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2009-CI-19492
The City of San Antonio, Texas acting by and through the City Public Service Board of
San Antonio, a Texas municipal utility ("CPS Energy") requests the Court to award actual
damages in excess of $2 Billion and exemplary damages in excess of $30 Billion from Toshiba
Corporation, NRG Energy, Inc. and Nuclear Innovation North America arising from their
fraudulent, defamatory, and illegal conduct and that of their affiliates, parents, partners and co-
conspirators. CPS Energy also asks the Court to declare the rights, status, and other legal
relations among CPS Energy, NINA Texas 3 LLC, and NINA Texas 4 LLC as tenants in
common with an undivided interest in the South Texas Nuclear Project Units 3 and 4. In
addition, CPS Energy requests the Court for a temporary restraining order and other expedited
injunctive relief to preserve and protect from imminent irreparable injury the rights and interests
of CPS Energy.
1. Plaintiff intends for discovery to proceed under Level 3 pursuant to Rule 190.4 of
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and the parties
because the amount in controversy exceeds this court's minimum jurisdictional requirements.
3. Venue is proper in Bexar County, Texas, under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
15.002 because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to CPS Energy's claims
occurred here and because CPS Energy is located in Bexar County, Texas.
Parties
company registered to do business in Texas, with its principal place of business in Texas, doing
company registered to do business in Texas, with its principal place of business in Texas, doing
substantial business in the State of Texas and may be served through the Texas Secretary of State
pursuant to §17.044 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because Toshiba does not
maintain a regular place of business in the State of Texas and this action arose from Toshiba's
substantial business in the State of Texas and may be served through the Texas Secretary of State
pursuant to § 17.044 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because NRG does not
maintain a regular place of business in the State of Texas and this action arose from NRG's
limited liability company conducting substantial business in the State of Texas and may be
served through the Texas Secretary of State pursuant to §17.044 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code because NINA does not maintain a regular place of business in the State of
Texas and this action arose from NINA's business activities in the State of Texas.
10. This case involves the construction of two nuclear reactors, known as Units 3 and
4, at the South Texas Project in Bay City, Texas (the "Project"). Defendants Toshiba, NRG, and
NINA have engaged in a course of action designed to deprive CPS Energy of its valuable rights
in the Project and to enhance their interest in and benefit from the Project at the expense of CPS
Energy. These Defendants made misrepresentations and also failed to disclose Project critical
information to induce CPS Energy to participate in the Project. They also conspired to and did
disparage CPS Energy and conspired to and did interfere with CPS Energy's business and
harm the ability of CPS Energy to enjoy the benefits of its substantial investment in the Project.
11. Defendants Toshiba, NRG, and NINA have undertaken a campaign of media
misinformation, public threats and disclosure of confidential Project information, all designed to
harm CPS Energy. Defendants Toshiba, NRG, and NINA knew and intended that their actions
from the ratepayers and the San Antonio City Council necessary for CPS Energy to continue in
the Project. The conduct of these Defendants is outrageous and entitles CPS Energy to recover
actual and punitive damages in excess of $30 Billion or a higher amount as may be determined
by the Jury.
12. The request for declaratory relief involves CPS Energy's undivided ownership
interest in the Project. CPS Energy, NINA 3 and NINA 4 entered into certain agreements to
define their participation in and ownership of the Project as tenants in common. Those
agreements also reflected their intention to enter into a future final agreement to set the terms of
13. Since 2007, CPS Energy has invested approximately $300 million in the Project.
This work has resulted in considerable enhanced value in and to the Project site. Preliminary
assessments of the enhanced value of the Project are in excess of $2 Billion. But, the executed
participation agreements are either silent or ambiguous with respect to ownership rights in the
Project if one co-tenant exercises its contractual right to withdraw from the Project.
14. CPS Energy has not withdrawn from the Project and cannot make a decision
whether to proceed or withdraw until it receives the revised cost estimate on December 31, 2009.
Although CPS Energy continues to honor its obligations as an owner in the Project, it faces
extreme uncertainty and potential harm due to the lack of definition in the agreements as to a
withdrawing owner's rights in the Project, especially in light of its considerable investment in the
Project to date.
