TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000 Quas et al.

/ QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS

QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS
What Can We Conclude From the Research Thus Far?
JODI A. QUAS
University of California, Irvine
GAIL S. GOODMAN
SIMONA GHETTI
University of California, Davis
ALLISON D. REDLICH
Stanford University
In recent years, increasing numbers of studies have investigated childrens mem-
ory, suggestibility, and false event reports. The purpose of this article is to high-
light key findings from and implications of this research for interviewing child
witnesses. First, developmental changes in childrens memory and suggestibility
are discussed. Second, theory and research concerning relations betweenemotional
distress and childrens memory are reviewed, with an emphasis on methodological
differences that have led to varied results across studies. Third is a description of
factors associated with the context of an interview that may influence childrens
susceptibility to false suggestions. Fourth, recent studies are described concerning
individual differences in childrens mnemonic capabilities, suggestibility, and
false memories. At the end of the article, recommendations are provided about what
can and cannot be concluded from research on questioning child witnesses.
Key words: children, eyewitness testimony, false memory, individual differences, memory, stress,
suggestibility
DURINGTHE PAST DECADE, skepticismcon-
cerning childrens eyewitness capabilities has
grownconsiderably. At present, attentionseems
to be on the malleability of childrens memory
and their susceptibility to misleading sugges-
tions and false memories. This skepticism has
been fueled by high-profile legal cases in which
scores of children made extreme and often im-
probable allegations of sexual abuse following
repeated, highly suggestive interviews (e.g.,
Bottoms, Shaver, & Goodman, 1996; Dunn,
1995; State v. Michaels, 1994; see Ceci & Bruck,
223
AUTHORS NOTE: We wish to thank Veronica DeCicco for her comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. Correspondence should
be sent to Jodi Quas, Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, 3340 Social Ecology II, University of California, Irvine, CA
92697-7085.
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 2000 223-249
2000 Sage Publications, Inc.
1995). As was evident in these celebrated cases,
circumstances clearly exist in which the accu-
racy of childrens reports should be questioned,
such as when children have been subjected to
repeated, highly leading, and coercive inter-
views. However, there are alsocircumstances in
which childrens eyewitness accounts can be
quite accurate. It is crucial that we move toward
a better understanding of the personal and situ-
ational factors that produce more or less reliable
reports fromchildren. Not only will such infor-
mation enable researchers and practitioners to
evaluate childrens eyewitness accounts with
greater accuracy, but it also will facilitate fair ju-
dicial prosecution of adults against whom alle-
gations are made.
The purpose of this article is to provide an
overview of the growing body of literature on
childrens memory and suggestibility. Because
of the recent explosion in research on childrens
eyewitness testimony, particularlyonchildrens
suggestibility, we cannot, in a single article, dis-
cuss all the researchinthis large andcontinually
growing body of literature. Instead, we have
224 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
KEY POINTS OF
RELEVANT RESEARCH
The relation between stress and childrens mem-
orymaydiffer dependingonthe level of stress as-
sociated with a to-be-remembered event and the
level of personal threat of the stressor (e.g.,
watching someone receive an inoculation, expe-
riencing an inoculation).
In studies of childrens memory for stressful
events, whenchildrenare not randomly assigned
to high- versus low-stress conditions, conclusions
about the effects of stress on memory cannot be
drawn. Rather, other factors related to children
may affect who becomes distressed, and these
same factors may affect childrens memory per-
formance.
Repeated experience with a stressful event does
not appear to decrease memory completeness or
accuracy. Rather, with repetition, children may
develop a script for the central, common fea-
tures of a stressful event and subsequently re-
member these features quite well.
Measures of childrens distress (e.g., observer rat-
ings, physiological indices) are often unrelatedto
each other and differently related to childrens
memory. Also, for events that are long in dura-
tion, distress at diverse time points may have dif-
ferent implications for childrens memory
accuracy.
As distress increases from moderate to high lev-
els, memory for peripheral information unre-
lated to the cause of the stress may decrease,
whereas memory for central information directly
related to the cause of the stress may increase. As
of yet, however, it is difficult to determine what
children consider to be central versus peripheral
information.
Initial free recall reports, even from young chil-
dren, are often highly accurate, although also in-
complete. More direct questioning increases the
completeness of childrens reports but raises con-
cerns about suggestibility. Yes/no questions may
be problematic because of potential response bi-
ases in children (e.g., yeah saying). Leading
questions may be problematic because children
often rely on adults for information and may
trust what an adult tells them over what they ac-
tually remember.
The mere act of question repetition, especially
across interviews, does not necessarily lead to in-
accuracies inchildrens reports. Whenfalse infor-
mation is repeatedly presented as true, or when
children are given negative feedback following
their initial responses, errors and false reports
may increase
It is more difficult to mislead children to report
negative or abuse-related events than positive or
nonabuse-related events, although children at
times will assent to false negative, personal expe-
riences. It is also more difficult to suggest that
implausible events occurred than to suggest that
plausible events occurred, although develop-
mental differences exist in what children find
plausible.
Children are often less suggestible when ques-
tioned by a supportive interviewer who asks
questions ina simple, age-appropriate manner as
opposed to a cold interviewer who asks ques-
tions in a complex, legalese manner.
Characteristics of children and their social envi-
ronment influence the accuracy and complete-
ness of childrens memory for stressful events.
Factors that have been investigated include pa-
rental attachment, childrens temperament, prior
knowledge, and parent-child communication
patterns.
Links have been established between childrens
suggestibility and their understanding of dual
representations. Preliminary relations have also
been uncovered between childrens willingness
to assent that never-experienced events occurred
and the following: source-monitoring capabili-
ties, imaginativeness, and intelligence, although
additional research is needed to confirm and ex-
plain these associations.
chosen to reviewselected topics regarding chil-
drens (e.g., preschool- and school-age chil-
drens) memory and suggestibility. The struc-
ture of the article is as follows: We begin by
briefly discussing developmental changes in
childrens event memory spanning from the
early preschool years through middle child-
hood. We then reviewliterature that sheds light
on the degree to which emotional distress helps
versus hinders childrens memory and suggest-
ibility. Next, we discuss the implications of
questioning tactics and contextual features of
forensic interviews for evaluations of childrens
ability to resist false suggestions. We finally
turn to a discussion of recent investigations of
individual differences in childrens memory
and susceptibility to false suggestions. The over-
arching goal of the review is to highlight litera-
ture on childrens memory and suggestibility
that is relevant toevaluations of childwitnesses.
Toaidthe review, we have provideda summary
of the key points that we believe can be reliably
drawn from the research presented. We end
with a list of implications for practitioners and
policy makers regarding interpretation of child
witness research. We anticipate that this review
will help professionals in psychology, social
work, criminology, medicine, and related disci-
plines both understand research on childrens
memory and suggestibility and better evaluate
the capabilities and limitations of child wit-
nesses these professionals encounter.
De ve lop m e nta l C ha ng e s in C hild re ns
M e m ory a nd Sug g e stib ility
Across studies of childrens memoryandsug-
gestibility, the most consistent and robust pre-
dictor of differences in childrens performance
is age. Older children generally remember more
than younger children do, and older children
are less susceptible tofalse suggestions. However,
young children still can and do remember their
experiences, although as we review, there are
several limitations to their abilities.
One of the more remarkable mnemonic capa-
bilities of preschoolers is their script memory.
Scripts are sets of mental expectations about the
typical temporal and/or causal relations among
features of a given event, including the actions
and roles played by different actors (Nelson,
1984; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Children form
scripts of laboratory-based experiences, such as
participating in a structured play session, and
naturally occurring experiences, such as going
to daycare (Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Fivush,
1984; Hudson & Fivush, 1991; Kuebli & Fivush,
1994; Murachver, Pipe, Gordon, Owens, &
Fivush, 1996). Children also form scripts of dis-
tressing, repeated experiences. In a study of
childrens memory for
chemo- therapy, for ex-
ampl e, Beari son and
Pacifici (1989) reported
that childrens scripts for
this stressful event were
as well formed as their
scripts for other, more
positive recurring events.
Regardless of the type of
script memory, however,
young children seem to
have difficulty recalling
specific details of a single
instance of a repeated
event when those details
deviate what usually oc-
curs (Farrar & Goodman,
1992; Powell & Thomson,
1996). Farrar and Good-
man (1992) involved 4-
and 7-year-olds in a play
event that occurred four
times. For half of the chil-
dren, the play event was
the same each time (standard experience), and
for the other half, the fourth session deviated
from the other sessions. All children formed a
script-like memory for the repeated experience,
but younger children performed more poorly
than did older children when they were re-
quired to distinguish the standard and devia-
tion visits.
Preschool children can also remember events
they only experienced one time, especially
events that have some personal significance to
them (Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984;
Hamond & Fivush, 1991; Hudson & Fivush,
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 225
Across studies of
childrens memory
and suggestibility, the
most consistent and
robust predictor of
differences in
childrens
performance is age.
Older children
generally remember
more than younger
children do, and
older children are less
susceptible to false
suggestions.
However, young
children still can and
do remember their
experiences,
although as we
review, there are
several limitations to
their abilities.
1991; Sheingold & Tenney, 1982). For instance,
Hamond and Fivush (1991) interviewed pre-
school children about a trip to Disneyworld ex-
perienced with their families when the children
were between2.8 and4.5 years of age. The inter-
views took place either 6 or 18 months after the
vacation. Childrenreportedapproximately20%
of the information about their vacation sponta-
neously, with children interviewed after the
6-month delay providing more information
than children interviewed after the 18-month
delay. Although several children appeared not
to remember the trip when only asked general
questions about what happened, all children, ir-
respective of their age at the time of the vacation
or the delay between the trip and memory test,
revealed some memory of the vacation when
questioned about particular details of the
experience.
At the same time that young children can re-
call their experiences, theylackknowledgeabout
how to structure narrative reports, how to con-
duct memory searches, and what is important
torecount (Flavell, Friedrich, &Hoyt, 1970; Kail,
1990; Nelson, 1993). They also tend to forget in-
formation more quickly than older children, rely
more on verbatimrather than gist memory, and
confuse different sources of event information
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Brainerd, Reyna,
Howe, &Kingma, 1990; Foley &Johnson, 1985).
