II.

GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
- BILL OF RIGHTS A. General Considerations
1. CARLOS SUPERDRUG v. DSWD
Facts:
On February 26, 2004, R.A. No.
9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed
into law. Section 4 (a) of the Act states:
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following: (a) the grant of twenty percent
(20%) discount from all establishments
relative to the utilization of services in hotels
and
similar
lodging
establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for
the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts
granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods
sold or services rendered.
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and
adopted
the
Implementing
Rules
and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9257.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Section 4 (a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens
Act on the ground that: it violates the equal
protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) of the
Constitution.
Issue: whether the State, in promoting the
health and welfare of a special group of
citizens,
can
impose
upon
private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing
a government program.
Held: YES. The Senior Citizens Act was
enacted primarily to maximize the contribution
of senior citizens to nation-building, and to
grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State
considers them an integral part of our society.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police
power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as "the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,

either with penalties or without, not repugnant

to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for
the
good
and
welfare
of
the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same."
For this reason, when the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare. Moreover, in the absence of evidence
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect
of the provision in question, there is no basis
for its nullification in view of the presumption
of validity which every law has in its favor.
While the Constitution protects property rights,
petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of
a business which may result in an impairment
of property rights in the process.

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives.

Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution,
it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly
members while the State may design programs of
social security for them. In addition to this, Section
10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
provides: The State shall provide social justice in all
phases of national development. Further, Article
XIII, Section 11, provides: The State shall adopt an
integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to
all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick,
elderly, disabled, women and children. Consonant
with these constitutional principles the following are
the declared policies of this Act:
(f) To recognize the important role of the private
sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior
citizens and to actively seek their partnership.

TAX CREDIT is a peso-for-peso deduction from a

taxpayers tax liability due to the government of the
amount of discounts such establishment has granted
to a senior citizen. The establishment recovers the
full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and
hence, the government shoulders 100% of the
discounts granted.
It must be noted, however, that conceptually, a tax
credit scheme under the Philippine tax system,
necessitates that prior payments of taxes have been
made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this
tax payment from his/her income tax due.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 1

2. BANAT v COMELEC
Issue: Is the twenty percent allocation for
party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling?
Held: Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides:
Section
5.
(1)
The
House
of
Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected
from
legislative
districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this
Constitution,
one-half
of
the
seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.

Number of seats
Number of seats
available
to
x . available
to
legislative districts
20
party-list
=
representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding
increase in the number of seats available for
party-list
representatives
whenever
a
legislative district is created by law. Since the
14th Congress of the Philippines has 220
district representatives, there are 55 seats
available to party-list representatives.
220
.80

x .20 = 55

After prescribing the ratio of the number of

party-list representatives to the total number
of representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to
party-list representatives to the wisdom
of the legislature.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No.

7941 reads:
Section
11. Number
of
Party-List
Representatives.
The
party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution
states that the "House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law." The House of Representatives shall be
composed of district representatives and partylist representatives. The Constitution allows the
legislature to modify the number of the
members
of
the
House
of
Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 2

3. MIRASOL v DPWH
Facts: Petitioners assert DPWHs Department
Order No. 74 (DO 74), (DO 215), and the
Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB) violate (RA 2000) or the Limited Access
Highway Act.
In the questioned law and orders, tricycles and
other contraptions for traveling were not
allowed to use the express ways.
Held: The RTC held that Section 4 of RA 2000
expressly authorized the DPWH to design
limited access facilities and to regulate,
restrict, or prohibit access as to serve the
traffic for which such facilities are intended. It
logically includes the determination of who and
what can and cannot be permitted entry or
access into the limited access facilities.
The use of public highways by motor vehicles is
subject to regulation as an exercise of the
police power of the state. The police power is
far-reaching in scope and is the 'most
essential, insistent and illimitable of all
government powers. The sole standard in
measuring its exercise is reasonableness.
What is 'reasonable is not subject to exact
definition or scientific formulation, for its
determination rests upon human judgment
applied to the facts and circumstances of each
case.
AO
1
does
not
impose
unreasonable
restrictions.
It
merely
outlines
several
precautionary measures, to which toll way
users must adhere. The purpose of these rules
and the logic behind them are quite evident. A
toll way is not an ordinary road. The special
purpose for which a toll way is constructed
necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the
manner of its use and operation. The mere fact
that certain rights are restricted does not
invalidate the rules.
However, the means by which the government
chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is
'best, rather, on simply whether the act is
reasonable. The validity of a police power
measure does not depend upon the absolute
assurance that the purpose desired can in fact
be probably fully accomplished, or upon the
certainty that it will best serve the purpose
intended. Reason, not scientific exactitude, is
the
measure
of
the
validity
of
the
governmental regulation. Arguments based on
what is 'best are arguments reserved for the
Legislature's discussion. Judicial intervention in