15. The Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§37.001 et seq, allows CPS Energy to bring this action to obtain relief and certainty with respect
substantial controversy exists because the participation agreements are silent or ambiguous with
respect to the rights of these co-tenants in the event an owner opts to unilaterally withdraw.
Thus, this action involves a genuine conflict of tangible interest and is not merely theoretical.
16. Pursuant to the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, CPS Energy respectfully asks
the Court to declare the rights, obligations, and legal relations of the parties under applicable law
and the agreements in the event of a unilateral withdrawal. Nothing in this request is intended or
should be construed as a withdrawal by CPS Energy from the Project, and CPS Energy
specifically reserves its right to exercise the full range of rights given under the controlling
agreements, including the unilateral right to withdraw, when and ifit chooses to do so.
17. In November 1997, CPS Energy entered into an agreement that, among other
things, gave the owners of Units 1 and 2 of the South Texas Project the option to participate in
building additional generating units at the site. This agreement, named the Amended and
Restated South Texas Project Participation Agreement, is an agreement between CPS Energy,
the City of Austin, and NRG South Texas LP, the predecessor entity to NINA 3 and NINA 4
("Participation Agreement").
18. The Participation Agreement provides that each owner had an undivided
percentage ownership interest as tenants in common in Units 1 and 2, the 11,000 acre plant site,
the transmission corridor, the railroad strip, the pumping facility, the cooling reservoir discharge
construction of additional generating units by written notice to all other owners. Each owner
may then elect to participate in the construction of additional generating units on the site.
20. In or around June 2006, CPS Energy and Defendants agreed to participate in the
21. In October 2007, ten years after entering into the Participation Agreement, CPS
Energy entered into the South Texas Project Supplemental Agreement ("Supplemental
Agreement"). The Supplemental Agreement was between CPS Energy and NRG South Texas
22. The Supplemental Agreement did not restate or replace the 1997 Participation
Agreement. Rather, the Supplemental Agreement provides that all of the provisions of the
Participation Agreement remain in effect, except those provisions of the Participation Agreement
that are "affected" by the Supplemental Agreement. The Supplemental Agreement governs as to
those "affected" provisions. (Supp. Agreement, ~ 12.1). However, the Supplemental Agreement
does not identify specifically which provisions of the Participation Agreement survIve the
Participation Agreement.
23. Paragraph 5.1 of the Supplemental Agreement provides that CPS Energy and
Defendants will own an undivided interest in Units 3 and 4 as tenants in common. CPS Energy
and NINA 3 each own an undivided 50 percent interest in Unit 3 as tenants in common. CPS
Energy and NINA 4 each own an undivided 50 percent interest in Unit 4 as tenants in common.
parties the right to cease participating in the development of the Project by unilaterally
withdrawing. The parties further agreed that the withdrawing party "shall cease having any
further obligations for the Project," except to the extent of obligations already incurred by the
from the Project and expressly relieves the withdrawing party of any further obligations for the
Project, the Supplemental Agreement does not determine how the withdrawing party's undivided
ownership interest in the Project is treated, or how the withdrawing party recovers its investment
in the Project, or what rights the remaining tenants in common have regarding the withdrawing
26. In the Supplemental Agreement, the parties agreed to execute a final agreement
("which the Parties anticipate will occur on or after February 1, 2008") with respect to ownership
of the Proj ect, including, presumably, disposition of the withdrawing party's ownership interest.
27. The parties were unable to agree on the terms of an owner's agreement and never
28. Since agreeing to participate in building Units 3 and 4, CPS Energy has spent
approximately $300 million on preliminary design and engineering for the Project and
improvements to the Project site. Preliminary assessments of the value of the participation and
29. CPS Energy's decision to continue to invest in two new nuclear power plants was
based on representations by Toshiba, NRG, and NINA about their particular expertise and
experience in nuclear development. Specifically, these Defendants represented that they had
financial and licensing expertise in developing large nuclear generation projects across the
United States. These Defendants represented that they would employ the disciplined approach of
NRG and Toshiba in the Project and touted that their approach "aligns the interests of both
developer and prime contractor to optimize the schedule, performance and costs of its projects."
