Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Dignos vs CA
FACTS:
The spouses Silvestre and Isabel Dignos were owners of a parcel of
land in Opon, Lapu-Lapu City. On June 7, 1965, appellants, herein
petitioners Dignos spouses sold the said parcel of land to respondent
Atilano J. Jabil for the sum of P28,000.00, payable in two installments,
with an assumption of indebtedness with the First Insular Bank of Cebu
in the sum of P12,000.00, which was paid and acknowledged by the
vendors in the deed of sale executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant, and
the next installment in the sum of P4,000.00 to be paid on or before
September 15, 1965.
On November 25, 1965 the Dignos spouses sold the same land in
favor of defendants spouses, Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. De
Cabigas, who were then U.S. citizens, for the price of P35,000.00. A
deed of absolute sale was executed by the Dignos spouses in favor of
the Cabigas spouses, and which was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3344.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
x x x.
Issues
Our Ruling
Section 17. Registration. All contracts to sell, deeds of sale, and other
similar instruments relative to the sale or conveyance of the
subdivision lots and condominium units, whether or not the purchase
price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the nullity of the mortgage, neither DELTA nor the BANK
could assert any right arising therefrom. The BANKs loan of P8 million
to DELTA has effectively become unsecured due to the nullity of the
mortgage. The said loan, however, was eventually settled by the two
contracting parties via a dation in payment. In the appealed Decision,
the CA invalidated this dation in payment on the ground that DELTA,
by previously entering into a Contract to Sell, had already conveyed its
ownership over Lot 4 to Enriquez and could no longer convey the
same to the BANK. This is error, prescinding from a wrong
understanding of the nature of a contract to sell.
Both parties are correct in arguing that the Contract to Sell executed by
DELTA in favor of Enriquez did not transfer ownership over Lot 4 to
Enriquez. A contract to sell is one where the prospective seller
reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer until the
happening of an event, such as full payment of the purchase price.
What the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property only
when the entire amount of the purchase price has already been
delivered to him. In other words, the full payment of the purchase
price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which
prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is
retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the
prospective buyer.[63] It does not, by itself, transfer ownership to the
buyer.[64]
[The Bank] should have considered that it was dealing with a property
subject of a real estate development project. A reasonable person,
particularly a financial institution x x x, should have been aware that, to
finance the project, funds other than those obtained from the loan
could have been used to serve the purpose, albeit partially. Hence,
there was a need to verify whether any part of the property was
already intended to be the subject of any other contract involving
buyers or potential buyers. In granting the loan, [the Bank] should not
have been content merely with a clean title, considering the presence
of circumstances indicating the need for a thorough investigation of the
existence of buyers x x x. Wanting in care and prudence, the [Bank]
cannot be deemed to be an innocent mortgagee. x x x[65]
xxxx
Further, as an entity engaged in the banking business, the BANK is
required to observe more care and prudence when dealing with
registered properties. The Court cannot accept that the BANK was
unaware of the Contract to Sell existing in favor of Enriquez. In Keppel
Bank Philippines, Inc. v. Adao,[66] we held that a bank dealing with a
property that is already subject of a contract to sell and is protected by
the provisions of PD 957, is bound by the contract to sell (even if the
contract to sell in that case was not registered). In the Courts words:
It is true that persons dealing with registered property can rely solely
on the certificate of title and need not go beyond it. However, x x x, this
rule does not apply to banks. Banks are required to exercise more care
and prudence than private individuals in dealing even with registered
properties for their business is affected with public interest. As master
of its business, petitioner should have sent its representatives to check
the assigned properties before signing the compromise agreement and
it would have discovered that respondent was already occupying one
of the condominium units and that a contract to sell existed between
[the vendee] and [the developer]. In our view, petitioner was not a
purchaser in good faith and we are constrained to rule that petitioner is
bound by the contract to sell.[67]
xxxx
We are not persuaded. Like in all contracts, the intention of the parties
to the dation in payment is paramount and controlling. The contractual
intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be
considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as
full satisfaction for the debt. The dation in payment extinguishes the
obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as
agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by
agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing
as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally
extinguished.[69]
In the case at bar, the Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and the
BANK indicates a clear intention by the parties that the assigned
properties would serve as full payment for DELTAs entire obligation:
xxx
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Balance to be paid by Enriquez
This instrument, made and executed by and between:
Facts:
CIR assessed the sum of P20,272.33 as the commercial brokers
percentage tax, surcharge, and compromise penalty against Ker & Co.
