G.R. No.

96492 November 26, 1992

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES,respondents.
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106. Devoted to the production of palay,
the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that between
July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case,
defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the
recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation
of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of their official
functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and claimed moral damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00.
For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and nonpayment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also demanded actual and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees.
Contention of petitioners
It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo because the
present petition involves Lot No. 46, and not Lot No. 106 of the estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio
Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to the barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay
Pare Barangay High School.

Contention of respondents
Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners who conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino
Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot No. 46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where they
were ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed by the Court of Appeals from the judgment, private
respondents should be compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily liable with Olympio Mendoza and Severino
11
Aguinaldo.
HELD:
We find for the private respondents.
We rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C")
although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court
shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was
incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that
there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of
14
the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders", carrying with them
four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes
no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size
(1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box
ready for shipment .
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane
wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted
from the cellophane wrapper. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment
was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila.

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of
the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post
Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central
Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section
of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Contention of Marti
Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence.
HELD: Evidence is admissible
Topic: Search and seizure
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise,
may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State.
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed
overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's
own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the
authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of
the offense charged.
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned
the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody
thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open,
where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in
the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Topic: Right to privacy and communication.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the
alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
Topic: Custodial investigation
We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed
of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant
was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other
hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI.
Appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael,
a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested

him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the
next day.
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It
can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the
shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking
without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value
at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the
other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his
mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571
[1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers
v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA
567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contr act of
shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more
weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131).
At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a
country home not any near the metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Bengue t. Perhaps
they thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and trouble when in the early morning of 27 August
91, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery.
Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victimsformer houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the That illusion was
shattered ghastly crime. The co-accused is Hector Maqueda.
Hector Maqueda was arrested. Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria,
Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so
and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed aSinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit
"LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6"). He stated therein that "he is willing
and volunteeringto be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27
August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would
oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda.
Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a
job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that
Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on
agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead

pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe providedhim by Salvamante,
After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already
unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces
of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward the road where they Saw two
persons from whom they asked directions, and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two Persons that it was
bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked until they
reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. His testimony is summarized by the trial court, denying the participation of
the alleged crime. He was working at the polvoron factory on the date of the said crime.
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience and SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence,
the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was
impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991.
HELD:
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession theSinumpaang Salaysay and an
extrajudicial admission the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to
convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the former and the latter
as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the
accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party
in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which
tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that
after such filing an accused "no longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and not
to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process
where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would
not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of
the Constitution,
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are
not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20,
Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .

The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination reading: No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights
under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly
inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads: (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not
governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the
course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given
to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without
28
governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; or restriction on the power
of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind
the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited. 29 They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or
state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the
Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. 31

Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former Under Section 26,
32
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs; People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circ umstances
proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the
requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case.
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly rejected such defense.
The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove
that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does
not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for
Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence
categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony
that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.

[G.R. No. 142356. April 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, appellant.
FACTS:
Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and PO3 Nestor A. Galvez, members of the Criminal Detection and Intelligence
Group based at Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, received information from one of their informants that a certain woman from
Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some drug pushers. Said information
was also relayed by the informant to C/Insp. Rhodel O. Sermonia who instructed the two operatives to conduct surveillance operation against
their target female who was described by their informant as about 50 years old, 5 feet in height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga
province.
At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their informant went to their headquarters and informed them that their suspect is
due to arrive at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. PO3 Sagum and PO3 Galvez, together with the informant, immediately went to Sapang Biabas
and parked their car near the entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas. While they were in their car, the informer pointed to them a
woman bearing the same description given by the former. The woman alighted from the tricycle and subsequently loaded two sacks with
camote fruits on top. The two officers proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves protruding through
a hole of one of the sacks. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police officers and requested the woman to put out the contents of
the said sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A brick,
which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana leaves. The woman who was arrested identified
herself as accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-Og of Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. Ayangao and the suspected dried marijuana
leaves were brought to the police officers headquarter at Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. The evidence confiscated from the accused
were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas where it was examined by Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babor. The Initial
Laboratory Report issued indicated that the specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves weighing 14.75 kilograms were
found to be positive for marijuana.
HELD:
After a thorough review of the records, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving the appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial court was supported by the evidence on record.