Each of these factors leads to limitations in the
amount and, at times, accuracy of young chil-
drens memory. Thus, without some type of as-
sistance, youngchildrens reports tendtobebrief
and include only skeletal descriptions.
Because some of young childrens difficulties
stemfromthemnot knowing howto structure a
memory report or what is important to tell oth-
ers, methods designed to help them with these
activities often result in increasing the amount
of information they report. Specifically, probing
young childrens memory (e.g., by asking ques-
tions about particular details of an experience)
can lead to dramatic improvements in the
amount of information they appear to remem-
ber (Hamond & Fivush, 1991; Hudson, 1990;
Nelson, 1993; Tessler & Nelson, 1994). Through
the more direct probes, an interviewer is in-
forming children what is important to recount,
helping them structure their reports and pro-
viding reminders that may cue childrens mem-
ory. Yet, the inclusion of direct probes is not
without risks. As we discuss later, depending
onhowsuchprobes are phrased, the accuracyof
childrens reports couldbe compromised. Inter-
estingly, some researchers are currently devel-
oping and testing techniques to teach young
children how to provide narrative accounts of
their experiences. Insofar as suchtechniques are
successful, children may be able to learn, to
some extent, general rules for recounting past
events and thus to provide additional informa-
tion without the necessity of more direct
prompts (see Saywitz & Lyon, in press; Saywitz
& Snyder, 1996; Sternberg, Lamb, Esplin,
Orbach, & Herschkowitz, in press).
Youngchildrenare alsolimitedintheir ability
to employ retrieval strategies to facilitate their
memory (Case, 1991; Cox, Ornstein, Naus,
Maxfield, & Zimler, 1989; Flavell, Miller, &
Miller, 1993; Kail, 1990). Although the benefits
of strategy use pass through several develop-
mental phases (e.g., when children use a strat-
egy only if explicitly instructed to do so, when
children use a strategy without experiencing
any concomitant benefit in recall, and when
children use a strategy and it improves their re-
call), in general, childrens ability to employ
mnemonic strategies improves with age, as
does their memory (Bjorklund & Coyle, 1995;
Cox et al., 1989; Keniston &Flavell, 1979). Older
childrencanconduct internal memory searches,
recreate images in their heads, think of informa-
tion similar to the to-be-remembered event, and
organize the to-be recalled information in a sys-
tematic manner (Bjorklund&Douglas, 1997), all
of which lead to improved memory perfor-
mance. In addition, older childrens increased
reliance on internally generated retrieval strate-
gies minimizes the need to rely on interviewers
cues, which can reduce their suggestibility.
Another developmental change in childrens
memory capabilities is their source-monitoring
abilities. Source monitoring refers to individu-
als abilityto identifythe sources of their knowl-
edge or memories. Within the context of this ar-
ticle, source monitoring can be thought of as
childrens ability to distinguishbetweenmemo-
ries of an event gleaned from actually experi-
encing the event and memories of an event
226 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
gleaned from some other source (e.g., an inter-
viewers questions). Research suggests that
preschool-age children are poorer than older
children at source monitoring (see Roberts &
Blades, in press, for a reviewof source-monitor-
ingresearchwithchildren). Suchdifferences are
especially pronouncedwhen children are asked
to distinguish between events they imagined
experiencing and events they actually experi-
enced and between events in which children
were active participants rather than observers.
Young childrens limited source-monitoring ca-
pabilities have been implicated as underlying
their increasedsusceptibility to misleading sug-
gestions. Specifically, when young children
cannot identify an interviewers suggestion as a
source of event information, they may report the
suggested action as having occurred during a
particular event, thus potentiallyleadingtocon-
siderable errors. With age, childrens ability to
distinguish sources of event information im-
proves, as does the effectiveness of trainingchil-
dren to monitor the sources of their memories
(Poole &Lindsay, 1999). In both cases, such im-
provements may well lead to reduced suggest-
ibility. It should also be mentioned that vari-
ability in source-monitoring capabilities has
been implicated as a potentially important pre-
dictor of individual differences inchildrens sug-
gestibility, apoint towhichwe returnlater inthis
article.
Insummary, judgments about the accuracyof
childrens eyewitness accounts can best be
made within the larger developmental back-
drop of childrens emerging mnemonic capabil-
ities. During the preschool years, children can
provide accurate and coherent verbal descrip-
tions of past events, especially those that are re-
peated or salient. Yet at the same time, young
children often need help retrieving particular
features of events, structuring their narratives,
reporting information that may be important to
adults, and distinguishing among sources of
event information. Beyond preschool, chil-
drens use of mnemonic strategies and knowl-
edge of listeners informational needs increase
considerably, leading to more elaborate and
complete spontaneous memory descriptions.
With age, childrens source-monitoring abilities
also improve, which can decrease how often
they incorrectly claim information they only
heardhadoccurred. Importantly, althoughchil-
drens age remains a clear, important predictor
of memory accuracy and suggestibility, several
other factors, including those associated with
the to-be-rememberedevent, the memory inter-
view, and children themselves, must also be
considered when evaluating the degree to
which childrens eyewitness accounts can be
trusted.
C hild re ns M e m ory for Stre ssful Eve nts
Throughout at least this century, there has
beeninterest inthe role of stress, especiallytrau-
matic stress, in affecting memory. For instance,
whether and how well individuals remember
highly distressing events (e.g., whether individ-
uals form vivid, intrusive memories or lack
conscious memories) are defining features of
several accounts of trauma reactions (e.g., post-
traumatic stress disorder). In addition, in many
legal situations, the events about which wit-
nesses are questioned are highly distressing
personal experiences (e.g., witnessing a homi-
cide, being the victimof rape, being involved in
a car accident). Thus, it is
of considerable interest to
determine how stress af-
fects memory. Because
children, like adults, can
experience stressful and
traumatic experiences
and must somet i mes
serve as witnesses inlegal
cases, understanding the
relations between stress
and memory in children
is a worthwhile endeavor. We acknowledge that
stress may arise from different sources, such as
fromthe event childrenwitness or frombeingin-
volved in the legal arena in which children must
recount, sometimes repeatedly, a prior personal
experience. In the present section, we address
the relation between stress and memory when
the to-be-remembered event is stress inducing.
Classic theoretical perspectives on stress and
memory. Numerous theories have been ad-
vanced to explain how negative emotion, par-
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 227
Judgments about the
accuracy of
childrens eyewitness
accounts can best be
made within the
larger developmental
backdrop of
childrens emerging
mnemonic
capabilities.
ticularly trauma, affects memory (Freud, 1938;
Putnam, 1989; Rapaport, 1942). Three classic
theoretical accounts, the notions of repression
anddissociation, andthe flashbulb memory hy-
pothesis, have received considerable attention.
Thus, we review each briefly.
According to Freud (1915/1986), repression
is a primary unconscious defense mechanism
people use after they experience conflicts be-
tween their inner drives and external demands.
The conflicts create anxiety, and rather than
dealing directly with the conflictual and hence
distressing ideas, people push the remembered
information out of consciousness. It is only after
the anxiety associated with the repressed infor-
mationhas beenremoved, for example, withthe
help of a supportive therapist, that people can
consciously access the information (Freud,
1917/1963). Dissociation, like repression, was
proposed to explain how people deal with
highly traumatic experiences (Janet, 1919; see
van der Kolk, 1997). Unlike repression, how-
ever, which involves pushing information out
of conscious awareness after a trauma, dissocia-
tion is believed to operate as a trauma is unfold-
ing. During a stressful event, an individual may
consciously or unconsciously avoid thinking
about the ongoingexperience. As a result, mem-
ories of different portions of the event become
compartmentalized and inaccessible to recall
(Putnam, 1993). The flashbulb memory hypoth-
esis, in contrast to repression and dissociation,
predicts enhanced memory for stressful events
(Brown & Kulik, 1977). According to this hy-
pothesis, when a highly charged emotional
event is encountered, physiological changes
occur that lead to the formation of a durable,
picture-like event representation. The flashbulb
memory account thus implies that insofar as an
experience is considered shocking and highly
emotionally charged, an individual would not
forget the experience but, rather, wouldremem-
ber it in vivid detail.
Despite the intuitive appeal of each of the
aforementioned theoretical accounts, none has
received unequivocal empirical support. Rather,
results that appear to support these hypotheses
can often be explained by other mechanisms
common to memories of nontraumatic events
(see Pezdek et al., in press). Also, it is often diffi-
cult to distinguish between a lack of memory
versus a lackof willingness totalkabout a highly
stressful experience (e.g., Goodman, Ghetti,
Quas, Redlich, & Alexander, 1999; Quas et al.,
1999) because both processes would lead to the
appearance of poor memory for distressing
events. Furthermore, although both children
and adults can provide narrative accounts of
some highly emotionally charged experiences
(e.g., an assassination of a president, the Space
Shuttle Challenger explosion), these memories
do not appear to be picture-like or impervious
to errors, as would be expected based on the
flashbulb memory hypothesis (e.g., Warren &
Swartwood, 1993). Infact, evenwhenpeople are
particularly confident in the accuracy of their
flashbulb memories, the reports often contain
errors and can be inconsistent over time
(Neisser &Harsch, 1993; Weaver, 1993). Finally,
repression, dissociation, and the flashbulb
memory hypothesis all make predictions about
extreme levels of stress. It is unclear what the
theories wouldpredict withregardtothe effects
of mildor moderate stress levels onmemory. Nor
do any of the theories take into account devel-
opmental differences in childrens understand-
ingof or reactions to stressful experiences, which
may well affect how well children remember
such events.
