Mind Association

Images
Author(s): Douglas Odegard
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 80, No. 318 (Apr., 1971), pp. 262-265
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252415 .
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IMAGES
LET USuse ' image 'to referto what is often called a ' mental image'

or ' mental picture 'and to excludethings like idols, statues, pictures,

mirror-imagesand even after-images. Images are what we frame
when we visualise something, although words like ' visualise '
or ' imagine ' may be used in such a way that visualisingor imagining
something need not involve framing images; e.g. consider 'Just
visualise (imagine, fancy, consider, suppose) a situation where '.
Images are often thought to be private entities existing in the mind.
They are frequentlysaid to be " seen in the mind's eye " or to occur
"before the mind's eye ".
GilbertRyle denies that an image is a thing which is private and
mind-dependent,indeed that it is in this sense a thing at all.1 J. M.
Shorteragreesthat an imageis not a private, mind-dependentobject,
but he feels Ryle's accountgoes too far.2 Shorterfeels we must make
room for talking about images without talking about what they
represent,i.e. without talking about what they are images of. They
are thus in certain respects " things in their own right ". We may
not be able to say they are private, mind-dependentthings, but we
can say, e.g. that they are blurred. To this extent they are similar
to portraits, since the latter have features independently of what
they are portraits of, although obviously the independent features
cannot all be the same.
J. E. R. Squiresdisagreeswith Shorterin favour of Ryle, insisting
that even predicates like 'is blurred' apply to images only in an
oblique way, i.e. only by reference to what they are images of.3
Thus an image is blurredif and only if it is of something with illdefined boundaries. There is no conceptual distinctions between
'It's a foggy image' and 'It's an image of something foggy'.
Squiresfails to anchor his position as firmly as he might in two important ways, however. First, he neglects to show exactly where
Shorter'smost plausibleargumentsagainst Ryle go wrong. Second,
he fails to spell out the fuRlimplications of Ryle's view for the
question of the numerical identity of images. Since Ryle is substantially correct on this particular issue, I think tlhese gaps are
worth filling.
Shorter at one point argues that images are things in their own
right by insistingthat we can talk about visualisingwithout referring
to the representativeaspect of visualising (see p. 168). His premiss
is in a sense true but not in a sense in which it entails his conclusion.
We can talk about Nero'svisualisinga burningcity, or Rome burning,
by saying 'He's visualisingthings again. This is the third time in
the last hour. It does keep him occupiedand out of trouble,though.
1 In Conceptof Mind (Lonidon, 1949), Ch. viii.
2In "Imagination ", Mind, LXI (1952); rep. in Essays in Philosophical
Psychology ed. D. F. Gustafson (New York, 1964). Page references are to the
latter.
3 In " Visualising ", Mind, LXXVII (1968).

262

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IMAGES

263

Fortunately, it's not illegal.' Nero's visualising becomes a " thing

in its own right ", in the sense that it takes non-obliquepredicates,
but it does not follow that the images which Nero framesare equally
independent. We cannot say of them that they are the third set
in the last hour, that they keep him occupied and out of trouble,
or that they are not illegal, unlessby this we mean what is said above
about Nero's visualising. And if this is all we mean, then again
our talk about the images involved becomesoblique;though instead
of being dependentupon talk about what the images represent,it is
now dependent upon talk about someone's visualising something
(or someone's framing images). The direction of the obliqueness
is not important, however. So long as talk about images is oblique
in some direction,Shorterfails to establish that images are things in
their ownright.
Shorter introduces a case where we try to visualise the face of
someonewe know well and do a poor job of it. We might say 'All
I got was a blur' or 'It was a blur'. He argues that in this case
'is blurred'is not being merelyobliquelyascribedto what is visualised.
' It is blurred' does not mean anything like ' So and so's face is
blurred'or 'I've justvisualisedso and so'sface andthe latteris blurred'.
He might also have added that 'It is blurred' does not mean anything like 'My visualising so and so's face is blurred'. He then
concludesthat ' being blurred' is " a feature of the image in its own
right " (p. 169). Again, Shorter'sargumentis invalid if his premisses
are true. If what is visualised in this case is a particularfriend's
face, then 'being blurred' is not a feature of what is visualised,since
the face is not blurred. Nor is my visualising the face the sort of
thing that can be blurred(althoughit may be muddled,inadequate
careless). Nevertheless,it does not follow that the image involved
bears the feature ' is blurred' in its own right, since ' what the
image is of ' and 'what is visualised ' are not the same. 'Being
blurred' is not a feature of what is visualised (the face) but it is a
feature of what the image involved in the visualisingis of. For the
image I framein visualisingmy friend'sface is an image of a blurred
face. Alternatively, if ' visualise x ' means 'frame an image of
x ', then in this case what is visualisedis not my friend'sface (which
is not blurred) but simply a blurred face. In either event, ' is
blurred' is ascribedto the image only obliquely and the latter fails
to emergeas a thing in its own right.
The characteristicof oblique predicationapplies to any relevant
feature which may be predicatedof images. For instance, Shorter
maintains that images can be said to be non-specificand acknowledges that, e.g. ' It did not have a specificcolour' amounts to ' The
image was not of something with a specific colour'. Similarly, he
admits that ' It was red ' amounts to ' It was an image of red'.
He does not want to extend this analysisto all the relevantpredicates
assignedto images, however, and in this he is wrong, his arguments
to the contrary notwithstanding. Now, when consideringspecific

