Unconscious, Conscious, and

3
Metaconscious in Social Cognition
Piotr Winkielman and Jonathan W. Schooler

Introduction

S
ocial cognition explains the mechanisms of social behavior using concepts
and methods shared with related fields of cognitive psychology and cogni-
tive science as well as new fields such as cognitive, social, and affective
neuroscience. This approach led to remarkable progress in understanding social
perception, memory, reasoning, emotion, and judgment and offered insights into
real-world social issues, such as optimal decision making, stereotyping, and cul-
Mention specific tural differences (see other chapters). We consider the role of consciousness in
chapters.
a variety of social cognition phenomena. We ask what people are conscious of,
and not conscious of, during perception, memory, emotion, and decision making
and how this matters for social interaction. We review several findings, but more
important, we offer a fresh theoretical perspective on consciousness that differs
from currently dominant views in social cognition. Our perspective is informed by
recent developments in cognitive psychology, particularly in the area of metacog-
nition, and draws on new discoveries in neurosciences.
We start with a few historical remarks, mostly to highlight that, over the years,
psychology oscillated from viewing consciousness as indispensable to claiming it is
unnecessary. We then discuss how to define consciousness and its possible func-
tions and mechanisms. This gives us an opportunity to comment on some cur-
rent debates in social cognition, including the automaticity of purposive behavior
and sophistication of unconscious perception, thinking, and decision making. We
then make a distinction critical for the remainder of our chapter among levels
of awareness and review research on dissociations among mental events that are
unconscious, conscious, and meta-aware. Reflecting the book’s aims, throughout

49
50 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

we discuss mechanisms of consciousness across different levels of explanation and

include phenomena from different stages of social cognition, including perception,
representation, memory, judgments, and decisions.

History
Reflecting its philosophical roots, early scientific psychology was fascinated with
consciousness. In fact, one major goal was to accurately characterize conscious con-
tents, which would establish a catalogue of basic mental elements that resembles
in precision the Mendeleyev periodic table (Boring, 1953). The method of intro-
spection assumed that critical elements of mental life (thoughts, feelings, volitions)
are in principle consciously accessible. They might initially escape explicit atten-
tion, but with proper training of focus and reporting, researchers can capture most
essential mental elements and discover lawful relations between them. An impor-
tant assumption was that psychology should be fundamentally interested in “men-
tal” events (i.e., content-bearing, intentional states) but not so much in nonmental
events (e.g., associative chains, reflexes, physiological processes, etc.). Still, even
the early psychologists admitted some role for unconscious processes. For exam-
ple, Helmholtz famously proposed that vision is mediated by unconscious infer-
ences, whereas James debated the role of habits and the subconscious (Kihlstrom,
2007). Behaviorism, and the ambition to make psychology “objective” and equal
to other natural sciences, brought a disfavor for introspection and mentalistic con-
cepts like consciousness. Along with this came the belief that behavior is ultimately
under the control of the environment, and that somehow providing mechanistic
explanations of behavior would make concepts like “consciousness” or “volition”
superfluous (Kihlstrom, in press). The situation started to change in the mid-1970s
when cognitive psychologists revived the “black box” and began to tackle issues
like controlled and automatic processing (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), attentional
selection (Kahneman, 1973; Posner & Snyder, 1975), and unconscious perception
(Marcel, 1983). Although few dared to speak its name, there was a growing rec-
ognition that consciousness might be “respectable, useful, and probably necessary Page number of
quotation.
” (Mandler, 1975). Soon, the legitimacy of the topic was fully reestablished and
Page number of now “everyone who is conscious, is studying consciousness” (Churchland, 2005).
quotation?
Psychological journals routinely carry articles on consciousness, as do general jour-
nals such as Science and Nature, and there are journal outlets (e.g., Consciousness
and Cognition) and serious annual conferences (Association for Scientific Study
of Consciousness) exclusively dedicated to this topic. The enthusiasm is not only
limited to psychology. The codiscoverer of DNA, Francis Crick, left genetics for
neuroscience and declared consciousness the greatest puzzle of contemporary sci-
ence. Subsequently, he even called the possibility of a biological account of con-
sciousness The Astonishing Hypothesis (Crick, 1994). Indeed, some of the most Correct to change to
1994 (per references
interesting recent discoveries in neuroscience come from consciousness research- and publication date
ers (Edelman, 1989; Singer, 2000; Tononi, 2004). There is also exciting work in for the title)?
computer science on mechanistic, but not eliminative, explanations of conscious-
ness and choice (e.g., Cleeremans, 2005; Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2007). And,
philosophers try to bewitch the reader or outwit each other with book titles such
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 51

as Mystery of Consciousness, Consciousness Reconsidered, Reclaimed, and even

Explained (Zeeman, 2002).
It is encouraging that social cognition researchers have always been in the
game, even proving some of the early impetus toward revival of interest in con-
sciousness. Thus, an influential study showed that stimulus value can be enhanced
via unconscious mere exposure (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). Another pioneer-
ing study showed that people’s conscious beliefs about the causes of their own
behavior can be at odds with actual causes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Since then,
there have been many influential studies of unconscious influences on social per-
ception, affect, reasoning, judgment, and behavior. Ironically, much of the social
cognition work on consciousness has always been aimed at showing its limits, if not
unimportance (Bargh, 1989). This emphasis continues (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren,
2006; Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002), even as other disciplines progressively focus
on understanding consciousness itself. Along with it comes fascination of social
cognition with all things “implicit”—perception, learning, attitudes, self-esteem,
self-concepts, stereotypes, partisanship, goals, and so on (Greenwald et al., 2002).1
However, there have also been attempts to explore the limits of the unconscious
mind (Baumeister, in press; Greenwald, 1992).

