G.R. No. 137882.

February 04, 2005

SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. OLGA RAMISCAL represented by
ENRIQUE MENDOZA, respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS
Respondent OLGA RAMISCAL is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the corner of 18th Avenue
and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City, covered by a TCT. Petitioners SPS. DE LA CRUZ are occupants of
a parcel of land, with an area of eighty-five (85) square meters, located at the back of Ramiscals property,
and covered by a TCT in the name of Concepcion de la Pea, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. The
subject matter of this case is a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent which
is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18thAvenue, the nearest public highway from their property.
Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate, fence, and roof.
In 1976, respondent leased her property to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned a property
adjacent to that of respondents. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the sale,
Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared a relocation survey and location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent and
San Benito Realty. It was only then that respondent discovered that the aforementioned pathway being occupied by
petitioners is part of her property. Through her lawyer, respondent immediately demanded that petitioners demolish
the structure constructed by them on said pathway without her knowledge and consent.
As her letter addressed to petitioners went unheeded, the Ramiscal referred the matter to the Barangay for
conciliation proceedings, but the parties arrived at no settlement. Hence, Ramsical filed this complaint with the
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-95-25159, seeking the demolition of the structure allegedly illegally constructed
by petitioners on her property.
She asserted that petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the current one
they are using, which she owns. In support of the complaint, respondent presented TCT covering the property
in the name of Concepcion de la Pea. The TCT reveals that a portion of Lot, consisting of 85 square meters,
is being occupied by petitioners.
To prove that petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the pathway which
respondent owns, Ramsical adduced in evidence a copy of the plan of a subdivision survey for Concepcion
de la Pea and Felicidad Manalo prepared in 1965 and subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Pea prepared in
1990. These documents establish an existing 1.50-meter wide alley, on the lot of Concepcion de la Pea,
which serves as passageway from the lot being occupied by petitioners, to Boni Serrano Avenue.
On the other hand, petitioners, in their Answer, admitted having used a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long
strip of land on the northern side of respondents property as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest
public highway from their property, but claimed that such use was with the knowledge of respondent. Sps De la Cruz
alleged that in 1976, respondent initiated the construction on her property of a motor shop known as Phil. Orient
Motors and they, as well as the other occupants of the property at the back of respondents land, opposed the
construction of the perimeter wall as it would enclose and render their property without any adequate ingress and
egress. They asked respondent to give them a 1.50-meter wide and 40.15-meter long easement on the eastern side
of her property, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the owner of another
adjacent estate. Ramsical did not want to give them the easement on the eastern side of her property,
towards Boni Serrano Avenue but, instead, offered to them the said 1.10-meter wide passageway along
the northern side of her property towards 18th Avenue, which offer they had accepted.
Petitioners additionally averred in their Answer that they were made to sign a document stating that they
waived their right to ask for an easement along the eastern side of respondents property towards Boni Serrano
Avenue, which document was among those submitted in the application for a building permit by a certain Mang
Puling, the person in charge of the construction of the motor shop. That was why, according to petitioners, the
perimeter wall on respondents property was constructed at a distance of 1.10-meters offset and away from
respondents property line to provide a passageway for them to and from 18 th Avenue. They maintained in their
Answer that respondent knew all along of the 1.10-meter pathway and had, in fact, tolerated their use thereof.
The RTC rendered a decision in favour of Ramsical, giving probative weight to the evidence adduced by her.
The spouses were ordered to demolish the structure built by them along the pathway on the eastern side of plaintiffs
property towards 18th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City. The CA dismissed the appeal filed by for failure to file brief
within the reglementary period. Their MR was also dismissed. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: 1. WON petitioners were entitled to a legal easement of right of way, assuming no voluntary right
of way was granted them by the respondent.
2. WON operative equitable principle of laches barred the respondent from depriving the
petitioners continued use of the said right of way.