NRG and NINA also represented that they would collaborate with Toshiba to develop accurate
Project costs and that such collaboration and Toshiba's proven design would bring a higher
probability of success and certainty to the Project. Toshiba, NRG, and NINA further represented
that their expertise was key to this nuclear development because, they acknowledged, "the costs
and commercial terms associated with the construction of new nuclear units have emerged ... as
perhaps the biggest remaining obstacles to the nuclear renaissance in the United States." Thus,
Defendants knew or should have known that accurate Project costs were critical to the success of
the Project.
30. Toshiba, NRG, and NINA prepared Project cost estimates and were responsible
for bringing the Project in on-time and on-budget as they had represented they would and could
do. CPS Energy relied upon these representations in entering into the Project, continuing to
31. In June 2009, Defendants provided a cost estimate of $9.9 Billion (excluding
financing costs) to build the two new reactors. Although this was a non-binding estimate, the
Lundy and the Brattle Group that concluded the Project cost estimate was reasonable.
Defendants knew that CPS Energy relied upon and used the estimate of $9.9 Billion as the basis
for comparing alternative resource plans, for arranging financing, and for obtaining the necessary
approvals from the San Antonio City Council and the ratepayers to proceed.
32. On October 13,2009, CPS Energy decided to reduce its interest in the Project to a
total of 20 to 25 percent. CPS Energy then entered into discussions with various Texas
cooperatives and municipalities for the purchase of CPS Energy's equity interest in the Project to
reduce its ownership level. CPS Energy planned to sell a portion of the energy it produced as a
50 percent owner to other users outside of San Antonio, thereby creating an income stream for
CPS Energy and the City of San Antonio. The City of San Antonio collects 14 percent of the
revenue from CPS Energy. Or, alternatively, CPS Energy planned to sell a portion of its 50
percent interest and reap a substantial return on its investment by selling an equity share in the
Project.
33. Approximately two weeks later, Defendants NRG, NINA and Toshiba made
comments in the press about the dramatic increases in the cost of the Project. These new cost
estimates were significantly higher than had been previously represented to CPS Energy. On or
around October 26, 2009, news articles reported that the estimated cost of the Project could
increase by as much as $4 Billion, a 40 percent increase over Defendants' original cost estimate.
34. Defendants knew that for CPS Energy to proceed with the Project, it must have
support from the San Antonio City Council and the consent of the ratepayers and that inflated
and inaccurate cost estimates recklessly released to the public would seriously harm, if not
CPS Energy would be unable to continue with the Project and would be placed in a weakened
negotiating position. Defendants knew that by manipulating the estimated Project costs and
letting that play out in the public arena, they would deprive CPS Energy of the benefit of its
bargain of affordable nuclear power, thereby threatening or depriving CPS Energy of the
healthy return on its investment when it sold equity in the Project or entered into long-term
power contracts for the sale of the excess electricity produced. Defendants also knew that the
political fallout resulting from a significantly more expensive price tag than anticipated by the
San Antonio City Counsel would cause a loss of public support and deprive CPS Energy of the
time it would need to search for a buyer and sell its equity share, which could take more than a
year.
36. In November 2009, right after the news hit that Defendants expected construction
costs to run $4 Billion over the cost estimates provided to CPS Energy earlier this year, officials
from NRG, NINA, and CPS Energy flew to Japan for meetings held by executive management
of Toshiba to evaluate Project costs and potential cost reductions. CPS Energy returned from its
meeting with Defendants in Japan with no guaranty or assurances regarding the cost of the
Project or the methodology Defendants would use to arrive at these ever-changing cost estimates.
