AGAN v.

PIATCO
Topic: Proper Party: Taxpayers Suit Reqisites

FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the
development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the
NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive
or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air
and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium)
submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that,
it was incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO)
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other
charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be
renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession
period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing
concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering,
passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing,
and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they would lose their job
upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA
likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners and the petitioners-in-intervention have standing.

Held:

By way of background, two monopolies were actually created by the PIATCO contracts. The first and more obvious
one refers to the business of operating an international passenger terminal in Luzon, the business end of which involves

Page

Petitioners-in-intervention are service providers in the business of furnishing airport-related services to international
airlines and passengers in the NAIA and are therefore competitors of PIATCO as far as that line of business is concerned.
On account of provisions in the PIATCO contracts, petitioners-in-intervention have to enter into a written contract with
PIATCO so as not to be shut out of NAIA Terminal III and barred from doing business there. Since there is no provision to
ensure or safeguard free and fair competition, they are literally at its mercy. They claim injury on account of their
deprivation of property (business) and of the liberty to contract, without due process of law.

Yes. The petitioners are confronted with the prospect of being laid off from their jobs and losing their means of livelihood
when their employer-companies are forced to shut down or otherwise retrench and cut back on manpower. Such
development would result from the imminent implementation of certain provisions in the contracts that tend toward the
creation
of
a
monopoly
in
favor
of
PIATCO,
its
subsidiaries
and
related
companies.

providing international airlines with parking space for their aircraft, and airline passengers with the use of departure and
arrival areas, check-in counters, information systems, conveyor systems, security equipment and paraphernalia,
immigrations and customs processing areas; and amenities such as comfort rooms, restaurants and shops.
In furtherance of the first monopoly, the PIATCO Contracts stipulate that the NAIA Terminal III will be the only facility to
be operated as an international passenger terminal; that NAIA Terminals I and II will no longer be operated as such; and
that no one (including the government) will be allowed to compete with PIATCO in the operation of an international
passenger terminal in the NAIA Complex.
There is another monopoly within the NAIA created by the subject contracts for PIATCO in the business of providing
international airlines with the following: groundhandling, in-flight catering, cargo handling, and aircraft repair and
maintenance services. These are lines of business activity in which are engaged many service providers (including the
petitioners-in-intervention), who will be adversely affected upon full implementation of the PIATCO Contracts.
The determination of whether a person may institute an action or become a party to a suit brings to fore the concepts
of real party in interest, capacity to sue and standing to sue. To the legally discerning, these three concepts are different
although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action. As defined in the Rules of
Court, a real party in interestis the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Capacity to sue deals with a situation where a person who may have a cause of action is
disqualified from bringing a suit under applicable law or is incompetent to bring a suit or is under some legal disability that
would prevent him from maintaining an action unless represented by a guardian ad litem. Legal standing is relevant in the
realm of public law. In certain instances, courts have allowed private parties to institute actions challenging the validity of
governmental action for violation of private rights or constitutional principles.In these cases, courts apply the doctrine of
legal standing by determining whether the party has a direct and personal interest in the controversy and whether
such party has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of, a
standard which is distinct from the concept of real party in interest. Measured by this yardstick, the application of the
doctrine on legal standing necessarily involves a preliminary consideration of the merits of the case and is not purely a
procedural issue.

EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS (ARTS 7-11, LABOR CODE)

& EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource
among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing
the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding
specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."

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The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not

Facts:

exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding
until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in
accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from
persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that
the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the
Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying
Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474),
Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and
Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for
Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the
petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven
hectares of agricultural land.
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the
uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm
workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive
a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Issue:

Page

Whether or not there is a violation on equal protection clause.

Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained
by him even under R.A. No. 6657.

Held:
P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be
deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was
to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder,
further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions.
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any
public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm,
such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)
hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.

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The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection
because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too
have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden
of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with
particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who
were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No.
6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event,
the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and
his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were
declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is
invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small
landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

Case Title: Chavez v. PEA and Amari, GR No. 133250, 7/9/02

Page

Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD
No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road
and
Reclamation
Project
(MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to
PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters."
Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom
Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through
then
Executive
Secretary
Ruben
Torres,
approved
the
JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA
itself
is
illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the
Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached
by
the
Senate
Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner

Topic : The Constitution and the Courts

requisites of judicial review
proper party (locus standi)
Taxpayers suit requisites

prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and
statutory
grounds
the
renegotiated
contract
be
declared
null
and
void."
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has locus standi and the requisites for tax payers suit were follows.
Held:
Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately
affect
the
social,
economic
and
moral
well
being
of
the
people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner
has
the
requisite
locus
standi.
PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this
public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of
this
legal
duty,
petitioner
had
the
right
to
seek
direct
judicial
intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in
view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution
of
alienable
lands
of
the
public
domain
among
Filipino
Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

City of Manila versus Chinese Community

40 Phil 349
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into
an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said
portion
of
the
privatecemetery and
that
the
said
lands
are
within
their
jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They
further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those
persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question.
Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right
to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

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Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the
case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipalcorporation or entity attempts to exercise the

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power ofthe
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts havethe right to inquire to.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs. SAN DIEGO
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
FACTS:
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.
A student shall be allowed only three chances to take the NMAT. After three successive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for
mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
2
petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No.
12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and
granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power which is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
ISSUE: Whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
HELD:
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents and the three-flunk rule is
intended to protect the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the invasion of those not qualified to be
doctors. The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The Court feels
that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that
he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. The
petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against
the private respondent.
ENRILE, Petitioner VS SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PIMENTEL, Respondents
Topic: Moot and Academic Questions
FACTS:
On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections.