There was a request on the part of petitioner for the cancellation of
such assessment, which request was turned down. As a result, it filed
a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. CTA ruled that that
Ker & Co is liable as a commercial broker under Section 194 (t) of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
accepted such orders as called for the employment of such materialmoulding, frames, panels-as it ordinarily manufactured or was in a
position habitually to manufacture. The Oriental Sash Factory does
nothing more than sell the goods that it mass-produces or habitually
makes; sash, panels, mouldings, frames, cutting them to such sizes
and combining them in such forms as its customers may desire.
2)
Oriental Sash Factory did not merely sell its services to Teodoro & Co.
It sold materials ordinarily manufactured by it sash, panels,
mouldings to Teodoro & Co., although in such form or combination
as suited the fancy of the purchaser. Such new form does not divest
the Oriental Sash Factory of its character as manufacturer. Neither
does it take the transaction out of the category of sales under Article
1467 above quoted, because although the Factory does not, in the
ordinary course of its business, manufacture and keep on stock doors
of the kind sold to Teodoro, it could stock and/or probably had in stock
the sash, mouldings and panels it used therefor.
Supposing for the moment that the transactions were not sales, they
were neither lease of services nor contract jobs by a contractor. But as
the doors and windows had been admittedly manufactured by the
Oriental Sash Factory, such transactions could be, and should be
taxed as transfers thereof under section 186 of the National Revenue
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether it was one of sale or for a piece of work.
HELD:
Under Art. 1467 then of the Civil Code which provides:
Conchita Nool owned a lot which was mortgaged to DBP when she
secured a loan. Upon non-payment of loan it was foreclosed by DBP.
Within the time of redemption Conchita contacted Anacleto Nool to
redeem the foreclosed property which the latter did. The titles were
transferred to Anacleto but it was agreed that Conchita can get back
the property soon when she has money. Conchita asked the Anacleto
for the return of the property but the latter refused even after the
intervention of the barangay. The case was filed.
Anacleto theorized that the lands were acquired by them from DBP
through negotiated sale. He argued that he was made to believe that
the property was still owned by Conchita when they agreed of
redemption.
RTC said it was DBP who was the owner of the property when the sale
to Anacleto was made. DBP became the absolute owner of the
property after the redemption period of the foreclosed property had
lapsed. RTC denied the action by Conchita. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: The contract of repurchase entered by Conchita and Anacleto was
void there being no subject to speak of. It is clear that Conchita was no
longer the owner of the property when such agreement was made with
Anacleto. It is likewise clear that the seller can no longer deliver the
object of the sale to the buyer, as the buyer had already acquired the
title from the rightful owner. Jurisprudence teaches us that a person
can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell ; the buyer can
acquire no more that what the seller can legally transfer.
The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between
the same parties. CA is decision AFFIRMED. Petition is DENIED.
Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific
Company
Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific
Company
97 Phil 247
June 1955
FACTS:
On March 24, 1953, defendant-appellant Atlantic granted plaintiffappellee Southwestern an option period of ninety days to buy the
formers barge No. 10 for the sum of P30,000. On May 11 of the same
year, Southwestern Company communicated its acceptance of the
option to Atlantic through a letter, to which the latter replied that their
understanding was that the "offer of option" is to be a cash transaction
and to be effected "at the time the lighter is available." On June 25,
Atlantic advised the Southwestern Company that since there is still
further work for it, the barge could not be turned over to the latter
company.