Regarding the credibility of witnesses, this Court has ruled time and again that this is a matter best assessed by the trial court judge since he
[8]
has the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand. Besides, in this case, the inconsistencies criticized
by the appellant were minor ones involving negligible details which did not negate the truth of the witnesses testimonies nor detract from
their credibility.[9]
Appellant also assigns as error the illegality of her arrest because she was not read her Miranda rights. (This is in addition to her argument
that the 15 bricks of marijuana were inadmissible since the warrantless search was invalid, not having been made pursuant to a lawful
arrest.) This contention is without merit since this Court has repeatedly ruled that, by entering a plea upon arraignment and by actively
participating in the trial, an accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his arrest and warrantless search. [10] Any objection to the
arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived.[11] Here, in submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she entered a plea of not guilty and participated in
[12]
the trial, the appellant waived any irregularity that may have attended her arrest.
Assuming, however, that there was no such waiver, pursuant to People vs. Barros,[13] reiterated in People vs. Aruta,[14] the waiver of the nonadmissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure is not to be casually presumed for the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to retain vitality. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant
was actually committing a crime when she was arrested transporting marijuana, are act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made,
the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to
validly search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense.[15]
In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. This section provides that a peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. However, the police officer should be spurred
by probable cause in making the arrest. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is gu ilty of the
offense with which he is charged.[16] The determination of probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of each case. In this case,

the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from their informant. This Court has already
[17]
ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers received the
tip two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellants
arrival was not known by the informant.
In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and informed the officers that the appellant
would be arriving at 6:00 A.M. (just an hour later) that day. The circumstances clearly called for an immediate response from the officers.
In People vs. Valdez,[25] this Court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and corresponding search of accused Valdez as the officer
made the arrest on the strength of a similar on-the-spot tip. In the case at bar, though all other pertinent details were known by the officers
except the date, they could not have applied for a search warrant since the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days.[26] Considering that the
officers did not know when the appellant was going to arrive, prudence made them act the way they did.
The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi. Appellants alibi could not prevail over the
overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak[27] and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the
accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and
(b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. [28] The appellant failed to meet these two requirements. Jaime Alarcons house
where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by
the officers.[29] Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges.

[G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant.
FACTS:
The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp. (Keyser Plastics for brevity), with
principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. [5] Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore
[6]
Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall, the
lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards.[7] The part of the wall made
oflawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side. [8]
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he
saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to be one of the trusted
employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was
located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics. [9] Campos paid scant
attention to Keyser.
Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises (kalabugan) coming from
the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not
pay much attention to the sound.[10]
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he saw appellant Guillermo look through one
of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos
[11]
assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately
[12]
dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect escape,
while a
reaction team was being dispatched to the scene.
Ten minutes later, arrived at the crime scene. The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the
keys. This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo who told them,

Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito. (Sir, I shall not fight you, I am surrendering, and I shall face the
[14]
consequences.) Guillermo was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the
victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped
torso of Victor F. Keyser. The victims head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. [15]
When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees.[17] He expressed
[18]
no regret whatsoever about his actions.
Keysers death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV
reporters, namely: Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently
[29]
broadcast nationwide. Appellant admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He disclosed to David
the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and
[30]
cartons. When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and
treated him like an animal.[31] Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during
the course of their respective interviews with him. [32]
At the trial, appellant Guillermos defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a victim of police frame-up. He testified that he
had been an employee of Keyser for more than a year prior to the latters death. On the date of the incident, he was all alone at the Keyser
Plastics factory compound as a stay-in employee. Other employees have left allegedly due to Keysers maltreatment of them. When he was
[36]
made to face the media reporters, he said the police instructed him what to say. He claimed that he could no longer recall what he told the
reporters. The appellant denied having any grudge or ill feelings against his employer or his family.
Contention of Guillermo
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out that there is no clear showing that he was
informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he was only made
to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel during the
custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rig hts, appellant
argues that any evidence gathered from him, including his alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
In our view, the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo
[43]
PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution. Under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be
admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing. [44] In the instant case, the
testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of said constitutional guarantees.
Q: Did you inform the accused that he has the right to get a counsel during the investigation?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What did the accused say, Mr. Witness?
A: He did not utter any word.
Q: During the investigation at the police station, did you exert effort to provide him with counsel before you asked him
questions?
A: No, mam.
Appellants alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. The investigating officer made no
serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of the
appellants right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a
Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that
appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain
and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. [47] Absent that understanding, there is a
denial of the right to be informed, as it cannot be said that the person has been truly informed of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the

communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial
investigation.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals.
According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had
killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos testimony was not rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor
[48]
General points out, appellants statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the Rules of Court, a
declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. [49] All these
requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, the death of his
employer. His admission to Campos was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an
opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser.
Appellants spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by
the Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
The TV news reporters testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed appellant. They
were not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows
that the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead,
he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keysers killing. As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by
a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence. [51]
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellants alleged confession to the police, the prosecution has
amply proven the appellants guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to
the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and David. The
positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible
prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly
described before the trial court.

G.R. No. 145176

March 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS (at large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE
LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, accused,
ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, appellants.
FACTS:
Sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
with others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away
punctured currency notes due for shredding in the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines as
represented by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of P194,190.00 Philippine currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and
Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said offense with grave abuse of confidence they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers,
Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party and as such they had free access to the property stolen."4
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not guilty.
Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different
banks to the latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff
of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured
notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for circulation. Before these
notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the above-named accused.
While in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave three separate statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged.

"Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorneys Office on November 4, 1992, at the
office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused-appellant Garcia and told
him that Atty. Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not agree to have Atty. Sanchez to be his
lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and accused-appellant Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since
then. He was not present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly signed x x x the alleged three (3) sworn statements.
HELD:
Sufficienty of Evidence
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights
under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides thus:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited."
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions 13 that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter
on those documents was affixed after the word "SAKSI." Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted
Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. 14
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in
the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused
understands its nature and consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the confession.

Hence, the lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated
15
16
compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel.
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the
waiver has no evidentiary relevance.17 The Constitution states that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited
Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x." Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled
confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured becomes moot.
Perforated Currency Notes
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2") allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his arrest
were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and, hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash
Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any
crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the
circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the
illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or
to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search.
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures 18 of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant, these are allowed only
under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a
19
moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search.
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. 20 Any evidence obtained in violation of the
21
constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. In the present case, the perforated P100 currency

notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in
evidence.
Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct
assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so
as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditi ons for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'.
Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways.
Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for
direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since

appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature;
Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200;
Whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation.
HELD:
We rule for the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess
any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs
v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by
wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in
the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S.
107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out
his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use
an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or
others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages
against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M". Among the exhibits offered by
private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape
recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private
respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
HELD:
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and
for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as
follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the
cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."
Contention of Ramirez
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.
HELD:
We disagree with Ramirez.
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
13
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged
in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
19
telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts
and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

G.R. No. 121087

August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of
the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing
the nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to
perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. 2
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a
picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." 4 Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter
5
6
that he would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policeman on duty, including petitioner Navarro,
were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to
the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. 7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. 8Afterwards, petitioner
Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin,
hindi mo ba kilala?"9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin
na kita?"10
As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood
flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. 19
20

Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon." He said to Sgt. Aonuevo:
"Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." 21 He then poked his gun at the right

temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. 22Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he
23
simply wrote his name in print.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon M emorial
Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy, Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there.
But Lingan died from his injuries.24
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
Contention of Navarro
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that
Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete.26
HELD:
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A.
No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons;
or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any

other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. 29 Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he
personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are
30
31
those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that
the tape played in the court was the one he recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. 33 A sufficient
foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.