RULING: 1. The Court ruled in the negative

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by
virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the
benefit of another thing or person. The statutory basis for this right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of
the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is
subject thereto, the servient estate.
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal
and the latter voluntary easements.
Ramsical did not voluntarily accord petitioners a right of way. Also, petitioner spouses failed to show by
competent evidence other than their bare claim that they and their tenants entered into an agreement with
respondent, through her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the pathway to 18th Avenue, which would be reciprocated with
an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the owner of another adjacent estate. The hands of this Court are tied
from giving credence to petitioners self-serving claim that such right of way was voluntarily given them by
respondent for the following reasons:
First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of document evidencing such agreement. The Civil Code
is clear that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing. Thus, the dearth of
corroborative evidence opens doubts on the veracity of the naked assertion of petitioners that indeed the subject
easement of right of way was a voluntary grant from respondent.
Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only the foreman, Mang Puling, who talked with them
regarding said pathway on the northern side of respondents property. Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz
testified that she did not talk to respondent regarding the arrangement proposed to them by Mang Puling despite the
fact that she often saw respondent. It is, therefore, foolhardy for petitioners to believe that the alleged foreman of
respondent had the authority to bind the respondent relating to the easement of right of way.
Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling submitted said agreement to the Quezon City Engineers Office,
in connection with the application for a building permit but said office could no longer produce a copy thereof, does
not inspire belief. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, petitioners should have requested a subpoena duces
tecum from said court to compel the Quezon City Engineers Office to produce said document or to prove that such
document is indeed not available.
The fact that the perimeter wall of the building on respondents property was constructed at a distance of 1.10
meters away from the property line, does not by itself bolster the veracity of petitioners story that there was indeed
such an agreement. Further, as noted by the trial court, it was Atty. Federico R. Onandia, counsel of Phil. Orient
Motors, who wrote petitioners on 25 August 1994 advising them that his client would close the pathway along
18th Avenue, thereby implying that it was Phil. Orient Motors, respondents lessee, which tolerated
petitioners use of said pathway.
Likewise futile are petitioners attempts to show that they are legally entitled to the aforesaid pathway under
Article 649 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is
entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the following
requisites:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;

payment of proper indemnity;
the isolation is not the result of its own acts;
the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
The first three requisites are not obtaining in the instant case. Also, the trial court found from the
records that Concepcion had provided petitioners with an adequate ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue.
The trial court, gave weight to TCT covering the property in the name of Concepcion. Said TCT indicates that a portion
of Lot 1-B, consisting of 85 square meters and denominated as Lot 1-B-2, is the one being occupied by petitioners. In
this connection, a copy of the plan of a subdivision survey for Concepcion de la Pea and Felicidad Manalo prepared in
1965 and subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Pea prepared in 1990 revealed an existing 1.50-meter wide alley, on
the lot of Concepcion de la Pea, which serves as passageway from the lot being occupied by petitioners to Boni
Serrano Avenue.

