THE ROLES OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE IN COMBATING

TERRORISM IN MALAYSIA
Mej Mohd Raslam bin Hj Dollah (Malaysian Army)

INTRODUCTION

1.

Post-Cold War era was the period with full of optimism and possibility and

perceived by many scholars the end of history while others claimed the triumph of
democracy over totalitarianism.1 On the contrary, recent global scenario saw the world
facing with the new security challenges with the growing of non-traditional security threat
particularly international terrorism. The new breed of terrorism so-called New Terrorism
has raised great concern to world community due to the capability of inflicting devastating
damage to wide range of targets.2 Sep 11 incident is wake-up call for the world
community to a new face of terror. The message conveys is very clear that the act of
terrorism could be occurred in any parts of the worlds where no place is safe and even
superpowers are not immune. The threat of terrorism is present across the entire world
including in the Southeast Asia region. Thus, Malaysia is no exception to this threat and
potentially to be terrorist target in the absence of effective combating terrorism program.
This broad effort is responsibility of security agencies and relies heavily on predictive
intelligence.

2.

Intelligence is used widely in various fields ranging across military, political,

economic, social, environmental, health, and cultural. However, throughout history the use
of Intelligence is prominent in the military and security agencies. As such, intelligence
proven plays an important role in the success of various military campaigns. Sun Tzu in
his book, The Art of War said with advance information, costly mistake can be avoided,
destruction averted, and the way to lasting victory made clear. Subtly, very subtly, do not
neglect the use of intelligence. Today, intelligence has increasingly been more crucial as
the face of threat changes from traditional form to asymmetric. Hence, intelligence is
considered as the first line of defence against terrorism.

Rebecca Johnson, Post-Cold War Security: The Lost Opportunities, Disarmament Forum 1999,
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art257.pdf [Accessed on 17 Apr 2011]
2
Assaf Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism, New York: Infobase Publishing, 2006, p. 7

TERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE: GENERAL OVERVIEW

DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

3.

Terrorism or terrorist acts have been in existence for millennia. Despite having a

longer history, definitions of terrorism vary widely and are usually in adequate because of
the difference in life values and beliefs. It is becoming more complicated when discussing
about terrorism on international level. Furthermore, the use of terror by governments and
those that contest their power remains poorly understood. Different states, departments or
agencies of even the same government will themselves often have very different
definitions for terrorism. Each of the definitions reflects the priorities and particular
interests of the specific government and agency involved. In this regard, the US State
Department, for example use the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United
States Code, Section 2656f(d):
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience,3

While the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as:

the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives,4

4.

For Malaysian Government, the term is based on Directive No. 18, National

Security Council (NSC) which means;

Unlawful use of threat or the use of force or terror or any other attack by person,
group or state regardless of objective or justification aim at other state, it citizens or their
properties and its vital services with the intention of creating fear, intimidation and thus
3

Russell D. Howard, Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment, Reading and Interpretations, Connecticut: Mc Graw Hill Companies Inc, 2004, p. 19.
4
Ibid.

forcing government or organization to follow their impressed will including those act in
support directly or indirectly.5

5.

On the other hand, the term of terrorist is stipulated in the Internal Security Act

(ISA) 1960, where terrorist defined as any person who: (1) by the use of any fire-arm,
explosive or ammunition acts in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to the
maintenance of public order or incites to violence or counsels disobedience to the law or to
any lawful order; (2) carries or has in his possession or under his control any fire-arm,
ammunition or explosive without lawful authority; or (3) demands, collects or receives any
supplies for the use of any person who intends or is about to act, or has recently acted, in a
manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.6

6.

Generally, the stated definitions did not have much difference. The meaning of

terrorism is more towards the use of whatever aspect of violence or force aimed to gain a
political end. In this aspect, the aim is major distinction between the acts of terrorism with
criminal or other unlawful activities. Base on the frequencies of definitional elements in
109 definitions of terrorism, the five most prominent elements are violence, force (83.5%),
political (65%), fear, terror emphasized (51%), threat (47%) and psychological effect
(41.5%).7

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM

7.

Generally, the recorded history of terrorism could be divided into five eras. The

first era of terrorism span up from the beginning of human history until the period
immediately prior the French Revolution.8 The Zealots of Judea or dagger-men were the
earlier known organisation that demonstrated aspects of a modern terrorist organisation.
Most terrorism during the first era is classified as Establishment Terrorism as such action
usually constitutes the acknowledged policy of the government. The second era closely

Majlis Keselamatan Negara, Arahan No 18 (Semakan Semula), Pengurusan dan Pengendalian Krisis
Keganasan, p. 3.
6
Internal Security Act (1960), http://www.atlantic.metropolis.net/security/malaysia-isa.html, [Accessed on 2
May 2011].
7
Russell D. Howard, Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment, Reading and Interpretations, Connecticut: Mc Graw Hill Companies Inc, 2004, p. 21.
8
US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army Intelligence Centre, Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, 2009, p. 13.

related with the French Revolution, specifically the several years of the French Revolution
commonly called the Reign of Terror.9 The French Revolution provided the first uses of
the words Terrorist and Terrorism.

