BIGAMY; ELEMENTS, EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY OFSECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PENALTY

VERONICO TENEBRO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu
City. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this
third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in
handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and
produced two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held: (1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The prosecution
sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the existence of the marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
(2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage
to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se
an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC criminalizes any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

Requisites for a valid marriage

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
LlBERTY D. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 | 2013-10-16
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties
went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did
not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized
from its inception. CA affirmed.

Issue: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?
Ruling:
Under Article 2 of the Family Code for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. But consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship.
There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 4 7 (3 ), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party
because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSEDfor utter lack of merit.

REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT

FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. Later on, Jose filed a complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage with
the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham. There was no marriage ceremony; his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud; the affidavit of marital cohabitation was false. However, the petition was dismissed. The CA likewise affirmed.
But then it changed its mind and ruled in favor of Jose.
ISSUE: WON the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation rendered the marriage void ab initio???
RULING: YES.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years
of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa's
own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a
sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for
bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on
July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his
consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage
license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab
initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time.
TOPIC: MARRIAGE LICENSE AND ANNULMENT
SYED AZHAR ABBAS V. GLORIA GOO ABBAS (JANUARY 30 2013)
Facts
1) Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage against his wife, Gloria GooAbbas, alleging the absence of a marriage license as a ground. He testified that they were married in Taiwan and when he arrived in
the Philippines, he was told he was going to undergo a ceremony he later on knew was a marriage ceremony. He further testified that
he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license and that he had never resided in that area. The marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract was the number of another marriage license issued to a different couple. It was also brought
up by the petitioner that Gloria filed bigamy cases against him.
2) The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner but in the Court of Appeals, Gloria was the winning party. Hence the petition to the
Supreme Court by Syed.
Issue: Was their marriage valid given the allegations of the petitioner with regards to the marriage license?
Held: No. The marriage was not valid. The Regional Trial Court was correct in holding that no valid marriage license was issued for
the couple. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions to the rule that a marriage license is necessary. Not having complied
with the law under the Family Code, the marriage is void ab initio for being solemnized without a valid marriage license.
Alcantara vs. Alcantara
August 28, 2007
The case:
This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners appeal and
affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose
of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person fixer who arranged their wedding before a certain

Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there
was a marriage license obtained in Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never went to
the said place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at
the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license
number 7054133 is not identical with the marriage license number which appears in their marriage contract. There is also a case
filed by the respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.
The Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent void when there was no marriage license at the precise moment of
the solemnization of the marriage, and when a marriage license appeared both parties were neither resident of the place where the
license was presumably issued, when there was a discrepancy on the marriage license number issued in Cavite and the marriage
license number in the marriage contract?
Held:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family Code, the applicable law would be the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the same
Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the
local civil registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a license
was issued to the parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul their marriage.
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the parties or party responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal civil registrar, which states that the
marriage license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of
the parties is number 7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not detract
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any
showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and regularly issued by
the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities
or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City
is affirmed.
Psychological Incapacity of Parties
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. (COURT OF APPEALS AND) MOLINA
268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997.
FACTS: On August 16, 1990, Roridel Molina filed a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo on the
ground of the latters psychological incapacity. She alleges that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo presented signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility as both husband and father as Reynaldo: preferred to spend time with, and spend money on, his friends; was
dependent on his parents for aid, and; was always dishonest with her about the familys finances.
Reynaldo had been terminated from employment in February 1986 and Rorida had been the sole breadwinner since. In March 1987,
she resigned from her job and went to stay with her parents. Shortly thereafter, Reynaldo left her and their son, Andre, and had since
abandoned their family.
The trial court declared the marriage void and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated NO. The marriage subsists.
RATIO: It has not been established that the defect spoken of is an incapacity. It is more of a difficulty, if not an outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations. Roridels evidence simply showed that she and Reynaldo could not get along.

Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities are not tantamount to psychological incapacity. Rather than
merely failing to meet marital obligations, it is necessary to show that said person is incapable of doing so because of a psychological
illness.
Psychological incapacity is the mental incapacity to the most serious of psychological disorders demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity is characterized by: gravity, judicial
antecedence, and incurability.
(Art. 36 Guidelines laid down by the Court)
Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the plaintiff. Doubt is resolved in favor of the continuation of the marriage.
The root of psychological incapacity must be: a.) clinically identified; b.) alleged in the complaint; c.) proven by experts; and d.)
clearly explained in the decision. The evidence should satisfy the court that either, or both, of the parties is mentally ill to the extent
that s/he could not have known the obligation s/he was assuming; or knowing the obligations, could not validly assume them.
Incapacity must exist at the time the marriage was celebrated. Perception of a manifestation is unnecessary at the time of the
celebration, but the illness must be proven to exist at such moment.
Incapacity must be shown to be incurable or permanent.
Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The essential obligations are those covered by Art. 68 to 71 of the Family Code, between spouses, and Art. 220, 221 and 225 as
regards parents and their children.
Interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not decisive, should be
given great respect by the courts.
Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall
be handed down without the Solicitor Generals issuance of a certificate, stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition. Such certificate will be quoted in the decision. The certificate must be submitted within 15 days from the date the case is
submitted for resolution.

