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14. CANGCO v. MANILA RAILROAD (sack of watermelons. Breach of

contract NOT a tort)
- Jose Cangco was an employee of the Manila Railroad. He used the
company trains to commute to and from work as he lived in San Mateo,
Rizal and worked in the company office in Manila. One night, while the
train was slowing down to a stop at his station in San Mateo, he alighted
and slipped on sacks of watermelons improvidently placed on the train
platform. His shoulder was amputated with two separate operations.
Aggrieved, Cangco claimed damages and reimbursement for his medical
- The railroad company claimed that Cangco was negligent in stepping off
the train before it had come to a full and complete stop and was thus
prevented from claiming anything for the company for his injuries.
- W/N Manila Railroad is liable to Cangco for damages.

- Defendant Railroad Co. operates a line through the district of Daraga. As
one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks were
emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive and a fire was
communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs alleged that Railroad Co. was conspicuously negligent in relation
to the origin of the fire for failing to exercise proper supervision over the
employees in charge of the locomotive, for allowing the locomotive to be
operated without having the smokestack protected by some device for
arresting sparks and for using Bataan coal, a fuel known to produce sparks
in great quantity. As a defense Railroad Co. alleged that the house of
plaintiff Rodrigueza stands partly on Railroads property, and because they
asked him to get the house off company land, alleged that Rodrigueza is
guilty of contributory negligence.
- W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of Rodrigueza

- YES. The defense of contributory negligence is unavailing as the
obligation of Manila Railroad stems from a breach of contract, not a quasiobligation.
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
contractual. Extra-contractual obligations have their source in the breach
or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of
certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept
of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of
- The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to
mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to
indemnify the injured party.

- NO. There is no proof the plaintiff unlawfully intruded on the railroads
property. He was there at the sufferance of the company and as long as his
house remained in the exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk
of loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by defendants
locomotive if operated and managed with ordinary care. He cannot be held
to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the
unlawful negligent acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate
and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. He has the
right to assume the other will use the care of the ordinarily prudent man.
- The fact that Rodriguezas house was on company land cannot be
imputed to him as contributory negligence. Firstly, the condition was not
created by
himself (his house was there before Railroad acquired the land). Secondly,
the house remained on the ground by toleration of the company. Thirdly,
even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not
justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.

15. RODRIGUEZA v. MANILA RAILROAD (sparks from smoke stack. No

contributory negligence)


- Pacifico Mabasa owned a parcel of land with a two-door apartment,

surrounded by the defendants houses. There are only two pathways that
serve as ingress and egress to and from the property, through and
between some of defendants houses and the other through a septic tank.
Some tenants were occupying the apartment houses owned by Mabasa.
However, when Defendant Santoses built an adobe fence and
subsequently Defendant Morato built another fence, the whole of the path
was enclosed and so one of the tenants of Mabasa left.
- Mabasa filed a civil case for the grant of an easement of right of way in
between the houses and asked for damages because of the loss of income
he suffered. The trial court favored Mabasa and ordered the defendants to
grant Mabasa permanent ingress and egress for the sum of P8,000.
However, the trial court did not grant damages.
- Mabasa appealed. The Court of Appeals granted him P65K in actual
damages, P30K as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages. The
Defendants appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Defendants
contend that the CA erred in granting the easement and the damages.
- W/N the grant of the right of way was proper
- W/N the award of damages was proper
- The Supreme Court said that the defendants were barred from
questioning the judgment granting the easement since it has already
become final because they did not appeal.
- NO. The CA erred in awarding the damages since the award has no
substantial legal basis.
- The award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original
plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals
when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of
the passageway. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both
a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action. since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or

- There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the

illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be
the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there
should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering. In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et
- In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury.
Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said
to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle
of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should
have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to
the plaintiff.
- The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
- One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and
though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of
action arises in the latter's favor.
18. FLORES v. PINEDA (D&C operation. Diabetes. Flores Negligent)
Teresita Pineda consulted Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her medical
condition. She complained of general body weakness, loss of appetite,

frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. Dr.

Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked for the history of her
monthly period to analyze the probable cause of the vaginal bleeding and
subsequently advised her to return the following week or to go to the
United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for a general checkup.
Teresita did not return the next week as advised. However, when her
condition persisted, she went to further consult Dr. Flores at his UDMC
clinic in Quezon City. Dr. Fredelicto did a routine check-up and ordered
Teresita's admission to the hospital. In the admission slip, he directed the
hospital staff to prepare the patient for an "on call" D&C operation to be
performed by his wife, Dr. Felicisima Flores, despite his suspicion that
Teresita was suffering from diabetes.
Teresita was taken to the operating room. It was only then that
she met Dr. Felicisima, an obstetrician and gynecologist. The two doctors Dr. Felicisima and Dr. Fredelicto, conferred on the patient's medical
condition, while the resident physician and the medical intern gave Dr.
Felicisima their own briefings. She also interviewed and conducted an
internal vaginal examination of the patient which lasted for about 15
minutes. Dr. Felicisima thereafter called up the laboratory for the results of
the tests. At that time, only the results for the blood sugar (BS), uric acid
determination, cholesterol determination, and complete blood count (CBC)
were available. The preliminary laboratory results indicated that the blood
sugar of the victim was high.
After the operation, Teresita's condition had worsened. She
experienced difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the intensive care
unit. Further tests confirmed that she was suffering from Diabetes
Mellitus Type II. Insulin was administered on the patient, but the
medication might have arrived too late. Due to complications induced by
diabetes, Teresita died in. Believing that it was negligence of petitioners
that caused the death of Teresita, respondents filed a medical negligence
case. The trial court and the CA rule in their favor.
Issue:Whether or not petitioners were negligent.

Yes, however it is proper that a discussion of the meaning and elements

of medical negligence must be made before proceeding to the ruling on to
A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or
the death of a patient. There are four elements involved in a medical
negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.
However, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, thus he must prove
that: (1) the physician either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something
that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and (2) the
failure or action caused injury to the patient. Expert testimony is therefore
essential since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon has
exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is generally a matter of expert opinion.
The elements of medical negligence:
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on
one's conduct. The standard in turn refers to the amount of competence
associated with the proper discharge of the profession. A physician is
expected to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use under the same circumstances. Breach of
duty occurs when the physician fails to comply with these professional
standards. If injury results to the patient as a result of this breach, the
physician is answerable for negligence.
Breach of Duty
There was a breach of duty in this case since the urinary results shows
that the blood sugar of the victim was high, indicative of diabetes. And
under these circumstances according to expert witnesses, "the attending
physician should have postponed the D&C operation in order to conduct a
confirmatory test to make a conclusive diagnosis of diabetes and to refer
the case to an internist or diabetologist. This was corroborated by Dr.
Delfin Tan (Dr. Tan), an obstetrician and gynecologist, who stated that the
patient's diabetes should have been managed by an internist prior to,
during, and after the operation."

Moreover, petitioners contention that they are concerned with the

vaginal bleeding of the victim does not ablsolve them of liability. This,
contention adds the court, does not warrant absolution but rather reflects
the petitioners incompetence! Expert witnesses testified that vaginal
bleeding is only rarely so heavy and life-threatening that urgent first-aid
measures are required. Thus, D&C operation on a hyperglycemic patient
may be justified only when it is an emergency case - when there is profuse

ketones) in the blood and urine (called diabetic ketoacidiosis, a medical

emergency with a significant mortality). This was apparently what
happened in Teresita's case; in fact, after she had been referred to the
internist Dr. Jorge, laboratory test showed that her blood sugar level shot
up to 14.0mmol/l, way above the normal blood sugar range. Thus,
between the D&C and death was the diabetic complication that could have
been prevented with the observance of standard medical precautions. The
D&C operation and Teresita's death due to aggravated diabetic condition is
therefore sufficiently established.

In this case, the court choose not to rely on the assertions of the
petitioner spouses that there was profuse bleeding, not only because the
statements were self-serving, but also because the petitioner spouses
were inconsistent in their testimonies. Dr. Fredelicto testified earlier, he
personally saw the bleeding, but later on said that he did not see it and
relied only on Teresita's statement that she was bleeding. He went on to
state that he scheduled the D&C operation without conducting any
physical examination on the patient. These acts of petitioners are indicia of

Petitioners were guilty of negligence. Their negligence is not solely the

act of ordering an "on call" D&C operation when he was mainly an
anesthesiologist who had made a very cursory examination of the patient's
vaginal bleeding complaint. Rather, it was his failure from the very start to
identify and confirm, despite the patient's complaints and his own
suspicions, that diabetes was a risk factor that should be guarded against,
and his participation in the imprudent decision to proceed with the D&C
operation despite his early suspicion and the confirmatory early laboratory
results. Ergo, they are liable for damages.

Casual Connection of the Injury and Breach of Duty

It must be noted that a verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based
on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a
reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.

19. CULION ICE, FISH v. PHIL. MOTORS (Engine change. Phil Motos had no
experience with ships. Boat set on fire)
January, 1925: Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on
the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil
burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of running
the boat
He made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors,
and was told by Mc Kellar that he might make inquiries of the
Philippine Motors Corporations
Cranston repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation
and had a conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to do
the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon
completion of the work.
The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in
business as an automobile agency, but, under its charter, it had
authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well
as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment therof.

The acts of petitioners in proceeding the D & C operation without

adequately preparing the victim is the logical cause of the latter's death.
Relying on expert testimonies and reliable medical literatures, explained
the court: "stress, whether physical or emotional, is a factor that can
aggravate diabetes; a D&C operation is a form of physical stress. Dr.
Mendoza explained how surgical stress can aggravate the patient's
hyperglycemia: when stress occurs, the diabetic's body, especially the
autonomic system, reacts by secreting hormones which are counterregulatory; she can have prolonged hyperglycemia which, if unchecked,
could lead to death. Medical literature further explains that if the blood
sugar has become very high, the patient becomes comatose (diabetic
coma). When this happens over several days, the body uses its own fat to
produce energy, and the result is high levels of waste products (called

Quest, in company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay

at anchor in the Pasig River, and the work of effecting the change in
the engine begun
Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the
conclusion that it was necessary to install a new carburetor, and a
Zenithcarburetor was chosen as the one most adapted to the
After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with
gasoline as a fuel, supplied from the tank already in use. The result of
this experiment was satisfactory.
The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel,
consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate.
In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its
connections, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and
that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower
part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's
attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter and said that,
when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would
January 30,1925 5 pm: The first part of the course was covered
without any untoward development, other than the fact that the
engine stopped a few times, owing no doubt to the use of an
improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial Quest remained
outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making
distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two
elements would give best results in the engine.
7:30 pm: and when passing near Cavite, the engine stopped, and
connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new
start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to
the tube connecting with the new mixture.
A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This
caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly
the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of
flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. They
were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and
their escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a
mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the

sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occurred, as
the court found, was P10,000.
ISSUE: W/N the incident was due to the negligence of Phil. Motors as
YES. It results that the judgment appealed from,
awarding damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P9,850, with interest,
must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any
disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding
of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent
mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken
precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the
fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds
himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he
attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he
was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.
Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats = negligence.
The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense,
but whether Quest was free from blame
accident is chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the
changes which Quest undertook to accomplish; and even supposing
that our theory as to the exact manner in which the accident occurred
might appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the origin of the
fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it was casus
20. ABAYA v. FAVIS (Tonsilectomy operation. No negligence. Presumption
of care)

