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Pacano also claims to have also recognized appellants Leon Lumilan and
Antonio Garcia who joined Orbiso inside the house. They were purportedly
after a certain Ben Estrada who was the barangay captain of Gayong-Gayong
Sur, Ilagan, Isabela.5
Prosecution eyewitness Benito Alonzo corroborated the eyewitness account of
Simeon Pacano on the shooting incident. Benito Alonzo recalled that they
were drinking at the house of Policarpio Palomo when successive gunshots
were fired by three persons outside the fence of Palomos house. He identified
appellants Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia as two of the alleged assailants.6
Both Lumilan and Garcia interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant Garcia
testified that he was in the company of Atty. Benjamin Olalia who stood as
sponsor in the wedding of the daughter of a certain Hilario Lagua in GayongGayong Sur, Ilagan, Isabela. They had late lunch at the house of Hilario
Lagua and stayed there until 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. Thereafter, Garcia
and Atty. Olalia returned to the latters house in Osmenia, Ilagan, Isabela,
together with Martin Lagua, Juan Lorenzo, Felix Aguda, Romeo Callo, Rodrigo
Junio, a driver, and two other individuals. They spent the rest of the day at the
house of Atty. Olalia who corroborated Garcias testimony.7 On the other hand,
appellant Lumilan testified that he was in Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela the whole
day of October 12, 1987.8
After an assessment of the evidence, the trial court declared that no proof
beyond reasonable doubt was adduced by the prosecution to justify the
conviction of appellants for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in
Murder. However, the trial court convicted the appellants for Murder,
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder as it ruled that:
"x x x The eyewitness account of Simeon Pacano which was
corroborated by Benito Alonzo can not be discounted. Both
testified in a straitforward and candid manner, leaving no doubt as
to their veracity.
"x x x
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It cannot be said that murder or homicide necessarily includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal
possession of firearms used in murder or homicide. To state otherwise is to contradict Tac-an and its
progeny of cases where We categorically ruled out the application of double jeopardy in the simultaneous
prosecution for murder or homicide and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or
homicide against same accused involving the same fatal act.
Sec. 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may not be convicted of an
offense other than that with which he is charged in the Information, unless such other offense was both
established by evidence and is included in the offense charged in the Information. Since murder or
homicide neither includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal possession of firearms used in
murder or homicide, the trial court may not validly convict an accused for the former crime under an
Information charging the latter offense. Conversely, an accused charged in the Information with homicide
or murder may not be convicted of qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, for
the latter is not included in the former. As We have amplified in Quijada:
"The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866 is to respect
and to preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm
where such firearm is used in killing a person. Its clear language yields no intention of
the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide
or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished.
Indeed, the words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion
that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised
Penal Code, is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in
illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person.
The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first
paragraph of Section 1reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetuato
death, seemingly because of the accuseds manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of
law in using an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to absolve
the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with
death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider
such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have
been the intention of the lawmaker because the term penalty in the subject provision is
obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for
homicide or murder. x x x
xxx
Evidently, the majority did not x x x create two offenses by dividing a single offense
into two. Neither did it resort to the unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original
offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by using a
component crime which is also an element of the former. The majority has always
maintained that the killing of a person with the use of an illegally possessed
firearm gives rise to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form."25
Since Quijada, however, many changes have been introduced to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866 by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 829426 . Said section now reads:
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Where an accused uses an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be
charged with what used to be the two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under P.D. No. 1866. As
amended by R.A. No. 8294, P.D. No. 1866 now mandates that the accused will be prosecuted only for the
crime of homicide or murder with the fact of illegal possession of firearms being relegated to a mere
special aggravating circumstance. To obviate any doubt, R.A. No. 8294 expressly restricts the filing of an
information for illegal possession of firearms to cases where no other crime is committed. Thus, illegal
possession of firearms may now be said to have taken a dual personality: in its simple form, it is an
offense in itself, but when any killing attends it, illegal possession of firearms is reduced to a mere
aggravating circumstance that must be alleged in the information in order to be appreciated in the
determination of the criminal liability of the accused.
Now We observe that the Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms
Used in Murder, violates Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which obliterated the
now obsolete concept of qualified illegal possession of firearms or illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form, i.e., where the penalty for illegal possession is increased to reclusion perpetua or death
by the attendance of homicide or murder. In fact, qualified illegal possession of firearms, which used to be
a distinct offense, no longer exists in our statute books.