Empirical investigations of childrens memory for
stressful events. Although it is difficult to gener-
ate predictions about the effects of moderate
levels of stress on memory based on the afore-
mentioned theoretical perspectives, researchers
have studied childrens memory for a variety of
stressful events, ranging from mildly arousing
laboratory-induced fire alarms to real-world
medical experiences to violent crimes (Good-
man, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger &
Kuhn, 1994; Merritt, Ornstein, & Spicker, 1994;
Peterson & Bell, 1996; Stein & Boyce, 1995; Terr,
1988). Unfortunately, results have not yielded a
consistent picture of the relation between stress
and memory. Some studies suggest a beneficial
effect of stress on memory (e.g., Goodman,
Hirschman, Hepps, & Rudy, 1991, Study 2; Pe-
terson, Moreno, & Harbeck-Weber, 1993); other
studies suggest a negative effect of stress on
memory(e.g., Merritt, Ornstein, &Spicker, 1994;
228 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
Peters, 1991); and still other studies suggest no
direct effects of stress on memory (e.g., Howe,
Courage, & Peterson, 1995). Despite the appar-
ent discrepancies in the literature, there are several
logical explanations for the discrepancies, in-
cluding both methodological/measurement
explanations and individual-differences expla-
nations. We now discuss how variations in the
methodology of stress-memory research may
account for some of the variability across (and
within) studies. We also mention, periodically,
how individual differences in childrens stress
reactions may contribute to the observed in-
consistencyinresearchfindings. Towardthe end
of this article, we turn to sources of individ-
ual differences in childrens memory for their
experiences.
Across studies, the levels of stress and per-
sonal significance of the to-be-remembered
events have varied. In some experiments, a
mildly stressful event, such as children experi-
encing a mock fire alarm or showing children a
video of a child receiving an inoculation, has
served as the to-be-remembered event (e.g.,
Bugental, Blue, Cortez, Fleck, & Rodriguez,
1992; Peters, 1989). In other studies, the to-be-
remembered event has been a medical proce-
dure, accident, or injury children endured
(Goodman et al., 1994; Merritt et al., 1994; Peter-
son &Bell, 1996). Watching a video of a child re-
ceiving an inoculation can be stressful for some
children, but there is no direct threat to personal
safety. Experiencing a painful medical proce-
dure, such as one involving catheterization and
body restraint, is likely very stressful and con-
stitutes a significant personal threat. Childrens
emotional and physiological reactions to events
viewed as threats versus nonthreats (e.g., chal-
lenges) may differ considerably (Tomaka &
Blascovich, 1994) and subsequently affect
whether stress helps or hinders their memory.
When studying childrens memory for natu-
rally occurring stressful events, it is typically
not possible to assign children randomly to dif-
fering stress conditions. Rather, comparisons
are made between children who appear more
versus less distressed during the same event
(e.g., Goodman, Hirschman, et al., 1991, Study 2;
Merritt et al., 1994). Althoughnecessary, suchan
approach does not allow for evaluations of the
causal effects of stress onmemory. Only the cor-
relations between stress and memory can be
determined. There may well be certain charac-
teristics within children, such as attentional fo-
cus or attachment status, that affect both how
distressed they become during a particular
event and their later memory accuracy (e.g.,
Yuille & Tollestrup, 1992). If so, evident rela-
tions between stress and memory may simply
be due to both factors being influenced by some
third variable, rather than stress actually di-
rectlyaffectingmemory. Some researchers have
dealt withthe potential confoundbycomparing
childrens memory for a stressful event to chil-
drens memory for a similar event withthe stress-
ful component removed (e.g., Goodman,
Hirschman, et al., 1991). For example, Oates and
Shrimpton (1991) comparedchildrens memory
for a medical check-uptochildrens memoryfor
a visit by a stranger that took place at their
school. Goodman, Hirschman, et al. (1991) com-
pared childrens memory for an inoculation to
childrens memory for a sticker placed on their
arms (both of which took place during a physi-
cal examination). Although in employing such
designs, children can be assigned to high- or
low-stress conditions, there exist subtle and not
so subtle differences between the two to-be-
remembered events that preclude drawing
conclusions about causes of any differences in
memory performance between children in the
stressed groups compared to nonstressed
groups. For example, receiving an inoculation
is consistent with childrens general knowl-
edge of what happens at the doctors office.
Getting a sticker on the armis not. In free recall,
young children often remember information
that is consistent with their general knowledge
better than information that is inconsistent
(Koblinsky, Cruse, & Sugawara, 1978; Welch-
Ross & Schmidt, 1996; however, see Farrar &
Goodman, 1992, for evidence that older chil-
dren also remember instances well that deviate
from their script knowledge). Thus, the effects
of knowledge on memory may account for the
performance of childrenwhoare assignedtoex-
perience events that differ in stressfulness.
Childrens prior experience with a particular
trauma canalsoaffect their memory(Bearison&
Pacifici, 1989; Terr, 1991). Terr (1991) made a dis-
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 229
tinction between Type I and Type II traumas
and posited that, with the exception of very
young children (e.g., infants), children and
adults form clear and detailed memories of
Type I traumas, which are short, one- time, un-
anticipated events. Type II traumas are long, re-
peated, andanticipatedtraumas. Terr proposed
that the coping mechanisms employed to deal
with Type II traumas involve massive denial,
dissociation, and repression, all of which can
lead to poor and possibly nonexistent memory.
Despite the intuitive appeal of Terrs distinc-
tion, researchers have found that children can
often remember repeated traumas quite well
(Bearison&Pacifici, 1989; Goodmanet al., 1994).
Bearison and Pacifici (1989) reported that chil-
dren undergoing cancer radiation treatment (a
recurring stressful and painful procedure) cre-
ated script- like memory representations for the
central components of the treatment. Similarly,
Goodman et al. (1994) interviewed children
about t hei r memory f or voi di ng
cystourethrogramfluoroscopy (VCUG), a med-
ical procedure designed to identify problems in
kidney functioning. The procedure involves the
patient being catheterized through the urethra,
the patients bladder being filled with contrast
medium, and the patient voiding for the medi-
cal staff while lying onanX-ray table. No signif-
icant differences were uncovered in 3- to
10-year-olds memory of whether they had ex-
perienced the VCUGonce or up to six times. In-
sofar as either chemotherapy or urethral
catheterization can be considered a traumatic
event, neither the Bearison and Pacifici nor
Goodman et al. study provides empirical sup-
port for Terrs notion. Evidence in support of
her claims comes froma small clinical sample of
children who were classified as having experi-
enced a Type I or Type II trauma (Terr, 1988).
The completeness of childrens memory could
be partially explained using the distinction.
However, young children (e.g., toddlers) were
overrepresented in the Type II group, and age
could have significantly affected the results.
Thus, although memory for trauma is likely af-
fected by prior experience, it does not appear
that repeatedtraumas are necessarily poorly re-
called. If anything, repeated experience of
trauma mayleadtothe formationof a script-like
representation that facilitates memory for re-
peated details.
Howstress is definedandmeasuredmayalso
affect whether stress appears to be related to
memory. Across and within studies, stress has
been measured using a variety of approaches,
such as observer ratings (Goodman, Hirschman,
et al., 1991; Merritt et al., 1994), physiological
measures (e.g., Bugental et al., 1992; Eisen et al.,
1998; Merritt et al., 1994), self-report (Merritt et
al., 1994; Steward & Steward, 1996), and par-
ents report (Howe et al., 1995; Peterson et al.,
1993). Many of the aforementioned measures of
stress are often statistically unrelated to each
other (e.g., Hong & Quas, 1999; Merritt et al.,
1994) and differentially related to childrens
memory. For instance, Merritt et al. (1994) found
that observers ratings of childrens distress
were negatively associated with childrens
VCUG recall, whereas childrens salivary
cortisol levels (oftentakenas physiological indi-
ces of stress) were unrelated to their recall. Fur-
thermore, the observer ratings were unrelated
to childrens cortisol levels and to childrens
own ratings of their distress. These patterns of
results suggest that detectable relations be-
tween stress and memory may be dependent on
the type of stress measure employedinastudy.
Individual differences in childrens expres-
sion of distress may account for some of the ap-
parent lack of consistency across stress mea-
sures. Even when children experience similar
levels of distress during a particular event, their
overt expression of their experiences may differ
considerably. For instance, when put into situa-
tions that evoke attachment issues, such as when
infants are placed in an unfamiliar room with a
stranger, although children classified as avoid-
ant (a form of insecure attachment) evidence
physiological indices of stress (e.g., elevated
heart rates), they often do not appear overtly
distressed (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978; Izard et al., 1991). Gender differences in
childrens emotional expressiveness have also
been noted (e.g., Haviland & Malatesta, 1981;
Malatesta-Magai, Leak, Tesman, Shepard,
Culver, & Smaggia, 1994). Malatesta-Magai
et al. (1994) found that boys displayed more lip
biting(a behavioral signof stress) thangirls when
the children encountered a potentially stressful
230 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
situation. Boys also displayed more anger and
aggression expressions, whereas girls dis-
played sadness expressions. Given the variabil-
ity in childrens expression of emotion, regard-
less of underlying experiences, it is not
surprisingthat across andwithinstudies, differ-
ent stress ratings (e.g., observer report and sali-
vary cortisol) are often unrelated to each other
as well as differentially related to childrens
memory (e.g., Merritt et al., 1994).
A final point regarding the measurement of
distress concerns differential relations between
stress and memory depending on when stress is
measured. Specifically, for events that are long
in duration or contain multiple components,
such as VCUG, which involves taking X-rays,
being catheterized, voiding, and taking more X-
rays, stress levels mayvarywithinthe event and
maycorrespondinglyvaryinrelationtomemory
and suggestibility (Goodman, Quas, Batterman-
Faunce, Riddlesberger, & Kuhn, 1997; Quas
et al., 1999). Abetter understanding of howchil-
dren cope with stressful experiences and ex-
press their distress may provide important in-
sights into why various stress ratings have
different implications for memory.
