Dao (2014) 13:323342

DOI 10.1007/s11712-014-9382-1

Aristotle and Confucius on the Socioeconomics of Shame

Thorian R. Harris

Published online: 25 June 2014

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract The sociopolitical significance Aristotle and Confucius attribute to

possessing a sense of shame serves to emphasize the importance of its development.
Aristotle maintains that social class and wealth are prerequisites for its acquisition,
while Confucius is optimistic that it can be developed regardless of socioeconomic
considerations. The difference between their positions is largely due to competing
views of praiseworthy dispositions. While Aristotle conceives of praiseworthy dispositions as consistent traits of character, traits that calcifiy as one reaches adulthood,
Confucius offers us an alternative picture, one that affords a greater plasticity to
praiseworthy dispositions by treating them as situational character traits. I argue that
the Confucian conception of praiseworthy dispositions, combined with several strategies for developing a sense of shame discussed in the Analects, renders Confuciuss
optimism defensible.
Keywords Confucian Ethics . Aristotle . Shame . Emotion . Role Ethics . Situationism

1 Introduction
Aristotle and Confucius consider a sense of shame to be a praiseworthy
disposition, each claiming that it forestalls bad conduct, stimulates good conduct, andif widespreadrenders a non-coercive form of government sufficient for achieving social order. These two philosophers differ, however, on the
question of whether social class and wealth necessarily affect our potential to
develop a sense of shame. By assuming that its development requires a
particular kind of upbringingone that is only available to freeborn males
from families of ample meansAristotle renders shame a possession guarded
by the prerequisites of social class and affluence. Confucius, on the other hand,
claims that almost anyoneregardless of class, wealth, or upbringingcan
acquire a sense of shame; and in the course of the Analects he presents us
with three strategies for cultivating a sense of shame in others regardless of
Thorian R. Harris (*)
Philosophy Department, University of Maryland, Baltimore County,
1000 Hilltop Circle, Baltimore, MD 21250, USA
e-mail: thor@umbc.edu

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Thorian R. Harris

their initial socioeconomic status. The best explanation of this difference between Aristotle and Confucius, however, is not that Confucius deploys methods
that Aristotle does not, but that they have competing views on the relative
fixity of dispositions. While Aristotle conceives of praiseworthy dispositions as
fixed character traits of individuals, traits which calcify as one reaches adulthood, Confucius allows praiseworthy dispositions a greater degree of plasticity
by conceiving of them as relational functions rather than individual character
traits. While it is tempting to put this debate in terms of the existence or nonexistence of fixed character traits, we might instead entertain a pragmatic
question: What difference does it make to conceive of praiseworthy dispositions, such as a sense of shame, as individual character traits or, following the
early Confucians, as relational virtuosity? That is, which conception of praiseworthy dispositions better fosters the development of a sense of shame? I will
argue that the Confucian conception of praiseworthy dispositions best supports
the development of a sense of shame.

2 Aristotles Account of Shame

Aristotle defines the emotion (pathos) of shame in the Rhetoric as being-outof-sorts or disturbed at the prospect of social disgrace (adoxia) (Rhetoric II.6;
cf. Cooper 1996). 1 Shame, at its most basic, is sensitivity to the values and
opinions of others. Yet Aristotle speaks of the emotion as having necessary ties
to virtueas if those who are capable of experiencing shame are somehow
better for it. This might strike us as a bit odd since we often think that the
esteem of ones community is, by itself, no guarantee of the ethical worth of
ones character or conduct. Aristotle, however, binds shame to virtue by
stipulating a rather narrow definition of the emotionone where shame is
sensitivity to only a limited range of values and opinions. First of all,
Aristotle is particular about whose opinions are capable of causing us genuine
disgrace (and by extension, shame). For instance, Aristotle distinguishes between shamelessness and bashfulness, the two extremes on either side of
shame, in terms of the opinions a person regards as significant. One is
shameless, he says, if one disregards everyones opinion, and bashful if one
regards just anyones opinion. Those with shame will have the proper caliber of
social concern and will only pay attention to the opinions of good people
(Rhetoric II.6). Second, besides restricting the opinions that are relevant to
shame, he mentions only two stimuli of shame, and each is linked to the
1
All references to the works of Aristotle are taken from Barnes 1984. It might be more accurate to describe
shame, on Aristotles account, as an affection rather than an emotion (not every pathe is, after all, a
recognizable emotion). I will, however, refer to shame as an emotion so that I might reserve the term
affection for another usethus minimizing confusion when I introduce the distinction between the cognitive
and affective dimensions of the various pathe. There is some debate in the literature over the exact meaning of
the terms aischun and aids (see Dodds 1951; Nussbaum 1986; Williams 1993). I will restrict myself to
Aristotles use of these terms. In this particular passage the term he uses is aischun, but there is no good
reason to think that his account of aischun is necessarily different from his account of aids (see note 10 and
Grimaldi 1988: 105 ff.).

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virtues. We feel ashamed, he says, either when others think that we, or those
whom we care about, have acted viciously,2 or when they think we (or, again,
those whom we care about) lack a particular virtueor other such honorable
thingspossessed by our peers (Rhetoric II.6; cf. Nicomachean Ethics X.9).3
For Aristotle, the emotion of shame is not an ethically neutral psychological
event, nor is it something everyone has an immediate capacity to experience.
It is, however, not the experience of shame but the sense of shame to which
Aristotle attributes the greater ethical significance.4 On Aristotles account of the
emotions they are simultaneously cognitive and affective. Each emotion is associated
with a particular affective sensation, either pain or pleasure. For example, shame, as we
have already mentioned, involves a painful sensation. This affective dimension to the
various emotions allows Aristotle to distinguish them from other types of psychological
phenomena, such as thoughts or perceptions. Yet if the emotions were merely affective
in nature it would be difficult to distinguish between the experience of fear, anger,
shame, emulation, envyand all the other emotions qualified with pain. Aristotle
accomplishes his taxonomy of the emotions by referencing their cognitive dimension.
The emotion of anger, for example, is not simply a painful experience; it is a painful
experience caused by a perceived slightthat is, the judgment that a specific person
has done something that we take to be an undeserved action that comes between us and
achieving our desired ends. Likewise, shame is not merely a painful experience; it is a
painful experience caused by conduct considered capable of bringing disgrace upon
The phrase is kakon erga, which translates as acting badly. It can denote acting clumsily, making a
mistake, even being slow to comprehend something; but it can also denote acting viciously, and this is what
interests us here.
3
Someone who loves what is truly noble or honorable (kalon) will naturally seek the virtues; hence, the
virtues are to be included in the set of honorable (kalon) things.
4
He is explicit about the distinction between these twothe emotion and sense of shameon at
least one occasion (Eudemian Ethics II.2). In that passage Aristotle contrasts what he calls the
capacity (dunamis) for shame with the affection. It is interesting that, in this passage, he defines
capacity is such a wayviz., the product of habitas to make it equivalent to what, in the
Nicomachean Ethics, he refers to as a state (hexis) rather than what he refers to, in that work, as a
capacity (dunamis). Regardless of whether we call this a Nicomachean-state or an Eudemiancapacity, the sense of shame is a character traita disposition. While the authenticity of this rather
unique passage has been questioned (see Rowe 1971 and Woods 1992), there are several other
passages where his mention of shame can only refer to a capacity, state, or what we are calling a
sense of shame. When, for instance, he discusses civic courage in the Nicomachean and
Eudemian Ethics he attributes it to shame (Eudemian Ethics III.1 and Nicomachean Ethics III.8;
cf. Magna Moralia I.19). In this case, it makes much more sense to suppose that the courageous
conduct of those with civic courage is due not to a feeling of shame (since this would seem to
require a failing on their part) so much as an aversion to shame. It is a disposition, not an affection
or feeling or emotion, which is at work; and it is this disposition that entitles a person to claim the
character trait of civic courage (see Nicomachean Ethics X.9 and II.7). Yet another reason to accept
this distinction appears when we contrast Aristotles comments on shame in book two and four of
the Nicomachean Ethics (II.7 and IV.9). In the former book he speaks of it as a praiseworthy trait,
while in the latter book he says that it is not characteristic of a good man. We would be wise
to follow Alexander of Aphrodisias and resolve this contradiction by utilizing the distinction
between the experience of shame and a certain capacity toward shame (cf. Cua 2003: 151, and
Van Norden 2002: 5253). Aristotle seems to have the emotion of shame in mind in the fourth
book of the Nicomachean Ethics: since the emotion of shame is most often a consequence of
shameful conduct, it is not something we would wish to find in mature individuals. It would be
praiseworthy, rather, to avoid any reason to feel shameand as it is the sense of shame that
facilitates this very thing, it is worthy of praise.
2