We come to the conclusion, thus, that whether considered in the light of our ruling in Tac-an and its
progeny of cases or in the context of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866, the
Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, is defective,
and their conviction for Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder, is irregular.
The decisive question, however, is: do such defect in the Information and the irregular conviction of
appellants, invalidate the criminal proceedings had in the trial court?
No. Appellants waived their right to quash the Information, and they effectively defended themselves
against the charges for murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder.
The Information in the instant case reads:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FRED ORBISO, LEON LUMILAN and
ANTONIO GARCIA of the crime of QUALIFIED ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
USED IN MURDER, in violaiton of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of October 1987, in the municipality of
Ilagan, Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being authorized or allowed by
the law to keep, possess and carry firearms, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and under their
control and custody, firearms without first having obtained the necessary
permit and/or license to possess the same, and that on the occasion of
such possession, the herein accused with treachery did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill suddenly and
unexpectedly and without giving them a chance to defend themselves,
fired [sic] at and shoot Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, and Eliong de
la Cruz inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which directly caused their
deaths; and further inflicting on the same occasion gunshot wounds upon
Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and
Simeon Pacano which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the
said Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and
Simeon Pacano, thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder with respect to the last named
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In the instant case, appellants did not file any motion to quash the Information. More significantly, the bulk
of the evidence that they presented during the trial was intended to disprove their complicity in the
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder of the victims. Appellants were undeniably defending
themselves, not so much with the charge of qualified illegal possession in mind, as it was common
knowledge even in the beginning of the trial that no weapon was retrieved from the crime scene and it
was evident that the prosecution was never going to present any weapon in evidence against them, but
with the full awareness that they were as well and more vigorously being prosecuted for murder,
frustrated murder and attempted murder.
As such, appellants cannot pretend that the Information did not fully apprise them of the charges against
them as to cause them surprise in the event of conviction. The appellation of the crime charged as
determined by the provincial fiscal may not exactly correspond to the actual crimes constituted by the
criminal acts described in the Information to have been committed by the accused, but what controls is
the description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the provincial
fiscal31 . Since appellants defended themselves not only against the offense of Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms Used in Murder as specified in the Information, but also, and more seriously
against the crimes of Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder as described in the body of the
Information, it cannot be said that their conviction for the latter crimes is infirm and invalid.
This now leads us to the main business of every criminal appeal: the determination of the liability of
appellants for the crimes they have been convicted of.
The appeal is meritorious. Appellants must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The trial court found appellants guilty of three (3) counts of murder, two (2) counts of frustrated murder,
and three (3) counts of attempted murder on the strength of the direct testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses Simeon Pacano and Benito Alonzo.
Simeon Pacano testified, thus:
"Q And while you and the persons you mentioned were drinking, do you recall if there
was anything unusual which happened?
A There was, sir. That was the time when I heard a gun report.
Q And from what direction did the gun report emanate?
A Outside the fence, sir. On the road outside the fence or road leading to Salindingan.
x
xx
Q And do you know what happened to youand your companions when as you stated you
heard firings?
A I know, sir, because my companionsdied during that incident.
Q Who of your companions died?
A Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, andEliong dela Cruz. Three of them, sir.
Q About you, did you suffer anyinjuries or not?
A Yes, sir.
Q What part of your body was hit?
A My left leg, sir. (Witness pointedto his left leg which was already amputated).
Q Besides you and three others whosenames you mentioned as having died, do you
know if any of your other companionssuffered any injury or inmjuries?
A Romeo Pacho was injured, sir.Francisco Macugay and the two brothers of Policarpio
Palomo, Mario Palomo andOly Estrada.
xxx
Q And while you were in that positionas you have stated face downwrd on the ground, do
you know what laterhappened?
A When I was in that position, sir,face downward, I heard no gun reports and that was the
time that one of thegunmen went to the place where we were and that was the time that I
was able torecognize him.
Q What did that gunman whom yourecognized do, if he did anything?
A He turned us around, sir, to see ifwe were already dead.
Q And can you tell the Court who isthe person you recognized?
A Fred Orbiso.
