Jason Wong

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Weber’s Conceptions of the Roles of Two Types of Individuals: the

Politician vs. the Scientist

This paper is primarily interested in the great sociologist and

philosopher Max Weber’s account of the characteristics of the politician and

the scientist and the contributions each has made to modernity. In order to

place Weber’s discussions on the roles of the politician and scientist in their

proper context, we must briefly discuss the rise of the bureaucratic order of

the Weberian society. We begin with Weber’s sobering idea that modern

society is headed toward a colorless, completely rational and bureaucratic

order, which Weber indicated was the “disenchantment of the world.” We

then discuss the roles and characteristics of the politician and scientist

themselves, and critically examine Weber’s claim that the politician plays a

bigger and more irreplaceable role in modern society than the scientist. We

evaluate this idea and attempt to look at historical and current examples to

support and discredit this claim, primarily focusing on the role of the scientist

in modern society. Finally, I come up with my own modified analysis of the

roles of the politician and the scientist. I indicate that, considering their

overarching tendency to promote social progress and the overall goals of

society, the roles, characteristics, and contributions of the politician and the

scientist are not as mutually exclusive as Weber believed. I conclude with

the thought that because politicians and scientists can contribute to society

in a way that Weber may not have considered, then modern society may not

be as depressing as Weber believed.

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Max Weber was fascinated by the issue of modernity. Weber’s

prognosis of what will result from modern society, however, was very

discouraging. One of Weber’s most famous quotes reads, “The fate of our

times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above

all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world.’” (Weber, Science as a Vocation, p.

155) Weber believed that the defining characteristic of the modern state

was the increasing reliance on rationalization and bureaucratization, which

had a negative effect on society by taking away some of the magical effects

of the natural world. Weber dismally wrote, “No summer’s bloom lies ahead

of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which

group may triumph externally now.” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation, p. 128)

For Weber, the future brought ‘darkness and hardness’ because the

rationalization of society brought on by the ascent of bureaucratic order was

all but assured through the rise of democratic societies. This is because

bureaucratic societies are the most effective means to level social

stratification, one of the major goals of democratic order. On this idea,

Weber wrote about how bureaucracies encourage equality:

“Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy

in contrast to the democratic self-government of small
homogeneous units. This results from the characteristic principle
of bureaucracy: the abstract regularity of the execution of
authority, which is a result of the demand for ‘equality before the
law’ in the personal and functional sense—hence, of the horror of
‘privilege,’ and the principled rejection of doing business ‘from
case to case.’ Such regularity also follows from the social
preconditions of the origin of bureaucracies.” (Weber,
Bureaucracy, p. 224)
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Two types of individuals loomed large in Weber’s account of modernity and

the rise of bureaucracy: the politician and the scientist. Weber, as a

preeminent sociologist, was particularly interested in studying the patterns

of social relationships and interaction among and between the scientist and

the politician. Furthermore, he investigated their effects on the modern

social state, which we just described as increasingly rational, intellectualized,

and disenchanted.

For Weber, the politician and the scientist both play key roles in the

highly bureaucratic modern society. In his analysis, Weber has mostly given

up on the ability of either of these two types of individuals to bring back

romantic and inspiring notions of humanity and enchantment into social

order. Weber overall held a low opinion of scientists. He described the

culture of science as a “predominance of mediocrity” because in his mind

random chance, rather than naturally endowed and/or developed ability,

played a larger role in the process of academic selection. In his lecture

Science as a Vocation Weber wrote:

The fact that hazard rather than ability plays so large a role is not
alone or even predominantly owing to the ‘human, all too human’
factors, which naturally occur in the process of academic
selection as in any other selection. […] The predominance of
mediocrity is rather due to the laws of human co-operation,
especially the co-operation of several bodies, and, in this case,
co-operation of the faculties who recommend and of the
ministries of education. (Weber, Science as a Vocation, p. 132)

Weber argues that networking and other “human, all too human” factors play

too large a role when scientists achieve academic recognition and/or

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academic positions in academia. Weber also believed that great scientific

discoveries may happen only once in a blue moon, and that these

discoveries will be out of date in too short a time frame. A scientist seeking

to enter the field will have to gamble on whether or not an idea will strike

them at the appropriate moment. Weber famously mused that “ideas occur

to us when they please, not when it pleases us,” and that “each of us knows

that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years.”

(Weber, Science as a Vocation, p. 136 & 138) Weber’s biggest issue with

science, though, is not based on the fact that he viewed success in science

as random chance. His biggest issue with science is based on the idea that

scientific accomplishments are purely technical achievements. Science,

Weber argues, doesn’t provide additional meaning to life. In fact, Weber

would say, science detracts from life. Success in science would mean

increasing rationalization and disenchantment in the world. Weber argued:

It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if

one but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means
that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that
come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all
things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted.
One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to
master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such
mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations
perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization
means. (Weber, Science as a Vocation, p. 139)

It is important to note that Weber sees one key distinction between

science as a vocation and politics as a vocation. Science as a vocation

directly leads to the disenchantment of natural occurrences and our

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understanding of natural events. Politics as a vocation, on the other hand,

(for reasons which we will discuss after this note), only indirectly leads to

bureaucratization and rationalization. Furthermore, it is possible for a very

talented and rare political leader to be able to inspire others and serve “the

vocation for politics in its deepest meaning.” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation,

1958, p. 128) Generally, it is assumed, that both types of individuals

(politicians and scientists) will encourage, promote, and protect rational

bureaucratic order, although Weber leaves room to hope that a charismatic

authority can restore meaning and vigor to the populace, should one arise.

