Languishing in the “Valley of no Return”: NATO’s Stalled Efforts in Eradicating

the Taliban

By Richard L. Dixon

The U.S. and NATO involvement in Afghanistan has disintegrated into a quagmire that in the

years to come will even be more painful than our military adventures in the jungles of Southeast

Asia over 40 years ago. Afghanistan as a country has earned a notorious reputation for being a

black pit where would be conquerors have met their fatal demise. From the likes of “The Median

and Persian Empires, Alexander the Great, the Seleucids, the Indo-Greeks, Turks, Mongols,

British and Soviets all met the end of their ambitions in Afghanistan.” (Dahr Jamail).

The inhabitants view us as occupiers instead of liberators. This is especially true within the

increasing amount of collateral damage in terms of noncombatant casualties. In essence, we have

become the same empire just as the British in the past. Our military is overstretched and under-

supplied in trying to maintain stability in a region of the world that has never experienced such a

concept in its history.

“Framing the idea of empire as a force for good, however, is one of the recurring themes of empires

throughout history. Indeed the Roman and British empires were formed, not

by force alone, but on the basis of their capacity to present their authority at home and

abroad as being in the service of right and peace. That is how empires have regularly justified

their authority to use instruments of coercion extraterritorially; that is, they have felt they were

exercising “imperial sovereignty” rather than just “national sovereignty.” (Ivan Eland, November 26,

2002).
In fact, our continued presence in the guise as Empire has emboldened the enemy (Al Qaeda) and

provided ready-made recruits who view the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a crusade against Islam.

Our continued presence will become a blowback which will threaten other regimes such as Bahrain,

Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Yemen which is now experiencing a Shia rebellion in their Northern most

provinces. Pakistan is trying to throw the yoke of a Taliban uprising in the SWAT Valley which

threatens nearby Islamabad. “It also shows that imperial behavior by one power can lead to

counterbalancing by other powers. Imperial expansion can even cause proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction among poor countries as the great equalizers vis-à-vis the imperial power.

Finally, the military interventions required to maintain an empire can erode the foundations

of the constitutional system of a republic such as the United States.” (Ivan Eland, November 26,

2002).

All have underestimated the terrain, people, culture, and history of the country and the region.

Throughout its history Afghanistan has been a country steeped in tribal conflict, ruled by

warlords, poor mountain terrain, and governed by a fierce independence. It’s no wonder that

Frank L. Holt called Afghanistan the “Land of Bones.” Unless the United States and NATO

quickly changes it mode of operations in Afghanistan, no amount of Troop increases will give us

leverage for a quick victory in such a God forsaken country. Both the U.S. and NATO would be

wise to learn from the failed military strategies of their predecessors.

“Second, we must acknowledge that the wars waged in Afghanistan by Alexander, Britain, the

Soviet Union, and now the United States share some salient features that may not bode

well for our future. For example, all these invasions of Afghanistan went well at first, but so far

no superpower has found a workable alternative to what might be called the recipe

for ruin in Afghanistan:

1. Estimate the time and resources necessary to conquer and

control the region.

2. Double all estimates.

3. Repeat as needed.

Afghanistan cannot be subdued by half measures. Invaders must consider the deadly demands of

winter warfare, since all gains from seasonal campaigns are erased at every lull. Invaders must

resolve to hunt down every warlord, for the one exception will surely rot the fruits of all other

victories. Invaders cannot succeed by avoiding cross-border fighting, since the mobile insurgents

can otherwise hide and reinforce with impunity. Invaders must calculate where to draw the

decisive line between killing and conciliation, for too much of either means interminable

conflict.” (Frank L. Holt, 2005).

Afghanistan itself is a contrast in culture, language, and tradition. It presents both an opportunity

and problem for the major players in the region which includes the United States, NATO, Russia,

China, Pakistan, Iran, and India. The country poses a danger to all parties involved and threatens

to destabilize the Eurasian region and Indian subcontinent. The Pakistanis are already trying to

put down a Taliban insurgency in the SWAT Valley which is only 70 Kilometers from

Islamabad and threatens to put nuclear weapons in the hands of crazed and radical Islamists.

India has been fighting a rebellion in the Kashmir region that it shares with Pakistan since the

partitioning of the region by the British. Iran is dealing with both a huge influx of Shia refugees

that they are desperately trying to integrate into their nation. The U.S. and NATO are not only

fighting a resurgent Taliban but also a thriving heroin trade in the Golden Triangle area which

funnels drug money back into the insurgency. In essence, Afghanistan is like the bad in-laws
who won’t go away and one has to readily adapt to their ever constant presence. The meddling,

intrusion, and interference in the affairs in the country has not given its inhabitants hope for

peace or stability. “As is often stated, Afghanistan stands in a dangerous neighborhood.