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On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative
results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the
th
petitioners name dropped to the 15 position in the senatorial race.

On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined, the SET required
the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the total precincts involved.

On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentels Protest and to Conduct
Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate comments
alleging petitioners motion is premature considering the SET has not resolved respondents election protest.
In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an oversight, hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos
Norte should be made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those garnered by petitioner were
given back to him.
Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. The SET also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution that denied
petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to conduct another Appreciation of Ballots
in the Presence of All Parties.
One of the contentions of the Solicitor General is that the present petition has become moot and academic because the
tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of respondents protest where the assailed Resolutions originated
expired on June 30, 1998.
Issue: Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said petition.
Ruling: The petition is dismissed. The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested
senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot considering there is
no more actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any merit.
Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering the resolution of no
practical use or value.
It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Page

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the
same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first
complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year."

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261
NOV. 10, 2003

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as
a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them
to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The
major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that
while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora
of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Case Title: Ichong vs. Hernandez

101 Phil 1155

Topic (based on syllabus): Police Power; Definition, Scope and Characteristic

Facts:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides for
a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country.
This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the
Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was
violated according to him.
Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.

Page

According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power cannot be

Court Decision:

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise
in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the
laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in
mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police
power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As
it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope;
it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become
almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest
or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to
set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not
limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is
there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims
conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are
the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws
is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations
of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet
there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons
of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The
police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.

Page

Topic:B. Amendment and Revision (see Article XVII, Constitution)

1. Distinction

10

The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

2. Stages
Proposal stage
IMBONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it
prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each
representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by
providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each
representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2.
1
2
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5 , and par. 1 of 8(a) , and the entire law, while Imbong questions
the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1.
Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such
convention?
2.

Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress
also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such
details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely
obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The challenged
disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is
reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as
the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact
and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.

Note:
1
Sec. 2, 4 , and 5 (R.A. No. 6132)

Page

Section 4. Persons Holding Office. Any person holding a public office or position, whether elective or appointive, including
members of the armed forces and officers and employees of corporations or enterprises owned and/or controlled by the
government, shall be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That any government
official who resigns in order to run for delegate and who does not yet qualify for retirement under existing laws, may, if
elected, add to his length of service in the government the period from the filing of his certificate of candidacy until the final
adjournment of the Constitutional Convention.

11

Sec. 2 Composition of the Convention; Qualifications of Delegates. The Constitutional Convention authorized by
Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Two of the Congress of the Philippines, adopted on March sixteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty-seven, as amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines,
adopted on June seventeen, nineteen hundred and sixty- nine, shall be composed of three hundred and twenty delegates
who shall have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.

Section 5. Disqualification to Run. Any person elected as delegate to the Constitutional Convention shall not be qualified
to run for any public office in any election or to assume any appointive office or position in any branch of the Government
until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention.
2

Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention

(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized
group of whatever nature from:
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.

Case Title: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim

GR No. 119775

Page

Facts:
Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive uses,
Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefore and for other
purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992.
The law set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive
uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely,
the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in
the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers
pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with
the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ)
the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines;
and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from
local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave
authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government
units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military
reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld
Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands,
preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as
premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company
known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp
John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally
envisioned by the parties under their AZ memorandum of Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a
number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By
Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the
barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its
development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication,
waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the
military reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to
BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other
things, a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist

12

Topic (based on syllabus): Requisites of Judicial Review

destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed
participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named
nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the
camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the
sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in
accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to
order the determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. The
resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be
declared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's property and the
economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed
Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President
Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the
provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration
by the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and
designating a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone
pursuant to Republic Act 7227."
Issue: Whether or not the court can exercise its power of judicial review to the case at bar having question of
constitutional significance.
Court Decision:
Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
[52]
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation No.
420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from the invalid second
sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and
is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the
aforesaid void provision

Page

Topic: C. Eminent Domain (Also Read Rule 67 (re Expropriation) of the Rules of Court)
3. Elements
Just Compensation
Definition
Who is the owner who shall receive the payment?

13

It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the
concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The
grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a
legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a
particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the
legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the
enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover,
Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the
local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of
whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then,
Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255

Knecht v. CA, 297 SCRA 754

(G.R. No. 109234. May 20, 1998)
Ponente: J. Puno
FACTS:
In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines initiated a case for expropriation against the Knechts' property. The
government sought to utilize the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and
the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. The CFI issued a writ of possession. This SC, however,
held that the choice of area for the extension of EDSA was arbitrary. The SC annulled the writ.
In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property
from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction on
May 27, 1982 for the sum of P63,000.00, the amount of the deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were
respondents Babiera and Sangalang couples.
The petitioners failed to redeem the property. Babiera then filed for registration of the land to his name. The trial
court granted the petition. The Knechts, who were in possession of the property, allegedly learned of the auction
sale only by the time they received the orders of the land registration courts.
The De Knechts also filed Civil Case No. 2961-P to prevent the titles from being given to the contending spouses.
They put up lack of notice to the sale as defense. This was dismissed for lack of counsel to appear on the last
hearing.
On March 12, 1985, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation (Salem)
for P400,000.00.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national
government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The just compensation for
this purpose was docketed by the OSG under civil case 7327. The De Knecht property was covered by the
expropriation. On August 30, seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government
took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Salem instituted against them Civil Case No.
85-263 for unlawful detainer.
The SC allowed for the expropriation this time. Meanwhile, Salem conveyed 5,611.92 square meters of the
subject property to respondent spouses Mariano and Anacoreta Nocom. Part was left to Salem.
As prayed for by Salem, the trial court issued an order on September 13, 1990 for the release of P5,763,650.00 to
Salem by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as partial payment of just compensation.
The De Knechts filed a motion to intervene. On April 23, 1992, as prayed for by Mariano Nocom, the trial court
ordered the release of P11,526,000.00 as third installment for his 5,611.92 square meters of the subject land. The
De Knechts questioned this in the CA.
The CA quashed their motion to intervene due to the lack of legal interest. They filed an original action for the
annulment of TC judgments. Therein, the Knechts challenged the validity of the orders of the land registration
courts in the two petitions of the Sangalangs and Babieras for registration of their names, the reconveyance case
and the just compensation proceedings.