Finally, some resolution of discrepancies
across and within stress and memory studies is
possible when a distinction is made between
central and peripheral information. Proposed
differential effects of stress on memory for cen-
tral and peripheral information stem from the
Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908;
see Christianson, 1992; Easterbrook, 1959). Ac-
cording to this perspective, a curvilinear rela-
tionexists betweenstress andmemorysuchthat
stress enhances memory up to a point but fur-
ther increases in stress narrowattentional focus
and inhibit memory. Christianson (1992) quali-
fied that this inverted-Urelation only applies to
peripheral information, that is, information not
related to the cause of the stress or that precedes
or succeeds the stressful event. According to
Christianson, memory for central information
or information directly associatedwith the cause
of the stress, is retained quite well even at
extremely high levels of stress. Classifying
different studies as well as features of a to-be-
remembered event within studies in terms of
whether memory tests probed for central or pe-
ripheral information does resolve some contra-
dictory findings. Peters (1989), for example,
found that children were worse at identifying a
woman if they had heard a fire alarm sound
than if they heard a radio. Note that the woman
was unrelatedto the cause of the stress andthus
may have been a peripheral detail. In contrast,
Goodman, Hirschman, et al. (1991) assessed
childrens memory for an inoculation and
found that children who were more upset ex-
hibited better memory than children who were
less upset. The cause of the stressthe inocula-
tion and associated detailswas also the
to-be-remembered event.
Unfortunately, the central-peripheral distinc-
tion does not resolve all disparities (Merritt et
al., 1994; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Vandermaas,
Hess, & Baker-Ward, 1993). Specifically, several
studies have been conducted comparing chil-
drens memory for central versus peripheral in-
formation about an event under varying stress
conditions. Results have failed to uncover any
differences in memory based on stress levels or
the type of information being recalled (e.g., Pe-
terson & Bell, 1996; Vandermaas et al., 1993).
Reasons why the central-peripheral dichotomy
has not yielded better explanatory power in-
clude, first, that age differences may exist in
what is consideredcentral or peripheral dur-
ing a particular experience (Courage & Peter-
son, 1995; King&Yuille, 1987). Second, it is diffi-
cult to obtain reliable ratings of centrality from
children (e.g., Brown & Smiley, 1977). Third, if
stress affects some individuals willingness to
talk about highly emotional experiences, there
may appear to be a negative relation between
stress and memory for central information, al-
though not because of poor memory. Fourth,
differences in childrens attentional focus may
also account for some findings (Cortez &
Bugental, 1994; Vasey, El-Hag, & Daleiden,
1996), for instance, by affecting what children
perceive as central versus peripheral. Yuille and
Tollestrup (1992) made a distinction between
external and internal focus of coping during a
stressful event. External focus entails attending
to what is going on in the immediate environ-
ment during a stressful event. Internal focus of
attention includes attending to ones internal
(physical and psychological) experiences asso-
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 231
ciated with the event or imagining oneself else-
where. Althoughsucha distinctionawaits empir-
ical test, especially in children, it may be that
variations in childrens attentional focus lead not
onlytodifferent expressions of distress but alsoto
differences inwhat is perceivedas salient or what
is central and peripheral. Thus, although a dis-
tinction between central and peripheral informa-
tion may be useful at times, research to date indi-
cates that the effects of stress on childrens
memory are not adequately explainedin terms of
this dichotomy.
Summary. Research concerning the effects of
stress on childrens memory has failed to pro-
vide unequivocal support
for any one theoretical
perspective put forth.
Rather, some researchers
have uncovered a posi-
tive or negative relation
between stress and mem-
ory, and other researchers
have failed to reveal any
significant direct rela-
tions. There are, however,
several explanations for
the lackof consistent find-
ings in the literature.
These include differences
across studi es i n the
stress-inducing event,
variations in the number
of times a stressful event
has been encountered,
differences in how stress
is measured, individual differences in chil-
drens expressions of distress, and whether the
memory test probes for central or peripheral in-
formation. Because of variability in methodol-
ogy and individual differences in childrens
overt distress responses, it has been difficult to
draw definitive conclusions about how emo-
tional distress may relate to childrens memory.
A more complicated question, but one we be-
lieve will prove more useful to answer is, Un-
der what conditions, both during and after the
occurrence of a distressingevent, canindividual
children remember and accurately recount
what happened during the event? That is,
whether stress helps or hurts memory and/or
affects willingness to discuss anexperience may
depend on how individual children interpret
and react to the event and later answer ques-
tions about what happened. A crucial next step
is to delineate what specific factors make some
children react with higher levels of stress than
others and whether these same factors then
contribute to poor versus enhanced memory
performance.
C hild re ns Sug g e stib ility a nd
Susc e p tib ility to Fa lse M e m orie s
Currently, one of the main concerns about
childrens eyewitness testimony is childrens
suggestibility, and much research has been de-
voted to understanding conditions that contrib-
ute to childrens suggestibility across a wide
range of contexts. We have foundit useful todis-
tinguish among studies in terms of the extent of
false information suggested and the strength of
the suggestions. Regardingthe extent of false in-
formation suggested, at one extreme are studies
in which children hear a story or a list of words.
Inaccurate information, such as an unheard
word or an untrue sometimes minor detail of
the story (e.g., the color of the story characters
outfit), is then suggested (Brainerd & Reyna,
1996; Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Rudy & Good-
man, 1991; Schwartz-Kenney & Goodman,
1999; Welch- Ross, 1999). At the other extreme
are studies in which entire false events are sug-
gested to children (Bruck et al., 1997; Pezdek &
Hodge, 1999; Quas et al., 1999). Regarding the
strength of the suggestions, minimally sugges-
tive tactics might include simply asking chil-
dren if the false information was present in the
to-be-remembered event (e.g., a question about
whether a man with whomchildren playedwas
wearing a red hat when he was not). Highly
leading suggestive tactics might include an in-
terviewer telling children that a trusted source,
such as their mother, informed the interviewer
about the occurrence of a false event or instruct-
ing children to pretend that a false event hap-
pened, and then asking children to provide ad-
ditional details (e.g., a question stating that the
childs parent said the man was wearing a red
hat, then asking the child whether the mans
232 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
Research concerning
the effects of stress on
childrens memory
has failed to provide
unequivocal support
for any one
theoretical
perspective put forth.
Rather, some
researchers have
uncovered a positive
or negative relation
between stress and
memory, and other
researchers have
failed to reveal any
significant direct
relations.
pants were the same color) (Ceci, Loftus,
Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994; Leichtman & Ceci,
1995). Suggestibility can range from children
merely agreeing with the interviewers state-
ment, thus implying the false information is
true, to children providing detailed narratives
about fictitious events. Characteristics of the in-
terviewquestions (type of questions asked, rep-
etition of questions) as well as the interview
context have been found to influence childrens
susceptibility to false suggestions.
Type of questions. In investigative interviews
of children, it is often recommended that only
free-recall questions be asked. Bysimplyasking,
What happened? children are not provided
with detailed information about the event, thus
diminishing controversy about their suggest-
ibility. Children as young as 3 years usually pro-
vide accurate information when asked initial
free-recall questions, even when they are inter-
viewed about a stressful event (e.g., Fivush,
1993; Goodman, Hirschman, et al., 1991; Oates
& Shrimpton, 1991). However, there are limita-
tions to the utility of free-recall questions.
One limitation is that although childrens
free-recall reports are often accurate, this rule of
thumb is not absolute. When false information
is presented as true prior to or during free-recall
questions, childrens narratives can contain er-
rors (e.g., Brown, 1998; Poole & Lindsay, 1995;
Quas et al., 1999). For instance, Quas et al. (1999)
queried children about a false medical proce-
dure. The questions began with general, vague
prompts asking children to tell what happened
the time they had the test because of problems
with their nose, including prompts for children
to tell about the test in which the doctor put
something up their nose. Although the ques-
tions were phrased in a vague, free-recall- type
manner, the questions in essence told children
that a false event occurred and only asked chil-
dren to provide additional details. Several chil-
dreninthe studyassentedthat the fictitious pro-
cedure occurred in response to these questions.
Thus, although the questions were phrased in a
manner similar to free recall, the questions
themselves were still quite suggestive. Poole
and Lindsay (1995) had parents repeatedly read
stories about what happened during a science
demonstration their children had previously
witnessed. The stories contained information
about true and false details about the demon-
stration. A few days after the stories were read,
children were interviewed about the science
demonstration. Despite the interview begin-
ning with free-recall questions, many children,
ranginginage from3 to8 years, erredandincor-
rectly reported information from the stories as
having occurred. As these studies suggest,
when free-recall questions are preceded, either
immediately or several days beforehand, by the
presentation of false information, errors in chil-
drens narrative accounts can result.
Asecond noteworthy limitation to free-recall
questions is the brevity of childrens narrative
reports. Younger and, at times, older children
do not always provide complete memory re-
ports when asked only general, open-ended
questions about their experiences. As discussed
earlier, young children have difficulty conduct-
ing self-generated memory searches and know-
ing what is important to recount, which could
impede their ability to answer unstructured,
vague free-recall questions. Children may also
be reticent to reveal certain types of informa-
tion, such as genital touch, when asked to re-
count a past experience andinsteadmay elect to
discuss other, perhaps less personal, features of
their experience. In studies of childrens mem-
ory for medical procedures that included geni-
tal contact, for example, fewchildren spontane-
ously disclosed the genital portion of their
experience in response to free-recall questions
about what happened (Goodman et al., 1997;
Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, &Moan, 1991). In
these studies, the medical procedures hadtaken
place only days or weeks before, so presumably
most of the children, especially the older ones
(e.g., 5- to 10-year-olds), had some memory of
the event. Yet, without more specific question-
ing, most children did not provide any indica-
tion that their genitals had been touched during
the medical procedures.
In short, finding out what, if anything, hap-
pened to children by only asking free-recall
questions can be difficult and even impossible.
Especiallyfor younger children, the inclusionof
more direct probes may be a developmentally
appropriate manner of questioning young chil-
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 233
dren to ascertain sufficient details about a par-
ticular to-be-remembered event. Although nec-
essary, the employment of direct questions
raises serious concerns about childrens inaccu-
racy and suggestibility.