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Thorian R. Harris

ourselves. While the recognition of conduct as nominally disgraceful or shameful

may occur cognitively and be open to revision through discussion, actually experiencing the shame occasioned by such conduct presupposes an affective disposition.5
An affective disposition is not the feeling of an emotion but a habitus (hexis) to feel
an emotion in certain circumstances, for certain reasons, toward certain persons, in
association with certain ends, and to a certain degree of intensity (cf. Nicomachean
Ethics 1106b2124).6 The sense of shame, as an affective habitus, includes a disposition to feel pained whenever one has done something disgraceful, but it also includes an
active aversion to disgraceful conduct. It is this aversive quality to the sense of shame
that explains the ethical value Aristotle attributes to it, and the connection he sees
between it and what he refers to as noble hatredthat is, a dislike for, or aversion to,
base conduct.7
While Aristotle considers the sense of shame to be praiseworthy, and a
character trait, he does not consider it to be a character virtue.8 This is because
a sense of shame may be possessed even when ones ethical judgment, or
practical wisdom, is undeveloped. For example, someone who acts with civic
courage will, in terms of the action itself, act in the same way as those with
genuine courage. The difference is not in the action but in the motivation. The
person with civic courage is moved to do the courageous action because of her
fear of disreputeher sense of shame. The nobility of the act and not fear of
disrepute, on the other hand, moves the person with true courage. Stealing a
distinction from Kant we could say that Aristotelian civic courage accords
with, but does not arise from, love for what is noble. When persons with
5

In their respective essays on shame in the early Confucian literature, Bryan W. Van Norden and Antonio S.
Cua make a verbal distinction between the emotion of shame and the sense of shame; yet their accounts of the
sense of shame are rather different from Aristotles notion (Van Norden 2002; Cua 2003). First of all, neither
Van Norden nor Cua discuss the role of affective dispositions, but discuss the sense of shame in purely
cognitive terms. Van Norden, for example, defines the sense of shame as the recognition of shameful conduct
(Van Norden 2002: 5052). Yet the affective dimension to the sense of shame significantly impacts any
discussion of its necessary conditions. Cuadrawing upon Aristotles comment in Rhetoric II.6, that we feel
shame in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or futurecharacterizes the sense of shame as
prospective shame. Cua is right to attribute an action-regulating function to Aristotles account of the sense
of shame, in addition to the action-evaluating function presupposed by the experience of shame (Cua 2003:
184, n22). However, there are two problems with Cuas account. First of all, Aristotle is not discussing the
sense of shame when he mentions the time-referents of the emotion in Rhetoric II.6. Aristotles point here is
not that we can anticipate future shame, and so act to prevent it; rather, he is simply saying that future events,
no doubt future events that strike us as inevitable, can cause us to experience shame. In short, he is talking
about the emotion of shame, not the sense of shame. Even if we place Cuas claims on solid textual footing,
there remains a second problem that has to do with the way he characterizes the sense of shame. The sense of
shame, on Aristotles account, is neither always nor necessarily prospective. It is certainly useful in its
prospective dimension, as anticipation, but it is not limited to the future. Our sense of shame might very well
include an aversion to being associated with anyone whom we discover to have done something shameful in
the past. In that case, the referent is retrospective, not prospective.
6
Again, only with a clear distinction between emotion in the sense of a disposition and emotion in the
sense of a felt experience can we make sense of Aristotles seemingly contradictory claims in the
Nicomachean Ethics that, on the one hand, the emotions are part of virtue (1106b17, 1105b26, 1104b14,
1106b17, 1106b25, and 1107a9), capable of praise and blame (1109b3032), and so must be voluntary
(1109b3032), and on the other hand, that the emotions are not capable of blame or praise (1105b29
1106a1), and so cannot be part of virtue, and are not voluntary (cf. 1109b30 ff.).
7
For the connection between the sense of shame and noble love and hatred, see Nicomachean Ethics X.9.
8
On the praiseworthiness of a sense of shame see Nicomachean Ethics II.7; on a sense of shame as a character
trait, see footnote 4 above.

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civic courage act in a meritorious fashion they do so by the grace of properly

formed public opinion and just laws. Had their society not appreciated courageous actions, or their state not legislated on matters of courage, their civic
awareness would not produce such good results (nor, given the way Aristotle
links shame to virtue, would their civic awareness even amount to genuine
shame had the laws and public opinion not been keyed properly to the virtues
and vices). Thus a sense of shame, expressed in the case of civic courage,
remains dependent upon the judgment of others. Since Aristotle claims, at the
beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, that a person cannot be said to have a
character virtue if their virtuous actions are not the result of their own knowledge (or what we might describe as self-sufficient ethical judgment), we must
conclude that while a sense of shame can be a praiseworthy character trait, it
cannot be a character virtue.9
Still, Aristotle thinks that a sense of shame properly plays a significant role in the
development and maintenance of the character virtues. 10 For the young, a sense of
shame is first cultivated through the training and habituation of a proper upbringing.
Equipped with a sense of shamea capacity expressed in terms of the noble sentiments, or love of the noble and hatred of the baseone is already attracted by what is
noble, and repulsed by what is base (see Nicomachean Ethics X.9). Even those without
fully developed character virtues are still open to remonstrance and ethical argumentation if they but have a sense of shame (Nicomachean Ethics IV and X.9). Such
arguments are able, on Aristotles account, to correct misconceptions, to develop ones
ethical knowledge, but to also stimulate and further encourage the development of the
9
While discussing Aristotle, Van Norden comments that a sense of shame, as a disposition, is the right sort of
thing to be a virtuesurprisingly, however, Aristotle goes on to deny that a sense of shame is a virtue (Van
Norden 2002: 53). The possibility that persons might have a sense of shame without much practical wisdom of
their own should render Aristotles position unsurprising.
10
There is a passage in the fourth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that seems to challenge the ethical
significance I attribute to shame. In that passage, after defining shame in much the same way as he does in the
Rhetoric, Aristotle goes on to say that while it may be praiseworthy for a youth to have this affection
because they live by passion and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shamewe would be
wrong to praise an older person for the same affection. An older person no one would praise for being
ashamed, since we think he should not do anything that need cause him to be ashamed. For shame is not even
characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions it is the mark of a bad man even to be
such as to do any disgraceful action (Nicomachean Ethics IV.9; translation modified). I might attempt to
salvage my position by pointing out that in the Rhetoric Aristotle is speaking of aischun, while in the
Nicomachean Ethics he is discussing aids. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not seem to see a real difference in
the meaning of these two terms. He uses them interchangeably on several occasions (Nicomachean Ethics
IV.9, Rhetoric II.6, cf. Eudemian Ethics III.1), and defines them in very similar ways. Both can be described, at
times, as an emotion. When described as an emotion, and not a disposition, each is said not to be a virtue, even
if they contribute to the virtues (aids is said, at one point [Eudemian Ethics III.7], to contribute to the virtue of
temperancea comment that clearly flies in the face of the passage we are discussing). Both are said, on
different occasions, to fall between the extremes of shamelessness and bashfulness (Eudemian Ethics II.3 and
III.7, Magna Moralia I.29, Nicomachean Ethics II.7, Rhetoric II.6). The difference in the Greek does not
reflect a difference in philosophical terminology. I would suggest that the tension between the passage under
consideration and my general thesis is due to a failure on our part to distinguish between the emotion of shame
and the sense of shame. Since the feeling of shame is the consequence of disgraceful action, it is not something
we wish the mature person to feel. However, because the sense of shame can prevent disgraceful actions, and
so preclude any cause for feeling shame, the sense of shame is certainly something we should wish mature
persons, not just young persons, to have. Aristotles critical remarks about shame, in the second half of this
passage, really only concern the emotion of shame and need not trouble our account of the sense of shame.

