Philosophy of Mathematics

Class Notes

PHL-113
Dr. Carl Posy
Duke University
Fall 1992

Prepared by
Greg J. Badros

Table of Contents
Part I: General Survey of Philosophy of Mathematics 1
I.1 Prehistory of numbers 1
I.2 Greek Development of Math 2
2.1 Flowering of the Pythagoreans 3

2.2 Downfall of the Pythagoreans 3

2.3 Greek Reaction to the Downfall 4
I.3 Road to Non-Euclidean Geometry 12
3.1 Hilbert's axiomatization of Geometry 12
3.2 The Evaluation of non-Euclidean Geometry 13
I.4 History of the concept of a number 16
I.5 Conceptual Foundations of Mathematics 22
5.0 General Overview of Reactions to Berkeley 23
5.0.1 Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics 24
5.1.1 Introduction of the Notion of a Limit 25
5.1.2 Arithmetization of Mathematics 26
5.2 Cantor 29
5.3.1 Peano 33
5.3.2 Frege 34
I.6 Two of the Three Reactions to the Third Crisis 37
6.1 Platonistic Reaction 37
6.2 Hilbert's Program 40
Part II: Intuitionism, A Third Direction 46
II.1 General Introduction to Intuitionism 46
II.2 Intuitionist's Construction of the Natural Numbers 47
II.3 Intuitionist's Construction of the Real Numbers 47
II.4 Choice Sequences 48
II.5 General view of Brouwer's Intuitionism vs. Hilbert's Formalism 51

Part I: General Survey of Philosophy of Mathematics

Philosophy of Mathematics involves the epistemology, ontology, and methodology of
mathematics. Certain aspects unique to mathematics cause its philosophy to be of
particular interest:
1) abstractness - math involves abstract concepts
2) applicability - math is used by other sciences such as Physics
3) infinity - peculiar notion specific to pure math, yet a central concept to applied
calculations
Specific events caused the evolution of mathematical views in an attempt to eliminate
cracks in the foundation of mathematics. The most important of these was the
discovery of inconsistencies, or paradoxes, in the foundations of mathematics. This
represents the starting point of the modern philosophy of mathematics.
Overview of Part I
1. Prehistory of numbers
2. Crisis in Greek Mathematics, the Calculus Crisis, and the 20th Century Crisis
Crises result from problems between numerical and geometrical mathematical models
3. Road to Non-Euclidean Geometry
4. History of the concept of a number

I.1 Prehistory of numbers - origins of the notion of a number

The Farmer and the Crow
A farmer wanted to shoot a crow who was eating his crop. He went out by himself and
hid behind a tree waiting for the crow to come out. Unfortunately, the crow saw him
hide behind the tree, and wouldn't return until he'd seen the farmer (and his rifle)
leave. The farmer then figured he would trick the crow; he and his wife went out and
both hid behind the tree. The farmer then sent his wife back inside, in clear view of
the crow. Again, the crow wouldn't come out until the farmer left as well-- the crow
could apparently tell the difference between one and two people. The farmer then

repeated his attempts with three, four, five, six, and seven of his friends. Not until he
brought a seventh friend, and sent all seven friends away from the tree did the crow
come out of hiding, at which point the farmer promptly shot the crow.
What's the point?
Although the crow could distinguish between one through seven, it seemed as though
it couldn't tell the difference between seven and eight individuals. It could "count" as
high as seven, since it has six talons. It could remember the number of people by
equating each person to a talon, and thinking one, two, three, four, five, six, more.
Since both seven and eight people equate to "more" they were indistinguishable to the
crow.
Counting
Counting rests on a 1-1 correspondence; a mapping between the elements of two sets;
for example, stones(1) used to count sheep. the set of talons, however, was exhausted
with the seventh person, since there were no more talons to correspond to the last
person.
Usually the correspondence is set up because we are concerned about the size of one
set against the index set.
Numbers are a canonical (universally-accepted) index set.
English numbers are infinite, based on the number 10 (decimal), while French
numbers are based on 20.(2)
Babylonians used base 60,(3) which is why time and the circle are divided into
multiples of 60. They also altered their number system to simplify calculations within
different applications.
There is an important distinction between counting and comparing relative size.
Cardinal numbers tell about size, while ordinal numbers are used for counting.
For counting, the order is significant, while cardinal numbers' order is irrelevant.
In English, we make a semantic distinction between the two types of numbers: fifth is
an ordinal number, expressing an ordered position, while five is a cardinal number
expressing a magnitude.

I.2 Greek Development of Math

Thales is credited with the beginning of Greek mathematics; he gave math the
position of a separate science-- it's own area of discourse.
2.1 Flowering of the Pythagoreans(4)
Pythagorean ideas dominated mathematical thinking for a while. The pythagoreans:
represented a coherent body of mathematical doctrines
believed "number rules the universe" - made no distinction between math, physics, or
different areas of mathematics
were primarily concerned with the study of properties of counting numbers
believed all measurements could be expressed in terms of natural numbers, or ratios
of natural numbers (called rational numbers)
developed number theory(5) (primes, relative primes, amicable numbers, etc.) with
applications (eg. harmonics)
developed geometric theorems and ideas about proportions
insistent that mathematical ideas required proofs
thought numbers had concrete representations as figures of points-- developed
figurate numbers (eg. square numbers, triangular numbers, etc.)
Three important pythagorean beliefs
1) Agreed with Babylonian assumption of commensurability-- any geometric
measurement will be some rational multiple of the standard unit.
2) Thought that space is ultimately discrete (separable)-- there is nothing between 1
and 2. Everything had to have atomic parts.
3) Believed continuity implied infinite divisibility

2.2 Downfall of the Pythagoreans [Crisis #1]

a) Commensurability is false (found irrational numbers)

If commensurability were true, (1+1)=2 must equal p/q where p and q are natural
numbers.
Proof that Commensurability is False:
1) Assume 2=p/q, p and q {set of natural numbers}
2) Reduce p/q to lowest terms (can be done with any fraction)
3) p=q2 p2=2q2
4) Thus, p2 is an even number (it is equal to twice an integer)
5) p2 = p is also even (all even sqaures' roots are even)
6) So, p=2k, k {set of natural numbers}
7) (2k)2=2q2 4k2=2q2 2k2=q2
8) Thus, q2 is even, so q is even
9) Both q and p are even, thus they share the common factor of 2; this however,
contradicts step #2, that p/q is reduced to lowest terms, thus our assumption that
2=p/q is false.
First recorded use of reductio ad absurdum(6) proof
b) Infinite divisibility and discreteness seem inconsistent
Zeno's paradoxes of motion (4 main paradoxes) attack philosophical theories of
motion which parallel a pythagorean view of reality.
The paradox of the arrow-- it is impossible for an arrow to move
at any instant of time, the arrow travels over no space, thus it is stationary
if an interval of time is a continuum of instants, the arrow doesn't move during any of
the instants, thus it doesn't move during the entire interval either.
Thus, the Pythagorean world view was internally inconsistent.

2.3 Greek Reaction to the Downfall

a) Plato - isolate and defeat the problem
Stressed separation of geometry and number as two separate branches of mathematics,
thus isolating math from the study of the physical world altogether.
Thought mathematics belonged to realm of ideas and forms; believed in abstract
notions without physical counterparts-- those abstract things comprise a mathematical
reality.
Thought abstract reality of mathematics is completely precise and structured-Abstract is real; concrete is illusory.
b) Aristotle
Gives much more precise account of nature of collections, manifolds
Gives much more precise account of nature of continuity, discrete
1) Aristotle's definition of continuity
Things are together in place when they're in one primary place; they are apart when
they are in different places. Things are in contact when their edges are in the same
place. A thing is in succession when it is after something with nothing similar (of the
same kind) in between.
Contiguous succession is succession along with contact.
Continuous is what is contiguous when the extremities are one and the same,
contained in one another. Continuous implies shared, merging edges.
Isomorphisms-- all basic continuous manifolds (i.e. space, time, motion) are
isomorphic.
Flowing motion is the basic idea of Aristotle's continuity-- very different from the
Pythagoreans' view.
Aristotle pointed out that the problem in Zeno's paradox is due to infinity.

2) Aristotle's analysis of infinity

To get a point requires infinite divisions of a line; anything short of infinite divisions
is a continuous magnitude. Infinite divisions is not possible, thus we can't get to a
point from a line.
A completed infinity was an incomprehensible, impermissible notion to Aristotle,
while a potential infinity is permitted. The idea of a completed infinity was based on
an existential claim-- there would exist a point; a potential infinity, instead, contains
no existential claim-- any finite number of divisions can be made to a line without
exhausting the magnitude(7).
3) Aristotle believed proof methods may by usable only in different contexts. He
thought patterns of reasoning should be discussed and science could be organized
according to acceptable patterns of reasoning.
Aristotle invented logic. In fact, his basic categorization for logic defined its study
until the late 19th century.
His basic idea was that reasoning always requires a starting point. Aristotle believed
science is made up of statements, and science is basically about inferring conclusions
from propositions. Aristotle showed what inferences were valid and what were
fallacious. He analyzed the structure of statements(8), the components of inferences.
Aristotle also introduced the idea of deduction-- that one can infer new statements by
building upon accepted past truths. This technique has the problem of infinite regress,
(9)
hence he developed postulates or axioms to serve as a foundation. Postulates (and
axioms(10)) are accepted as true, without requiring proof. All other statements about a
science must then be proven to be true using only the postulates, axioms, and
previously-proven-true statements.
Aristotle thought that concepts required definition. Again, a hierarchy existed where
there were concepts defined as specializations of more broad concepts. For example a
square could be defined as a rectangle with four equilateral sides; in this example, the
square is the species of the more broad genus, rectangle. Again, infinite regress is a
problem, necessitating fundamental concepts which aren't defined (eg. a geometric
point). Other concepts are then constructions (combinations, specializations, etc.) of
the fundamental concepts.
However, just defining a concept wasn't enough for Aristotle. He required that one
must also show an instantiation of the new concept exists. Thus each fundamental
(undefined) concept requires an existence postulate (since their existence can't be

proven).
c) Mathematicians reaction to the Downfall (Eudoxes and
Euclid)
Eudoxes
Theory of proportion:
Four magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third
to the fourth, when, if any equimultiples whatever be taken of the first and third and
any equimultiples whatever be taken of the second and fourth, the former
equimultiples alike exceed, are alike equal to, or are alike less than the latter
equimultiples.(11)
So, if x and y are the same kind of magnitude, and z and w are also the same kind of
magnitude (not necessarily the same kind as x and y, though), then:
x:y = z:w if and only if:
mx > ny implies mz > nw, and
mx < ny implies mz < nw, and
mx = ny implies mz = nw,
for all m and n.
Note that Eudoxes's theory of proportion is non-numerical; it only describes a basic
notion of proportionality.
We can prove that the areas of triangles of equal heights is proportional to the lengths
of their bases. In other words, given ABC and ADE, we can show that Area of ABC :
Area of ADE = BC : DE(12).
Proof:
Given m and n, we must show:
m AABC > n AADE

m BC > n DE, and

m AABC < n AADE
m BC < n DE, and
m AABC = n AADE
m BC = n DE.
1) Replicate segment BC to the left of B n-1 times; replicate segment DE to the right
of E m-1 times, see figure 2.
2) Thus, BnC = n(BC); DEm = m(DE).
3) So, AABnC = n(AABC); and
AADEm = n(AADE).(13)
4) There is a theorem that says if two triangle's share the same altitude, whichever has
the larger base has the larger area (likewise for smaller, and equal). Thus:

If m BC > n DE, then

m AABC > n AADE, and
if m BC < n DE, then
m AABC < n AADE, and
if m BC = n DE, then
m AABC = n AADE.
INCORRECT Proof:

1) Choose T such that BC = TP, and DE = TQ, see figure 3.