such matters will only be warranted if the

assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We
do not find the situation in this case to be so.

The right to travel does not mean the right to choose

any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to
travel refers to the right to move from one place to
another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any
time they choose using private or public fourwheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right
to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way.
Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as
the rest of the public can. The mode by which
petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of
using the toll way, a subject that can be validly
limited by regulation.

4. YRASUEGUI v PAL
Facts: Petitioner was formally informed by PAL
that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, and considering the utmost leniency
extended to him which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years, his
services were considered terminated effective
immediately.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of
the equal protection clause afforded by the
Constitution.
Held: NO. The setting of the companys weight
limit is within the valid prerogative of the
airline relative to the necessities of the
business. Equal protection afforded by the
Constitution may not be availed of in the
absence of governmental interference. Equal
protection erects no shield against private
conduct however discriminatory or wrongful.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a
cabin attendant are important factors to consider in
case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin
space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the
arguments of respondent that [w]hether the airlines
flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct
relation to its mission of transporting passengers to
their destination; and that the weight standards has
nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents
airlines, must fail.
Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national
origin unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or national origin is an actual qualification
for performing the job.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 3

5. ATIENZA v COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that
their expulsion from the party is not a simple
issue of party membership or discipline; it
involves a violation of their constitutionallyprotected right to due process of law. They
claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should
have first summoned them to a hearing before
summarily expelling them from the party.
According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on
party discipline are the equivalent of
administrative proceedings and are, therefore,
covered by the due process requirements laid
down in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
Issue: Whether or not members of a political
party can claim denial of due process in their
expulsion from the party.
Held: NO. The requirements of administrative
due process do not apply to the internal affairs
of political parties. The due process standards
set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative
bodies created by the state and through which
certain governmental acts or functions are
performed. An administrative agency or
instrumentality "contemplates an authority to
which the state delegates governmental power
for the performance of a state function." The
constitutional limitations that generally apply
to the exercise of the state's powers thus,
apply too, to administrative bodies.
Although political parties play an important
role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its
citizens, it is still a private organization. The
discipline of members by a political party does
not involve the right to life, liberty or property
within the meaning of the due process clause.
An individual has no vested right, as against
the state, to be accepted or to prevent his
removal by a political party. The only rights, if
any, that party members may have, in relation
to other party members, correspond to those
that may have been freely agreed upon among
themselves through their charter, which is a
contract among the party members. Members
whose rights under their charter may have
been violated have recourse to courts of law
for the enforcement of those rights, but not as
a due process issue against the government.
But even when recourse to courts of law may
be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a
political party. A political party is free to
conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its
constitutionally-protected
right
to
free
association.