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Thorian R. Harris

virtues. As Myles Burnyeat aptly puts it, shame is the semivirtue of the learner
(Burnyeat 1980: 78).11
Even upon reaching adulthoodwhich, for Aristotle, is the age of 21 (see
Politics VII.17)a sense of shame continues to stimulate the further refinement
of our character virtues.12 It is also said to be constitutive of several character
virtues, such as temperance and liberality. Furthermore, a sense of shame is
thought to prevent vicious acts; this is because a sense of shame orients us in a
certain way toward the experience of shame. If we have a sense of shame we
are not only aware of shameful things nor simply averse to having cause to feel
ashamed. A sense of shame also involves a kind of imaginationone that
projects possible shameful outcomes (see Rhetoric II.6 and Eudemian Ethics
II.2). Combined with the fear of dishonor that is part of a sense of shame, this
projective imagination contributes to our ability to avoid shameful conduct. It is
also an effective deterrent to acting out of character whenever personal gain
or comfort might compete with noble action.13
Besides its significance for the character virtues Aristotle saddles the sense
of shame with an interesting political function. At the end of the Nicomachean
Ethics he entertains the idea that anyone with a sense of shame could be
stimulated by legislators to excellence, and urged forward by the motive of
the noble, on the assumption that those who have been well advanced by the
formation of habitsthe very habits that produce ones sense of shamewill
attend to such influences (Nicomachean Ethics X.9). This approach to
governing contrasts sharply with the form of legislation Aristotle reserves for
those without a sense of shame. Lacking shame, and driven by a desire for
their personal conceptions of pleasure, such persons are to be corrected by
pain like a beast of burden (Nicomachean Ethics X.9). In short, one can rule
those who possess a sense of shame in a dignified and edifying fashion, yet
one cannot avoid using the threat of punishment and brute force upon those
who lack a sense of shame.

11

In his reading of the argument at Nicomachean Ethics X.9, Burnyeat chides David Ross for translating
eugeneia as gently born, which, Burnyeat says, has aristocratic overtones irrelevant to the argument, even if
Aristotles sympathies happened to run in that direction (Burnyeat 1980: 89, n7). Burnyeat cites two passages
to support his contention: Rhetoric II.15 and Politics III.13. At most, these passages can support the claim that
class and wealth are not sufficient for good character; even so, Burnyeat has given us no reason not to
conclude that class and wealth are prerequisites of good character.
12
As we have already mentioned, one of the two possible causes of shame is aretaic disparity or lacking a
virtue possessed by one of our peers. Incidentally, this is also the cause of the emotion Aristotle refers to as
emulation (zlos) (see Rhetoric II.6). Yet these two emotionsshame and emulationshare more than a
common trigger. Aristotle says that the pain of emulation stimulates us to overcome the aretaic disparity
between our peers and ourselves. Yet if aretaic disparity is said to cause the pain of emulation, might it not also
cause the pain in ones experience of shameand have a similar consequence? If emulation causes us to
cultivate a better character, the same must be true of shame.
13
Because a sense of shame is responsive to the conduct of those whom we care about and not merely our
own conduct, a sense of shamewhen coupled with moral imaginationwill benefit not only those who
possess it but their intimates as well. Yet the social benefit of a sense of shame goes further. In addition to
seeking to prevent the disgraceful conduct of those whom we care about, because our sense of shame renders
the disgraceful action of our intimates as painful to us as if we had done it ourselves, a sense of shame allows
us to learnand thus morally benefitfrom the disgrace of others.

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3 Shame in the Analects and Mencius14

When discussed in the Analects of Confucius, shame (chi )15 does not appear
to be an ethically thick concept.16 Some people, much to Confuciuss dismay,
find simple clothing and food shameful, or are ashamed to ask advice from
those whom they outrank in the social hierarchyeither by age, administrative
position, or gender. Yet, in addition to the passages that attribute a negative
ethical significance to the affection of shame, there are other passages that
mention things that ought to cause us to feel shame. We should be ashamed if
our words exceed our actions (Analects 14.20, 14.27),17 or if we find ourselves
benefiting from the immoralities of the state (Analects 8.13, 14.1). Confucius
also enumerates a set of social gestures he finds shameful: clever words,
concealing ones resentment of another person, and feigning friendship
(Analects 5.25).18
While the emotion of shame, as it is discussed in the Analects, can be both
positive and negative in its ethical significance, the Mencius discusses shame
(chi or xiuwu ) as if it were an exclusively positive and ethically thick
conceptas if it were impossible to feel shame inappropriately. The social
dimension of shame is also well attested to in this later work. The Mencius
states, the heart-mind of shame (xiuwu zhi xin ) is the seed of yi
(Mencius 2A6).19 Yi is a complex notion with a vital place in Confucian ethics.
Often translated as appropriateness or righteousness, yi is juxtaposed with
the desire for personal profitusually at anothers expense. It is a kind of
moral imagination that allows us to move beyond only our own interests, to
consider our conduct or a given situation from the perspectives of others along
with our own. A relationship qualified with yi implies all parties achieve
consensus and mutual advantage. If shame is the seed of yi, it would make
sense that the emotion involves and develops this type of moral imagination
that shame, like yi, requires that we attempt to see ourselves as others might
see us. Yet the social dimension of shame works in the other direction as well.
It involves imagining how others perceive us, but also our estimation of the
conduct of others. This is because the conduct of others, and not just our own,
can cause us to feel shame. We can see this in the story Mencius tells about
14

For a discussion of shame in the Xunzi , see Cua 2003.