2) Divide ABC into P triangles each of base T, ADE into Q triangles each of base T.
3) Each smaller triangle has equal area, so total areas are in proportion.
ERROR: This proof assumes the existence of T, which is false. Thus the proof is
unsound-- it is based on a false assumption.

Method of Exhaustion, Basic Assumption:

If from any magnitude there be subtracted a part not less than its half, from the
remainder another part not less that its half, and so on, there will at length remain a
magnitude less than any preassigned magnitude of the same kind.
Proof:
1) Given two circles, A1 and A2 (denoting area), with diameters d1 and d2, respectively,
we know A1 : A2 = d12 : d22 (area is proportional to square of diameter), see figure 4.
2) Take circle A1 and inscribe a regular polygon and repeatedly double the number of
sides in the inscribed polygon. See figure 5.
3) Given any small , we can eventually get an inscribed polygon, P1 with enough sides
such that:
Acircle #1 - Apolygon < .
4) Suppose:
A1 : A2 > d12 : d22

Choose Pn such that the inequality holds and thus:

P1 : A2 > d12 : d22
5) Now take P2 to be a similar polygon inscribed in A2.
6) From theory of proportions, we have:
P1 : P2 = d12 : d22
7) Thus, we have:
P1 : A2 = P1 : P2
which implies P2 > A2. However, P2 is inscribed in A2 and thus cannot have a greater
area. Therefore, our supposition in #4, above, is false.
8) Through parallel reasoning, we can show that:
A1 : A2 < d12 : d22
is also false, reducing to a similar absurdity.
9) If both inequalities are false, then the only other possible relationship is equality,
so:
A1 : A2 = d12 : d22
must be true.
Similar double use of reductio ad absurdum method characterizes almost every
geometric use of method of exhaustion.

Resistance to the theorem due to the double use of reductio ad absurdum for positive
results.
Very sterile method; the relationship to be proved must be discovered in another way,
mathematics is simply used to prove the other possibilities to be false.
Split mathematicians into empirical scientists and theorematic mathematicians.
Archimedes objected to the method of exhaustion and replaced it with the method of
equilibrium.
Idea of infinite was very little strips that could be measured on a scale
Archimedes used the method of equilibria for discoveries, but used method of
exhaustion for rigorous proofs.
Euclid
Axiomatized geometry into a perfect Aristotelian science (in The Elements). Few
proofs are attributed to Euclid, his achievement was the organization: what needs to
be a postulate? etc.
Believed in absolute separation of discrete mathematics and magnitudes.(14) For
example, Books 5 and 6 state the theory of proportion for magnitudes, while Book 7
states the theory of proportion for numbers.
Thomas Heath wrote a commentary on The Elements (1926). He wondered why
Euclid didn't use numbers as a special case of magnitudes and save all the repetition.
Mathematicians made an ontological change after Zeno's paradox-- separation of
numbers and magnitudes was commonplace, thus it probably didn't occur to Euclid
that numbers (numerical entities) were a special case of magnitudes (geometric
entities)
Elements is full of difficulties
1. Absolute separation resulted in a great deal of repetition
2. There were actual gaps
3. There were perceived gaps

Archimedean Postulate (Unstated assumption in the method of

exhaustion):
If we continuously mark off segment AB in the direction of C, eventually we'll pass
C.
This can not be proven from the other axioms.
Gaps were often due to the dependence on pictorial diagrams. Assumptions seemed
obvious, but needed to be explicitly stated. For example, Euclid forgot:
Given a line, there must be two points on it, and
Given a line, there exists at least one point not on the line
Euclid should have stated the "self-evident" assumptions.

Perceived overstatement: The Fifth Postulate of Geometry (Parallel Postulate)

If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same
side less than two right angles, then the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely,
will meet on that side on which are the angles less than two right angles. (see figure
7).

Mathematicians objected-- the postulate was too complex, and seemed derivable from
the other postulates. However, Euclid was right!

I.3 Road to Non-Euclidean Geometry

3.1 Hilbert's axiomatization of Geometry

David Hilbert wrote Hilbert's Foundation of Geometry-- a new axiomatization of

geometry with about thirty postulates, divided
into
five categories:
a) Incidence (intersection)
b) Betweenness
c) Congruence
d) Continuity
e) Parallelism
Hilbert points out that the interpretation of terms is irrelevant, only deductive logic is
used to generate theorems.
Dedekind's Postulate
Given line l1, split it into c1 and c2 such that l = c1 c2, and c1 and c2 are not empty nor
do they equal l. No point of c1 is between two points of c2, and no point of c2 is
between two points of c1. Then there is a unique point O such that O is between x and
y if and only if x c1, y c2
3.2 The Evaluation of non-Euclidean Geometry
How did Hilbert realize the necessity of the parallel postulate? Many attempts were
made to prove the parallel postulate as a theorem, using only the other four postulates.

Proclus's Proof Attempt:

As PR increases, so does SR. Thus, somewhere, SR PQ as PR is extended (see figure
8).

Can be proven, but requires the parallel postulate!!

John Wallis (1616-1703) - looked for simpler postulates to assume, and tried proving
the parallel postulate from those.
Simpler Postulate: Given a ABC and any line segment DE, there exists a triangle with
DE as a side which is similar to ABC
In other words, similarity preserves shape-- size, shape, and location, are independent
of each other.
This simpler postulate allows derivation of Euclid's fifth postulate.(15)

Saccheri (Italian, 1663-1733) and Lambert (German, 1728-1777)

Saccheri and Lambert independently tried proving the parallel postulate by the
reductio ad absurdum method. Their proof started with "neutral geometry"-Euclidean geometry excluding the parallel postulate.

Assume B = C, three possibilities exist:

1) B = C = 90
2) B, C > 90 (obtuse angle hypothesis)
3) B, C < 90 (acute angle hypothesis)
#1 is equivalent to the parallel postulate.
#2 can be shown to be contradictory to neutral geometry.
#3 couldn't be proven contradictory; it generated weird results-- "results [that] were
repugnant to the nature of the straight line and space."

This was the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry (but they didn't know it)
In the late 18th and early 19th century, three men became interested in the acute angle
hypothesis. Bolyai (Polish), Gauss (German), and Zobachevsky (Russian) all took the
negation of the parallel postulate as a postulate and added it to neutral geometry.
Nothing contradictory followed!
The Negation of the Parallel Postulate:
There is at least one line l and one point p outside of l such that through p there are at
least two lines which do not intersect l.
As it turns out, this implies through any point outside of l, there are infinitely many
lines parallel to l.
Some theorems that are derivable from neutral geometry and
the negation of the parallel postulate:
Angles in a triangles sum to less than 180 degrees.
Angles in a quadrilateral sum to less than 360 degrees.
Rectangles do not exist.
If two triangles are similar, then they are congruent-- size and
shape are not independent.(16)
This new geometry is called "hyperbolic geometry."
Riemann developed "elliptical geometry" where there are no parallel lines; all lines
intersect.
Klein and Belttrami
independently proved that there is no hope of contradiction between neutral geometry
and the negation of the parallel postulate
showed if straight Euclidean geometry is consistent, it must also be true that no
contradiction can occur in non-Euclidean geometry.
showed one could model non-Euclidean geometry inside Euclidean geometry.

See figure 10: circle is whole plane, a chord is a line. Notice that infinitely many
chords (lines) don't intersect l and are thus parallel.
Translation between notions of normal geometry and interpretation in the hyperbolic
plane:
Euclid Hyperbolic
point point interior to circle
line chord of circle
Given the translation equivalence, theorems and postulates can be proven.
These facts inspired Hilbert's remark that a study of geometry is just a consequence of
certain axioms and their interpretations are unimportant.
Klein said geometry is really the study of Algebra: a collection of transformations and
what remains the same. In fact, geometries can be classified by which properties of
figures remain invariant under which transformations; Euclidean geometry is
characterized by a certain set of invariants.
Bottom line:
There are several ways to consistently extend Euclid's first four postulates (neutral
geometry) in incompatible directions.
Philosophical Questions:
What do the paths have in common?
What makes them all geometry [Klein's answer about transformations?]
What is space? What are its properties?
Hilbert believed geometry was just a formal system and the consequences of
postulates and axioms studied independently of their interpretations (an uninterpreted
formal system). A consistent interpretation of a system (called a model could be given
to show consistency.

What makes a sentence true?

Which geometry is the "true geometry"?
The one physics verifies? Why does one work for physics? Why should any work for
physics?
An empirical question?
What happens to the other geometries?
Other notion of space?
Meaningless game?

I.4 History of the concept of a number

Respect for Aristotelian idea that a completed infinity does not belong in
mathematics.
Need to introduce objects which are infinite in an essential way(17)
Pressure not to admit irrationals as numbers due to their lack of a decimal expansion.
Conflict: separation of magnitude and number, versus applications requiring them to
be together. Conflicts arose due to the need to apply mathematics to physical
situations.
Nicholas of Cusa - cleric, write, philosopher, and theologian of the 15th century
Liked infinity in theology, so liked it in mathematics also; wanted infinity to be
brought back into math
Thought triangle was the polygon with the fewest sides; circle was the polygon with
the most sides (infinitely many sides)
"the infinite is that which cannot be made bigger. . . .the infinitesimal is that which
cannot be made smaller."
Mathematicians didn't buy it!