8.

The third era saw the political and philosophical foundations of modern terrorism

were formed. This era begins in the mid-1800s and extends through the end of World War
II.10 The action and writings of few people, especially those in and from Czarist Russia
and Germany, had a remarkable impact on the political thoughts and actions of many.11
The fourth era dates from the end of World War II and marked by advances in technology
and with the end of colonial era.12 The fifth era or also known as the age of modern
terrorism, begun in 1968, representing by the incident of the hijacking of E1 A1 airliner
route from Tel Aviv to Rome by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP).13

CAUSES OF TERRORISM

9.

Terrorism has occurred throughout history for a variety of reasons. Its causes can

be political, social, economic, cultural, historical, psychological and religious or any

combination of these. Therefore, a clear understanding of terrorism requires insight from a
variety of disciplines, including political science, international relations, psychology,
sociology, religious studies, cultural studies and economic.14 Indeed, it is a complex
concept that is best understood in a larger context and cannot be examined in isolation.
Some scholar examines the root of terrorism from three different perspectives; individual,
organizational, and environment.15 Individual perspective explaining whether or not
terrorist are mentally ill and how individual terrorist justify the use of violence against
innocent civilians.16 Meanwhile, the organizational perspective helps us to understand
terrorism because majority of terrorist acts are perpetrated by organizations, not by
individuals acting alone. Organizations provide the infrastructure, the means, the ideology,
9

US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army Intelligence Centre, Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, 2009, p. 14.
10
Ibid, p. 15.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid, p. 17.
14
Assaf Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism, New York: Infobase Publishing, 2006, p. 10.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.

the justification and the social support required to carry out terrorist activities.17 The third
perspective lies on environmental factors such as political, social, economic and other
condition. The differences and grievances derive from these factors may affect
organizations and individuals and have an impact on their decisions to commit acts of
violence to achieve their goals.18

CATEGORIES OF TERRORISM

10.

The categorisation of individual terrorist organizations has a useful purpose in

combating terrorism. It provides significant information about terrorist group particularly

their intention and capabilities. Basically, terrorist organizations are categorised into two
groups by Scope of Operations and Degree of State Support.19

a.

Scope of Operations.

The Geographic designation is simply to

consider where, geographically, the group conducts its terrorist operations. There
are three classifications of terrorist group within this category which is domestic or
national, transnational and international.20 Domestic or national terrorist group are
local terrorist that operate within and against government or social system of their
home country. Their aim principally focuses on their nations socio-political arena
and all attacks are conducted within the borders of that single country.21
Meanwhile, the transnational terrorist group is one whose target is singular. The
groups operations targeted both the interests of that particular country internally
and externally.22 The third group, international terrorist group on the other hand,
conduct terrorist operations whenever they perceive it to be to their advantage and
their targets are not singular. They operated across international boundaries with
no limit to area of operations.23

17

Assaf Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism, New York: Infobase Publishing, 2006, p. 11.
Ibid.
19
US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army Intelligence Centre,
Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 2009, p. 33.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid, p. 34.
18

b.

Degree of State Support.

The degree of state support can be identified

with three affiliations i.e. non-state supported, state-supported, and state-directed

terrorist groups. Non-state supported is self-sufficient terrorist groups that operate
independently and receive no help, aid, assistance, or direction from a
government.24 On the contrary, state supported are groups normally operate
independently but receive a degree of help, aid and assistant from one or more
governments.25 As such, supporting state by virtue of their support have a degree
of influence over terrorist operation. Next category is state sponsored or state
directed terrorist group which operate as an agent of a government received
substantial intelligence, logistics, operational support, and in addition, will receive
direction and operational orders from the sponsoring government.26

TERRORIST IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATION

11.

Generally, all terrorists are, by characterization, motivated by an extreme

ideology.27 Thus, all terrorist is extremist which by their very nature intolerant of beliefs
which differ from their own. Ideological categories explain the political, religious or social
orientation of the group. Terrorist believe that the use of any means including violence is
justified by their particular ideological objective. A terrorist groups ideological
motivations are segregated into three, specifically politically motivated terrorism,
Nationalist/Territorialist and Religiously Inspired Groups.

TERRORIST ORGANISATION

12.