Direct questions have often been classified as
specific or misleading, although both types can
be considered leading in a court of law. Specific
questions do not imply or suggest an inaccurate
or particular answer, whereas misleading ques-
tions suggest an incorrect response. Some re-
searchers have distinguished between different
types of specific questions. Peterson and Biggs
(1997) argue that althoughspecific questions are
often necessary to elicit a sufficient amount of
information, a distinction should be made be-
tween specific questions that probe for particu-
lar information (short answers) and specific
questions that simply require confirmation or
disconfirmation (yes/no
responses). In a study of
2- to 12-year- olds mem-
ory for injuries and acci-
dents, Peterson andBiggs
(1997) found that across
age, the short-answer
specific questions were
more likely to elicit cor-
rect information than the
yes/no specific ques-
tions. This is reasonable
because specific short an-
swer questions constitute
a type of cued recall task
that may not be as influ-
enced by response biases
as yes/no questions (see
also Fivush, Peterson, &
Schwarzmueller, in press;
Poole & Lindsay, 1995).
Childrens (and adults) inaccurate respond-
ing typically increases when misleading ques-
tions are asked, althoughat times, evenchildren
can remain resistant to many misleading ques-
tions when they are interviewed about a per-
sonal, salient event (Eisen, Goodman, Qin, &
Davis, 1998; Merritt et al., 1994), especially
when the misleading information concerns
possible abuse when none occurred or central
features of the to-be-remembered event (Bjork-
lund, Bjorklund, Brown, & Cassel, 1998; Good-
man, Hirschman, et al., 1991; Rudy&Goodman,
1991; Ornstein, Baker-Ward, Myers, Principe, &
Gordon, 1995; Saywitz et al., 1991). For example,
in a study of childrens memory for a medical
examination that included an inoculation or
venipuncture, Goodman and her colleagues
found that children were remarkably resistant
to misleading questions that concerned
abuse-related topics (e.g., that the child was hit)
or main activities of the examination (e.g., that
the child received a gift when he or she had not)
(Goodman, Bottoms, Schwartz-Kenney, &
Rudy, 1991; Goodman, Hirschman, et al., 1991).
Importantly, however, there are also clear cir-
cumstances when misleading questions can
lead to dramatic false reports, as will be evident
shortly.
Repeated questioning. When children become
involved in the legal system, they, like adults,
may be questioned on numerous occasions
(Goodman et al., 1992; Whitcomb, 1992).
Whether repeated questions or interviews in-
crease childrens suggestibility and lead to the
creationof false event reports has beenthe focus
of considerable debate and empirical research.
Findings seem to indicate that the mere act of
question repetition, either within or across in-
terviews, does not necessarily leadto greater in-
accuracies in childrens reports (e.g., Fivush
et al., in press). However, the combination of re-
peated interviews and strongly leading ques-
tions canleadtodramatic increases inchildrens
memory errors.
Whenrepeatedquestions are askedwithinan
interview and no misleading information is in-
troduced, children as young as 5 and 6 years of
age can maintain accurate accounts, even when
they are asked repeated questions about fea-
tures of an event that never occurred (Quas,
Denton, Goodman, & Myers, 1996; Poole &
White, 1991). One to 3 weeks after aninteraction
with an adult male confederate, Quas et al.
(1996) interviewed 5- to 7-year-olds about what
happened. The interview included repeated
within-interviewyes/no questions about being
touched. Children who were not touched pro-
vided both consistent and accurate responses to
the repeated questions, whereas children who
234 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
Findings seem to
indicate that the
mere act of question
repetition, either
within or across
interviews, does not
necessarily lead to
greater inaccuracies
in childrens reports
(e.g., Fivush et al., in
press). However, the
combination of
repeated interviews
and strongly leading
techniques can lead
to dramatic increases
in childrens memory
errors.
were touched tended to change their answers
across the repeated questions. Thus, errors of
omission (denials of true touch) were much
more prevalent than errors of commission (false
reports of touch). Importantly, accuracy of both
childrens and adults responses decreases
when they are given negative feedback about
their responses (Warren, Hulse-Trotter, &
Tubbs, 1991). However, accuracy canalso be en-
hanced by warnings; warnings about the diffi-
culty of the task significantly reduced the effect
of misleading questions on 7-year-olds, 12-
year-olds, and adults (Warren et al., 1991).
At times, children also can maintain fairly ac-
curate reports when questioned on multiple oc-
casions (Brainerd & Ornstein, 1991; Dent &
Stephenson, 1979; Fivush &Shukat, 1995), even
when misleading questions are included
(Goodman, Bottoms, et al., 1991). In fact, the
repetition may actually facilitate childrens
memory and increase their resistance to later
suggestions (Brainerd &Ornstein, 1991; Dent &
Stephenson, 1979; Goodman, Bottoms, et al.,
1991; Warren &Lane, 1995). For instance, Good-
man, Bottoms, et al. (1991) observed a positive
effect of interview repetition on childrens
memory accuracy. Specifically, 3- to 4-year-olds
and 5- to 7-year-olds were interviewed either
once (following a 4-week delay), or twice (fol-
lowing a 2- and 4-week delay) about an inocula-
tion they received. At the 4-week interview,
children who had been questioned previously
were more accurate in responding to specific
and abuse-related misleading questions than
childrenwho hadnot beenquestionedpreviously.
Furthermore, among children in the repeated-
interview condition, childrens resistance to
misleading questions was better in the second
than the first interview.
Quite a different picture of the deleterious ef-
fects of repeated questioning emerges when
false information is presented as true at the out-
set of each interview or confirmed as true by
parents or other witnesses, and is then followed
by misleading questioning. In such circum-
stances, both childrens and adults false assent
rates increase considerably (Ceci, Loftus, et al.,
1994; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Shaw, Garven, &
Wood, 1997). In a series of clever studies, Ceci
and his colleagues demonstrated the power of
such questioning tactics on childrens false
event reports (Ceci, Loftus, et al., 1994;
Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). In one study, for ex-
ample, children were questioned on 12 separate
occasions about events that never actually took
place (Ceci, Loftus, et al., 1994). During the first
11 sessions, the same interviewer told children
that their parent confirmed the events occur-
rences, asked them to imagine the events, and
then questioned themabout what happened. In
the 12th session, a new interviewer questioned
the children about the false events. Overall, one
third of the children made at least one false re-
port, with 3- to 4-year-olds making more erro-
neous reports than 5- to 6-year-olds. However,
childrens false reports decreasedin the final in-
terviewwhenthe new, unfamiliar personposed
direct (e.g., yes/no) questions about whether
the events occurred.
Heightened suggestibility is similarly evi-
dent whenfalse informationis presentedas true
prior to an interview by a parent. Poole and
Lindsay (1995, 1996) interviewed 3- to 8-year-
olds on multiple occasions about their witness-
ing science demonstrations with an unfamiliar
adult male. On three consecutive nights prior to
the secondinterview, whichtook place approxi-
mately 3 months after the science demonstra-
tions, parents readchildrenpersonalizedstories
about the events. Included in the stories was ac-
curate and inaccurate information about what
happened, including inaccurate information
about the adult male wiping their faces with
something that tasted yucky. During the inter-
view, manychildrenfalselyreportedthat events
they only heard about in the story really oc-
curred. Furthermore, a majority of the children
falsely assented that the man put something
yucky tasting in their mouths when directly
questioned about it, and some children even
provided narrative detail. Although childrens
false reports decreasedover time, some children
falsely maintained that the heard- about events
actually occurred when they were questioned a
third time 2 months later. Only when source-
monitoring questions were asked in this final
interview (i.e., whether children really remem-
bered particular events happening or they re-
membered being read a story that contained the
information), did the older childrens (e.g., 7-
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 235
and 8-year-olds) false reports decrease to near
zero levels (Poole & Lindsay, 1996).
Despite the deleterious effects of repeated,
leading interviews on childrens suggestibility,
it should also be mentioned that childrens false
report rates are lower for negative (e.g., falling
off a tricycle and getting stitches) than positive
(e.g., going on a balloon ride) events (Ceci, Lof-
tus, et al., 1994; Schaaf, Alexander, &Goodman,
2000). In addition, although perceptions of
event plausibilitychange withdevelopment, chil-
drenare oftenless likely to assent that implausi-
ble (e.g., an enema) than plausible (e.g., getting
lost) events occurred (Pezdek, 1999; Pezdek &
Hodge, 1999). Finally, Huffman, Crossman, and
Ceci (1997) reinterviewed children who had
participated 2 years earlier in Ceci, Huffman,
Smith, and Loftuss (1994) study of repeated
false suggestions. In the original study, one
thirdof the childrenmade at least one false affir-
mation that untrue events occurred. Two years
later, many of these same children denied that
the false events ever happened, and only 13%
falselyreportedinthe follow-upinterviews that
the nonevents had occurred. These findings
suggest that without further misleading sug-
gestions, childrens false recollections of entire
events tended to dissipate after lengthy delays.
Note, however, that childrens increasing age
during the 2-year time delay could also contrib-
ute to or account for the reductioninfalse report
rates that was evident in the follow-up study.
A final note about the consequences of re-
peated questions is their potential effect on con-
sistency. In a legal context, jurors often perceive
witnesses whose accounts are consistent as
more accurate than witnesses whose accounts
are inconsistent (Berman, Narby, &Cutler, 1995;
Leippe, Manion, &Romanczyk, 1993), and such
perceptions affect jurors case decisions. The ef-
fects of repeatedquestions on the consistency of
childrens reports depend on the types of ques-
tions asked, and accuracy may or may not be af-
fected. Across repeated free-recall questions, al-
though young childrens reports tend to be
accurate, they also tend to be inconsistent
(Fivush & Shukat, 1995). That is, children tend
to provide different but still accurate informa-
tionacross repeatedfree-recall questions. When
more direct questions are asked, the effects on
consistency and accuracy remain unclear
(Fivush, 1993). On one hand, in contrast to free-
recall questions, which leave children with am-
ple flexibility in choosing what information to
report, direct questions provide children with a
precise cue of what is to be recalled. Such ques-
tions can thus increase childrens accuracy and
consistency. On the other hand, especially
young children (e.g., 3- to 4-year-olds) may
come to believe that because they are asked the
same specific questions repeatedly, their origi-
nal answers were not correct and they should
provide a different response (Poole & White,
1991). If so, changes in childrens answers, re-
sultingfromthe social demands of the situation,
can negatively affect the consistency and accu-
racy of their reports (Quas et al., 1996).