B. Due Process
1. REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the
Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her
gender from female to male. It is appearing
that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a
rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary
male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital
Adrenal
Hyperplasia
which
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition,
explained
that
Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs
did not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female. The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme
Court invoking that the same was a violation of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because the said petition did not implead the
local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of
the change of sex or gender and name of
respondent as ruled by the lower court.
RULING: The contention of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the petition is fatally
defective because it failed to implead the local
civil registrar as well as all persons who have
or claim any interest therein is not without
merit. However, it must be stressed that
private respondent furnished the local civil
registrar a copy of the petition, the order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of
the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme
Court ruled that there is substantial compliance
of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court held that the determination of a persons
sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue which in this case should be dealt with
utmost care in view of the delicate facts
present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings
forth the need to elaborate the term
intersexuality which is the condition that

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 4

respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY

applies to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female. It is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species
whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined
to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is
said that an organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the
highest tribunal of the land consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court
is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification. That is, Philippine courts must
render judgment based on law and the
evidence presented. In the instant case, there
is no denying that evidence points that
respondent is male. In determining respondent
to be a female, there is no basis for a change
in the birth certificate entry for gender. The
Supreme Court held that where the person is
biologically
or
naturally
intersex
the
determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good
reason
thinks
of
his/her
sex.
Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender
of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having
erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female.
Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has
to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of
action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence
of
evidence
that
respondent
is
an
incompetent and in the absence of evidence
to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are
equally entitled to protection under the law,
the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and
justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

2. BPI v
DAVAO

BPI

EMPLOYEES

UNION

Facts: BPI and Far East Bank and Trust Co.

(FEBTC) merged and BPI, as the surviving
corp., acquired all the assets and liabilities of
FEBTC.
FEBTC employees, including those in its
different branches across the country, were
hired by the petitioner as its own employees,
with their status and tenure recognized and
salaries and benefits maintained.
BPI Employees Union as the exclusive
bargaining agent of BPI requested the
implementation of the Union Shop Clause of
the CBA to the absorbed employees of FEBTC
as a condition for continued employment, for
their continuous refusal to join the said union.
Voluntary Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
FEBTC employees as it was their constitutional
right to join or not join any organization and
that the said employees are not new
employees of BPI for purposes of applying the
Union Shop Clause. However, on appeal, CA
reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not a corporation may
invoke its merger with another corporation as a
valid ground to exempt its absorbed
employees from the coverage of a union shop
clause contained in the CBA with its own
certified labor union.
Held: NO. It is the policy of the State to
promote unionism to enable the workers to
negotiate with the management on the same
level and with more persuasiveness the
purpose of a union shop or other union security
arrangement is to guarantee the continued
existence of the union through enforced
membership for the benefit of the workers.
Union Security Clause is a valid restriction of
freedom or right to join any labor organization
because it is in favor of unionism. The right to
abstain from joining a labor org. is subordinate
to the policy of encouraging unionism as an
instrument of social justice.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 5

3. ANONYMOUS v RADAM
Facts:
In
an
anonymous
lettercomplaint, respondent Ma. Victoria Radam,
utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City in
Pangasinan, was charged with immorality. The
unnamed complainant alleged that respondent
was unmarried but got pregnant and gave
birth. The
complainant
claimed
that
respondents behavior tainted the image of the
judiciary.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended
that,
in
accordance
with Villanueva
v.
Milan, respondent
be
absolved of the charge of immorality because
her alleged misconduct (that is, giving birth
out of wedlock) did not affect the character
and nature of her position as a utility worker.
However, it proposed that she be held liable for
conduct unbecoming a court employee and
imposed a fine ofP5,000 for stating in the birth
certificate of her child Christian Jeon that the
father was "unknown" to her.
Issue: Whether or
due process on the
for stating in the
father of her child is

not respondent was given

issue of imposition of fine
birth certificate that the
unknown.

Held:NO. Respondent was indicted only for

alleged immorality for giving birth out of
wedlock. It was the only charge of which she
was informed. Judge Abellas investigation
focused solely on that matter. Thus, the
recommendation of the OCA that she be held
administratively liable in connection with an
entry in the birth certificate of Christian Jeon
came like a thief in the night. It was
unwarranted.
Respondent
was
neither
confronted with it nor given the chance to
explain it. To hold her liable for a totally
different charge of which she was totally
unaware will violate her right to due process.
The
essence
of
due
process
in
an
administrative proceeding is the opportunity to
explain ones side, whether written or
verbal. This presupposes that one has been
previously apprised of the accusation against
him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of
both with regard to her alleged unbecoming
conduct in relation to a certain statement in
the birth certificate of her child.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 6

4. ROMAGOS
DISTRICT

CEBU

WATER

Facts: Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD)

employed Vilma E. Romagos (Romagos) as
Clerk-Processor B. On August 9, 1999, MCWD
barred Romagos from entering the work
premises unless she undergoes psychiatric
treatment and is certified by her doctor to be
mentally fit to work. Thereafter, in a letter
dated December 1, 1999, MCWD informed
Romagos that, effective January 1, 2000, she
was being dropped from the rolls for mental
incapacity.

