G.R. No.

L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C.
CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent
Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his
allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the
Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time
to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of
such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was
due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise
noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was
previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category
being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing
the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow
withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however,
the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that
must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it
should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily
discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even
on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of
work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the
slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar,
who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is
clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964,
was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a

motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such
motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an
urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full
time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6,
1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved
futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion
of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began
with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17,
1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of
Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of
October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the
prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964
(alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in
this case without the express authority of the Commission on
Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two
witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the
government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When
counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on
October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would
be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil
service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated
counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained
postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963,
October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9,
1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4
Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964:
"Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the
continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9,
1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and
that the government witnesses have to come all the way from
Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to
the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of

the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be

served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel
de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than
duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes
in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome
chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that
counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It
makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated
to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then
why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated.
A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7
"There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on
the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his
zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other
pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either
to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him
as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where
respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice
Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and
subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10
Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these
words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say
that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused
as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the
case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional

ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render

effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer
who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a
bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was
only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a
counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be
rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." 13 So it
was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is
even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is
this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar
in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have
sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de

oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his
responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no
such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and
in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as
defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase
doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks
of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them,
when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against
petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC

August 28, 2009

RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID1 TO

EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET
AND OTHER FEES.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No.
24, series of 2008.2 The resolution requested the IBPs National
Committee on Legal Aid3 (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the
payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid
offices in the various IBP chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of 2008
provided:
RESOLUTION NO. 24, SERIES OF 2008

RESOLUTION OF THE IBPMISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR

THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE TO REQUEST THE
COURTS AND OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE
PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER AND PROSECUTORS
OFFICES TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING
FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING
AND LITIGATION OF ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OR
ON APPEAL.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article I of the Guidelines Governing the
Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as
["]Guideline[s] on Legal Aid["]) provides: Legal aid is not a matter of
charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may
often lead to injustice, for which reason, it is a public responsibility of
the Bar. The spirit of public service should therefore unde[r]ly all legal
aid offices. The same should be so administered as to give maximum
possible assistance to indigent and deserving members of the
community in all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may
be necessary to forestall injustice.
WHEREAS, Section 2 of the same provides: In order to attain the
objectives of legal aid, legal aid office should be as close as possible
to those who are in need thereof the masses. Hence, every chapter
of the IBP must establish and operate an adequate legal aid office.
WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter
has long been operational, providing free legal services to numerous
indigent clients, through the chapters members who render volunteer
services in the spirit of public service;
WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the various mediation
centers and prosecutors offices are collecting fees, be they filing,
docket, motion, mediation or other fees in cases, be they original
proceedings or on appeal;
WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified under the same
indigency and merit tests used by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO),
and would have qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other
than indigency, are disqualified from availing of the services of the
PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting
defenses, and other similar causes;

WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically exempt from the payment

of docket and other fees for cases, be they original proceedings or on
appeal, by virtue of the provisions of Section 16D of R.A. 9406 (PAO
Law), without the need for the filing of any petition or motion to
declare them as pauper litigants;
WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any substantive law or
procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid clients the same benefits or
privileges enjoyed by PAO clients with respect to the payment of
docket and other fees before the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and
prosecutors offices;
WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other fees from the IBP Legal
Aid clients poses an additional strain to their next to non-existent
finances;
WHEREAS, the quarterly allowance given by the National Legal Aid
Office to the IBP Misamis Oriental Chapter is insufficient to even
cover the incidental expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much
less answer for the payment of docket and other fees collected by the
courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutors offices and mediation
fees collected by the Philippine Mediation Center;
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of the Board of Officers of the IBP
Misamis Oriental Chapter, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to
move the IBP National Legal Aid Office to make the necessary
requests or representations with the Supreme Court, the Philippine
Mediation Center, the Department of Justice and the National
Prosecution Service and other quasi-judicial agencies to effect the
grant of a like exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other
fees to the IBP Legal Aid clients as that enjoyed by PAO clients,
towards the end that IBP Legal Aid clients be automatically exempted
from the filing of the abovementioned fees;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this Resolution be furnished to
Supreme Court Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno, IBP
National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the IBP Board of Governors,
Secretary of Justice Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, the National Supervisor
of the Philippine Mediation Center, the National Labor Relations
Commission, the Civil Service Commission and other quasi-judicial
bodies and their local offices;

RESOLVED FINALLY to move the IBP Board of Governors and

National Officers to make the necessary representations with the
National Legislature and its members to effect the filing of a bill before
the House of Representatives and the Senate granting exemption to
IBP Legal Aid clients from the payment of docket, filing and or other
fees in cases before the courts, quasi-judicial agencies and
prosecutors offices and the mediation centers.
Done this 23rd day of September 2008, Cagayan De Oro City.
Unanimously approved upon motion severally seconded.4
The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required the
IBP, through the NCLA, to comment thereon.5
In a comment dated December 18, 2008,6 the IBP, through the NCLA,
made the following comments:
(a) Under Section 16-D of RA7 9406, clients of the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) are exempt from the payment of docket and other fees
incidental to the institution of action in court and other quasi-judicial
bodies. On the other hand, clients of legal aid offices in the various
IBP chapters do not enjoy the same exemption. IBPs indigent clients
are advised to litigate as pauper litigants under Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court;
(b) They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to prove
compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., certifications from the barangay and the
Department of Social Welfare and Development. However, not only
does the process involve some expense which indigent clients could
ill-afford, clients also lack knowledge on how to go about the tedious
process of obtaining these documents;
(c) Although the IBP is given an annual legal aid subsidy, the amount
it receives from the government is barely enough to cover various
operating expenses;8
(d) While each IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation (from
the legal aid subsidy),9 said allocation covers neither the incidental
expenses defrayed by legal aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases

nor the payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts,
quasi-judicial bodies and the prosecutors office, as well as mediation
fees and
(e) Considering the aforementioned factors, a directive may be issued
by the Supreme Court granting IBPs indigent clients an exemption
from the payment of docket and other fees similar to that given to
PAO clients under Section 16-D of RA 9406. In this connection, the
Supreme Court previously issued a circular exempting IBP clients
from the payment of transcript of stenographic notes.10
At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its
effort to help improve the administration of justice, particularly, the
access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in
fact echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during the
Forum on Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court last
year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental
Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to "participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts
in law reform and in the administration of justice."11
We now move on to determine the merits of the request.
Access to Justice: Making an Ideal a Reality
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal
in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule
of law. As such, it is guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.12 (emphasis supplied)
The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most
important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of
our society.13 Among others, it has exercised its power to "promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights"14 to open the doors of justice to the underprivileged and to
allow them to step inside the courts to be heard of their plaints. In
particular, indigent litigants are permitted under Section 21, Rule 315
and Section 19, Rule 14116 of the Rules of Court to bring suits in

forma pauperis.
The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to "improve the
administration of justice and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively,"17 assists the Court in providing the
poor access to justice. In particular, it renders free legal aid under the
supervision of the NCLA.
A New Rule, a New Tool for Access to Justice
Under the IBPs Guidelines Governing the Establishment and
Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the IBP (Guidelines
on Legal Aid), the combined "means and merit tests" shall be used to
determine the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid:
ARTICLE VIII TESTS
SEC. 19. Combined tests. The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the
[NCLA], as the case may be, shall pass upon the request for legal aid
by the combined application of the means test and merit test, and the
consideration of other factors adverted to in the following sections.
SEC. 20. Means test. The means test aims at determining whether
the applicant has no visible means of support or his income is
otherwise insufficient to provide the financial resources necessary to
engage competent private counsel owing to the demands for
subsistence of his family, considering the number of his dependents
and the conditions prevailing in the locality.
The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under
the Developmental Legal Aid Program such as Overseas Filipino
Workers, fishermen, farmers, women and children and other
disadvantaged groups.
SEC. 21. Merit test. The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not
the applicants cause of action or his defense is valid and chances of
establishing the same appear reasonable.
SEC. 22. Other factors. The effect of the Legal Aid Service or of the
failure to render the same upon the Rule of Law, the proper
administration of justice, the public interest involved in given cases

and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be considered.

ARTICLE II Definition of Terms

SEC. 23. Private practice. Care shall be taken that the Legal aid is
not availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law, or taken
advantage of by anyone for personal ends.

Section 1. Definition of important terms. For purposes of this Rule

and as used herein, the following terms shall be understood to be how
they are defined under this Section:

SEC. 24. Denial. Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already

receiving adequate assistance from any source other than the
Integrated Bar.

(a) "Developmental legal aid" means the rendition of legal services in

public interest causes involving overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers,
laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and other
disadvantaged groups and marginalized sectors;

The "means and merit tests" appear to be reasonable determinants of

eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP.
Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure that any exemption
from the payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the
NCLA and the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really
further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will guarantee
that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this
end, the following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid
offices in IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling
cases for the said clients:
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the
Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee
on Legal Aid and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the
Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the
Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP)
ARTICLE I Purpose
Section 1. Purpose. This Rule is issued for the purpose of enforcing
the right of free access to courts by the poor guaranteed under
Section 11, Article III of the Constitution. It is intended to increase the
access to justice by the poor by exempting from the payment of legal
fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original
proceeding or on appeal, qualified indigent clients of the NCLA and of
the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters nationwide.

(b) "Disinterested person" refers to the punong barangay having

jurisdiction over the place where an applicant for legal aid or client of
the NCLA or chapter legal aid office resides;
(c) "Falsity" refers to any material misrepresentation of fact or any
fraudulent, deceitful, false, wrong or misleading statement in the
application or affidavits submitted to support it or the affidavit of a
disinterested person required to be submitted annually under this Rule
which may substantially affect the determination of the qualifications
of the applicant or the client under the means and merit tests;
(d) "Legal fees" refers to the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court as a necessary incident of instituting an action in court
either as an original proceeding or on appeal. In particular, it includes
filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional
remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees, stenographers fees (that is
fees for transcript of stenographic notes) and commissioners fees;
(e) "Means test" refers to the set of criteria used to determine whether
the applicant is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family;
(f) "Merit test" refers to the ascertainment of whether the applicants
cause of action or his defense is valid and whether the chances of
establishing the same appear reasonable and
(g) "Representative" refers to the person authorized to file an
application for legal aid in behalf of the applicant when the said
applicant is prevented by a compelling reason from personally filing

his application. As a rule, it refers to the immediate family members of

the applicant. However, it may include any of the applicants relatives
or any person or concerned citizen of sufficient discretion who has
first-hand knowledge of the personal circumstances of the applicant
as well as of the facts of the applicants case.
ARTICLE III Coverage
Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from payment of legal fees.
Persons who shall enjoy the benefit of exemption from the payment
of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original
proceeding or on appeal, granted under this Rule shall be limited only
to clients of the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices.
The said clients shall refer to those indigents qualified to receive free
legal aid service from the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices.
Their qualifications shall be determined based on the tests provided in
this Rule.
Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. The following shall be
disqualified from the coverage of this Rule. Nor may they be accepted
as clients by the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices.
(a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by developmental legal
aid or public interest causes involving juridical entities which are nonstock, non-profit organizations, non-governmental organizations and
peoples organizations whose individual members will pass the means
test provided in this Rule;
(b) Persons who do not pass the means and merit tests;
(c) Parties already represented by a counsel de parte;

Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. The NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices shall not handle the following:
(a) Cases where conflicting interests will be represented by the NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices and
(b) Prosecution of criminal cases in court.
ARTICLE IV Tests of Indigency
Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of the NCLA and
the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters. The NCLA or the chapter
legal aid committee, as the case may be, shall pass upon requests for
legal aid by the combined application of the means and merit tests
and the consideration of other relevant factors provided for in the
following sections.
Section 2. Means test; exception. (a) This test shall be based on the
following criteria: (i) the applicant and that of his immediate family
must have a gross monthly income that does not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee in the place where
the applicant resides and (ii) he does not own real property with a fair
market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than
Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos.
In this connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency
(printed at the back of the application form) stating that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor
own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported
by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
applicants affidavit. The latest income tax return and/or current tax
declaration, if any, shall be attached to the applicants affidavit.

(d) Owners or lessors of residential lands or buildings with respect to

the filing of collection or unlawful detainer suits against their tenants
and

(b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under
the developmental legal aid program such as overseas workers,
fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women,
children and other disadvantaged groups.

(e) Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or chapter legal aid
office previously in a case where the NCLA or chapter legal aid office
withdrew its representation because of a falsity in the application or in
any of the affidavits supporting the said application.

Section 3. Merit test. A case shall be considered meritorious if an

assessment of the law and evidence at hand discloses that the legal
service will be in aid of justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into

consideration the interests of the party and those of society. A case

fails this test if, after consideration of the law and evidence presented
by the applicant, it appears that it is intended merely to harass or
injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.

and/or current tax declaration, if available, and execute an affidavit of

indigency printed at the back of the application form with the
supporting affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of
the applicants affidavit.lawph!l

Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be considered. The effect

of legal aid or of the failure to render the same upon the rule of law,
the proper administration of justice, the public interest involved in a
given case and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be
considered.

After the interview, the applicant shall be informed that he can follow
up the action on his application after five (5) working days.

ARTICLE V Acceptance and Handling of Cases

Section 1. Procedure in accepting cases. The following procedure
shall be observed in the acceptance of cases for purposes of this
Rule:
(a) Filing of application An application shall be made personally by
the applicant, unless there is a compelling reason which prevents him
from doing so, in which case his representative may apply for him. It
shall adhere substantially to the form made for that purpose. It shall
be prepared and signed by the applicant or, in proper cases, his duly
authorized representative in at least three copies.
Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the NCLA or with the
chapter legal aid committee.
The NCLA shall, as much as possible, concentrate on cases of
paramount importance or national impact.
Requests received by the IBP National Office shall be referred by the
NCLA to the proper chapter legal aid committee of the locality where
the cases have to be filed or are pending. The chapter president and
the chairman of the chapters legal aid committee shall be advised of
such referral.
(b) Interview The applicant shall be interviewed by a member of the
chapter legal aid committee or any chapter member authorized by the
chapter legal aid committee to determine the applicants qualifications
based on the means and merit tests and other relevant factors. He
shall also be required to submit copies of his latest income tax returns

(c) Action on the application The chapter legal aid committee shall
pass upon every request for legal aid and submit its recommendation
to the chapter board of officers within three (3) working days after the
interview of the applicant. The basis of the recommendation shall be
stated.
The chapter board of officers shall review and act on the
recommendation of the chapter legal aid committee within two (2)
working days from receipt thereof; Provided, however, that in urgent
matters requiring prompt or immediate action, the chapters executive
director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions may
provisionally act on the application, subject to review by the chapter
legal aid committee and, thereafter, by the chapter board of officers.
The action of the chapter board of officers on the application shall be
final.
(d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted. In the following
cases, the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office, through the chapters
executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions may
accept cases provisionally pending verification of the applicants
indigency and an evaluation of the merit of his case.
(i) Where a warrant for the arrest of the applicant has been issued;
(ii) Where a pleading has to be filed immediately to avoid adverse
effects to the applicant;
(iii) Where an appeal has to be urgently perfected or a petition for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed has to be filed immediately;
and
(iv) Other similar urgent cases.

(e) Assignment of control number Upon approval of the chapter

board of officers of a persons application and the applicant is found to
be qualified for legal assistance, the case shall be assigned a control
number. The numbering shall be consecutive starting from January to
December of every year. The control number shall also indicate the
region and the chapter handling the case.