- Plaintiffs are the spouses Abaya who filed an action for damages against
Dr. Mariano Favis, alleging negligence in ministering to her for
- The child of the spouses was brought to Dr. Favis for treatment from
supposed chronic follicular tonsillitis. Dr. Favis then gave instructions to
have her swabbed with colargol solution and to take calcium lactate three
times daily previous to the operation. The operation was done in Dr.
- After the operation, the patient had vomited blood several times. Hence,
Dr. Favis was called upon to check on the child. Dr. Favis stopped the blood
clot and packed the wound after giving the patient synkavit and other
- However, the patients vomiting of blood still continued, hence, she was
brought to the Ilocos Sur Provincial Hospital where blood transfusion was
- However, the patient still died as the process of transfusion was
- The trial court dismissed the complaint for damages. Hence, this appeal.
- W/N Dr. Favis is liable for the death of plaintiffsdaughter.
- No. Even though the operation was done in the clinic of Dr. Favis and not
in the Ilocos Sur Provincial Hospital, the parents consented to it and the
evidence disclose that Dr. Favis had all the attention and care in
conducting the operation in his clinic.
- Where, as in the instant case, the qualifications of a physician are
admitted, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes
the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill
in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.
- There must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well
as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of the
patient. In the performance of Dr. Favis professional duties, there is no
fixed rule for a physician to follow. If he has the necessary qualifications,
he needs only such degree of skill and ordinary learning as this and that
circumstance may require, using the care and diligence as the best of his

judgment would dictate, and as each particular circumstance or

circumstances may require.
- Under the given circumstances, the presumption of negligence cannot
arise, is neither available simply from the mere fact that the ministration of
a physician had been unsuccessful or failed to produce the expected
results. If it were otherwise, it would open unnecessarily the floodgates of
actions against physicians and surgeons.
- All that is needed in this case is that the physician had employed
conscientiously his best judgment such as the circumstances may require
which, based on the evidence, is so in this case. Dr. Favis conducted the
operation according to how the operation should be conducted and the
death was because of unpredictable developments.
21. RASUMAN v. MANILA REYNA HOSPITAL (Cesarian section operation.
Tetanus. Negligent. Operation was proximate cause of death)
- Linda Ramusan was admitted by defendant private hospital for maternity
and medical attention as an obstetrical case. Dr. Alfredo Pedrajas
performed a ceasarian section with appendectomy operation on her. A
baby boy was delivered. After Linda was discharged she was brought to her
parents' home. She complained of stiffness of neck and locked jaw, and
was brought back to the hospital. She was again attended to by Dr.
Pedrajas. Despite medication, she became worse and died on the following
day. Her death certificate stated that the direct cause of death was
"cerebral anoxia; respiratory failure probably due to tetanus." Plaintiffs
legal heirs of the deceased charged defendants with negligence and not
exercising due care in handling Linda's case.
- The heirs of Ramusan presented Dr. Tamano as an expert witness. Linda's
husband and Dr. Tamano testified that Linda was given some tests,
including a spinal tap, when she was brought back to the hospital. Dr.
Tamano testified that this was in order to determine whether or not Linda
had meningitis. Tamano also testified as to the incubation period of
tetanus and the symptoms of Linda which were consistent with tetanus.
Tamano theorized that tetanus germs entered Linda's body through her
surgical wounds, presumably through unsterilized equipment. Dr. Pedrajas
testified that the death certificate stated "probably due to tetanus" and
claimed Linda's death could have been to other causes.

- TC found for the plaintiffs. On appeal to the CA, defendants raised several
issues which the court consolidated into one.

damages against petitioner Dr. Mariter Mendoza in 1993 before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City.

- W/N the defendants-appellants (hospital) were guilty of negligence and
mismanagement of the case of Linda Ramusan resulting to her death.

On February 13, 1993 Josephine underwent hysterectomy and

myomectomy that Dr. Mendoza performed on her at the Iloilo Doctors
Hospital. After her operation, Josephine experienced recurring fever,
nausea, and vomiting. Three months after the operation, she noticed
while taking a bath something protruding from her genital. She tried
calling Dr. Mendoza to report it but the latter was unavailable. Josephine
instead went to see another physician, Dr. Edna Jamandre-Gumban, who
extracted a foul smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix.

- YES. While it is true that tetanus could have been introduced inside
Linda's body through other means beside the surgical wounds it cannot be
denied that six days before she died, she underwent a ceasarian with
appendectomy operation in the the defendant-appellant's private hospital
performed by Dr. Pedrajas. The CA agreed with the lower court's findings
that tetanus was introduced inside the body of Linda while still in the
responsibility and care of defendant-appellants.
- Firstly, there was a surgical wound which is conclusively considered a
mode of entry of tetanus. Second, six days after her operation, symptoms
were felt by Linda which is consistent with the incubation period of
tetanus. Thirdly, Linda's condition, despite medical attendance, never
improved. Fourthly, she
succumbed to death a day after. Finally, Linda's death certificate which
was issued by Dr. Pedrajas stated the immediate causes of death cerebral
anoxia and respiratory failure which are usually of death for tetanus
victims occurring within the first week.
- The facts of the case left the court with no doubt but to conclude that
tetanus was introduced inside Linda's body which proved to be fatal due to
the negligence of defendant-appellants in the management of her case.
Where the proximate cause of death of a patient is the operation handled
negligently by the hospital and physician, because tetanus germs entered
the patient's body while still in the responsibility of the hospital and
physician, compensatory damages were awarded.
22. MENDOZA v. CASUMPANG (FULL CASE dahil maiksi lang naman. Gauze
left in body after operation.
Josephine Casumpang, substituted by her respondent husband Adriano
and their children Jennifer Adriane and John Andre, filed an action for

The discovery of the gauze and the illness she went through prompted
Josephine to file a damage suit against Dr. Mendoza before the RTC of
Iloilo City. Because Josephine died before trial could end, her husband and
their children substituted her in the case. She was a housewife and 40
years old when she died.
On March 7, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Dr. Mendoza guilty
of neglect that caused Josephines illness and eventual death and ordering
her to pay plaintiffs heirs actual damages of P50,000.00, moral damages of
P200,000.00, and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus costs of suit.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself and
dismissed the complaint in an order dated June 23, 2005.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision on March 18,
2011, reinstating the RTCs original decision. The CA held that Dr.
Mendoza committed a breach of her duty as a physician when a gauze
remained in her patients body after surgery. The CA denied her motion
for reconsideration on July 18, 2011, prompting her to file the present
Petitioner claims that no gauze or surgical material was left in Josephines
body after her surgery as evidenced by the surgical sponge count in the
But she raises at this Courts level a question of fact when parties may raise

only questions of law before it in petitions for review on certiorari from the
CA. With few exceptions, the factual findings of the latter court are
generally binding. None of those exceptions applies to this case.
As the RTC pointed out, Josephine did not undergo any other surgical
operation. And it would be much unlikely for her or for any woman to
inject a roll of gauze into her cervix. As the Court held inProfessional
An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not
complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the
leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the
incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating
surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due
care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of
authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.
The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded
exemplary damages against Dr. Mendoza when, under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be awarded in cases of gross negligence.
A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He
must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and materials
used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up have been
correctly done. To provide an example to the medical profession and to
stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to a patients health, the
award of exemplary damages in this case is in order.
Further, in view of Josephines death resulting from petitioners
negligence, civil indemnity under Article 2206 of the Civil Code should be
given to respondents as heirs. The amount of P50,000.00 is fixed by
prevailing jurisprudence for this kind.
The Court also deems it just and equitable under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code to increase the award of attorneys fees from P20,000.00 to

WHEREFORE, the Court entirely AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated March 18, 2011 with the MODIFICATION ordering
petitioner Mariter Mendoza to pay respondents Adriano, Jennifer Adriane
and John Andre, all surnamed Casumpang, an additional P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, additional P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and civil
indemnity arising from death in the amount of P50,000.00.
23. DE GUIA v. MANILA ELECTRIC CO (standing on the rear of the truck.
Contractual breach)
- Manuel De Guia is a physician who rode the street car line of the Manila
Electric Railroad (Railroad Company) which met an accident of which De
Guia was injured as a result.
- De Guia was riding on the back platform when the wheels of the rear
truck left the track which as a result, caused it to bump a post and threw
De Guia against the door.
- Hence, De Guia is suing the company seeking damages for the injuries he
sustained and certain alleged transactions and occurrences which caused
him damage.
- The trial court held the railroad company liable for damages but
disallowed certain items being claimed by De Guia.
- W/N the defense of the company that it took steps to ascertain the
qualifications of the employee and providing for training is tenable.
- W/N damages for medical services are proper.
- NO. The defense of the company is untenable. The breach here is a
contractual breach (Art. 1103-1107 of the Civil Code) which is different
from that of culpa aquilana which the railroad company relies on for its
defense (Art. 1903 of the Civil Code). However, the court has the power to
moderate liability according to circumstances of the case. The railroad
companys liability is limited to such damages as might, at the time of the
accident, have been reasonably foreseen as a probable consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff and which were in fact a
necessary result of those injuries.

- YES. The first item, the lost professional income by reason of the injury
for three months is proper. However, the second item, which is the
opportunity of being a district health officer in Occidental Negros was
speculative. It is evident that the damages are too speculative in nature.
The last element of damages, were the medical expenses. A person who is
entitled to recover expenses for cure as an item of damage in a civil action
for physical injuries cannot recover doctors bills for services gratuitously
rendered and the claim must furthermore be limited to medical expenses
reasonably suited to the case. Charges of professional experts retained
merely with a view to promote the success of the action for damages
should not be allowed.
24. CARLOS v. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (storm. Electric current causing death.
Meralco NOT liable but CITY ELECTRICIAN responsible)
- Manila Electrics street railway track on Calle Gagalangin was on the east
side of the street and its trolley wire was uncovered and carried a current
of high voltage. Above Manila Electrics wires were the insulated wires of a
telephone company. Trees towered above the wires.
- Manila was visited by a typhoon of extraordinary violence. One of the
trees was broken or uprooted and its fall broke one of the telephone
companys wires. The free end of the wire was carried by the wind across
the trolley wire of Manila Electric and striking the wet ground, established
a circuit and became charged with dangerous current.
- A child struck the live telephone wire and was killed. Alfonso Sobrevilla, a
policeman on duty, who went to the assistance was himself killed.
- Manila Electric shut off the current immediately upon receipt of order
from city electrician.
- W/N Manila Electric was negligent in:
o Failing to guard its wires so a falling telephone wire would not come in
contact with them
o Not cutting off its current upon its own initiative on account of the
danger from the unusual severity of the storm which had been raging for
some time prior to the order of the city electrician

- No. Art. 1105: No person shall be liable for events which could not
foreseen, or which having been foreseen were inevitable, with the
exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or hose in which the
obligation so declares.
- In this case, it was Manila Electrics privilege and duty to supply electric
current to the city and keep its cars running as long as possible. The people
depended on this service.
- Although the law implies a duty of using a very high degree of care in the
construction, operation and maintenance of its appliances, and that the
degree of skill and diligence should be commensurate with the danger
involve, the only precautionary measure Manila Electric could have taken
was the stringing of guard wires over the trolley wires so as to prevent the
telephone wires, suspended above, from falling on those uninsulated and
highly charged wires. However, practical experience has proved that guard
wires are not effective, because themselves liable to be blown down or
disarranged by storms.
- The city electrician was given the power to inspect all wires and other
apparatus. City authorities have real supervision and control over Manila
Electrics railway and light system.
25. PICART v. SMITH (pony case. Last clear chance. Both negligent)
- Picart was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge at San Fernando, La
- Before Picart had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile. Smith blew his horn to warn his
- Picart, perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or rapidity of Smiths
approach, pulled the pony up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going left.
- Appearing that Picart was not observing road rules, Smith gave two more
successive blasts. Smith guided toward his left, which is the proper side of
the road, assuming that Picart would move to the other side.
- At this stage, the pony had not yet exhibited fright.
- Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.

- The automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it

became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. It was struck and the limb was broken.
- W/N Smith was negligent.
- W/N Picart was negligent
- YES. As Smith started across the bridge, he had the right to pass assume
that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge, it was demonstrated to his eyes
that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that
it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving
- From the moment Picart no longer had the power to escape being run
down and the automobile was yet some distance away, the control of the
situation had passed entirely to Smith and it was his duty either to bring
his car to an immediate stop, or take the other side and pass sufficiently
far from the horse to avoid the danger of collision, there being no other
persons. Instead, he ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. In
view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that if
the animal has unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited.
- The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in a situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
- TEST: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeaser would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding
against its consequences.
- YES. Picart himself was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself
on the wrong side of the road. But Smith was the agent immediately and
directly responsible. The negligence of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, there was an appreciable interval. The law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party. Thus damages should be reduced.