G.R. No. 154430

June 16, 2006
Spouses JOSE N. BINARAO and PRECIOSA BINARAO, Petitioners, vs.
PLUS BUILDERS, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Bahayang Pag-asa, Inc., and its sister corporation, Delfin Hermanos, Inc., are the owners and developers of Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision.
Herein respondent, is in charge of the construction and sale of the houses therein.
Spouses Jose and Preciosisima N. Binarao, petitioners, purchased a house and lot in Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price
of P327,491.95.
Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay respondentP96,791.95 in the following
manner: P5,000.00 upon signing of the contract, and the remaining P91,791.95 within 15 days thereafter. Petitioners paid
respondent P20,000.00, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in three installments.
Respondents counsel sent petitioners another demand letter, but they refused to pay. Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for a sum
of money against petitioners.
In the instant case, petitioners did not deny the allegations as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the complaint of herein respondent corporation. In
fact, petitioners even admitted the allegations thereon. Xxx
Petitioners, in their answer, specifically paragraph 1 thereof, stated:
1. Defendants admit paragraphs 1 and 4 of the complaint.
While it is true that paragraph 7 of petitioners answer to the complaint qualified the fact that they didnt sign any payment plan, this
qualification however neither denies nor negates the other facts, as admitted, that were stated in paragraph 4 of the complaint which
actually states three facts: (1) that petitioner paid the amount of P20,000.00 to respondent; (2) that petitioner still has a balance
of P65,571.22; and (3) that such unpaid balance is to be paid in three (3) agreed payment plan. What is denied by petitioners in paragraph 7

of their answer, if at all, is the fact that there is no agreed payment plan. But, as to the fact, to repeat, that petitioners still owe P65,571.22,
as balance after payment ofP20,000.00, is admitted by petitioners as this fact is never denied by them.
Petitioners contend that they did not admit in their answer that they are liable to respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners admitted absolutely in their answer their liability under the proposed payment plan.
HELD: Yes.
The petition lacks merit.
Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made."
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c)
in other stages of the judicial proceeding. 5
Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondents complaint. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount of P20,000.00; (b) they still have a balance ofP65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid
balance is to be paid in three installments. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party
himself6 and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in this case) , no
amount of rationalization can offset it.

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners, vs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a petition2 for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M.
Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter).
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of Franciscos estate.3 In
support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco. Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was
single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as
Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite
her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed
parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco,
be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.
When the trial ensued, Corazon testified
1.
She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado.
2.
She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
3.
Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born to Francisco
Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below the question
"Legitimate? (Legitimo?)".
4.
Pictures taken during respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract.
5.
Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.
After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to

state or prove a cause of action", it being her stated position that "[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis-10
vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles."
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco.
HELD: No.
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly
no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived
or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."
A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not
18
introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be overemphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, 19 the presumption
of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code 20 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the
presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state from what facts established during the trial
was the presumption of respondents supposed legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For,
save for respondents gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the dece dents marriage to
respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos
21
and Genovevas marriage, if one had been solemnized was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority
was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent
presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage.
In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and
where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of
saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as manand-wife. Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above
explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no
presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.
Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined
even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. "E"). In it, her birth was recorded as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado.
And the word "married" is written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva.
Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that "[I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that *respondents+ Birth
Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married". The contention
commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco
against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an
instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,

commenting on the probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote: xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of
27
the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. 29 It cannot, as the decision under review
seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child.
For then, an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring
through the simple expedient of writing the putative fathers name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate. A long time past, this
Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:
Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and
government records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures
which showed Francisco giving respondents hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the
31
execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition. And needless to stress, they cannot support a
finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.