In every passage but one the term is chi ; the one exception occurs in Analects 14.20, where the term is
zuo . The related terms ru and xiu appear in several passages of the Analects; however, they have more
to do with how others see us than an emotion we might experience. Hence, these two terms are best translated
as disgrace, and not as shame or a sense of shame (see Analects 1.13, 4.26, 12.23, 13.20, 13.22, and
18.8).
16
To borrow a phrase from Bernard Williams. In other words, the Analects assumes that it is possible to feel
shame for both appropriate and inappropriate reasons.
17
Our words exceed our actions when we fail to keep our promises, but also when we are
solicitous about another persons affairs in which we can offer no aid (Liji 33.23/151/1215;
Legge 1967: XXIX.47).
18
Mencius adds to this catalogue of stimuli worthy of causing shame: we ought to feel ashamed, he says, if we
are morally inferior to another person (a stimulus Aristotle also sees as a proper cause of shame).
19
All translations from the Chinese are my own. For more on the connection between shame and yi see Van
Norden 2002: 66; Shun 2000: 5663; Mencius 2A6 and 6A6. A comparison of Mencius 3B1 and 5B7 reveals
the interchangeability of the terms xiu and yi in certain contexts.
15

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Thorian R. Harris

the man from Qi who begs for brew and meat from anyone leaving offerings
at the grave of their ancestors (Mencius 4B33). When this mans wife and
concubine discovered how he came by his meals, Mencius imagines that the
two women felt shame (xiu ). While Aristotle says that the disgrace of those
whom we care about can cause us shame, he is unlikely to have imagined that
one might feel shame if just one person in the community acted in a disgraceful manner. Yet this is how Mencius describes King Wu : if there was one
bully in the realm, Mencius says, King Wu took this to be a personal affront
and was ashamed of it (Mencius 1B3).20
In addition to thinking of shame as an emotion, there is some indication in the
Analects that shame can also be a disposition. At one point Confucius claims that if a
ruler instructs the common people with his personal example, keeps them in line with
ritual proprietyhis people will have a sense of shame; moreover, they will correct
themselves (Analects 2.3; see also 13.20). While one might wish to translate chi
simply as a feeling of shame, the emotion by itself would be incapable of explaining
how this approach to rulership could generate lasting effects, or how it could enable the
people to order themselves. While the sting and moral motivation occasioned by a
momentary sensation of shame may be suffered without lasting effect, the efficacy of a
general sensitivity to shame may be more reliable. Furthermore, a sense of shame is
lodged in the person while a sensation of shame can depend almost entirely upon
external stimuli. Hence, when we translate chi as a sense of shame, we simultaneously name a disposition in the people with lasting effects, and explain how social
order might stem from the people themselves rather than simply from external sanctions such as punishments.21
Beyond the sociopolitical significance of the sense of shame, Confucius sees it as
also contributing to a persons moral cultivation. When an aversion to experiencing
shame is combined with a projective moral imagination strong enough to anticipate
shameful outcomes, shameful conduct can be more successfully avoided. Confucius
says that it was because they would be ashamed if they personally did not to measure
up (to what they said) that the ancients, in speaking, did not exceed themselves
(Analects 4.22). Just as those who use restraint and still miss the mark are rare indeed
(Analects 4.23), lacking a sense of shame can get one into trouble.

4 The Socioeconomic Preconditions of a Sense of Shame

According to Aristotle there is only one way to develop a sense of shame, and that is by
means of a proper upbringing. Such an upbringing relies upon the development of
20

This extended regard for the conduct of others appears to stem from King Wus rather inclusive sense of
personal responsibility. King Wu is recorded in the Analects as having said, If any of the Hundred Clans
commit a transgression, let the punishment be visited upon me alone (Analects 20.1). It appears that this
sagely form of responsibility is also asymmetrical. In the same passage the sage-ruler Yu is quoted as
saying, If I should personally commit an offense, let not the punishment be visited upon the inhabitants of the
myriad regions; if the inhabitant of the myriad regions commit an offense, let the punishment be visited upon
me personally. While this inclusive and asymmetrical responsibility is characteristic of the Confucian sages
sense of personhood, Mencius suggests that even a sage will place certain limits upon it (see Mencius 4B28
and 4B29).
21
Which is the other approach to rulership mentioned in Analects 2.3.

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habits in order to instill the noble sentiments that are constitutive of a sense of shame.22
The significance of these habits, cultivated in ones youth, cannot be overstated for
Aristotle: It makes no small difference whether we form habits of one kind or of
another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the
difference (Nicomachean Ethics II.1). When Aristotle contemplates those who, due
to an inadequate upbringing, lack the noble sentiments (and, consequently, a sense of
shame), he considers them beyond the reach of rational argument and simply in need of
law and punishment. In effect, Aristotle sees no hope for the ethical growth of anyone
who lacked a sufficient upbringing since even rational argumentation on ethical matters
presupposes a proper set of habits.23 Rather than seek ways to develop their character,
he spends his time focusing on the next generation and outlining the laws best suited to
the institutionalization of proper upbringing.
Aristotles commitment to upbringing as the sole source of a sense of shame renders
this disposition contingent upon certain socioeconomic factors. For instance, Aristotle
assumes that slaves are incapable of undergoing a proper upbringing. While he does
allow that slaves have a (diminished) capacity for virtue, he says that their excellence is
defined in terms of their social function as slaves.24 Furthermore, slaves are said to lack
any deliberative faculty, and it is doubtful that Aristotle suspected them capable of a
sense of shame. Aristotle also considers gender a limiting factor, leaving proper
upbringingas he discusses itan opportunity only for freeborn males. In addition
to these social preconditions, a boy only stands a chance of a good upbringing when his
parents are beyond the constraints of economic necessitythere is, in other words, a
22
Among the habits Aristotle suggests, I can distinguish three kinds. First, there are what we might call
environmental habits. These include the ancient Greek customs (said to be practiced in ancient Athens) of
molding and stretching the body of the infant to habituate it to good posture, or plunging a child into a cold
river and dressing them in very little clothing to stimulate a healthy constitution and temper them against the
miserable conditions associated with military affairs. Similar processes of habituation can be found in the
history of Sparta, where making ones bed from reeds or traveling at night without a lamp were each meant to
cultivate martial dispositions. A second kind of habituation concerns ones associates. When outlining proper
upbringing in the Politics, Aristotle recommends that the young be kept away from slaves as much as possible,
as well as from intemperate individuals. He also disapproves of children observing artworks or religious rites
that depict shameful conduct. With our association with things as well as with persons, Aristotle comments,
we always like best whatever comes first. And therefore youth should be kept strangers to all that is vulgar
(Politics VII.17; translation amended). As the ancient Greek proverb has it, If one lives with a lame man, one
eventually walks with a limp. The third kind of habit concerns our own behavior. In the Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle says that we become virtuous persons by engaging in virtuous behavior (II.4). One is, of course, not
yet virtuous in character simply because one acts in a virtuous fashion. In addition to such conduct, one
mustamong other requirementsenjoy behaving virtuously. Yet one of the results of repeated virtuous
behavior is a habituation to the pleasures of virtue. It is thought that a proper upbringing, through its
facilitation of virtuous behavior, affords us the opportunity to come to delight in such behavior.
23
Aristotles position here (that ethical philosophy is incapable of convincing anyone of the merit of what is
noble, let alone correcting ones bad habits, if one does not already have the noble sentiments) can be
explained by his pragmatic approach to the justification of normative ethics. As Iakovos Vasiliou has argued,
Aristotle understands ethics to be a unique field of study because it requires the student to be in a certain
disposition before study begins. To be able to learn from lectures on ethics the student needs to already take
pleasure in what is noble. Hence, Aristotle relies upon a certain kinship to excellence among his students of
ethics and does not attempt a foundational justification of normative ethics independent of this prerequisite of
youth (Vasiliou 1996). It is interesting that Vasiliou attempts to minimize the implications of this interpretation
of Aristotles ethics by suggesting that if ones upbringing were inadequate a new upbringing could be
offered (Vasiliou 1996: 794). This, however, flies in the face of Aristotles comments on the gradual, and near
perfect calcification of our habits (see Nicomachean Ethics VII.10, Magna Moralia II.6, and Rhetoric I.11).
24
For developed accounts of role-specific virtues see MacIntyre 1981; Nagy 1999, and Nussbaum 1986.

