PROPERTY RELATIONS

ALAIN M. DIO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO

FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001,
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriag against respondent
citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping
sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent
and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. The court
ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later
altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE to be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
HELD: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102,
Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Since the property relations of
the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute
the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. In this case,
petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in
a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply
and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, partition
may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x.
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ATIENZA v. DE CASTRO
FACTS: In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006,
Lupo, a married man cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their
coverture, they allegedly acquired a real property and registered it under the name
of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they parted. He filed an action
for partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of limited
co-ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she acquired it
thru her own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared the property
subject of co-ownership, but the CA reversed it as he failed to prove material
contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he contended that he was
not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property
because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that
under Article 484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the property during their

extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and
governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the contention correct? Explain.
HELD: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry
each other because Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the
time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances
of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. (Cario v. Cario, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual contribution is
required. (Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302) . As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership
of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal .
(Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000,
330 SCRA 718; Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006). Here,

although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way

before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Article 148 thereof
applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA
678). Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article
256, F.C.). The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some
measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that
the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. It is the
petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire
the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two
(2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner,
his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts
duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed
of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer
dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the
vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner. The claim of coownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very
trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the
benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous
records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner
failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not evidence. True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title
in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may
have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either
insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed
property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to
petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to
present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no coownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived
the funds used to purchase the property from earnings, not only as an accountant
but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending
and jewelry retain. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing
substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account
statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity
to pay the purchase price of the subject property.

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

ANTECEDENT FACTS: On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin)
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial
court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that
on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III. In
1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan
(Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned
by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and
wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for
bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and
that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the
trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance
with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and
Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the
subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which
the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court
also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and
asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the
Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before
the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The
trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28
February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court,

Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the
case submitted for decision.
RULING: In a Decision dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of
Benjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from
the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only
Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of
February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued
to Benjamin and Sally. The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not
be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of
the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the
lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The
trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley
because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim
for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court
likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and
did not ask for support. On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally
could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal
properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to
Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin,
as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his

brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of
Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using
his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money,
property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as
well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 . However, the
trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units
were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the
properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice
to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate
proceeding. The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she
knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family
Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena. The dispositive portion of the
trial courts decision reads: ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT. Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the
thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630,
194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651,
206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,

Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of
"Sally Go". Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are
directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37)
titles. Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
are properties acquired from petitioners money without contribution from
respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties.
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from
these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. On the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under coownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and
Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these
two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No.
02-11-10 of March 15, 2003. Respondents claim of spousal support, children
support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties children. No other relief granted. SO
ORDERED.
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, the trial court denied the
motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals: In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court
of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that
there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the
initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence
on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed
despite the presence of her other witnesses. The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys
allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his
prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was
annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring
Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that
only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin
and his siblings. As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the

Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was
able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of Appeals
found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of
Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the
share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing
marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a
clear and convincing proof of bad faith. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the
case. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be
solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall
be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the
petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage
while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the
decision stands.
SO ORDERED
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14
March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit. Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that
she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her
to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. In this case,
Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled on 28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and
28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance.
Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that
in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other
available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even
subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not
dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts
prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain
that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the
postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it
would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on
28 November 2008. We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to
present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her
evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of
interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the
case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her
petition questioning the trial courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as
Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage
as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that

trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her
marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the
same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to
present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove
her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her;
that Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he
stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and
friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that
Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena. First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly
established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their
marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported
marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was
valid and subsisting. On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita
Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City,
testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally.
Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil
registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract,
the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. It was
also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig; Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;
and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National
Statistics Office. The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was
no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" and "a simulated
marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives." In short, it was a fictitious marriage. The
fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court
notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 while Sally was the
informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally
were married on 8 March 1982. Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates. We
see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article
34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued
by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case
clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and
void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the
trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in all aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the
decision stands." While the Court of Appeals did not discuss bigamous marriages,
it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the
rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts

discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The
trial court stated: On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the
concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It
is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes
such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De
Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079] , it was held that what was committed was contracting
marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not
bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand
of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be
sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet
the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. For bigamy to exist, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith. Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only
the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself
conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses
which included Sally x x x."
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court
of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property
covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally
as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name
of Benjamin with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos . N193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We
have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do
not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit
himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to
accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin. We have ruled that the issue of
voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge. To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition
to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. In