[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondents.
FACTS:
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. However, there relationship turned out
to be short-lived. Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years
before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario
was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She,
however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to
the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the bastardization of
Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision insofar only which granted to the petitioner so-called visitation rights.
She argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child.[11] She further
maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an
illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion. Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Ma. Theresa moved for the
reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo.
Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his
illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao,

would prevent any possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.
HELD:
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. [19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during
the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. [22] We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent
[23]
case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals :
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice
and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only
Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, [25] his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his
[26]
[27]
wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage
of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child.
[28]

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this
presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that
could have enabled the husband to father the child. [29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
[30]
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife
[31]
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. [32] This may take place,
for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of concepti on.[33] Or, the
husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison
[34]
regulations.
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which
is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove pe rsonal access
between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such
as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between
Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer[35] to the petition for annulment of marriage [36] that she never lived with Mario. He
claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
Reasons:
1.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son
with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

2.

3.
4.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could
have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never
lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. The impossibility of physical access was never
established beyond reasonable doubt.
A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. [38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to
question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband
and that her offspring is illegitimate. [39] The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It
also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in
evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. [42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. [43] Although a record of birth or birth certificate may
be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,[44] as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary
only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the te rmination of
marriage is sought to be established.[45]
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by
the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.[46] As prima facie evidence, the statements in the
record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
[47]
statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which isprima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter
shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the
purpose of the law.

This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely
a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now
comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.

G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006

JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner, vs.
SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAA and ROSALITA CARDAA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within
the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa - filed a case for
damages against petitioner.
The Cardaas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on
the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principals office. The
Cardaas averred that petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was
dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers
during a meeting and assigned Remedios Palaa to negotiate the sale.
Contention of Capili
Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaa, to see to its
disposal; that despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor
did any of her 15 teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten.
Contention of the respondents
Respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin.

HELD: Yes.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. 13
The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that
the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and
rotting tree which caused the death of respondents daughter was a result of petitioners negligence, being in charge of the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held:
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to
an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally,
the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or
some other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioners negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain.
The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 16
Was petitioners explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the schools premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger
posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee. 17 The record
shows that more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaa on December 15, 1992, to the
time the incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been
removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence.

G.R. No. 144268 August 30, 2006

DATALIFT MOVERS, INC. and/or JAIME B. AQUINO, Petitioners, vs.
BELGRAVIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SAMPAGUITA BROKERAGE, INC. Respondents.
FACTS:
The premises involved in this case is a warehouse (bodega) used by petitioner Datalift Movers, Inc. (Datalift for short) for its cargoes in
connection with its brokerage business. The warehouse stands on a lot owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR).
Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. (Sampaguita, hereafter), pursuant to a written contract commencing
on July 1, 1987 and terminating on June 30, 1990.
Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corporation (Belgravia
for short) whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own use. True enough, Belgravia did put up a warehouse. However,
instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift, represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant
to a 1-year written contract of lease.
After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment of the leased warehouse, evidently by
acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties. Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental
to P60,000.00 then to P130,000.00. Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the
warehouse.
Contention of Datalift Movers
Sampaguita has no cause of action against them, not being a party nor privy to the Datalift-Belgravia contract of lease; Under the PNRSampaguita contract of lease over the PNR lot, Sampaguita is prohibited from subleasing the property; The same PNR-Sampaguita contract
had allegedly expired; Lessor Belgravia likewise has no cause of action because it was neither the owner nor lessee of the lot whereon the
warehouse stands.
HELD:

The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by the petitioners as lessees, regarding
its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred
from assailing Belgravia's title of better right of possession as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. -- The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. (Underscoring ours.)
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned
7
by any contrary proof however strong." As long as the lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case,
the former, as lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better
right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.
In fact, the application of the rule on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted Section 2, Rule 131 strengthens the position of the
MeTC that the petitioners may be validly ordered to vacate the leased premises for nonpayment of rentals. Likewise, the logical consequence
of the operation of this conclusive presumption against the petitioners is that they will never have the personality to question whether an
implied new lease was created between PNR and the respondents, because so long as there is no showing that the lessor-lessee relationship
has terminated, the lessors title or better right of possession as against the lessee will eternally be a non-issue in any proceeding before any
court.
Additionally, as correctly pointed out by the CA, being non-privies to the contract of lease between PNR and respondent Sampaguita, the
petitioners have no personality to raise any factual or legal issue relating thereto.