Definition and Distinctions

But, what is consciousness? The term itself is quite slippery. The Concise Oxford
English Dictionary lists two major meanings: (1) the state of being conscious and
Which one? (2) one’s awareness or perception of something. However, Webster’s dictionary lists
as many as five different definitions, and books on consciousness devote pages elu-
cidating different meanings (e.g., Zeeman, 2002). Thus, it is useful to highlight dif-
ferent senses in which the term appears in psychological literature. This will also
allow us to briefly comment on some debates in social cognition.

Conscious as “Awake and Mindful”

The word conscious can refer to a global state of an individual. One use of this word
is similar to “awake” or “vigilant” as opposed to “asleep” or “comatose.” The sleepy-
vigilant dimension is typically investigated by neurologists, although some interest-
ing social cognition studies showed that anesthetized patients form implicit, but not
explicit, memory for events during the surgery (Kihlstrom, Schacter, Cork, Hurt,
& Behr, 1990). Perhaps, a more relevant meaning of conscious as a description of
a global state refers to a “mindful” as opposed to a “robot-like” dimension. In that
sense, being conscious is the ability to have subjective experiences, wishes, desires,
and complex thoughts and to perform flexible, self-initiated, purposeful behav-
iors. For example, patients in a pervasive vegetative state (PVS) maintain regular Should this be
“persistent”?
sleep-wake cycles, respond to simple simulation (e.g., withdraw their hand from
sharp objects), yet are not considered conscious and possessing of “personhood”
because of their inability to make choices, process complex information, show flex-
ible behavior, and initiate purposive actions (Laureys et al., 2002).2 It is actually
useful to contrast the above medical and legal view that consciousness is essential
52 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

for personhood with the social cognition view that often minimizes the role of
consciousness in complex thought, choice, and purposive behavior. Despite some
radical “anticonsciousness” declarations (for samples, see Kihlstrom, in press), we
actually doubt that social cognition researchers seriously believe that there is little
distinction between people and robots and would readily concede that only some
goals or decisions are unconscious, and that only sometimes a sense of voluntary
control is illusory. We return to this issue in this chapter.

Conscious as “Subjectively Experienced”

The second major meaning of the word conscious is in reference to the subjective
status of a particular mental content (perception, thought, or feeling). Being con-
scious means being represented in subjective experience and, as a result, poten-
tially available to report and to use in intentional control of behavior. It is in that
sense that psychologists are interested in whether there are unconscious percep-
tions, memories, goals, attitudes, or emotions (Bargh, 1989; Greenwald, 1992;
Winkielman & Berridge, 2004).
The interest in what makes certain mental content conscious and what makes
it available for report and control binds together the research on consciousness
with research on meta-cognition, for which the central effort is to uncover the
relation between people’s mental states and their beliefs about those mental states
(Koriat, 2006). The meta-cognitive perspective, which guides much of our review
in this chapter, highlights that mental content can stand in one of three relations
to consciousness. First, mental content can be genuinely unconscious. One clas-
sic example comes from research on so-called blind-sight patients with damaged
primary visual cortex (area V1 of the striate cortex) but intact subcortical visual
pathways. These patients can discriminate simple visual information (e.g., loca-
tion or shape) and use it in their motor pointing behavior without being able to
verbally report on that discrimination (Weiskrantz, 1986). In that case, the mental
representation (e.g., “x is a square”) is genuinely unconscious—the patient truly
does not know that he or she “knows” what shape was presented. Second, men-
tal content could be “experientially conscious,” existing in the ongoing experience
without being reflected on. For example, preverbal infants are typically assumed
to have conscious experiences (e.g., recognize and be happy to see their mother;
feel pain, hunger, and pleasure) but limited meta-awareness. A less-speculative
example comes from classic experiments on iconic memory, which showed that
people are temporarily aware of a much larger amount of information presented in
a visual matrix than they can spontaneously report (Sperling, 1960). Third, mental
content can be “meta-conscious” (or “meta-aware”) and be explicitly represented
as a content of one’s own consciousness (Schooler, 2001, 2002; Schooler, Ariely, &
Loewenstein, 2003; Schooler & Schreiber, 2004). It is this type of consciousness
that is typically assessed when an experimenter asks participants questions like,
“How happy do you feel now? “Did you notice any briefly presented words?” or,
“Did you pursue goal X in your behavior?”
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 53

Functions of Consciousness
A central assumption in social cognition is that mental information is represented
on several levels. Accordingly, much research attention focuses on understand-
ing how these different levels, or perhaps systems, relate to each other (Strack &
Deutsch, 2004; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). So, what distinguishes unconscious,
conscious, and metaconscious representation? This question touches on a more
general problem of the purpose of consciousness—a problem that received a vari-
ety of functional and mechanistic answers in the psychological literature. In gen-
eral, researchers have emphasized the idea that consciousness is associated with (a)
special access to mental content and (b) special functions that can be performed
on this content.