Weber begins his lecture on Politics as a Vocation with the line, “This

lecture, which I give at your request, will necessarily disappoint you in a

number of ways,” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation, p. 77), indicating that the

vocation of politics may not be as glorious, or to use a Weberian term,

‘enchanting’, as one would think. Politicians, being in charge of the political

state, tend toward routine and bureaucratic order rather than promote

personal relations and/or passionate behavior. The state, after all, “is a

human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate

use of physical force within a given territory.” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation,

p. 78) It makes sense then that politicians would turn to bureaucratic

administration in order to maintain the stability of the state, ensure law and

order, and otherwise manage politics in a way that doesn’t radically alter the

systems and organizations in place nor stir up the populace in a negative

manner. Weber writes that “the political element consists, above all, in the
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task of maintaining ‘law and order’ in the country, hence maintaining the

existing power relations.” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation, p. 91) The process

of promoting this stability and bureaucratic order has given rise to a class of

politicians who Weber describes as the ‘professional politicians’, who Weber

notes, are “unlike the charismatic leader.” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation, p.

83)

Weber does, however, as previously noted, hold on to the hope that

politicians can circumvent the rationality of their time through charismatic

leadership. Weber writes that “As a permanent structure with a system of

rational rules, bureaucracy is fashioned to meet calculable and recurrent

needs by a means of a normal routine.” (Weber, The Sociology of

Charismatic Authority, p. 245) He continues, however, later on in his essay

entitled The Sociology of Charismatic Authority that “charisma, and this is

decisive, always rejects as undignified any pecuniary gain that is methodical

and rational. In general, charisma rejects all rational economic conduct.”

(Weber, The Sociology of Charismatic Authority, p. 247) Charismatic

leadership, Weber notes, “takes passion and perspective. Certainly all

historical experience confirms the truth—that man would not have attained

the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible.

But to do that a man must be a leader, and not only a leader but a hero as

well, in a very sober sense of the word.” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation, p.

128) Charismatic leadership, then, can inspire and encourage passion in the

populace through their leadership. Charismatic leaders can help men and
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women reach for goals they never before believe possible. But charismatic

leadership is a double edged sword, in addition to being a rare quality among

men. Weber notes that “by its very nature, the existence of charismatic

authority is specifically unstable.” (Weber, The Sociology of Charismatic

Authority, p. 248) By this observation Weber is implying that charismatic

leaders can also blind a populace and encourage them to pursue action that

are detrimental to their overall social welfare and best interests.

It is safe to say that Weber emphasizes the role of the politician more

than the scientist. As previously noted Weber believes that scientists serve a

technical purpose rather than a deeper meaning—which is to say that

science as a vocation doesn’t increase human society’s sense of purpose.

Weber writes,

Under these internal presuppositions, what is the meaning of

science as a vocation, now after all these former illusions […]
have been dispelled? Tolstoi has given the simplest answer, with
the words: ‘Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to
our question, the only question important for us: “What shall we
do and how shall we live?”’ That science does not give an
answer to this is indisputable. (Weber, Science as a Vocation, p.
143)

On this point, Weber is overly critical of the field of science. Weber does not

recognize that a key characteristic of the scientist is that the scientist

necessarily first takes into account the greater needs of society before

embarking in scientific investigation. In order for the scientist’s discoveries

to be relevant to society, which is to say that in order for the scientist to

make money off his or her discovery or achieve renown from it, the scientist
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needs to understand toward what purpose their discovery shall serve. For

example on one hand Weber makes the argument that most of humanity

need not understand the physics behind a moving streetcar. Weber writes

that “unless he is a physicist, one who rides on the streetcar has no idea how

the car happened to get into motion. And he does not need to know.”

(Weber, Science as a Vocation, p. 139) However, in order for such a

technology to exist, someone needs to acquire the technical knowledge to

create such an invention. In order for such a technology to serve human

purposes, that person, the scientist, needs to first understand how his or her

invention will further humanity’s goals.

Weber takes issue with the fact that the invention and improvement of

the streetcar itself does not shed light on important questions such as “What

shall we do and how shall we live?” Responding to Weber’s example, the

streetcar assists human transport, and the train helps increase human

industrial capacity and supports an increasing human population by

transporting goods and supplies. The scientist is eminently aware of these

facts, and for this reason the scientist’s technical discoveries are not outside

the domain of serving larger social purposes as Weber would believe. For

this reason Weber underestimates the contributions scientists have made to

further the larger social questions.