Valerio and Stevin - applied mathematicians

Stevin was interested in the problem of calculating the fluid pressure on a vertical
damn. He assumed the damn is made up of thin rectangles and used known formulas
for the relationship between the area and volume of the polygons, then rotated the thin
strips through the area of the damn.
Valerio developed similar applied methods using thin strips.
After formulas were derived, they were treated as if they were delivered
independently of mathematics
Next step? Use this way of thinking inside mathematics.
Cavalieri - introduced a thin strip, or "indivisible" into mathematics. Plane strip can
be thought of as infinitely many parallel indivisibles, etc.
Cavalieri's principle:

One can move indivisibles composing a figure independently of each other and thus
recreate the figure. Then we have two figures inside two parallel lines. If all lines
parallel to two containing lines intersecting the two figures cut chords of equal
lengths, then the areas of the two figures are the same.
Cavalieri admitted that his methods clearly couldn't be rigorous; "Rigor is for
philosophers, mathematics is for scientists."
Cavalieri's chief critic was Galileo.(18) Galileo launched another attack against the
notion of infinity:

Let's think about a set of all natural numbers. It is infinite. This set is clearly larger
than the set of all perfect squares. However, there is a one to one correspondence
between the set of all natural numbers and the set of all perfect squares. Thus the sets
have the same size. A paradox is apparent.
Thus, mathematical notions don't apply to infinity; we can't speak of larger or smaller
than infinity. Infinity is not a magnitude, it is a collection of aggregates. Thus Galileo
didn't permit Cavalieri's method in mathematics, but did teach his method to students,
and advised them to use it to solve problems.
Pressure moving towards the notion of integration, yet still viewed as non-rigorous.

Theorem
If two solids have equal altitudes and if sections made by planes parallel to the bases
and of equal distance are always in a given ratio, then the solids' volumes are also in
that ratio.
See figure 12:
Area DBC : Area Rectangle = 1:2
Now build three dimensional figure out into space from whole rectangle and for
triangle (forming a half-pyramid)
Area Half Pyramid : Area Parallelopiped = 1:3.
Note that these observations using modern calculus notation are:

and
These generalize to the well-known integration formula:

This generalization came much later; for the individual results, each calculation's
methods were different. It was only conjectured that the pattern must hold in general.
The notation itself wasn't understood.
Heterogenia is the notion that geometric figures are made of lots of figures in lower
dimensions. The above methods use the idea of summing these figures of lower
dimensions to make calculations about the figures of the higher dimensions
Heterogenia was a very controversial idea!
1) infinitary methods allowable in mathematics and/or usable for calculation?
Cavalieri didn't mind because his idea of mathematics didn't require rigor.
Galileo didn't accept the methods into math, but used for calculations
2) infinitesimals vs. indivisibles
Infinitesimals are objects which make up a figure; their size decreases as their number
increases.
Indivisibles are the basic, atomic components of a geometric figure.(19)
Keppler gave a proof for the area of the circle by summing the areas of infinitely
many small triangles with heights equal to the circle's radius:(20)
h=r, sum of base length = circumference of circle = 2r, thus,
area of circle = (2r)r = r2.
3) geometric vs. numerical methods
Cavalieri thought everything should be viewed geometrically.
Vieta instead worked with algebraic notions; he represented variable magnitudes by
letters, and described geometric figures by equations that would lead to their graph.
This analytic geometry was rejected by Cavalieri because in an equation typical of
analytic geometry such as x3 + x2 + x = 0, terms corresponding (geometrically) to a
volume, area, and magnitude were being added-- this summation of unlike terms was

abhorrent to Cavalieri.

John Wallis, a mathematician in favor of the idea of the indivisible, and in favor of
numerical methods attacked the same parallelogram problem as previously
mentioned. He introduced to represent the largest number. Thus, according to Wallis:

since the reciprocal of the largest number must

be the smallest number.
Wallis also conjectured the integration formula:

Also calculated the area of a triangle to be bh by summing

infinite trapezoids.
Wallis's proofs used properties of numerical progressions.

Isaac Barrow(21) also rejected analytic geometry. He favored geometrical methods and
the concept of the infinitesimal. Barrow was concerned with determining tangents to
curves, but wouldn't view curves as equations.
Take an indefinitely small arc MN, and construct MNR, and compare NR:MR to
NP:TP. There are several rules Barrow followed when considering the idea of M
moving closer and closer to coincidence:
1) Omit all terms containing e or f to a power greater than one.(22)
2) Balance
3) Assume as M approaches N, the lines coincide.

Invention of the Calculus by Newton and Leibniz

rivalry developed
colorful personalities
interesting story-- Who was first? Any plagiarism?
Newton, born in 1642, had written ideas about the Calculus in the 1660s, but Leibniz,
born in 1646, had already published similar ideas. What makes things more
complicated is that there was a good deal of correspondence between the two of them.

No clarification whatsoever of the confusion in mathematics!

Newton's and Leibniz's contributions were formal, technical improvements; they
systematized and generalized the confusion of methods. They did not have any better
conceptual methods than others. From the promulgation of their methods, the
Calculus was immediately thought of as a new branch of mathematics. Today, we use
Newton's reasoning, and Leibniz's notation.
Newton dealt with the analysis of motion; he viewed curves as the locus of motion of
a point and believed that notions of motion and flow must be used when analyzing
continua. He called his discovery the method of fluxions. Curve was a mapping
between abscissa and ordinates. Variables were called "fluents"; rates of change were
called "fluxions." The moment of a fluent was the delta of a variable. Newton's
notation was as follows:

x is a fluent;

is a fluxion;(23) o represents a small t

Notation of lowercase "o" was misleading-- it looks like zero, and people accused him
of letting the t equate to zero.

Important contribution was recognizing the existence of an abstract technique which

was applicable to all problems involving rates of change.

Leibniz's notation:
. dy and dx are both very small that they are insignificant,
however, their ratio is a number; thus ratios were stressed, not the individual
components.

Impact of Newton and Leibniz was due to systematicity and applicability-- not at all a
conceptual improvement. There was no longer confusion, math had a new science:
infinitesimal analysis; it was so powerful that the face of mathematics was changed
forever. It was called the Second Great Crisis because math is proceeding on the basis
of conceptually unclear notions; Physics was being based on these questionable ideas.
These problems brought serious attacks against mathematics.
George Berkeley criticized the whole process of the Calculus (in The Analyst, 1734)
very effective argument that the Calculus is an unacceptable scientific practice.
objected to the notion of instantaneous velocity.
tried recreating Zeno's paradoxes in Newtonian Calculus.
thought the notion of instantaneous velocity has no physical velocity
shows there is no consistent mathematical position on the issues.
saw math as the science of extended things; infinitesimals don't have extensions.
mathematical techniques don't mesh with the reality of the times

Reaction to the challenge was opposite to the Greek's earlier reaction:

Keep mathematics, keep the Calculus; dig in and discover a clear conceptual
foundation!

I.5 Conceptual Foundations of Mathematics

Infinite quantities are not picturable-- maybe that's okay. So then what is mathematics
about?
What are adequate grounds for mathematical reasoning if not picturability?
Two Possible Answers:
1) Math is just an abstract science with strict definitions; it is simply a matter of proof
and rigor.
2) Math is about the physical world but we have to learn how to use the appropriate
theory about what we perceive-- we need a theory of intuition to allow us to keep the
infinitary parts of mathematics.
Within math, it was recognized that the problems arise because of the unclarity that
the mathematicians had about the relationship between geometric methods and
numerical methods. Geometric methods which allowed the infinitesimally small are
too imprecise. This led to the introduction of arithmetic techniques to the study of
infinitesimal analysis(24) to give it rigor-- a return to Pythagorean ideas.

5.0 General Overview of Reactions to Berkeley

Two Philosophical Lines
1) Math should be limited by the nature of perceptual faculties; it should be intuitive,
and should be about the perceivable world. Hence, what is needed is a more
sophisticated theory of perception.
2) Problems in math are not consistent with perceptual abilities, but do not limit math
to what is intuitable; math isn't necessarily about perceivable things, it should be
governed only by abstract considerations of rigor and reasoning.
The first reaction within the philosophical community was the first idea above.
Imanual Kant(25) and John Stuart Mill(26) took this view.
On the other hand, the mathematics world supported the second philosophical line.
This was called the anti-Kantian direction, as it opposed Kant's views. The reason for
this direction was related to two developments in pure math:

Consistent alternative theories of Geometry showed that mathematics can be

presented as an abstract system without any particular interpretation.
Arithmetization of mathematics proved math could be reduced to simply the concepts
of natural numbers and sets.
There was still resistance to leaving intuition behind. Kronecker,(27) for example,
advocated a return to an intuitive basis of mathematics.
Another Crisis: Abstract non-intuitive mathematics was internally inconsistent!!!

5.0.1 Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics

First Thesis:
Mathematics is about the empirical world, but it is special in one important way:
necessary(28) properties of the world are found through mathematical proofs; to prove
something is wrong, one must show only that the world could be different.
Epistemological Problem:
Sciences are basically generalizations from experience, but this can provide only
contingent, possible properties of the world (it could have been otherwise). Science
simply predicts that the future will mirror the past.
Mathematics is about the empirical world, but usually methods for deriving
knowledge give contingent knowledge, not the necessity that pure mathematics(29)
gives us. Kant wants necessary knowledge with empirical knowledge.
Kant Solves the Problem in a Couple of Steps
1) Objects in the empirical world are appearances (or phenomenon). By their nature,
they have only the properties that we come to know of them from experiences. They
are not things in themselves. Therefore Kant said we must:
Become an idealist-- object's properties are only what is perceivable; there are no nonexperienceable properties of objects.
2) Built into our minds are two forms of intuition and perception such that every
perception we have is shaped by these forms: Space and Time. These are, in fact,
parts of the mind, and not something the mind picks up from experience. Thus,
empirical objects are necessarily spaciotemporal objects.

3) We then come to know spaciotemporal properties in an a priori fashion; in

studying spaciotemporal properties, we are merely studying ourselves, and our
perceptual abilities.
4) Mathematics is simply the science that studies the spaciotemporal properties of
objects by studying the nature of space and time.(30)
Thus, mathematics is the studying of the abstract form of perception.
What about infinitary ideas-- things not subject to perception?
Kant makes a distinction between:
Empirical intuition, the intuition from the senses which is always finite (mathematics
doesn't deal with this), and
Pure intuition, the study of possibilities for empirical intuition where finite limits are
not introduced in either direction.
Thus mathematics can allow the division of small intervals and the expansion of large
intervals. This means we can discuss smaller and smaller quantities without
introducing the smallest quantities.
Suppose we want to prove an interval is divisible. We can do this by the following:
1) Pick an interval
2) Show it is divisible
3) Abstract from its actual size, and let it represent the notion of a perceivable
interval.
Two Consequences of Kantian View
No such thing as unapplied mathematics-- math is, by nature, about the world (if it's
not, it's just an abstract game).
There is exactly one right mathematical theory of time, space, and motion.(31)

5.1.1 Introduction of the Notion of a Limit

Instead of talking about infinitely small quantities, think of a sequence of smaller and
smaller quantities approaching a number. This idea was formulated independently by
Bolzano and Cauchy in the late 18th century.
Bolzano's Definition of a Limit
When F1(x), F2(x), ..., Fn(x), ... is such that for any given small quantity the difference
between Fn(x) and Fn+r(x) gets and stays smaller than that quantity as n gets larger,
then there is one and only one magnitude to which the sequence gets as close as you
please.
Today, this definition is considered an example of an internal criterion for
convergence.
Cauchy's Definition of a Limit
When the successive values attributed to a variable approach indefinitely a fixed value
so as to end by differing from it as little as one wishes, this last is called the limit of
all the others.
Difference between definitions: Cauchy's talks about a relationship to the end! He
gives an external criterion for convergence.(32)

5.1.2 Arithmetization of Mathematics

First step was the precise notion of what a limit is; Bolzano and Cauchy took care of
that.
Applications of converging to a limit:
Cauchy used limits in describing the notion of a derivative. He also introduced the
notion f(x):

This used an Aristotelian potential infinity, instead of an actual infinity.