Conscious Access
Several theories posit that consciousness is a representational system characterized
by special access to mental content. One useful framework is the global workspace
theory, which proposes that consciousness functions to allow communication,
transparency, and coordination between the many isolated, parallel subprocesses
in the human mind (Baars, 1988). Consciousness constitutes a global workspace
in which various local processes can “broadcast” their outcomes and talk to each
other in a common “language” (more like a language of thought, rather than actual
language). As a result, the previously independent and isolated local processes
can coordinate, sequence, and structure their actions, thus helping the organism
achieving its goals. For example, by representing tactile, visual, and auditory pro-
cesses in a common matrix, global workspace allows novel cross-modal and cross-
temporal connections (e.g., “The sequence of musical notes I just heard has the
same order as the sequence of colored lights I saw before.”). It also presumably
helps us understand expressions such as “blue mood,” “bitter cold,” “sharp cheese,”
or “loud tie” (Ramachandran, 2004).3 But, more important, this “global accessibil-
ity” of conscious representations makes them available for verbal report and for
high-level processes such as conscious judgments, reasoning, and the planning and
guiding of action.
But, what gives representations conscious or “global” access? Cognitive
researchers often emphasize the role of “strength” (Cleeremans, 2005). The notion
of strength captures the idea that representations require a certain stability and
quality before they can enter working memory, where they can be actively main-
tained, and become accessible for potential report. One determinant of strength
is activation, which in turn is determined by many factors, such as stimulus energy
(longer presented items are more likely conscious than briefly presented items);
familiarity (all things equal, more familiar items become conscious easier then less-
familiar items); recency (more recent items are more likely to be conscious than
older items); and so forth. Representational strength is also influenced by focused
attention—a perceptual amplifier and selector of events (conscious and noncon-
scious) that fall into its scope. Thus, an objectively very weak stimulus can reach
consciousness if it receives attentional processing, and there is little perceptual
54 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

competition (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006). Interestingly, recent research shows,

somewhat paradoxically, that focused conscious attention may be necessary for
some unconscious processes (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). For example, subliminal
priming is enhanced by attentional cuing of location (Sumner, Tsai, Yu, & Nachev,
2006), and limbic responses are stronger if brief affective stimuli fall in the scope
of focused attention (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). These
observations may explain why so many successful subliminal priming paradigms in
social cognition require that the subject is paying attention to a specific area on the
screen (even if the prime remains invisible). It may also explain why many social
cognitive studies on unconscious processes use “unobtrusive” rather than sublimi-
nal priming. In those studies, participants are exposed to stimuli in a definitely con-
scious, attended, and prolonged fashion (e.g., as a part of a sentence-unscrambling
task or a crossword puzzle), with the “unconscious” element the relevance of the
task to subsequent judgment or the importance of a particular stimulus dimension.
In short, focused attention might be a precondition for many unconscious effects.
Another factor that modulates whether mental content is conscious has to
do with anatomical and functional disconnection. Thus, a visual representation
in previously mentioned blind-sight patients can be strong (it can drive pointing
behavior) but remains unconscious because it is restricted to lower visual pathways
(Weiskrantz, 1986). Similarly, habits (e.g., biking) may involve representations that
are very robust, but unconscious, because they are only instantiated in the motor
system (Cleeremans, 2005). A functional disconnection may occur when input
is incoherent with the currently processed information. For example, a distinct,
prolonged, unusual, and dynamic event (e.g., a gorilla slowly walking through a
room of people passing balls to each other) can remain unconscious, even when
participants “look” at the scene (Simons & Chabris, 1999). One explanation of this
“blindness” is that the event is incompatible with the current mental model (i.e.,
generalized schema) of the situation or participants’ current perceptual goals.
Finally, there is some exciting neuroscientific research on the mechanisms of
conscious access. Some evidence suggests that consciousness represents a form of
multiregional activation that is perhaps integrated by oscillatory activity (Singer,
2000; Tononi, 2004). For example, conscious perception of a stimulus is associ-
ated with a synchronous activation of higher associative cortices, particularly pari-
etal, prefrontal, and anterior cingulate areas, whereas unconscious perception is
associated only with a local activation (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, &
Sergent, 2006). Consistent with these ideas, clinical work has shown that the pre-
viously mentioned patients in a PVS (awake but unconscious) show only localized,
modality-specific responses to stimuli, whereas patients in a minimally conscious
state show coherent responses across multiple sensory and associative systems
(Laureys et al., 2002).

Conscious Thinking
Some argue that consciousness enables higher-order, meaning-based, truth-value-
preserving processing of information (Block, 1995; Searle, 1997). In contrast,
the unconscious is restricted to a simpler, associative type of processing. This
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 55

distinction resembles, although does not completely overlap, with “dual-process”