Case: Jaime Sevilla vs. Carmelita Cardenas

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari (RTC: invalid; CA reversed and declared it valid)
Facts:
There are two facts given by both the plaintiff and the respondent:
There was a Civil Marriage contracted in the City Hall of Manila
Thereafter a Religious Ceremony was Conducted in Quezon City
Plaintiff averred that he was forced to enter into marriage with the respondent
Respondent averred that the plaintiff and took her away from her parents and arranged a wedding for them
Plaintiff alleges that he did not procure a marriage license
Due to irreconcilable differences, plaintiff and respondent were separated, thereupon plaintiff obtained a divorce decree and
subsequently married in the US
It was attested by different witnesses that it was the plaintiffs family that arranged the marriage.
RTC declared the marriage void for lack of a marriage license, because they found out that there was no existing license on record
CA reversed the decision due to the fact that it was not substantially proven that there was no marriage license issued. There were
erratic problems with regard to the records because records were not found due to the absence of the handling officer.
Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of
the marriages in question?
Held: SC agrees with the ruling of CA the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License. It
can also mean, as SC believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, SC cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he
married another individual sometime in 1991.We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give
him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it
is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Petition is Denied. Judgment of CA is affirmed by SC.
Sevilla v. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 429
FACTS: Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas were married at Manila City Hall where they executed a marriage contract. A
marriage license number was indicated in the contract, which Jaime never applied for. A church ceremony was conducted on May 31,
1969 using the same license. They lived as husband and wife and later on went to Spain for Jaimes medical education supported by
Jaimes parents. When in Spain their marriage turned bad since Jaime was having a hard time balancing marriage and medical studies;
obsession of Jaime with Carmelitas knees which he would take countless pictures of, intrafemural sex between her knees which are
attributed to Jaimes drug addiction. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to
a break up in their marriage. Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in 1981 and a judicial separation in 1983. Later, she learned that
plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States. Sevilla presented 3 certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan which states that the marriage license with that number cannot be found. The parish where they were wed presented a
Certified copy of a Marriage certificate dated April 11, 1994. RTC ruled that marriage is null due to lack of marriage license. CA
reversed RTCs decision. Marriage license was probably issued but cannot be located
ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid

HELD: Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed. The local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." Failure to locate does not
mean non-existence of the marriage license. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the indissolubility of marriage bonds.
Always presume marriage.
Posted by Michelle Vale Cruz at Saturday, March 22, 2014

Case: Engrace Nial vs. Norma Bayadog

Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioners should have filed the action to declare their fathers
marriage to respondent before his death applying by analogy of Article 47 of the FC (which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate fro annulment of marriage)
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license?
Ruling: There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. They executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other.
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or
should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.

In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.

Declaration of Nullity
Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122
March 14, 2000
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa on September 26, 1974. On April 24, 1985, he shot and killed her. 20 months thereafter,
he remarried Norma Badayog, the respondent herewith. After Pepito died, his heirs by his first marriage filed a petition for declaration
of nullity on the marriage of their father with Norma Badayog on the ground of lack of marriage license. Norma Badayog contends
that the ground have no legal basis for her marriage to Pepito according to Article 34 of the Family Code no marriage license is
necessary for person who have cohabited for atl east five years. The respondent also contends that petitioners are not among those
allowed by the law to file a suit for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Pepito.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent on the ground that indeed the Family Code is silent as to situation. The Petition should
have been filed before the death of Pepito and not after his death. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of marriage license was necessary for Pepito and her have
cohabited for at least five years.
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid.
Held: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited for at least five years since Pepito was still married to Teodulfa
counting backwards from the time he and Norma celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized by exclusivity
and continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to marry. Pepitos previous marriage to Teodulfa is a legal
impediment disqualifying him to the exception of a marriage license. Thus, his second marriage should have a marriage license to be
valid. In this case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking the formal requisite of a marriage licese is therefore void.

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGE

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, COMPLAINANT, VS. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, RESPONDENT.
(OCTOBER 22 2012).
Facts
1) During the subsistence of Lourdes Ciprianos marriage with Socrates, she married Silverio Cipriano. This lead to her filing a
petition for annulment of marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
RTC ruled in Lourdes favour and declared her marriage with Socrates null and void in 2003.
2) In 2004, petitioner, Merlinda Montanez, Silverios daughter from the first marriafe, filed with the MTC of Laguna a complaint for
bigamy against Lourdes. She alleged that Lourdes failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
3) Respondent argued that since her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio, there was no more marriage to
speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on 1983.
Issue: Whether the annulment of respondents first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity justifies the dismissal of the
information for bigamy against her?
Held: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the
accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (Mercado v Tan). Even if the accused eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled (Abunado v People). The moment that the accused contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first marriage which had not been declared null and void in a court of competent
jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting (Jarillo v. People).