ABBAIN V.

CHUA 22 SCRA 748 (Sanchez; February 26, 1968)

NATURE: Direct appeal to the SC
FACTS
- Tongham Chua commenced suit for forcible entry and illegal detainer against Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the
Peace (JOP) Court of Bongao, Sulu. Chua's averred that he is the owner of a 4-hectare land together with the
improvements thereon mostly coconut trees located in Maraning, Bongao, Sulu; that this land was donated to him by
his father, Subing Chua, in 1952 and from that date he has assumed ownership thereof, taken possession of the land
and paid the corresponding taxes yearly; that from 1952-1958, Abbain has been his tenant and the two divided the
fruits or copra harvested therefrom on 50- 50 basis; that in 1957, Abbain by means of force, strategy and stealth
unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after Chua have repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the
premises due to his failure to give chuas share of the several harvests.
LC: JOP Managula rendered judgment directing Abbain to vacate the premises and place Chua in possession of the
plantation, with costs. This judgment was predicated upon the findings that sometime before WWII, Abbain,
because of financial hardship, sold for P225 to Subing Chua the coconut plantation; that after the sale, Abbain
became the tenant of Chua, the harvests of the land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently, Subing Chua
donated the plantation to his son, Tongham Chua, and Abbain, the same tenant of the father, continued to be the
tenant on the land.
- Abbain filed a petition in the CFI of Sulu against Tongham Chua and Judge Managula, seeking relief from the
judgment of the JOTP Court anr/or annulment of its decision with preliminary injunction. He averred that the JOTP
Court did not have jurisdiction over the civil case and that said case was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR).
CFI of Sulu: petition dismissed without cause
-

Petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant relationship between the parties"
to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the CAR, and that upon the allegations of the complaint, the case
is "clearly one of ejectment."

ISSUE: WON the JOTP Court has jurisdiction over the case filed by Chua
HELD: NO
Ratio. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. In Gomez vs.
Concepcion, this Court quoted with approval the following from Freeman on Judgments: "A void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and
all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The
purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress."
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are
inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even when no appeal has been
taken."

Reasoning. The provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 1199 (approved August 30, 1954), known as the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of the Philippines, read:
"SEC. 21. Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction. All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder
or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landholder and
tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations
anddisputes."
Sec. 7, RA 1267, creating the First Court of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as amended by Republic
Act 1409 which took effect on September 9, 1955, provides:
"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all
those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land where one of the parties works the land."
- Chua's complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 long after RAs 1199, 1267 and 1409 were incorporated in our
statute books. Chua's complaint positively averred that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis of the
harvest; and that he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his non-compliance of agreement of his giving my
share of the several harvests he made." The JOTP Court itself found that Abbain continued to be the tenant of Chua
after the latter became owner of the plantation which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that
Abbain refused to give "the share of his landlord of the harvest."
- If both the complaint and the inferior court's judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the JOTP Court had no
jurisdiction over the case. Right at the outset, the complaint should have been rejected. Failing in this, the case
should have been dismissed during the course of the trial, when it became all the more evident that a landlord-tenant
relationship existed. The judge had no power to determine the case. Because Chua's suit comes within the coverage
of Sec. 21, R.A. 1199 - that "cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder," shall be under the
"original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance
of tenancy relations and disputes", and the broad sweep of Section 7, RA 1267, which lodged with the CAR
"original and exclusive jurisdiction . . . to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters,
controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of
persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land."
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the CAR over cases of this nature. Such exclusive authority is
not divested by a mere averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts ownership over the land, "since the law does
not exclude from the jurisdiction" of the CAR, "cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to him
for cultivation by the landlord."
The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null and void.
The judgment of the JOTP Court is not merely a voidable judgment. It is void on its face. It may be attacked directly
or collaterally. Here, the attack is direct. Abbain sought to annul the judgment. Even after the time for appeal or
review had elapsed, appellant could bring, as he brought, such an action. More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement
of that judgment. In varying language, the Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court
without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped of' or
wholly disregarded as the circumstances require.
Disposition: The decision of the JOTP Court of Sulu is annulled.

Platinum Tours Incorporated v Panlilio

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
-

Petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages
against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez (Galvez). Platinum
sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. On October 24, 1994, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and
ordered PATC and. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03 with legal interest, P
50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit.
Writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary
Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Galvez was levied upon and sold for P479,888.48 to a
certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.
Private respondent Jose M. Panlilio (Panlilio) filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634.
Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares
of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him
the stock certificates valued at P5 million.

TC: denied Panlilios motion for intervention

-

TC denied the motion because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case and that the only
matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action.
TC declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof.
Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment of
the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to
Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, this time by
incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634.
Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge
Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge
Diokno later issued an order, allowing the consolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the order of Judge Diokno but its
motion was denied.
Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the CA assailing, among others, the July 23, 1996 order of Judge
Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634.
CA: annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and decide it as a separate case.
Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying that
Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati.
However, the motion was denied by the CA.

Petitioners contention:

Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96-365. It argues that,
when Judge Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two cases was annulled and set aside,
RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.
ISSUE: WON Makati RTC Branch 62 has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case 96-365
HELD: NO.
Ratio: Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. In general, jurisdiction may
either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues
framed in the pleadings.
-

Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he
files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes exerted
over his person.
Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the
regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions.

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently
annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 941634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.
Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the
authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions
arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the
case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno decided on what to do
with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and the expense of seeking
recourse from this Court, which in turn would have had one petition less in its docket.
All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from proceeding with Civil Case No. 96365. Should it decide to retain the case, it is hereby directed to resolve the same with dispatch.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.