theories in social cognition. For example, Strack and Deutsch (2004) suggested
that social cognition is carried out by two systems: a reflective system that relies
on knowledge about facts and values and an impulsive system based on associative
links and motivational orientations. The differential information base on which
the two systems rely determines the types of responses they engender. The reflec-
tive system, drawing on propositions about the world, leads to responses based on
rational considerations. In contrast, the impulsive system, drawing on associations
and impulses, leads to nonreasoned actions.
Does processing of meaning require consciousness? This question is a sub-
ject of long debate, which touches on tricky issues of the relation between seman-
tic cognition and associationism (McClelland & Rogers, 2003). It is now widely
accepted that subliminally presented pictures and words can activate related
semantic and affective categories (Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Marcel,
1983). Even subliminally presented single digits can activate magnitude informa-
tion (Dehaene et al., 2006). Thus, there is no doubt that complex content can be
unconsciously activated across meaning dimension. However, the evidence for
unconscious semantic processing, rather than automatic activation, is sparse. For
example, unconscious priming responds to partial- rather than whole-word infor-
mation, is not sensitive to basic operations like negations (“not,” “un-,” or “dis-”),
and cannot process two-digit numbers (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000). One could
wonder if these limitations arise because subliminal presentations afford very weak
stimulus input. However, similar results hold when the input is conscious, and only
conscious processing capacity is reduced. Thus, processing relational information
such as negation (“no disease”) or causality (“smoke causes fire”) requires conscious
capacity, whereas processing information about association does not (Deutsch,
Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). In a colorful demonstra-
tion of this point, DeWall and Baumeister (under review) presented participants
with a standard set of Graduate Record Examination (GRE) analytical problems
and asked them solve them under typical conditions or under cognitive load. Not
surprisingly, loaded participants did much worse.
More generally, these findings highlight the difference between the position
that many complex mental processes can be made to run automatically from the
position that these processes do not require consciousness (i.e., never required it).
To use an example, most adults can do the basic multiplication table automatically
via associative recall (2 times 2 is 4). However, no one believes that the uncon-
scious actually does multiplication. It simply means that highly trained operations
become automatic over time and can eventually be performed by “dumb” associa-
Is 1988 correct as tive retrieval (Logan, 1988; Rickard, 2005; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).4
provided? If not,
provide 1998 refer- The image of the “dumb unconscious” (Loftus & Klinger, 1992) has recently
ence and mention
1988 reference
been challenged by claims of “unconscious thinking” (Dijksterjhuis, Bos, Nordgren,
in text. & van Baaren, 2006). For example, in one study, participants were quickly (although
consciously) presented with a set of 12 positive and negative attributes each about
four different cars (i.e., 48 attributes total, with one car having 75% positive attri-
butes, two having 50% positive attributes, and one having 25% positive attributes).
One group of participants (termed “conscious thinkers”) made their decision after
56 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

4 min of deliberation and another group (termed “unconscious thinkers”) after 4

min of engaging in a distracting anagram-solving task. Interestingly, the uncon-
scious thinkers group was most likely to choose the “good” car, with the conscious
group remaining at chance. For the authors, these results showed that unconscious
thinking not only facilitates decisions but also might be better than conscious
thinking. However, other interpretations are possible. First, it is not clear why dis-
traction by anagrams eliminates conscious thought rather than simply reduces its
amount. If so, perhaps the advantages of distraction occur because they help to
prevent overthinking and encourage a reliance on more effective simple heuristics.
In fact, when the best solution to the problem is simply to count the number of pos-
itive attributes, engaging in deeper processing that focuses on the attribute mean-
ing might lead to suboptimal decision making (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
Accordingly, the benefits of unconscious thought may only apply to so-called lin-
ear integration problems, in which the attribute content either does not matter or
can be consciously translated into attribute weights before unconscious “thought.”
Also, note that it is strange that giving people 4 min to think consciously about a
simple choice produces only a chance response—after all, it is not that complicated
to figure out that a car with 12 (75%) positive attributes is better than a car with 4
(25%) positive attributes. This suggests that the problem encountered by conscious
thinkers may simply lie in confusion about the original attributes, perhaps because
recall is susceptible to primacy or recency effects and interference by the inter-
mediate task (Shanks, 2006). In short, while recent evidence does suggest some
limitations to extensive deliberation, the degree to which this research implicates
truly intelligent unconscious processing remains to be determined.

Conscious Control
Consciousness is associated not only with special access to mental content but also
with special operations that can be performed on this content. Several of these
operations fall under the umbrella name “control,” thus linking consciousness to
what cognitive scientists call “executive functions” (Norman & Shallice, 1986).5
One aspect of control is selection. Thus, conscious content can be preferentially
attended to and maintained in working memory or discarded if not needed.
Another aspect of control is intentionality. Action can be deliberately started and
stopped or can be delayed until appropriate conditions appear. Scheduling con-
flicts can be resolved, and new hierarchies can be established. Finally, with control
comes flexibility. Thus, mental content can be used in adaptive, nonroutine ways,
and old response chains can be broken and rearranged. This simple point was
recently elegantly demonstrated in a study in which participants had to come up
with novel titles, musical improvisations, or interesting drawings. Not surprisingly,
participants under cognitive load produced repetitive, inflexible, and uninspiring
works (Baumeister, Schmeichel, DeWall, & Vohs, under review).
One interesting aspect of conscious control is its restricted capacity. Thus,
only few elements can be manipulated at a time; operations must be performed
in a serial, rather than parallel fashion; and there are severe bottlenecks (Pashler,
1998). In fact, it is hard to be overwhelmed by the power of the unconscious
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 57