It is obvious to the modern observer that science has greatly changed

the experience of human society and how we humans go about our lives.
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Without our latest technical advances, humans would not be as connected as

they are if we did not have cheap and ready access to telephones, speedy

travel, and the internet. Governments, such as the United States, and other

entities such as the United Nations, would not be motivated to interfere in

genocides such as Sudan and Darfur if it weren’t for the populace’s easy

access to news of worldly events (modern communication is a byproduct of

science). The fact that international countries are pressured to react to

catastrophes and crises in other states are a testament to how increasingly

inter-connected human society is compared to human societies of the past

where such incidences would be ignored. Science can also change human

society for the worse, as well as for the better. The advent of the nuclear

bomb allows motivated groups of people the option of destroying the planet

as we know it. Society has necessarily reacted to these threats, especially

political bureaucracies concerned with self-preservation.

Weber’s major critique of this assessment would focus on the ultimate

authority by which scientists are held accountable. He would argue that

scientific accomplishments are only a response to the general needs of the

day, and are exploited by others such as politicians. Weber writes that

individual scientists generally “maintain that he engages in ‘science for

science’s sake’ and not merely because others, by exploiting science, bring

about commercial or technical success and can better feed, dress, illuminate,

and govern.” (Weber, Science as a Vocation, p. 138) This argument also has

historical merit: the United States’ development of the nuclear bomb was a
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result of government sponsorship of the science, without which the nuclear

bomb would likely not have developed the way it had—especially if countries

did not compete to obtain the destructive nuclear technology. This shows

that politics and science are inextricably linked, which Weber agrees. But the

nuclear example is only one of many different examples for ways in which

scientific discoveries are made. Many have been encouraged by

governments, but others have been encouraged also by individuals

unaffiliated with governments, be it for capital gain, academic study, and/or

fame. Individual scientific discoveries happen often enough that rather than

treat them, as Weber would, as exceptions, they must be included in the

rule. The advent of electricity was unanticipated, and thus its discovery and

utilization could not have been prompted by the government. On the other

hand, other inventions such as the nuclear bomb, the internet, and other

inventions were sponsored by the government to serve social and/or state

needs. This shows that Weber is correct in many areas of his analysis, but

could have been mistaken in others.

In response to Weber’s critique concerning the politician’s greater

authority over society than the scientist, I would argue that the relationship

between politicians and scientists are more complex than Weber recognizes.

Weber holds the reasonable assumption that politicians hold the ultimate

authority within a state. On the other hand, as Weber also recognizes, there

is much movement on behalf of democratic societies of the modern era to

level social stratification and enable governments to tap into the will and
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desires of their citizens in order to better serve them (see Bureaucracy page

224, which was quoted early on in this paper). In this manner, citizens,

being “occasional politicians” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation, p. 83) can

complicate the authority of the politician. Citizens, if under the influence of

scientists or scientific beliefs that are contradictory to those held by

politicians, can easily vote in politicians that agree with them and vote out

politicians who disagree. For this reason, politicians don’t hold supreme

authority over the power of the state. Furthermore, in democratic societies,

there is always the possibility of the scientist becoming the politician. In

modern American politics, there are many examples of scientists becoming

politicians. Howard Dean, a doctor by trade, was a governor and contender

for the Democratic Party’s nomination for President, and now heads the

Democratic Party organization. George Foster, a physicist, was recently

elected to the United States House of Representatives for the Illinois 14th

Congressional District.1

Weber believed that the scientist and the politician generally promoted

bureaucratic order that increased rationalization, intellectualization, and

disenchantment of worldly affairs. On that same vein, he criticized scientists

for their technical study, and did not recognize that their discoveries and

achievements can in actuality serve general social pursuits. Their

discoveries in many instances are necessarily based on their understanding

of social progress and how their achievements can service societal needs. To

1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Foster_(physicist)
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name a few of their accomplishments, many of their inventions have allowed

humans to increase their population and live in greater luxury than at any

other point in history, to better enjoy each other’s company even from

faraway locations, to be exposed to many different geographies and cultures

through advances in transportation, and each of these achievements and

others (while we may take them for granted) have encouraged us to dream

of other future advances in store for us. These advances have also enabled

us to reach ever higher in whatever pursuit we choose to strive for. For

example, we would not be able to dream about exploring space, or even

conceive of space exploration, if not for the technological achievements

before our time. I would argue that rather than being disenchanting, these

accomplishments, and the possibilities for greater achievements, is more

enchanting than he realized.

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Works Cited
Weber, M. (1958). Bureaucracy. In H. Gerth, & C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology (pp. 196-244). New York City: Oxford University Press.

Weber, M. (1958). Politics as a Vocation. In H. H. Gerth, & C. W. Mills, From Max

Weber: Essays in Sociology (pp. 77 - 128). New York City: Oxford University Press.

Weber, M. (1958). Science as a Vocation. In H. Gerth, & C. W. Mills, From Max

Weber: Essays in Sociology (pp. 129-158). New York City: Oxford University Press.

Weber, M. (2002). The Protestant Ethic & The Spirit of Capitalism. (S. Kalberg, Ed.)
New York City: Oxford University Press.

Weber, M. (1958). The Sociology of Charismatic Authority. In H. Gerth, & C. W. Mills,

From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (pp. 245-252). New York City: Oxford
University Press.