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1 Wigmore
ISSUE:
Whether Dimat guilty of fencing.
ISSUE:
RULING:
HELD:
No, thus, he is guilty of violating the anti-fencing law.
Under Presidential Decree 1612, fencing is the act
of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
There is no question that the farrowing crates and
assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises of
petitioner. The positive identification by Fortunato
Mariquit, an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these
items were previously owned by it gave rise to a
presumption of fencing under the law:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao
succeed in rebutting this presumption?
We hold in the negative.
First of all, contrary to petitioners contention,
intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a
special law such as P.D. 1612.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity.
The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On
24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January
1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
HELD:
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain
items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those
items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim
never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former
employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she
forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public
crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a
private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As
complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for
certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the
first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a
crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking
of anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an
extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had
pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an
admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense
may be given in evidence only against the person admitting
or confessing.[15] Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the
confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise,
the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the
person so admitting.[16] Here, the extra-judicial confession of
witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of
counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither
may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence
against accused.[17] There must be corroboration by
evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of
guilt.[18] Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the
crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the
crime has been actually committed.[19] The essential
elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2)
the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was
done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil.
1000).[20] In theft, corpus delicti has two elements,
namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2)
that it was lost by felonious taking.[21] In this case, the theft
was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not
complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of
her property. She sought out her former employee
Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain
articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold
them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]
What is more, there was no showing at all that the
accused knew or should have known that the very stolen
articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know
a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of
something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has
something within the minds grasp with certitude and
clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact
is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if
a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless
he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other
hand, the words should know denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would
ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness
about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of
an accused and state with certainty what is contained
therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from
the overt acts of that person. And given two equally
plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the
court should choose the one which sustains the
constitutional presumption of innocence.[23]
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen
articles, he can not be guilty of fencing.[24]
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish
the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is
entitled to an acquittal.
PEOPLE V. YANSON-DUMANCAS
FACTS:
Acting upon the alleged inducement of spouses Jeanette and
Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and
undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas Torres, taking
advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the
PNP, with the direct participation and cooperation of other
Police Inspectors, concurring and affirming in the said
criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct,
kidnap and detain Rufino Gargar Jr., with evident
premeditation and treachery, nocturnity, and the use of
motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said
victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that
accused did then and there secretly bury the corpse in a
shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the crime of
murder in order to prevent its discovery.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused
charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs of Rufino
Gargar Jr.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused
charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law, indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of Danilo
Lumangyao.
Accused Charles Dumancas, Police Officers Pahayupan and
Cadunay Jr. are hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. On the case of accused-appellant
Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas, the information charged her of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as principal
by induction together with her husband, Charles, who was
found by the trial court not guilty of the crime.
ISSUE: WON Jeanette is principal by Inducement
HELD: No
Why?
Requisites of PBI
Article 17, Revised Penal Code, provides: The following are
considered principals: (i) Those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; (ii) Those who directly force or induce
others to commit it; and (iii) Those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a
crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony
of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to
conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused
uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to
commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of
command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial
court, to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or
promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they
abduct and later kill the victims in this case.
PEOPLE VS TADULAN
(PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY)
FACTS:
Complainant B owns a house in Metro Manila, where she
resides with her common-law husband and their minor
daughter A. Beside their house is an apartment building
wherein one unit was rented by accused Irvin Tadulan along
with his family.
One morning, when Complainants minor daughter A was
playing outside the apartment, accused Tadulan brought
called her and brought her upstairs where he eventually had
intercourse with the child. Initially, A did not inform her
mother about the incident, and it was only when the laundry
woman discovered bloodstains on the panty of A that they
knew of the said incident. When accuseds wife returned to
the apartment, Complainant B told her of her husbands
sexual advancement towards her her daughter A, and that
she would not take legal action against the accused if he
would vacate the apartment unit right away. Accuseds wife
promised to uphold the condition, but her husband was still
coming home to the apartment every night.
Days later, Complainant B heard a commotion in the
apartment unit of the accused, where she saw the accused
arguing with his wife. B called the police, and when they
came, the accuseds wife denounced him and told the police
that he raped the minor daughter of Complainant B, in
which he was thereafter arrested. The trial court found the
accused guilty of rape, and upon appeal, raised the
contention that he was pardoned by the mother of the
victim.