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certain equipage (chorgia) to proper upbringing.25 Aristotle has rather disparaging

things to say about those who are compelled by economic necessity to work as
merchants, craftsmen, or wage-earning laborers. These people, he says, are made vulgar
(banousos) by their work, needs, and lack of leisure.26 Burdened with exhausting labor,
their bodies and minds are rendered incapable of virtuous conduct, precluding the
development of the noble sentiments. Furthermore, they will spend their days solely in
the pursuit of their basic needs; their hearts will be filled with desires for pleasure and
wealth, but will remain blind to the natural pleasure of noble actions (see Politics
1341b1015 and Nicomachean Ethics 1095b1496a10). Having no taste for what is
noble, they will never desire to do a noble deed simply because it is noble, nor be
ashamed simply because they lack noble characteristics.
Vulgar families, no doubt, cannot afford to hire the nurses and tutors involved in
Aristotles conception of a proper upbringing. We are reminded of Platos comment in
the Protagoras that the wealthy are the first to enroll their sons under a teacher. Perhaps
the sons of the middle class will enroll next, but the sons of the poor will never enroll.
Yet in addition to the direct cost of a childs education, there is the indirect cost of
allowing ones son freedom from the familys occupation. Aristotle insists that a child
must not be exhausted by labor, nor engaged in vulgar occupations, if he is to stand a
chance of developing noble sentiments and a sense of shamea corollary to Aristotles
general claim that leisure is necessary for the development of virtue (Politics VII.9). It
is unlikely that a family of masons or olive merchants could afford to support their son
for twenty-one years without expecting him to contribute to the vulgar family
business. The net result of these socioeconomic preconditions to a proper upbringing
is the automatic exclusion of slaves, women, and poor freemen from the development
of noble sentiment and a sense of shame, rendering such affective dispositions the sole
possession of the aristoi who alone can afford them.
Confucius, for his part, acknowledges the tremendous impact ones upbringing has
upon the ethical quality of ones relationships with othersincluding ones relationship with political authorities (Analects 1.2). He also speaks about several preconditions for fruitful dialogue on ethical matters, echoing Aristotles claim that students
must, in some way, be predisposed to the subject matter before they can benefit from
lectures on ethics (Analects 5.10, 6.21, 7.7, 7.8, 15.8, 15.16). Confucius even goes so
far as to admit hopeless cases, such as those who have not done something of note, or
learned how to avoid evoking the hatred of others, by the time they are forty years of
age. Still, he is committed to the idea that people, even adults, are capable of
developing a sense of shamethat ones upbringing, in short, is not the only occasion
for its development. Confuciuss commitment to the availability of the sense of shame,
however, does not also commit him to thinking that it will be easily gained, or that it can
always arise regardless of economic considerations. That is not his position, nor is
25
Just as wealth is necessary for the specific virtue of generosity, so leisure is said to be necessary for the
development of the virtues (Politics VII.9; cf. Politics VII.15). While equipage is necessary for the good life
and the virtues, Aristotle maintains that it is not sufficient for these two (Politics VII.13) and that any value
they have derives from the character of whoever possesses them (Politics VII.1). Even if a good man can
endure poverty later in life, as Aristotle claims, it is entirely because of the equipage at the disposal of his
parents when he was younger, which laid the foundation of his ability to endure poverty. Even in this case,
monetary capital was necessary for the mans ethical capital.
26
This leisure was not simply freedom from labor, but freedom to work on developing oneself.

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it the one we find in the Mencius. Confucius and Mencius are, however, committed to the potential irrelevance of class, and endeavor to promote shame in others
regardless of their economic situation.
A revolutionary with respect to the social norms in his own day, Confucius claimed
that a persons class was insufficient to determine his or her worth. This social outlook
impacted the way he understood his role as educator: The Master said, Instruction
precludes social class (you jiao wu lei ) (Analects 15.39); I have yet to deny
lessons to those who, drawing upon their own stores, can only offer a gift of dried meat
to their superiors (Analects 7.7). Even if one does well to ignore social class, the same
cannot be said for wealth or poverty. Each is capable, according to the early Confucian
literature, of preventing the development of a sense of shame. While the wealthy are
said to be prone to arrogance, we are warned in the Mencius that commoners without
reliable means of support will not have reliable heart-minds; if they lack reliable heartminds, nothing will put a stop to their roguishness and villainy (Mencius 3A3).
Poverty stimulates thinking in terms of profit, gain, or the acquisition of wealth. This
is an individuating way of thinking, which places ones interests in direct competition
with the interests of others (Mencius 1A1). Confucian ethicswhich involves yi and
shameis distinctly integrating, socially consummating. It requires considering the
perspectives of others and developing ones conduct to include their interests. This is
why it is often remarked in the Confucian canon that if ones primary aim is wealth, one
cannot live as a consummate ( ren) person (Analects 4.5, 8.4, 8.13; Mencius 3A3; Liji
43.2/166/810).
Despite the tendency for poverty to prevent or corrupt ones proper affective
dispositions, including ones sense of shame, there are famous counter-examples within
the early Confucian traditioneach suggesting that the ethically negative consequences of poverty may be mitigated. There is the legendary sage-ruler Yu who was
faultless, in Confuciuss estimation, and yet ate simple food, wore coarse clothing, and
lived in a humble dwelling (Analects 8.21). Then there is the example of Confuciuss
best student, YAN Hui .
The Master said, A person of substance is this YAN Hui! A single bowl of food, a
single dipper of drink, and a place in a back alleyother people would not be
able to endure his hardships, yet for YAN Hui they do not affect his happiness. A
person of substance is this YAN Hui! (Analects 6.11; cf. 7.16)
This capacity to overcome the negative impacts of ones poverty is discussed in
Analects 1.15. One of Confuciuss students, Zigong who was poor at one time,
but had recently acquired wealth through his own initiativeasks his teacher what he
would think of someone with a similar history: someone who, when poor, was not
obsequious and, when rich, was not arrogant. Confucius replies that such a person is
fine for all that, but not as good as someone who, regardless of poverty or wealth,
enjoys ritual propriety (li ) and the way (dao ). As ZHU Xi comments on this
passage,
Ordinary people are overwhelmed by the experience of poverty or wealth and do
not know how to get a handle on themselves; it is no wonder that they come to
have these two defects. If one is not obsequious or arrogant, it is simply because