this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in
submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to present
her evidence. We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge
Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are
not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith
in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
VENTURA JR., vs. SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA,
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision dated 9 March
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the Resolution
dated 3 August 2012 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Decision and
Resolution dismissed the Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed with
modification the Decision dated 24 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-Manila).
FACTS: The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June
1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them
had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline
Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U.
Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case. Evidence shows that Socorro
had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she married
Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not
annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes
death in 1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a
portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila
(Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline
on her fathers behalf sometime in 1970.4The Vitas property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."5
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small
business establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila
(Delpan property). On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan
properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino). According to
Edilberto: when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he
decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline
continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan
Street. The amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were
considered part of the purchase price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline
likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase
of the Vitas properties and she shouldered his medical expenses. Esteban passed
away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered
the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of
Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the
properties was fraudulent because Estebans signature on the deeds of sale was
forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior
marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus,
neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties
purchased by Esteban and respondents.
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void
from the beginning. Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law
at the time Esteban and Socorro were married, provides: Any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:
1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void.

During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorros daughter-in-law Conchita

Ventura (Conchita). In her first affidavit, Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a
seaman, had been missing and unheard from for 35 years. However, Conchita
recanted her earlier testimony and executed an Affidavit of Retraction. The RTCManila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not affect the
status of the union. It applied our ruling in Nial v. Badayog: Jurisprudence
under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. x x x Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
[the] fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal,
and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the
charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a
contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved. The RTC-Manila then determined the
respective shares of Socorro and Esteban in the properties. It found that: with
respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo,
Manila covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road, Magsaysay Village,
Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared that part of it was first acquired by her father
Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968 when he purchased the right of Ampiano
Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she x x x bought the right to one-half of the remaining
property occupied by Ampiano Caballegan. However, during the survey of the
National Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot to be registered in her
fathers name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits "8" to "11" x x x. These
documents prove that that she has been an occupant of the said property in Vitas,
Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got married in June, 1980. Anent
the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street,
Tondo, Manila, x x x Evangeline professed that in 1978, before her father met
Socorro Torres and before the construction of the BLISS Project thereat, her father
[already had] a bodega of canvas (lona) and a sewing machine to sew the canvas
being sold at 903 Del Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also operating
Vangies Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, which was
evidenced by Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued in her favor on
09 November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS project was constructed in 1980, the
property became known as Units D-9 and D-10. At first, her father [paid] for the
amortizations for these two (2) parcels of land but when he got sick with colon
cancer in 1993, he asked respondents to continue paying for the amortizations x x
x. [Evangeline] paid a total of P195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces
of receipts x x x and the aggregate amount of P188,596.09 for Unit D-10, as
evidenced by 36 receipts x x x. The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not
contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be
considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and
Delpan properties. Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the RTCManila. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged Decision of the
court a quo STANDS. SO ORDERED.
The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article 148 of
the Family Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of the
Family Code states that in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other: x x x only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married
to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be

forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith. The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of Appeals , and held that the
foregoing provision applies "even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code." The CA found that
Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas and
Delpan properties. Edilberto was unable to provide any documentation evidencing
Socorros alleged contribution. On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated 3 August
2012. Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition. Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a
woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the
properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on
the actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v.
Descallar in his petition: It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to
any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not
apply. This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied
in the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith. Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can
be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) if there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry. Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas
property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro
because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or
several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued
to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres." We disagree. The
title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
"married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and
does not show that Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record
also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration
of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and
does not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition
wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo: Registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source
of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the
property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her
the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent.
A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties
for a valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Estebans actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property. We cannot sustain
Edilbertos claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property
was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if
payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline,
such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtors

consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted
it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the
name of Esteban. During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing
payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property.On the other hand,
Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorros alleged monetary
contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA: settled is the rule that in civil
cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here
it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which
undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
92330 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and
GINA S. REY
FACTS: 17 year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. Private
respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole
owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00,
representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to
her.
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties.
HELD: it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions Proof of actual contribution is required. Even if cohabitation
commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. The fact that
the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property. In the case at bar, the controversy
centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of
their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase
of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the
absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share
shall be presumed to be equal.
ARTURO R. ABALOS v. DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR.
FACTS: Arturo and Esther Abalos were husband and wife. They own a parcel of
land in Makati. On June 2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of
Attorney, executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano
Macatangay, Jr. in which Arturo acknowledged he received a P5k check from
Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and that
Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the
P5k. The purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. However, the P5k check was
dishonored due to insufficiency. Apparently however, Esther and Arturo were
having a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA in favor of her sister and that
she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was alleged that
that the RMOA is not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed thereto. And that
Esther never executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that
he has prepared a check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be
paid for the land. He demanded that the land be delivered to him. But the spouses
failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano.
Whether or not the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is

binding and that it cured the defect of the earlier contract between Arturo and
Galicano.
HELD: No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At
best, the agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to
purchase to Galicano. The promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was
actually no consideration distinct from the price. Be it noted that the parties
considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price.
Assuming arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still
not binding for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not
a legal tender. Still assuming arguendo, that the P5k was an earnest money which
supposedly perfected a contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esthers
signature was not affixed. The property is conjugal and under the Family Code,
the spouses consents are required. Further, the earnest money here is not
actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil Code.
The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier
transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial
court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with
Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and
Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her
conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant
Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they
begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their
marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue
City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated
in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina
Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8)
parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties earn income from
coconuts leased to corporations. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein
Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person
who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living
in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own
from which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until
the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the
income of his properties. Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial
court in favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was
then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial courts decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage
between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal
HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed
RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates
that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired
during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. Nicolas and Eusebia
were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936.
Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on
4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Since the subject properties, including Lot No.
152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of
Nicolas and Eusebia.
SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, April 12, 2000
THE CASE: For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy
and Fernando Sy.
THE FACTS: Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes
in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since

then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of
their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation
before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition
for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on
the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina
filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the
petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner
for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage
license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was
attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different
and incongruous.
The Issues:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the
ceremony?
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the
time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute
nullity?
Held: A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the
beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that
the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither
petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she
presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony
took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there
being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil
Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by
the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab
initio for lack of marriage license at the time heir marriage was solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between
petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void
ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.
ERLINDA AGAPAY VS CARLINA PALANG
FACTS: Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He
then contracted his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a
son. The couple purchased a parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate
was issued in their names. She also purchased a house and lot in Binalonan,
where the property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a
complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy. Miguel died, and Carlina and
Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the riceland and house and lot
allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed
the complaint and ordered the respondents to provide for the intestate shares of
the parties, particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted
to Erlinda.
RULING: No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be
granted to Erlinda. The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The
marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of
Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto
separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must
be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to

Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of
the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade SC that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland.
Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, when she was only
around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there
being no proof of the same. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony
of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and
directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee. Since Erlinda failed
to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find
no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the
riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang. The transaction was properly
a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union. As regards to the donation of their
conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their daughter, was
also void. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an
express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from
the parties compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.
AYALA INVESTMENTS v. CA
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent
Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980
and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs
indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint
against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the
appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo,
appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May
1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA
issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way fthe
scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of
sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone
is considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore,
AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family
of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate
entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as
surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or
services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety orguarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the
family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment
(prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the

benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting
from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.

the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages
amouting to P660,000.00.

DELA CRUZ v. DELA CRUZ

FACTS: Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in
Bacolod and begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several
parcels of land and were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an
action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further
alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their
conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always
visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his
frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their
business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in
his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home,
which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a
mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of
property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal
assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON
there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD: The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations
and support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the
conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and
perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation.
In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by
the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. The
plaintiff even testified that the husband paid short visits implying more than one
visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife
has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally
by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the
husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the
progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to
exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

BPI vs Posadas
FACTS: BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze,
appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from
the complaint filed against him in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to
P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under protest, and
sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the
deceased. Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was
actually residing and living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927.
The latter while in Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law
wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not only
real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of
shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is
a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by
the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance
policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any
qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as
administrator of the decedents estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having
been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest.
Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund
such amount.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.
HELD: SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership,
constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other
half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal
and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal
in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable
to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the
matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the
insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax
collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy
on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional
part corresponding to the first premium.