During the trial, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz herself admitted knowledge of the existence of the subdivision
plan of the lot prepared for Concepcion de la Pea by Engr. Julio Cudiamat in 1990. From petitioner Elizabeth de la
Cruzs own admission, a portion of the lot owned by Concepcion was intended by the owner-Concepcion to serve as an
access to a public highway for the occupants of the interior portion of her property. Inasmuch as petitioners have an
adequate outlet to a public highway (Boni Serrano Avenue), they have no right to insist on using a portion of
respondents property as pathway towards 18th Avenue and for which no indemnity was being paid by them.
Petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz claimed before the trial court that although there was indeed a portion of land
allotted by Concepcion de la Pea to serve as their ingress and egress to Boni Serrano Avenue, petitioners can no
longer use the same because de la Pea had constructed houses on it. As found by the trial court, the isolation
of petitioners property was due to the acts of Concepcion de la Pea, who is required by law to grant a
right of way to the occupants of her property. In the trial courts rationale:
Article 649 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right of way is not compulsory if the
isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietors own acts. To allow the spouses access to
Ramsicals property towards 18th Avenue simply because it is a shorter route to a public highway, despite the
fact that a road right of way, which is even wider, although longer, was in fact provided for them by
Concepcion de la Pea towards Boni Serrano Avenue would ignore what jurisprudence has consistently
maintained through the years regarding an easement of right of way, that mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a
real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it.
In Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, it was likewise held that a person who had
been granted an access to the public highway through an adjacent estate cannot claim a similar
easement in an alternative location if such existing easement was rendered unusable by the
owners own act of isolating his property from a public highway, such as what Concepcion de la
Pea allegedly did to her property by constructing houses on the 1.50 meter wide alley leading to
Boni Serrano Avenue. And, if it were true that the spouses had already bought the lot, the portion occupied
by them, from Concepcion de la Pea, then the latter is obliged to grant defendants a right of way without
indemnity.
We hasten to add that under the above-quoted Article 649 of the Civil Code, it is the owner, or any person
who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable surrounded by other immovable pertaining to other
persons, who is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates. In this case, petitioners fell short
of proving that they are the owners of the supposed dominant estate. Nor were they able to prove that they possess
a real right to use such property. The petitioners claim to have acquired their property from Concepcion. However, as
earlier noted, the trial court found that the title to both lots is still registered in the name of Concepcion de la Pea
under a TCT. Neither were petitioners able to produce the Deed of Sale evidencing their alleged purchase of the
property from de la Pea. Hence, by the bulk of evidence, de la Pea, not petitioners, is the real party-in-interest to
claim a right of way although, as explained earlier, any action to demand a right of way from de la Peas part will not
lie inasmuch as by her own acts of building houses in the area allotted for a pathway in her property, she had caused
the isolation of her property from any access to a public highway.
2. The Court ruled in the negative.
Petitioners cannot find sanctuary in the equitable principle of laches under the contention that by sleeping on
her right to reclaim the pathway after almost twenty years, respondent has, in effect, waived such right over the
same. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or
declined to assert it.
The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge
of defendants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the
complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
the relief is accorded to the complainant. The second and third elements are certainly lacking here.
As borne by the records, it was only in 1995 that respondent found out that the pathway being used by
petitioners was part of her property when a relocation survey and location plan of her property and the adjacent land
bought by San Benito Realty were prepared.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 112331.

May 29, 1996

ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. CA and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO,J.:

FACTS
Petitioner Anastacia together with her 5 siblings inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They
agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero,
Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia was located at the extreme left. It is bounded
on the right by the property of Sotero. Adjoining Soteros property on the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4
originally owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina
Santos. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio which he divided
into two equal parts Lot A and B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot A is located behind Anastacias lot while
Lot B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then
acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant
to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that
she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter. Thereafter, Yolanda
constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia s
property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot B, located directly behind the
property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about nineteen
(19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of Sotero, and Anastacias perimeter fence. The store is
made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters
(9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal
road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the
back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road.
In December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia s
property. An ocular inspection upon instruction of the presiding judge was conducted. The report was that the
proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacias property facing the public highway, starting from the
back of Soteros sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five
(5) meters to avoid the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal road [3] and the way was unobstructed except
for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way through
Soteros property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacias property would no longer
make the path straight. Hence the trial court concluded that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway to
the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public
road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacias property. On appeal by
respondent Yolanda, the CA reversed the lower court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners
property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
The appellate court however did not award damages to private respondent as petitioner did not act in bad faith in
resisting the claim.
Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent CA: (a) in disregarding the agreement of the
parties; (b) in considering petitioners property as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the
property of private respondent; and, (c) in holding that the one-meter by five-meter passage way proposed by private
respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest distance to the public road.
Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private respondent a right of way. She claims that her
agreement with private respondent was to provide the latter with a right of way on the other lot of Antonio Quimen
under her administration when it was not yet sold to private respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through
the property of Yolandas parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her
property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon. Anastacia further argues that when Yolanda
purchased Lot B in 1986 the easement of right of way the former provided for Yolanda was ipso jure extinguished as a
result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one person so that there was no longer
any compelling reason to provide Yolanda with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the
purpose. Petitioner strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road
because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income
of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has
an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.
ISSUE: Which of the two proposed passage way is less prejudicial?