There is no standard or doctrinal structure for terrorist organizations. Nevertheless,

base on the membership, terrorist organization structure could be segregated into three
level group of people; Terrorist Leadership, Direct Support and Indirect Support.28
Terrorist Leadership and Support Group can be distinguished by a few key criteria.
Terrorist Leadership is the terrorist; those who provide direction and policy, approve goals

24

US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army Intelligence Centre,

Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 2009, p. 34.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid, p. 35.
27
Ibid, p. 19.
28
Ibid, p. 48.

and objectives and provide guidance for operations.29 Support Structure, however, lead
normal lives, relatively immobile, and conduct their support activities in the area of their
homes and workplaces.

13.

The major difference between the direct and indirect tiers is one of knowledge.

Members of the direct support are generally fully knowledgeable of the purpose of their
activities. Despite their diversity in motives, sophistication and strength, terrorist
organizations share a basic structure as depicted in Figure 1.30

Figure 1. Pyramid Structure of a Typical Terrorist Organization.

TERRORIST GOALS AND TARGETS

14.

The immediate objective of any terrorist attack normally complies with one or

more categories. The goals may be either for immediate or long term gain. Generally, they
are recognised by coercion, intimidation and provocation. Amongst the common short
term goals that terrorists wish to attain are to obtain recognition for their cause, to force
government reaction and to harass, weaken or embarrass government, military or other
security forces.31 Meanwhile, the long term goals are to cause dramatic changes in

29

US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army Intelligence Centre,

Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 2009, p. 48.
30
Ibid.
31
Intelligence in Combating Terrorism,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/accp/it0468/lsn3.htm, [Accessed on 2 May
2011].

government, to disrupt and discredit an established infrastructure in support of an

insurgency and to influence local, national or international policy decision making.32

15. The terrorist operation should be considered simply a message, an unconventional

communication, sent indirectly to the ultimate target of the attack, usually a government,
an entire population or some other entity. Terrorists target selection normally is based on
specific desired results and they are divided into three sequential targets. First is target of
violence, commonly referred to as the victim, the persons who are directly affected by the
terrorist attack.33 Secondly, target of attention, usually the general population of the
country/countries under attack by terrorists.34 Thirdly, is target of influence, the ultimate
target of the terrorist attack i.e. the government or other entity with power to grant the
terrorist wishes.35 As the target of violence is used to influence the target of attention, the
latter is used to influence the target of influence.

TERRORIST TACTICS

16.

The act of violence is the terrorist common strategy principally aims to draw the

attention of the people, the government and the world to their cause. In order to attain their
goals, some common tactics terrorists use are bombing, arson, hijacking, ambush,
kidnapping, hostage taking and assassination.36 On top of that, the tactics choose usually
simple to apply, dynamic in effect, hit-and-run by nature and designed to strike their
objective rather than the victim. Terrorists will always do a thorough reconnaissance and a
detailed plan where time is not a factor.37

DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

17.

Intelligence could be simply defined as the information that has been processed,

evaluated and interpreted. Intelligence in military term is the product derived from the
32

Intelligence in Combating Terrorism,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/accp/it0468/lsn3.htm, [Accessed on 2 May
2011].
33
US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army Intelligence Centre,
Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 2009, p. 39.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid, p. 40.
36
Ibid, p. 52-61.
37
Ibid, p. 52.

collation, evaluation and interpretation of all available information which concerns the
enemy or potential enemy or area of operations which is significant to military planning
and operations.38 Based on this definition, any information yet to be process is considered
as raw material. There are two crucial steps involved in the process, specifically evaluation
and interpretation of the information. The sources of information may come from various
collecting disciplines.

BASIC PRINCIPAL OF INTELLIGENCE

18.

The good intelligence is utmost important for the commander or decision maker in

the planning and decision making process. In order to produce sound intelligence, there
are basic principal needs to be observed by intelligence personnel. To meet this
requirement, intelligence must accuracy, timely, usability, completeness, precision, and
reliable.39 The characteristic of effective intelligence could be explained as follows:

a.

Accuracy. Intelligence must provide commanders an accurate, balanced,

complete and objective picture of the enemy or threat and other aspects of the Area
of Operation. Effective intelligence should be derived from multiple sources and
disciplines.

b.

Timeliness. Timely intelligence is crucial to support operations, and

prevent surprise from enemy action. It must disseminate continuously to the

commander before, during, and after an operation. Failure to do so will make
intelligence meaningless.

c.

Usability. Intelligence is useful when it is presented in a form that is easily

understood or displayed in a format that immediately expresses the meaning to the

consumer.

d.

Completeness. The products of intelligence must convey all the necessary

components to be as complete as possible.