1. Whether the De Knechts were denied due process when they were not sufficiently notified of the tax
delinquency, the auction sale, and the surrender of the owners duplicate for the tax lien?
2. Whether the first civil case (2961-P) is res judicata and was there due process in this dismissal?

Page

ISSUE:

14

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit on November 24, 1992. Hence the filing of G.R. No.
108015. In a Resolution dated February 1, 1993, the SC denied the petition finding "no reversible error"
committed by the Court of Appeals. The De Knechts alleged:
1. CA committed a reversible error when it claimed 7327 was not an eminent domain proceeding
2. another error when CA upheld res judicata to bar the MFR
3. another error when CA refused for respondent judge to rule for the motion for inhibition

3. Whether 7327 is an expropriation case?

HELD: Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
1. No. The De Knechts claimed that they did not receive the notices for tax delinquency and the auction sale. That
was why they were unable to claim the property. It has been ruled that the notices and publication, as well as the
legal requirements for a tax delinquency sale, are mandatory; and the failure to comply therewith can invalidate
the sale. The prescribed notices must be sent to comply with the requirements of due process. The De Knechts
claim was a factual question and not to be answered in the SC. Moreover, the question had already been
answered in the previous cases in the appellate courts. Res judicata had already set in. Res judicata is a ground
for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and
determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based
upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law-- one, public policy and necessity, that there
should be a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a
right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

Page

3. Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation case. It was
precisely in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriation
proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by
itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation. The law merely described the specific properties expropriated
and declared that just compensation was to be determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public
Works and Highways as the administrator in the "prosecution of the project." Thus, in the absence of a
procedure in the law for expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court. The complaint must join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest therein. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the
owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the
property including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person
having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. The Knechts
insist that although they were no longer the registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327 was
filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as defendants in the expropriation
proceedings. They claim that they still occupied the land when it was expropriated and therefore had a share.
Four months earlier, in January 1990, Civil Case No. 2961-P for reconveyance was dismissed with finality by this
Court and judgment was entered in February 1990. The Knechts lost whatever right or colorable title they had to
the property after we affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the reconveyance case. The Knechts'
possession of the land and buildings was based on their claim of ownership not on any juridical title such as a
lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Indeed, the Knechts had no legal interest in the property by the time the
expropriation proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in
denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties." Their intervention having been denied,
the Knechts had no personality to move for the inhibition of respondent Judge Sayo from the case.

15

2. Yes. Petitioners claim it wasnt due to the lack of judgment on the merits in the said case. Moreover, it was
based by the court on their lack of interest. Court- "Lack of interest" is analogous to "failure to prosecute." (S
3, R 17 of ROC) An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the
plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of
time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. They also requested for
postponements which prompted Salem to move for dismissal. The court agreed. The order of dismissal was
based on the following factors: (1) pendency of the complaint for a considerable length of time; (2) failure of
counsel to appear at the scheduled hearing despite notice; and (3) lack of interest of the petitioners. Under
Section 3, Rule 17, a dismissal order which does not provide that it is without prejudice to the filing of another
action is understood to be an adjudication on the merits. The Knechts contend, however, that the facts of the
case do not call for the application of res judicata because this amounts to "a sacrifice of justice to technicality."
It must be noted that the Knechts were given the opportunity to assail the tax sale and present their evidence on
its validity in Civil Case No. 2961-P, the reconveyance case.

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-1123
March 5, 1947

Political Law Amendment to the Constitution

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election
irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the
House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required
vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)* which has been
considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the
respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote.
Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as
entered in the Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts.
*this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
HELD: If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that
the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent
of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
On the other hand, as far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of
the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of
the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified
in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the
law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do
what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in
conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not
say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding
the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each,
approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

MMDA v. Garin

The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation
receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila,

Page

Facts:

16

Topic: Police Power: Who may exercise?

on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero
Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending that,
in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled
discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and
other penalties on erring motorists.
Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his
license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his
license have no legal basis.
The MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which
powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty
imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of
government in administrative agencies.
MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is
neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the
interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does
not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
Issue: Does the MMDA have the power to exercise police power?
Ruling:
NO. The MMDA is not vested with police power. MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed
with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a
political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Local
government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies.

17

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No.

Page

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body.

7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as
the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable
in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro
Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There
is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the
MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment,
such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.