26. ACHEVARA v. RAMOS (passenger jeep. On opposite side of road. Last

clear chance does not apply here)
FACTS: respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno
Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the national highway
in Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent
manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to
encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by
Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death,
notwithstanding prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged that
Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep.
Petitioners allege that Benigno Valdez was driving southward at a
moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south
and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the
west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep
towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type
jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side
of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who
was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well
knew had a mechanical defect.
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable.
RULING: It was the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a
defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and runningfast in a zigzag
manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez
was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the
road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the
rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the
right shoulder of the road and letting the owner type jeep pass before
proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals
correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by
neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man

would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which

proximately caused injury to another.
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant who had
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the
prior negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply
where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case,
because even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last
chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the
western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity
to avoid the collision.
27. BANK OF AMERICA v. PHIL RACING CLUB (Pre signed blank checks.
Irregularity on face but was encashed. BOTH liable)
1. Plaintiff PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains a current
account with petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized signatories are the
company President and Vice-President. By virtue of a travel abroad for
these officers, they pre-signed checks to accommodate any expenses that
may come up while they were abroad for a business trip. The said presigned checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs accounting officer.
Unfortunately, the two (2) of said checks came into the hands of one of its
employees who managed to encash it with petitioner bank. The said check
was filled in with the use of a check-writer, wherein in the blank for the
'Payee', the amount in words was written, with the word 'Cash' written
above it.
2. Clearly there was an irregularity with the filling up of the blank checks as
both showed similar infirmities and irregularities and yet, the petitioner
bank did not try to verify with the corporation and proceeded to encash
the checks.
3. PRC filed an action for damages against the bank. The lower court
awarded actual and exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the

lower court's decision and held that the bank was negligent. Hence this
appeal. Petitioner contends that it was merely doing its obligation under
the law and contract in encashing the checks, since the signatures in the
checks are genuine.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and
thus should pay damages to PRC
Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last clear chance
to prevent the fraudulent encashment hence it is the one foremost liable .
1. There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but
the presence of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted
the bank to exercise caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that
banks are in the business impressed with public interest that they are duty
bound to protect their clients and their deposits at all times. They must
treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest
degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The
diligence required of banks are more than that of a good father of a family.
2. The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously negligent
and highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. Its
own negligence must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability.
Moreover, the person who stole the checks is also an employee of the
plaintiff, a clerk in its accounting department at that. As the employer, PRC
supposedly should have control and supervision over its own employees.
3. The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of
damages while PRC should shoulder 40% of the said amount.
Torts and Damages:*
In every tort case filed under Article 2176, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence:(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;(2) the fault
or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he
must respond; and(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence and the damages incurred.*

A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly
donefrom a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates asituation involvi
ng an unreasonable risk to another because of theexpectable action of the
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from
which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar
foreseesuch an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to d
o theact or to do it in a more careful manner.*
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated
as follows: Did
in committing the
allegednegligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinar
y person would have used in the same situation?
Facts:Tanjangcos owned joined lots in Corinthian Gardens. Spouse Cuasos, on the other
hand, own a lot adjacent to the formers. Before the Cuasos constructed their
house, it was surveyed by De Dios Realty(surveyor) as per recommendation of
the petitioner association. Later on, the petitioner approved the plans
made by CB Paras Construction (builder).Corinthian conducted periodic
ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved
plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian (MRRC).
Unfortunately, after construction, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached upon the
Tanjangcos lot.
Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and,
if so,whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
Decision: Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is tainted with
Ratio: Petitioner is found negligent under the TEST. The MRRC provides that no new
constructions can be started without the approval of the petitioner
association. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, inth
e approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections
of on
going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuringcompliance
with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of
perimeterwalls.Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cua
sos perimeterwall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted

constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury

suffered by the Tanjangcos.
NB: This is another case where the court ruled using Article 2176 despite
the fact that there is an existing contractual obligation between the
parties. (just a thought to ponder on)
- While Criselda was signing her credit card in Syvels Department Store,
her daughter, Zhieneth, was suddenly pinned down by the bulk of the
stores gift wrapping counter or structure.
- Zhieneth was operated and died 14 days later due to intra-abdominal
injuries from blunt injury, contusion, rupture of the stomach and anterior
walls, hemorrhage.
- Criselda demanded reimbursements from Jarco Marketing for
hospitalization, medical bills, wake and funeral expenses.
- Jarco refused to pay, which prompted Criselda in filing a complaint for
- Jarco Marketing denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death
of Zhieneth. They attributed the unfortunate events to Criseldas
negligence in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing
her to freely roam the store. Zhienenth was also guilty of contributory
negligence since she climbed the counter. Jarcos other defense was that
the counter was made of sturdy wood and had never collapsed in the past
15 years.
- The TC dismissed the complaint
- The CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
- W/N the death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence
- If negligence was in fact present, whether the same was attributable to
private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to Criselda for
failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
- YES. Zhieneths falls was attributable to negligence.
o Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and

reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.
o The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the
landmark case of Picart v. Smith. Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation?. If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
- Negligence was attributable to Jarco Marketing.
o Employees testified that they had been for a while informing the store
that the said structure, not being nailed down was unstable, and because
the top of which was heavy could have collapsed at anytime. And while
said employees had informed the store, no concrete action to remedy the
situation nor ensure the safety of the stores employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done.
o The testimony of the child after the operation that she had done nothing
and did not come near the counter when it fell on her. Formed part of RES
o RES GESTAE statements made by a person while startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gastae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
- Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a token.
- While he was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
- A fight ensued, and Navidad fell on the tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,operated by Rodolfo
Roman was coming in.
- Navidad was struck by the mving train and he was killed instantaneously.

- The CA exonerated Prudent (security agency) from any liability and

holding LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
- W/N CA was right in making LRTA and Roman liable.
- NO. LRTA is liable, Roman is not.
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the
nature of its business and for reason of public policy, burdened with the
duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers
- The law requires common carriers to carry passengers sagely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligated it not only during the course of the trip but so long
as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage.
- The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
- In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrie on how the
accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court,
have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act
or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Artile 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine
the liability for tort may arise even under a contract, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of
a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the
rules on tort to apply.
- There is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor for the reason
that the negligence of its employee, Escartin has not been duly proven.

Similarly, no showing that petitioner Roman was himself guilty of any

culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability.
On May 14, 2004, at about three oclock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara
a passenger
headed towards Bicol to
onion crops, with his
companions (Cresencio
Samuel, Dominador
Antonio and Joel). While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong,
Quezon, a PNR train, operated by respondent Estranas, suddenly turned
up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the
instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the
other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical
injuries. At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at
the railroad crossing. Additionally, the Stop, Look and Listen signage was
poorly maintained. The Stop signage was already faded while the
Listen signage was partly blocked by another signboard. Respondents
filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga,
the alternate driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan City. In
the complaint the respondents alleged:
proximate cause of the accident was the petitioners gross negligence in
not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to persons and
At the railroad track, there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or
bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching train.
Petitioners claimed:
exercised due diligence in operating the train and monitoring its
roadworthiness. Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed.
400 meters away from the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn to
approaching train. However, when the train was
a l r e a d y t e n 1 0 m e t e r s a w a y f r o m t h e intersection,
the passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly
crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes

to avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the
train, it did not instantly come to a complete stop until the jeepney was
dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision.
ruled in favor of the respondents. PNR, Estranas and Saga was ordered to
jointly and severally pay approximately P2.1M CA-reduced the amount
WON the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
YES. Petitioners
to install adequate
safety devices at the
crossing which
proximately caused the collision .
Petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into
consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward
incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to
prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an
approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the Stop,
Look and Listen signage installed in the area was poorly maintained,
hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger.
signaling device in
good condition,
just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage, is needed to
give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to
use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to
do so would be an indication of negligence.
There was NO contributory negligence on the pa
rt of the respondents.
CONTRIBUTORYNEGLIGENCE is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.
It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of
the person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury.
Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their
aware of the forthcoming danger. Itwas established du
r i n g t h e t r i a l t h a t t h e j e e p n e y c a r r y i n g t h e respondents was

following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to five meters
ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo,
the driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the
impression that it was safe to proceed. Likewise, there was no crossing
bar to prevent them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to
forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus, relying on his
faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to
anticipate the impending danger. The maintenance of safety equipment
and warning signals at railroad crossings is equally important as their
installation since poorly maintained safety warning devices court as much
danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of safety
warning signals at railroad crossing carries with it the
presumption that they are in good working condition
a n d t h a t t h e p u b l i c m a y d e p e n d o n t h e m f o r assistance. If
they happen to be neglected and inoperative, the public may be misled
into relying on the impression of safety they normally convey
and eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.

32. LILIUS v. MANILA RAILROAD 59 Phil 758 (pagsanjan not obvious that
there was a railroad. Hit by train)
- Lilius (journalist, author and photorapher), his wife and daughter left
Manila for Pagsanjan for a sight-seeing trip, in their Studebaker car driven
by Lilius.
- It was the first time that Lilius drove from Calauan to Pagsanjan via
Dayap. He was never acquainted with the conditions of the road at said
points and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at
Dayap. Before reaching the crossing, there was nothing to indicate its
existence as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along the road. It
was impossible to see an approaching train.
- As several people who seemed to alight from a parked truck walked on
the opposite side of the road, he slowed down and sounded his horn for
the people to get out of the way. With his attention occupied, he did not
see the crossing but heard two short whistles.

- Immediately, the locomotive struck the car right in the center, dragging it
about 10 meters, throwing it upon a siding. Lilius wife and daughter were
thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground unconscious and
seriously hurt.
- There had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing.
Nobody was there to warn the public of approaching trains. The flagman
arrived after the collision. He had many times absented himself from his
post. The train left Bay station a little late and therefore traveled at great
- Who are liable?
- Manila Railroad alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own
negligence (not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing
at Dayap, to serve as a warning) and that of his employees, for not having
employed the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of
the said employees in the discharge of their duties.
- Although the company employed the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting its employees, it did not employ such diligence in
supervising their work and discharge of duties. It would have had a sign at
crossing, flagman at his post.
- The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order
to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of
subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.
- The employees: (1) flagman and switchman for not having remained at
his post at the crossing to warn passers-by, (2) stationmaster for failing to
send the flagman and switchman to his post on time, (3) engineer for not
having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident in view of the
absence of the flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and
continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the
- Lilius took all precautions. He was driving at a speed which prudence
demanded, blowing his horn upon seeing persons. The only warning which
he received of the impending danger was two short blows immediately
preceding the collision.

33. WRIGHT V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 28 Phil 122 (Calesa. Slipped. A little
- Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street
railway in Manila and its suburbs, including Caloocan.
- Wrights residence in Caloocan fronts a street along which Manila
Electrics tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street, he is
obliged to cross
the tracks. The rails were above-ground, some 5 or 6 inches or more above
the level of the street.
- One night, Wright drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to
enter the premises, the horse stumbled and fell causing the vehicle to
strike one of the rails. This threw Wright from the vehicle and caused
- Manila Electric was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but it is contended
that Wright was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent
at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself
properly and that such was the primary cause of the accident.
- The trial court rendered both parties negligent but awarded Wright
P1,000 because his negligence was not as great as Manila Electrics.
- Both parties appealed. Wright contends that damages were insufficient,
while Manila Electric contends that Wright would have crossed the track
safely as he had done a hundred times before if he had been sober.
- W/N the negligence of Wright contributed to the principal occurrence
(he cannot recover), or only to his own injury (entitled to damages).
- NO. Note:
o If the negligence was the primary cause of the accident, he cannot
o If the negligence had nothing to do with the accident but contributed to
his injury, then the trial court war correct in apportioning the damages.

o If there was no negligence, he should be awarded damages adequate to

the injury sustained.
- Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence.
- It is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary
care of prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is
required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than
by a sober one.
- In this case, it is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen
from the vehicle under the conditions described.
o Wright was not negligent. Manila Electric, however, is negligent for
having left the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there
is a large amount of travel.
34. U.S. V. KNIGHT 26 Phil 216 (roller. Little boy run over. Not liable. Gave
timely notice and was driving at appropriate speed)
- Knight was driving a heavily loaded automobile truck on a street that was
wholly unoccupied and clear of all obstruction save for a road roller. The
was running at a rate of 8 miles an hour and that at a distance of about 45
to 50 feet from the roller, he sounded his horn twice in order to overtake
the roller. Just as he was overtaking, a boy jumped from the step of the
roller directly in front of the truck and was run over and killed.
- W/N Knight should be held liable
- NO. Accdg to Act. No. 2159,
o SEC. 25. Every person operating a motor vehicle on a highway shall turn
to the left when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to
the right when overtaking persons or vehicles going in the same direction,
unless a different course of action is required in the interests of the safety
unless a different course of action is required in the interests of the safety
and security of the safety and security of life, person, or property.

o SEC. 31. When meeting or overtaking persons or vehicles every operator

of a motor vehicle shall give timely notice and warning of his proximity by
sounding his horn. Such warning should be sounded when the operator,
having regard to the speed at which he is traveling, is still a safe distance
from the person or vehicle about to be met or overtaken and before the
motor vehicle has drawn opposite to or abreast of such person or vehicle,
the intent of this provision being the requirement of a warning within such
a distance that the same will be clearly heard and not within such short
distance that, owing to its nearness and suddenness, it is likely to cause
fright or startle the person, horse or other animal which is being met or
- The charge of reckless negligence in this case cannot be sustained unless
the evidence be deemed sufficient to establish either that the accident was
due to the fact that, when it occurred defendant was on the wrong side of
the street; or that he was running at an excessive speed; or that he had
failed to give timely notice of his approach to those who were riding on the
road roller by sounding his horn.
- It is the duty of the prosecution in each case to prove by competent
evidence not only the existence of criminal negligence, but that the
accused was guilty thereof."