Responsibility for much of the political instability and misery of its people can be traced to

external powers seeking to realize their own strategic, ideological, and economic interests in the

country. The close and more distant neighbors of Afghanistan have regularly intervened in its

politics and economy. Foreigners have sometimes acted on behalf of domestic clients and have

organized and armed them to dominate large portions of the country.” (Marvin G. Weinbaum,

June 2006).

The only viable solution for stability in the region is to gain the trust and support of the people

one province at a time. In the past, the Russians, British, Greeks, and Mongols have acted as

invaders in every sense of the world thereby earning the wrath and hatred of the local population.

Even the Warlords were despised just as much; they get rely on the support of the people in their

gurriella operations against the foreign invaders. We find that both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are

viewed with suspicion by the population because they come from all parts of the Islamic world.

“While it has made military gains, the Taliban today enjoys little support among an Afghan

public tired of war. Its leadership does not command a significant standing army; indeed the

Taliban is a disparate network of groups using the name as they pursue different agendas.

Disillusionment with both the international community and the state has grown but the vast

majority of people remain far more fearful of what would happen if foreign troops were to leave

rather than stay. Strengthening popular support and goodwill should be the heart of the counter-

insurgency and the creation of a resilient state.” (International Crisis Group, March 13, 2009).
If the Taliban and Al Qaeda are so despised then why are they so strong and control most of the

Southern Provinces. The obvious answer to that question is that the past Bush Administration

took its eye off Afghanistan once they drove the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks from power in

order to consolidate and concentrate its efforts on the Iraqi War. The lack of a comprehensive

strategy to deliver a decisive blow to the already reeling Taliban was perhaps one of the worst

strategic blunders by the Bush Administration. With time on their side, the Taliban regrouped by

using the mountainous terrain of Pakistan to resupply, rearm, and recruit willing and eager young

people.

The Taliban has also been able to convince the local population that their resistance is against a

foreign occupying force who do not have the best interest of the people at heart. Indeed, NATO

has made some blunders which have resulted in massive civilian casualties that have given

credibility to both the Taliban and Al Qaeda propaganda effort. Unfortunately, the alliance has

written off the civilian casualties as unfortunate consequences in the execution of war. The

fallout and collateral damage has cost the United States and NATO a lost of legitimacy from the

countries that borders around and about Afghanistan. “Collateral damage will have a blow-back

effect; that is, it will make missions, whether military, humanitarian, or diplomatic, harder to

achieve. This also has an immediate effect of exposing U.S. forces and institutions to greater

danger. What may have once been a willingness to cooperate transforms into a hatred that

propels people to take up arms against U.S. forces, as they are seen as bring-ing nothing more

than death and destruction. (Marcus Raskin & Devin West, October 10, 2008).

Afghanistan Commander General McChrystal gives a first hand account of the obstacles that the

NATO alliance and their coalition face in overcoming and defeating the insurgency. This list

includes a very well-organized and defiant enemy in the likes of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, lack of

confidence by the people in the government of Afghanistan, and corruption and abuse of power by
crooked public officials. “Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it.

Resourcing communicates commitment, but we must also balance force levels to enable effective

ANSF partnering and provide population security, while avoiding perceptions of coalition

dominance. Ideally, the ANSF must lead this fight, but they will not have enough capability in the

near-term given the insurgency’s growth rate. In the interim, coalition forces must provide a bridge

capability to protect critical segments of the population. The status quo will lead to failure if we wait

for the ANSF to grow.” (General Stanley A. McChrystal, August 30, 2009).

What is unique about General McChrystal’s assessment of the insurgency and the best path to

counteract and defeat them, is that he gives a detailed insight into the major players in the region,

what influence they have exerted on the internal affairs of the country of Afghanistan whether

negative or position, and the expected outcome that they are trying to shape for their advantage.

These major players include the countries of Iran, Pakistan, Russia, China, and the Central Asian

Republics. The success in putting down the insurgency will depend upon how coalition forces will

handle, juggle, and define these external and internal influences.

Externally Iran could play a major role in controlling the growing narcotics by tightening down and

persecuting smugglers inside their borders. However, if Israel launches a pre-emptive strike on Iran’s

nuclear facilities, there is the possibly that Iran would heighten the intensity of the war by pouring in

material, recruits, and weapons to increase the insurgency effort against the United States. They

could also get directly involved in the war and rallying the extremist elements as a jihad by defining

the Afghan conflict in wider terms as a war against Islam. This would prove to be very costly and the

end result could be for a call of additional troops \within the region.