given how many accidents are caused by people attempting to multitask (e.g.,
talking on the cell phone while driving; Levy, Pashler, & Boer, 2006), not to men-
tion various social and physical disasters caused under the influence of various
consciousness-impairing substances. Conscious operations also require effort
and so are metabolically costly. As an illustration of this point, a recent series of
studies has shown that manipulating an individual’s blood glucose level affects
mental control in basic tasks like the Stroop task, thought suppression, emotion
regulation, attention control, or more social tasks like coping or helping (Gaillot
et al., 2007). This is, of course, not terribly surprising given that measures of neu-
ronal functioning, such as positron emission tomographic (PET) scanning, work
by measuring glucose consumption in the brain, which is enhanced in mentally
challenging tasks (Ward, 2006).
Of course, not all forms of control are conscious. The world is filled with
mechanical devices, not only thermostats, that automatically check for a condi-
Provide 1992 tion of a subordinate process and adjust its operation (Shinskey, 1992). The human
reference. Or should
this be 1979, as body has many systems of complex control loops (e.g., homeostatic temperature
provided?
and blood sugar mechanisms). Further, several “mental” processes automatically
adjust their operation based on contextual conditions (Carver & Scheier, 1990).
Thus, people unconsciously regulate eye movements to facilitate text processing
(Reichle, Pollatsek, Fisher, & Rayner, 1998) and unconsciously adjust hand move-
ments to capture the desired object (Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe, & Sullivan, 2003).
Finally, people are typically unaware of several aspects of control required for
coherent speaking and writing.
In the domain of social cognition, there are many proposals that individuals
engage in all kinds of automatic control (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). One case is
the pursuit of “unconscious goals.” The evidence for this comes from studies in
which individuals primed subliminally or unobtrusively with goal-related words
(e.g., “cooperate,” “achieve,” “memorize”) show corresponding adjustment in their
behavior (e.g., show more helpful behavior, solve more problems, or remember
more details). Further, they appear to be sensitive to conditions under which the
goal is appropriate and track success at goal pursuit. These findings are interest-
ing, but note that control explored in these studies is very different from control in
research on executive functions. First, the unconscious goal paradigms rely on an
unobtrusive activation of preformulated, standard goals, rather than formulation
of novel goals. Second, those goals do not require participants to overcome a stron-
ger alternative behavior (e.g., go against prepotent tendency), but operate when
behavioral choices are already predetermined (participants can either cooperate or
compete, with the likelihood of either action relatively equal). Third, the outcomes
are fairly unimportant and do not require participants to reflect on the meaning
or consequences of their actions. Accordingly, we suspect that many effects attrib-
uted to unconscious goals simply reflect influence of primes on interpretation of
a vague experimental situation, including giving participants an idea of what and
how much they are supposed to do (see Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007, for
discussion).6 Finally, while unconscious goal activation clearly operates under some
conditions, unconscious goals have yet to be shown to possess anything approach-
ing the potency or flexibility of conscious goals.7
58 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

Indeed, in addition to offering a skewed perspective of the role of conscious-

ness in mediating behaviors, the present trend toward attributing the bulk of
human action to unconscious mechanisms may potentially have undesirable effects
on people’s self-regulatory ability. A study (Vohs & Schooler, 2008) exposed some
participants to an excerpt from Francis Crick’s The Astonishing Hypothesis that
articulates the view that conscious control is an epiphenomenon, that is, that people
lack any meaningful sort of free will. Compared to controls, participants exposed
to the message that conscious control is illusory behaved more immorally on a pas-
sive cheating task. Moreover, their increased cheating was mediated by decreased
belief in free will. In a second experiment, exposure to deterministic statements
led participants to overpay themselves on a cognitive test relative to participants
who were exposed to statements endorsing free will. Of course, such findings do
not speak to the actual efficacy of conscious control. Nevertheless, they do raise
concerns about the impact that a scientific dismissal of conscious control might
have on the population at large and thus further highlight the importance of not
overstating the degree to which science has shown consciousness to be impotent
(Shariff, Schooler, & Vohs, in press). Order of names
correct as in refer-
ences? Update here
and in references.
Metaconscious Monitoring
As we discussed, some forms of control might be automatized and unconscious,
but others clearly involve consciousness. In fact, one form of control may require
explicitly articulating the content of the conscious state to bring it into metacon-
sciousness. A good example is mind wandering (or “zoning out”) during reading.
Although we hope that readers have managed to keep their minds on our chapter
as they have been reading it, we suspect that all readers have had the experience
of suddenly realizing that, despite their best intentions and the fact that their eyes
have continued to move across the page, they had no idea what they had been
reading. Mind wandering suggests that the tacit monitoring systems failed to catch
the mind’s drifting and instead require a higher-level explicit monitoring process
to take stock of the specific contents of thought and alert one to the fact that they
have wandered off task. Schooler and colleagues have used the mind-wandering
phenomenon to examine the function of meta-awareness in a domain in which
mind wandering is antithetical to success (see Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, for a
review). Specifically, Schooler, Reichle, and Halpern (2005) developed a paradigm
to identify temporal lapses of meta-awareness during the attentionally demanding
task of reading. In this research, participants read passages of text and indicated
every time they caught their minds zoning out. They were then asked whether
they had been aware that they had been zoning out prior to reporting it. In a
second condition, participants were also probed intermittently and asked to indi-
cate whether they had been zoning out at that moment. The results revealed that
participants (a) frequently caught themselves zoning out during reading, (b) were
still often caught zoning out by the probes, and (c) frequently reported that they
had been unaware that they had been zoning out, particularly when they were
caught by the probes. These findings demonstrate that individuals frequently lack
meta-awareness of drifting off task, even when they are in a study in which they
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 59

are specifically instructed to be vigilant for such lapses. In sum, explicit monitor-
ing level (metaconsciousness) acts in effect like the pilot of an airplane. Although
the autopilot system can handle mild adjustments due to normal shifts in wind and
other conditions, when anything major occurs, the pilot is still needed to handle
the situation. This second level of regulation has many more resources available
to it, but because it draws on conscious processing, it is resource demanding and,
as argued in this chapter, can even interfere with carrying out concurrent tasks.
Thus, it is important to activate it only when needed as often the most effective
performance may occur when individuals can smoothly operate without having to
deliberately reflect on what they are doing.