Thus, a declaration of mental disorder does not

automatically translate to a judgment of
mental incapacity to perform work. A window
remains open for the affected officer or
employee to counter opinion on his mental
condition and to show that his ability to work
remains unimpaired. Only then may the
appointing authority or head of office decide on
whether said officer or employee is no longer
mentally capable of performing his work and
should be discharged. These requirements are
designed to obviate misuse of non-disciplinary
modes of separation for petty vengeance or
vicious harassment.

Issue: whether there was proper procedure

and substantial basis for MCWD (respondent)
to declare petitioner mentally unfit to work and
drop her from the rolls.
Held: NO. The case involves a non-disciplinary
separation
as
opposed
to
disciplinary
separation which involves Physical or mental
incapacity or disability due to immoral or
vicious habits.
The only difference between the two modes of
separation
is
that
the
first
carries
administrative disabilities, such as forfeiture of
retirement
benefits
and
perpetual
disqualification from employment in the
government service, while the second does
not. But both result in loss of employment a
property right protected under the due process
clause. Hence, even if considered a nondisciplinary mode of separation, dropping from
the rolls due to mental incapacity not arising
from immoral or vicious habits is subject to the
requirements of due process.
Clearly, before an officer or employee may be
dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity,
the following elements and process must
obtain: first, that it has been observed that
the subject officer or employee has been
behaving abnormally for an extended period;
second, that it has been established through
substantial evidence that such abnormal
behavior manifests a continuing mental
disorder and incapacity to work; third, that a
written notice is issued by the subjects
immediate supervisor, describing the formers
continuing mental disorder and incapacity to
work and citing the reports of his co-workers
or immediate supervisor, as confirmed by the
head of office; and finally, that another notice
is issued by the appointing authority or head of
office, informing the subject of his separation
from the service due to mental incapacity.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 7

5. TAN v PACURIBOT
Facts:
Judge
Pacuribot
was
charged
administratively
for
sexual
harassment
committed against two married subordinates
a court stenographer and a clerk in the Parole
Probation Office. The matter was referred to
the
CA
Justice
for
investigation
and
recommendation. The investigating Justice
found the charges to be well-founded, making
reference to quantum of evidence that would
suffice for said purpose, proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

removal of a judicial officer should thus be

more than substantial; they must be proven
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
To
borrow
from Reyes v. Mangino:
Inasmuch as what is imputed against
respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so
grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal
from the bench, the quantum of proof required
should be more than substantial.

Held: It is well settled that in administrative

proceedings, the complainant has the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. In the case
at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca
were
able
to
adequately
substantiate their allegations.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does
not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude
the possibility of error and produce absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or
that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence
adduced here overwhelmingly established
moral certainty that respondent judge raped
and sexually harassed complainant Mesdames
Tan and Villafranca on separate and repeated
occasions.

The decision side-stepped the issue of the

requisite of quantum as decreed in Alcuizar
which was decided 4 months ago. Instead it
referred to a general rule about administrative
proceedings and requisite proof.
Case of Alquizar v. Carpio, et al., the
Supreme Court pronounced that:
x x x. In administrative or disciplinary
proceedings, the burden of proving the
allegations in the complaint rests on the
complainant. While substantial evidence would
ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt,
the rule is a bit different where the
proceedings involve judges charged with grave
offense. Administrative proceedings against
judges are, by nature, highly penal in
character and are to be governed by the rules
applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of
proof required to support the administrative
charges or to establish the ground/s for the