Topic: C. The Constitution and the Courts

3. Declaration of unconstitutionality
Effects
orthodox view vs. modern view
Norton v. Shelby, 118 US 425 (1886)
FACTS:
This suit was brought to enforce payment of twenty-nine bonds for $1,000 each issued by the Board of
Commissioners of Shelby County in payment of a subscription by the county to stock in the Mississippi River
Railroad Company. The form of the bond appears in the opinion of the Court, post, p. 118 U. S. 434.
On the 25th February, 1867, the county court of any county through which that railroad might run was authorized
to subscribe to its capital stock.
On the 7th day of the following March, the legislature reorganized the City of Memphis, and enacted that the
powers theretofore vested in the Quarterly Court should be vested in a Board of Commissioners created by that
act. Acts of 1867-1868, c. 46, 21, 25. [Footnote 3]

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Before the Board of Commissioners abdicated, they ordered taxes to be levied to pay these bonds, and the
justices of the peace, upon resuming functions, received the money collected on the tax and paid the interest on
the bonds and paid the principal bonds maturing. This was continued, and thus a large amount of interest has

18

This act was subsequently held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee to be unconstitutional and invalid, and the
board created by it to have had no legal existence. The board, however, before it was so held had organized and
had performed the functions of the County Court until November, 1869, and, among other things, had subscribed
in the name of the county to stock of the Mississippi River Railroad Company and had issued bonds in payment
therefor, of which bonds those in suit were part. It had received certificates of stock in exchange for its bonds,
and had and has since exercised its rights as a stockholder.

been paid on the bonds, and a large part of the principal has also been paid, since the County Court resumed its
functions.
On the 5th May, 1870, a new constitution came into force in Tennessee, which contained the following
provisions:
"But the credit of no county, city, or town shall be given or loaned to or in aid of any person, company,
association or corporation, except upon an election to be first held by the qualified voters of such county, city, or
town, and the assent of three-fourths of the votes cast at said election, nor shall any county, city, or town
become a stockholder with others in any company, association, or corporation except upon a like election and
the assent of a like majority."
"All laws and ordinances now in force and in use in this state not inconsistent with the constitution shall
continue in force and use until they expire or be altered or repealed by the legislature. But ordinances contained
in any former constitution or schedule thereto are hereby abrogated."
A large part of the payments of principal and interest above referred to was made after this constitution came
into force.
ISSUE:
Whether the commissioners who were allegedly authorized to sell the bonds were indeed lawfully appointed.
HELD:
The Supreme Court had no contention with the decision made by the highest court of Tennessee.The point
raised to the Supreme Court was that even if the commissioners were not appointed de jure, they were in fact
working de facto, and thus this provided lawful authority and should be binding on the county. The Supreme
Court responded, This contention is met by the fact that there can be no officer, either de jure or de facto, if
there be no office to fill. As the act attempting to create the office of commissioner never became a law, the office
never came into existence. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.

NPC v. Aguirre-Paderanga
Facts:
National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, involving parcels of land situated in Carmen, Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to implement Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project.
A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the
lands.

Issue:

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The RTC rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay fair market value at P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the
same was denied due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the prescribed period. A motion for execution of
judgment was subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
lower courts decision.

19

The RTC issued an order granting NPCs motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.
The board recommended appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter. However,
NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act No. 6395
which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
market value of the property. NPC asserted that Digao, et al. could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes,
subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines.

Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the rules governing fair valuation by ordering NPC to pay fair
market value of P516.66 per square meter and not applying Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395.
Ruling:
In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it
misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports valuation of P500 per square
meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or
otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The rightof-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as
in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.
From the Commissioners report it cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of mere
passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by
the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably
restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupants life and limb.
From the Commissioners Report chronicling the following findings:
The parcel of land owned by the defendant PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. is very fertile, plain, suited for any crops
production, portion of which planted with coco trees and mango trees, portion planted with corn, sometimes planted with
sugar cane, the said land has a distance of about 1 kilometer from the trading center, about 100 meters from an industrial
land (Shemberg Biotech Corp.) adjacent to a Poultry Farm and lies along the Provincial Road.
IMPROVEMENTS AFFECTED
Per ocular inspection made on lot own by PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. traversed by a transmission line of NPC and with
my verification as to the number of improvements, the following trees had been damaged.
1.

5.

55 coco trees productive

2.
10 mango trees productive
3.
30 cacao trees productive
4.
110 bananas
400 ipil-ipil trees

The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function, the Court finds the
commissioners recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and
reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.

Case Title:Phil. Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272

Topic : Eminent Domain [Also Read Rule 67 (re Expropriation) of the Rules of Court]
Elements
Taking
Taking under Police Power

FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not less than one
half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make

20

invalid taking under the police power

Page

known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press
Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said
resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the publishers
any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection
with the procurement of Comelec space. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an
exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec
over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and
ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was an invalid exercise of taking under the police power?
HELD: It held that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for
the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment
of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the
case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a nationalemergency to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers.The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space amounts to taking of private personal property for
public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial;
this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of
the compulsory donation, measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in
cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the taking and the legal
authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has
not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem.
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent
domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for Comelec space is

Page

Case Title: Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272

Topic :Police Power
Tests of Valid Exercise (Limitations)
Lawful Means

21

precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.