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one knows how to get a handle on oneselfyet this is not yet enough to enable
one to extricate oneself completely and stand clear of the influence of wealth and
poverty. Hence Confucius response, It is sufficient. Still it is barely sufficient,
and there is something more to his instruction. When you are happy, you think
and feel broadly, comport yourself in comfort, and forget about your poverty;
when you delight in the rites, you find your ease in their excellence, your
happiness in their patterns, thus forgetting about yourself and your wealth.
(Zhu 1983: 5253)
The Confucian ideal involves cultivating this ability to get a handle on oneself so as
to be indifferent to wealth and poverty (see Analects 14.32, 7.16)to be at ease in
poverty, to treat wealth at the expense of yi as so many floating clouds (Analects
7.16), and to focus instead upon cultivating the way (dao).
This sort of indifference is certainly neither easily cultivated nor readily found in
others. The early Confucian literature, however, proposes two general approaches to
developing it in others. 27 The first approach is to address the economic hindrances
directly, aiming to change the circumstances by supplying basic goods to the poor (and,
ostensibly, depriving the arrogant of their wealth). The hope is that a change in
conditions will prevent the negative impact of poverty and wealth. The second approach, on the other hand, is to prevent the effects of poverty and wealth by producing
an internal change in a person. This approach has more in common with the Hellenistic
philosophies of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism than with
Aristotles commitment to the equipage of virtue and shame. It is also the approach
that the early Confuciansfor several reasons we will get toregard as the most
promising of the two.
The first approach is described in the Analects as enriching the people (fu zhi )
(Analects 13.9). When Confucius visited the state of Wei , he remarked on its
abundant populationa great asset to any state built upon agrarian prosperity. When
asked what more could be done for such a teeming population, he replied enrich
them.28 After that is accomplished, Confucius says, one should teach them. A ruler can
set out to cultivate his people only after he has supplied their material prosperity (see
Hall and Ames 1987: 145).
A fuller picture is developed in the Mencius:
Duke Wen of Teng asked about running a state. Mencius said, The affairs
of the people cannot be neglected. The Book of Odes says In the daytime they
gather reeds, in the nighttime they braid rope; with urgencythey repair their
roofs, they begin to sow the various grains. The peoples way of doing things is
such that, without reliable means of support, they will not have reliable heartminds. If they lack reliable heart-minds, nothing will put a stop to their roguishness and villainy. To compel them to turn to crime, only to come along afterwards
to punish themthis is to lay a trap for the people. How can those who are
27
It is expected that someone in authorityclassically, the ruler of the statewill implement both approaches; but we can see various contemporary applications for these approaches if we assigned them to
those with other types of authority: parents, teachers, older friends, elder siblings, and so on.
28
There are several ways to do this. By not taxing the people to desperation or assigning them public works
during the time of the harvest, and by providing for orphans and the elderly, a ruler enriches his people.

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consummate in their social position lay a trap for the people? Therefore, excellent
rulers must be respectful and frugal, treating their inferiors with ritual propriety,
and taking from the people only the prescribed amount. (Mencius 3A3)
While Mencius acknowledges the value of the peoples material prosperity, he does not
see it as sufficient to produce a sense of shame or the other proper affective dispositions. As he puts it, when the common people are well fed, warmly clad, at leisure in
their homes, but without instruction, they are no different from animals. Because the
sage [sc. Yao ] was worried about this he employed Xie as Minister of Education,
who then taught the basic human relationships (renlun ) to the common people
(Mencius 3A4).29
We must, however, attend to the protreptics of this advice from the Analects and
Mencius. Very often the Confucian philosopher will speak with an eye not to proper
description so much as to good results. A pragmatic notion of truth is quite germane to
the interpretation of Confucian philosophical utterances. As such, mention of the
peoples prosperity as a prerequisite for edifying rulership may be best understood as
advice to rulers intended to encourage the sentiment: Do not expect people to listen to
your counsel or follow your example until you have provided for their basic needs. It
is, however, possible for persons to respond to the moral example of their rulers despite
poverty and need. 30 In fact, when he was asked about the relative value of food,
weapons, and the ruler, Confucius gave first place to the ruler:
Zigong asked about proper governing (zheng ). The Master said, Its simply a
matter of making sure there is sufficient food, sufficient weapons, and that the
common people trust their ruler. Zigong asked, If I could not have them all but
were forced to give one up, which of these three should be the first to go? The
Master replied, Give up the weapons. Zigong asked, If I could not have them
both but were forced to give one up, which of the remaining two should be the
first to go? The Master replied, The foodeveryone dies once they grow old;
but if the common people do not trust their ruler, nothing can get established.
(Analects 12.7)
Poverty might, in fact, make transforming the people even easier. As Mencius
argues, The people of Qi have a saying: Even if you have cunning, it is better to
take advantage of circumstances; even if you have a hoe, it is better to wait for the right
season. Now is a time when things are easygiven that the state of Qi, whose ruler
Mencius is advising in this passage, has the necessary territory and population for
prosperity and security. Moreover, Mencius continues,
concerning the absence of true kings, they have never been so rare as they are in
the present era. As for the maladies the common people have suffered on account
of diseased governments, they have never been pushed to such extremes as they
Aristotle makes similar remarks about the ethical degradation among the vulgar rich (see Adams 2001).
Confucius responds this way to the historical rulers, Duke Wen and Shun of Yu . If we accept an
analogy between rulers and teachers, we could include YAN Huis response to Confucius, despite the poverty
of the former, as another example.
29
30

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Thorian R. Harris

have in the present era. Those who are hungry are easy to feed; those who are
thirsty are easy to hydrate. Confucius said, The influence of ones good example
(de ) spreads faster than establishing posts and transmitting commands. In the
current era, were a state of ten thousand chariots to practice consummate government (renzheng ), the common people would delight in it like someone
who is freed from being strung upside down. Now is the time when you
can, with half the effort it took someone in antiquity, achieve twice as
much. (Mencius 2A1)
If the influence of moral rulers is increased by hardship, we might expect a simultaneous increase in their ability to stimulate the sense of shame in their people.
Turning to the second approachthat is, effecting a sort of internal change
in othersthe Analects appear to present us with three separate methods for
cultivating both indifference to wealth and poverty, and a sense of shame. They
are setting a good example, elevating the worthy, and the pedagogy of
fate. The first means for cultivating shame in the common people is mentioned
in Analects 2.3: Instruct them with your good example (de ), keep them in
line with ritual propriety (li )the common people will have a sense of
shame.31 In other contexts in the Analects, de can denote authority, excellence,
even kindness; it is attributed to horses, houses, and commoners. However,
within a political context, de contrastsdomesticallywith commands and
punishments, andinternationallywith martial conquest. De refers to the
influence of ones personal example.
The Analects discusses two ways this personal influence is acquired.32 One is
the de facto political influence enjoyed by those born into the ruling family.
This source of de clearly allows for abuse, and the Confucians say what they
can to encourage rulers to use their influence to good results. This is perhaps
why Confucius, in Analects 2.3, appends the expression, keep the people in
line with ritual propriety; this renders explicit the moral requirements of
effective rulership. The other way to gain personal influence is through a
process referred to as accumulating de (chong de ) (see Analects 12.10,
12.21), which essentially involves establishing ones social and political influence on the bases of personal merit.
The early Confucians are convinced that nothing exercises as much influence on the
common people as the personal example of their rulers and exemplars. Set a good
example and your commands become superfluous; even if someone tries to bribe one
of your subjects, they will not act contrary to your example. Yet if you set a bad
example, even commands cannot stop them from following it. As Confucius remarks,
The example of the exemplary person (junzi ) is the wind, the example of the petty
person (xiaoren ) is the grass; as the wind blows upon the grass it is sure to bend
The full passage reads, Instruct them with commands, keep them in line with punishmentsthe common
people will be evasive but without a sense of shame. Instruct them with your good example, keep them in line
with ritual proprietythe common people will have a sense of shame; moreover, they will correct
themselves.
32
There are, no doubt, other ways to acquire it, but the authors of the Analects appear to purposively leave
them out. Of the two they mention, the first is a fact of the dynastic system of government of the time, while
the latter is the Confucian attempt to improve and augment that system.
31