RULING: That of respondent Yolandas.

The voluntary easement in favor of Yolanda has become a legal easement or an easement by necessity
constituted by law.
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to
pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way
being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. A cursory examination of the complaint of
respondent Yolanda for a right of wayreadily shows that
Even before the purchase of the said parcels of land, Yolanda was reluctant to purchase the same for they are
enclosed with permanent improvements like a concrete fence and store and have no egress (exit) leading to
the road but because of the assurance of Anastacia that Yolanda will be provided 1 meter wide and
five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per square meter to be taken from Anastacias lot at
the side of a concrete store until Yolanda reaches her fathers land, the latter was induced to buy the aforesaid
parcels of land. That the aforesaid right of way is the shortest, most convenient and the least onerous leading
to the road and being used by the plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest from the very inception.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of Yolanda is hemmed in by the estates of other persons
including that of Anastacia; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between
her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to
the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the
trial court itself declared that the said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by Yolanda were totally
isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public
highway.
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private
respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly
states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may
ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest
distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most
convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way
which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This is the test.
The trial court found that Yolandas property was situated at the back of her fathers property and held that
there existed an available space of about 19 meters long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between
the boundary line and the house of Yolanda s father; that the vacant space ended at the left back of Soteros store
which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and
cut an opening of 1 meter wide and5 meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway. But
notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled
to a right of way on petitioners property since a detour through it would not make the line straight and would not be
the route shortest to the public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent CA declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda,
which is 1 meter wide and five 5 meters long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause the least
prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda s father which
would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials. This Court accepts and adopts them. As
between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and
another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
should be preferred.

The petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. L-17482

March 31, 1966

GENOVEVA R. JABONETE, ET AL., plaintiffs, vs. JULIANA MONTEVERDE, ET AL., defendants, ANTONIO
LEGASPI, respondent-appellant, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, MRS. LUZ
ARCILLA, petitioner-intervenor-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
FACTS
In March 11, 1954, the CFI Davao, in view of its finding in the case entitled Jabonete vs. Monteverde, et al.,
that Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with the knowledge that a "gravamen" or easement of right of way
existed thereon, promulgated a decision: that defendant Antonio Legaspi should demolish the part of the corral
(enclosed) built along the ground which prevents plaintiffs Jabonetes batch access to the path that lead the Main
Road Tomas Claudio and declares that the applicants are entitled to use the sidewalk, 3 meters wide, the only step
available to access Tomas Claudio Street, for the passage of their jeeps and vehicles, repaired to entering and leaving
the repair shop of those.
Antonio filed his notice of appeal. However, upon a previous motion of the plaintiffs, the lower court issued an
order granting discretionary execution of the said decision. The plaintiffs immediately proceeded to the premises in
question and opened in the fence of the defendant Antonio Legaspi a sufficient opening for the passage of men and
vehicles. Even then, however, the defendant filed an MR of the order granting discretionary execution. Thereafter, and
upon the lower court's suggestion, the parties entered into an amicable agreement which was later embodied in an
order or "auto" dated May 24, 1954: that defendant, Antonio Legaspi, allows the use and step into the
private road built by on his land along the ground of the plaintiffs, to, your family, your friends,
chauffeurs, servants and their jeeps. As a result of the agreement and Order of May 24, 1954, the defendant
abandoned the prosecution of his appeal. At the same time, both parties complied with its terms until the plaintiffs,
unable to continue with their repair shop, transferred to another place in December 1959 whereupon the defendant
reconstructed his fence and its footing, closing thereby the opening previously made by the plaintiffs.
In the course of time, the plaintiffs' lot was foreclosed by DBP which, later still, conveyed it under a
conditional sale to Mrs. Luz Arcilla. On her acquisition of the said lot, Mrs. Arcilla demanded of the defendant the reopening of the fence in question as it was her plan to construct her house in the said lot. When the defendant
refused, DBP filed with the lower court a petition to hold the said defendant in contempt. To this petition,
Mrs. Luz Arcilla later intervened and was so allowed by the lower court. DBP and Mrs. Luz Arcilla contended that the
refusal of the defendant to cause or allow the making of an opening in his fence was a defiance of the said court's
decision of March 11, 1954 and was, therefore, contemptuous.
After due hearing, the lower court sustained the petitioners and found the defendant guilty of contempt with
ordering him to open the vereda or alley leading to the lot owned by DBP and conveyed to Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla under a
conditional deed of sale. Thus, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: WON the right of way granted to Jabonetes shall be extended to DBP/Arcilla.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.
Respondent-appellants contention: Maintains that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of contempt because the
decision of March 11, 1954 was novated by the order of May 24, 1954. Consequently, he could not have
violated the former decree since with its novation it ceased to have any legal effect.
Even assuming that the said decision was not novated by the subsequent order of May 24, 1954, still he could
not be deemed to have violated the said decision because the same never became final and executory. The
respondent-appellant argued that since the decision of March 11, 1954 ordered the opening of a right of way
in his property without providing for this corresponding compensation to him, contrary to Article 649 of the
Civil Code, there was in the said decision "a void which ought to be filled or to be done in order to completely
dispose of the case. It was not clear, specific and definitive, and consequently, a judgment that could not have
acquired finality.
This Court believes that the order finding the respondent-appellant guilty of contempt should be reversed. It
is clear that the order of May 24, 1954 superseded and was fully intended by the lower court to modify or
stand in substitution of the decision of March 11, 1954. More than the expression of the parties amicable
agreement on the dispute, the said order was the lower court's resolution of the respondent-appellant's motion for
reconsideration of the decision of March 11, 1954. In the determination, therefore, of the said appellant's obligation
relative to the easement in question, the March 24, 1954 decision and not that of March 11, 1954 is the proper
point in reference.
Under the order of May 24, 1954, the easement awarded or secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was
strictly a personal one. The right of way granted was expressly limited to the latter and their "family, friends,
drivers, servants and jeeps." The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the plaintiffs and the
persons enumerated in their agreement and it is clear that the lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the
said order, did not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs' successors-in-interest. In other words, the right
acquired by the original plaintiffs was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a
predial servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the dominant estate.