Facts:On March 2, 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 stating that theCommission shall have free print space of
not less than one-half page in at least one newspaper in every province or city as Comelec Space. This ad space will be used
by candidates for their campaign and platforms of government, and for the Commissions dissemination of vitalinformation.
Moreover, COMELEC released a letter-directive ordering the different newspapersto comply with the said resolution. The
petitioner Philippine Press Institute (PPI) filed apetition contending that COMELEC violated the Prohibition imposed by the Constitution
against the taking of properties without just compensation due to Sec 2. Moreover, thedirectiveof COMELEC amounts to involuntary
servitude and violation of the freedom of expression and of the press due to Sec 8 . On the other hand, COMELEC asserts their
directiveis not mandatory and compelling . They only ask for a donation . They aver that even if theorder is mandatory , it would still be
valid through the use of police power.
Issue:Is COMELECs action constitutional through the exercise of police power?
Held:No. Looking at Sec 2 , it seems that respondent is correct that the order to give a freespaceto COMELEC is not mandatory
as there is no compelling language or any criminal oradministrative charges for violation . The respondents reason for creating the
resolution wasdue to the voluntary offers given by the newspaper company in the 1992 elections to helpthem advertise important
election matters. However, the court will have to disagree that even if the order is mandatory, it would still be valid as an exercise of
police power. First, only thelegislature can exercise police power except if it is delegated to some other body. The COMELEC did
not give any effort to specify evidences that they were given police power .According to the Constitution, when a property is taken, it must
be given a just compensation .In the case at bar, there is no just compensation as the newspapers wilgive the space for free as a
donation. Moreover, there was no showing of reasonable necessity or emergency for thetaking of print space confronted the
Commission. However, Sec 8 still stands as it is within the power of COMELECtocontrol the media influences of candidates to prevent
unequalcampaigns.Petition is partially granted. Sec 2 is not mandatory and Sec 8 is valid
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974

Topic: Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking

FACTS:

After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the
lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the
government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings
begun. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned
lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or
a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the
court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of
condemnation.

Page

In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the land under her
administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value

22

On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10.

of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force,
had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from
using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the
complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00,
plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as
unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.

The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as
lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1)
entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it
to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not
present.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as
lessee in 1947.

HELD:

No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary
period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a
contract of lease.

Page

Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be
expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic would enter into a contract of

23

Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract between the parties was one of lease on a year to
year basis, it was "in reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease with the 'right
and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is
merged as an integral part of the lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been agreed upon, not,
as of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy" since by express legal provision a lease made for a
determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
demand (Article 1669, Civil Code).

lease where its real intention was to buy, or why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under the
guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time the Republic had the right of eminent domain,
and could expropriate Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. To sustain the contention
of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to
expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to lease the land (for say
ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the
property for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy the
property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of
the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime increased during
the period of the lease.

This would be sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of
the property of its true and fair market value at the time when the expropriation proceedings were actually instituted in
court.

ROMULO MACALINTALvs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.
9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.

Page

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

24

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within
the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include
the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean
that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and
vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of
RA 9189.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City),
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon
City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN
MADELLA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging
that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner
asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On
September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost
killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the
YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken
sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los
Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group
pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical
Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all
direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr.
Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives,
and damage to property.
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an
American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of
persons.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger
brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven
his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980.
Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not
carry a bag when he left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the
gate of the petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return that day to pick up his
brother.
The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the
various bombings in Metro Manila.

Page

On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila, namely:
Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting of the General
Military Council was called for October 6, 1980.

25

Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office
of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time.

On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference
of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded.
Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were
apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor
Lovely offered himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal everything he
knows about the bombings.
On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center
where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The
arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.
For some time, the petitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case
of Ordoez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing that the petitioner's
right to be visited by counsel be respected.
On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room
without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he
was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and
placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" inPeople
v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the
above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days
from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner
states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of
Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violated
Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981.
On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo
comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye
to save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal
Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was
riddled with shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an AV fistula caused by a piece of
shrapnel lodged one millimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining hand and arms, is
completely blind and physical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in
the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad.
On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen.
Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A.
1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were
conducted. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the
Philippines in Los Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command and Victor Lovely himself.

Page

On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the
filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including
herein petitioner.

26

On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.

The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the petition.
It is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of
an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him
would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to
establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.
However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the respondents.
The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being
interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be considered
by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
and that public interest dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.
The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account certain exceptions
when a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such exception.
In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case
shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or
prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds
invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may
take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599;Echarol v. Purisima,
et al., 13 SCRA 309.)
On this argument, we ruled:
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also
recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest
of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669,
April 30, 1969."

Page

In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the
initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made against him,
justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased,
there are at least 38 other co-accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond
reasonable doubt against each and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying participations in the charge
for subversion. The prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with regard to the alleged
link between the petitioner and the series of terrorist bombings is now in the United States. There is reason to believe the

27

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's
right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The
integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on
the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a
victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while
hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither
was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers
be permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months
of detention was the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary
investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent
judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been established
against an of the forty persons accused.

petitioner's citation of international news dispatches * that the prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him
back to the Philippines to testify against the petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury
how could he possibly be made to testify when the charges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial
against the 39 accused. Considering the foregoing, we find it in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of
whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the questioned resolutions.
The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if the evidence, by
then, is not sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the circumstances of
this case, at what cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic fabric of our criminal justice system?
The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the
proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction. The question raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they
were unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and
warrant his conviction?
We do not think so.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col.
Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive
organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement
for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when
asked what evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was
the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Taada, one of the brains of the bombing
conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A.
was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's
birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in
the United States, his only bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me
or taken by me personally," which of course negate personal knowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he
would categorize petitioner in any of the subversive organizations, whether petitioner was an organizer, officer or a
member, the witness replied:
A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a member, your
Honor, please, we have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement: first, Senator
Salonga wanted always to travel to the United States at least once a year or more often under the pretext
of to undergo some sort of operation and participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp14-15)
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence
of subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected
to or not, -has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See
People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was personally
examined by the court, there was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined
his investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently implicated petitioner in the
bombings which eventually led to the filing of the information.

36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?