37. Over the days and weeks that followed, Defendants took full advantage of this
situation by reporting to the press about the status of contract negotiations and by publicly
speculating about CPS Energy's willingness and ability to continue the Project. This was done
to enhance Defendants' own position to the detriment of CPS Energy. For example, Steve Winn,
the chief executive officer of Defendant NINA, told an NRG investor meeting on Thursday,
November 19, 2009, that a higher cost estimate to build the two new reactors may force its
that an updated cost estimate for two new reactors may exceed the target rate increases that CPS
Energy had promised its customers. "It's probable that the estimate may come outside of their
range," Mr. Winn was reported to say. Mr. Winn also said that he expected CPS Energy's final
equity stake to fall to between zero and 20 percent. Mr. Winn admitted that CPS Energy, as a
municipal utility, had to consider not only the long-term economics of its investment, but the
impact on its customers. Mr. Winn intended that his public speculation about the rising cost of
the project would produce "near-term rate shock," as Mr. Winn himself called it, for CPS
Energy's ratepayers.
38. Defendants' public speculation about CPS Energy's ability to perform the
contract and realize on its significant investment not only disclosed confidential information
about the Project but also invited confusion and public outcry by the citizens of San Antonio that
jeopardized CPS Energy's position on the Project. Mr. Winn's actions put Defendants in a
position to assume control over CPS Energy's ownership for their own benefit and enjoy the
investment that CPS Energy had made in the Project without just compensation.
preliminary cost estimates to the press and by manipulating the numbers for their benefit.
Defendants' actions caused CPS Energy to lose public support and the confidence of San
Antonio's City Council and endangered CPS Energy's ultimate ownership position.
40. Within a matter of a few weeks after the $4 Billion cost increase was reported in
the newspapers, NINA's chief operating officer was quoted in the press as saying that NINA was
working to reduce the cost of the two new units to less than $10 Billion, the very number that
CPS Energy had been relying on previously to move forward with the Project. In another press
achievable. On November 19, NINA presented an updated cost estimate at its analyst's meeting
that targeted the final project cost estimates at between $9.2 Billion and $10 Billion.
41. On November 19, 2009, Bloomberg reported that NRG had disclosed III an
analyst's meeting that it had identified a new partner for the Project and had "a contingency plan
42. After Toshiba was selected as the contractor, CPS learned that Toshiba purchased
its 12 percent interest in NINA by paying $300 million to NRG. Half of that amount, or $150
million, now appears to be related, in part, to Toshiba's right to be general contractor on the
Project. Thus, Toshiba, NRG, and NINA were aligned in interest to and did manipulate Project
costs for their collective benefit. Defendants failed to disclose these facts to CPS Energy at the
43. Moreover, upon information and belief, CPS Energy would show that the
Defendants have taken other unilateral actions with respect to the development of the Project that
are favorable to Toshiba (its partner in NINA) and detrimental to CPS Energy.
44. CPS Energy has learned that NRG and NINA representatives have threatened to
"hit CPS Energy with a two by four" through some sort of "countersuit." As recently as
December 16, 2009, Steve Winn has been quoted that "San Antonio's indecision could risk
federal loan guarantees needed to build two reactors." For example, in the same article, Mr.
Winn was also quoted that "if either party quits making payments for 90 days, they lose their
to continue with the Project. These statements are false and are part of Defendants' plan to harm
46. Mr. Winn's speculation about the ramifications of withdrawal from the Project are
particularly irresponsible and damaging in light of the fact that the parties have never come to
final terms on withdrawal rights, and those very issues are pending before this Court.
47. NRG made clear its course of dealing with CPS Energy in a Forbes.com article
dated December 14, 2009. The article states that David Crane, the chief executive officer of
NRG Energy, plans to develop a nuclear project "with a time honored strategy: use other
people's money." The article describes NRG's plan as "finding a series of suckers to take the
risk off his hands." NRG's reckless statements aside, CPS Energy cannot and will not allow it
and its ratepayers to become one of NRG's "suckers." CPS Energy is entitled to full and
adequate relief to protect its valuable investment and rights in the Project.
48. CPS Energy incorporates paragraphs 1 through 47 by reference as if fully set forth
below.