Dissociations Between Levels of Awareness

The discussion so far suggests that at any given moment individuals’ behavior
reflects a variety of influences. There is the unconscious information, including var-
ious tacit monitoring processes that make routine adjustments. There is also infor-
mation in their stream of consciousness (experiential consciousness). Periodically,
however, the mind encounters situations that require more resource-dependent
conscious monitoring process. In effect, it occurs anytime one explicitly attempts
to answer the question, “What am I thinking or feeling?” Given that this answer
represents a description of one’s state, rather than the state itself, it offers individu-
als the opportunity to step out of the situation, which may be critical for many of
the innovative behaviors of which individuals are capable. However, it also raises
the possibility that in the re-description process individuals might get it wrong.
More specifically, there are three kinds of dissociations between levels of mental
representation. There are access dissociations, in which a mental state occurs and
has influence on behavior but is never directly accessed by consciousness. There
are also two additional dissociations that follow from the claim that metaconscious-
ness involves the intermittent rerepresentation of the contents of consciousness
(Schooler, 2002). Temporal dissociations occur when metaconsciousness tempo-
rarily fails to take stock of the current contents of thought (e.g., failing to notice
that one is mind wandering during reading). Translation dissociations occur if the
meta-representation process misrepresents the original experience. Such dissocia-
tions are particularly likely when one verbally reflects on nonverbal experiences or
attempts to take stock of ambiguous experiences. Several interesting social cogni-
tive phenomena illustrate these different dissociations.

Access Dissociations
An interesting dissociation occurs when a person is an affective state (as dem-
onstrated by its impact on behavior, physiology, and cognition) without having
Should this be conscious access to that state (see Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005, for
2005a or 2005b?
comprehensive discussion). This idea of “unconscious affect” may seem initially
strange, but note that, evolutionarily speaking, conscious representation of affect
is a late achievement compared with the ability to respond affectively to relevant
stimuli, which is presented in animals as simple as fish and reptiles. Accordingly,
60 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

the basic affective neurocircuitry is contained in the subcortical brain and can
operate even in the absence of cortex (Berridge, 2003). However, evolutionary
and neuroscientific considerations can only be suggestive of unconscious affect
in typical humans. Accordingly, Winkielman et al. (2005) have tested this pro- Should this be
2005a or 2005b?
posal in psychological studies aimed at dissociating the impact of simple affective
stimuli on behavior from their impact on conscious feelings. For example, in one
study participants were subliminally presented with a series of happy, neutral, or
angry emotional facial expressions. Immediately after the subliminal affect induc-
tion, participants rated their conscious feelings and poured and consumed a novel
drink. The results showed that the ratings of conscious feelings were unaffected by
affective faces, even though the faces influenced consumption behavior, especially
when participants were thirsty. Importantly, participants in those studies had no
access to their affective reaction even when attending on-line to their feelings or
even when they were told these feelings could bias their judgment (Winkielman,
Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997). Similarly, Förster (2003) found that manipulations of
basic affective tendencies, via arm flexion versus arm extension, influence food
intake without influencing conscious experience of moods. In sum, all these find-
ings suggest that one can obtain genuine “access dissociation” between an underly-
ing affective process and its conscious awareness.8

Temporal Dissociations
Sometimes, mental content is consciously experienced without being explicitly
appraised in metaconsciousness. Temporal dissociations are illustrated by cases in
which the induction of metaconsciousness causes one to assess aspects of experi-
ence that had previously eluded explicit appraisal. Several phenomena represent
such dissociations.

Well-Being Appraisals  We often fail to explicitly notice our own emotional

states (e.g., sullenness, cheerfulness) until someone points them out to us. If we
commonly lack metaconsciousness of affective states, then it follows that induc-
ing continuous metaconsciousness of affect may alter that experience. Schooler
et al. (2003) explored this issue by asking participants to report on-line happiness
while listening to hedonically ambiguous music (Stravinsky). The results showed
that continuous hedonic monitoring reduced individuals’ postmusic ratings of hap-
piness relative to a condition in which participants listened to music without moni-
toring. The fact that hedonic monitoring altered participants’ experience suggests
that by default individuals are, at most, only intermittently metaconscious of their
affective state.

Automaticity  Automatic behaviors are often assumed to be unconscious

(Bargh, 1997; Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997; Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002).
However, there is a peculiarity to this designation. Consider a person driving auto-
matically while engaging in some secondary task (e.g., talking). Although such
driving is compromised, one still experiences the road at some level. Thus, a more
appropriate characterization of the consciousness of automatic behaviors may be
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 61

that they are experienced but lack metaconsciousness, the latter only taking hold
when individuals run into difficulty.