Page

According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:

28

Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn statement made
before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not
presented as a prosecution or state witness but only as a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and
Baltazar, who were both included in the complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was
examined by his counsel and cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement which he made
before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the court
that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness.

A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel where somebody
would come to contact me and give the materials needed in the execution of my mission.
I thought this was not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis changed the plan and
instead told me to visit the residence of Ex-Sen. Jovito Salonga as often as I can and
someone will meet me there to give the materials I needed to accomplish my mission
37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?
A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the residence of Mr. Johnny
Chua, husband of my business partner, then I went to the Hospital where I visited my
mother and checked-in at Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street, Manila.
38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed by
Psinakis?
A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was August 20 or 21, and
the last was 4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKED to him on
the phone about three or four times. On my first visit, I told him "I am expecting an
attache case from somebody which will be delivered to your house," for which Sen.
Salonga replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala namang attache case para sa iyo."
However, if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you." I gave him my number. On my
second visit, Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so just come back on the 31st of August at 4
P.M." On that date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort and had to hurry back to be at
Salonga's place for the appointment. I arrived at Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.
39. Q. What happened then?
A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga joined
me in the sala. Sen. Salonga informed me that somebody will be coming to give me the
attache case but did not tell me the name.
40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for that somebody to
deliver your materials?
A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to him the efforts of
Raul Daza in setting up that meeting but I have previous business commitments at
Norfolk, Virginia. I told him, however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was able to
talk with Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in San Francisco. He also asked
about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest opposition group activities but it seems
he is well informed.
41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?
A. About thirty (30) minutes.
41. Q. What happened when the man arrived?

A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave and I rode in Atty.
"Nits" Taadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded to Broadway Centrum

Page

43. Q. Were the materials given to you?

29

A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato Taada Jovy
Salonga was the one who met him and as I observed parang nasa sariling bahay si
Taada nung dumating. They talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not
hear what they talked about. After their whispering conversations, Sen. Salonga left and
at this time Atty. "Nits" Taada told me "Nasa akin ang kailangan mo, nasa kotse."

where before I alighted, Atty. Taada handed me a "Puma" bag containing all the
materials I needed.
xxx xxx xxx
45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?
A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, ten (10) pieces
electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1 " length,
nine (9) pieces volts dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten (10) plastic
packs of high explosive about 1 pound weight each.
However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8, 1980 and which was
also offered as evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which negates the above testimony insofar as the
petitioner's participation was concerned:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpose?
A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at the Manila Hotel or
the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the materials I would need. I
disapproved of this, and I told him I would prefer a place that is familiar to me or who is
close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen. Salonga.
And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salonga, but he
was out. The next day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I made an
appointment t see him. I went to Sen. Salonga's house the following day. I asked Sen.
Salonga if someone had given him an attache case for me. He said nobody. Afterwards, I
made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me "call me again on the 31st of
August. I did not call him, I just went to his house on the 31st of August at 4 P.M. A few
minutes after my arrival Atty. Renato Taada arrived. When he had a chance to be near
me, he (Atty. Tanada) whispered to me that he had the attache case and the materials I
needed in his car. These materials were given to me by Atty. Tanada When I alighted at
the Broadway Centrum. (Emphasis supplied)
During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization plan which the latter
mentioned in his sworn statement:
Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Exhibit "G"
about the so-called destabilization plan of Aquino. When you attended the birthday party
of Raul Daza wherein Jovito Salonga was also present, was this destabilization plan as
alleged by you already formulated?
WITNESS:
A. Not to my knowledge.
COURT TO WITNESS:

Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party.

Page

A. Raul Daza, your Honor.

30

Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?

A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.

Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political. Was there any
political action taken as a result of the party?
A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84).
Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical condition of petitioner,
he really implicated petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro Manila. The fiscal objected without stating any
ground. In sustaining the objection, the Court said:
Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga. In other words, you
are widening the avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of this
witness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only being in the
house of Mr. Salonga which was used as the contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about the
bombings. Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That would be unfair to Mr.
Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67)
Respondent judge further said:
COURT:
As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to the witness
coming to Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone over the statement and there
is no mention of Salonga insofar as activities in the United States is concerned. I don't
know why it concerns this cross-examination.
ATTY. YAP:
Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he came to Manila.
COURT:
According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to come here, but
Salonga was introduced only when he (Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of the
question is also to connect Salonga to the activities in the United States. It seems to be
the thrust of the questions.
COURT:
In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked him question, the
focus on Salonga was only from the time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the
first time that the name of Salonga came up. There was no mention of Salonga in the
formulation of the destabilization plan as affirmed by him. But you are bringing this up
although you are only cross-examining for Salonga as if his (Lovely's) activities in the
United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, pp. 73-74).

Page

However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the "activities" of
petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:

31

Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged
"participation" in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely
and Taada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.

On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements declared:
'To the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most
likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.
It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances sufficient for
a finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is
undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, and is
being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of force and for that purpose it has
linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to rely on aliens for its
supporters and financiers.
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States is
not only inexplicable but without foundation.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or
terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and
(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not
instituted by President Marcos immediately."
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a basis
to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply
because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a
dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions
would be seriously undermined.
The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato
Taada could not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could not have met
Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in 1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only
on November, 1978. Senator Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He
states that he has hundred of visitors from week to week in his residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.
The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga
was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he
has posed with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct.
Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important
visitors and the picture proves nothing.

Page

The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any
proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint.
Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been
attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the
alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not
instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and
expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as the late Justice
Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought not free thought for those who
agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."

32

It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and
visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group
picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a
rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an
indictment. Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and arguments of
the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.