38

Malaysian Army Manual, MP 10.1.2 TD-Intelligence, Army Hq, MINDEF, Kuala Lumpur, 2003, p. 1.
US Field Manual 2.0, Intelligence, Headquarters of Department of the Army, p 17.
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf, [Accessed on 4 Apr 2011].
39

e.

Precision. Intelligence product and briefings must offer only the required

level of detail and complexity to answer the requirements.

f.

Reliability. Intelligence must be evaluated to verify the extent to which the

gained information being used in intelligence briefings and products is

uncorrupted, trustworthy and undistorted.

PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE

19.

As a basic principle of intelligence, the purpose of military intelligence is to

provide commanders and staffs with timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored
intelligence about the enemy or threat and other aspects of the area of operation. In this
regard, Intelligence supports the planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of
operations. The most important role of intelligence is to drive operations by supporting the
commanders decision making.40 In military, the role of intelligence in combating
terrorism is closely associated with the counter insurgency, a form of asymmetric warfare.

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

20.

The intelligence process also known as intelligence cycle consists of 4 key steps

namely direction/tasking, collection, analysis and dissemination.41 The intelligence

process generates information, products, and knowledge especially about the 3 main
elements; threat, terrain and weather to support the commander and decision maker in the
conduct of operations. The first step, direction/tasking, is where the entire intelligence
effort planned, from the identification of a need for data to the final delivery of the
intelligence product to the consumer. The second step, collection, involves the collection
process encompasses the supervision of various activities, including developing collection
guidelines that ensure optimal use of available intelligence resources. The third step,
processing, is the crucial stage in entire process where all the raw data gathered is analyze
and converted into finished intelligence products. The final step of intelligence cycle is
dissemination. Intelligence is disseminating to the consumer in a usable form through
40

US Field Manual 2.0, Intelligence, Headquarters of Department of the Army, p. 4.

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf, [Accessed on 4 Apr 2011].
41
Malaysian Army Manual, MP 10.1.2 TD-Intelligence, Army Hq, MINDEF, Kuala Lumpur, 2003, p. 2.

10

wide range of formats such as verbal reports, written reports, imagery products, and
intelligence databases. The intelligence process/Intelligence Cycle is shown in Figure 2.42

Figure 2. The Intelligence Cycle.

MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

21.

Intelligence is a dynamic process and field of multi-disciplinary. According to US

Department of defence, intelligence discipline is a well defined area of intelligence

collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or
human resources. These disciplines include HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, GEOINT,
SIGINT, ELINT, OSINT, TECHINT and CI. These all play key roles in intelligence
collection process. Despite intelligence discipline continues to grow in line with
technological development, HUMINT remains as the fundamental method and primary
source of intelligence for most of the world intelligence community. HUMINT also
important because it can confirm or augment intelligence derived through other technical
means disciplines. Apart from that, until recently OSINT often to be one of the useful
collecting disciplines in combating terrorism.

42

Malaysian Army Manual, MP 10.1.2 TD-Intelligence, Army Hq, MINDEF, Kuala Lumpur, 2003, p. 2.

11

TERRORISM IN MALAYSIA AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORK

22.

The Sep 11 incidents followed by several terrorist attacked in Indonesia and the

Philippines was so alarming that any countries in this region also vulnerable of such
attack. Malaysias concern is that, the same incident will occurs in its soil due to its porous
long stretch land and sea border. In Southeast Asia (SEA) and regional level, the known
active terrorist group are categories as religious extremist or religious inspired terrorist
group and in geographical term they are falls into transnational terrorist group. Amongst
the prominent groups are Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Laskar Jihad, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM).43 Additionally, some states in SEA like
Thailand and the Philippines are encounter with the years-long separatist movement in
their soil. Although separatist group in SEA and terrorist group do not share the same
goals, their cooperation across national boundaries verifies that they are connected with
some kind of brotherhood.44

MALAYSIA GOVERNMENT POLICY

23.

Like the other nation, Malaysia condemned the terrorist attack on U.S. In the

immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir

offered his full support and cooperation to the United States. Malaysias support however
consider as ambivalent.

45

However as a matter of fact, even though not share the same

idea in certain areas such as military campaign in Afghanistan, but Malaysia was actually
playing a key role in the U.S. war on terrorism. Malaysias policy on terrorism is clearly
stipulated in the Directive No. 18 NSC i.e. against any form of terrorist acts, to protect the
live of hostage/hostages and property, to find solution through negotiation, no exchange of

43

Dana Dillon, Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism,The Heritage Foundation, 20 Dec 2004
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/southeast-asia-and-the-brotherhood-of-terrorism, [Accessed on 1
May 2011].
44
Ibid.
45
Rommel C. Banloi, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, (Quezon City : SISCI, 2003), p. 41.