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264

D. ODEGARD:

cases, it is important to bear in mind that the given predicate need

not be a predicate which is directly assignable to what the image is of.
It, or a sufficiently close cousin, may be directly assignable to the
person framing the image or doing the visualising. For instance, in
' The image is of something red and round ', the predicate ' is of
something red and round' is itself oblique because the claim has the
force of 'He visualised, or imagined, something red and round'
or 'He framed an image of something red and round'. Or, as
noted above, the predicate may be directly assignable to the act
of framing the image; e.g. 'That image was opportune ' becomes
'His framing that image was opportune '.
Moreover, even in cases where the predicate is directly assignable
to what the image is of, there is a possible ambiguity in 'wwhatthe
image is of '. For, an image may in one sense be said to be of a
particular person, thing or event: 'He had an image of Caesar ',
'Frame an image of your boy riding a tricycle '. Or, it may be
said to be of a so and so, where the latter is simply generic. Now, in a
case where an image is of a particular, the image involved is also
generic, but not vice versa. Consequently, in the case of an image of a
particular, we can ascribe predicates to the image which are directly
predicable either of the given particular or of the given kind of thing.
For example, 'Your image is gruesome ' becomes the event you are
imagining (imaging) is gruesome ', though in a sense you are not
framing an image of a gruesome event, whereas 'Your image is
round ' becomes 'Your image is of a round thing ', although you
are not imagining a particular round thing.
This distinction concerning ' what an image is of ' is of some importance when considering predicates like ' resembles such and such '.
We might say of an image 'It resembles Caesar' and mean a number
of different things. We might mean, e.g. 'It is of Caesar '; thus,
two images resemble one another because they are of the same particular. Features like these would eventually amount to features of
the person framing the image; 'He is visualising Caesar by framing
an image', 'In both cases someone is visualising Caesar by framing
an image'. Or ' It resembles Caesar ' might mean ' The image is of
something which is x, y and z, and Caesar has all or several of x,
y and z '. In this case, the analysis is in terms of what kind of thing
the image is of and the relationship between its features and those of
Caesar. Thus, if we say ' These two images resemble one another ',
it amounts to 'One image is of something with such and such properties and the other is of something with such and such properties,
and these properties are at least much the same
Consider now the question of assigning 'is numerically the same
as ' to images. We might say of two images of Caesar that they are
numerically the same because the particular person they are of is
numerically the same. Similarly, an image of Brutus and an image
of Caesar's assassin can be said to be the same. This much Squires
suggests with the remark, " So far as I know, there are no analogous

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265

IMAGES

ways of decidingwhethera mental pictureis the same as one we had

last week. The only criterion of identity I can suggest would be
that it resemblesthe same thing " (p. 66). He does not emphasize,
however,that this criterionis one whichwarrantsascribingnumerical
sameness to images solely in an oblique way. Moreover,and perhaps this could explain the lack of emphasis, he does not make it
clear that this criterion will work only if ' what an image is of'
is understoodin such a way that what an image is of is a particularand
not simply a kind of thing. For, if what an image is of is a kind of
thing, then what an imageis of is not the sortof thing to be numerically
the same as or differentfromsomethingelse. Thus, e.g. ' This image
of a colouredpatch andthat image of a colouredpatch are numerically
the same ' or ' This image of something foggy and that image of
something foggy are numerically different' are neither true nor
false so long as 'image of such and such' is used in a generic way
and the proposed criterion is invoked. An identity claim of this
sort can acquire a truth value only if it means 'Your imagining a
coloured patch then and your imagining a colouredpatch now are
numericallythe same occurrences', that is, only if the criterion of
identity for images becomes the identity of the acts of framing
them. Once again, then, 'is identical with' becomes an oblique
predicatewhen assignedto images. And so long as this is the case,
images can never be " things in their own right ", since whatever
else a " thing in its own right " may be, it must have a non-oblique
numericalidentity.
Universityof Guelph

DOUGLAS ODEGARD

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