Iran’s role in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is multi-pong and is part of a bigger effort to

exert its influence in both the Persian Gulf and the Asian corridor.
 1. It is their intention of creating Shia unrest in the region to act as a counterbalance against

the U.S. presence in Iraq and to keep the international community guessing in terms of its

weapons program.

2. The Iranians are working indirectly to control their borders to prohibit their country as

being an access way for the transportation and spread of the heroin traffic that is coming

from the Southern Regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They view the heroin trade as a

destabilizing influence.

3. The Iranians are training, arming, and supplying the warlords as an opposing force

against Al Qaeda who seeks to supersede their influence within the region by

concentrating on creating an international radical Islamic union.

4. The Iranians view a stabilized Karzai regime as important to stem the tide of refugees

who are causing problems in terms of sector security and integration within their country.

India’s increased role in the internal affairs of Afghanistan to use that country as a counterweight

against Pakistan especially after the deadly terrorist attack this past spring in the financial capital of

Mumbai. There was a direct link between the participants who carried out the attack and the

Pakistani Secret Service. The Pakistanis view the actions of India as trying to recruit a hostile state in

the likes of Afghanistan and would be less inclined and cooperative to control the Taliban Insurgents.

In the past, both India and Afghanistan have had close diplomatic ties to the dismal of the

Pakistanis who view Kabul and New Delhi’s cozy diplomatic relations as a threat to its internal

security. Their recognition of the Taliban in power was meant to thwart those diplomatic

overtures. Under the Karzai regime, diplomatic relationships between the two nations have been
restored. India has a vested interest in stemming the tide of illegal drugs passing through it

borders and funding the Taliban insurgency.

The solution that India proposes to combat the growing opium trade is to legalize them into

legitimate enterprises with stiff penalties for violations and to import huge quantities of seed,

supplies, technical assistance, and money for the farmers within the Southern Region of

Afghanistan. “This programme proposes to legalize poppy cultivation through a system of

licensing, add value to crop at the village level by converting it into morphine and channeling

funds generated for economic development. This would in turn generate incentive for an

estimated 14 million Afghans dependant on illegal poppy cultivation to sever links with drug

traffickers. India could contribute by sharing its experiences on its model of licensing poppy

production, under which the entire village stands to lose its license if a family indulges in an

illegal act, thus providing a powerful social deterrent.” (Raghav Sharma, April, 2009)

NATO and the United States should take note of the success of India in the affairs of

Afghanistan and should forge partnership alliances to expand its programs throughout the nation

of Afghanistan.

Russia and the Central Asian Republics would prove a vital staging ground in mopping up efforts

against the Taliban through joint operations command. They view that controlling and eventually

defeating the Taliban would blunt the rising Islamic militancy.

The Russians have much to offer to the United States from their failed operations in the Russian-Afghan

War in the 1980’s. “When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their

chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the

experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi

resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet
army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the

highly motivated mujahedeen freedom fighters.” (Lester W. Grau, ed., 1996).

The Russians have a vital stake in a stable Afghanistan because the resurgent Taliban would seek to

spread their insurrection to the neighboring former Soviet Republics. Learning, listening, and acting

on their timely recommendations will mean a chance of success in the battle against the Taliban.

There are those who view the role of the United States and NATO as a slippery slope to disaster. To

them Afghanistan represents a quicksand towards disaster both militarily and politically. They view

the efforts to promote democracy in Afghanistan under the current conditions of corruption and

insurgency as a zero-sum game for the United States. That is the United States is not readily

equipped in the task of nation-building in fractured regimes that have only known war and have not

given these countries the necessary time to develop key political and economic institutions to foster

democratic development over a prolonged period of time.

“But there is a deeper and more ominous possibility which so far has largely

escaped public discussion – that the task of bringing democracy to a people as

tyrannized as Iraqis and Afghanis historically have been is by its very nature

undoable in the short term. This is because democracy relies on a complex,

multi-layered web of civic organizations for a number of its most basic functions.

But regimes such as Saddam’s or the Taliban’s regard such organizations as

competing structures of power, and deliberately and systematically undermine

them. The organizations that

give form to and empower individual initiative are gradually destroyed, or

prevented from emerging in the first place, leaving citizens atomized and

powerless before the authority of the state. Society is “de-structured”. As a

socio-political foundation for a new political order, this is quicksand. Democracy

will not work in such an environment. This is a considerably more worrying

explanation of America’s postwar troubles, as remedies will exist only in the

long term if at all. It implies that

America will eventually face an unpleasant choice between a protracted,

expensive physical and social reconstruction, or a quicker withdrawal that

leaves the conquered country either in the hands of a new dictator, albeit one

friendly to US interests, or in a semi-anarchic, possibly violent state.” (Jean-Paul

Faguet, November 19, 2003).