The chapter legal aid committee and the chapter board of officers
shall take the necessary measures to ensure that cases are welldistributed to chapter members.
Section 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance and handling of
cases. The following policies and guidelines shall be observed in the
acceptance and handling of cases:

Example:
Region18
Chapter
Year
Month
Number
GM Manila 2009 03 099
(f) Issuance of a certification After an application is approved and a
control number duly assigned, the chapter board of officers shall issue
a certification that the person (that is, the successful applicant) is a
client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office. The certification
shall bear the control number of the case and shall state the name of
the client and the nature of the judicial action subject of the legal aid
of the NCLA or the legal aid office of a local IBP chapter.
The certification shall be issued to the successful applicant free of
charge.
Section 2. Assignment of cases. After a case is given a control
number, the chapter board of officers shall refer it back to the chapter
legal aid committee. The chapter legal aid committee shall assign the
case to any chapter member who is willing to handle the case.
In case no chapter member has signified an intention to handle the
case voluntarily, the chapter legal aid committee shall refer the matter
to the chapter board of officers together with the names of at least
three members who, in the chapter legal aid committees discretion,
may competently render legal aid on the matter. The chapter board of
officers shall appoint one chapter member from among the list of
names submitted by the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter
member chosen may not refuse the appointment except on the
ground of conflict of interest or other equally compelling grounds as
provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility,19 in which case
the chapter board of officers shall appoint his replacement from
among the remaining names in the list previously submitted by the
chapter legal aid committee.

(a)
First
come,
first
served

Where
both
the
complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and defendant/ respondent apply for
legal aid and both are qualified, the first to seek assistance shall be
given preference.
(b) Avoidance of conflict of interest Where acceptance of a case will
give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter legal aid
office, the applicant shall be duly informed and advised to seek the
services of a private counsel or another legal aid organization.
Where handling of the case will give rise to a conflict of interest on the
part of the chapter member assigned to the case, the client shall be
duly informed and advised about it. The handling lawyer shall also
inform the chapter legal aid committee so that another chapter
member may be assigned to handle the case. For purposes of
choosing the substitute handling lawyer, the rule in the immediately
preceding section shall be observed.
(c) Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary No member of the
chapter or member of the staff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office
shall directly or indirectly demand or request from an applicant or
client any compensation, gift or present for legal aid services being
applied for or rendered.
(d) Same standard of conduct and equal treatment A chapter
member who is tasked to handle a case accepted by the NCLA or by
the chapter legal aid office shall observe the same standard of
conduct governing his relations with paying clients. He shall treat the
client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and the said
clients case in a manner that is equal and similar to his treatment of a
paying client and his case.
(e) Falsity in the application or in the affidavits Any falsity in the

application or in the affidavit of indigency or in the affidavit of a

disinterested person shall be sufficient cause for the NCLA or chapter
legal aid office to withdraw or terminate the legal aid. For this purpose,
the chapter board of officers shall authorize the handling lawyer to file
the proper manifestation of withdrawal of appearance of the chapter
legal aid office in the case with a motion for the dismissal of the
complaint or action of the erring client. The court, after hearing, shall
approve the withdrawal of appearance and grant the motion, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
Violation of this policy shall disqualify the erring client from availing of
the benefits of this Rule in the future.
(f) Statement in the initiatory pleading To avail of the benefits of the
Rule, the initiatory pleading shall state as an essential preliminary
allegation that (i) the party initiating the action is a client of the NCLA
or of the chapter legal aid office and therefore entitled to exemption
from the payment of legal fees under this Rule and (ii) a certified true
copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article
is attached or annexed to the pleading.
Failure to make the statement shall be a ground for the dismissal of
the action without prejudice to its refiling.
The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or
chapter legal aid office, files an appeal.
(g) Attachment of certification in initiatory pleading A certified true
copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article
shall be attached as an annex to the initiatory pleading.
Failure to attach a certified true copy of the said certification shall be a
ground for the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its refiling.

urgent cases, by the executive director of legal aid or whoever

performs his functions.
Ordinary motions such as motions for extension of time to file a
pleading or for postponement of hearing and manifestations may be
signed by the handling lawyer alone.
(i) Motions for extension of time or for postponement The filing of
motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of
hearing shall be avoided as much as possible as they cause delay to
the case and prolong the proceedings.
(j) Transfer of cases Transfer of cases from one handling lawyer to
another shall be affected only upon approval of the chapter legal aid
committee.
Section 4. Decision to appeal. (a) All appeals must be made on the
request of the client himself. For this purpose, the client shall be made
to fill up a request to appeal.
(b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If the handling lawyer,
in consultation with the chapter legal aid committee, finds that there is
no merit to the appeal, the client should be immediately informed
thereof in writing and the record of the case turned over to him, under
proper receipt. If the client insists on appealing the case, the lawyer
handling the case should perfect the appeal before turning over the
records of the case to him.
Section 5. Protection of private practice. Utmost care shall be taken
to ensure that legal aid is neither availed of to the detriment of the
private practice of law nor taken advantage of by anyone for purely
personal ends.
ARTICLE VI Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of Exemption

The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or
chapter legal aid office, files an appeal.
(h) Signing of pleadings All complaints, petitions, answers, replies,
memoranda and other important pleadings or motions to be filed in
courts shall be signed by the handling lawyer and co-signed by the
chairperson or a member of the chapter legal aid committee, or in

Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. The NCLA or the chapter legal

aid committee may, in justifiable instances as provided in the next
Section, direct the handling lawyer to withdraw representation of a
clients cause upon approval of the IBP Board of Governors (in the
case of the NCLA) or of the chapter board of officers (in the case of
the chapter legal aid committee) and through a proper motion filed in