Forensic context. The situational context of a
forensic interview may include such factors as
being questioned by a police officer or social
worker, being at a police station, knowing that
something bad may have happened, knowing
who may have done the bad things, and having
an idea of what the bad things may have been.
Childrens understanding of these contextual
factors caninfluence their interpretations of their
experiences, how they talk about those events,
and the accuracy of their reports (Lepore &
Sesco, 1994; Thompson, Clark-Stewart, &
Lepore, 1997; Tobey &Goodman, 1992). For in-
stance, inducedstereotypes canleadchildrento
err in their reports in a manner consistent with
those stereotypes. Tobey and Goodman (1992)
examined childrens memory for an interaction
with an adult male. Immediately prior to the
memory interview, a police officer told some
children that something bad may have hap-
pened when they played with the man. Then,
children were interviewed about what hap-
pened by researchers dressed in pseudo-police
uniforms. Children who were told that some-
thing bad might have happened made more er-
rors than children who were not provided with
this information. Interestingly, although the po-
lice officers implied that something bad hap-
pened, most children did not actually report
that anythingbadhadhappenedor that the man
withwhomtheyhadplayeddidsomethingbad.
In fact, when individual childrens reports were
236 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
examined, only 2 children made decidedly false
reports about specific bad things happening.
Results of other studies revealed much stron-
ger negative effects of stereotype induction
when it is combined with repeated misleading
questions. LeichtmanandCeci (1995) queried3-
to 6-year-olds about a mans uneventful visit to
their preschool. Prior to the mans visit, some
children were told about the mans clumsiness.
After the visit, children were interviewed on
four occasions about the mans visit, with some
children being provided misleading informa-
tion each time about misdeeds committed by
the man. Results indicated that among children
who received neither the stereotype induction
nor the misleading information, none of the
children erred in free recall, and 10% of chil-
drens responses to direct questions indicated
that he did commit one or both of the alleged
misdeeds. Similarly, among children who only
receivedthe stereotype induction, none claimed
in free recall that the man had done anything
wrong, although 37% of their responses to the
direct questions suggested that he had commit-
ted the alleged misdeeds. Among children who
received the repeated, misleading information
about the misdeeds, 18% reported in free recall
that the man committed at least one of the mis-
deeds (that was suggested to them). When
asked direct questions about the misdeeds, ap-
proximately 40% of their responses were in er-
ror. Finally, 38% of the children who received
both the stereotype induction and the mislead-
ing suggestions claimed in free recall that the
man committed the misdeeds. Furthermore,
when asked directly about these events occur-
ring, approximately 55% of the childrens re-
sponses implicated the man as committing the
misdeeds. Note that across experimental condi-
tions, the younger children (i.e., 3- to 4-year-
olds) were more likely to assent to the fictitious
activities than the older children (i.e., 5- to 6-
year olds). Even so, the older children still made
some errors, particularly when the stereotype
induction was combined with misleading sug-
gestions. Thus, the combination of stereotypes
plus misleading suggestions can lead to sub-
stantial errors in childrens reports, even in re-
sponse to free-recall questions, which are typi-
cally believed to elicit accurate accounts from
children.
Other factors associated with the forensic in-
terview context that have implications for chil-
drens suggestibility concern the rules,
procedures, and complex language associated
with the legal system that are unfamiliar and
quite confusingtochildren(andoftentoadults).
For one, the language used during interroga-
tions traditionally is not developmentally ap-
propriate. The long, difficult questions often
posedbyattorneys andsometimes byinvestiga-
tors have been given the label legalese. In most
laboratory studies of childrens memory and
suggestibility, the questions are phrasedina rel-
atively straightforward format. However, in
some forensic and many courtroom situations,
children are asked lengthy questions that con-
tain embedded clauses, difficult vocabulary,
double negatives, and multiple prepositional
phrases (Brennan & Brennan, 1988; Walker,
1994). Such questions can be particularly diffi-
cult for children to interpret. Although age-re-
l at ed changes i n chi l dren s l anguage
comprehension are common and may affect
childrens ability to respond to lengthy ques-
tions, even adults can have difficulty under-
standing legalese, such as the following
question posed to a 5-year-old during a trial:
Lurene, do you also recall driving in a car a day or
two after Dougyou found out that Dougthat
something had happened to him and telling and
pointing out houses as being the place were the peo-
ple or one of the people who hurt Doug lived?
(Walker, 1993, p. 68)
Researchers have investigated the effects of
legalese questioning on childrens suggestibil-
ity and found, not surprisingly, that inaccu-
rate responding increases as questions become
more complex (Carter, Bottoms, &Levine, 1996;
Saywitz & Snyder, 1996). For example, Carter
et al. (1996) asked children either complex (i.e.,
questions containing age-inappropriate words,
complex syntactic constructions, and general
ambiguity) or short, simple, and straightfor-
wardquestions about aplayexperience. Children
in the complex-question condition made more
errors in response to both abuse-related and
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 237
nonabuse-related questions than children in
the simple-question condition. Furthermore,
the greater number of errors made by children
in the complex-question condition was evident
regardless of whether or not questions were in-
tentionally misleading. Thus, question com-
plexity affected childrens ability to respond
accurately to all types of questions, not just mis-
leading ones.
The social context of an investigative inter-
view can affect both the accuracy and believ-
ability of childrens eyewitness reports. Some
legal scholars fear that childrens suggestibility
increases when an interviewer provides an
emotionally supportive context, because chil-
dren will try to answer questions in ways to
please the interviewer rather than according to
their own memory. Yet, in several studies, chil-
drens suggestibility decreased when they were
interviewed by a warm interviewer (Carter
et al., 1996; Goodman, Bottoms, et al., 1991). For
example, Carter et al. (1996) assessed 5- to 7-
year-olds memory for a play session. The mem-
ory interviews were conductedby either intimi-
dating interviewers (e.g., ones who did not at-
tempt to establish rapport, used monotonic
intonational contours, lacked eye contact, and
smiledinfrequently) or supportive interviewers
(e.g., ones whointroduced
themselves at the out- set,
employed intonational
contours that conveyed
warmth, smiledfrequently,
and maintained eye con-
tact). As reportedbyother
researchers (e.g., Good-
man, Bottoms, et al . ,
1991), Carter et al. found
that children who were
questioned by the intimi-
dating interviewer made more memory errors
and were more suggestible than children who
were questionedbythe supportive interviewer.
Summary. Research indicates that there are
some conditions that decrease andincrease chil-
drens susceptibility to misleading suggestions
and false memories. Many children can remain
resistant to misleading questions when they are
interviewed one or two times about a personal,
salient event, especially when the misinforma-
tion concerns abuse-related actions and when
children are about 5 years of age or older. Yet,
childrens willingness to assent to the occur-
rence of false events increases when they are re-
peatedly toldthat false events, particularly false
positive events, happened. Childrens false re-
port rates are also higher for plausible than for
implausible events, whenquestions are phrased
in difficult, legalese terminology, and when
chi l dren are quest i oned by col d and
nonsupportive interviewers. However, once
children have erred in their reports or claimed
an untrue event occurred, the inclusion of
source-monitoring questions may decrease
older childrens false reports by allowing them
toclarifywhether theyactuallyremember expe-
riencing a particular event or only remember
hearing about it. Finally, although in the short
term some younger and older children falsely
assent that untrue events occurred, after longer
delays, their false report rates may decrease
considerably.
Ind ivid ua l Diffe re nc e s in C hild re ns
M e m ory a nd Sug g e stib ility
One of the most common findings in studies
of childrens memory and suggestibility, irre-
spective of whether the to-be-remembered
event is stressful, is variability in childrens re-
ports. Even same-aged children often have
quite different emotional reactions to and mem-
oryfor their experiences (e.g., Goodman&Aman,
1990; Goodman et al., 1997; Gordon et al., 1993).
This variability has led some researchers to look
in new directions to gain insight into childrens
memory and suggestibility (see Bruck et al.,
1997; Quas, Qin, Schaaf, & Goodman, 1997, for
reviews). Specifically, researchers have become
interested in identifying individual differences
(inaddition to age) that affect howwell children
remember their experiences, particularly stress-
ful events, andhoweasilychildrencanbe ledto
claim that fictitious events occurred. An un-
derstanding of individual-difference factors
may help explain many of the discrepancies in
the childrens eyewitness memory literature,
and armed with this knowledge, practitioners
can better attend to individual childrens needs
238 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
Research indicates
that there are
conditions that
decrease and
increase childrens
susceptibility to
misleading
suggestions and false
memories.
to ensure that they are questioned in the most
appropriate manner possible.
Individual differences in childrens memory.
Researchers have begun to identify individual-
difference factors that are related to childrens
memory for personal experiences (e.g., Baker-
Ward, Burgwyn, Ornstein, &Gordon, 1995; Howe
et al., 1995). Examples of potential sources of in-
dividual differences include childrens temper-
ament and emotional reactivity, parents
attachment and communication, and childrens
gender andcognitive development. Note that in
future research, it will be important to ascertain
the degree to which such individual-difference
factors affect childrens memory generally ver-
sus childrens memory only for certain types of
experiences, such as stressful experiences.
Several researchers have uncovered associa-
tions between temperament characteristics and
childrens memory (e.g., Merritt et al., 1994;
Stein & Boyce, 1995). For example, in Merritt
et al.s (1994) study of childrens memory for
VCUG, which is the medical test described ear-
lier that involves urethral penetration, children
who scored higher on a measure of adaptability
(ease and speed of adjusting to novel social set-
tings) and approach/withdrawal (tendency to
become involved in novel social settings) evi-
dencedbetter memoryfor the maincomponents
of the VCUG than did children who scored
lower on these two measures. Similar findings
were reported by Gordon et al. (1993) in a study
of childrens memory for a routine medical
check-up (rather than for a highly distressing
event like the VCUG). Approach tendencies
were positively associated with the proportion
of the physical examination features recalled by
both 3- and 5-year-olds. The positive associa-
tions betweenapproach/withdrawal andmem-
ory were particularly robust when the amount
of elaborative detail children provided about
their medical experience was examined. Yet, in
another study of childrens memory for a pedi-
atric checkup, approach/withdrawal was unre-
lated to 3-year-olds recall, but manageability
and persistence were predictive of enhanced
recall (Greenhoot, Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-
Ward, 1999). The variabilityinfindings suggests
that additional research is needed to under-
standwhen andhowtemperament might relate
to childrens memory across different ages.