G.R. No. 169737

February 12, 2008
BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC., petitioner, vs.
*
NEOMI and DANILO OLIVARES, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care, Inc., a health maintenance firm. The
application was approved on October 22, 2002. In the health care agreement, ailments due to "pre-existing conditions" were excluded from
the coverage.
On November 30, 2002, or barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance, respondent Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted
at the Medical City which was one of the hospitals accredited by petitioner. During her confinement, she underwent several laboratory tests.
On December 2, 2002, her attending physician, Dr. Edmundo Saniel, 8 informed her that she could be discharged from the hospital. She
incurred hospital expenses amounting toP34,217.20. Consequently, she requested from the representative of petitioner at Medical City a
letter of authorization in order to settle her medical bills. But petitioner refused to issue the letter and suspended payment pending the
submission of a certification from her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not caused by a pre-existing condition.9
She was discharged from the hospital on December 3, 2002. On December 5, 2002, she demanded that petitioner pay her medical bill. When
petitioner still refused, she and her husband, respondent Danilo Olivares, were constrained to settle the bill. 10 They thereafter filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner.

Contention of Blue Cross Health Care, Inc.

It had not yet denied respondents' claim as it was still awaiting Dr. Saniel's report. It cannot be held to pay because it was Neomi himself who
prevented her attending physician from issuing the required certification, petitioner cannot be faulted from suspending payment of her
claim, for until and unless it can be shown from the findings made by her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not due to preexisting conditions could she demand entitlement to the benefits of her policy.

Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. Saniel from submitting his report regarding the medical condition of Neomi. Hence, it
contends that the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced should apply in its favour.
Contention of the Olivares
Respondents counter that the burden was on petitioner to prove that Neomis stroke was excluded from the coverage of their agreement
because it was due to a pre-existing condition. It failed to prove this.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and therefore was
excluded from the coverage of the health care agreement.
HELD: We agree with the Olivares.
It is an established rule in insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on liability, they should be construed strictly against
the insurer. These are contracts of adhesion the terms of which must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which
prepared the contract. This doctrine is equally applicable to health care agreements.
Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was due to a pre-existing condition. It merely speculated
that Dr. Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable
presumption at best.
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful;
22
(c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Here, respondents' refusal to present or
allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and patient.

Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it should have made its own assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a
pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it
out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence.

G.R. No. 157177

February 11, 2008
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs.
JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B. REYES, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account. She was accommodated
by Cicero Capati (Pats). Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of
which shall be withdrawn from her existing savings account with BPI bank and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account with said
bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware
of the mistakes in figures.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the
withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00. Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and
then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same.
Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account and brought the same
to the teller's booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt
stamp showing December 7, as the date. Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her savings account passbook with the folded deposit
slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same was
returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion thereof. Thereafter, Luna
returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the validation, she got angry.

Plaintiff filed this instant case.

Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in the
banks teller tape. Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with
flying colors, indicative of the fact that he was not lying when he said that there really was no cash transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa
Reyes went to the defendant bank on December 7, 1990.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000 in her newly opened account.
HELD: Jesusa only made an initial deposit of P100,000.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by
12
13
law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the
testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other. 14
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the
witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the
appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on
record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully
prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount ofP200,000.00, and
not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her new Express Teller account, the

insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to
her new Express Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer
terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is no showing that the same had been
purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter, that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund
30
transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit slip was in the amount
of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00.
An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the
cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the deposit slip in the amount ofP200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp
mark is convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business. She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him
a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name
for her new Express Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook reflecting a balance of P249,657.6431 as of November 19, 1990.32 Thus,
at first glance, these appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's
stamp mark, stamped it on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the original copy33 of
the deposit slip was left in her cage.34However, as Torneros started processing the transaction, it turned out that respondent Jesusa's balance
was insufficient to accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip and had already left the teller's counter thereafter and Capati was
still inside the teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the latter told her, "Ok naman iyan,"35 and Capati
36
superimposed the figures "1" on "2" on the deposit slip to reflect the initial deposit of P100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express
Teller account and signed the alteration. Torneros then machine-validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, which
bore Torneross stamp mark and which was given to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her transaction, was not machine-validated
unlike the original copy of the deposit slip.

Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 38 We have, on
many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to
39
the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.

G.R. No. L-9268

November 28, 1959
VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
Pedro Icong, an employee of the petitioner, was sleeping on board the latter's vessel, M/V "Miss Leyte", when it caught fire. Awakened by
the fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard. Since then, he has not been heard of. The employee was unmarried and respondent Juan Icong, his
father was his partial dependent. The latter filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission and a petitioner a notice of claim for death
compensation. The petitioner reported the matter to the Commision only on August 17, 1954. The Commission rendered an award in favor of
respondent Juan Icong in the sum of P2,038.40, plus P200.00 for burial expenses and P20.00 as legal fee.
Contention of the petitioner:
In the absence of proof of the death of Pedro Icong, the nearest approach to the matter, from the facts of his case, is the provision on the
presumption of death established in Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, according to which the person to be presumed dead must
be unheard of for at least four years; that inasmuch as Pedro Icong had been missing only for a few months from the alleged accident, there
is as yet legal presumption of death on which to base any award for compensation.
Contention of the respondent:
It did not apply the rule on presumption of death because in the employer's report of the accident submitted by petitioner, laborer Pedro
Icong was reported as the only casualty, and in transmitting said report petitioner's counsel had implicitly admitted the fact of Pedro Icong's
death.
Held:
We agree with the respondent.
Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to
case wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch
as the word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane, the
persons taking both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence. In the instant case, none of the

foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of petitioner's vessel is not unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had been
definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that when petitioner's vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped
overboard and since then had not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not apply. Instead the rule on
preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death.
In the same case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., supra, we said:
Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from
again, though diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may be drawn. (Brownlee, et al., vs. Mutual Benefit, Health and
Accident Association, 29 Fed [2nd] 71).

G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents.
FACTS:
Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V
Eastern Minicon plying the HongkongManila route. Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the
contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of
the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
On February 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt.
Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office for immediate assistance in view of the existing danger; seawater was
entering the vessel hatch and they were preparing to abandon the ship. After the message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or
its crew until the present time.
Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter,
the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to
accept the same.
Mrs. Lucerofiled a complaint with -the National Seamen Board, Board for short, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00,
which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned
to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-tovoyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.
Contention of Eastern Shipping
Mrs. Lucero was no longer entitled to such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had already confirmed the total loss of the vessel
and had in fact settled the company's insurance claim and [b] the Company, with the approval of the Board, had likewise paid the

corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the other seamen The Company further invoked the provisions of Article 643 of the Code of
Commerce, to wit:
Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo should be totally lost, by reason of capture or wreck, all rights shall be extinguished, both as
regards the crew to demand any wages whatsoever, and as regards the ship agent to recover the advances made.
HELD:
It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern
Minicon the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger": "sea water
was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this
message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time.
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The
foregoing facts, quite logically are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had
perished with it upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls."
Similarly, in People vs. Sasota, 7 the claim of the appellants therein that there was no conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his
body was never found was overruled by this Court in this wise:
In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where it can be found. 'Mere are cases like
death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency be
proven. There are even cases where said death and the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or
established by circumstantial evidence.
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was
not applied and the fact of death was deemed established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a finding of death. Indeed, We

cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that
Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.