Court.
Section 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. Withdrawal may be
warranted in the following situations:
(a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted, where it is
subsequently ascertained that the client is not qualified for legal aid;
(b) Where the clients income or resources improve and he no longer
qualifies for continued assistance based on the means test. For this
purpose, on or before January 15 every year, the client shall submit
an affidavit of a disinterested person stating that the client and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income mentioned in Section 2,
Article V, nor own any real property with the fair market value
mentioned in the same Section;
(c) When it is shown or found that the client committed a falsity in the
application or in the affidavits submitted to support the application;
(d) When the client subsequently engages a de parte counsel or is
provided with a de oficio counsel;
(e) When, despite proper advice from the handling lawyer, the client
cannot be refrained from doing things which the lawyer himself ought
not do under the ethics of the legal profession, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, witnesses
and litigants, or the client insists on having control of the trial, theory
of the case, or strategy in procedure which would tend to result in
incalculable harm to the interests of the client;
(f) When, despite notice from the handling lawyer, the client does not
cooperate or coordinate with the handling lawyer to the prejudice of
the proper and effective rendition of legal aid such as when the client
fails to provide documents necessary to support his case or
unreasonably fails to attend hearings when his presence thereat is
required; and
(g) When it becomes apparent that the representation of the clients
cause will result in a representation of conflicting interests, as where
the adverse party had previously engaged the services of the NCLA
or of the chapter legal aid office and the subject matter of the litigation

is directly related to the services previously rendered to the adverse

party.
Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. The court, after hearing, shall allow
the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office to withdraw if it is satisfied
that the ground for such withdrawal exists.
Except when the withdrawal is based on paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of
the immediately preceding Section, the court shall also order the
dismissal of the case. Such dismissal is without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred if the withdrawal is based on
paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding Section.
ARTICLE VII Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 1. Lien on favorable judgment. The amount of the docket
and other lawful fees which the client was exempted from paying shall
be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
In case, attorneys fees have been awarded to the client, the same
shall belong to the NCLA or to the chapter legal aid office that
rendered the legal aid, as the case may be. It shall form part of a
special fund which shall be exclusively used to support the legal aid
program of the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office. In this
connection, the chapter board of officers shall report the receipt of
attorneys fees pursuant to this Section to the NCLA within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof. The NCLA shall, in turn, include the data on
attorneys fees received by IBP chapters pursuant to this Section in its
liquidation report for the annual subsidy for legal aid.1awphi1
Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. The NCLA shall prepare
the standard forms to be used in connection with this Rule. In
particular, the NCLA shall prepare the following standard forms: the
application form, the affidavit of indigency, the supporting affidavit of a
disinterested person, the affidavit of a disinterested person required to
be submitted annually under Section 2(b), Article VI, the certification
issued by the NCLA or the chapter board of officers under Section
1(f), Article V and the request to appeal.
The said forms, except the certification, shall be in Filipino. Within

sixty (60) days from receipt of the forms from the NCLA, the chapter
legal aid offices shall make translations of the said forms in the
dominant dialect used in their respective localities.
Section 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in forma pauperis.
Nothing in this Rule shall be considered to preclude those persons not
covered either by this Rule or by the exemption from the payment of
legal fees granted to clients of the Public Attorneys Office under
Section 16-D of RA 9406 to litigate in forma pauperis under Section
21, Rule 3 and Section 19 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.
Legal aid service rendered by a lawyer under this Rule either as a
handling lawyer or as an interviewer of applicants under Section 1(b),
Article IV hereof shall be credited for purposes of compliance with the
Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.
The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shall issue the
certificate similar to that issued by the Clerk of Court in Section 5(b) of
the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.
ARTICLE VIII Effectivity
Section 1. Effectivity. This Rule shall become effective after fifteen
days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid
Service and the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, shall form
a solid base of rules upon which the right of access to courts by the
poor shall be implemented. With these rules, we equip the poor with
the tools to effectively, efficiently and easily enforce their rights in the
judicial system.
A Final Word
Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The
remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily
accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.

The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to

the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service
rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters
nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance.
Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP
chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the
payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint
or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section
11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is
increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major
roadblock.
WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the
access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental
Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other
fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters is
GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal
Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA)
and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned the docket
number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is
hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a newspaper of
general circulation within five days from the promulgation of this
resolution.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly
issue a circular to inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of
this resolution.
SO ORDERED.

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent. Attorney-General Jaranilla and
Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member
of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last
general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public CANDIDATE FOR
THIRD MEMBER Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for
the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew
lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit.
As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long
overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to
him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is
willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in
Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have
my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board
of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in
Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public.
Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise
my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot
see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always
find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any
work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and
affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that
some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the
Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to
exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not
the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your
barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they
may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my
capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality
have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection
with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the
work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
Yours respectfully,

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public.