12

hostage to resolve the crisis, and agreed that strike action as a last resort following the
failure of negotiation.46

24.

In international arena, Malaysia is strongly support the UN resolutions and

conventions to abolish on terrorism. Malaysia also offers to help as part of UN troops that
can be deployed by Security Council under Article No 42 of UN Development. Currently,
Malaysia carries out the Resolution 1373 of UN Security Council (2002) to freeze all the
financial assets and individuals fund that had relation with Al-Qaeda.47 Domestically, in
order to mitigate the threat of terrorism, Malaysia has implimented several actions such as
The Prevention Through Law and Regulations. Currently, the government has identified
regulations that can be used for handling terrorism elements. This is including Internal
Security Act (ISA) and Anti Money Laundering Act (AMLA) 2001.

PAST AND CURRENT EXPERIENCE

25.

Malaysia had experienced the threat of terrorism in the wake of the Communist

Party of Malaya (CPM) in the 1940's and during Emergency in 1960s. Subsequently,
several incidents of terrorism, whether initiated by domestic or international elements,
happened in Malaysia since 1970s. These incidents can and have the potential to
destabilise the security of our nation. Among the incidents as listed in the National
Security Council (NSC) Directive No. 18 are as follows:48

a.

August 1975. The Japanese Red Army (JRA) took more than 50 hostages

at the AIA Building, Kuala Lumpur. The gunmen won the release of five
imprisoned comrades and flew with them to Libya.

b.

December 1996. The Malaysian Ambassador to Peru was held hostage

during the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis in Peru by the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Their demands were as follows: 1) the release
46

Majlis Keselamatan Negara, Arahan No. 18 (Semakan Semula), Pengurusan dan Pengendalian Krisis
Keganasan, p. 5.
47
Ambassador Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, Threat to
International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, 19 Oct 2004, p. 1,
http://www.un.int/malaysia/SC/2004/SCTerrorism%2019%20OCT04.pdf, [Accessed on 23 Apr 2011].
48
Majlis Keselamatan Negara, Arahan No. 18 (Semakan Semula), Pengurusan dan Pengendalian Krisis
Keganasan, p.2.

13

of their members from prisons around Peru, 2) they singled out Japan's foreign
assistance programme in Peru for criticism, arguing that this aid benefited only a
narrow segment of the society, and 4) they protested against what they claimed
were cruel and inhumane conditions in Peru's jails.

c.

July 2000. Weapons heist at an army camp which leads to the killing of

two security personnels at Bukit Jenalik, Sauk, Perak, by the Al-Maunah Group.

d.

April 2001. Kidnapping of 21 tourists and locals by the Abu Sayyaf Group

(ASG) from the Malaysian resort of Sipadan Island, Sabah. They were taken as
hostages to Jolo Island, Southern Philippines.

e.

May 2001. Robbery at the Southern Bank, Petaling Jaya by individuals

believed to have connections with the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM).

26.

In early 2002, evidence emerged on the presence of an Al-Qaeda group in Kuala

Lumpur that was supported the September 11 attacks. This group formed part of a panAsian network known as Jemaah Islamiah (JI). With that, Malaysia was blamed as the
meeting and planning place for the attacks. Following this, Malaysia was also accused as
being the hub for international terrorism with the assistance of regional terrorist elements.
Although terrorism is increasingly decentralised, and fragmented, the basic objectives
remain the same, that is, JI still holds the desire to establish a Pan Islamic State (Daulah
Islamiah Nusantara). As such, there are efforts by JI elements to reactivate their struggle
in Malaysia with some extremist groups having links to several religious schools and
Institute of Higher Learning (IHL). Recruitment of students in IHL into extremist and
militant groups with violent extremist ideology provides intelligent and ICT-savvy
resources.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE IN MALAYSIA

27.

The Army is the core organization in the Malaysian Armed Forces, where the role

is to defend the sovereignty and strategic interest of Malaysia from all forms of threat. The
war against terrorism is a collective responsibility and new challenge for the security
organization including the Army. Since the seized of CPM in late 80s, Malaysian Army
14

moving towards the modernization to keep the organization remain relevance and in line
with current world development. The roles of the Army also changes with times from the
Counter Insurgency orientated force then to the Conventional and nowadays the Army is
prepared to be a versatile force.

28.

The Intelligence Department, Army Headquarters is responsible to coordinate and

manage the assets of information collection. These include clandestine and covert
operations to generate the intelligence cycle in a sustainable, secure and safe manner to
achieve information superiority in real time.