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 8

6. MACIAS v MACIAS

7. DOH v CAMPOSANO

Facts: Complainant alleged that sometime in

1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison
and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn
Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early
20s. The relationship continued until the time
of the filing of the complaint.
From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant
manifested that only four (4) witnesses shall
be presented.
Held: Members of the judiciary are not a class
of their own, sui generis, in the field of public
service as to require a higher degree of proof
for the administrative cases filed against them
other than, perhaps, the fact that because of
the nature of the responsibility judges have,
they are required to live up to a higher
standard of integrity, probity and morality.
When we dismiss a public officer or employee
from his position or office for the commission
of a grave offense in connection with his office,
we merely require that the complainant prove
substantial evidence. When we disbar a
disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant
merely prove a clear preponderance of
evidence to establish liability. There appears no
compelling reason to require a higher degree
of proof when we deal with cases filed against
judges.

NOTE: The procedure for the impeachment of judges

of first instance has heretofore not been well
defined. The Supreme Court has not yet adopted
rules of procedure, as it is authorized to do by law.
In practice, it is usual for the court to require that
charges made against a judge of first instance shall
be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter,
to give the respondent judge an opportunity to
answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the
respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the
charges without further annoyance for the judge;
while if the charges establish a prima facie case,
they are referred to the Attorney-General who acts
for the court in conducting an inquiry into the
conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion
of the Attorney-Generals investigation, a hearing is
had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment
to determine if sufficient cause exists involving the
serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent
judge as warrants the court in recommending his
removal to the Governor-General.
Impeachment proceedings before courts have been
said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature
highly penal in character and to be governed by the
rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges
must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 9

8. AGABON v NLRC

9. MICHAEL H. v GERAL D. (US case)

Facts: Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice

installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a
company engaged in the business of selling
ornamental construction materials. They were
employed from January 2, 1992 until February
23, 1999, when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. The Agabons filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA,
who ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on
appeal. The CA sustained the NLRCs
decision. The Agabons further appealed to the
SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and
claiming that the company did not comply with
the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
Issue: WON
dismissed.

the

Agabons

were

illegally

Held: NO. Substantive due process (EEs must

be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC
upheld the finding of abandonment, because
the act of the Agabons in seeking employment
elsewhere clearly showed a deliberate intent to
sever the ER-EE relationship. Procedural due
process (for just cause, there must be a
written notice informing him of grounds for
termination, a hearing or opportunity to be
heard, and a final notice of termination stating
the grounds therefor): There was no due
process because ER did not send the requisite
notices to the last known address of the EEs.
ER only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice
would be useless because the EEs no longer
lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they
should have still sent a notice as mandated by
law. For not sending the requisite notices, the
ER should be held liable for non-compliance
with the procedural requirements of due
process.

Facts of the Case:

Gerald D. was the presumptive father of
Victoria D. since she was born to his wife
Carole D.. However, Carole had an adulterous
partner, Michael H., who obtained blood tests
indicating that he was likely the biological
father. When Michael obtained visitation rights
in a California state court, Gerald argued that
Michael had no ground under California law to
challenge Gerald's paternity since more than
two years had passed since Victoria's birth.
According to Cal. Evid. Code 621, the child is
"presumed to be a child of the marriage" and
another man can only
challenge
this
presumption within two years of birth. The
court ruled in favor of Gerald and canceled
Michael's visitation rights. Michael claimed that
Code 621 violated his Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights by denying him an
opportunity to establish his paternity. A
California Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of Code 621.
Question:
Does Cal. Evid. Code 621 violate the Due
Process Clause by denying a possible biological
father the chance to establish his paternity of a
child after two years have passed since the
child's birth?
Conclusion:
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the
judgment for a 5-4 court. Based on its analysis
of common-law tradition, the plurality opinion
found that a possible biological father does not
have a fundamental right to obtain parental
rights after the presumptive father has
exercised significant responsibility over the
child. Therefore due process protection does
not apply. Code 621 was based on commonlaw precedent which showed "an aversion to
declaring children illegitimate" and supported
"the interest in promoting the 'peace and
tranquility of States and families.'" Restricting
Michael's parental rights achieved this by
granting Gerald the sole responsibility to play
the role of Victoria's father.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 10