Application to the notion of a continuous magnitude:

When is a line (or function) continuous?
A function is continuous at x0 if as xx0, f(x)f(x0). The function (as a whole) is
continuous if it is continuous for all points x0.
Thus, the notion of continuity was made into an arithmetic notion (from a geometric
notion).
Cauchy tried using the limit notion for defining, and actually building, irrational
numbers out of limits and series. He said that irrational numbers are the limit of a
sequence of rational numbers. For example:

(defined as limit of the series)

Cauchy was right that

should be viewed as a number, but his attempt to show the
convergence failed because of his definition of a limit. He defined an irrational
number as the convergence of a sequence, but his definition of a limit required
knowing the limit in advance (in order to get closer and closer).
Cauchy assumed internal convergence established the existence of a limit; he was
missing the step of defining what sort of entity the limit of a sequence is. Karl
Weierstrass(33) added the missing ingredient:
The problem with Cauchy's definition is there is no entity for the limit of the sequence
to be. Let the limit of a convergent series of rational numbers be the set of numbers in
the series. Therefore a set is a number. Hence, the limit of:
1, 1.4, 1.41, 1.414, 1.4142, ...
is the set:
{1, 1.4, 1.41, 1.414, 1.4142, ... }
and:

Weierstrass also introduced the - definition of a limit:

if for all > 0, there exists a > 0 such that for all t:
implies

We are now back to the Pythagorean idea of a single theory based on numerical
concepts.
Weirstrass' definition of an irrational depended on it being a series; the notion of
continuity reduced to the idea of a sequence of rational numbers and convergence.

Richard Dedekind took it one step more abstract. He showed the definition of
irrational number can be made only with the notion of sets of rational numbers
(eliminating the need for notions of series or convergence). Suppose we have a set of
rational numbers and cut the set into parts A and B, exhausting the set. All rational
numbers are in either set A or set B, none are in both, and all elements of A are less
than all elements of B. We can then define the abstract notion of a real number as a
pair, {A,B} of sets. For example:
is defined by sets {A,B}, such that:
A is the set of all rational numbers x, with x2 < 2, and
B is the set of all rational numbers y, with y2 > 2.
Dedekind's view is more abstract, but requires less conceptual machinery-- irrationals
are defined in terms of only rationals and sets.
This view signifies a retreat on one crucial issue: Actually infinite sets must be
legitimate objects.

George Cantor showed a consistent theory of infinite magnitudes exists. He defined

natural numbers in terms of sets.
Frege showed nothing else but an infinite set is required; he thought of math as a
branch of pure abstract logic.
Mathematics is built from classification of numbers shown in figure 14. Each level
has its own set of defined operations: N, the natural numbers, have operations defined.
Q, the rational numbers, are defined as ratios of N and their operations are defined in
terms of operations on N. R, the real numbers, are defined as sets of convergent
sequences of rational numbers or as Dedekind cuts
It is important that:
There is a subset of Q isomorphic to N, and
There is a subset of R isomorphic to Q.
The operations must be defined to preserve these isomorphisms.
The number one viewed as an element of N is a different entity from the number one
viewed as an element of Q is a different entity from the number one viewed as an
element of R.
So, ontologically, basic objects of mathematics are N (the natural numbers) and sets!
Two developments that this leads to are:
1) Investigation of the notion of infinite sets as numbers and that an infinite set can be
a number.
2) Investigation of the nature of natural numbers.

5.2 Cantor
Cantor wasn't concerned with what a number is. Instead, he wondered:
When is it that two sets of objects have the same number?
Cantor, therefore, defined the notion of similarity of size (i.e. equality of cardinal):

Two sets have the same cardinality if there exists a one to one mapping between them
which exhausts them both.

(34)

Similarly, set A has cardinality cardinality of set B if there

exists a one to one mapping from set B to set A which exhausts
B.
Take E, the set of even numbers, and N, the set of natural
numbers:
yet E N, so

should be greater than

.(35)

Dedekind said an infinite set is a set which can be put into a one-one correspondence
with a proper subset of itself.
Cantor showed cardinality of Q = cardinality of N by showing one to one mapping.

Proof: Write out rational numbers as shown in figure 15. All rational numbers
appear on the grid. Now give them the order shown by arrows. This orders the
rational numbers, thus creating a one to one correspondence with N. The first rational
number in the ordering corresponds to one, the second corresponds to two, etc.

A denumerable set (sometimes called enumerable) is one that can be put into a one to
one correspondence with the set of natural numbers.
Cantor conjectured that there are only two types of cardinal numbers: finite or
infinite; thus all infinite sets would be of the same size. However, he proved this
conjecture false! The set of R is larger than N; in fact there are more real numbers
between zero and one than there are total natural numbers.
Diagonal Proof:(36)

Assume that
. List all natural numbers down left side, and give
corresponding real number to each's right:

1 0.a11 a21 a31 a41 a51 a61 .....

2 0.a12 a22 a32 a42 a52 a62 .....
3 0.a13 a23 a33 a43 a53 a63 .....
4 0.a14 a24 a34 a44 a54 a64 .....
5 0.a15 a25 a35 a45 a55 a65 .....
6 0.a16 a26 a36 a46 a56 a66 .....
etc.
Two additional assumptions:
List can be completed
Every real number between 0 and 1 occurs in the list
Now select r = 0.d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 .....
Let dn = 3 if ann 3, otherwise let dn = 4.
In other words, let r differ by at least one digit (the diagonal digit) from all the real
numbers listed. Thus r is different from each rational at least one digit, so:
because one to one function of N into R exhausts N.

Cantor noticed the proof can be generalized:

Given any set K, the power set of K, P(K) = { S | S \&} K }. The following is then
true:

Recursively, a set of subsets of a set of subsets is an even larger infinity, and so on.
This implies that there exists an infinite hierarchy of larger cardinal numbers. In
general:
The power set of any set has a size of greater cardinality.

Cantor's Notation:
= 0 (the cardinal number of the natural numbers(37))
=0
=
Note that this notation is linked to the fact that:
P{1,2,3} = 8 = 2# of elements

The set of function from R to R =

Another reason for this notation is that we haven't yet proved that there is no set A
such that:(38)
0

Additionally, Cantor showed how to do arithmetic with the infinities:

+ 0 = {0,2,4,...} {1,3,5,...} = {0,1,2,3,4,...} = 0

= 0 0 = 0.

In general, don't operate with the cardinal number itself; instead, do a set-theoretic
operation on sets with cardinalities of the given numbers.
Question remains: What type entity is a cardinal number? The distinction between
cardinal and ordinal numbers is unimportant with finite numbers because their
makeup coincides; however with infinite numbers, a distinction is necessary.
Cantor's notion of ordinality (order-type) was defined as there being an orderpreserving one to one correspondence. For example, the set of natural numbers are of
the same order-type as the set of even numbers because there exists an orderpreserving one to one correspondence between the two sets (i.e. 0 0, 1 2, 2 4, 3 6,
etc.).

Thus, N and Q are of different order types! The elements of Q don't have a sequence-there is no next number. Thus there are two order types within denumerable sets.
= , and
=
Again, we can perform arithmetic on these order-types:
1 + = because {0} {1,2,3,...} = {0,1,2,3,...} =
However:
+ 1 because {1,2,3,...} {a} = a set with an end having no unique predecessor (different
from which has no end).
Thus, the commutative law doesn't hold for ordinal arithmetic.
*

is the order type of negative natural numbers, so:

+1=*

In fact, there are 2 different order-types of denumerable sets.

0

Outcome of Investigation of Infinity:

Infinity is no longer taboo
Infinity is accepted as a notion with rich content, central to mathematics.
A conceptual foundation for the calculus was provided-- all notions of mathematics
was reduced to the ideas of natural numbers and the (possibly infinite) set.
No appeal whatsoever to intuition in mathematics anymore.
Resistance from Leopold Kronecker(39)
Kronecker engaged in criticism of Cantor. He thought all Cantor did was nonsense-just the artificial work of man.(40)
Now mathematics has been reduced to natural numbers and sets. However, the
questions remain: Where is the rigor behind natural numbers? What are natural

numbers? Why does the reduction stop there? Thus, there is a general move towards
creating a non-intuitive conceptual framework for natural numbers.

5.3.1 Peano
First attempt was by Peano.(41) He goes back to Euclid's idea to give a complete
axiomatization of the framework. Peano gave five axioms about the notion of a
natural number:
1) 0 is a natural number
2) Every natural number, k, has a unique successor, k.
3) If k = m then k = m.
4) 0 is not the successor of any natural number.
5) Axiom of mathematical induction:
If 0 has some property, P, and if n having property P implies that n also has property
P, then every number has property P.(42)
This gives a rigorous characterization of the notion of a natural number. However,
several problems still exist:
Doesn't tell what a number is; the basic notions (i.e. number, successor, and 0) are left
undefined.(43)
Doesn't uniquely characterize the set, N, of natural numbers. Lots of sets fit into the
pattern, for example, E, the set of even numbers fits into the pattern as well.(44)

5.3.2 Frege
Frege(45) was motivated by a desire for an ontologically satisfactory notion of a
number, but also by a need for rigor. His analysis of the ambiguity of mathematical
notion is considered a gem of modern philosophy. Frege believed a language is made
up of two kinds of terms: those referring to individual objects (names), and those
referring to relationships between objects (predicates). Frege points out that numbers
aren't properties of objects.