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(Analects 12.19).33 No doubt the Confucians overstate the power of exampleif only
to properly affect their audience. But there is something to learn from this general
sentiment.
To follow the example of others, in this context, is to conduct oneself in similar
terms (to adopt the ritual proprieties they exemplify, for instance), but also to adopt the
abiding desires and sentiments of these persons (Liji 43.1/165/78; cf. 43.2/166/20). It
is true that one might follow another persons example with an obsequious motive,
seeking advancement by courting the favor of a superior. HAN Feizi warns of
this tendency, graphically depicting its effects, and suggests that a ruler hide his true
desires if he wishes to avoid this sort of result. However, subordinates can also be
motivated to become more like their ruler or an exemplarin both deed and heartmindout of a feeling that is similar to what Aristotle calls emulation (zlos). When
you see another persons excellence, Confucius implores us, think to become like them
in this regard (Analects 4.17). He also describes himself as someone who, upon seeing
something done well (shan ), is afraid he will never grasp it himself (Analects 16.11).34
If this is how we are to understand the influence of personal example, there is a
surprising result for our account of the Confucian program for the development of a
sense of shame. If the good example of a ruler is capable of cultivating a sense of
shame, it is only capable of doing so on the basis of emulation. These two emotions,
tangentially related on Aristotles account (see Rhetoric II.6, II.11), are ranked on
Confuciuss own. Emulation comes first, as it is our admiration for others that develops
our own sense of shamepresumably when we realize the various ways in which we
fall short of the person we admire. There is brilliance to this approach to developing a
sense of shame in others. While direct remonstrance often causes our listeners to defend
their conduct instead of listening to our criticism, if we can present them with a good
example (if not our own, then at least that of another), we leave the person free to
acknowledge their faults without any unnecessary harm to their dignity.35
The second method for developing a sense of shame in others is elevating the
worthy (jushan or juzhi ) which involves granting station and salary to
persons based on merit. In a world where wealth was gained largely through a process
of official commission, and ones clothing, utensils, and diet invariably reflected ones
social and political status, the ruler had tremendous control over the substance of social
elevation and demotion. Were rulers to promote only those who accumulated de, it
was assumed that the common people would be transformed. Presumably the force of
this kind of meritocracy is not simply emulation, but perhaps self-interest. As it is
expressed on another occasion, this social program makes the people eager and
industrious (Analects 2.20; cf. 7.8). If the common people think they can gain wealth
by accumulating de they will prize de. While they may at first attribute only an
instrumental value to it, they may eventually come to value de intrinsicallyand if
they do, they will have acquired a sense of shame since their concern for de will
33

Confucius seems to be borrowing the expression from the Shangshu (Book of Documents), where a
minister admonishes his ruler, You are the wind, the commoners below are the grass (er wei feng, xia min
wei cao , ) (Shangshu 49/46/9).
34
Although Confucius is not speaking in the first person here, it would still be fair to take this statement as an
adequate reflection of his own desires (see Analects 7.22, 7.28, and 7.32).
35
Something like this is at the heart of the classical narratives concerning Shun of Yus relationships with his
villainous family members. For more on the efficacy of indirect communication, see Jullien 2000.

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overwhelm their concern for personal gain whenever de and personal gain conflict.
Furthermore, though the program of elevating the worthy utilizes ones concern for
wealth and ones self-interest in general, it enables one to pursue these interests in such
a fashion that one is also serving the interests of the community.
Coming to the third method, we often hear Confucius complaining about the lack of
focus on the part of his students and contemporaries. As he puts it on one occasion, I
have not yet met a person as fond of de as he is of female beauty (Analects 9.18). On
another occasion he remarks, It is not easy to come by someone who does not seek an
official salary after a mere three years of study (Analects 8.12). To deal with the force
of these distractions, which are capable of undermining ones sense of shame with its
implied concern for de, Confucius devised a third methodwhat I am calling the
pedagogy of fate (ming ). The Confucian notion of fate, which draws upon a robust
tradition of thought, covers the propensities of ones birth, death, lifespan, health, the
failures or success in ones career, social rank, as well as ones wealth and poverty. It did
not, however, control ones every action; nor was it instigated by supernatural forces
similar to the Greek Moirai or an Abrahamic God, but by the unfolding of circumstance
(tian )a spontaneous and natural consequence of forces beyond ones control. By
classifying things such as professional advancement, wealth, and poverty as matters of
fate, Confucius sought to help his students focus on accumulating de. If successful in
this task, this method would no doubt disarm poverty and wealth of their negative
effects, and help preserve ones sense of shame. However, when Confucius spoke of fate
it is likely that he was engaging in a self-consciously protreptic utterance aimed at these
effects, and not necessarily intending to accurately describe affairs; fate, in other words,
was nothing more than a useful fiction for Confuciusa pedagogical strategy.36
The viability of these three methods presupposes that Aristotle is wrong to think that
a capacity for shame can only be developed in ones childhood. One of the things that
distinguishes Aristotle and Confucius is a disagreement on the fixity of moral traits
(dispositions, capacities, states). Aristotle thinks that children are relatively malleable,
but that this is the only time one can be molded; as one approaches maturity, one
becomes fixedup to the point where one develops traits of character that can be
sharply distinguished from the force of circumstance. By contrast, Confucius is committed to the possibility that even adults might take on radically new traits.

5 Individualistic and Situational Accounts of Praiseworthy Dispositions

I would suggest that this disagreement stems from competing conceptions of praiseworthy dispositions. For Aristotle, virtues are traits of individual agents and not the
traits of relationships or circumstances.37 If the acts that are in accordance with the
excellences have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done
justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them;
in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and
36

I defend this claim in a forthcoming paper.

Certainly several of the character virtues, on Aristotles account, are what we might call other-regarding,
but despite this they remain the possession of individuals. If one is magnanimous, this is a trait one has
regardless of the individuals toward whom one acts magnanimously; for Aristotle this trait does not depend
upon the identity of a specific other, nor is it constituted by specific relationships.