10. WASHINGTON v GLUCKSBERG (US

case)
Facts of the Case:
Dr. Harold Glucksberg -- along with four other
physicians, three terminally ill patients who
have since died, and a nonprofit organization
that
counsels
individuals
contemplating
physician assisted-suicide -- brought this suit
challenging the state of Washington's ban on
physician assisted-suicide. The State of
Washington has historically criminalized the
promotion of suicide attempts by those who
"knowingly cause or aid another person to
attempt suicide." Glucksberg alleged that
Washington's
ban
was
unconstitutional.
Following a District Court ruling favoring
Glucksberg and his fellow petitioners, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court
granted Washington certiorari.
Question:
Did Washington's ban on physician assistedsuicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause by denying competent
terminally ill adults the liberty to choose death
over life?
Conclusion:
No. Analyzing the guarantees of the Due
Process Clause, the Court focused on two
primary aspects: the protection of our nation's
objective fundamental, historically rooted,
rights and liberties; and the cautious definition
of what constitutes a due process liberty
interest. The Court held that the right to
assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause
since its practice has been, and continues to
be, offensive to our national traditions and
practices. Moreover, employing a rationality
test, the Court held that Washington's ban was
rationally related to the state's legitimate
interest in protecting medical ethics, shielding
disabled and terminally ill people from
prejudice which might encourage them to end
their lives, and, above all, the preservation of
human life.

11. LAWRENCE v TEXAS (US case)

Facts of the Case:
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance
in a private residence, Houston police entered
John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and
another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in
a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and
Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate
sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas
statute forbidding two persons of the same sex
to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.
In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held
that the statute was not unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.
Question:
Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence
and
Tyron
Garner
under
the
Texas
"Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes
sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not
identical behavior by different-sex couples,
violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee
of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal
convictions for adult consensual sexual
intimacy in the home violate their vital
interests in liberty and privacy protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?
Conclusion:
No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held
that the Texas statute making it a crime for
two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct violates the
Due Process Clause. After explaining what it
deemed the doubtful and overstated premises
of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case
turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were
free as adults to engage in the private conduct
in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government," wrote Justice
Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual," continued Justice Kennedy.
Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence
Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas joined, filed dissents.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 11

12. CITY OF MANILA v LAGUIO

At issue is the constitutionality of the City
Ordinance of Manila entitled: entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION
OF
BUSINESSES
PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super
clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In
Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of
the enumerated establishments are given three
(3) months from the date of approval of the
Ordinance within which to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside
the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable
within the area. Further, it states in Section 4
that in cases of subsequent violations of the
provisions of the Ordinance, the premises of
the erring establishment shall be closed and
padlocked permanently.
Held: The Ordinance is so replete with
constitutional infirmities that almost every
sentence thereof violates a constitutional
provision. ()
The tests of a valid ordinance are well
established. A long line of decisions has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1)
must
not
contravene
the
Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3)
must
not
be
partial
or
discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade;
(5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only
be valid when they are not contrary to the
Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance
must satisfy two requirements: it must

pass
muster
under
the
test
of
constitutionality
and
the
test
of
consistency with the prevailing laws. That
ordinances should be constitutional uphold the
principle of the supremacy of the Constitution.
The requirement that the enactment must not
violate existing law gives stress to the precept
that local government units are able to
legislate only by virtue of their derivative
legislative power, a delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature.
The constitutional safeguard of due process is
embodied in the fiat (N)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. . . .
There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It furnishes though a standard to
which governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
This standard is aptly described as a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice, and as
such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the
police power.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals; to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of the government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and
distributive justice; to protect property from
confiscation by legislative enactments, from
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a
trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of
judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons
equal and impartial justice and the benefit of
the general law.
The guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation, and private corporations
and partnerships are persons within the
scope of the guaranty insofar as their property
is concerned.
This clause has been interpreted as imposing
two separate limits on government, usually
called
procedural
due
process
and
substantive due process.
Procedural due process, as the phrase
implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Classic
procedural due process issues are concerned
with what kind of notice and what form of
hearing the government must provide when it
takes a particular action.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 12