We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level
than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a
fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained
by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political
and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations
are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion
is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.
The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between the abstract teaching of
the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would prepare a group for
violent action and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished
between criminal threats and constitutionally protected speech.
It stated:
We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory
term. For we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The language of the political arena,
like the language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and inexact. We agree with
petitioner that his only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition
to the President.
In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an advocacy of force or
a conspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the likelihood
of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited,
robust, caustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the
American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The
words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type
of proscribed advocacy.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of
speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a
subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only
constitute, prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any
plan or enterprise thereof.
As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and any
subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took place at Daza's
birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the
government through illegal means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no
means shows either advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.

Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against the government. My
bombing mission was directed against the particular family (referring to the Cabarrus
family [TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10].

Page

WITNESS:

33

Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the only bombing
incident that occurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980.
(See TSN, pp. 63-63, July 8, 1981). He further testified that:

Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to have
been commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the very reason why they answer
charged in the first place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about the possible relation between Cabarrus and
petitioner:
COURT:
Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, why did you
implicate Jovito Salonga?
A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.
It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was adopting him as a
prosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand,
that it was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate
Salonga", especially since Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link
between the petitioner and the bombing incidents.
The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists
against the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People
v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role
in the bombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere affidavits including
those made by Lovely during his detention.
The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous declarations about
the bombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such credibility by
the respondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan,
71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it
is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not
escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of
the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon
the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding
should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste,
S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that
some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116
SCRA 93).

Page

We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from
circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further
deliberations.

34

The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent
Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek
the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has
been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new charges for the
same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the case is
not completely academic.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's
functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of
Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not
enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,
therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot
because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the
President's legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation
and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were
released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder,
subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court
in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the
Reports.
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a
prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or
as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the
petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of
evidence against the petitioner found in the records.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and Cuevas, JJ.,
concur.

Page

35

Aquino, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

Del Castillo vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus. Before this Court could finally act on the petition, the subject was released and for that reason the majority of this
Court resolved to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic. Justice Teehankee and the undersigned
disagreed with the majority; we expressed the view that despite the release of the subject, the petition should have been
resolved on the merits because it posed important legal questions.
Babst et al. vs. National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, et al., G.R. No. 62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition
for prohibition to restrain the respondents from interrogating the petitioners, members of the print media, on various
aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Again the majority of this
Court dismissed the petition because the assailed proceedings had come to an end thereby rendering the petition moot
and academic. In dismissing the petition a short and mild note of concern was added. And again Justice Teehankee and
the undersigned disagreed with the majority. We expressed the view that this Court should rule squarely on the matters
raised in the petition rather than dismiss it for having become moot and academic.
I am glad that this Court has abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing them on the ground that they
have become moot and academic and stopped there. I am glad it has reverted to De la Camara vs. Enage, Gonzales vs.
Marcos and Aquino v. Enrile which are mentioned in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez.
I agree with the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez that because the subversion charges against the petitioner had been
dropped by the trial court on January 18, 1985, there is no longer any need to prohibit the respondents from prosecuting
Criminal Case No. Q-18606 insofar as he is concerned.
I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying that the initial action of this Court was to grant the petition, i.e. prohibit
the prosecution of the petitioner. This is manifest from the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. I regret that on this matter the
Court has been preempted by a "first strike" which has occurred once too often.
Justice Gutierrez states that, "The Court had already deliberated on this case, and a consensus on the Court's judgment
had been arrived at." Let me add that the consensus had taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and the decision
started to circulate for signature on November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, the decision was still circulating
overtaken by events. The decision could have had a greater impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

Page

Babst et al. vs. National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, et al., G.R. No. 62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition
for prohibition to restrain the respondents from interrogating the petitioners, members of the print media, on various
aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Again the majority of this
Court dismissed the petition because the assailed proceedings had come to an end thereby rendering the petition moot
and academic. In dismissing the petition a short and mild note of concern was added. And again Justice Teehankee and

36

Del Castillo vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus. Before this Court could finally act on the petition, the subject was released and for that reason the majority of this
Court resolved to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic. Justice Teehankee and the undersigned
disagreed with the majority; we expressed the view that despite the release of the subject, the petition should have been
resolved on the merits because it posed important legal questions.

the undersigned disagreed with the majority. We expressed the view that this Court should rule squarely on the matters
raised in the petition rather than dismiss it for having become moot and academic.
I am glad that this Court has abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing them on the ground that they
have become moot and academic and stopped there. I am glad it has reverted to De la Camara vs. Enage, Gonzales vs.
Marcos and Aquino v. Enrile which are mentioned in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez.
I agree with the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez that because the subversion charges against the petitioner had been
dropped by the trial court on January 18, 1985, there is no longer any need to prohibit the respondents from prosecuting
Criminal Case No. Q-18606 insofar as he is concerned.
I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying that the initial action of this Court was to grant the petition, i.e. prohibit
the prosecution of the petitioner. This is manifest from the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. I regret that on this matter the
Court has been preempted by a "first strike" which has occurred once too often.
Justice Gutierrez states that, "The Court had already deliberated on this case, and a consensus on the Court's judgment
had been arrived at." Let me add that the consensus had taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and the decision
started to circulate for signature on November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, the decision was still circulating
overtaken by events. The decision could have had a greater impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action.
Footnotes
* In the Philippines Daily Express, dated December 8, 1981, Lovely was quoted as having said in the
United States that "I was not the bomber, I was bombed."
Lovely, who was granted immunity in the United States, reportedly would not testify before a San
Francisco federal grand jury and instead said, "Your Honor, I came back to tell what happened in the
Philippines. I was not the bomber, I was bombed."
The United Press International dispatch from San Francisco, U.S., written by Spencer Sherman, gives a
fuller account, thus:
With the grand jury present in the courtroom Lovely alleged it was Philippine authorities who were
responsible for his injuries. It was they, not him, who placed the bomb in his hotel room, he said.
I came back to the States to tell what happened in the Philippines. I was not the bomber. I was bombed.
There are so many secrets that will come out soon. I cannot (testify) even if I will be jailed for lifetime. I
welcome that."
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. (TELEBAP) Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Topic: Test of valid exercise of police power : Lawful subject public interest