Unwanted Thoughts  Wegner (1994) suggested that individuals possess an

implicit monitoring system that tracks unwanted thoughts (e.g., of a white bear) in
order to veer away from them. But, what exactly is this system monitoring? Wegner
suggests that it is monitoring the contents of preconsciousness (i.e., thoughts that
are near, but below, the threshold of consciousness). However, another, and per-
haps more intuitive possibility, is that system actually monitors the contents of con-
sciousness itself. That is, perhaps individuals can consciously think about a white
bear without explicitly realizing that they are doing so. In this case, the monitoring
system can catch the unwanted thought and raise it to the level of meta-aware-
ness, in effect saying: “There you go again, thinking about that unwanted thought.”
Recent evidence for this account comes from a study in which participants were
asked to try not to think about a previous romantic relationship while reading or
while simply sitting quietly (Fishman, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2006). As in stan-
dard unwanted thought paradigms, participants were asked to self-report every
time they noticed an unwanted thought coming to mind. In addition, however, they
were periodically randomly asked whether at that particular moment they were
having the unwanted thought. The results revealed that participants frequently
experienced “unnoticed unwanted thoughts” about their previous relationship that
they experienced but failed to notice until they were probed. Further, these unno-
ticed unwanted thoughts were detrimental to participants’ performance on a test
of the reading material, suggesting again that they were conscious. Intriguingly,
participants for whom the unwanted thoughts carried emotional weight (i.e., they
still wished they were in the relationship) were less likely than participants who no
longer wanted to be in the relationship to notice the thoughts themselves and more
likely to be caught having the thought. This suggests that cognitive defenses do not
banish disturbing thoughts to the unconscious but rather prevent us from reflect-
ing on them (Schooler, 2001).

Translation Dissociations
The idea that metaconsciousness requires rerepresenting the contents of conscious-
ness suggests that some information may become lost or distorted in the transla-
tion, as with any recoding process. The likelihood of noise entering the translation
process may be particularly great when individuals (a) verbally reflect on inher-
ently nonverbal experiences, (b) are motivated to misrepresent their experience, or
(c) possess a lay theory that is inconsistent with their actual experience.

Verbal Reflection  There are some experiences that are inherently difficult
to put into words: the structure of a face, the taste of a wine, complex tonalities
of Stravinsky, the intuitions leading to insights. If individuals attempt to verbalize
these inherently nonverbal and holistic experiences, the resulting rerepresentations
may fail to do justice to the original experience. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler
(1990) examined the effects of describing faces, which, because of their holistic
62 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

nature, are notoriously difficult to commit to words. Participants viewed a face and
subsequently either described it in detail or engaged in an unrelated verbal activity.
When given a recognition test that included a different photograph of the target
face, along with similar distractors, verbalization participants performed substan-
tially worse than controls. This effect of verbalization, termed verbal overshadow-
ing, has been found in variety of other domains of visual memory (Schooler, Fiore,
& Brandimonte (1997), including colors (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and
shapes (Brandimonte, Schooler, & Gabbino, 1997) as well as other modalities such
as audition (Schooler et al., 1997) and taste (Melcher & Schooler, 1996). Similar
disruptions resulting from verbal reflection have also been observed in various
other domains hypothesized to rely on nonverbal cognition. Thinking aloud during
problem solving can disrupt the intuitive processes associated with insight problem
solving while having no effect on the logical processes associated with analytical
problem solving (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Verbally reflecting on the
basis of affective judgments can interfere with quality of affective decision mak-
ing, as assessed both by the opinions of experts (Wilson & Schooler, 1991) and
by postchoice satisfaction (Wilson et al., 1993). Verbally articulating the basis of
the match between analogical stories can reduce people’s sensitivity to meaning-
ful deep-structure relationships while increasing their emphasis on superficial
surface-structure relationships (Sieck, Quinn, & Schooler, 1999). Of course, in
many cases verbal analysis can be helpful. This occurs when experiences are read-
ily translated into words, due either to the nature of the task (e.g., logical problem
solving, Schooler et al., 1993) or individuals’ unique verbal expertise (e.g., wine
experts, Melcher & Schooler, 1996). However, our point here is that sometimes
the very process of articulating experiences can result in translation dissociations,
where meta-awareness misrepresents conscious content.

Motivation  In some situations individuals may want to misrepresent their expe-

riences to themselves. For example, homophobic individuals may not want to rec-
ognize when they are aroused by depictions of homosexual acts (Adams, Wright,
& Lohr, 1996). That is, individuals may consciously experience the arousal but,
because of their motivation, fail to become meta-aware of it (see also Lambie &
Marcel, 2002). Our perspective also suggests a different view of repression. Freud
argued that repression prevented unwanted feelings from coming to conscious-
ness, but we would say that it primarily prevents such feelings from reaching meta-
awareness (Schooler, 2002).

Faulty Theories  Finally, translation dissociation can occur if individuals have

a faulty theory about what they should be feeling in a particular situation, which
then colors their appraisal of their actual experience. A compelling example of
this comes from people’s reports of their experience of catching a ball (McLeod,
Reed, & Dienes, 2003). Most people believe that as they watch a ball, their eyes
first rise and then go down following the trajectory of the ball. Indeed, this is the
case when one watches someone else catch a ball. However, when people catch a
ball themselves, they actually maintain the ball at precisely the same visual angle.
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 63

Nevertheless, when people who just caught a ball are asked what they experienced,
they rely on their theory of experience rather than on what they actually did.

Unconscious or Not Metaconscious?