37

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choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and
unchangeable character (Nicomachean Ethics II.4; emphases added). Each of these
agent-specific criteria for the attribution of virtue seeks to separate the contribution of
the agent from the force of circumstance. However, it is the last criterion that drives
home the notion that a virtue must presuppose the individual-specificity and fixity of
traitsin this case, of a state of character (hexis). Aristotle, in short, is committed to
what John Doris has described as trait-relevant behavioral consistency (2002). While
the character trait of courage may involve context-dependent and agent-dependent
differences in our overt behavior, we can only be said to have courage if we consistently
engage in the trait-relevant behaviorif we are courageous in all manner of situations
and even, or especially, in those circumstances when courageous behavior is difficult.38
It is because Aristotle thinks of praiseworthy dispositionssuch as the virtues, or the
sense of shameas consistent traits of character that he is forced to neglect the moral
education of those who did not benefit from a proper upbringing.
Confucius, on the other hand, does not conceive of the sense of shame or other
praiseworthy dispositions as traits of character in a similarly individualistic fashion. We
may speak of these dispositions as traits of character, but these dispositions are not true of
persons in isolation. They are true of persons only within their social contextstheir roles
and relationships. This is a specific form of what is sometimes called situationism: an
idea that works as a corrective on our fascination with agency and character by claiming
that praiseworthy events, even praiseworthy tendencies, are more the result of the
situation than agents (see Doris 2002). 39 Situationism, according to Doris, denies the
consistency but not the stability of character traits. We may act compassionately across a
range of situations when these situations share important similarities (hence, the trait of
compassion can be said to be stable); but if situations become too dissimilar (especially if
these situations make compassionate actions more difficult), it becomes less likely that we
will continue to act compassionately. In that case, we cannot be said to be consistently
compassionate. If these two claims were both true, traits like compassion would seem to
be more aptly applied to situations than individuals.
Put another way, we might think of situationism as a deflationary account of
character. As I understand it, Doris is arguing in favor of a position akin to John
Deweysone that correlates character with context, and takes any ascription of a
disposition or habit to an individual to be nothing more than an abstraction away from
the person-in-context. As Dewey puts it,
Habits may be profitably compared to physiological functions, like breathing and
digesting. The latter are, to be sure, involuntary, while habits are acquired. But
important as is this difference it should not conceal the fact that habits are like
functions in many respects, and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism
and environment. Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesting an
affair of food as truly as of tissues of stomach. There are specific good reasons for
the usual attribution of acts to the person from whom they immediately proceed. But
to convert this special reference into a belief of exclusive ownership is as misleading
38
For the normative significance of differences between agents and situations in Aristotles ethics, see
Nicomachean Ethics II.6.
39
Situationism, as Doris uses the term, is not a thesis about the situation-dependency of value.

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as to suppose that breathing and digesting are complete within the human body.
Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility
are not private possessions of a person. They are working adaptations of personal
capacities with environing forces. (Dewey 1922: 1719)
When Aristotle attempts to ascribe character traits exclusively to individuals, thus
separating character from conduct, he commits himself to what Dewey would describe
as an individualistic account of character traits (Dewey 1922: 18; cf. Nicomachean
Ethics I.8).
Among the classical Chinese philosophical schools, the early Confucians were not
alone in adopting the notion that character traits were situation-dependent. In SUN Wus
Sunzi Bingfa (Sunzis Art of War) we are told that a good general does
not think of courage as a trait of individual soldiers, but as the product of terrain. On
the day they are ordered to attack, the soldiers sitting will have tears soaking their
collars, the soldiers laying on their backs will have tears running off their cheeks, yet
throw them into a situation where there is no escape, and they will have the courage of
ZHUAN Zhu and CAO Gui [two traditional exemplars of courage] (Sunzi
Bingfa 11/12/56). In a similar vein, HAN Feizi claims that honesty is the product of
public attention. When cheap goods are placed in a hideaway, even ZENG Shen
and SHI Yu [that is, two exemplars of honesty] may be suspected (if the cheap
goods go missing); yet if you suspend a hundred gold-pieces in the marketplace, even a
great thief will not grab it. Because no one will know (the thief), ZENG Shen and SHI Yu
can be suspected with regard to what was in the hideaway; because (the thief) is sure to
be known, a great thief does not grab the gold suspended in the marketplace (Hanfeizi
46/138/13). The Confucian variety of situationism, by contrast, focuses more upon
familial relationships and their analogs than upon terrain and public attention. For
Confucius, a sense of shame is not the possession of an individual alone but is
practiced by individuals within specific relationships.40 When discussing the three
40
Anyone who reads Confucian ethics as a virtue ethics may question the validity of this claim. A supporter of a
virtue ethics interpretation, Eric Hutton has recently argued that Doriss situationism cannot apply to Confucian
ethics. According to Hutton, the Aristotelian notion of character [is] about as widespread in the East Asian
philosophical tradition as in the Western philosophical tradition (Hutton 2006: 37), and an emphasis on robust
character traitsespecially the consistency of character traitsis a central feature of Confucian ethics (Hutton
2006: 40). When he turns to the Analects to support his claims, Hutton discusses the trait of ren (which he
translates as benevolencea translation that might very well beg the question). Linguistically speaking, he says,
this must surely be a trait of people: Confucian texts often speak of the [ren ren] ren person or [ren
zhe] one who is ren (Hutton 2006: 40). Furthermore, a careful reading of Analects 4.5 reveals an emphasis not
merely upon the stability of this trait, but its consistency as well: If the gentleman abandons ren, how can he merit
the name [of gentleman]? The gentleman does not go against ren even for the amount of time required to finish a
meal. Even in times of urgency or distress, he necessarily accords with it (Hutton 2006: 41). I do not think one
can doubt these claims; they are, however, incapable of supporting Huttons initial claim about Confucian ethics.
First of all, while ren might be said to be a trait of persons, we may still ask what it is to be a person? As David
Hall and Roger Ames have argued, a person in Confucian thought is a focus in a field of relationships, which
would suggest that ren could be relational instead of an individualistic or consistent character trait (Hall and Ames
1998). Secondly, when it comes to the issue of the gentleman (junzi) in times of distresswhat, we should ask,
allows the junzi to maintain ren? Drawing upon the Analects it would seem that a good answer to this question is
the company the junzi keeptheir relations and relationships (cf. Xunzi on li , situation). When The Five
Modes of Proper Conduct (Wuxing pian ) discusses praiseworthy dispositions (de zhi xing ) this text
is explicit that they are social in origin, but also relational practices (for the relation-dependency of ren , for
example, see Wuxing pian 5 [Holloway 2005]).

Aristotle and Confucius on the Socioeconomics of Shame

341

methods for developing a sense of shame in others we were not, after all, simply
discussing techniques for the cultivation of the sense of shame, but were discussing
certain relationshipsbetween ruler and subject, teacher and studentin which a sense
of shame is practiced. These relational practices are integral to the affective disposition
of the sense of shame; it is not something an individual could ever possess in a selfsufficient fashion as one might possess an Aristotelian character virtue.
To conceive of praiseworthy dispositions, such as the sense of shame, as relationdependent dispositions brings with it both promise and risk. Since relationships are more
malleable than character traits understood individualistically (we can find ourselves in
new relationships much easier than we can change our habits) we can expect relationaldependent traits to be more malleable than individualistic character traits. This accounts
for the Confucian conviction in the near universal availability of moral cultivation. Yet
greater malleability cuts both ways: if it gives us hope that even adults with an
inadequate upbringing can come to have a sense of shame, it should also give us cause
to fear that anyoneabsolutely anyonemight cease to have a sense of shame if their
relationships somehow deteriorate. This is one of the risks involved in the Confucian
conception of praiseworthy dispositionsa conception, however, that makes the development of a sense of shame possible regardless of socioeconomic considerations.
Acknowledgments For their comments on early drafts of this paper I wish to thank Jim Tiles, Roger Ames,
Jeremy Henkel, Kevin Delapp, the participants of the 6th International Philosophy Conference of the South
African Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities (especially Rachel Bothma, Mojalefa Koenane,
Josephat Obi Oguejiofor, Bret Oliver, and Pascah Mungwini), and two anonymous reviewers. I wish to also
thank Mike and Brenda Wingfield, of the University of Pretoria, for their hospitality while I was in South
Africa.

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