49. Because both the 1997 Participation Agreement and the 2007 Supplemental
Agreement are silent or at least ambiguous as to disposition of the parties' undivided interests in
the Project after withdrawal, CPS Energy asks this Court to exercise its equitable powers under
the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act to determine the rights of these tenants in common in the
event of a voluntary withdrawal from the Project by any party. Due to the sizeable investment
that CPS Energy has in the Project to date and the value of its interest in the site improvements,
50. Accordingly, CPS Energy requests that this Court construe the contracts to
determine the parties' rights upon unilateral withdrawal or, alternatively, declare the legal
51. CPS Energy also respectfully requests that this Court award its reasonable and
necessary attorney fees under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009.
52. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 51 are incorporated by reference
53. As described above, CPS Energy had (a) an agreement with its ratepayers to
deliver power at an affordable price, (b) prospective business relationships with other
municipalities and cooperatives to sell the power produced by the Project, and (c) a contract with
54. Defendants, in concert and conspiracy with one another, have interfered with CPS
Energy's prospective and actual contracts and business relationships and Defendants'
55. As a proximate result of this wrongful conduct, CPS Energy has sustained
56. Defendants' actions were willful and wanton, and CPS Energy is also entitled to
punitive damages.
57. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 56 are incorporated by reference
58. The information that Defendants NRG, NINA, and Toshiba disseminated publicly
was malicious, false and misleading. NRG, NINA, and Toshiba also failed to disclose
information to CPS Energy that was critical to the Project and that it had a duty to disclose.
Moreover, the cost estimates they provided to CPS Energy in June 2009 were false and
misleading and designed to sabotage the Project for CPS Energy. Finally, Defendants NRG,
NINA, and Toshiba failed to disclose that Toshiba had paid NRG to purchase an ownership
59. These Defendants knew and intended that CPS Energy would rely on these
misrepresentations and omissions and that CPS Energy would be - and was - harmed by such
misrepresentations.
CPS Energy has sustained damages in excess of $2 billion. Defendants' actions were willful and
61. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 60 are incorporated by reference
62. The information disseminated by NRG, NINA, and Toshiba publicly and to CPS
Energy contained inaccurate, false, and misleading information. Specifically, the cost estimates
provided to CPS Energy in June 2009 were false and misleading, as were reports about CPS
Energy's ability or inability to continue with the Project. In addition, NRG, NINA, and Toshiba
was also going to be participating in the project by paying NRG to participate in the Project as a
12% owner.
63. Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care or competence when making these
misrepresentations.
65. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 64 are incorporated by reference
66. The statements Defendants have made in the press and elsewhere about CPS
Energy's interest in and ability to complete the Project were false and hannful to CPS Energy's
67. Defendants knew or should have known that their statements were false and
would have a detrimental impact on CPS Energy, or Defendants made these false statements
with reckless disregard for whether they were true and without verifying the accuracy of their
statements.
68. Defendants made these statements with the intent to interfere with CPS Energy's
ability to participate in the Project and with CPS Energy's other economic interests. These
71. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 70 are incorporated by reference
72. Defendants fraudulently induced CPS Energy to enter into the subject contracts
for participation in and construction of the Project by overstating and misrepresenting their
capabilities regarding this type of Project and providing an initial cost estimate that they knew to
be inaccurately low. In addition, NRG and NINA permitted Toshiba to join the project as a 12
percent owner.
73. Defendants understood the critical importance of an accurate cost estimate to CPS
Energy's sustained participation in the Project and intended for CPS Energy to rely on its initial
ill-conceived cost estimate. Moreover, Defendants concealed the fact that Toshiba had
purchased an ownership interest in the Project. CPS Energy reasonably relied on the fact that
NRG and NINA had awarded the construction contract to Toshiba based upon its track record
74. Defendants made these misrepresentations and omissions in order to induce CPS
Energy to enter the contracts to build the Project and to secure, in NRG's own words, the
75. As a result, CPS Energy was fraudulently induced to enter the Supplemental
to punitive damages.