Frege believed that for mathematics, we should dispense with natural languages and
use a formal language instead. He then invented an artificial language with the
ambiguities removed.(46)
Frege's account of natural number is ontological-- he says numbers are names
referring to certain sorts of sets. This clever choice of the object to which numbers
refer reduces all of mathematics to the single notion of a set.
Frege's Principle of Comprehension:
To every property there corresponds a specific object (called the extension of that
property) that is the set of all things that have that property.
Notation:
{ X | PX } is the set of all X such that X has property P. For example:
{ X | X X } = D$, the empty set.
Consider M = {Groucho, Chico, Harpo}. Property is being the same size as M.
Extension of that property = { X | X is the same size as M } = 3 =

By this, the number 3 is a set with cardinality 0. The number 0, however, has
cardinality of 1.
As always, there are problems:
Only expresses the cardinal aspect of what a number is-- does nothing for ordinality.
Doing arithmetic becomes difficult.
Frege, therefore, took one final step. He recognized that what we needed were related
canonical sets. Thus he defined the natural numbers as follows:
0 = The extension of the property:
being the same size as the set { X | X X }.
1 = The extension of the property:
being the same size as the set { X | X = 0 }.

2 = The extension of the property:

being the same size as the set { X | X = 0 or X = 1}.
and so on. Note that this is a recursive definition in which the number n is defined in
terms of smaller numbers. This fact gives the natural numbers a sense of ordering
(how closely are they related to zero).
Thus, Frege's account of natural numbers is that sets are the fundamental notions out
of which numbers are build. Natural numbers depend only on the notions of a
property, the extension of a property, equality, and negation-- all of these are notions
from logic, not mathematics. Hence, Frege ultimately concluded that mathematics is
simply a branch of pure logic. Note Frege's definition is ontological. It is also antiKantian in that math is clearly freed from any appeal to intuition. Rigor was achieved
through definition and the use of artificial language. Frege supported Platonism: the
idea that mathematical objects are abstract to the extreme-- there can be no interaction
with mathematical objects through the senses.
Two Types of Properties
A first-order property is a property that applies to objects.
A second-order property is a property that applies to other properties.
Doctrine of Logicism - The view that mathematics is a branch of logic.
Frege's definitions of mathematical objects makes use only of logical ideas: or, not,
equals, set, property, and extensions. Thus any being capable of clear thought and
understanding the simple concepts has the complete foundation necessary for
mathematics.
Frege's work is considered indispensable-- there now is a firm foundation for
mathematics!

Bertrand Russell's work brought Frege's work into the public eye.
Problem:
Russell noticed that there existed a difficulty in the basic notion that every property
has an extension.

Some properties are self-referential (they apply to themselves). For example, the
property of being abstract is self-referential: the set of all things that are abstract
includes the set of all abstract things. Thus the set is a member of itself. Conversely, a
non-self-referential property has an extension which does not include itself. For
example, the property of being a building: the set of all things that are buildings (the
set of all buildings) does not include itself.
Frege's assumption was that every abstract notion has an extension. Consider the
properties of being a member of oneself and not being a member of oneself. We have:
, and
.
Let a = {z | z is abstract}, b = {w | w is a building}. Now notice that:

More importantly, r is not an element of itself (by definition). We will try to prove this
by a reductio ad absurdum method:
Assume: r r. This implies r {x | x x}, so r r. This contradicts with the initial
assumption, thus r r. Yet the fact that r is not a member of itself shows r is indeed a
member of itself (the set of things which are not members of itself). Thus the
existence of r is contradictory.
As we can see, therefore, the principle of comprehension is internally inconsistent.
This is very unfortunate! All of math has been reduced to a few simple notions, but
now there is an inconsistency in one of those simple notions! Does this mean that all
conceptual thought is ultimately internally inconsistent?
This is the Third Crisis. The Crisis in the Foundation of Mathematics.

I.6 Two of the Three Reactions to the Third Crisis

There were three main reactions to the crisis in the foundation of mathematics:
1) Bertrand Russell's Platonism-- maintain Frege's work, just patch up its problems.
2) David Hilbert's Formalism

3) Brouwer's Intuitionism
Both reactions two and three were anti-platonic; they favored recoiling from the
abstractness of mathematics, and refounding it on intuition.

6.1 Platonistic Reaction

Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell collaborated on a work called Principia
Mathematica for over a decade. This work:
Carried out the logicists program with a passion.
Demonstrated a construction of the main parts of mathematics going far beyond
Frege's work.
Went into detail of the theorems of Number Theory and The Calculus, all from Frege's
basic definitions.
Was carried out entirely in an abstract formal language-- a forerunner of modern logic
notation.
To remove Russell's paradox from Frege's theory, Russell and Whitehead refined the
notion of a set by introducing Type Theory. In type theory, no set can be an element of
itself; the thought of a set being an element of itself makes no sense. In type theory,
there are different levels of objects:
Level 0 objects are simple objects,
Level 1 objects are all sets of level 0 objects,
Level 2 objects are all sets of level 1 objects,
Level 3 objects are all sets of level 2 objects, and so on.
Thus, everything that exists gets typed at a certain level. It then becomes obvious that
nothing could be an element of something of its own level or lower. This, in fact
restricts the ability to form sets since each set must be capable of being typed at a
certain level. This system results in there being no such thing as a universal set,
because it must come in at a certain level, but the level one high up would be larger.
Overall, Type Theory changes the analysis of the notion of a set.

Kurt Gdel's, John VonNeuman's, and Paul Bernaceraf's solutions (independently

discovered) created a new set theory, now called GVB set theory. They opposed type
theory because it was philosophically and mathematically ad hoc (axioms needed to
be added to type theory to make everything follow properly).
GVB Set theory was based on the idea of classes. Every property had a corresponding
class, and there were two types of classes: sets, and proper classes. The notion of a set
was basically the same as with Russell and Whitehead. Proper classes were very large
classes that never came into being at a level; they were never elements of anything
(the universal class, for example, is a proper class).
Positive Aspects of the Platonistic Reaction
Gdel proved in 1940 that the continuum hypothesis is consistent with the axioms of
set theory; he used the same method as used for Euclid's fifth postulate-- give a
nonstandard model and show that all axioms hold, as well as the axiom whose
consistency we want to test holds. Gdel constructed an inner model of set theory
reinterpreting through a set, L, and showed that all axioms of set theory held, and
additionally proved the continuum hypothesis. Gdel also showed that the axiom of
choice is true within L.
Axiom of choice gives a new method of making sets. It lets one arbitrarily put objects
into a set, thus implying that sets whose elements we can never describe exist. For
example, we can construct a countably infinite set of rational numbers, one element
from the interval [0,1], one from [1,2], etc.; this set, since it's infinite, can not be
listed, and since it's random, cannot be described.
Cohen, in 1962, used an inner model and forcing techniques to show that the negation
of the continuum hypothesis was also true. Thus, the continuum hypothesis becomes
an undecidable question, like the parallel postulate.
Gdel's work led to set theory's becoming an autonomous, highly-developed branch
of mathematics. It also becomes generally accepted that set theory is the foundation of
mathematics.
Negative Aspects of the Platonistic Reaction
Set theory is now being challenged as the foundational theory of mathematics.
Category theory was proposed as a replacement. In category theory, the basic notions
are of function and operation.
Ontological Questions Raised

How accurate is the idea that sets are the basic objects of mathematics?
Set theory is too rich; there are too many different ways to build up the rest of
mathematics.
The basic element shouldn't be arbitrarily picked, yet nothing dictates its choice. The
modern view is structuralism: the basic units are structures, not actually objects
In the late 1960's, Paul Bernaceraf wrote paper called What the Numbers Could Not
Be.(47) Benacerraf claimed that numbers couldn't be a specific thing, because there is
nothing forcing them to be anything specific. This leads to structuralism. In
structuralism, to be a natural number, is to be a place in the sequence.
If mathematics is totally abstract, why should it have any applicability? Is it just a
"miracle" that mathematics applies to the physical world, or, instead, do we tend to
emphasize mathematical structures which relate to the world? This is complicated by
the numerous new applications for obscure mathematical methods, for example the
applicability of group theory to linguistics.
Epistemological Question Raised
How do we know what we know about mathematics without intuition?
Causal theory of knowledge. We know about properties of objects through interacting
with them, yet mathematical knowledge lacks a causal chain.
Gdel, in 1964, wrote What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? He said that we do have
intuition; not sensory intuition, though. Instead, Gdel believed intellectual
mathematical intuition exists and is developed through sufficient practice of
mathematics.

6.2 Hilbert's Program(48)

Hilbert had an anti-Kantian reaction now called formalism. Hilbert had two
conflicting goals while developing formalism:(49)
Knowing the difficulties of the Platonists' approach, he wanted to move mathematics
back to the concrete, recoiling from the abstract. Hilbert wanted an intuitive basis for
mathematics, without any appeals to infinitary entities, since there are no such entities
in science, the world, or anywhere. Mathematics is just a science, and it has no right
to create infinite entities. Hilbert believed the paradoxes serve to illustrate the

problems that loosening ties to the perceptual world will result in. Basically, he
thought that the only allowable reasoning is finitary reasoning.
But,
Hilbert did not want to lose any part of mathematics. He refused to give up the
infinitary methods which worked so well: "No one will expel us from the paradise
where Cantor has led us."
The result of these conflicting goals is called Hilbert's Program. The program is
implemented in two steps:
1) Divide all of the mathematical sciences into two broad classes: The real part (or
conceptual part) of mathematics and the ideal part of mathematics. The real part
included only the parts of mathematics which don't take us into the infinitary realm. It
involved no ontological or epistemological questions. Logic, and number theory are
part of real mathematics.
The ideal part of mathematics included everything else-- all the parts of mathematics
that would have been discarded without Hilbert's second motive. This includes
geometry, set theory, and analysis.
Hilbert had the basic idea that any branch of mathematics can be formalized (meaning
it can be expressed in a formal language(50)) and can be axiomatized to give a formal
system.
2) Hilbert observed that a formal system by itself is nothing other than a set of
symbols and rules for dealing with them. Symbols and rules belong to the real part of
mathematics. Thus, the science of dealing with formal systems (proving properties,
etc.) belongs to the real realm of mathematics. Among the properties we should be
able to prove is that of consistency. Consistency implies that no contradictions will
arise when dealing with the system. The method of proving consistency belongs to the
real part of mathematics.
The science of dealing with formal systems is called metamathematics. The usual way
to prove consistency is to model the formal system in concrete mathematics and then
show that the model was consistent.
Hilbert's program was applied in three steps:
1) Formalize the branch of mathematics to get a formal system, S.
a) Design an appropriate formal language for the branch.

b) axiomatize the theory in that language.