Substantive due process, as that phrase

connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a persons
life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there
is a sufficient justification for the governments
action
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
(TEST) To successfully invoke the exercise of
police power as the rationale for the enactment
of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only
must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. It must be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure
and
the
means
employed
for
its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly,
the promotion and protection of the social and
moral values of the community. Granting for
the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Councils police powers, the means employed
for
the
accomplishment
thereof
were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
That these are used as arenas to consummate
illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further
the illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay
stress on the acrid truth that sexual
immorality, being a human frailty, may take
place in the most innocent of places
While a motel may be used as a venue for
immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a
nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a
naked assumption. If that were so and if that
were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area
would not only be purged of its supposed social
ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well
as every human activity, reprehensible or not,
in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare
to the estimation of the authorities.

as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it

should not foster the illusion that it can make a
moral man out of it because immorality is not a
thing, a building or establishment; it is in the
hearts of men.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
It is readily apparent that the means employed
by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
persons fundamental right to liberty and
property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right
to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried
may invoke this right to autonomy to
consummate their bonds in intimate sexual
conduct within the motels premises. Be it
stressed that their consensual sexual behavior
does not contravene any fundamental state
policy as contained in the Constitution. Adults
have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of
their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. The liberty protected
by the Constitution allows persons the right to
make this choice. Their right to liberty under
the due process clause gives them the full right
to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government, as long as they do not run
afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and
restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only
means freedom from unlawful government
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is
to be a repository of freedom. The right to be
let alone is the beginning of all freedoms. t is
the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but

fails to address the core issues of morality. Try

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 13

13. WHITE LIGHT CORP v CITY OF

MANILA
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor
Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance
entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time
Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and
Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in
the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the
Malate
Tourist
and
Development Corporation (MTDC)
filed
a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and
prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992,
petitioners White Light
Corporation,
Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist
Development Corporation filed a motion to
intervene, which was granted by the RTC.
MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which
was also granted by the RTC. On January 14,
1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing
the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance. On October 20, 1993, the RTC
rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance
null and void. The City then filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
However, the Supreme Court referred the same
to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that
the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Local government code and
the Revised Manila charter. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue:
Whether
constitutional.

the

Ordinance

is

Held: No, it is not constitutional. The apparent

goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate
the
use
of
the
covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug
use and the like. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends does not sanctify any
and all means for their achievement. However
well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in
effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains
the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricts the rights of
their patrons without sufficient justification.

Facts: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National

Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law
and it . seeks to provide an adequate supply of
safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and by regulating blood banks in the country. RA
7719 provides for the phasing out of commercial
blood banks.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already
been operating commercial blood banks under
Republic Act No. 1517, The law, which allowed
the establishment and operation by licensed
physicians of blood banks and blood processing
laboratories.
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine
Foundation released its final report of a study on
the Philippine blood banking system. It was
revealed that the Philippines heavily relied on
commercial sources of blood. It was further found
that blood sold by persons to blood commercial
banks are three times more likely to have any of
the infections or blood transfusion transmissible
diseases than those donated to PNRC.
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services
Act providing for the phase out of commercial
blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting
the
Implementing
Rules
and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS
A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER;
Held: The Court finds that the National Blood
Services Act is a valid exercise of the States
police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under
the circumstances, adopted a course of action
that is both necessary and reasonable for the
common good. Police power is the State authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare.
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related
grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty and
property, and violation of the non-impairment
clause, to be unmeritorious.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give
meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out
commercial blood banks. This action may
seriously affect the owners and operators, as well
as the employees, of commercial blood banks but
their interests must give way to serve a higher
end for the interest of the public. (Sol Andoy)