It provides actionable and predictive

intelligence at operational and tactical level, encompassing the entire spectrum of threats
to the country. It also conducts counter-intelligence operations to counter espionage,
sabotage and subversion, and also Psychological Operation (PSYOP) and Psychological
Warfare (PSYWAR), in cooperation with Defence Intelligence Staff Division (DISD) and
local agencies concerned. The activities above are made possible by the Intelligence
Fusion Centre (IFC), which is the nerve of Intelligence Department, Army HQ.
Intelligence Fusion Centre is a centre of human and computerised automation systems or
information technology equipment for integrating, collating and analyzing all information.
This centre is responsible to produce quality and timely intelligence for the Army.

LIMITATION

29.

Operationally, Army Intelligence units adopt the current administrative principles

and systems. Likewise, legally, they are bounded by existing Malaysian laws relevant to
combating terrorism. Within Malaysia, the primary military involvement and interest in
combating terrorism only plays a supporting role. Currently, the threat of terrorism is
mainly handled by Royal Malaysian Police (RMP). In addition, military forces have no
executive authority towards key installations except in the most extraordinary of
circumstances like the declaration the state of emergency, and then only as directed by
competent authority. However, the MAF is responsible for protecting its own personnel,
bases, ships, deployed forces, equipment, and installations. Additionaly, the MAF is also
responsible for providing technical assistance or forces when requested by the national
authorities. The NSC, as the lead agency for terrorist incidents both inside and outside
Malaysia, will closely cooperate with the MAF and other government agencies.

15

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN COMBATING TERRORISM

THE COMPONENT OF COMBATING TERRORISM

30.

The intelligence in combating terrorism is divided into two broad components,

antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Both are interrelated and no distinct separation

between where anti-terrorism ends and counterterrorism begins. Thus, the two should be
viewed as parts of a single operation. Antiterrorism (defensive measures) is the preventive
stage of combating terrorism.49 Defensive measures are intended to harden potential
targets and to develop procedures to detect planned terrorist actions before they take place,
thereby reducing the probability of a terrorist event. In military context, antiterrorism is
defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to
terrorist act, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. 50 In
essence, antiterrorism program stresses prevention of terrorist incidents through all of
preventive measures i.e. threat assessment, analysis of threats, ongoing training and
education of personnel, planning and public affairs. In this regard, the role of intelligence
is supporting the operation with sound and effective intelligence.

31.

Counterterrorism is offensive measures conducted to prevent, deter and respond to

terrorism.51 U.S military defines counterterrorism as "operations that include the offensive
measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism."52 Counterterrorism
operations are a tactical approach used by governments, militaries, local law enforcement,
and other parties against terrorist. Counterterrorism includes applying intelligence and
using force to eradicate terrorists, and is essentially a strategy of repression or
suppression.53 It is a highly specialized and resource intensive mission.

49

Intelligence in Combating Terrorism,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/accp/it0468/lsn3.htm, [Accessed on 2 May
2011].
50
Joint Publication 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 17 Mar 1998, p. I1, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07_2rsd.pdf, [Accessed on 3 May 2011].
51
Ibid, p. I-2.
52
Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; U.S.
Department of Defense ; 12 July 2007, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp1_02(05).pdf,
[Accessed on 4 May 2011].
53
Henley-Putnam University, Intelligence Counterterrorism Proctection, http://www.henleyputnam.edu/753-233-d753.htm [Assessed on 1 May 2011].

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ROLES OF INTELLIGENCE

32.

The role of intelligence in combating terrorism although differs little from other

traditional operation in goal, is still regard as similar with the used to combat similar
threats such as sabotage, espionage, and other national security threat. Basically, the
principles, methodology, and objectives are the same. Army intelligence organizations at
various levels perform in the wide functional areas including collection, analysis,
dissemination and counter intelligence. Generally, the short term goal of such functional
areas are to prevent acts of terrorism directed against national interests, whereas the long
term goal is to defeat terrorism as an institution. In this context, the secondary objectives
within functional areas are in collection, analysis, dissemination of intelligence and
counterterrorism. The collection involved all level of intelligence from individual
personnel to the higher level including sharing information with other intelligence
agencies. The analysis on the other hand, is by and large conducted in higher level thereby
tend to look at the big picture. The intelligence then on the last stage, disseminated at
the right time to the right consumers through various means. Meanwhile,
counterintelligence has two stages in combating terrorism to safeguard security personnel
(antiterrorism) and advising the commander on specific Operational Security (OPSEC)
measures (counterterrorism) particular to counter terrorist pre-strike intelligence gathering
activities.

PROTECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES

33.