35. U.S. V. TANEDO 15 Phil 196 (hunting wild chickens. Accidentally shot
the deceased. ACQUITTED. Evidence not enough to support conviction.
When defense is that act was accidental it falls on the state to prove that it
was not.)
- Taedo , with the intention of hunting wild chickens in the forest asked
the deceased where a good place would be to hunt. The deceased pointed
in the direction of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack where
he lived. Taedo spotted a wild chicken and shot it. After he shot the
chicken he heard a human cry, so he picked up the chicken and went near
the place where he
heard the noise. He saw the deceased was wounded so Taedo went back
to where his labourers were fixing the dam and asked for the help of one
of his trusted friends. They hid the body of the deceased among the cogon
grass and later that night they moved it to the well.

- The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the
deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he
confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
- CFI found the accused guilty of homicide. Taedo appealed.
- W/N Taedo should be acquitted
- YES. The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.
- It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in
the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without
intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
- In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of
the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the
commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the
defendant are his concealment and denial.
- Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not
required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the
State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the
jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the
prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the
State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct
the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was
properly held to be erroneous.
36. U.S. V. TAYONGTONG 21 Phil 476 (Painter of telephone poles hit by
automobile. ACQUITTED. Not enough evidence to prove beyond
reasonable doubt. Faulty testimonies of witness)

- Severino was engaged in painting telephone poles located along the

highway between Jaro and Iloilo.
- The highway at the point where Severino met his death was straight, of
considerable width and in good condition.
- A passenger automobile driven by Tayongtong ran over Severino.
- According to Pablo Tayson, the sole witness of the prosecution, the
automobile driven by Tayongtong was travelling at a very high speed
and was zigzagging along the road when it hit Severino, who did not move
from the position where he stood
- According to accused Tayongtong, he was driving along the road while all
of a sudden Severino crossed the street, possibly to escape the clouds of
dust that was blowing towards their direction; that Severino misjudged the
speed of the automobile and was by then impossible to avoid a collision.
- W/N there was enough evidence to support a conviction against
- NO. We are satisfied that the evidence is not sufficient to convict. On
the contrary, we believe that, under all of the facts and circumstances of
the case, the fair preponderance of the evidence indicates that the
deceased met his death in substantially the manner described by the
- Pablo Taysons credibility was affected by an attack made upon his
credibility during the progress of the trial, he made varying statements
during the pretrial and the trial proper
- Furthermore, his testimony is unreasonable. It is improbable that a
machine as large as the one in question, going at the rate of speed
described by Pablo Tayson, could zigzag from one side of the highway to
the other in the manner described by the witness.
- It is undisputed evidence of the case that the portion of the machine
which struck the deceased first was the mudguard over the left wheel. This
fact alone shows the impossibility of the machine having hit the deceased
while standing at the post, as it is admitted that no part of the automobile
collided with the post.
- On the other hand, the story told by the accused and supported by
some passengers who saw the accident is entirely reasonable, accords with
common sense and ordinary experience.

- There was no reason for Tayongtong to zigzag in the manner described by

Tayson. Moreover, it is unreasonable for the deceased not to have moved
from his alleged position when he could have easily moved to the side of
the post to avoid being hit by the automobile.
- The accused is therefore declared not guilty.

37. BARCELO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 29 Phil 351 (Lights for altar. Fire.
Acquitted. Evidence not sufficient.)
- Plaintiff and her sisterhood contracted Manila Electric for the installation
of four small electric lights in the arch or roof of the niche of the altar for
the better illumination of the scene beneath.
- Although not entirely finished, the workman assured the sister in charge
that it was safe to use them.
- The lights were tried at that time, were used the night of the 24th and
again on the afternoon of the 27th, a total of about 2 to 2.5 hours.
- Shortly after using the lights on the 27th a fire broke out in or near the
chapel which destroyed the building and contents.
- W/N the electric company was negligent in installing the electric lights to
warrant recovery of damages.
- NO. The burden of proof always rests on one who seeks to recover
damages on the ground of the alleged negligence of another. Before
judgment for damages can be entered in such cases, the fact of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.
- We do not doubt that cases may arise wherein an inference of negligence
in the workmanship or in materials used may be predicated on proof of a
fire breaking out at or near a recent electrical installation under
circumstances which preclude the reasonable possibility that it its origin in
any other way. But such an inference could only be maintained on clear
and satisfactory proof that no reasonable ground exists for believing that
the fire might have originated from some other cause in which there is

unimpeached evidence tending to show that the installation had been

properly made.
- In the case at bar, we do not feel that we would be justified in holding
that there is any greater probability that the fire had its origin in the
negligence of the skilled workman who made the installation, that that it
may have been occasioned by the negligence of some of the sisters or
attendants in extinguishing the candles that stood nearby the altar,
decorated as it was for the festal season with paper flowers and other
inflammable materials, or that it may have resulted from the carelessness
of some of the ladies or children in putting these decorations in too close
proximity to the open swinging lamp filled with coconut oil.
38. ONG V. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 104 Phil 397 (Ong drowned
in swimming pool. Not negligent. Did everything to revive the boy)
- Petitioners are the parents of the late Dominador Ong, their son.
- Defendant is a government-owned corporation, and it admits that the
plaintiffs son was drowned in one its swimming pools.
- In the afternoon of 5 July 1952, Dominador went to the swimming pools
together with his two brothers.
- Later in the afternoon, some boys in the pool area informed the lifeguard
that somebody was swimming in the pool for quite some time already.
- The lifeguard immediately dove into the pool to retrieve the body of
- The lifeguard performed CPR, the male nurse also assisted, the sanitary
inspector followed, and the Doctor arrived and ordered the body to be
taken to the clinic because he found the boy to be already dead.
- W/N the death of Dominador can be attributed to the negligence of
defendant and or/its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover
- NO. The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article
2080 of the new Civil Code. The first article provides that "whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damages done." Such fault or negligence is called

quasi-delict. Under the second article, this obligation is demandable not

only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
- Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming
damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault
or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one
of his employees.
- The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved
from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything
possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the edge of
the pool, lifeguard Abao immediately gave him manual artificial
respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse Armando Rule arrived, followed by
sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen
resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the
inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the
manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen
resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts
were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the
Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body he
found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has
done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to
minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
39. BPI V. LIFETIME MARKETING CORP. 555 SCRA 383 (agent. Verbally
cancelled transaction and BPI employee did not ask for the original receipt.
BPI negligent. Contributory negligence on lifetime for not keeping a close
eye on accounts)
- Lifetime Marketing Corporation (LMC), opened a current account with
the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)This is where the "sales agents" of
LMC would have to deposit their collections or payments. LMC and BPI,
made a special arrangement that the former's agents will accomplish 3
copies of the deposit slips, the third copy to be retained and held by the
teller until LMC's authorized representatives retrieves them on the
following banking day.

- LMC then availed of the BPI's inter-branch banking network services in

Metro Manila, whereby the former's agents could make [a] deposit to any
BPI branch in Metro Manila under the same account. Under this system,
BPI's bank tellers were no longer obliged to retain the extra copy of the
deposit slips instead, they will rely on the machine-validated deposit slip,
to be submitted by LMC's agents. For its part, BPI would send to LMC a
monthly bank statement relating to the subject account.
- The registered sales agents or the Lifetime Educational Consultants of
LMC, can get the books from the latter on consignment basis, then they
would go directly to their clients to sell. These agents or Lifetime
Educational Consultants would then pay to LMC through BPI, seven (7)
days after they pick up all the books to be sold. It has been LMC's practice
to require its agents to present a validated deposit slip and, on that basis,
LMC would issue to the latter an acknowledgement receipt.
- Alice Laurel, one of LMC's agents, deposited checks to LMC's subject
account at different branches of BPI. Each check thus deposited were
retrieved by Laurel after the deposit slips were machine-validated. Laurel
verbally requested that the transactions be reversed and this was granted.
Based on general banking practices, however, the cancellation of deposit
or payment transactions upon request by any depositor or payor, requires
that all copies of the deposit slips must be retrieved or surrendered to the
bank. This practice, in effect, cancels the deposit or payment transaction,
thus, it leaves no evidence for any subsequent claim or misrepresentation
made by any innocent third person.
- Laurel presented the machine-validated deposit slips to LMC which then
considered her account paid. The fraudulent transactions of Laurel was
made possible through BPI teller's failure to retrieve the duplicate original
copies of the deposit slips from the former, every time they ask for
cancellation or reversal of the deposit or payment transaction.
- When BPI discovered this the BPI managers admitted that they cancelled,
without the permission of or due notice to LMC, the deposit transactions
made by Laurel based only upon verbal requests.
- The Court ordered BPI to pay LMC damages in the amount of Php 1M.
- W/N BPI observed the highest degree of care, as required by the nature
of the banking industry, in handling LMC's account.

- NO. They were negligent. Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence
in this case lies in the tellers' disregard of the validation procedures in
place and BPI's utter failure to supervise its employees. Notably, BPI's
managers admitted in several correspondences with LMC that the deposit
transactions were cancelled without LMC's knowledge and consent and
based only upon the request of Alice Laurel and her husband.
- It is well to reiterate that the degree of diligence required of banks is
more than that of a reasonable man or a good father of a family. In view of
the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are
duty-bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of
- BPI cannot escape liability because of LMC's failure to scrutinize the
monthly statements sent to it by the bank. This omission does not change
the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of BPI's
tellers in failing to require the surrender of the machine-validated deposit
slips before reversing the deposit transactions, the loss would not have
occurred. BPI's negligence is undoubtedly the proximate cause of the loss.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
- LMC should have been vigilant in examining its own financial records;
hence the CA correctly reduced the amount awarded (contributory
negligence). Since the actual damages were not appealed the CA should
not have increased it.
40. PENULLAR V. PNB 120 SCRA 171 (ownership over a parcel of land
disputed. Plaintiffs failed to oppose the registration within the
reglementary period. NEGLIGENT)
- Genoveva Miguel filed a case against Praxedes Moya et al, predecessors
of the plaintiff Penullar for declaration of ownership of three parcels of
land. While pending, an action for application for registration was filed by
Genoveva, which Praxedes opposed.

- While both actions were pending, Praxedes was able to obtain a free
patent over the property and an original certificate of title was issued.
Another original certificate of title was issued to Josefa SIson also one of
the plaintiffs predecessors.
- Trial Judge suspended the hearing for both the cases in order for
Genoveva to investigate the original certificates of title.
- Genoveva failed to take any steps for the prosecution of her action in the
Civil case, it was therefore dismissed.
- However, she prosecuted the registration case, and the Registration
Court promulgated a decision on her favor. Since she already died, it was
her successors in interest who filed for a writ of possession which was
- A few months after, herein plaintiff Christina Penullar filed an action for
the annulment of registration against the heirs of Genoveva as well as the
encumbrance by way of mortgage constituted by heirs to PNB.
- PNB submitted by special defense that it was an innocent mortgagee for
value having granted the loans to the heirs of Genoveva.
- RTC ruled in favor of Penullar and annulled the titles issued in favor of
Genovevas heirs.
- CA modified the appeal to the effect that the mortgages in favor of PNB
are declared valid.
- W/N the mortgage was VALID.
- W/N it was the negligence of the petitioners predecessors which caused
the problem.
- Yes. A mortgage can be considered valid even if it comes from a void
certificate of title.
- Yes. Where one of two innocent parties must have to suffer due to the
act of a third person, he whose negligence had caused the damage should
be made to bear the loss.
- The predecessors Praxedes and Josefa failed to appeal the decision in the
registration case. Instead, they let the decision in the registration case gain
the status of finality; allowed without prior protest, the certificate of title
to be issued; did not even as early as possible, annotate an adverse claim
on the "titles; and they filed this case only several months afterwards, it

was their negligence that permitted said adjudicatees in the said

registration case to apply for and secure mortgages from the Bank.