Q Will you look into the personsinside the courtroom who are seated there in the benches
and tell the Court ifthat Fred Orbiso is here in Court or not?
A He is not in Court.
Q And after you recognized Fred Orbisoas you stated, what else happened?
A What I heard, sir, that othercompanion of the gunman said that they are looking for Boy
Estrada.
xxx
Q And you said that persons enteredincluding the person you earlier recognized. Did you
come to know how manypersons entered?
A I remember, sir.
Q How many of them?
A Three (3), sir.
Q Now, you recognized one of them asFred Orbiso. About the other persons, were you
able to recognize them ornot?
A I also recognized them, sir.
Q Can you tell the Court the name orthe persons whom you recognized other than Fred
Orbiso?
A Manong Tony Garcia. (Witness pointedto a man seated at the third row of the benches
of the Court, and when asked, hegave his name as Antonio Garcia).
Q About the third person?
A The man seated beside AntonioGarcia, sir.
Q What is his name?
A That I know is Leon Lumilan.(Witness pointed to a man seated beside Antonio Garcia,
and when asked, he gavehis name as Leon Lumilan." 32
And Benito Alonzo corroborated him in this wise:
"Q What was that unusual incident thathappened?
A While we were drinking inside thehoudse, we heard gun reports firing at the door of the
house of Poling.
xxx
Q You stated that while you wereinside the house of Poling Policarpio you heard gun
reports. Are you in apsition to tell the Court from what direction did these gun reports
come oremanate?
A It is possible, sir.
Q Where did the firing emanate ororiginate?
A Coming from the gate of the fence ofMang Poling and the other firings took place on
the fence because there werethree(3) persons who fired.
Q How did you come to know that therewere three (3) persons who fired?
A I can see the flame of the firingscoming from the firearms going toward us.
Q Are you in a position to tell theCourt if you were able to identify these three (3)
persons?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please name the persons?
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Second, the incident occurred so fast and he was admittedlyvery afraid. He pretended to be dead by
closing his eyes and holding his breath,avoiding any sign of life, so to speak, to avoid detection by the
assailantswhen they entered the premises and inspected the bodies for survivors. 39
Third, after the shooting incident, Pacano was treated in theIsabela Provincial Hospital for six (6) days
after which he was transferred tothe National Orthopedic Hospital in Manila. Upon his discharge on
December 8,1987, he returned to Ilagan, Isabela and since then stayed in the house ofBonifacio Uy who
was the OIC Mayor of Ilagan, Isabela. On March 2I, 1988, morethan five (5) months after the incident,
Pacano executed his sworn statement40before the Ilagan, Isabela police authoritiesimplicating appellants
and Fred Orbiso.41It is true that initialreluctance to volunteer information regarding the crime due to fear of
reprisalis common enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a
witnesscredibility.42However, Pacano can not really claim to beafraid for his life inasmuch as he was under
the custody of then OIC MayorBonifacio Uy after the shooting incident. During the political rally
ofBonifacio Uy on January 16, 1988 in Centro Ilagan, Isabela, Pacano evendelivered a speech implicating
Fred Orbiso, Leon Lumilan, Antonio Garcia, JuanLorenzo and Martin Lagua, who were identified with the
camp of Uys opponents asthe authors of the shooting incident on October 12, 1987. 43
We also can not subscribe reliability to the testimony ofprosecution eyewitness Benito Lorenzo. First, he
claims to have recognizedappellants and Fred Orbiso with the help of the light of the flames coming outof
their respective firearms when they were firing them.44This is patently unbelievable, considering thathe
was drinking liquor inside the house of Policarpio Palomo when the shootingoccurred. It was already 7:00
oclock in the evening and the only light therecame from inside the house, not outside.
Second, Benito Alonzo went to the police authorities on October13, 1987 to give his sworn statement
regarding the shooting incident the daybefore. In said sworn statement 45, Alonzo categorically
admittedthat he did not see the assailants. However, he suspected Atty. Benjamin Olalia,whom he
allegedly had a misunderstanding over the latters cow, and his men asperpetrators of the crime
considering that they were the only persons who wentto their barangay in Gayong-Gayong Sur on
October 12, 1987 armed with longfirearms. He stated that he saw Atty. Olalia together with other
personsincluding appellants Lumilan and Garcia at the house of Hilario Lagua at about4:00 oclock of the
same date attending the wedding of Laguas son. Upon seeingappellant Lumilan and two others whom he
did not know carrying armalite rifles,he left the place and proceeded to the house of Policarpio Palomo.