COUNT 7 - Conspiracy
77. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 76 are incorporated by reference
78. Defendants conspired to defraud CPS Energy by, among other things, acting in
concert to mislead CPS Energy by failing to disclose Project critical information. Defendants
also acted in concert to disparage CPS Energy and to interfere with its prospective and other
about CPS Energy for the purpose of ousting CPS Energy or making it impossible for CPS
79. Defendants executed their plan by commISSIOn and omission to induce CPS
Energy to enter into the Project to initially finance it, and then to eliminate CPS Energy from the
80. Defendants have made misrepresentations to and about CPS Energy or failed to
81. As a result of Defendants' illegal conduct, CPS Energy has suffered damages in
excess of $2 billion.
82. As a result of Defendants' wanton and willful conduct, CPS Energy is also
83. The allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 82 are incorporated by reference
84. Due to the urgency surrounding the issues brought to the Court and the
uncertainty faced by the parties, CPS Energy respectfully urges the Court to expedite CPS
85. CPS Energy incorporates paragraphs I through 84 by reference as if fully set forth
below.
86. In the alternative, CPS Energy requests injunctive relief to prevent Defendants
from taking action to destroy or otherwise damage the value of CPS Energy's interests in the
Project. Additionally, CPS Energy fears that Defendants may destroy, remove or secret
documents and other information related to the issues and causes of action in an attempt to
conceal crucial evidence of their illegal conduct. If Defendants succeed in these efforts, CPS
Energy will suffer immediate and irreparable harm in that (a) this heavily negotiated and
valuable Project may be lost; (b) the credibility and goodwill of CPS Energy will be lost; and (c)
87. As set forth above, CPS Energy has shown a probable right of recovery and
likelihood of success on the merits on its claims against Defendants and that CPS Energy will
suffer imminent, irreparable harm without Court intervention, for which there is no adequate
remedy at law.
extraordinary relief from the Court to immediately restrain Defendants from engaging in the
illegal conduct described above. In order to preserve the status quo and to prevent imminent and
irreparable harm to CPS Energy's vested rights, CPS respectfully urges the Court to grant an
immediate Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 680
89. CPS Energy asks the Court to order Defendants and their agents, servants,
those persons or entities in active concert or participation with them (collectively, the
a. Enjoin the Restrained Parties from making any public pronouncements about the
rights and responsibilities of the parties under their agreements before the Court
has an opportunity to decide those issues in this lawsuit;
b. Enjoin the Restrained Parties from declaring any purported "default" under the
Project until such time as the Court can declare the legal rights of the parties with
respect to the Project;
c. Enjoin the Restrained Parties from interfering with or thwarting the Project by
refusing to act in good faith in negotiating a definitive agreement regarding the
Defendants interests in the Project;
f. Enjoin the Restrained Parties from altering the status quo by misleading the
Department of Energy ("DOE") about the rights of CPS Energy in the Project and
from taking any action that would jeopardize funding currently available from the
DOE;
h. Enjoin the Restrained Parties from depleting funds available for the Project;
1. Enjoin the Restrained Parties from negotiating, entering into, canceling, altering,
or modifying any oral or written contracts, understandings, or arrangements,
which conduct would operate to modify, compromise, jeopardize, undermine,
nullify, terminate, hinder, or obstruct the Project or funding for the Project;
90. The requested temporary restraining order and request for injunctive relief will
allow the maintenance of the last, actual, peaceable, and uncontested status quo.
91. CPS Energy is exempt from posting a bond pursuant to § 6.002 of the Texas Civil
Jury Demand
Conditions Precedent
93. All conditions precedent to CPS Energy's claim for relief have been performed or
have occurred.
Prayer
For all the reasons set forth above, CPS Energy respectfully requests the Court to declare
the rights and legal relations of the parties in the event of a unilateral withdrawal, award CPS
Energy its actual damages in an amount in excess of $2 Billion, as well as exemplary damages
pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 41.003 in an amount in excess of $30
its reasonable and necessary attorneys fees in connection with seeking declaratory relief, and for
Respectfully submitted,
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent to the following
opposing counsel on December 23,2009 via email and certified mail, return receipt requested.:
Lamont A. Jefferson
Haynes and Boone, LLP
112 East Pecan Street
Suite 1200
San Antonio, Texas 78205
lamont.jefferson@haynesboone.com
Les
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