In resisting the extension of the aforementioned easement to the latter, the plaintiffs' successors-in-interest,
the respondent-appellant, therefore, was not defying the decision of March 11, 1954 which was then no longer
subsisting, nor the order of May 24, 1954 since the said successors-in-interest had no right thereunder. Another
evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the plaintiffs is the fact that the same was
granted to the latter without any compensation to the respondent-appellant.

Wherefore, the order of the lower court finding the respondent-appellant guilty of contempt is hereby REVERSED.

G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991

SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. SARMIENTO, J.:p
FACTS
Petitioner Solid Manila is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity
of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent corporation. Bio Hongs title came from a prior
owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved a portion of the lot an easement of way that was
converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates and such was duly annotated at the back of the
covering transfer Certificate of title.
An annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, as follows:
CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY It is hereby made of record that a construction of private alley has
been undertaken on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion Street to the interior of the aforesaid
property with the plan and specification duly approved by the City Engineer subject to the following conditions
to wit:
(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon;
(7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same,
and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for
the use thereof; and
(8) That he shall impose upon the vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned; other
conditions set forth.
Solid Manila claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the
private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the
private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered used. Solid Manila commenced suit for
injunction against Bio Hong Trading to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The
court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing Bio Hong Trading to open the gates. Subsequently,
the latter moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by
merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former
owner; (2) the petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4)
the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The trial court issued a temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination
of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by Solid Manila. xxx The petitioner moved for
summary judgment and the court a quo granted it. The trial court rendered judgment against Bio Hong Trading,
making permanent the temporary mandatory injunction, that had been issued against the former.
Bio Hong appealed to the respondent CA. Meanwhile, it went to the RTC on a petition for the
cancellation of the annotation in question which the court granted, for which the petitioner instituted another
case of the CA which ordered the restoration of the annotation "without prejudice to the final outcome of Bio Hong
Tradings own appeal (subject of this petition). xxx In reversing the trial court which had rendered summary
judgment, the CA held that the summary judgment was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the
defense set up by the private respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished. According to the CA,
an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that
since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the
easement.
ISSUE: WON the easement had been extinguished by merger.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.
The Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-ofway, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are possessed of a
separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated from the tenement,
or mortgaged separately. The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the
main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a
limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof, of the
tenement, measuring 914 sq. m, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the
neighboring estates. Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the
property, including the disputed alley, as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or

otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is
supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took
place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a
merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person.
Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.
The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public. Personal servitudes are referred to in the
following article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to
whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains
to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the
termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the
public, if that is possible, no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement. For this
reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary judgment, and insofar as the respondent Court of
Appeals held that it (the trial court) was in error, the Court of Appeals is in error.
What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent and consequently, the challenged
holding of the respondent Court of Appeals as well is the fact that the CA itself had rendered judgment, in the case
entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which it nullified the cancellation of the easement annotated at the
back of the private respondent's certificate of title ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case. As the petitioner now in fact
insists, the Court of Appeals' judgment, which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution is at least, the law of the
case between the parties.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in
the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court
The said case is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to determine the rights of the parties regarding
the easement, subject of the controversy in this case, although as a petition for "cancellation of annotation" it may
have, at a glance, suggested a different cause of action.
And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent cannot validly reject CA-G.R. No. 13421 as the law of the case,
after all, it was the one that initiated the cancellation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273 that
precipitated that appeal. In the second place, the proceedings for cancellation of annotation was in fact meant to
preempt the injunction decreed by the lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the private respondent is guilty of
forum-shopping, as we have described the term:
As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the will of the owner.
In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo, this Court, speaking through Justice Claro Recto,
declared that a personal servitude (also a right of way in that case) is established by the mere "act" of the landowner,
and is not "contractual in the nature," and a third party (as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the personality
to claim its benefits. In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel maintained that a personal or voluntary
servitude does require a contract and that "[t]he act of the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not
constitute an offer . . . " and "[t]here being no offer, there could be no acceptance; hence no contract."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. L-48384

October 11, 1943

SEVERO AMOR, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL FLORENTINO, ET AL., respondents.

BOCOBO, J.:

FACTS
Over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The
house had and still has, on the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor.
Through these windows the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. In 1885,
Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on which it is situated to respondent Gabriel Florentino,
and to Jose Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse and
the lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnancion Florentino from which petitioner Amor bought the
property. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1882, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the windows
in question.
In 1938, Amor destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house. Respondents
filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from building higher than the original structure and from
executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through
the four windows referred to. The CFI found that the construction of the new house had almost been completed,
so the court denied the writ of preliminary injunction. Inasmuch as Maria Florentino died in 1892, according to the
finding of fact of the CA, Articles 541 of the Civil Code governs this case.
Art. 541. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor
of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively
and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is stated in the
deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed.
When the original owner, Maria Florentino, died in 1892, the ownership of the house and its lot passed to respondents
while the dominion over the camarin and its lot was vested in Maria Encarnancion Florentino, from whom said
property was later bought by petitioner. At the time the devisees took possession of their respective portions
of the inheritance, neither the respondents nor Maria Encarnacion Florentino said or did anything with
respect to the four windows of the respondents' house. The respondents did not renounce the use of the
windows, either by stipulation or by actually closing them permanently.
On the contrary, they exercised the right of receiving light and air through those windows. Neither did the
petitioner's predecessor in interest, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, object to them or demand that they be close. The
easement was therefore created from the time of the death of the original owner of both estates, so when
petitioner bought the land and the camarin thereon from Maria Encarnancion Florentino, the burden of
this easement continued on the real property so acquired because according to Article 534, "easements
are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively pertain."
ISSUE: WON the respondents had an easement of light and view, as well as the easement of altuis non
tollendi.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Petitioners contention: That Maria Florentino died in 1885 and, therefore, the Law of the Partidas should be followed
in this case and not the Civil Code. However, the petitioner's contention cannot be upheld without rejecting the finding
of fact made by the Court of Appeals, that the former died in 1892
These two easements necessarily go together because an easement of light and view requires that the owner
of the servient estate shall not build to a height that will obstruct the window. They are, as it were, the two sides of
the same coin. While an easement of light and view is positive, that of altius non tollendi is negative.
Clemente de Diego states that when article 538 speaks of the time for the commencement of prescription for
negative easements, "it refers to those negative easements which are the result and consequence of others that are
positive, such as the easement not to build higher, or not to construct, which is indispensable to the easement of
light." The relation of these two easements should be born in mind in connection with the (1) the modes of
establishing and acquiring easements; (2) the meaning of article 541; and (3) the doctrine in the case of Cortes vs.
Yu-Tibo.
First, as to the modes of establishing and acquiring easements. According to Article 536, easements are
established by law or by will of th owners. Acquisition of easements is first by title or its equivalent and secondly
by prescription. What acts take the place of title? They are mentioned in Articles 540 and 541, namely, (1) a deed of
recognition by the owner of the servient estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign between two estates,
established by the owner of both, which is the case of article 541. Sanchez Roman calls such apparent sign under
article 541 "extra of establishing title to the easement. The same jurist says in regard to the ways of constituting
easements:
In the Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain in 1911, it was held that under article 541 of the Civil Code,
the visible and permanent sign of an easement "is the title that characterizes its existence.