BA FINANCE Corp v. CA May 28 1988

FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of
P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and
as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special
power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and
under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the
husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2 months prior the
procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn
abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and
demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same. The petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud
consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and
A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court
and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of
attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not
sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by
the court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by
the husband.
HELD: A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily
Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets
were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property
forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the
obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own
benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already
abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear
that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such
loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some
advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Thus, the Court ruled that
petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal
properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

LIM vs. CA, GR No. 112229, March 18, 1997
FACTS: According to Maribel, Raymond courted her while she was working in a
club. She reciprocated his love and they soon live together. On July 1981, Maribel,
already pregnant, left for Japan and on October of the same year, she returned to
Manila. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter. Towards the
latter part of 1983, Raymond started to change and subsequently abandoned her
and Joanna Rose. He also failed to give support to their child. Thus, petitioner
filed a complaint before the RTC for support. On the other hand, petitioner denied
being the father of Maribels child. He claimed that they were only friends and
there was no intimacy between them. He inferred that Maribel became pregnant
only when she went to Japana. The RTC ruled in favor of Maribel. Petitioner then
elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not paternity filiation can be established between Joanna
Rose and the petitioner.
RULING: As shown by the hand-written letter Raymond wrote to Maribel, he
considered himself to be the father of Joanna Rose. From the tenor of the letter
and his statements made therein, it is clear that they were actually lovers. Other
hand-written letters made by Raymond were also presented as evidence of their
relationship. His denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father of Joanna
Rose. Under Art. 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Art. 172
of the Family Code, it provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by
the record of birth appearing in the civil register. Petitioner has never controverted
the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to
Joanna Rose; picture of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and
the Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Petition is DISMISSED. Decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.

1.

HERRERA v. ALBA, GR No. 148220

FACTS: On May 14, 1998, Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother, Armi Alba,
filed a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. Petitioner, in his Answer, denied that he is the blogical father of
respondent and also denied having physical contact with Armi. Respondent filed a
motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing and to support the motion, she
presented an expert witness, Dr. Halos, who asserted that DNA paternity
testing had an accuracy rate of 99.99% in establishing paternity. Petitioner
opposed DNA paternity testing contending that it has not gained acceptability and
it violates his right against self-incrimination. The RTC granted respondents
motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioner filed before the
appellate court a Petition for Certiorari and he asserted that the trail court
rendered the Order dated February 3, 2000 and June 8, 2000 with grave abuse of
its discretion. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the questioned Orders of
the trial court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the
appellate court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool to determine filiation.
2. Whether or not DNA paternity testing violates the petitioners right
against self-incrimination.
RULING: In People vs Valejo, it was held that, In assessing the probative value of
DNA evidence, therefor, courts should consider, among other things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the test. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results
of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value
of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Relevant portions of the trial courts February 3, 2000 Order were quoted with
approval: Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or
from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent
in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken under
duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the
right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not
an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a
defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body
(People vs. Olvis, Supra) ; the substance emitting from the body of the accused was
received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145);
morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36
Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was
allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman
accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62) ,
since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on testimonial compulsion. Petition
is DISMISSED. Decision of CA is affirmed.
AGUSTIN v. CA, June 15, 2005
FACTS: Respondents alleged that Arnel impregnated Fe on November 10, 1999
and despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to
their child out of wedlock on August 11, 2000. Arnel refused to give support to
Martin and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia in 2001 and on March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel
for support. Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair with Fe had
allegedly ended in 1998. He also claimed that the signature and the community
tax certificate attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate
were falsified. On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an
order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
but Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action and filed a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth
certificate. The tial court denied the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and ordered
the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing. The CA affirmed the trial
courts decision.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the order and resolution of the trial court, which were
affirmed by the CA, converted the complaint for support to a petition for
recognition.
2. Whether or not DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding
for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination.
RULING: The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support
into recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action
against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgment. But even if the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support,
such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals ,
integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones
inheritance was allowed. The answer to whether or not Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation. This Court
considers DNA testing as valid means of determining paternity. Petitioners
invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy for the reason that they
are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very
life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, there is no reason why
in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences
cannot be ordered to do the same. There is no grave abuse on the part of the
public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court with both denied the
petitioners Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing.
The petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
CA. Petition DENIED. The CAs decision is affirmed in toto.
CABATANIA v. CA, October 21, 2004
FACTS: This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support
filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo
Regodos. During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of Camelo
Regodos who was born on September 9, 1982. She said that she worked as a
maid for the petitioners household and on January 2, 1982, they had sexual
intercourse. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 and on Sepmber
9, 1982, Florencia gave birth to her child. On the other hand, Camelo alleged that
Florencia was already pregnant with the child of her husband when they had
sexual intercourse. He also denied having sexual intercourse with her on January
2, 1982. Camelo said that when his wife inquired about the father of the unborn
child, Florencia told her that the baby was by her husband. The trial court ruled in
favour of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a
widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. The courts decision was based on
the testimony of Florencia and the personal appearance of the child. The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not paternity relationship can be established between
petitioner and private respondent?
RULING: The birth and baptismal certificate presented by the private respondent
are not competent evidences of paternity since the preparation of which was
without the knowledge or consent of petitioner and there is now showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparations of said certificate. It was also held
that baptismal certificates cannot serve as evidence in the veracity of the entries
with respect to the childs certificate. Florencias husband being alive and the
subsistence of valid marriage between them give rise to the presumption that a
child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the other may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. In
this age of genetic profiling and DNA analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove
paternity and filiation before the courts of law. Petition is GRANTED. CAs decision
is reversed. Private respondents petition for recognition and support is
dismissed.
ADOPTION
In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Honorato B.
Catindig, Petitioner
FACTS: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, who has been using her
mothers middle name and surname. Honorato prayed that Stephanies middle
name Astorga be changed to Garcia (her mothers surname) and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig (his surname). The petition for
adoption was granted and Stephanie was given the name, Stephanie Nathy
Catindig. On April 20, 2001, Honorato filed a motion praying that Stephanie be