2) Show that the formal system, S, is adequate. In other words, the axioms must really
give a formal system for the desired branch of mathematics. There are two things that
must be proven to imply adequacy.
a) Soundness. Every theorem derivable from the formal system must be true in the
branch of mathematics the formal system implements. No false consequences may
follow from the axioms.
b) Completeness. Everything true in a branch of mathematics must be derivable as a
theorem from the axioms of the formal system.
3) Prove that S is consistent.
Successes in Hilbert's Program
Hilbert and his student Ackerman produced a formal system for logic.
Hilbert created a formal system for geometry.
Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica formalized number theory.
Two of Hilbert's students, Earnst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel, formalized set
theory.(51)
Kurt Gdel was a major player in Hilbert's Program. Gdel's dissertation proved the
completeness of (first-order) logic. This proof became known as Gdel's
Completeness Theorem.
Gdel also proved that Hilbert was right about his assumption that metamathematics
was part of the real part of mathematics. Gdel used number theory as a completely
concrete example. He then showed how to translate talking about symbols into talking
about numbers. He assigned a code to each symbol in such a way that these so-called
Gdel-numbers multiplied together represent a formula, sets of formulas, and other
things. Then one can talk about the Gdel-numbers using number theory.
Constructing Gdel-numbers:
To make a Gdel-number for a statement in a formal system, you must first assign
each symbol a distinct integer starting from one. Then assign each position in the
statement consecutive prime numbers (starting with 3). The Gdel-number for the
statement is the product of primes taken to the power of number assigned to the
symbol in that position of the statement. Since the number two is not a factor of the
Gdel-number for a statement, all statements' Gdel-numbers will be odd.

Gdel-numbers for sequences of statements (such as in a proof) are constructed by

multiplying out consecutive primes (starting with the number two) taken to the power
of the Gdel-number of the statement appearing at that position in the list. For
example, if Ai is a statement in a proof and A1 is the first line of the proof and An is the
last line, the Gdel-number for the list of statements is:
2g(A ) 3g(A ) 5g(A ) 7g(A ) 11g(A ) ... Png(A )
1

To say something is a theorem means we can write down a list of sentences which is a
proof of it. Thus a theorem's Gdel-number is the last sentence in an even Gdel
number. This reduces proofs of theorems to a number-theoretic property involving
Gdel-numbers. Thus consistency can be shown through number theory. Gdel
showed anything that we can represent in a formal system of number theory is
finitary.
Alan Turing(52) defined calculable functions as those that were programmable to be
calculated by a simple machine. Those calculable functions are the same as what
Gdel came up with. In fact, all differing definitions of calculable functions gave the
same set of functions. Notice that, at most, there are 0 calculable functions because are
at most 0 ways to program a Turing machine. The number of functions possible are 2 ,
so calculable functions are (theoretically) a rare exception.
0

Incalculable functions are those whose output depends on a random variable.

Consider a function defined to equal one if there is a run of seven 7s in the decimal
expansion of the number , and equals two if there isn't. This function is
indeterminably calculable; it is calculable if a run of seven 7s is found, but as the
decimal expansion continues to be generated, if there still hasn't been a run of seven
7s, we're unable to calculate the function.
Problem
Gdel showed Hilbert's Program can not succeed. This was proven in what is now
called Gdel's Incompleteness Theorem. This theorem states:
Let S be a formal system for number theory.
If S is consistent, then there is a sentence, G, such that neither G nor the negation of G
(written G) is a theorem of S.
Thus, any formal system sufficient to express the theorems of number theory has to be
incomplete.
Proof:

S can prove P(n) just in case n is the Gdel-number of a theorem of S. There exists k,
such that k is a Gdel-number of the formula P(k)=G. This statement says of itself, it
is not provable.
Even if we define a new formal system S = S + G (thus including the undecidable
theorem as an axiom), we can find G which isn't provable in (is independent of) S.
The reasoning Gdel used for his incompleteness theorem is finitary, so it could be
formalized inside S. Thus, S can prove that if S is consistent, then G is not provable.
Note that the underlined phrase is what G says, so S proves Cst(S)(53) implies G is true,
but G says G is not provable.
Suppose S can prove Cst(S), then S can prove G, but if S is consistent, it can't prove
G, thus it can't prove its consistency. Thus, Hilbert's Program does not work; one
cannot prove the consistency of a mathematical theory.

Proof Theory-- a formal system is characterized by the sort of complexity of proofs

that can be carried out in that system.
Gentzen looked at Gdel's incompleteness theorem and asked why is the formal
system for arithmetic so weak that it's unable to prove its own consistency. A natural
constriction on proofs is that they are finite lists of statements. Gentzen offered a
theory of arithmetic which then allowed the proof of the consistency of the formal
system of arithmetic in Principia Mathematica. His principle strengthened the axiom
of mathematical induction, allowing a strong induction axiom. Traditional induction
assumes the domain has order type . Gentzen, however, assumed the domain had a
more complicated, higher order type, 0. This order type was defined as:

( raised to the to the to the , etc., times)

Now we are qualifying over the set of proofs instead of the set of natural numbers.
The set of proofs viewed as a finite branching tree has order type 0.
Philosophical Questions
Suppose we admit the provability of the consistency of the formal system for
arithmetic. Is that proof epistemologically satisfactory? Is induction through 0 finitary
reasoning?

Alonzo Church has a thesis now simply called Church's Thesis. It states that any
epistemological proposal put forth as concrete finitary reasoning can be shown to be
equivalent to the theory of recursive functions.(54) Gentzen's theory goes beyond the
theory of recursive functions. This raises the question: Is Gentzen's proof a part of real
mathematics?
Ontological Problem
Hilbert's program still has a division between real and ideal parts of mathematics.
What ontological status do objects in the ideal part of mathematics have? They have
no reality. They were simply created to give the ideal parts, to give us shortcuts, but
never believed to be a part of reality. This gives us a realm of virtual objects,
completing the dualism of objects: there are objects that exist, and objects that don't
exist.
What is the source of mathematical knowledge? Of mathematical truth?
Paul Bernaceraf raises this dilemma: What is our standard theory of knowledge? Of
truth? There is sort of a correspondence theory; knowledge comes to be known
because objects impinge upon our cognitive faculties through our senses, and we form
beliefs through causal interaction between the object we are thinking about and our
thoughts. The formalists and the Platonists have complementary difficulties
concerning these matters.
Formalists
According to formalist theory, we have a perfectly reasonable conception of
knowledge of objects in real mathematics. With respect to ideal math, we can gain a
conception of the objects through the use of a formal system.
However, truths can only be for the real part of mathematics; there are no things
corresponding to our beliefs in the ideal part. This results in a dualistic theory of
truths-- some thoughts are true through a hybrid, artificial theory, while others are true
through normal means.
Platonists
Platonists believed that abstract reality is a reality. Thus, they don't have the problem
with truths because objects in the ideal part of mathematics have properties. Instead
the Platonists have an epistemological problem-- one can have no knowledge of
objects in the ideal part of mathematics; they can't impinge on our senses in any
causal way.

This fact, that the formalists have no satisfactory theory of truth while the Platonists
have no satisfactory theory of knowledge, is called Bernaceraf's problem. The effect
of Benaceraf's paper was to make public the idea that neither the formalists' nor the
Platonists' theories were totally acceptable.

Part II: Intuitionism, A Third Direction

II.1 General Introduction to Intuitionism

The intuitionist's picture of mathematics was different. In represented a continuation
of the unpopular Kantian approach to mathematics.
Intuitionism was founded in 1907 in the Ph.D. dissertation of L. E. J. Brouwer at the
University of Amsterdam. After publishing his dissertation, he introduced several
important topological theorems, thus giving him some mainstream mathematical
prominence.
Intuitionism embraced two important philosophical theories:
Brouwer's Doctrine-- to be true is to be experienced; whatever exists has its origin in
our conscious thought.
Mathematical objects are abstract, a priori, forms of our intuitions.
Two Differences from Kant
Brouwer was a solipsist. He believed the only mind was his own, and was less
concerned with intersubjectivity than was Kant.
Brouwer rejected the claim of an a priori intuition of space. Instead, he thought
mathematics was based entirely on an a priori intuition of time; Brouwer believed the
structure of time guides all conscious activities. The presence of non-Euclidean
geometry disallows a single a priori intuition of space.
Brouwer must reconstruct certain parts of mathematics given his own constraints. The
positive program of intuitionism is a construction of mathematics as limited by
Brouwer's Theory of Consciousness. The negative program of intuitionism argues that

standard mathematics is actually wrong (or at least inconsistent).

Brouwer does argue that standard mathematics is inconsistent; his argument is based
on his epistemological idealism. Brouwer makes little distinction between Hilbert and
the Platonists.
Some of Brouwer's constructions depend on the assumption that if a proposition is
true, we can come to know that it is true.

II.2 Intuitionist's Construction of the Natural Numbers

In constructing the natural numbers, there is one fundamental idea: We have the
ability to distinguish one thing from another. Then, we must abstract from the
difference between the two things, and get the concept of forming an entity with one
part and another part. Through this activity, the natural numbers are constructed; the
natural number one corresponds to the intuition before performing this mental
activity, while two corresponds to the intuition after the activity. Repeating the mental
abstraction gives the subsequent natural numbers. It is important to concentrate only
on the act itself-- abstracted from the content; one must look at the empty form.
Through this method, the intuitionists also derive the basic numerical operators. An
equation:

is the report of four activities: generating the numbers, looking at two of them
together, and recognizing they're the same as a third. Arend Heyting(55) said the role of
a math teacher is to make the student carry out the same mental activities as he did.
The point of abstract mathematical notation is to help us generate certain activities.
Rules of mathematics abstract away from the actual mental activities.
Ultraintuitionism concerns itself with physical limitations as well. Brouwer's standard
intuitionism simply limits us to what is finitary.
According to intuitionist theory, reductio ad absurdum proofs are not allowable to
prove that something exists (although they are acceptable for negative results.(56)

II.3 Intuitionist's Construction of the Real Numbers

Problem: The previous processes have finite limitations on the number of steps. The
set of real numbers requires infinity in some way or another.
Brouwer, in his dissertation (1907), suggested a separate act of consciousness is
needed for generating real numbers. He called it ur intuition-- a fundamental idea we
all possess corresponding to the continuum. The ur is always growing. By 1918,
however, Brouwer had given up the idea of the ur. His general idea was that it is the
whole that is important when speaking of the real numbers. The elements of the whole
are then abstracted through conditions or limitations. One of the main reasons the idea
of ur intuition was discarded was that it lacked any mathematically useful structure.
Real numbers can be seen as a convergent sequence of rational numbers, but
sequences are infinite. However, a constructable sequence, with a formula or rule
given to generate the elements, is allowable. Thus, the convergent sequence must be
capable of being generated by a rule. French mathematicians took the view that the
only real numbers that exists are those that are convergent sequences of rationals
which are calculable. However, Brouwer noticed the set of calculable algorithms is
enumerable (has cardinal number 0). Thus, we can't restrict the real numbers to this
set, because it would then not have properties that the uncountable reals have.
Brouwer's solution was a generalization of the notion of an algorithm or rule to give
an uncountable number of algorithms to give what is needed for reals. This was the
notion of a choice sequence.