It will thus be seen that under article 541 the existence of the apparent sign in the instance case, to wit, the
four windows under consideration, had for all legal purposes the same character and effect as a title of acquisition of
the easement of light and view by the respondents upon the death of the original owner, Maria Florentino. Upon the
establishment of that easement of light and view, the con-comitant and concurrent easement of altius non tollendi
was also constituted, the heir of the camarin and its lot, Maria Encarnacion Florention, not having objected to the
existence of the windows.
The theory of Article 541, of making the existence of the apparent sign equivalent to a title, when
nothing to the contrary is said or done by the two owners, is sound and correct, because as it happens in
this case, there is an implied contract between them that the easements in question should be
constituted.
Analyzing article 541 further, it sees that its wording is not quite felicitous when it says that the easement
should continue. Sound juridical thinking rejects such an idea because, properly speaking, the easement is
not created till the division of the property, inasmuch as a predial or real easement is one of the rights in
another's property, or jura in re aliena and nobdy can have an easement over his own property, nimini
sua res servit. In the instant case, therefore, when the original owner, Maria Florentino, opened the windows which
received light and air from another lot belonging to her, she was merely exercising her right of dominion.
Consequently, the moment of the constitution of the easement of light and view, together with that of altius non
tollendi, as the time of the death of the original owner of both properties. At that point, the requisite that there must
be two proprietors one of the dominant estate and another of the servient estate was fulfilled. (Article 530, Civil
Code.)

xxx Aside from the foregoing reasons that support the easement under consideration, the same has been acquired
by respondents through prescriptions.
The easement involved in this case is of two aspects: light and view and altius non tollendi. These two aspects
necessarily go together because an easement of light and view prevents the owner of the sevient estate from building
to a height that will obstruct the windows. This court in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo, supra, held that the easement concerned
when there is an apparent sign established by the owner of two estates is positive. This being so, and inasmuch as
the original heirs of Maria Florentino succeeded to these two estates either in 1885 or in 1892 and as petitioner
bought one of the lots in 1911, the prescriptive period under any legislation that may be applied the Partidas, Civil
Code or Code of Civil Procedure has elapsed without the necessity of formal prohibition on the owner of the servient
estate. The respondent's action was brought in 1938. The persons who were present, and 20 years between
absentees. (4 Manresa, 605). According to article 537 of the Civil Code, continous and apparent easements
may be acquired by prescription for 20 years. Under sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
period is 10 years.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.