This isolatedcircumstance is certainly not sufficient to hold appellants liable for theshooting incident.
In the light of all the foregoing, this Court is constrained toacquit the appellants on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The constitutionalpresumption of innocence in favor of the appellants was not overturned by theevidence adduced by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 16 of theRegional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela in Criminal Case
No. 995 is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia, are
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herebyACQUITTED on the ground that their alleged guilt was not proven beyondreasonable doubt.
Costsdeofficio.
SO ORDERED.
relnship between appellant and his victim- the victim is the daughter of appellants
common-law sp by the latters previous relnship w/ another man, is a qualifying
circumstance that has not been properly alleged in the given info. It is a qualifying
aggravating circumstance, as per Sec 11 of RA 7659, which cannot be proved unless
alleged w/c was a technical flaw committed by the prosecution w/c the Court cannot
ignore. It constrains the Court to reduce the penalty of death imposed by RTC to
reclusion perpetua.
?
Decision affirmed with modification.
EN BANC
Before the Court for automatic review is the judgment handed down in this case by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, on December 16, 1996 finding
accused-appellant Esteban Victor y Penis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and sentencing him to suffer supreme penalty of death, as well as to pay the
corresponding civil liability to the victim. i[1]
Appellant was charged with rape in complaint dated August 8, 1996, which
somewhat faultily but sufficiently alleges:
That sometime in June 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by
means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously undress said Raquel Villanueva, a minor, 15 years of age, stepdaughter,
and put himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.ii[2]
At this arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.iii[3] Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded and, as already stated, a
condemnatory decision was eventually rendered therein, with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Esteban Victor
y Penis, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined in and
penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is ordered to indemnify Raquel
Villanueva (in) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.iv[4]
2. Na, noong mga alas 10:00 ng umaga petsa 06 ng Agosto 1996, mayroon
dinadala na dalawang mga dalagita na magkapatid na ang mga pangalan nila ay
MARILYN VILLANUEVA, 13 taon gulang, at RAQUEL VILLANUEVA, 15 taong gulang,
pawang mga nakatira sa Urban Poor, Phase 4, Payatas, Quezon City at ito ay dinala
nila SPO4 AURORA VILLANUEVA, ng Station 6, Central Police District Command na
isang personnel ng Womens Desk sa nasabing station.
3. Na ayon sa policewoman na nagdala sa mga bata doon sa aming opisina,
iyong bata ay pinagsamantalahan daw ng kanilang amain (stepfather) o ni rape sila
kaya sila ay lumayas sa kanilang bahay.
4. Na, dahil dito iyong nasabing mga bata ng aming tanungin kong ano ang totoo
nangyari sa kanila, sinabi sa amin nang dalawang magkapatid na sila daw ay hinalay
ng stepfather nila na ang pangalan ay ESTEBAN VICTOR at sila ay paulit-ulit daw
hinihipuan sa kanilang maselang bahagi ng katawan, kong wala iyong kanilang Nanay
sa loob ng bahay nila (Emphasis ours).xiv[14]
Appellant also desperately claims that Raquel was being coached by someone in
court when she was under cross-examination. That ascription is completely without
bases. It was drawn solely from the fact that the defense counsel made this
manifestation during the trial: "may I Make a manifestation that the witness is talking
with somebody here in this Courtroom and is gazing (at) somebody." xv[15] As pointed out
by the Solicitor genera, That "somebody" whom Raquel was gazing at could have been
appellant himself, as manifested by the public prosecutor on the same occasion. xvi[16]
Of crucial importance in a rape case, especially when the life of an accused may be
held forfeit, is the determination of the credibility both of the victim herself and her
version as to how the crime charged was committed. For these, we must perforce
repose almost total reliance on the finding and conclusions of the trial court.
Additionally, we have jurisprudential guidelines distilled from judicial experience as
touchstones for our own evaluation of the evidence which, ex debito justitiae, we
analyze.