14. BELTRAN v SECRETARY OF HEALTH

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 14

15. LUCENA
GRAND
CENTRAL
TERMINAL v JAC LINER, INC.
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an
ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all
buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger
jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the
city and are hereby directed to proceed to the
common terminal, for picking-up and/or
dropping of their passengers; and (b) all
temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are
hereby declared inoperable starting from the
effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides
that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall
use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC
Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia,
the same constituted an invalid exercise of
police power, an undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition
against
monopolies.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect

an equilibrium between authority and liberty so
that rights are exercised within the framework
of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights. It is its reasonableness,
not its effectiveness, which bears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a
law were measured by its effectiveness, then
even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever
they happen to be effective.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies

the requisite of valid exercise of police power,
i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.
Held:
The
local
government
may be
considered as having properly exercised its
police power only if the following requisites are
met: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been
enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve
public interest warranting the interference of
the State. The first requisite for the proper
exercise of police power is thus present. This
leaves for determination the issue of whether
the
means
employed
by
the
Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed
objective were reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory
use of the terminal operated by petitioner
would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals
and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate
court. What should have been done was to
determine exactly where the problem lies and
then
to
stop
it
right
there.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 15

16. GSIS v MONTESCLAROS

Facts: Nicolas filed and was approved an
application for retirement benefits under PD
No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977.Milagros, as wife and
designated beneficiary, filed with GSIS a claim
for survivorship pension. GSIS denied the
claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146,
the surviving spouse has no right to
survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10
July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984.
Issue: WON the proviso in Section 18 of PD
1146 is valid and constitutional.
Held: It is void for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the law. The GSIS cannot
deny the claim of Milagros for survivorship
benefits based on this invalid proviso.
Denial of Due Process. The proviso is
contrary to Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that [n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, orproperty
without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of
thelaws. The proviso (Sec. 18, PD 1146) is
unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a
dependent spouses claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted
marriage to the pensioner within the threeyear prohibited period. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving
spouse without giving the surviving spouse an
opportunity to be heard. The proviso
undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is
to assure comprehensive and integrated social
security and insurance benefits to government
employees and their dependents in the event
of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of
the government employees.

17. DYCAICO v SSS

FACTS: Bonifacio became a member of SSS in 1980
and named Elena and their 8 children as his
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. He retired in 1989 and began receiving
his SSS pension. He married Elena on January 1997
and he died on June 19997.
Elena filed for survivors pension but said
application was denied on the ground that they were
married after Bonifacios retirement. According to
the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to
the survivors pension in ones capacity as primary
beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of
relationship with and dependency for support upon
the deceased SSS member during his lifetime.
Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 provides that the
primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivors
pension are those who qualify as such as of the date
of retirement of the deceased member.
HELD: The proviso infringes the due process clause.
In a pension plan where employee participation is
mandatory, employees have contractual or vested
rights in the pension where the pension is part of the
terms of employment. Where the employee retires
and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to benefits that is protected by the due
process clause and retirees enjoy a protected
property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law. The
mandatory contributions to the SSS under RA 8282
form part of the employees compensation. The
proviso as of the date of his retirement runs afoul
of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives
the surviving
spouses
whose respective
marriages to the retired SSS members were
contracted after the latters retirement of their
survivors
benefits.
There
is
outright
confiscation of benefits due such surviving
spouses without giving them an opportunity to
be heard.
By this outright disqualification, the proviso
qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the
purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has
created the presumption that marriages contracted
after the retirement date of SSS members were
entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits
under RA 8282. This presumption, moreover, is
conclusive because the said surviving spouses are
not afforded any opportunity to disprove the
presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it
creates
this
conclusive
presumption,
is
unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is
not necessarily or universally true.
Standards of due process require that the petitioner
be allowed to present evidence to prove that her
marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith
and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the
survivors pension accruing upon his death. Hence,
the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner and
those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired
SSS members this opportunity to be heard must be
struck down.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 16

18. ROMULADEZ v COMELEC

19. SOUTHERN
HEMISPHERE
ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. v
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

BILL OF RIGHTS (Due Process) 17