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ESPERANZA PO
GR No. L-5064
February 27, 1953
FACTS:
Winstanley and Navarro were husband and wife. Winstanley died, leaving Navarro and their minor children as heirs.
Winstanley left a parcel of land in Cebu, which was conjugal property.
Subsequently, Navarro sold the land to spouses Canoy. Canoy sold the land to Ibarle.
The two deeds of the two sales above were not registered.
Navarro, after being appointed guardian of her minor children, sold one-half of the subject land to Po.
The children alleged that they are the rightful owners of the property and filed an action to annul the sale.
ISSUE:
WON the sale of the property to Po was valid? NO.
HELD:
NO, the sale was void as it deprived the children of their right to the inheritance, which was transmitted upon the death
of Winstanley.
When Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children.
No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and
void in so far as it included the children's share.
It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into
possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of
death.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death. in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such
right is pure or contingent.
On the other hand, the sale to Po having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and
effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the nonregistration would not avail in favor of Ibarle.
YES. The second will executed on August 11, 1909 was duly executed and valid. The testatrix was held to have been
compos mentis, despite the physicians testimony to the contrary.
Upon a full consideration of the record, SC found that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will
SC found that no undue influence had been exercised over the mind of the deceased. While it is true that some of the
witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the
execution of he will, upon the other hand, there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at
the time of the execution of the will, to influence her mind in any way.
The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear, and to note the witnesses during their examination reached
the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed that:
a. No undue influence had been used
b. The deceased was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this
will.
SC found no good reason in the record for reversing the trial courts findings.
While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet,
nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps 24 hours before the execution of the will in question.
Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and
memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for 10 or 15 minutes and finally signed it.
It was proved that the 1st will was indeed executed by the deceased. Several witnesses testified to that fact. The mere
fact, however, that she executed a 1st will is no proof that she did not execute a 2nd will. She had a perfect right, by will,
to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a
perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her former wills and to make a new one.
Although the deceaseds signatures were different in the two wills, several witnesses testified that they saw her write
her full name. SC concluded that if the deceased signed any portion of her name to the will, with the intention to sign
the same, that the will amount to a signature.