Counterintelligence is part of protective security measures conducted to detect,

manipulate, disrupt, neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of terrorist activities. It is based

on two broad functions, which are distinct but interrelated i.e.: (1) Preventive Security.
This function comprises of offensive actions aimed at neutralising the effectiveness of
terrorist efforts and the acquisition of intelligence concerning the terrorists organisation,
methods and motives and (2) Protective Security. This consists of control or defensive
measures imposed to achieve military security and civil security. Military security is
concerned with measures to safeguard classified information, personnel and material,
whereas civil security which is designed to control civil population and to protect military
operations. Apart from that, CI operation also stresses to induce security awareness and
provide ongoing training to all military personnel. The protective security measures
17

include operations security (OPSEC), personnel protection and physical security. The
three are related elements, collectively protecting information from fall to terrorist and
lessen the vulnerability of an installation, unit, or personnel to terrorist attack.

ANALYTICAL METHODS

34.

Analysis is defined as an examination of a complex problem, its elements and

their relationship.54 This is achieved by breaking the problem into its component parts
and studying each part separately. Usually, intelligence analyst used two basic thought
processes to study problems and reach conclusions i.e. induction and deduction.55 Time
and information are the analysts most precious assets. The situation demands that the
analyst maximise the usefulness of the information while minimising the time required for
collection, collation and analysis of that information. Throughout of terrorism analysis, the
particular part of the problem deserving the most analytical effort is the terrorist group
itself, of which intelligence analyst examine its elements and their relationships with other
members, other terrorist groups, national governments and other organizations which
support or direct terrorism and terrorist-related events. The analysts do not analyse
terrorism, but rather concentrate on a particular terrorist group or entities and their
supporting structures. The study of each terrorist group is a separate effort.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISM

35.

In Malaysia, CT programs are addressed in NSC Directive No. 18 Pengurusan dan

Pengendalian Krisis Keganasan specifically designed to deal with terrorist crisis

management. The aim of directive is to establish crisis management mechanism
principally to determine the roles and responsibilities of various government agencies
involved in handling the threat of terrorism including other threats to the Malaysian
citizens or Malaysian interest abroad. This directive clearly stipulated the roles of every
government agencies in the crisis or incidents of terrorist including the MAF. This crisis
management mechanism are comprises several committees and sub-committees i.e.
Terrorism Control Committee, Crisis Management Team, Negotiation Group, Emergency
54

US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army Intelligence Centre,

Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 2009, p. 81.
55
Ibid.

18

Support Group, Striking Team and Executive Group.56 Having said that the members of
committee comes from various government agencies, the MAF is represented by Chief of
Defence Force himself (Terrorism Control Committee), Chief of Staff, MAF Hq and
Director General Defence Intelligence (Crisis Management Team). Apart from these two
top committees, the Malaysian Armed Forces also represented by other senior officers as a
permanent member in Emergency Support Group and Executive Group.

36.

The roles of the MAF are clearly stipulated in the directive to: (1) provide transport

that includes aircraft (Air Force), boat/vessel (Navy) and land vehicle (Army), (2) provide
expertise in various fields such as explosive, communication and field medical, (3)
provide logistic support during crisis, (4) provide air ambulance, (5) prepare striking team
(elite unit), (6) provide leadership in terms of the functions of crisis management team
when needed and (7) provide communication equipment/apparatus and technical support
at the scene.57 Generally, base on the roles of every agency in the committees, the MAF is
not directly involved in intelligence gathering but instead mainly carried out by Royal
Malaysian Police. Nevertheless, the participation of the Director General of Defence
Intelligence in the Crisis Management Team shows that to some extent these activities also
will be supported by the Military Intelligence.

CONCLUSION

37.

Terrorism indeed is not a new form of threat but instead has been recorded since

early history of mankind. Despite a long history, the Sep 11 incident has given terrorism
new definition. The incident has drawn world attention and instigated new set of security
concerns all over the world whereby threat of terrorism perceived as a global problem and
security issue. The threat of terrorism in Malaysia is considered as mild compare to the
threat in neighbouring countries and other parts of the world. However, base on the past
events and current indicators, Malaysia also vulnerable to terrorist attack. The existence of
terrorist activities in Malaysia suggested that the act of terrorism is a prominent threat in
Malaysia. On the contrary, the absence of terrorist attack in Malaysia so far clearly shows
the effectiveness of the government policy on terrorism and this stance is well delivered
56

Majlis Keselamatan Negara, Arahan No 18 (Semakan Semula), Pengurusan dan Pengendalian Krisis
Keganasan, p. 5-11.
57
Ibid, p. 23-24.

19

with effective law enforcement activities to curb such act from happened in Malaysia.
Therefore, Malaysian laws such as ISA, OSA and other emergency laws that can be use
in combating terrorism continues relevance until now.