ISSUE:
W/ N pardon granted by the mother of the minor offended
party without the concurrence of the offended minor is valid
HELD:
Pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an
offended minor but also by the minor herself to be effective
as an express pardon.
In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused
was allegedly granted only by the mother B, without the
concurrence of the minor A. Hence, for the sake of
argument, even if said mother B initially pardoned the
accused, it is clear that such pardon is ineffective without
the express concurrence of the minor victim A.
HELD:
No. It is clear that the conditional pardons separately
extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
In a prior resolutions, the SC categorically declared the
"practice of processing applications for pardon or parole
despite pending appeals" to be "in clear violation of law."
PEOPLE VS NERY
FACTS:
Accused Soledad Nery received 2 diamond rings
from Federico Matillano to be sold by her on commission on
Nov 15, 1954. In their agreement, Nery should deliver Php
230.00 to her principal, to whom she represented having a
B.)
B.)
HELD:
No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop
the running of the prescriptive period as a matter of
statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only
exception is the offenders physical absence and no other
cause can be sufficient to interrupt prescription.
The Court ruled that Where the sixtieth and last day to file
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day
period cannot be extended up to the next working day.
Prescription has automatically set in.
The fiscal cannot file the information on the next following
working day as it would tantamount to extending the
prescriptive period fixed by law.
Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution
was granted on the valid ground of prescription.
CABRAL V. PUNO 1976
70 SCRA 606
FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of
Public Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948
the signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in a
deed of sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
charge, since the said document of sale was notarized on
August 14, 1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on August 26, 1948. The said notarization caused
the cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new
transfer certificate of title was then issued. On March 25,
1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground of
prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according
to petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer
intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action
against the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same
factual averments contained in the criminal information. The
Fiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno, submitted
his comment expressing the view that the crime, has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only
discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in
the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to
ventilate the respective evidence of both parties in their
total meaning.
Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of
motion to quash. Petitioner Cabral moved for
reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the
judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon
promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for
correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case
No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This
motion was denied, as well as the second motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975
(granting the motion to quash and dismissing the
Information) based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense
HELD:
YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the
revival of the Information. This is more so, because said
Resolution had already become final and executory. When
the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or
about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of
dismissal, the same had already long been final.
The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a
motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is
one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under
Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal
Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10)
years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice
of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in
the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
While it is true that the offended party, San Diego, through
the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration
within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did
not stop the running of the period for appeal. He (private
prosecutor) did not have the legal personality to appeal or
file the motion for reconsideration on his (San Diegos)
behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the
private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the
Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal
filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for
appeal.
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal
case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September
24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia
Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San
Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a
forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio
Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First
Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the
same property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from
the record that at the time the order of dismissal was issued
there was a pending civil action arising out of the same
alleged forged document filed by the offended party against
the same defendant, the offended party has no right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case and
consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, or appeal from said order.
SERMONIA v CA
Petitioner: Jose Sermonia
Respondent: Court of Appeals, RTC
FACTS: Jose Sermonia entered into a subsequent marriage in
1975 during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Upon
the knowledge of a second marriage, his first wife filed an
information charging Sermonia with bigamy.
Sermonia moved to quash said information contending that
his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription, since bigamy is punishable by an afflictive
penalty, it prescribes in 15 years. The information had been
filed only in 1992, seventeen years after he contracted the
said marriage.
The RTC denied the motion to quash, as well as the
consequent motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the appellate court, however, dismissed his
petition for lack of merit, hence the present recourse.
Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract was
duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,
such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record
and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The
ISSUE:
1.
2.
DECISION:
1.
2.
HELD:
The Supreme Court agrees with the court
administrator only in so far as the dismissal of the instant
case is concerned. The respondent judge was correct in
stating that Slight Physical Injuries is a light offense (arresto
menor- one day to thirty days), being a light offense, the
crime of slight physical injuries prescribes in two months.
Article 91 of RPC provides the period of
prescription shall be interrupted by filing the complaint of
information. In the case of Reodica vs CA, filing of the
complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running
of the statute of limitations (citing Fransisco vs CA and Pp vs
Cuaresma).