Goodmanandher colleagues (e.g., Goodman
et al., 1997; Quas et al., 1999) focused on the ef-
fects of attachment relationships and interper-
sonal communication as potential individual-
difference factors predictingchildrens memory
for VCUG. Goodman et al. (1997) speculate that
attachment may affect how parents interact
with their children before, during, and after
stressful situations, and how children react to
and understand those experiences. Insofar as
insecure parents do not provide sufficient emo-
tional support and do not teach their children
coherent interpretations of some events, these
children may have difficulty accurately re-
counting what happened during a stressful
event. Results of two separate studies of chil-
drens memory for VCUG provide partial con-
firmation for Goodman et al.s ideas. In one
study, parents completeda measure of romantic
attachment before the VCUG occurred and
completed questionnaires concerning their
communication with and comforting behavior
towardtheir childrenafter the VCUGtookplace
(Goodman et al., 1994, 1997). Children of inse-
cure parents made more errors, whereas chil-
dren of secure parents made fewer errors. In
particular, children whose parents tended to-
ward fearful-avoidant attachment were more
upset before the VCUG, and also were more
likely to omit information during the memory
interview. Also, mothers whoreportedcomfort-
ing and talking to their children after the medi-
cal test had children who made fewer errors
than children did of mothers who reported not
comforting and talking to their children. (As
might be expected, securely attached parents
were more likely to discuss the VCUGandcom-
fort their children than insecurely attached par-
ents; see Goodman et al., 1997.) Although the
mechanisms underlying the observed associa-
tions need to be elucidated, several more recent
studies have begun to uncover similar associa-
tions between parental attachment and chil-
drens suggestibility for other stressful and
nonstressful events (Alexander, Goodman,
Schaaf, Edelstein, Quas, & Shaver, 2000; Davis,
1998).
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 239
Researchers have also found evidence for
gender differences in how children talk about
emotions and emotional experiences, which
may lead to differences in how well boys and
girls seem to remember some emotional events
(Fivush, 1993; Kuebli, Butler, & Fivush, 1995).
For example, mothers tendto use more emotion
words with daughters than sons and to talk
withdaughters more thansons about emotional
events. Comparisons of boys and girls use of
emotion words reveal similar patterns: Al-
though boys and girls use similar numbers of
emoti on words when
theyare youngpreschool-
ers, with age, girls tend to
talk more about emotions
anddo so for longer dura-
tions (Kuebli et al., 1995).
Kuebli et al. (1995) specu-
late that male children
learn relatively early that
emotions are not appropriate to discuss and
thus gradually decrease their use of emotion
words in conversations. Although gender dif-
ferences in childrens memory for stressful
events have not consistently emerged, Steward
(1993) reported that boys who experienced dis-
tressing medical procedures were more likely
than girls to deny that the experience hurt or
that they cried when in fact they had cried.
Numerous researchers have demonstrated
the importance of general and specific knowl-
edge inrelationto memoryprocesses, including
memory development (Chi, 1978; Gaultney,
Bj orklund, & Schneider, 1992; Pillemer,
Picariello, & Pruett, 1994; Schneider & Korkel,
1989; Stein, Wade, &Liwag, 1996). As knowledge
about a topic or event increases, individuals, in-
cluding children, become better able to under-
stand the event, and understanding typically
improves memory. Knowledge also leads to the
creation of generalized schemas about events
into which new experiences can be classified
and subsequently retrieved. Knowledge about
experiences may further aid in individuals
accurate inferences about what happened dur-
ing an event, which again can contribute to im-
provedmemory performance (althoughknowl-
edge can also lead to inaccuracies when an
actual event contradicts that knowledge). Al-
though knowledge generally increases with
age, there are alsosituations inwhichincreasing
age is not associatedwithmore knowledge (e.g.,
as with children who are experts on particular
topics, such as dinosaurs). Furthermore, knowl-
edge can differ substantially among same-age
children. Thus, knowledge represents an im-
portant source of variability that may underlie
age- related changes and individual differences
in childrens memory and suggestibility.
Several studies have reportedpositive associ-
ations between knowledge andmemory perfor-
mance. Clubb, Nida, Merritt, and Ornstein
(1993), for instance, found that childrens gen-
eral medical knowledge was predictive of mem-
ory for a routine physical examination, with
greater knowledge being associated with im-
proved memory. In Goodman et al.s (1994)
study of childrens memory for VCUG, the
number of prior VCUG experiences children
hadendured, whichcouldrepresent one formof
knowledge, was unrelated to childrens mem-
ory. However, childrens prior knowledge about
what would happen during the VCUG shortly
before its occurrence was predictive of their
memory. Children who knew what to expect
prior to the VCUG were more accurate in their
later memory reports than children who lacked
specific knowledge about what to expect. Im-
portantly, as mentioned, knowledge may im-
prove childrens inference abilities, leading to
increasedaccuracy, althoughonlywhenthe cor-
rect responses are consistent with childrens
knowledge. When knowledge is inconsistent
with what actually occurred, knowledge can
lead to increased errors in memory reports (see
Brewer, 1996, and Quas et al., 1997, for further
discussion). That is, knowledge may interfere
with memory under some circumstances.
Finally, childrens general emotional andcog-
nitive functioning may have implications for
their mnemonic capabilities. In a pilot study of
maltreated childrens memory for medical
checkups, Eisen et al. (1998) observed that chil-
dren who were functioning at a higher level ac-
cording to the General Adaptive Functioning
Scale (a measure of general psychopathology)
and who scored higher on the Ravens Progres-
240 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
Several studies have
reported positive
associations between
knowledge and
memory
performance.
sive Matrices Test (a standardized measure of
intellectual functioning) displayed better mem-
ory than children who scored lower on these
two indices. Childrens short-term memory
span was also positively related to their mem-
ory performance. Although the correlations in
Eisen et al.s study were not strong in magni-
tude, the results suggest that it may be useful
to consider childrens general emotional well-
beingandcognitive functioningwhenassessing
their memory for particular events.
Individual differences in childrens suggestibility.
Individual differences have also emergedinchil-
drens susceptibility to misleading information,
with some children remaining quite resistant to
suggestions even after repeated interviews and
other children falling prey to misleading sug-
gestions with little external prompting. Several
factors have been identifiedas underlying the ob-
served differences in young childrens suggest-
ibility. These include theory-of-mind, source-
monitoring abilities, and imaginativeness
(Leichtman&Morse, 1997; Shyamalan, Lamb, &
Sheldrick, 1995; Welch-Ross, Diecidue, &Miller,
1997). Additional factors that have been identi-
fied as potentially contributing to individual
differences in suggestibility include intelli-
gence, gender, familysocioeconomic status, and
self-esteem (see Brown, 1998; Bruck et al., 1997;
Goodman et al., 1998; Vrij &Bush, 1998). Impor-
tantly, however, many of the aforementioned
variables have not beentesteddirectly inempir-
ical research, and thus, they are not reviewed
here. Furthermore, among those that have been
tested, results remain preliminary until addi-
tional studies document both the stability and
generalizability of the observed findings to
other samples and situations.
One potentially promising individual-difference
factor to help explain variability in young chil-
drens (i.e., 2- to 4-year-olds) suggestibility is
their understanding of dual representations.
Briefly, dual-representation capabilities refer to
an understanding that one person or object can
have multiple or conflicting attributes (Flavell,
Green, &Flavell, 1986). This understandingtyp-
ically develops between the ages of 3 and 4
years. Welch-Ross et al. (1997) examined the re-
lation between preschoolers success on
conflicting representation tasks and their im-
mediate and 1-week story recall. The tasks as-
sessed childrens understanding of appear-
ance-reality and real-pretend distinctions, two
forms of dual-representation capabilities. For
example, one task involved showing children a
white piece of paper. A color filter was then
placedover the paper so that it appearedto turn
a different color. Children were asked what
color the paper really and truly was, despite
the paper looking like another color. Children
who failed the dual representation tasks were
more susceptible to misinformation about the
story following a 1-week delay than children
whowere successful onthe tasks. Welch-Ross et
al. speculated that children who had difficulty
reasoningabout the coexistence of multiple rep-
resentations of a single object had similar diffi-
culty maintaining an original memory repre-
sentation when new conflicting information
was added. These children overwrote the
original memory with the new information so
that they would still have only one representa-
tion. Welch-Ross et al. propose that children
who were successful on the conflicting repre-
sentationtasks were able to deal withcontradic-
tory information about an object or event.
Therefore, they did not lose the original mem-
ory despite new false information being added
(see also Welch-Ross, 1999).
Relatedtoyoungchildrens understandingof
conflicting mental representations is their ability
to identify the sources of their memories. Spe-
cifically, if children cannot maintain an original
representation when new, conflicting informa-
tion has been suggested, they would not be ex-
pected to be able to retain multiple sources of
event information and hence would not be ex-
pected to be able to distinguish among sources
of event information. Some researchers have ex-
amined whether childrens ability to identify
the sources of their beliefs is predictive of their
suggestibility. Leichtman and Morse (1997), for
example, reported that preschoolers who per-
formedpoorlyonsource-monitoringtasks were
more suggestible than children who performed
well on the source-monitoring tasks. Interest-
ingly, however, preschoolers source-monitoring
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 241
capabilities were predictive only of their sug-
gestibility and not of their memory perfor-
mance. These results shouldbe consideredwith
caution, however, until other factors, such as
age, are also takeninto account. Unlike younger
children, older children can maintain multiple
conflicting representations, and older children
exhibit better source-monitoring skills and are
typically less suggestible thanyounger children
(e.g., Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Poole & Lindsay,
1995). Thus, the observed
relations between source
monitoring and suggest-
ibility may be due to, or
confounded by, age.
