FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner vs.

NHA, Respondents
G.R. No. 164527
Facts:
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directy, among
other things, access to all documents and information relating to the Smokey
Montain Development and Reclamation Project including its underlying Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a
government body, and the R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI).
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for
eventual development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial
site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and
reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with
the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as
enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government
through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall
compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable
rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract
as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be
agreed upon by both parties.
The SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project
involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary
housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II
involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of
the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the
JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes
and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The
original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The
reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79
hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by
President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an
enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made
the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at
Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to
be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of
Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing
structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.

Issues:
Whether or not neither respondent NHA nor respondent R-II Builders
may validly reclaim foreshore and submerged land.
2.
Whether or not respondent R-II Builders cannot acquire the
reclaimed foreshore and submerged land areas.
3.
Whether or not the Clean Air Act struck down the Phase-II of the
Project.
1.

Held:
1.
Yes,the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in
the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM
which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were
given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the
project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that
originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of
lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415
issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President
Ramos.Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire
property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it
may deem appropriate.
2.
No, R-II Builders cannot acquire the land. When the lands were
transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by
which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.
3.
The court find that the March 19, 1993 JVA between NHA and RBI
and the SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent amendments to the JVA
and all other agreements signed and executed in relation to it, including, but not
limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Agreement and
the agreement on Phase I of the Project as well as all other transactions which
emanated from the Project, have been shown to be valid, legal, and
constitutional. Phase II has been struck down by the Clean Air Act.

Salalima vs. ECC and SSS

G.R. No. 146360

FACTS:
Petitioners husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was employed for twenty-nine years as
a route helper and subsequently as route salesman of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.,
Incorporated. For the considerable stretch of Juanchos stay at Coca-Cola, he was
found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. Several months before his
demise, he was diagnosed with Adenocarcinoma of the lungs. A little over two
weeks before his death, Juancho was afflicted with pneumonia.

Petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626 with SSS. SSS
denied the claim because allegedly the cause of death was not work connected.
Petitioner brought the matter to ECC, which affirmed the decision of SSS.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that Juanchos route as a

salesman exposed him to all kinds of pollutants. Petitioner cited the raison dtre
for the passage of Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act.
Petitioner stated that the Act provides for a comprehensive pollution control
policy that mainly concentrates on the prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its
scientifically proven deleterious effect on the health of individuals. Petitioner
likewise attached a clipping from the newspaper Manila Standard containing a
report stating that if the present level of diesel exhaust continues, the pollution
could be expected to cause more than 125,000 cases of lung cancer in 70 years.

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the ECC. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to death benefits under PD 626 as amended.

HELD:
P.D. No. 626 provides that for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of
an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees
Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the
claimants working conditions.

Cancer of the lungs is not among the listed occupational disease under Juanchos
line of work. However, petitioner can still claim death benefits if she can prove
that Juanchos risk of contracting the disease was increased by the latters
working conditions. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and
not a direct causal relation.
In Juanchos case, this probability exists. Juanchos job required long hours on the
streets as well as his carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales calls. The
combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment
verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His
continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development of his
cancer of the lungs.

Wherefore the claim for death benefits is granted.

SJS V Atienza
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
FACTS:
On November 20, 2001, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following
day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil
depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) which only scaled down the property covered by the
depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July
25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city
to
implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has
been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of
a guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a welldefined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be
the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to
the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are
citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance
of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city,
he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed
by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made
it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until
April 30, 2003.

Hilarion Henares vs. LTFRB and DOTC,

G.R. No. 158290
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents LTFRB (Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board) and
DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communication) to require public utility
vehicles to use Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as alternative.
Petitioners alleged that the particulate matters-Complex mixture of dust,
dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and composition emitted into air
from various engine combustions- have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners also allege
that the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major source of
harmful emissions and that an increasing number of victims of chronic obstructive
pulmonary diseases (COPD) was due to the emissions of PUVs.Petitioners
upholds the decision from Oposa vs. Factoran , Sec. 16 of Art. II of 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 8749 otherwise known as Philippine air act of 1999.
Solicitor General (SG) sought that the petition to issue a merit of
mandamus be dismissed, alleging that mandamus is only available only to compel
the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Hence, reiterates by SG
that LTFRB and DOTC are not in the position to compel PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel. The SG explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards set forth in R.A. 8749 and the said law only
goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does
not recognize CNG as an alternative fuel.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent is the agency responsible to implement
the suggested alternative fuel or requiring the PUVs to use CNG?
2. Whether or not the respondent can be compelled to require PUVs to
use CNG through a writ of mandamus?
HELD:
The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioners are
unable to pinpoint the law that imposes indubitable legal duty on respondents
that will justify a grant of writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for PUVs.
The SC agrees with the findings of SG. Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy
and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use
CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section
4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or
franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys It
appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific

statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein

petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.