allowed to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name but the trial
court denied it.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child upon adoption by her natural father
may use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
RULING: The Civil Code provides substantive rules which regulate the use of
surnames of an individual whatever may be his status in life. Art. 365 of the Civil
Code provides, An adopted child shall bear the surname of the father. But the
law is silent as to the use of middle name. There is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. However, it was pointed out by the OSG that the members of the
Civil Code and Family Code Committees recognize the Filipino custom of adding
the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Code Committees, the members approved
the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father. One of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter. Being a legitimate child
by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. Furthermore,
Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. Since there
is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so. The petition is GRANTED.

LAHOM v. SIBULO
FACTS: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him
up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption,
and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo
to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and
that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname
Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to
the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption (Section 19 of Article VI). These turn of events revealing Jose's
callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted
Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree
of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom
filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically
R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March
22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest
of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded
by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the
affirmative, whether or not the adopters action prescribed.
RULING: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be
resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was
filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that
Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972.
By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the
adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated
by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the
right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that

expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating
to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right
of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has
been exercised. But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his
legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
SUPPORT
MANGONON V. CA
FACTS: On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were
civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At
that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19
years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per
Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the
Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. 25 March 1976, or within
seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins
Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had
totally abandoned them. Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United
States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second
husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University
of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island
University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said
universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education because of the following:
a) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about
US$22,000/year or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina.
b) Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the amount of
US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per year. c)Unfortunately, petitioners
monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can
hardly give general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college
educational support. c) Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to
share in the general support and college education of Rica and Rina since he has
his own son with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend to. a)
Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected by
the U.S.
Department of Education.
1) On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy
and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati
2) Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latters
father, Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the required
college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to
work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico
and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be financially
well-off.
ISSUE: Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her
granddaughters educational support
HELD: ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico
are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily
charged to support their childrens college education but being restricted by their
financial income- respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica
and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their

parents, it having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial
means to support his granddaughters education.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in
the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give
support. Respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option
under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and
Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the
Philippines to study in any of the local universities. Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in
the family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in this case since there are
circumstances, legal or moral, between respondent and petitioner which should be
considered. Respondent Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school
expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by
petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount
given his various business endeavors, thus the amount of support should be
proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the
recipient. The Decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the amount of support
pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby
MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support
pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this
Decision. Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done
with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it
proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time
they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.
NOTES:
(respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which
owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate,
and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is
also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea.
Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in
turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is
likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla
Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel
Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad. )
What is SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE?
SECTION 1. Application. At the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified
application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds
for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.