So, how can we empirically distinguish between processes that are genuinely
unconscious or conscious but not meta-aware? This is tricky as a failure of verbal
report could result from both an absence of an experience and an absence of meta-
awareness. Distinguishing between these alternatives is not easy as the very same
findings can often be reasonably construed from either perspective. For example,
Winkielman and Berridge (2004) interpreted findings of indirect measures reveal-
ing unreported affective states as evidence for unconscious emotion, whereas
Schooler and Schreiber (2004) interpreted the same types of data as suggesting
affective experience without meta-awareness. At present, it is very difficult to dis-
tinguish between these two accounts; however, future studies may help to adju-
dicate between them. For example, if unreported states are indeed represented
in consciousness, then in principle they should be influenced by manipulations
targeting consciousness, such as cognitive load or explicit monitoring.
Experiences in the absence of meta-awareness can also be revealed retro-
spectively. For example, it is possible to catch conscious but not meta-aware states
with the external probe procedure, which, as described, was successfully used in
research on zoning out and unnoticed unwanted thoughts. In principle, similar
strategies could be used in other paradigms. For example, perhaps individuals who
fail to spontaneously report a goal (e.g., competition) could be caught consciously
experiencing such goal states if probed at the right time. It may also be possible to
refine individual’s ability to carefully scrutinize their prior state. For example, if
individuals are experiencing something without meta-awareness at the time, then
in principle it may be possible to have people later recall their old state when given
some additional source of self-insight (e.g., mindfulness training) or by removing
biases due to motivation. For example, individuals going through the breakup of a
romantic relationship may retrospectively recognize past experiences of jealously
or anger that had previously escaped meta-awareness. Of course, retrospective
analyses have their own pitfalls as it is possible to infer states that may not have
actually been experienced at the time (Joslyn & Schooler, 2006). However, if indi-
viduals are capable of retrospectively reporting states for which they lack a basis for
inference (e.g., determining whether they were subject to subliminally presented
mood manipulations), then the conclusion that the state was experienced seems
reasonable. Ultimately, determination of whether unreported states are genuinely
unconscious or experienced but not meta-aware will come down to an assessment
of the preponderance of evidence in each case.

Summary and Conclusions

Our goal in this chapter was to offer a fresh perspective on consciousness in social
cognition. We first highlighted that consciousness is currently seen as one of the key
topics of contemporary science and contrasted this view to occasional dismissals
64 Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction

of consciousness in social cognition. We then discussed what makes mental events

conscious and highlighted the role of consciousness in complex thought and action.
Finally, we distinguished among unconscious, conscious, and meta-aware events
and discussed dissociations between different levels of representations, highlight-
ing that seemingly unconscious events may simply be lacking in meta-awareness.
In conclusion, clearly, there is much (if not most) that science still does not under-
stand about consciousness. In fact, some believe that some of its critical features,
like subjectivity, will always escape scientific scrutiny (Searle, 1997). On the other
hand, there has also been remarkable progress in psychology, cognitive science,
and neuroscience. We do not see this research as showing that consciousness is
unimportant but rather as providing a more comprehensive understanding of its
role in how we think, feel, and act. It is encouraging that the field of social cogni-
tion research has much to contribute to this objective.

Acknowledgment
We thank the book editors for inspiration, generous feedback, and incredible
patience. Support was provided by a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant
to P. W. (BCS-0350687) and SHRCC grant to J. S. This chapter greatly profited Spell out SHRCC.
from discussions of these issues with Roy Baumeister, Kent Berridge, Patricia
Churchland, Zoltan Dienes, Hal Pashler, V. S. Ramaschandran, David Shanks,
Jeanne Shinskey, and participants of the Cold Spring Harbor 2007 conference,
New Frontiers in Studies of Nonconscious Processing.

Notes
1. Some psychologists serve as empirical and theoretical “police” on more dramatic
abilities attributed to the unconscious (Kihlstrom, 2007; Merikle & Reingold, 1998;
Shanks, 2005, 2006)
2. North American readers will remember Terri Schiavo, who died in 2005. As a result
of failing several neurological assessments, including tests for purposive behavior, she
was declared unconscious, and her feeding tube was removed (Caplan, McCartney, &
Sisti, 2006).
3. Note that cross-modal integration can be automatized into unconscious, suggesting
that access in the global workspace might be only needed to initially connect novel
sensations and responses. The famous McGurk effect illustrates not only the auto-
matic influence of vision on speech perception but also the value of cross-modal inte-
gration for unity of conscious experience (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976).
4. A believer in the smart unconscious should attempt to solve a novel mathematical
problem, like multiplying 87*65, under cognitive load or expose themselves to this
problem before going to sleep to see if the unconscious provides an answer in the
morning.
5. As Bargh (1989) pointed out, it is sometimes possible to dissociate consciousness and
control.
 Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious in Social Cognition 65

6. In some “unconscious goal” paradigms, participants could actually be conscious of the

goal but just confused about its source. As we discuss, there are also multiple ways
in which goals could be conscious but not verbally reported because of temporal and
translation dissociations.
7. Imagine the following experiment: Participants are in a room with both food and
drink. Participants are first told once, consciously, that their goal is to eat. Next, par-
ticipants are given an unconscious priming procedure with multiple words related to
the goal of drinking. We predict that very few, if any participants, would behave in
accordance with the more recent, but unconscious “goal” to drink.
8. The idea of “unconscious emotion” does not imply that conscious feelings are an
unnecessary “icing on the emotional cake” (LeDoux, 1996). Conscious happiness,
anxiety, anger, guilt, and sadness are critical in people’s life. Not only do they make
life worth living (we would not pay much for a substance that makes us “unconsciously
happy”), but also they are useful in judgments and decisions (Winkielman, Knutson,
Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007). As with conscious and unconscious goals, future research
may directly contrast the power of conscious and unconscious emotions.

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