41. CANLAS V. COURT OF APPEALS 326 SCRA 415 (Manosca the scammer.
Able to get titles from Canlas. With IMPOSTOR Canlas spouses obtained
loan from bank. Last clear chance applicable here. Bank did not ask for ID.
- Osmundo Canlas and Vicente Manosca decided to be partners in a
business venture and to raise the capital.
- Canlas agreed to sell to Manosca his parcels of land at lower price, the
difference would be his investment in the business.
- Canlas delivered to Manosca the transfer certificates of title of the
parcels of land, the latter also gave postdated checks to Canlas, but the
later check was not sufficiently funded.
- Manosca was able to secure a loan from Asian Savings Bank worth P500,
000 with the use of the parcels of land as his security. He was accompanied
by imposters who claimed to be the Canlas Spouses. The loan was not
paid, therefore, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and eventually sold it at
an auction sale.
- Canlas instituted an action to annul the deed of real estate mortgage.
- RTC ruled in favor of Canlas ordering the REM and the auction sale to be
void and without effect.
- CA reversed the RTC decision.
- W/N the CA erred in holding that Asian Savings Bank exercised due
diligence in granting the loan application of Manosca.
- NO. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good
father of a family; in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the
necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled
property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, holding in
trust the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the bank should
guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith, by reason of which the

bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law,
accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.
- It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was
exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity.
- Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applicable here, the
respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of
last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently,
the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude
recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
- Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Maosca
the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the owner's
copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land, it cannot
be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by
the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for
banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them.
- For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions,
whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings
Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.

42. GAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 165 SCRA 378 (two parked vehicles. Hit
old man crossing the road. The EMERGENCY RULE. Asking too much from a
mere mortal. No opportunity for rational thinking)
- The accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay
Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay
Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one
side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from
each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place where
the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the

opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass

the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by
the accused.
- To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant
swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the
Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard
from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney.
- The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward
hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured,
the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on
its rear and front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden
portion of its rear.
- The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was
immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was
(pronounced) dead on arrival.
- RTC and CA found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- W/N the CA erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime Homicide
through reckless imprudence.
- YES. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous
results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. A corollary rule is
what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence."
- The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said The accused
should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the

opposite direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing

towards its left. She should not only have swerved the car she was driving
to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that
she would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but
also the jeepney which was then parked along the street.
- Under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the
appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner
who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate
herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the
overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with
all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger
confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very
existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough
time to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation.

43. PEOPLE V. SANTOS (CA) 44 OG 1289 (Conductor was driving. Hit jeep.
Driver not driving because stomach ache or in the testimony of conductor
he was drunk. Whatever was the reason was of little consequence. Did not
exercise enough diligence in overtaking a 6x6 truck. Emergency rule does
NOT apply here)
- Defendants are Angel Santos, driver of the passenger truck, and Antonio
Teves, the conductor thereof.
- While the conductor, Teves was driving the passenger truck, he made an
attempt to overtake the 6x6 truck in front of them.
- In doing so, it collided with a jeepney coming from the opposite lane.
- Several passengers were thrown out and one of them Juan Flavin died.
- Angel Santos, explained that he wasn't the one driving because he had a
stomach ailment.
- Antonio Teves stated that he drove the truck because Santos was drunk.
- W/N defendants are guilty of Negligince.

- Whatever the reason for Teves being the one driving the truck, the
matter is really of little consequence.
- Teves was allowed by Santos to continue driving, therefore, the former
became the latter's agent thereby becoming liable for his acts.
- Teves' negligence cannot be doubted, he tried to overtake a 6x6 truck,
therefore was bound to exercise the care and skill in doing so.
- Santos says that he is exempt from liability because of the doctrine of the
"Emergency Rule." Having come to the conclusion that he and Teves were
guilty of negligience. said rule cannot be applied. An automobile driver, it
has been said, cannot put himself in a position where in order to save
himself, he must injure someone else.
44. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION CO.V. IAC 148 SCRA 353 (petitioner took 2
shots of liqueur, He was driving. Headlights failed. Phoenix dump truck.
Parked askew. Truck driver NEGLIGENT. Cause and condition. Contributory
- Dionisio was driving home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss. He had two shots of liquor.
- As he was crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding
down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation)
suddenly failed.
- He saw a dump truck owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
Phoenix Construction Inc.
- The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such
a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic.
- Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to
the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a
result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including
some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
- RTC ruled in favor of Dionisio, CA affirmed but lowered the amount of
certain damages.


- W/N the truck driver was negligent for parking the dump truck in such
- YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
- The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was
merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United
States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have
any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United
States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely
discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
- Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the
active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that
cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be
liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing
the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are
the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act
may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as
the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created,
the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction
is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the

defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some

new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause.
- That the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.
- Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which
the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances,
the defendant may be negligence among other reasons, because of failure
to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
- We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts
running on side of road. Avoided them and collided with the truck. Driver
or Ford NOT negligent. Emergency Rule applies here.)
- At around 9 or 10AM of Jan 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, Koh was driving his Ford Escort northward from San
Fernando Pampanga to Angeles City, while Galang was driving the
International cargo truck southward.
- Two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the
lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether
to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Koh blew his horn. To
avoid the two boys who were crossing, he swerved to the left and entered
the lane of the truck.
- A head on collision thus occurred in the lane of the truck as the car was
not able to return to its lane before being hit by the truck.
- The driver Koh, his granddaughter and his granddaughters babysitter
died. Additionally, the driver Kohs daughter and his two grandsons
sustained physical injuries.

- W/N Koh was negligent, thereby causing the collision resulting in the
death and physical injuries of the respective plaintiffs
- NO, Koh was not negligent.
- Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
- Under the Emergency Rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought upon by his own negligence.
- Koh adopted the best means possible to avoid hitting the two boys. In
applying the Emergency Rule, he was not guilty of negligence.
- Even if he were negligent, his negligence was not the proximate cause of
the collision. There was a sufficient intervening event: the negligent act of
the truck driver which was the actual cause of the tragedy. It was the truck
drivers subsequent negligence in failing to take proper measures and
degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate
result of the resulting accident.
- The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable here. The contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured

46. ORIX METRO LEASING & FINANCEGROUP V. MANGALINAO (multivehicular accident on NLEX. Minor children suing. Allege negligence in
selection of of Orix of employing truck drivers. Court did not rule on facts
but rules that Orix is liable because of vicarious liability on the negligent
driving of its employees)
This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the
death of all the passengers in one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spouses and a sibling of

heirs. An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the minor c
ildren of the Mangalinao spouses through their legal guardian against the registered
owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks that collided with their
parents Nissan Pathfinder.
The children imputed recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on the truck
drivers for the deaths of theirs ister and parents; while they hold Sonny and Orix
equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their respective drivers.
Whether or not the defendants are jointly and severally liable.
The finding of negligence of petitioners as found by the lower courts is binding.
Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues. Settled is the rule that
this Court is not a trier of facts, and the concurrence of the findings of fact
of the courts below are conclusive. "Apetition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should include only questions of law - questions of fact are not
reviewable" save for several exceptions, two of which petitioners invoke, i.e., that the
finding is grounded on speculations, surmises, and conjectures, and that the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso Truck is liable to the heirs of the
victims of the mishap. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner
to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the
Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for
the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused.I t has
already been explained: Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by
proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for
him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility
and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He
has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles
Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him

would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape
liability by disproving his ownership.
Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner
of the amount that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury
caused to the plaintiff, which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party
Manuel. While
the net income of the Mangalinao spouses had not been
sufficiently established, the Court recognizes the fact that the Mangalinao
heirs had suffered loss deserving of compensation. What the CA awarded
is in actuality a form of temperate damages. Such form of damages under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code is given in the absence of competent proof on the actual
damages suffered. "In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established
but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured partys
actual income."
In this case, Roberto Mangalinao, the breadwinner of the family, was a
businessman engaged in buying and selling palay and agricultural supplies
that required high capital in its operations and was only 37 at the time of his
death. Moreover, the Pathfinder which the Mangalinaos own, became a total wreck.
Under the circumstances, we find the award of P500,000.00 as temperate
damages as reasonable. Moral damages, it must be stressed, are not
intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he/she had undergone due to the other partys culpable action
and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
While the children did not testify before the court, undoubtedly, they
suffered the pain and ordeal of losing both their parents and sibling and hence, the
award of moral damages is justified.
However, the amount must be reduced to P500,000.00.
"In quasi -delicts
, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence." It is given by way of example or correction for the public
good. Before the court mayc onsider such award, the plaintiff must show
his entitlement first to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages,
which the respondents have. In the case at bench, the reckless driving of

the two trucks involved caused the death of the victims. However, we shall reduce the
amount of exemplary damages to P200,000.00.Lastly, because exemplary
damages are awarded and that we find it equitable that expenses of litigation
should be recovered, we find it sufficient and reasonable enough to grant attorneys
fees of P50,000.00.
47. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. V. CA (Cimarron v. Panel Truck. Panel
truck negligent. Cimarron though negligent in some aspects was not main
source of collision)
- The employees of PMCI and their family and friends were traveling along
Aguinaldo Highway on their way back from Laguna to Manila. They were
riding a Cimarron driven by Rolando Hernandez.
- Meanwhile, the Mercedes Benz panel truck of Sanitary Steam Laundry
was traveling on the opposite side of the road, from Manila to Laguna.
- The driver of the panel truck, Hernan Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney
in front of him suddenly stopped and he stepped on the brakes to avoid
hitting the jeepney. This caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and
encroach on a portion of the opposite lane.
- The panel truck then collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.
Rolando Hernandez and two other passengers aboard the Cimarron died,
and several other passengers were injured.
- W/N the alleged negligence of the driver of the Cimarron contributed to
the collision between the vehicles
- No, the negligence of the driver of the Cimarron did not contribute to the
collision between the vehicles.
- The driver was negligent because: (1) Cimarron was overloaded; (2) front
seat of Cimarron was occupied by 4 adults; and (3) Cimarron had one
headlight on. (These are violative of the Land Transportation and Traffic
- Notwithstanding the alleged negligence, it was not shown how these
contributed to the collision. The violation of the statute, his negligence,

was not shown to be the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto.
- The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the truck
driver who was running the vehicle at very high speed and his tailgating
the jeepney ahead of it.

- NO, the owner and driver of the minibus are not liable for damages.

- McKee doctrine (Doctrine of Last Clear Chance) is inapplicable because

the driver of the Cimarron had no last clear chance to avoid the collision.

- The proximate legal cause of the injuries suffered by Lugue was the
collision of the KC-20 and tanker truck. It was the reckless imprudence of
the driver of the KC-20 that set the other events in motion which
eventually led to the passengers of the KC-20 sustaining physical injuries.

48. CORPUZ V. LUGUE (three vehicles. Tanker truck absolved of liability. It

was driver of KC-20 which is liable for reckless imprudence because he set
the proximate legal cause. Nag signal naman yung minibus)

- Driver of the minibus was not reckless. He signaled to overtake the KC-20
because the way was clear. Despite his best effort to do everything to
avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had
moved to a position blocking the way of the minibus.