Individual differences
in imaginativeness have
been implicated as under-
lying variability in chil-
dren s willingness to
confabulate about never-
experienced events. Several false-memory
study paradigms have included interviewers
asking children to imagine particular aspects of
the never-experienced events (e.g., Ceci,
Huffman, et al., 1994; Ceci, Loftus, et al., 1994).
Although childrens ability to imagine events in
these studies was not assessed, one may specu-
late that any differences across children in this
ability could have affected howeasily they con-
jured up and recounted the false events.
Shyamalan et al. (1995) replicated Ceci,
Huffman, et al.s (1994) study and included an
imaginativeness measure. Children were inter-
viewed five times about having gotten their
handcaught ina mousetrap(anevent that never
happened to any of the children). Increases in
childrens scores on the imaginativeness mea-
sure were associated with increases in false re-
ports. The positive relation between imagina-
tiveness and childrens false reports remained
significant when other factors related to chil-
drens suggestibility (i.e., childrens age and
family socioeconomic status) were statistically
controlled. Recently, Quas et al. (1999) failed to
uncover similar relations between childrens
imaginativeness and their susceptibility to mis-
leading questions using the same measure of
imaginativeness as that used by Shyamalan
et al. (1995). Importantly, the measure of imagi-
nativeness used by both teams of researchers
may have been too difficult for the preschoolers
to understand (it was standardized for use with
childrenages 8 to15 years). Thus, the discrepant
findings could have stemmed from childrens
imaginativeness not having been accurately as-
sessed in either study. The need for a more sys-
tematic investigation of imaginativeness and
suggestibility is essential.
Summary. In summary, studies of individual
differences in memory and suggestibility make
overarching generalizations about childrens
eyewitness capabilities difficult. Although chil-
drens age remains the single strongest predic-
tor of differences in childrens memory and
susceptibility to false suggestions, other charac-
teristics within children also contribute to evi-
dent differences. Temperament, attachment,
and gender appear to be promising factors that
may contribute to variability inchildrens mem-
ory for some types of experiences, particularly
stressful or emotional ones. Childrens knowl-
edge and intellectual abilities also contribute to
differences in childrens general mnemonic ca-
pabilities. Dual representation, source monitor-
ing, and imaginativeness have all been linked,
at least preliminarily, to variability in childrens
suggestibility. Clearlyadditional researchis need-
ed to elucidate the precise conditions under
which each of the aforementioned individual-
difference factors predicts memory and sug-
gestibility, the generalizability of the findings
to children of varying ages and to different
types of to-be-remembered events, and the
mechanisms underlying the observed associa-
tions. Such investigations will be critical, and
evaluations of childrens eyewitness memory
capabilities may not be possible without a con-
sideration of the many social and individual-
difference factors that affect childrens percep-
tions of and memory for their experiences.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we providedan overviewof re-
cent research concerning childrens eyewitness
memory, highlighting factors that contribute to
more or less accurate reports. As our review
suggests, a host of experiential, situational, and
242 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE / July 2000
Studies of individual
differences in
memory and
suggestibility make
overarching
generalizations about
childrens eyewitness
capabilities difficult.
individual-difference factors affect the accuracy
and completeness of their memory reports.
However, as our review also revealed, the con-
text andconditions under which various factors
exert their influence over childrens memoryare
limited. Much more research is needed to deter-
mine, more precisely, just how and when indi-
vidual and situational variables affect chil-
drens memory and suggestibility.
Based on our review, we would like to put
forth several recommendations to practitioners
regarding research on childrens event memory
and eyewitness testimony. These recommenda-
tions do not spell out how to conduct forensic
interviews with children, as that was not the
goal of this article. Other researchers have done
an excellent job providing more detail on this
topic. Rather, these recommendations are to aid
practitioners in their quest to understand em-
pirical research on childrens memory and the
applicabilityof this ever-growingbodyof litera-
ture to their experiences and practices in con-
ducting forensic interviews with children.
As children continue to become involved in
the legal system as victims and witnesses to
crimes, it is imperative that they are inter-
viewed in the most appropriate manner possi-
ble. This involves educating those who work
with children to recognize developmental dif-
ferences in childrens memory capabilities and
limitations, situational factors may affect the ac-
curacy of childrens accounts, and individual
differences in childrens perceptions of and
memory for their experiences. This also in-
volves education about interpreting empirical
research concerning childrens mnemonic capa-
bilities and limitations. Armed with knowledge
not only about empirical research findings but
also about interpreting empirical research, we
anticipate that practitioners will use the most
appropriate andup-to-date interviewing tactics
toensure that the informationprovidedbychild
witnesses is as accurate as possible. We also
hope that with an awareness of the utility and
limitations of empirical research, practitioners
can continually improve the strategies they use
to question child witnesses based on exposure
to this large and growing body of literature.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE, POLICY, AND RESEARCH
Re c om m e nd a tions: Inte rp re ting Em p iric a l Re se a rc h on
C hild re ns M e m ory a nd Sug g e stib ility
When evaluating results from empirical research, it
is imperative to know the ages of children in the
study. Childrens memory andsuggestibility change
sometimes dramatically with age. Thus, research
findings may be constrained by the ages of the chil-
dreninthe sample andmaynot generalize tochildren
of other ages. Experimental manipulations (e.g., of
interviewingtactics) andindividual-difference char-
acteristics (e.g., dual representations) may differen-
tially affect children of varying ages.
The utility of empirical research to real-world foren-
sic interviewing maybe affectedbythe type of to-be-
remembered events studied. Childrens willingness
and ability to describe both true and false experi-
ences vary depending on the type of event (e.g.,
events involving genital touch, witnessing a social
interaction) and the emotional valence of the event.
Note, however, that the type of to-be-remembered
event is not the sole determinant of childrens mem-
ory accuracy and suggestibility.
The methods employed in research on childrens
suggestibility and false memory may affect the
generalizability of the findings. It is important to
identify the precise interview tactics that may (or
may not) be contributing to errors or heightened
suggestibility. If multiple suggestive tactics are em-
ployed simultaneously, it is difficult to identify
which one is causing errors or whether the com-
bined force of the tactics is required to obtain the ef-
fects. It is also important to assess the degree to
whichthe tactics usedinempirical researchare simi-
lar to those employed in actual forensic interviews
with children.
In research on individual-difference factors as pre-
dictors of childrens memory and suggestibility, the
degree to which factors are applicable only to chil-
drenof certainages needs to be understood. Because
much of this research is preliminary and explor-
atory, further research is needed to confirm associa-
tions uncoveredinone or twostudies anddetermine
the generalizabilityof the findings (e.g., tochildrens
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 243
memory for all types of events, to childrens mem-
ory for stressful events only).
In studies identifying predictors (e.g., individual-
difference factors, situational characteristics) of chil-
drens memory and suggestibility, the size of the
demonstrated effects must be specified. Sample size
and statistical techniques can affect whether empiri-
cal research findings are significant, whether or not
the findings are alsomeaningful. If a particular ques-
tioningtactic or individual-difference factor explains,
at best, only a small amount of the variance, then it
may not be especially useful to exert considerable
effort taking into consideration the factor during a
forensic interview. Thus, practitioners needtoevalu-
ate empirical research not only basedon the applica-
bility of the results but also in terms of the magni-
tude of the reported effects.
Empirical researchis basedongroupcomparisons or
trends in evident patternsfor example, compari-
sons between children who received repeated false
suggestions or false suggestions on a single occa-
sion, or the degree to which increases in childrens
imaginativeness parallel increases in their suggest-
ibility. Practitioners need to evaluate empirical re-
search carefully to determine what factors are being
compared and how. These evaluations can reveal
critical information relevant to cause-effect relations
and whether cause-effect relations are being exam-
ined at all. Most important, because empirical re-
search is not focused on individuals, findings are
difficult to apply to a single child and should not be
used as litmus tests to determine the veracity of a
single childs report in a forensic interview.
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Jodi A. Quas is an assistant professor in the
Department of Psychology and Social Behav-
ior at the University of California, Irvine. Her
research focuses on two related areas: memory
development and childrens involvement in
the legal system. She has conducted studies
concerning the relations between stress and memory in
children, individual differences and developmental changes
in childrens memory and suggestibility, and the effects of
repeated interviews on childrens memory. She has also
been collaborating on a large, federally funded study of the
long-termconsequences of criminal court involvement on
child victims. Much of her work has been applied to ques-
tions about childrens capabilities as eyewitnesses and
childrens participation as victims in legal cases.
Gail S. Goodman is professor of psychol-
ogy and director of the Center on Social Ser-
vices and the Lawat the University of Califor-
nia, Davis. Her research concerns memory
development and childrens abilities and expe-
riences as victim/witnesses. Over the years,
her studies have been cited in U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions, and her writings have won several national awards.
Dr. Goodman has served on numerous editorial boards,
including Child Development, Law and Human
Behavior, and Applied Cognitive Psychology, and as
president of two divisions (Division 37, Child, Youth, and
Family Services; and Division 41, Psychology and Law)
and one section (Child Maltreatment) of the American
Psychological Association.
Simona Ghetti, M.A., is a doctoral candi-
date in the Department of Psychology at the
University of California, Davis. Her research
interests include theoretical questions about
false memory formation and memory develop-
ment, and applied questions about childrens
eyewitness testimony. She has conducted studies on chil-
drens reports of sexual and physical abuse and childrens
memory for abuse over long delays. She has also conducted
experimental studies on memory development.
AllisonD. Redlich, Ph.D., is a postdoctoral
fellow in the Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.
She is interested in howchildren, both victims
and defendants, are treated and perceived in
the criminal justice system. Of particular
interest is howjuveniles are interrogated by the police and
whether certain interrogation tactics lead to false confes-
sions in juveniles. She has also studied the effects of hear-
say in legal cases involving children and attitudes toward
child sexual abuse prevention measures.
Quas et al. / QUESTIONING THE CHILD WITNESS 249