The finding of trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given
the clear advantage of a trial judge over an appellate magistrate in the appreciation of
testimonial evidence. In this connection, it is well entrenched that the trial court is in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth. xvii[17]
The emphasis, gesture and inflection of the voice are potent aids in understanding
the testimony of witnesses. The trial court has the opportunity and is presumed to take
advantage of these aids in weighing the testimony of the witnesses. But as they cannot
be incorporated into the record, this Court has no assistance in the examination of the
testimony and must, therefore, rely upon the good judgment of the lower court. xviii[18]
Thus, in the absence of any showing that the trail court's calibration of credibility was
flawed, we are bound by its assessment. xix[19]
Furthermore, it is a reputable precept that testimonies of rape victims who are
young or of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity
was abused deserves full credit. xx[20] Courts usually lend credence to the testimony of
young girl especially where the facts point to her having been a victim of sexual assault.
For sure, the victim would not make public the offense, undergo the trouble and
humiliation of a public trail and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she
had not in fact been raped, for no decent Filipina would publicly admit she had been
raped unless it was the truth. As a rule, a victim of rape will not come out in the open if
her motives were not to obtain justice. xxi[21] The willingness of the complainant to face
police investigators and to submit to physical examination is a mute but eloquent
testimony of the truth of her complaint. xxii[22]
With the foregoing teachings in mind, and in the context of the evidence of record,
we are satisfied that the court a quo prudently and conscientiously discharged its duties
as a trier of fact and an arbiter of law. We quote its pertinent findings with excerpts from
the victim's testimony, which vividly illustrate that the mode of her presentation and the
substance thereof justify our acceptance of the conclusion and verdict of the trial court,
to wit:
Culled from the evidence and after a judicious and cursory examination of the
evidence especially the testimony of Raquel, the Court firmly believes that the incident
complained of as narrated by Raquel actually took place during the month of June
1996. The Court keenly observed the demeanor of Raquel while testifying and she
testified in a straightforward and forthright manner, bereft of any artificialities that
would impair her credibility. The spontaneous and categorical testimony of Raquel can
easily be deduced from the portion of her testimony as follows:
"PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q
Yes, sir.
If said person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
Long time ago because he and his three-year old son were living in our place at Phase
IV, Urban 2, Payatas, Quezon City, sir.
Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court why he and his son were living in your house?
xxx
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q
Are you aware if your mother and the accused were legally married?
Sometime in the month of June 1996, do you remember where you were at daytime?
Yes, sir. We were three in the house at that time, Esteban Victor and his son Jobet
w(ere) playing outside the room when Esteban Victor entered my room.
He held both my legs and spread them and went on top of me, sir.
And as he inserted his private organ into your private organ, what happened next, if
any?
I was trying to resist by pushing him away from me but I was not able to do so, sir.
While he inserting his private organ into your private organ, what did you feel, if any?
When the accused successfully entered (sic) his private organ into your private organ,
what movement did he do, if any?
(The witness answered by placing her right hand of top of her left hand upwards and
downwards.)
While the accused was on top of you, and inserted his private organ into your private
organ making an upward and downward movement, what else was he doing?
Madam Witness, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court how long a time in terms
of minutes or hours was the accused on top of you?
Although he claimed otherwise, the lower court found that appellant was not legally
married to complainant's mother and, strictly speaking, is not really the victim's
stepfather. However, this does not, in principle, completely divest him of some degree of
moral ascendancy over her. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the element of force
or intimidation is nonetheless duly established and supplied by appellant's use of a
deadly bladed weapon to threaten, coerce and compel submission to his satyric desires
by the hapless complainant.
Along the same vein, the trial court justified the death sentence pursuant to the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, which now further provides:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
xxx
xxx
xxx
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the
offended party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained
in People vs. Gementiza.xxx[30] that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil
liability ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing
judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual
or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages
thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue
unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The
Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect
should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of
rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the present amended law,xxxi[31] the indemnity for the victim
shall be in the increased amount of less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to
the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time,
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity.
From all the foregoing considerations, therefore, and the People having established
the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction and the penalty imposed
must be sustained. Four members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act
No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; but they
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority of the Court that the law is constitutional
and the death penalty should be imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. Q-96-67321
imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant Esteban Victor y Penis is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount awarded to the offended party should
be increased to P75,000.00 and considered as actual, and not moral, damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
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