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the

approaching date for our induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or
recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your
barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in
Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation
as you may desire.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the

applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.
In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal
section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof
the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of

Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in

1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and
28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being
a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers
in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the
lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower
the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH
AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to
bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship
or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not
only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed
litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or
those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or
reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing
of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or
prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may
succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in
influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to
the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having
knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner

immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be

disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and
quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one
of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was
disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been
provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind
statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession
and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment
by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
(State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People
vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly
practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to
strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted
facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in
defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining
duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken.
The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of
the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests
that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action
should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases
of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one.
The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances
working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that
he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar
mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit
the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood
that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have

influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance

and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future
convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court
is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended
from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month
from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Johnson, J.,
reserves his vote.
A.C. No. 6672

September 4, 2009

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTAN

Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Back

Tel: 362-7820
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Cel.: (0926) 270171

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES

TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious
collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5
of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to
sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondents" calling card:6
Front

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS
SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY,
ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT
CLAIMS ABROAD.
1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing
the printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
report and recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached

on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and

other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition
would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use
only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is
a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their
talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability
to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer,
he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled
is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labianos "referrals." Furthermore, he never
denied Labianos connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an
unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot
escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple

professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only
exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind
so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client
in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation
of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction
recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character
and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labianos calling card contained the phrase "with financial
assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing
and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating
Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE
and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA,
JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.,
respondents.

practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or
associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm

name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the
highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo).
This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p.
115.)

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for

respondents.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law

under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.

AQUINO, J.:

G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980

verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47,
Puerto Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES,
respondents.
RESOLUTION

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres,

using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names
of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares
of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
REGALADO, J.:
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any
liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is
your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago,
Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar,

Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing

Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a
reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law,
respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for
reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration dated April 26, 1995.
For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be
deduced, separate copies of the basic motion were furnished the
Chief Justice, Judicial and Bar Council, Solicitor General, Bar
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator and

his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and Ombudsman. Copies of the

supplemental motion were also furnished by him to the same officials
or entities and, additionally, to the individual members of this Court.
In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division
of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin,
specified that the only issue to be resolved in this case was whether
or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the
motion to quash the aforementioned criminal case. We quote the
pertinent portions of his ponencia not only for easy reference but to
serve as a basis for determining whether the sanctions imposed were
commensurate to the administrative offense, to wit:
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is
quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275
aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could
not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI.
Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite
P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of
the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent
judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D.
No. 1. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of
the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the
validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D.
No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law
powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by
Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs.
Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the former
President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal,
binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts
of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former
President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to
implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2
has been expressly or impliedly revoked or repealed, both continue to
have the force and effect of law (Rollo, pp. 7-8).

xxx xxx xxx

But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable
neglect to check the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief
that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a particular
case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the
advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that
courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the land
(Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are
presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments
and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the
bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in
the performance of his duties is subject to censure. But where, as in
the present case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it
not for the public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of
his duties, it is but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and
his order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For,
respondent judge's error is not a simple error in judgment but one
amounting to gross ignorance of the law which could easily undermine
the public's perception of the court's competence.
We could stop here, since the rehashed arguments raised by
respondent judge in his aforesaid original and supplemental motions
are completely refuted by the foregoing discussion demonstrative not
only of his adjudicatory error but also of judicial incompetence. In fact,
just to cite a few representative cases, it may be worthwhile for
respondent judge to ponder upon the Court's observations in
Aducayan vs. Flores, etc., et al., 1 Ajeno vs. Inserto, 2 Libarios vs.
Dabalos, 3 and Estoya, et al. vs. Singson, etc., 4 which would put his
asseverations at rest.
Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his
other supplications, arguments, and even his insinuations for that
matter, which although born more of fecundity in formulation and less
of bases in law, we have decided to anatomize even with some
expense of prolixity.
Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance

that "(t)he only purpose of (h)is motion is to plead with bended knees
and with all humility for the kind reconsideration" of the decision in this
case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly ignorant of the law
and as such, (he) was reprimanded and fined in the amount of
P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid decision is to be spread on (his)
personal records." 5
He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates
that the error primarily stemmed from the shortcomings of the public
prosecutor and, on a personal note, he expresses this concern: ". . . I
am again begging with humility that the spreading of the aforesaid
Decision on my personal records be reconsidered because doing so
will foreclose any chance for me to aspire for promotion in the
judiciary in the future. This is very painful. I will agonize up to my last
day and my last breath in life." 6
The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid
matters into consideration and is not insensitive thereto, including his
argumentum ad misericordiam. It feels, however, that there is more
than ample substantiation for the findings of the ponente in the main
case, and compelling legal warrant for the administrative penalties
imposed which are even milder than those meted by it under similar
and comparable situations.
The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent
is an official procedure and requirement which, incredibly, respondent
judge would want this very Court to violate and forego, in suppression
of facts which must appear in official documents. His further argument
that
The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only
open criticisms on my private qualifications as a minister in the temple
of justice but will open more comments on my official acts,
competence and credibility as a judge that might undermine the
people's faith in the judicial system in the Province of Palawan, in
Puerto Princesa City and in the entire country because it is always
difficult to disassociate my private credential from that of my public
qualifications. 7
is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic.
The Court regrets that respondent judge appears unaware that he is
actually the recipient of uncommon sympathetic consideration in this

