. 1549, p. 735, a27-b14);

(CBETA, T28, no. 1549, p. 736, a25-28).

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