On June 27, 1953, the Southwestern Company filed this action to
compel Atlantic to sell the barge in line with the option, depositing with
the court a check covering the sum of P30,000, but said check was
later withdrawn with the approval of the court. On June 29, the Atlantic
withdrew its "offer of option" with due notices to Southwestern
Company stating that the option was granted merely as a favor. The
Atlantic contended that the option to sell it made to Southwestern
Company is null and void because said option to sell is not supported
by any consideration.
The trial court granted herein plaintiff-appellee Southwestern
Companys action for specific performance and ordered herein
defendant-appellant Atlantic to pay damages equivalent to 6 per
centum per annum on the sum of P30,000 from the date of the filing of
the complaint.
ISSUE:
Is Atlantic liable for specific performance and to pay damages in favor
of Southwestern Company?
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the trial courts decision applying Article
1479 of the new Civil Code. The Court reiterated that "an accepted
HELD:
Nietes can avail of the option to buy because he already express his
intention to buy the property before the termination of the contract. The
contention of the respondent that the full price of the property should
first be paid before the option could be exercised is of no merit.
The contract doesnt provide such stipulation and as such, the
provision of reciprocal obligations in oblicon should prevail. Notice of
the creditor's decision to exercise his option to buy need not be
coupled with actual payment of the price, so long as this is delivered to
the owner of the property upon performance of his part of the
agreement.
Nietes had validly and effectively exercised his option to buy the
property of Dr. Garcia, at least, on December 13, 1962, when he
acknowledged receipt from Mrs. Nietes of the sum of P2,200 then
delivered by her "in partial payment on the purchase of the property"
described in the "Contract of Lease with Option to Buy"
Spouses Doromal, Sr. and Salas vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-3608, 66
SCRA 575 , September 05, 1975
G.R. No. L-3608
August 7, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
notwithstanding the fact that in the other suit for theft he was
sentenced to the penalty of six months of arresto mayor and the
accessory penalties.
Basing our decision upon the foregoing reasons, we are therefore of
opinion that with the reversal of the judgment appealed from the
defendant must be acquitted with the costs of both instance de oficio,
and the calf must be returned to its present owner, who acquired the
same from the accused, and the latter to be set at liberty. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
MERCADO v ESPIRITU
FACTS:
This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of the four
parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale, these
minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at the time
they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the
notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented
themselves that they were of legal age.
RATIO:
The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it
was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and
adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors
pretended that they had already reached their majority.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deafmute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the
capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements.
Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse
themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao vs. Ramon Alcantara, March 4, 1950
Facts:
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs
of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not
valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the
subsequent sale of the subject properties made by Enrique and his
children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents is
valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares. With respect to
Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique,
represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16
shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
A father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the
property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial
guardian of the wards property and even then only with courts prior
approval. Napoleon D. Neri, et al. vs Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and
Julpha Ibrahim Uy. G.R. No. 194366. October 10, 2012
Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may
be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which
cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the
time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which
have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract.
Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may
have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second
contract; or the service which was impossible may have become
possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have
been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would
then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the
date of the first contract."
Present:
Rubias v. Batiller
Facts:
Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for
registration of the parcel of land in question. After the war, the petition
was heard and denied. Pending appeal, Militante sold the land to
petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for forcible entry
against respondent. Defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff
does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he
and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and
continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of
ownership of the portions of the lot in question.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his fatherin-law was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his
father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in
dispute
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Held:
The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established
plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of
the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was
predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in- law in his favor, at
a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already
been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil
Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the
relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from
acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or
indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1)
guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and
employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and
lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law.
Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent
such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and
employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices,
judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and
submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4)
and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil
Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as
"inexistent and void from the beginning."
Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and
permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and
public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or
ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and
judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the
first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491,
PR BUILDERS, INC.,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
September 25, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
On September 3, 2007, the Court rendered a Decision[1] in the present
case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated August 28, 2000 of
HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza
in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 is declared NULL and VOID.
HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed to issue the
corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the winning bidder, Holly
Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to
respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of
the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. After the finality