case.
Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrian
chant to a public career, judicial or otherwise. It is for respondent
judge, by subsequently demonstrating his true worth through
observance of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a
misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and to rise to
higher levels which is the destiny of the deserving. Besides, it is a
curious fact that assuming as valid his meticulosity on the confidential
nature of disciplinary cases, he nevertheless sent copies of his
motions to all the persons enumerated at the start of this resolution. It
is elementary that copies of such motions are merely filed with the
court and furnished only to the adverse party. Here, he wants us to
keep sub rosa what he himself publicizes.
From his initial exhibition of humility and penitential pose, respondent
judge then goes into a critical second gear by rhetorically wondering
aloud in this fashion:
On July 27, 1994, the Third Division of the Honorable Supreme Court
required me to comment on the above-entitled petition. On August 23,
1994 I filed my comment thereto and on October 24, 1994, in a
Resolution the Third Division of the Supreme Court resolved to note
my Comment. When the Third Division of the Honorable Court
required me to comment in G.R. No. 116049, the supposition is that a
valid raffle of said case to that Division had already been made. That
was my thinking and impression for, why would the case go to that
Division except thru a valid raffle. I am now in quandary, however, as
to why all of a sudden, G.R. No. 116049 was transferred to the
Second Division of the Supreme Court without us or any party being
informed by the Honorable Supreme Court about it. In our level at the
Regional Trial Court in Palawan, we observe the raffle of cases with
solemnity and abide by the result of the raffle faithfully. And the said
Second Division meted me out excessive penalties when it was the
Third Division that required me to comment. Why did this happen?
(Emphasis supplied.) 8
Since this was obviously spoken with the ascriptive courage of the
uninformed, we assure His Honor that the Supreme Court also
conducts "a valid raffle," observes such raffle of its cases "with
solemnity," and abides by the result thereof "faithfully." This case was
validly and solemnly raffled to Mr. Justice Bidin who was then with the

Third Division of the Court. On January 23, 1995, he was transferred

to the Second Division where he served as working chairman until his
retirement on April 7, 1995. In accordance with the internal rules of
the Court, this case remained with him as the original ponente and he
accordingly penned the decision therein for and as a member of the
Second Division. There is no rule in the Court that the parties be
informed that a case has been transferred to another division, as
respondent judge would want or expect. To do so would easily be
revelatory of the identity of the ponente which is precisely what some
litigants used to, and still, watch for and speculate upon.
In anticipation of a similar insinuendo, respondent judge is further
informed that because of the retirement of Mr. Justice Bidin and the
uncertainty of the date when his replacement could act upon his
unfinished cases and the subsequent proceedings therein, after its
summer session and working recess the Court en banc, after due
deliberation on respondent judge's successive motions, decided to
assign the preparation of this resolution to the present writer thereof,
he having been and still is with the Second Division. Respondent
judge, with his claim of extensive magisterial experience, should have
verified all the foregoing facts from the records of this Court, instead
of proceeding upon speculations.
Finally, shifting to what he obviously fancies to be high gear on a
constitutional basis, respondent judge questions the competence of
the Second Division of this Court to administratively discipline him.
Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a constitutional
issue as to require the referral of this case, or at least the disciplinary
aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter
merely involves a clarification of the misconception of respondent
judge thereon, presumably because of his unfamiliarity with circulars
adopted and followed by this Court, some of them being on internal
procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court are
aware of the submissions of respondent judge on this point through
the copies of the motions which he furnished them, and he insistently
harps on constitutional grounds therein, the Court en banc resolved to
accept this aspect of the case from the Second Division.
His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of
the present Constitution which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took

part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."
This provision is an expansion of and was taken from the second
sentence of Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution which
provided: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members,
order their dismissal."
Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the
adverbial phrase "en banc" in referring to this Court in the quoted
provision of the 1987 Constitution and, from this, he argues that it is
only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively
punish him.
Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a member of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
had the opportunity to take up that precise matter with the committee
chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointing out
the equivalent provision in the 1973 Constitution, hereinbefore quoted,
which merely referred to the "Court," without qualification. It was
accordingly explained and agreed that insofar as the power to
discipline is concerned, the qualification was not intended to make a
difference, as a reference to the Court by itself necessarily means the
Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en banc" there because
all internal procedural and administrative matters, as well as
ceremonial functions, are always decided by or conducted in the
Court en banc. On the other hand, where the reference is to the Court
acting through its divisions, it would necessarily be so specified. For
lack of transcription of the proceedings of the committees of said
Commission, the writer has perforce to rely on his recollection and
notes, but he assures this Court of the foregoing facts as they
transpired.
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII
clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein.
The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of
the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not
therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an
absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated

therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma,
declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein."
Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated
upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary
power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc
resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the Matter
of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court
Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either
the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year
or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxx xxx xxx
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23,
1993, but the aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate
in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions,
imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue
delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in
administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would
subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a
systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or
matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, 9 and the
very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of
three, five, or seven members. 10

judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the

Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious
evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is
only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more
than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative
matter may be decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the
Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred
in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a
decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII,
1987 Constitution).
That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases
assigned to a division thereof rests on the same rationale and applies
with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable
for said respondent to hereafter deal with situations like the one
subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.
WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for
reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar are hereby
DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3944