II.4 Choice Sequences

Choice sequences represent Brouwer's main contribution to Kantian mathematics.
Ordinarily, an algorithm is a rule for calculating the elements in a sequence. Two
things characterize an algorithm: 1) it is rule-like; and 2) it is deterministic (it gives
exactly one value). Brouwer generalized algorithms by loosening the requirement that
an algorithm be deterministic. The result is a sequence in which an element of a
sequence is able to be chosen out of a set of candidates.
A choice sequence is given by a deterministic rule to give the first few elements, and a
not-necessarily-deterministic rule for picking subsequent elements. Brouwer pointed
out that this corresponds to an a priori intuition of time: the past is fixed, while the
future depends on the past, but many possibilities remain.

Example
is a sequence of rationals.
(1) = , (2) = , (3) = , (4) =
(n+1) is some rational number such that:

Thus (5) is on

, and (6) depends on what is picked for (5).

The canonical choice sequence is the sequence used to generate decimal fractions.
Consider defined exactly as is:
is a sequence of rationals.
(1) = , (2) = , (3) = , (4) =
(n+1) is some rational number such that:

Are and the same? Do they converge to the same real number? We don't and cannot
know! Some important questions about choice sequences are not answerable in a
finite amount of time. Thus, there is no truth concerning questions about the equality
of and . We don't even know if we'll know the answer in a finite amount of time.
Brouwer had to rework set theory to coincide with his other constructions. Under his
version of set theory, the distinction between an element of a set and the set itself is
less well-defined.
The introduction of choice sequences result in contradictions with classical
mathematical theorems. For example, there is a classical theorem stating a line has a
total order;

This doesn't hold for numbers like ! Thus, order properties of the continuum are
weaker in the intuitionist theory.
Brouwer proved a theorem stating that every real-valued function defined on a closed
interval is uniformly continuous on that interval. Consider f(x) = 1 for x < , f(x) = 3
for x > . This function is clearly discontinuous at x = . It also appears to be defined
over the interval [0,1]. However, in order for Brouwer's theorem to hold, he must
show that the function is not defined at some point on the interval. One such point is .
We can't tell what f() is equal to. Thus, this is not a counterexample to Brouwer's
theorem.
From this, we can see that a function is defined if its value depends on only a finite
amount of information about the input. This corresponds identically to continuity.
Two consequences of the property of discontinuity
Brouwer can easily prove the uncountability of the real numbers. Consider a function,
f, mapping the reals into the natural numbers. If this is truly a continuous function, its
value must be calculable based on a finite amount of information. However, since the
natural numbers are discrete, such a function would have to be discontinuous. Let's
say f() = n. Then, f() = n if = , or f() = k, if (where k n). Thus, the function, f,
must be undefined at x = . Therefore the function cannot be continuous (it isn't
defined everywhere), and the real numbers must be uncountable.(57)
Suppose we want to divide the continuum into two sets, A and B (B = R - A). This
activity of forming a subset of the continuum is perfectly natural. Using the method of
characteristic functions, we can translate talking about sets into talking about
functions. We define fA(x) = 1 if x A, fA(x) = 0 if x A. This method results in
undetachable sets-- sets such that they cannot cleanly be picked out of the continuum.
The real number may, or may not, be in the set, and the characteristic function for that
set is discontinuous. In fact, for any subset of R, the characteristic function for R is
discontinuous. In other words, there are no detachable subsets of the continuum. This
view of the real number line is the same as Aristotle's. In a sense, we've come full
circle, as the problems with the Aristotelian continuum re-appear.
Brouwer noticed that the properties of space thought to be purely geometric can be
expressed temporally once we admit that what characterizes the structure of time is
that the future is undecided.
The intuitionists and the Platonists agree on one important point: They both believe
that the ideal parts of mathematics consist of actual objects created in the mind.
Brouwer, later in his career, admitted that there was a problem with choice sequences.
The basic tenet that a real number is created by acts of choice seemed improper-- it

required acts of humans, which Brouwer didn't feel should be introduced into
mathematics. In the late 1940's, Brouwer introduced the method of the creating
subject to generate real numbers. He said we should focus on an idealized
mathematician, B, and divide his research into stages. At each stage we ask him the
status of an unsolved mathematical problem. We then define the sequence :
(n) = if at the nth stage, B hasn't yet proved or refuted the unsolved problem.

(n) =

if at the nth stage, B has solved the problem.

This process forms a sequence which is a real number; there is no act of choice.
Instead, there is an automatic procedure, capturing the same effect as choice
sequences, without appealing to the non-mathematical act of choice.
Clearly, this method will not work if the unsolved problem is solved, so, in order for
the method of the creating subjects to be an acceptable method, there must be an
inexhaustible supply of unsolvable mathematical problems. Brouwer, as a matter of
faith, believed this to be true. Hilbert, however, in a famous address to the congress of
mathematicians in the late nineteenth century, remarked that there could be no
problem which is unsolvable in principle. Brouwer obviously opposed this view.

II.5 General view of Brouwer's Intuitionism vs. Hilbert's Formalism

Both Hilbert and Brouwer were constructivists. Hilbert's Kantianism was very
different from Brouwer's, though. Hilbert actually put a structure on the intuitive part
of mathematics-- essentially that of finitary thought and formal systems. With Gdel's
work, we can see that Hilbert's formal system fits the theory of recursive functions.
Brouwer was very much opposed to these ideas, especially that of formalizing
systems. He even opposed the formalization of logic. Brouwer had a very radical view
of mathematics and language's relationship. In language, we can communicate the
output of mathematical construction, thus helping others recreate the mathematical
experience. But, the proof itself--mathematical thought itself--construction itself--is a
pre-linguistic, purely conscious activity which is much more flexible than language.
Brouwer thought formal systems could never be adequate to cover all the flexible
options available to the creative mathematician. Brouwer, in fact, thought formalism
was absurd! In particular, Brouwer thought that it was crazy to think that codified
logic could capture the rules for correct mathematical thought. He showed particular
rules of logic are inadequate. The most famous of these was the law of the excluded

middle:
fails for
. Another such rule, the rule of double
negation (
) does not hold either. The inadequacy of the rule of double
negation is another good reason for rejecting reductio ad absurdum proofs for positive
results.
Brouwer hypothesized about the reason why philosophers and mathematicians
included the law of the excluded middle. He supposed that logic was codified when
the scientific community was concerned only with finite objects. Considering only
finite objects, the law of the excluded middle holds. However, a mistake was made
when mathematics moved into the infinitary: the rigid rules of logic were maintained
without question. Brouwer suggested that no rigid codification should come before
the development of mathematics.
A second major distinction between Brouwer and Hilbert was that they disagreed on
the position of logic. While Hilbert thought logic was an autonomous, finished
science that could be freely applied to other mathematics, Brouwer argued logic
should only come after the mathematics is developed.
Brouwer's disciple, Arend Heyting, took on the challenge of explaining to the
mathematical community what intutionism is all about. Contrary to Brouwer's wishes,
Heyting formalized intuitionistic logic and intuitionistic number theory. Brouwer was
furious, but in the end, Heyting's approach won; the intuitionism dealt with today is
largely that which Heyting formalized.
Gdel, in the middle 1930s, proved the consistency of classical number theory relative
to the consistency of intuitionistic number theory. Gdel, in 1958, gave an even more
interesting proof to the effect that one can't proof the consistency of a formal system
within a formal system with equivalent finitary limitations. Instead, one must use a
less finitary formal system. Intuitionistic number theory is, in fact, less finitary than
the formalist's number theory.
Intuitionism's drawbacks
Intuitionistic mathematics is much less familiar, and arguably more complicated than
classical mathematical theory.
Many people were unhappy with Brouwer's ontological idealism.(58)
In summary, Brouwer's contribution was more philosophical than it was
mathematical. The situation today remains that there is no single philosophy of
mathematics that is entirely satisfactory.

Index

a priori 24
Abscissa 21
Abstractness 1
Acute angle hypothesis 14
Adequate 41
Analyst, The 22
Anti-Kantian view 23
Applicability 1
Archimidean Postulate 11
Archimides 10
Area of circle 19
Aristotle 5, 50
analysis of infinity 5
logic 5
proof methods 5
Atomic parts 3
Atomism 19
Axiom of choice 38
Axiomatization of Geometry 12
Axioms 6
Babylonians 3, 11
Barrow, Isaac 20
Belttrami 15

Berkeley, George 22
Bernaceraf, Paul 38, 39, 44, 45
Bernaceraf's Problem 45
Betweenness, Hilbert's Postulates 12
Bolyai 14
Bolzano 25
Definition of a limit 25
Brouwer, L. E. J. 46-52
Brouwer's 37
Brouwer's Doctrine 46
Brouwer's Theory of Consciousness 46
Calculus, Invention of 21
Cantor, George 28, 29, 32
Cardinal numbers 2
Category theory 39
Cauchy 25
Definition of a Limit 26
Cauchy's condition for convergence 26
Causal theory of knowledge 39
Cavalieri 17, 19
Cavalieri's principle 17
Characteristic functions, method of 50
Choice sequences 48, 51
Church, Alonzo 44
Church's Thesis 44

Circle, area of 19
Classes 38
Cohen 38
Commensurability 3
Completed infinity 5, 16
Conceptual Foundations of Mathematics 22
Congruence, Hilbert's Postulates 12
Contiguous succession 5
Continuity 3, 28
Aristotle's definition 5
Continuity, Hilbert's Postulates 12
Continuous magnitude 26
Continuum
Intuitionist's theory of 47
Continuum hypothesis 38
Counting 2
Creating subject, method of the 50
Crisis
in the foundation of mathematics 37
Second 22
Third 37
Crisis, First 3
Criterion for convergence
external 26
internal 25

Decimal 2
Dedekind 39
Dedekind, Richard 13, 28, 29, 39
Dedekind Cuts 28
Dedekind's Postulate 13
Deduction 6
Definition of concepts 6
Denumerable set 30
Diagonal Proof 30
Discrete 3
Discrete mathematics 11
Discreteness 4
Doctrine of Logicism 36
Double negation, rule of 51
Egyptians 11
Elements 11
Elements, The 11
Elliptical geometry 15
Empirical intuition 25
Enumerable set 30
Epistemology 1
Epsilon-delta definition of a limit 27
Euclid 6, 11, 16, 33
Elements, The 11
Fifth postulate, his 38

Self-evident assumptions 11
Euclidean geometry 15, 25
Eudoxes 6
Method of Exhaustion 9
Theory of proportion 6
Excluded middle, law of 51
Exhausted 2
Existence postulate 6
Extension 35
External criterion for convergence 26
Fallacious 6
Farmer and the Crow 1
Fifth Postulate of Geometry 12
Figurate numbers 3
Finitary reasoning 40
First-order property 36
fluents 21
fluxions 21
Formal system 16
Formalism 40, 51
Fraenkel, Abraham 41
Frege 28, 34
Function, continuous 26
Galileo
Attack on infinity 17