- A KC-20 passenger bus was being driven on the right lane of the highway
facing Mariveles.
- A minibus was following said KC-20, occupying the left portion of the road
facing the same direction.
- Just as the minibus was overtaking the KC-20 from the left, a tanker trunk
coming from the right shoulder of the highway then bumped the KC-20.
- The KC-20 was thrown to the left side of the road, blocking the path of
the minibus. The minibus then bumped the KC-20 as both vehicles were on
the left lane of highway facing Mariveles.
- The KC-20 then spun and bumped a service truck which was parked on
the left side of the highway facing Mariveles.
- Finally, the KC-20 fell crumpled on the left concrete lane of the road
facing Balanga.
- Instant case was filed by Edison Lugue, a passenger of the KC-20 who
suffered injuries as a result of the collision.
- TC held all the drivers and owners of the three vehicles liable to Lugue.
Owners and drivers of the tanker truck and the minibus filed an appeal, but
only the owner and driver of the tanker truck was absolved from liability.

- Even if the driver of the minibus had a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it.
49. GABETO v. ARANETA (falling off horse case. The action was too remote
from the actual injury therefore it cannot be considered the proximate
- The action was instituted by Consolacion Gabeto for the purpose of
recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of
Proceso Gayetano
- Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay.
When the driver turned his horse, defendant Agaton Araneta stepped into
the street, seized the horse's bridle and caused the bit to slip from the
horse's mouth. The driver stepped down to fix the bit and the horse was
pulled over to the curb. The horse moved forward, hit a police telephone
box on a nearby post, became frightened and ran away. Ilano had alighted,
but Gayetano was still seated. After the horse ran away, Gayetano jumped
or fell from the rig and in doing so received injuries from which he soon

- Instant petition was filed by owner and driver of minibus.

- W/N Araneta's actions were the proximate cause of the injury.

- W/N the owner and driver of minibus are liable for damages


- NO. The defendant Araneta interfered with the carraomata by stopping

the horse in the manner that would not make him liable for the death of
Gayetano. One witness testified that Araneta in emphasizing a point,
gesticulated with his arms and brought his hand down on the horse's nose.
The Court held that the preponderance of the evidence is against this fact.
- The horse was conducted to the curb and an appreciable interval of time
elapsed before the horse started on his career up the street. The stopping
of the rig by Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the
accident to be considered the proximate cause thereof. Defendant is not
legally responsible for the death of Gayetano.
50. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. REMOQUILLO (fixing a leaking media aguall.
Hit a Manila Electric Co. wire. Electrocuted. Wire was NOT the proximate
cause. Negligence of Magno was the proximate cause. Manila Electric
cannot be blamed for setting up the situation which the injury was made
- Efren Magno went to the house of his stepbrother (Antonio Penaloza) to
repair a leaking media agua, which was just below the window of the
third story of the house. Standing on the media agua, Magno received
from his son a galvanized iron sheet to be used in the repair.
- The galvanized iron sheet came in contact the electric wire of the Manila
Electric Company, strung parallel to the edge of the media agua (around 2
feet from the edge of the eave), electrocuting and causing Magnos
death. Magnos widow and his children filed a suit to recover damages
from Manila Electric.
- W/N Manila Electric is liable.
- NO. The principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the
electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and
negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the

street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering
the latter's length of 6 feet.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
51. VDA. DE BATACLAN v. MEDINA (tires burst. Turtled. 3 passengers left in
bus, diver and conductor did nothing but walk back and forth. Lighted
torches which set fire to bus. Bus company liable because the bus driver
and conductor did not warn of gasoline)
- Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No. 30 left the town
of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City. The bus was driven by its
regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers,
including the driver and conductor.
- At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning. while the bus was in Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to wobble until it
fell into a ditch on the right side of the road. The bus turned turtle. Some
of the passengers managed to leave the bus, others had to be helped or
pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver and the
woman behind them could not get out. Some of the passengers who had
escaped heard groans and moans from inside the bus, as well as shouts for
help as they were trapped. The bus driver and the conductor walked back
and forth and made no attempt at rescue.
- After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch, to aid the trapped passengers. Ironically, it was the lighted torch
that set the bus on fire, killing the remaining survivors.

- That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers inside
the bus were removed and duly identified. The widow of Juan Bataclan,
one of the casualties, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
- W/N the bus company is liable.
- YES. It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins
down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, and if through
some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on
fire, and the passenger dies, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the subsequent fire. In the present case and under
the circumstances obtaining in the same, the proximate cause of the death
of Batacln was the overturning of the bus, because when the vehicle
turned turtle, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural
or unexpected. When the men came to help with a lighted torch in
response to the call for help made not only by the passengers but also by
the driver and the conductor themselves, and considering that it was very
dark, and the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some
of its passengers and the call for outside help.
- The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of
the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to witnesses,
the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus. The spilt gasoline was smelt and detected from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.
student license directed to drive truck. Then Orfanel, policeman took the
wheel. Fact that Romera just a student driver was NOT proximate cause)

- Go Chong Bing (defendant) was the owner of a truck. He ordered Romera
to drive it and follow another truck driven by his other driver to help the
latter in crossing Sumlog River.
- Romera was at that time not a licensed driver. He only has a students
- Some persons boarded the truck including policeman Orfanel. While it
was on the way, Ofanel took the wheel from Roman.
- While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, another truck was trying to
park on the left side of the road. Orfanel lowered its speed as suggested by
Romera. Orfanel tried to avoid collision by swerving to the right but it so
happened that two pedestrians were there.
- Romera shouted brake but Orfanel accidentally stepped on the gas
pedal instead hence running over Quirico Gregorio.
- W/N Go Chong Bing is liable for damages.
- No. As to the circumstances that Romera voluntarily given the wheel to
Orfanel, such was not proven by the evidence. What was proven was that
Romera warned Orfanel that he was unauthorized to give anybody the
wheel according to his masters instructions and that Romera gave the
wheel to Orfanel either out of fear or out of respect for the uniformed
- As to the allegation of negligence of defendant for letting Romera drive
the truck despite the absence of a drivers license, the court has held that
such negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. The
proximate cause was the negligence of Orfanel to which he was already
made to suffer the consequences.
53. UMALI v. BACANI (storm. Banana plant cut electric wire. Employee of
electric plant informed. But moments after 3 year old boy electrocuted.
Umali the owner of electric plant is liable. Should have cut off lines.
Parents negligence NOT proximate cause.)

- On May 14 a storm with strong rain hit the municipality of Alacala,

Pangasinan. As a result, banana plants standing on an elevated ground
near the transmission lines of the Alcala Electric Plant (owned by Umali)
were blown down and cut a live electric wire.
- On the following morning, the barrio captain saw the danger and notified
Cipriano Baldomero (an employee of the electric plant) about it. Cipriano
however said that he couldnt fix it and he will notify the lineman to fix it.
- However, moments after the barrio captain and Cipriano left, Manuel
Saynes, a 3 year old boy, went close to the cut electric wire and got
electrocuted. Manuel Saynes died because of this.
- The trial court held Umali liable as owner of the plant for negligence
which caused the death of Saynes but mitigated it because of the
contributory negligence of Manuel Saynes parents.
- W/N Umalis is liable for damages.
- Yes. The proximate cause of the death of Manuel Saynes is the negligence
of the company. First, they knew of the banana plants being on an
elevated ground and yet they did not take the necessary precautions that
its danger entails. Second, Cipriano, despite his knowledge of the live
electric wire, did not take the necessary precautions in warning the people
not to get close. Third, the electric company should have cut off the flow of
electricity in order not to hurt anyone because of the cut lines.
- The parents negligence was not the proximate cause of the death. It was
only a contributory negligence justifying mitigation of the damages. If the
company took the necessary precautions, this incident wouldnt have
54. VDA. DE IMPERIAL v. HERALD LUMBER CO. (helicopter crash. Alleged
contact with the steel cables of Herald. They were installed in violation of
law. Herald NOT liable. Not proven that the cables were actually the
proximate cause. Most likely due to lack of fuel)

- A helicopter owned by Pal was chartered by Lepanto Mining. It took off

from Nichols headed for Mankayan, Mt. Province, via Rosales, Pangasinan.
- The helicopter reached Rosales. However, the helicopter failed to reach
the destination as it crashed.
- Capt. Rohlings and Jaime Manzano, both of PAL, organized a search party
in which they found the crash site in the barrio of Ampusungan.
- Capt. Hernandez and Lt. Imperial were found dead. The former was a duly
licensed helicopter pilot and the latter was only under training.
- Capt. Rohlings observed that there were black marks in the rotor blades
of the chopper. He said that it could be grease from somewhere and said
that it was due to the contact with the steel cables of Herald Lumber
- The plaintiffs are now trying to get damages from Herald Lumber because
they stated that the steel cables were installed in violation of law and that
it posed a danger to aerial navigation.
W/N Heald Lumber Company can be made liable for damages
- No. It was not really proven that the steel cables were the proximate
cause of the helicopter crash. In fact, it is admitted that the helicopter had
hit a tree before falling into a ravine. The main rotor blade was not duly
preserved as to identify which was the real cause of the crash.
- The defendant endeavored to prove that the crash was due to exhaustion
of fuel and the negligence of the pilot which was more believable. The
helicopter had only 27 gallons of fuel in its main tank and 15 gallons in its
auxiliary tank. According to PAL, the maximum flight endurance was 2
hours and fifty minutes. However, the flight plan would take 3 hours and
11 minutes. Even if ten minutes was deducted from the time saved from
the flight from Nichols to Rosales, it would still be eleven minutes more
than that of the maximum flight endurance of the helicopter. In fact, the
crash site was ten minutes of flying time away from Mankayan. In addition,
the helicopter doesnt seem to emit the smell of gasoline and the
helicopter was not put into flames even if the crude oil being used was
highly flammable.

- In addition, the paper works in Rosales were accomplished by Lt. Imperial

who was not authorized yet to pilot the helicopter which was in violation
of Civil Aviation Regulations. Furthermore, the terrain they flew at were a
mountainous terrain and a slopping valley which was quite dangerous in
55. BERNAL AND ANVERSO v. HOUSE ET AL. (Mother and Daughter. Child
tried to run from automobile and fell into gutter. 3 degree burns. Mother
and Daughter had a right to be on the street. FAULT of the electric & ice
plant for allowing hot water to flow through public streets)
- Mother and daughter had visited a procession in Leyte.
- While walking home in front in of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd after the procession. An automobile appeared from the
opposite direction which frightened the child that she turned to run, with
the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot
water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric & Ice Plant of J.V
- When the mother reached her child, she found her child face downward
in the hot water.
- Death was caused by 3rd degree burns
- W/N the death was caused due to the fault and negligence of House and
tacloban & Ice Plant or contributed by the parents own fault and
- The mother and child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run
along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
- The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages.

- The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting
hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of
passers-by who were unfortunate enough to fall into it.
56. BAYASEN v. CA (Jeep went over precipice and passengers thrown out.
Unreasonable speed not proven. Skidding may have occurred without
fault. Unforeseen event.
- Dr. Bayasen went to a barrio to visit a patient. Two nurses rode with him
in a jeep for their use: Elena and Dolores. Elena was sitting between Dr.
Bayasen and Dolores.
- On the way, the jeep went over a precipice. The three were thrown out of
the jeep, causing the death of Elena.
W/N Dr. Bayasen was negligent for driving at an unreasonable speed
- NO. The proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear
wheels of the jeep and not the unreasonable speed of Dr. Bayasen because
there is no evidence on record to prove that he was driving at an
unreasonable speed.
- It is well known physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery
roads, as in this case, without fault on account of the manner of handling
the car.
- Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under
circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without
fault. Dr. Bayasen could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being
an unforeseen event.
- Dolores testified that Dr. Bayasen was driving his jeep moderately and
that the road was moist or wet. Further, the jeep was found at second
57. RAMOS v. C.O.L REALTY CORP (Driving along Katipunan avenue. Hit
another car which was trying to dive through barricade. Both negligent and
Ramos vicariously liable)

On or about 10:40 in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan
Avenue, QC, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan
owned by COL Realty Corp and driven by Aquilino Larin, and a Ford
Expedition owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo.
A passenger of the Sedan, one Estrela Maliwat sustained injuries, she was
immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment. COL realty averred that
its driver, Aquilino was slowly driving the Toyotal Altis at a speed of 510Km/h along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane
of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) For Expedition violently rammed
against the cars right rear door and fender. Upon investigation, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of QC found probable cuse to indict Rodel, the driver
of the Ford Expedition for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses
incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estrella.
COL Realty filed a complained for damages based on quasi-delict before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila. Ramos denied liability
insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino (COL Realtys) driver, which
was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos asserted that the sedan
car crossed Karipuanan Avenue from Rajah Matanda St. despite the
concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the
ISSUE: W/N Ramos is solidarily liable for the negligence of Rodel Ilustrisimo
HELD: YES. What is clear to us is that Aquilinio recklessly ignored the
barricades and drove through it. Without doubt, his negligence is
established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. However it also
declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodels contributory negligence in
driving the Ford Expedition at a high speed along a busy intersection. We
cannot exculpate Rodel from liability. Thus having settled the contributory
negligence of Rodel this created a presumption of negligence on the part
of Ramos.