In the Reodica case, Section 9 of Rule on
Summary Procedure which provides that cases covered
thereby, the prosecution commences by filing the
complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or
MTCC cannot be taken to mean that prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said court. In case of conflict between Rule on
Summary Procedure and RPC (which is a substantive law),
latter prevails.
Respondent Judge erred in declaring the crime of
slight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of
the complaint before the Prosecutors Office did not toll or
suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
The matter however is judicial in nature and the
rule is that a partys remedy (if prejudiced by the orders of a
judge given in the course of trial) is the proper reviewing
court and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by
means of administrative complaint.
An administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed
aberrant or irregular. Administrative liability for ignorance of
the law does not arise from the mere fact that a judge
issued an order that may be adjudged to be erroneous.
Rule: Only when a Judge acts fraudulently or
with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are
called for.
Wherefore, administrative case is dismissed.
bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame
to the world or risk the offenders making good their threats
to kill or hurt their victims.
The failure of herein complainant to report the
incident immediately does not discredit her credibility, her
hesitation being attributable to the death threats made by
appellant, not to speak of the natural reluctance of a woman
having to admit in public her having been raped. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the
assault on their virtue because of the rapists threat on their
lives. Not every victim of a crime can be expected to act
reasonably and conformably with the expectation of
mankind. One persons spontaneous or unthinking, or even
instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may
be aggression, while anothers may be cold indifference.
The law on prescription of crimes would be
meaningless if we were to yield to the proposition that delay
in the prosecution of crimes would be fatal to the State and
to the offended parties. In fixing the different prescriptive
periods on the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed
therefor, the law takes into account or allows reasonable
delays in the prosecution thereof. In a number of cases, we
have ruled that a delay of seventeen days, thirty-five days,
or even six months,by a victim of rape in reporting the
attack on her honor does not detract from the veracity of
her charge.
TORRES V THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS
FACTS:
In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardoned
by the president with the condition that if he shall violate
any penal law again, his sentence will be carried out.
Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
released from prison. However, by 1982, the Board of
Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres
because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of
estafa before, and convicted of sedition. His pardon was
cancelled. He appealed the issue before the Supreme Court.
He contended that his pardon should not have been
cancelled since the judgment on the new estafa cases were
still on appeal. Through his wife and children, he petitioned
to be released from prison alleging that he was denied due
process, and that his constitutional rights to be presumed
innocent and to a speedy trial were violated upon his
recommitment to prison.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the
terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
RULING:
The petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced
to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor
carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the
principal penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars
the convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. Even
if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the
accessory penalties remain unless the same have been
expressly remitted by the pardon. The penalty of prision
correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties,
suspension from public office.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute
pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the
crime for which she was convicted. Pardon cannot mask the
acts constituting the crime. Thus pardon does not ipso facto
restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction
although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended
primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of
the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor
private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot
preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment
to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk,
or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that
when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the
office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And
in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public
post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should
be evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.
Lastly, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The
Court cannot oblige her since civil indemnity subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation
of sentence.
PP V. NACIONAL
Facts:
On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis,"
Absalon Millamina alias "Ka Alvin," Efren Musa, Rudy Luces,
Javier Mirabete alias "Commander, " and Zacarias
Militante alias "Care" were charged with murder.
The six accused were all civilian members of the barangay
organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
NPA at Daraga, Albay. 10 A few days before February 21,
1985, their organization had conference at Barangay Lacag,
Daraga for the purpose of identifying suspected informers of
the military whom they perceived as posing a threat to the
NPA's operations within the vicinity. They identified Quirino
b) . . .
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was
right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years
and four months maximum, he would have had the right to
apply for probation.
TOLINTENO V ALCONEL
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Tolentino was charged wih Section 4,
Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on
September 4, 1981, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 8, 1981, after the prosecution had presented
part of its evidence, petitioner manifested his desire to
change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser
offense of possession of Indian Hemp [marijuana], under
Section 8 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425.