The key ingredient to success in Afghanistan is to utilize the external actors to forge a peaceable

solution and climate within the region. It would become less of a dangerous neighborhood if the

United States tapped into the spheres of influences of the Iranians, Russians, Indians, and

Pakistanis by satisfying their nationalistic interest and expectations with an exchange of a solemn

promise that they would continue to work for meaningful solutions of peace within the region.

These third party relationships should be combined with a comprehensive internal strategy

militarily, politically, and economic to get Afghanistan back on the road to recovery and

stability. Hence, the only effective solutions are as follows:

1. Reconstruct the infrastructure of Afghanistan by providing economic and educational

assistance for both men and women.

2. Reintegrating former Taliban fighters back into the fabric of Afghan society. All options

should be kept on the table including negotiating with more moderate elements of the Taliban

to bring them into the Afghan governing structure. General David Petraeus utilized the

option as a corner stone policy during the surge in Iraq and was able to enlist the help of

several prominent Sunni Tribal Chieftains (who were once formerly opposed to the US

presence in Iraq) that were instrumental in pacifying several problem areas. However,
 negotiating should not be misconstrued as a notion of positive acceptance of the Taliban as a

serious political player. Its command infrastructure and organization must be destroyed and

dismantled whereby forcing them to come to the table to accept a settlement that is

acceptable to both the coalition and Afghan government. “The central question for the

United States is how to achieve victory in Afghanistan. If victory—understood

as the marginalization of the Taliban as an armed opposition—can be

attained, reconciliation between some Taliban elements and the Afghan state

would become possible, but paradoxically at a time when it is also least

necessary. Achieving victory, in any event, involves erecting an effective

Afghan state that can control its national territory and deliver the personal

security, responsive governance, and economic development necessary to

ensure internal stability. Success in this respect is essential even if the United

States focuses only on the limited objective of defeating al-Qaeda and its

allies. What will be required, however, is an ironclad American determination

to stay involved in ensuring Afghanistan’s security over the long term.

Signaling American impatience with the coalition; encourage important

Afghan bystanders to persist in their prevailing ambivalence; and induce

Islamabad to eschew relinquishing its support for the Taliban because they

could once again be required to protect Pakistan’s interests in Kabul.” (Ashley

J. Tellis, 2009).

3. Combat the corruption of both Afghan governmental officials and the warlords. "The

government of Afghanistan’s inability to deliver good governance, especially

in the south and east of the country, is viewed in Europe and the United

States—correctly—as exacerbating the Taliban insurgency. This perception,

in turn, intensifies the fear that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won and
 leads corrosively to the widespread discussions about exit from the country.

When complemented by NATO’s poor choice of counterinsurgency strategy in

recent years—a strategy that emphasizes firepower and standoff attacks

against insurgents but that also produces excessive collateral damage—the

popular alienation that results leaves Karzai forsaken at precisely the time

when he is unable to confidently conclude that his Western allies are

committed to winning the war in the right way and staying the course in

Afghanistan.” (Ashley J. Tellis, 2009).

The notion by those that Afghanistan would eventually settle down into a western style

democracy is seriously mistaken, the United States should do the best it can for the country and

then get out. Afghanistan will always continue to be a work in progress as has always been the

case in its checkered history over the past 2500 years.

 References

1. Dahr Jamail, “Afghanistan: Where Empires Go to Die”

2. Ivan Eland, The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws,” Cato

Institute, Policy Analysis, No. 459 (November 26, 2002), 3.

3. Ibid. 3.

4. Frank L. Holt, Into the Land of Bones: Alexander the Great in Afghanistan (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 2005), 18-19.

5. Marvin G. Weinbaum, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: an Ever Dangerous

Neighborhood,” Special Report 162, United Institute of Peace (June 2006), 5.

6. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, New Directions,”

Asia Briefing #89 (March 13, 2009), 1.

7. Marcus Raskin & Devin West, “Collateral Damage: A U.S. Strategy in War,” Paths for

Reconstruction in the 21st Century (October 10, 2008), 24.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Commander’s Initial Assessment: Initial United States Forces-

Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment (August 30, 2009), prepared by Stanley A McChrystal

 General, U.S. Army Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan/International Security

Assistance Force, Afghanistan, 1-4.

9. Raghav Sharma, “India & Afghanistan: Charting the Future,” IPCS Special Report #69,

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (April 2009), 2.

10. Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in

Afghanistan, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), ix.

11. Jean-Paul Faguet, “Building Democracy in Quicksand: Altruism, Empire, and the United

States,” London School of Economics, Development Studies Institute (November 19, 2003),

1 & 2.

12.Ashley J. Tellis, “Reconciling with the Taliban? Towards an Alternative Grand

Strategy in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

(2009), v-vi.

13.Ibid. 7.