For the employer to avoid the solidariy liability for a tort committed by his
employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his
employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a
family. Ramos diver was texting with his cellphone while running at a high
speed and that the latter did not slow down alebit he knew Katipunan
Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded
with barriers. As the employer of Rodel, Ramos is solidarily liable for the
quasi-delict committed by the former.
This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code: Unless there is proof
to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realtys)
negligence which resulted in the vehicular mishap
58. SABIDO v. CUSTODIO (hanging on to the left side of bus. Hit by truck.
BOTH liable. Fact that Agripino allowed to hang on bus. BUT truck had last
clear chance.)
- Agripino Custodio was hanging on to the left side of the LTB bus when he
was sideswiped by a truck on the other side of the road and killed.
- W/N the operator of the bus or the truck is liable for the death.
- Both are solidarily liable
- The fact that Agripino was allowed to hang on to the left side of the bus,
makes Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages. For both the
driver and conductor were negligent, they should have never allowed
Agripino Custodio to hang on to the side of the truck.
- The truck which hit him was equally negligent. Witnessed testified that
the truck was running fast and on the middle of the road while negotiating
a sharp curve. Had the truck been more cautious, the driver would have
had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap.

- It seems from evidence that both trucks did not keep close to the right
side of the road which caused them sideswiped each other. By not driving
their trucks in the proper lane, both drivers were negligent.
- Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. The
Negligence of the first two (driver and conductor of the bus) would not
have produced the death of Agripino, without the negligence of the truck
- The truck drivers negligence was the last, in point of time, for Agripino
was on the running board of the carriers bus sometime before the truck
came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, the truck had the
last clear chance.
- Jurisprudence provides the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or persons, although acting independently of each other
are in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a singly injury to a
third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury. Even
though his act alone might not have cause the entire injury, or the same
damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor.
59. TEAGUE v. FERNANDEZ (Stampede. Non-compliance with the city
ordinance. The school is liable)
- Realistic Institute, owned and operated by Teague, was a vocational
school situated on Gil-Armi Building. A fire broke out in a store ten meters
away from the institute.
- The instructresses tried to calm down the students. They told them not to
be afraid as the building was made of concrete and the fire was across the
street. They instructed them to go down the stairway two by two, or to use
the fire escapes.
- No part of the building caught fire. But after the panic was over, four
students, including Fernandezs sister Lourdes were found dead and
several others injured after the stampede.
- CA ruled that the institutes non-compliance with the City Ordinance
(which required a building to have at least two unobstructed staircases)
was an act of negligence and that such negligence was the proximate

cause of the death of Lourdes. The institute had only one staircase, while a
second was under construction.
- Teague contends that the violation of the ordinance was only a remote
cause and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened
independent causes which produced the injury. It relates the chain of
events: (1) violation of ordinance, (2) fire across the street, (3) shouts of
Fire! Fire!, (4) panic, (5) stampede, and (6) death.
- YES. Proximate cause applies. It is true that Teagues non-compliance
with the ordinance was ahead of and prior to the other events in points of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would
pose a danger to the occupants of the building.
- This specific situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen,
was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one
stairway available.
- American Jurisprudence: The general principle is that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by
the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the
manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent.
- The overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and
overcrowding was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by
requiring at least 2 stairways.
- Proximate legal cause that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have

reasonable ground to expect at that moment of his act of default that an

injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
60. CIPRIANO v. CA (rustproofing. Not registered with DTI therefore not
insured. Fire. Loss of car. NEGLIGENT. Did not comply with duty imposed
by law)
- Cipriano owned E.S. Cipriano Enerprises engaged in the rustproofing of
- Macline Electronics, Inc. (MIA) brought a Kia Pride to Ciprianos shop for
- A fire broke out at an adjoining restaurant owned by Cirpriano as well,
destroying both the restaurant and the rustproofing shop, including the Kia
- MIA demanded reimbursement alleging that the vehicle was lost due to
the negligence and imprudence of Cipriano, citing his failure to register his
business with the DTI under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required by
its implementing rules.
- Cipriano denied liability claiming that the loss was due to a fortuitous
event and he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.
- W/N Cipriano is covered by the law
- W/N his failure to insure renders him liable for loss due
- YES. P.D. No. 1572 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
vehicles to register with the DTI. As a condition for such registration,
Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance
- Yes. There is a statutory duty imposed on Cirpriano and it is for his failure
to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him
liable for damages. While the fire may be considered a fortuitous event,
this cannot exempt him.
- Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.
- The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar a finding of
negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. Ciprianos negligence is the

source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his
contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not
complying with a duty impose on him by law. It is therefore immaterial
that the loss was due to a fortuitous event, since it was his negligence in
not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.
61. CALALAS v. CA (extension seat. Hit by truck causing injuries. The
demand arose from a contract of carriage. Negligence need not be proven.
Plus jeep not properly parked and overloaded)
- Sunga took a passenger jeep owned and operated by Calalas. She was
given an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the
rear end of the vehicle as the jeep was filled to capacity.
- As Sunga gave way to an outgoing passenger, a truck bumped the left
rear portion of the jeep resulting in Sungas injury.
- Sunga filed against Calalas while Calalas filed a third-party complaint
against the truck driver. Calalas contends that the negligence of the truck
driver was the proximate cause of the accident and negates his liability.
W/N Calalas was negligent.
- Sungas action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict
- In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligator, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.
- Further, the jeep was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
from the highway, and Calalas took in more passengers than allowed,
violating R.A. No. 4136.
- Calalas should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeep with its body
protruding into the highway.
- The doctrine of proximate case is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. In quasi-delict, the

obligation is created by law, but where there is a pre-existing contract, the

parties themselves create the obligation.
- The ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the truck driver liable for quasidelict is not res judicata. Sunga was never a party to that case, and the
issues were different. This case involves breach of contract while the other
for quasi-delict.
Ofelia Cheah and her friend Adelina were talking when they were
approached by Filipina Tuazon. Filipina asked if Adelina could have a bank
of America check, cleared and encashed. Since Adelina didnt have a Dollar
Savings account, But Ofelia did, Ofelia was asked if she could be the one to
clear and encash. PNB assured Ofelia that the check was being processed
and later on PNB credited the amount of the check to Ofelias account
which the latter withdrew and all the proceeds went to Filipina
It was later discovered that the check had insufficient funds. The cheah
spouses in order to try save the money in their account contacted Filipina
but they were informed that the cash was already distributed to several
PNB: Cheah spouses should be liable
Cheah spouses: PNB should be liable for crediting the account before
waiting for the 15 day clearing period.
ISSUE: W/N the Cheah spouses were negligent and therefore must be
liable for the value of the check
HELD: YES but only Solidarily with PNB. It was PNBs negligence in allowing
the account to be credited before waiting for the 15 day clearing period
which was the proximate cause for the loss.
Emphasis on the diligence of banks which should be greater than the usual

BUT the Cheah spouses are also liable for contributory negligence for
accommodating a complete stranger and thereby leading to their being
64. MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BANKING (supposed to buy only Diamicron
for elevated blood sugar but instead was given Dormicum a sleeping pill by
the employee of Mercury Drug. Fell asleep on the wheel and entered into
car accident. MERCURY LIABLE. Public interest. Proximate cause was the
sale of sleeping pills)
- Sebastian Baking went to DR. Sys clinic for tests and after which was
given a prescription for Diamicron for his elevated blood sugar. He
proceeded to buy the medicine at Mercury Drug where the saleslady
misread the prescription and instead gave him Dormicum a potent
sleeping tablet because of this he entered into a car accident (he fell
asleep on the wheel). He went back to Dr. Sy and was shocked to find out
he was given the wrong medication. He filed suit.
- Mercury alleges that Banking was negligent in driving his car which was
the proximate cause of the accident.
- W/n Baking as negligent and is the proximate cause of the damage?
- NO. generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of
care and diligence in selling medicines.
- Obviously, Mercurys employee was grossly negligent in selling
Dormicum. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and
death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very
cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified the medicine
she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The
care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the
skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands

- Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate
cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
- Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners
employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent
effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent
would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.
- ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
- The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
- When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence
on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in
the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however,
may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
- petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will
make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.
65. NOVO & CO. v. AINSWORTH (rental of barge by Aisworth from Novo. It
sank and Ainsworth lost coal and Novo lost barge. No one can collect from
the other. Losses and damages suffered by a vessel and her cargo by
reason of shipwreck or standing shall be individually for the account of the
- Ainsworth leased, received and accepted from the Novo, a barge called
Varadero and a large iron dredging scoop; that the terms of the lease
stipulated between them appeared in an instrument, which reads literally:

- The undersigned has assumed the engagement toward Messrs. "M. Novo
y Co., S. en Cta.," that he will, commencing with this date, lease from them
the barge Varadero for P175 per month; likewise and from the same date,
a dredging scoop, at the rental price of P100 per month. Mr. J. E.
Ainsworth shall be liable for any loss or damage to the said barge and
dredging scoop during the existence of this contract.
- After 5 days use by Ainsworth, both were lost at sea and totally
abandoned. On the same day, Ainsworth also got Novos consent to have
its steam launch, Amelia, tow the barge from Cebu to Bohol for P60.
- Ainsworth now refuses to pay for rental for five days use, value of the
barge and dredging scoop and launch of the Amelia.
- Ainsworth also claims from Novo value of 10 tons of coal belonging to the
defendant which was on board the barge; and that this coal, which was
also lost, was worth P130, an amount which the Novo owed the defendant
and had not paid him, although its payment had been demanded.
- W/N Novo is entitled to collect from Ainsworth value of barge, scoop and
launch of Amelia
- W/N Ainsworth is entitled to collect from Novo value of coal
- NO. Article 840 of the Code of Commerce prescribes as follows: "The
losses and damages suffered by a vessel and her cargo by reason of
shipwreck or standing shall be individually for the account of the owners,
the part of the wreck which may be saved belonging to them in the same
- Article 1902 of the Civil Code also provides: "A person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done."
- The barge was not excessive for the capacity of the boat; that the ways
and means employed by the defendant in loading the barge did not tend in
any manner to show cause for the accident that occurred; that the towage
was effected under the exclusive direction of the captain of the launch, an
employee of the plaintiff firm, which owned the said launch; and that there
was no proof that the two laborers, placed by the defendant on board the

barge, performed any acts which might have contributed to the foundering
of the vessel, or failed to perform their duties.
- The same rule is applicable with respect to the loss of the coal by the
foundering of the barge. The plaintiff cannot be held liable therefore.
- BUT Ainsworth should pay Novo the amount for said rentals.
66. CENZO v. ATLANTIC GULF (Ocumen was a layer of gas pipes employed
by Atlantic. Went to the East side of the trench to answer call of nature
and was buried. Atlantic NOT liable. No right to be there and exercised
diligence of good father)
- This is an action for damages against the defendant for negligently
causing the death of the plaintiff's son, Jorge Ocumen.
- Ocumen was the employee of Atlantic, in laying gas pipes. He was
assigned to fill up the west end of the trench, while there was no work
being done in the east end.
- However, Ocumen went to the east end to answer a call of nature and
was buried in dirt when the bank caved in. He was killed before he could
be released.
- W/N Atlantic should be held liable for his death
- NO. The Employers' Liability Act was passed to obviate the injustice to
workmen that employers should escape liability where persons having
superintendence and control in the employment were guilty of negligence
causing injury to workmen.
- The obligations of the master ... continue in force, not only during all the
time in which his servants are actually engaged in his service, but also
during the time reasonably occupied by them on his premises in going to
and returning from their work and in intervals of rest between. ... But he is
under no obligation to keep in safe condition for their use any part of the
premises to which their duties do not call them and to which he has not
given them permission to go.