As no objection was interposed by the fiscal, the court
allowed petitioner to withdraw his former plea of guilty and
to enter a plea of guilty to said lessor offense. Petitioner was
thereupon sentenced to imprisonment of six [6] months and
one [1] day to two [2] years and four [4] months, to pay a
fine of P1,000.00, and to pay the costs, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for probation.
Respondent judge forthwith directed the probation officer
of the City of Manila to conduct a post sentence
investigation on said application and to file said report
thereon within 60 days. After conducting such investigation,
the probation officer submitted its report, recommending
that petitioner be placed on a two-year probation upon the
claim that the latter was already on his way to reformation
and that a prison cell would turn him into a hardened
criminal.
Such recommendation notwithstanding, the respondent
judge issued the challenged order of March 9, 1982, denying
petitioners application on the ground that it will depreciate
the seriousness of the offense committed.
Motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that "probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed.
RULING:
"SEC. 5. Post Sentence Investigation. No person shall be
placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the
probation officer and a determination by the court that the
ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as
that of the defendant will be served thereby."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is evident from the foregoing that the potentiality of the
offender to reform is not the sole, much less the primordial
factor, that should be considered in the grant or denial of an
application for probation. Equal regard to the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed. Thus, Section 8
of P.D. 968 lays down the criteria for the placing of an
offender on probation, as follows:
a) . . .
FACTS:
less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less
than two hundred pesos;
d) those who have been once on probation under the
provisions of this Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
The National Probation Office denied petitioners
application for probation under Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D.
968 because a prior conviction was entered against the
petitioner on June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199,
penalizing her with a fine of P4,648.00; thereby placing her
within the ambit of disqualification from probation under
Section 9 paragraph (c) of P.D. 968.
Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the
effect that a person who was previously convicted by final
judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less
than two hundred pesos, is disqualified from applying for
probation.
ANSELMO DE LEON CUYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On August 25, 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) in San Fernando City, La Union, found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to imprisonment of four (4) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year. He was likewise ordered to pay
private complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000 for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Petitioner was not
present during the promulgation of the judgment and was
represented by his counsel instead.
His motion for reconsideration was denied on October 23,
2009. He subsequently filed a Motion for Probation on
November, 5, 2009 but is denied on the ground that it had
been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen days as
provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. 968.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of
probation.
HELD:
This court held that the RTC that the Motion for Probation
was filed out of time.
Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated
by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the Court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court
to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred and committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule
65.
HELD:
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is
found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[17] This
liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made.[18] However, before execution
against an employer ensues, there must be a determination,
in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an
employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge
of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.[19]
There are two instances when the existence of an employeremployee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged
vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the
essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against
accused because it was his truck that was involved in the
incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company, with
which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for
the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their
contract.[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal
proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the
prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee
relationship.[24] With the convicts application for probation,
the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All
told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it
found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all
his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and
prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he
chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the
proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even
assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on
the motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked
by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he
did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that
there was no employer-employee relationship between him
and accused and that the latter was not discharging any
function in relation to his work at the time of the
incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed
and duly served on December 3, 1991, and December 9,
1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of
the motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on
December 13, 1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not
appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court that
the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on
January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a
counter-manifestation[27] that belatedly attempted to
contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution
of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court
issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the
subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we
cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him
due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent
appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of
the trial court.
PEOPLE VS. DAGAMI
Rape-Indeterminate Sentence Law-Information-Aggravating
Circumstance
Facts:
ISSUES:
1. Whether Banisa is considered a co-conspirator in the case;
2. Whether the civil indemnities awarded by the RTC were
proper and justifiable
HELD:
1. NO. From the testimony of the victims as well as
from the physical evidence, it seems that SPO1
Bangcado was the lone gunman, while PO3 Banisa
merely stood behind him with his gun drawn. Thus,
as to the identity of the gunman, it is apparent that
both witnesses were positive only as far as
Bangcado was concerned. However, it seems that
they only concluded that Banisa participated in the
shooting because he was also holding a gun. The
failure of the surviving victims to assert with
confidence that Banisa also fired his gun raises
reasonable doubt as to whether he participated in
the shooting.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to
commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising
from different acts directed against one and the
same person is individual and not collective, and
that each of the participants is liable only for his
own acts. Consequently, Banisa was absolved from
criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims.
2.