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Page

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers
of radio and television broadcasting companies. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television
broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress. It was declared to be without
legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to
bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippinesaffected by
the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

37

Facts:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio
or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to
do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale
of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in
this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Is the subject of the measure of regulation undertaken by the government (COMELEC), through the exercise of police
power, concern the public interest?
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.

Held:
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign.
Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them.
Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the
state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
Art. XII, 11 of the Constitutionauthorizes the amendment of franchises for the common good. What better measure can
be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the
public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? [I]t is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.

Art. III, 7 of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, while Art. XII, 6 states that the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and

Page

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are
about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More
than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by
the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know.

38

What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass
media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and
space for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands.
To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety
and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common
carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people
have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of
broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the peoples right to information on matters
of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the
common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may
render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers
and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without
merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print
media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that
they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Umali versus Guingona

GR 131124
3/21/99

Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V.
Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4,
1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged
violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly
the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former
President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the
Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his
Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on
August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After
evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima
facieevidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the
recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from
the
service,
with
forfeiture of
retirementand
all
benefits
under
the
law.

Issues:
(1)
(2)

Whether
Whether

or

Not
or

AO
Not

No.

152
Petitioner

violated
was

petitioner's
denied

Right
due

to

Security
process

of
of

Tenure.
law

Page

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis for the
petitioner's
dismissal
with
forfeiture
of
benefits
as
ruled
in
AO
No.
152

39

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue
of
constitutionality
belatedly
in
its
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
trial
courts
decision.

Held: Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause and under the
Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently,
his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After
a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be
sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his
answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended
the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due
process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts
as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO
eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was
incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the
matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner
in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first
time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the
administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in
Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on thecriminal
charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner
do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its
equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the
succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no
longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for
Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.

Urtula VS Republic of the Philippines, G.R No. L-22061 (January 31, 1968)

Facts:
The Court of First Instance had rendered judgment on 16 November 1957 in its Civil Case No. 3837, for the expropriation
of the Hacienda Quitang, owned by Dalmacio Urtula by the Republic of the Philippines, for the sum of P213,094.00, "and
upon making the payment the plaintiff shall take full possession of the land." While the appeal was pending before the
Court of Appeals, the Republic of the Philippines deposited on 29 July 1958, with the Philippine National Bank the sum of
P117,690.00 as provisional value of the land, in accordance with an order of the trial court dated 3 January 1958, and this
deposit was withdrawn by Dalmacio Urtula in August of 1958, on 10 September 1958, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic's petition to be placed in possession of the property; and under a writ of possession issued by the provincial
sheriff of the province, the Land Tenure Administration took actual physical possession of the land on 11 October 1958.
The Supreme Court had affirmed, as aforesaid, the decision of the trial court fixing the amount of just compensation for
P213,094.00; thus, at the time the decision became final, the balance still due was P95,404.00. Of this balance, the
Republic paid Dalmacio Urtula the sum of P5,404.00 on 17 April 1961; but on the same day, Urtula deposited same
amount with the Land Tenure Administration in payment of taxes and penalties for prior years up to 1958 on the
expropriated land and for the surveyor's fee for segregating one hectare donated by condemnee Urtula for a school site.
On liquidation at a later date, an excess in the amount of P423.38 was found, and the Republic refunded this excess to
Urtula on 25 September 1961. On 3 May 1961, the Republic paid the remaining balance of P90,000.00. The trial court
rendered judgment for plaintiff Urtula and ordered the defendant Republic to pay P14,633.52 as interest on the balance of
P95,404.00 from 11 October 1958 to 3 May 1961 and to pay the costs, but denied the plaintiff's claim on the land
taxes and attorney's fees. Both parties were not satisfied with the decision; hence, both appealed to this Court.

Ruling:

Page

Whether the amount fixed by the trial court was a just compensation for the property.

40

Issue:

Page

41

Section 3 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 4, Rule 69 of the old Rules) directs the defendant in an
expropriation case to "present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his objections and
defenses and if not so presented "are waived." As it is, the judgment allowing the collection of interest, now under appeal
in effect amends the final judgment in the expropriation case, a procedure objectionable to orderly judicial proceedings.
The Republic took possession on 11 October 1958. From this date, therefore, the owner, while retaining the naked title,
was deprived of the benefits from the land and it is just and fair that realty taxes for the years 1959 and onward should be
borne by the entity exercising the right of eminent domain. Costs in cases of eminent domain, except those of rival
claimants litigating their claims, are charged against the plaintiff. But the present case is not one of eminent domain but an
ordinary civil action where the Republic of the Philippines is a party. Section 1 of Rule 142 provides that no costs shall be
allowed against it, unless otherwise provided by law. No provision of law providing the contrary has been cited; hence,
costs should be charged against Urtula. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is reversed and the
case dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs Dalmacio Urtula, et al.