Criticizing Cavalieri 17
Gauss 14
General Survey 1
Gentzen 43, 44
Genus 6
Geometry
Euclidean 25
Gdel, Curt 44
Gdel, Kurt 38, 39, 42, 43, 51, 52
Completeness Theorem 42
Gdel-number 43
Gdel-numbers 42
Gdel-numbers 42
Greek Reaction to the Downfall 4
Group theory 39
GVB Set Theory 38
Heterogenia 19
Heterogenous indivisible 19
Heyting, Arend 47, 52
Hilbert, David 15, 37, 40, 41, 46, 51, 52
Axiomatization of Geometry 12
Hilbert's Program 40, 43
Hilbert's Foundation of Geometry 12
Hilbert's Postulates
Betweenness 12

Congruence 12
Continuity 12
Incidence 12
Parallelism 12
Hilbert's Program 40
Hilbert's Program 43
Homegenous indivisible 19
Hyperbolic geometry 15
Ideal part of mathematics 40
Incidence, Hilbert's Postulates 12
Inconsistencies 1
Infinite divisibility and discreteness 4
Index set 2
Indirect proof 4
indivisible 17
heterogenous 19
homegenous 19
Indivisibles
vs. infinitesimals 19
Infinite divisibility 3, 4
Infinite divisions 5
Infinite regress 6
Infinitesimal 20
Infinitesimals
vs. indivisibles 19

Infinity 1
Artistotle's analysis 5
attack against 17
Instantiation 6
Integration 18
Internal convergence 27
Internal criterion for convergence 25
Internally inconsistent 4
Intuition 25
Empirical 25
Intuition, pure 25
Intuitionism 37, 46-51
Irrational numbers 3
Isomorphism 5
Kant 46
Kant, Imanual 23, 24
Epistemological Problem 24
First Thesis 24
Klein 15
Kronecker, Leopold 23, 33
Lambert 14
Law of the excluded middle 51
Leibniz 21
Levels of objects 37
Limit 25

Bolzano's Definition 25
Cauchy's Definition 26
Epsilon-delta definition 27
Weierstrass' definition 27
Linguistics 39
Logic 5, 35, 52
Logicism 36
Magnitudes 11
Mathematical induction 33, 44
Metamathematics 41, 42
Method of characteristic functions 50
Method of equilibrium 10
Method of Exhaustion 9-11
Method of fluxions 21
Method of the creating subject 50
Methodology 1
Mill, John Stuart 23
Model 16
Moment of a fluent 21
names 34
Natural Numbers
Intuitionist's construction of 47
Negative program of intuitionism 46
Neutral geometry 14
Newton 21

Newton and Leibniz, Impact of 22

Newton, Isaac 21
Nicholas of Cusa 16
Non-Euclidean geometry 46
discovery 14
evaluation of 13
modeling inside Euclidean geometry 15
Number theory 3
Obtuse angle hypothesis 14
Ontology 1
order-type 32
Ordinal numbers 2
Ordinality
Cantor's notion 32
Ordinates 21
Paradoxes 1
paradox of the arrow 4
Parallel postulate 12, 14, 38
Negation of 14
Parallelism, Hilbert's Postulates 12
Pascal 20
Peano 33
Pictorial diagrams 11
Plato 4
separation of geometry and number 4

Platonism 35
Positive program of intuitionism 46
Postulates 6
Potential infinity 5
Power set 31
predicates 34
prick of x 21
Principia Mathematica 37, 41, 44
Principle of Comprehension 35
Proclus 13
Proof by contradiction 4
Proof methods
Aristotle's view 5
Proof, Falsehood of Commensurability 3
Proofs 3
Proper classes 38
Properties
self-referential 36
Property
first-order 36
second-order 36
Pythagoreans 3, 5
Rational 3
Reactions to Berkeley 23
Real Numbers

Intuitionist's Construction of 47
Real part of mathematics 40
Recursive 35
Reductio ad absurdum 47
Riemann 15
Rigor 17
Rigorous 17
Russell, Bertrand 34, 36, 37, 41
Saccheri 14
Second Great Crisis 22
Second-order property 36
Self-evident assumptions
11
Self-referential 36
Set 27
Space 24
Spaciotemporal 24
Species 6
spirit of finesse 20
Stevin 17
Straight arrows 50
Structuralism 39
Thales 3
Theory of proportion 6
magnitudes 11

numbers 11
Theory of recursive functions 51
Third Crisis 37
Reactions to 37
Thomas Heath 11
Time 24
Total order 49
True geometry 16
Turing, Alan 42
Type theory 37
Ultraintuitionism 47
Unapplied mathematics 25
Undetachable sets 50
Uninterpreted formal system 16
Unsound proof 9
Ur intuition 48
Valerio 17
Valid 6
Vieta 19
VonNeuman, John 38
Wallis
axiom, his 15
Wallis, John 13, 19, 20
Weierstrass 27
What Are and What Ought to Be the Numbers 39

What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? 39

Whitehead, Alfred North 37, 41
Zeno 4
paradoxes of motion 4
Zeno's paradox 5, 11
Zermelo, Earnst 41
Zobachevsky 14
1. Interestingly, "Calculus" is latin for pebble.
2. In French, the number 80 is said "quatre-vingts" which directly translates as "four
twenties."
3. The number 60 has three prime components (2, 3, and 5), one more than either 10
or 20. That additional prime component was useful in calculations.
4. The Pythagoreans were a nearly religious cult who followed Pythagoras and his
ideas.
5. One number theoretical discovery the Pythagoreans made is that squares are sums
of two successive triangular numbers.
6. Latin for "reduced to an absurdity." Often called an indirect proof or proof by
contradiction.
7. Note the way the potential infinity's definition is stated negatively, without
mentioning the ultimate existence of a point.
8. A statement generally tells about the relationships of concepts.
9. Going back forever
10. Axioms are self-evident universal truths, while postulates are specific to a
particular science, and may be irrelevant to other sciences.
11. From handout "Two Eudoxian Principles."
12. Note that here, plugging into the symbolic interpretation of the theory of
proportion, x and y are areas of triangles (the same kind of magnitude) and z and w
are line segments (again, same kinds of magnitudes). We couldn't say the area of one
triangle relative to its base is equal to the area of the other, relative to its base.
13. The fact that triangles of equal height have areas in proportion to their base had
already been proven by the Pythagoras.

14. This Greek idea seems less advanced-- a step backward. The Egyptians and the
Babylonians had an integrated view to mathematics.
15. Conversely, given Euclid's fifth postulate, this postulate can be proven.
16. Note that from this it follows that Wallis' axiom is false.
17. This need derives from applications of mathematics to the physical world.
Decimal expansion of numbers is one example.
18. Galileo was Cavalieri's teacher.
19. Along with this is the idea of atomism, that all spatial figures are made of atomic
parts.
20. This proof uses the homogenous indivisible-- an indivisible with the same number
of dimensions as the figure it makes up. This contrasts with the heterogenous
indivisible-- one which has fewer dimensions than the whole it sums to.
21. Barrow was Isaac Newton's teacher.
22. There is no justification for this; it is based on the mathematician Pascal who also
took the infinitesimal approach. He called it the "spirit of finesse."
23. Also called the "prick of x."
24. This process was called the arithmetization of analysis.
25. Kant was an 18th century German philosopher.
26. Mill was a 19th century American philosopher.
27. Kronecker was a 19th century mathematician.
28. Necessary properties are properties such that it couldn't be otherwise.
29. Pure mathematics is, after all, an a priori science; it involves the study of things
known prior to having experience.
30. Mathematics involving the study of space is geometry. That which involves the
study of time is arithmetic (the concept of succession). The Calculus, specifically
mechanics, studies motion, which is the study of the interaction between space and
time.
31. In the case of space, this correct theory is Euclidean Geometry.
32. Readers should be aware of a surprising idiosyncracy in modern day definitions:
Cauchy's condition for convergence actually utilizes Balzono's definition.

33. Weierstrass was a German mathematician born in 1815. Unlike many great
mathematicians, he made the majority of his contributions later in life, after he was 48
years old.
34. The double bars indicate the cardinality of the set.
35. The symbol means "is a proper subset of." A proper subset is a subset which isn't
the whole set.
36. This proof again utilizes the popular method, reductio ad absurdum.
37. The character representing the cardinal number of the natural numbers, 0, is the
Hebrew letter alaf subscripted with the Egyptian numeral zero.
38. This remains a question until 1962, at which point the answer is that there is no
answer; it is undecidable. Gdel showed the existence of A to be consistent, and
Cohen later showed its non-existence to be consistent as well. See Gdel, Escher, and
Bach by Douglas Hofstadter for more on undecidable axioms. The hypotheses that 2
= 1 is called the continuum hypothesis.
0

39. Kronecker was a leading 19th century German mathematician.

40. Interestingly, Cantor had a general nervous breakdown as a result of conflicts with
Kronecker. Mathematics today does accept Cantor's work as the foundation of basic
mathematical analysis.
41. Peano was an Italian mathematician.
42. The property is said to progress hereditarily upwards.
43. Bertrand Russell commented that "all of mathematics is hostage to these three
concepts" pointing to the need for an ontological basis of the three primitive ideas.
44. Russell thought the axioms did, at least, characterize the notion of a progression-a set of order type . However, sets of order types + * + also fit Peano's axiomatization.
45. Frege was a professor of mathematics at Jena university.
46. Peano actually wrote papers in the artificial language Frege invented.
47. This title was a pun on Dedekind's book, What Are and What Ought to Be the
Numbers.
48. David Hilbert was one of the top mathematicians in the twentieth century. No
branch of mathematics is without Hilbert's influence, and he was indeed a pioneer of
many modern areas of investigation.
49. Hilbert's basic inspiration towards creating formal systems was founded in the
consistency proofs for non-Euclidean geometry. Hilbert observed that one can

concentrate separately on the language, forgetting about a specific interpretation, thus

dealing only with a concrete thing.
50. A formal language is an artificial language designed especially for a branch of
mathematics.
51. It is especially interesting to note that David Hilbert's effect on mathematics
extended beyond his own direct influence. Hilbert had several famous students,
including Zermelo and Fraenkel, who contributed a great deal.
52. Turing was one of the early founders of computer science. He is especially famous
for his Turing machine.
53. Here, we're using Cst(S) to mean that the formal system, S, is consistent.
54. Referring to the theory of constructive functions and recursive functions initiated
by Curt Gdel.
55. Heyting was a student of Brouwer's.
56. Remember a negative result means showing that something does not exist.
57. Interestingly, Brouwer had a special name for real numbers which were sequences
of the same number. They were called straight arrows. Note that the set of all straight
arrows is countable.
58. Ironically, Brouwer's epistemological idealism has become quite popular and
widespread.