July 27, 2007

LEA P. PAYOD, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMEO P. METILA,

Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of

Lea P. Payod (Lea) charges Atty. Romeo P. Metila (respondent) with

"willful neglect and gross misconduct" in connection with this Courts
dismissal of her petition in G.R. No. 102764, "Lea P. Payod v. Court of
Appeals," by Resolution dated February 3, 1992, reading:
Acting on the pleadings filed in this case, the Court resolved: to
DENY: (a) petitioners second motion for extension of time to file
petition for review on certiorari, as petitioners first motion for
extension was denied in the resolution of December 16, 1991 for
failure to comply with the requirement of No. two (2) of Revised
Circular 1-88. Moreover, the said second motion for extension still
fails to comply with the same requirement of Revised Circular 1-88,
and (b) the petition itself, for having been filed late and for failure to
comply with requirement No. four (4) of Revised Circular 1-88, and for
failure to submit the certification required under Circular 28-91 on
forum shopping.1
Petitioner submits that:
It is difficult to believe that practicing lawyers cannot submit very
important documents considered regular pieces of information in their
practice of law leading to default with serious consequences
prejudicial to the client if the said counsel is not ill motivated or not
due to gross misconduct and willful negligence inimical to the best
interest of the client.
Together with my mother Mrs. Restituta Pelio and my sister Mrs.
Portia P. Velasco, I have found difficulty making follow-up with Atty.
Romeo P. Metila for him to comply with the submission of required
documents to the Supreme Court because of his unreasonable
excuses for non-performance despite our persistent follow-ups,
payments of expenses and attorneys fees, and willingness to supply
him with materials and needed facts. More often, we got lame
excuse[s] and had his no-shows in appointed meetings at the
Supreme Court.2
Respondent denies the charges and gives his side of the case as
follows:
The case was referred to him by Leas mother on November 29, 1991,
six days before the period to perfect an appeal to this Court expired,
without supplying him with any document bearing on the case other

than the Court of Appeals resolution denying Leas motion for

reconsideration.3
He thus told Leas mother that he would only file a motion to stay the
running of the prescriptive period of appeal and advised her to look for
another lawyer who could assist her in getting the complete certified
records of the case from the Court of Appeals and in filing a petition
for review with this Court.
Neither Lea nor her mother communicated with him, however, until
January 21, 1992, forcing him to finance and defray all the expenses
for the initiation of the appeal.
He concludes there was no attorney-client relationship between him
and Lea, there being no Special Power of Attorney authorizing her
mother to hire him as a lawyer in her behalf.4
After investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar Discipline, to which the complaint was referred,
found respondent guilty of simple negligence and recommended that
he be seriously admonished and required to undergo three units of
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in Remedial law for his failure
to update himself with the developments in the legal profession and
for the cavalier manner by which he denied the existence of an
attorney-client relationship when one in fact existed.5
The IBP Board of Directors adopted the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be seriously
admonished.
This Court upholds the finding and recommendation of the IBP.
In failing to comply with the requirements in initiating complainants
appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 102764 even after his attention to
it was called by this Court, respondent fell short of the standards
required in the Canon of Professional Responsibility for a lawyer to
"keep abreast of legal developments"6 and "serve his client with
competence and diligence."7
That Leas mother did not have a Special Power of Attorney to hire
respondent on Leas behalf is immaterial, given that he actually

initiated the appeal, albeit unsuccessfully.

It need not be underlined that a lawyer who accepts a case must give
it his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence,8 and his
negligence in connection therewith renders him liable.9
The circumstances attendant to respondents initial handle of Leas
case do not warrant a finding of gross negligence, or sheer absence
of real effort on his part to defend her cause.10 1avvphi1
Respondent accepted Leas case upon her mothers insistence, with
only six days for him to file a petition for review before this Court, and
without her furnishing him with complete records, not to mention
money, for the reproduction of the needed documents. Despite these
constraints, respondent exerted efforts, albeit lacking in care, to
defend his clients cause by filing two motions for extension of time to
file petition. And he in fact filed the petition within the time he
requested,11 thus complying with the guideline of this Court that
lawyers should at least file their pleadings within the extended period
requested should their motions for extension of time to file a pleading
be unacted upon.12
Neither do the circumstances warrant a finding that respondent was
motivated by ill-will. In the absence of proof to the contrary, a lawyer
enjoys a presumption of good faith in his favor.13
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Romeo Metila, is SERIOUSLY
ADMONISHED with WARNING that similar charges will be severely
dealt with.
SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE
C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case
which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for

V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against
Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V &
G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges
the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without
sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the
registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the
eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer
certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some
pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested
therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in
connection with pending official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent
Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment
(in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the
lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve
or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with
assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of
real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the
transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent

Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending

compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between
them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round
trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money
per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house
and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V

& Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he

would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the
latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a
round trip plane ticket for him.

Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.

Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on
the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.

The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of

P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to
plane fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements.
Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant
wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all
pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24)
hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the
transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground
that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as
to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes
moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period
of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same
set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during
the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied
registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the
Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority
[LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the
NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable.

Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the

NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm.
Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.

In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of

extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for
himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator
Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney
Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties
submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping
the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He
opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated
requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
time on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort
some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party,
absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official,
extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for
himself in connection with pending official transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988,
recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez that the
respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be
reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for
registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found

respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that
ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the
respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents
presented to him for registration and, notwithstanding representations
by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents,
he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied
the registration of the documents involved; that he himself elevated
the question on the registrability of the said documents to
Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration
thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the
registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such
resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still
refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties
interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to
in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the
respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the money
sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that
his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00
earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of
P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample
opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter
dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did
so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office
cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should have
motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and
regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the
discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)

Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino

that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave
credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment
in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the
Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the
respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in
the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16,
1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent
register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court
for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath
as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment
or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983
Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is
designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby
becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and
efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is
subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the
only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what
as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place.
From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected
those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public

service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of
society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the
quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790;
emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6).
Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and
papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them
from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars
them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course
of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their
office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or
interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent,
honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega
vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the
highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator
vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron
committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to
practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G.
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C.
Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines,

and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

SO ORDERED.