38.

Many believed that Sep 11 incident, Bali Bombing and other terrorist attacks all

over the world were as a result of intelligence failures. Although this view has negative
connotation, but it is deem significant. However, in different perspective, the view itself is
self-explanatory the important of intelligence against terrorism. As a matter of fact, in
spite of the secluded failures, intelligence largely proved successful in predicting and
preventing many attempt of terrorist attack across the world. However, this achievement
is not share with the public because of various reasons especially on the pretext of need
to know. Thus, the phrase of intelligence failure is always close to our expression.

39.

In Malaysia, Military Intelligence is not a leading agency in combating terrorism.

This responsibility is over the shoulder of NSC and on the execution part (law
enforcement) mainly carried out by the Royal Malaysian Police. However, the MAF is
always prepared to support the NSC and other government agencies in combating
terrorism. Moreover, in some circumstances such as in the state emergency, this
responsibility will be handled by the MAF. Therefore, as far as the MAF is concern, it is
important to maintain the expertise and capability in combating terrorism. This effort
reflected with the procurement of new platform and equipment for combating terrorism
particularly for Special Force and Military Intelligence.

20

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARMY MANUALS
Malaysian Army Manual, MP 10.1.2 TD-Intelligence, Army Hq, MINDEF, Kuala
Lumpur, 2003.
US Army Manual, Sup R, 244-F8-Intelligence In Combating Terrorism, US Army
Intelligence Centre, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 2009.
MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Majlis Keselamatan Negara, Arahan No 18 (Semakan Semula), Pengurusan dan
Pengendalian Krisis Keganasan.
BOOKS
Adnan bin Said & Dr Baharudin bin Omar, The Malaysian Armys Battle Against
Communist Emergency in Peninsular Malaysia 1968-1989, Kuala Lumpur: Army
Headquarters, MINDEF, 2001.
Assaf Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism, New York: Infobase Publishing, 2006.
Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perpectives and Issues, California:
Sage Publication Inc, 2006.
Howard, Russell D., Sawyer, Reid L., Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding
the New Security Environment, Reading and Interpretations, Connecticut: Mc Graw Hill
Companies Inc, 2004.
Mahathir Mohamad, Terrorism and the Real Issues, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications (M)
Sdn Bhd, 2003.
Smith, Paul J., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to
States and Regional Stability, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 2005.
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES/JOURNALS
Joseph Kaos Jr, Govt Mulls Over Biometrics to Tacke Illegal Immigrants Issue, The Malay
Mail, 21 June 2010.
Rommel C. Banloi, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, (Quezon City : SISCI,
2003).

21

INTERNET SOURCES

Ambassador Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United

Nations, Threat to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, 19 Oct
2004, p. 1, http://www.un.int/malaysia/SC/2004/SCTerrorism%2019%20OCT04.pdf,
[Accessed on 23 Apr 2011].
Dana Dillon, Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism,The Heritage Foundation,
20 Dec 2004 http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/southeast-asia-and-the-brotherhoodof-terrorism, [Accessed on 1 May 2011].
Henley-Putnam University, Intelligence Counterterrorism Proctection, http://www.henleyputnam.edu/753-233-d753.htm, [Accessed on 1 May 2011].
Intelligence in Combating Terrorism,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/accp/it0468/lsn3.htm,
[Accessed on 2 May 2011].
Internal Security Act (1960), http://www.atlantic.metropolis.net/security/malaysiaisa.html, [Accessed on 2 May 2011].
Johnson, Rebecca, Post-Cold War Security: The Lost Opportunities, Disarmament Forum
1999, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art257.pdf, [Accessed on 17 Apr 2011].
Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms;
U.S.
Department
of
Defense
;
12
July
2007,
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp1_02(05).pdf, [Accessed on 4 May
2011].
Joint Publication 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 17
Mar 1998, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07_2rsd.pdf, [Accessed
on 3 May 2011].
The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (Final Report May 2004),
Reference
on
the
Rule
of
Law
in
Combating
Terrorism,
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/acj/references/acj-references-terrorism-and-rule-oflaw/downloads/reference-on-terrorism-and-the-rule-of-law/final.pdf, [Accessed on 2 May
2011].
US Field Manual 2.0, Intelligence, Headquarters of Department of the Army.
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf, [Accessed on 4 Apr 2011].

22

Mej Mohd Raslam bin Hj Dollah was

commissioned into Royal Intelligence
Corps on 22nd Jul 1995. He holds a
Diploma in Business Administration from
Universiti Tun Abdul Razak (UNITAR)
and completed his study in Diploma in
Defence and Strategic Studies from
Universiti of Malaya (UM) in 2011.

23