- The deceased was at a place where he had no right to be at the time he

met his death. His work did not call him there, nor is it shown that he was
permitted there tacitly or otherwise.
- The Civil Code provides, nonliability of an employer for events which
could not be foreseen (article 1105), and where he has exercised the care
of a good father of a family (article 1903), and, on the other hand, his
liability where fault or negligence may be attributed to him (article 1902).
- From the testimony of the witnesses it does not appear that there was
any water in the bottom of the trench, although some of the witnesses
said that it was damp. The trench was only three and one-half to four and
one-half feet deep. The cause of Ocumen's death was not the weight of
the earth which fell upon him, but was due to suffocation.
- Experience and common sense demonstrate that ordinarily no danger to
employees is to be anticipated from such a trench as that in question. The
fact that the walls had maintained themselves for a week, without
indication of their giving way, strongly indicates that the necessity for
bracing or shoring the trench was remote.
- Ordinary care did not require the shoring of the trench walls at the place
where the deceased met his death. The event properly comes within the
class of those which could not be foreseen; and, therefore, the defendant
is not liable under the Civil Code.
67. AFIALDE v. HISOLE (Loreto gored to death by carabaos. invoked the
possessor of animal provision. w/N Hisole, the owner of the carabao is
liable? NO. possessor does not necessarily mean owner. In this situation,
the animals were in the care and custody of Loreto)
- Loreto Afialda now deceased, was employed by the defendant spouses as
caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the
animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as
a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own
fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir
depending upon him for support.
- Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil
Code, which reads:

- The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for
any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or
stray away.

it was acts of god, the proximate cause was the negligence of NPC. NPC
negligent in seeing that no harm done to the general public.

- This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.
- W/N the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its

- There was a storm in Ilocos Norte which caused flooding in the area of
the plaintiffs.

- NO. The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the
owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under
article 1902 of the same code.
- The statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person
liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that
the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is
therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
- In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of
the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which
he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
- If action is to be based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that
there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the
animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation
on those points.

- She was accompanied by Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo.


69. ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC v. CA (Isabel Lao Juan, after typhoon wanted
to check on merchandise in store. Stepped out and was killed because of
an electric wire. The engineer seeing fluctuations in the power headed to
INELCO to seek a lineman. But seeing that INELCO was still closed the
merely returned to the NPC compound. THE COMPANY IS LIABLE. Although

- The next morning while the flood was still waist deep, Isabel Lao Juan
(deceased) ventured out of their house to see if her store merchandise
were damaged by the storm.
- Suddenly, Isabel shouted Ay! and went under the water. Her
companions wanted to help her but they were afraid to go near her
because they saw a dangling electric wire moving in a snake like fashion.
- Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters
away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida
and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ
Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.
- The body of the deceased was later fished out bearing 1st degree burns
and an electrically charged wound.
- In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967,
Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power
Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations
in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or
short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag
NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the
ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to
the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As
he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric
wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the other end was
seeming to play with the current of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972)
Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein,
he returned to the NPC Compound.
- W/N the company is liable to pay damages.

- YES. We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor. The respondent
CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated
from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's
negligence that death took place.
- Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in
seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been
shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the
victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event.
- When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would
not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am.
Jur., p. 649).
70. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN v. REYES (Reyes: He was having coffee
at Hotel Nikko when he was approached by Dr. Violeta Filart and invited to
a party for the hotels manager. Reyes lined up in the buffet but he was
told to leave by one Ruby Lim. He claims she spoke in loud voice. Claimed
damages for embarrassment. LIM: She was polite in asking Reyes to leave.
Court believes in Lim. 20 years in hotel business. And absence of any
motive of Lim to humiliate. Doctrine of self- inflicted injury not applicable
Facts according to plaintiff
Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly
known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00
oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at
the lobby of Hotel Nikko.

- He saw Dr. Violeta Filart in the hotel and he was invited by Filart to a
party for hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.
- After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes
lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who
claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were
making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party
(huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).
- Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual
damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees
Facts according to defendant Lim
- Lim narrated that she asked Reyes to leave since the party was to be kept
private for the managers close friends
- She inquired as to the unwarranted presence of Reyes and upon knowing
that he did not want to leave after Ms. Fruto discreetly asked her to leave,
Ms. Lim took it upon herself to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
- She did so in a discreet manner
- Which story merits credibility; consequently should the Hotel be liable for
- The Court believes that defendant has a more plausible story, thus the
Hotel is not liable for damages.
- In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that
she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are
virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
- Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave
was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this
regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration
that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first

verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration
of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect
of such dignity. - Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act
of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that
Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad
judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
- NOTE: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents
is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation
to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
71. TAMAYO v. GSELL (Braulio Tamayo is minor son of Plaintiff.
Inexperienced and without preparation. Assigned in cleaning part of
machine where pieces of wood were stuck. Hand got amputated. Gsell
liable. Duty of masters or superintendents to warn employees as to the
dangers of the work and instruct them. Duty comes with employment.)
- This case is an action for damages against Gsell for injuries suffered by
Braulio Tamayo, minor son of plaintiff.
- Due to his inexperience in the work to which, for the first item and
without any preparation or instruction, he had been assigned in essaying
to clean that part of the machine where the pieces of wood from the strips
were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and the right finger
of his right hand was served. He was thereupon taken to the General
Hospital, where he received medical treatment until he was released.
- RTC ruled for the plaintiff.

- W/N the defendant is liable to the plaintiff.

- YES. While the defenses of assumption of risks and contributory
negligence are available to masters in actions for personal injuries brought
under Act No. 1874, these defenses have their limitations when interposed
in actions for personal injuries of minor or infant employees. These
limitations rest upon the well-established principle that it is the duty of
masters or their superintendents to warn such employees as to the
dangers of the work and instruct them as to the manner of doing the work
in order to avoid accidents.
- The master is bound to warn and instruct his servant as to all dangers
which he knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to know, and
which he has reason to believe the servant does not know and would not
by the exercise of reasonable care discover.
- The duty continues during the employment, and cannot be delegated by
the master.
72. RAKES v. ATLANTIC GULF (Rakes is employee who was transporting
Nails in harbor to barge. Was walkin on side of car which was prohibited
byt the tracks were also weakened and needed repair but Atlantic did not
cause repair. Because rakes was himself negligent the damages were
- The plaintiff is an employee of defendant who was working at
transporting iron nails from a barge in the harbor to the companys yard.
- While doing this, the plaintiffs leg was caught between the rail and it was
- It was amputated afterwards.
- It is important to know that the tracks were already weakened, and the
defendant refused to make any repairs.
- But, the plaintiff also was walking by the side of the car, this practice was
ich caused the injury entirely?

- NO. The plaintiffs disobedience played a factor to his injury.
- It is therefore not proper to hold the defendant entirely liable.
- Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the
failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages
that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to
himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his
act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
- Court awarded 2500 as damages, this was originally 5000, but reduced on
account of the negligence attributable to the plaintiff.
73. TEH V. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI (Plaintiff landed on waters and pilot
did all necessary operations however plaintiff walked towards propeller.
Medjo bobo. And his arm was caught by revolving blafe. The PHIL AERIAL
TAXI NOT LIABLE. Pilot was well experienced. They exercised the diligence
required of them. It was plaintiff which was NOT AN ORDINARY MAN OF
PRUDENCE. Did not wait for Banca but instead walked along the pontoons
toward the propeller. Medjo bobo. Only his reckless negligence was cause)
- Plaintiff is passenger of defendant.
- The plane landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait.

- The pilot did all the necessary operations to prevent further serious
- The plaintiff walked toward the propeller, hit his head, and his arm was
caught by the revolving blades.
- The plaintiff did this despite being told frantically not to.
- The plaintiff didnt follow the usual procedure in the discharge of the
- W/N defendant entity is liable.
- NO. The pilot in charge of the plane has had fourteen years of experience,
having first learned to fly during the World War. He is duly licensed by the
Department of Commerce of the United States and by the Department of
Commerce and Communications of the Government of the Philippine
- The contract entered into by the plaintiff Teh Le Kim and the defendant
entity Philippine Aerial Taxi Co., Inc., was that upon payment of the price
of the passage, which the carrier had received, the latter would carry the
former by air in one of its hydroplanes and put him, safe and sound, on the
beach at Iloilo. After an uneventful flight, the hydroplane, which carried
the plaintiff and his companion, arrived at the Iloilo beach, as usual, with
nothing more left to do but to take the plaintiff and his companion, safe
and sound, ashore. In order to do this, it was necessary to wait for the
propeller to stop, turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore,
take the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end thereof, place
them in a banca and take them ashore. By sheer common sense, the
plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an
aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run
the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He ought to know
furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait
for a banca to take him ashore.
- Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals given him from the shore
by the representatives of the consignee firm, the plaintiff herein, not being
a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked
along one of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller, while
the banca which was to take him ashore was still some distance away and
the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the

plane. Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the

plaintiff-appellant acted with reckless negligence in approaching the
propeller while it was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a
position to take him.
- That the plaintiff-appellant's negligence alone was the direct cause of the
accident, is so clear that it is not necessary to cite authoritative opinions to
support the conclusion that the injury to his right arm and the subsequent
amputation thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own
imprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable to the
defendant entity or to its agents. Therefore, he alone should suffer the
74. BERNARDO V. LEGASPI (Both drivers driving in opposite directions and
turning on a street corner. BOTH equally negligent)
- Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collision of
plaintiffs automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a crosscomplaint
against the plaintiff claiming that the collision was due to plaintiffs
negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence.
both as to prevent either from recovering.
- Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a
street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial
court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed
equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither
can recover of the other for the damages suffered.


driving var of Mangune Spouses. Lost rear whool. Hit by bus. The
passengers suing Manalo. W/N Manalo Negligent. Yes. Last clear chance
does not apply. Not a suit between the two owners but suit between the

passenger and the driver. They have contract of carriage. Carrier presumed
to be negligent unless overcome by evidence)
- The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and
driven by Manalo to bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
- Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack, The right rear wheel of the truck
was detached so the driver stepped on the brake as a result of which, the
jeep who was running unbalanced made a u-turn so that the front part
face the south where it come from and its rear face the north where it is
- The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bumped the jeep
resulting in the death of the three passengers of the jeepney and injuries
to others.
- The two drivers were charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of
San Miguel Tarlack.
- Probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the
case of Delos Reyes was dismissed and Manalo was convicted by the court
of first instance of Pangasinan.
- Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery
of civil damages before the court of first instance impleading both the
defendant and the respondent.
- The CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the
- W/N Manalo was negligent.
- YES. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo
and the Mangune spouses. They failed to exercise the precautions that are
needed precisely pro hac vice. The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last
clear chance in this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit
between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles and not in a suit
where passengers demand responsibility from a carries to enforce its
contractual obligation.
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently and

may only be overcome by evidence of extraordinary diligence as

prescribed in Arts. 1733, 1755, and 1756 or a fortuitous event.
- But a driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in
case of breach of contract of carriage. He is not a party to the contract and
the carrier is exclusively liable even if the breach is due to the negligence
of the driver. The carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to the
driver neither can he share it with him. This would make the carriers
liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently wntitle the
victim to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver.
- So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was


injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a

person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a
third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
- The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held
liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or
according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that
of the plaintiff to avoid an accident
- It applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."
- Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended
into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the
latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently
negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by
pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury."
- The CA committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear
chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit
between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought
by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving
the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
- Pursuant to the new policy of this Court to grant an increased death
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, their respective awards of
P30,000.00 are hereby increased to P50,000.00.

- The driver of the cargo truck was negligent
- The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own
acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the

77. TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (David Taylor and his friend went to
the power plant of manila electric to visit another friend. Finding he was
not there. Roamed the premises. Found 30 brass fulminating caps. Took it
home. Opening the cap with a knife. Caused injuried. Manila Electric NOT
liable. The proximate cause was the opening of the brass cap.)

76. BUSTAMANTE V. COURT OF APPEALS (Bus and truck driver. They were
found to be both negligent. Bustamante was one of passengers. Last clear
chance does not apply because this is a suit between the passenger and
the driver. This is a breach of contract of carriage)
- A gravel and sand truck collided with a bus, several passengers of the bus
were thrown out and died (Bustamante, Jocson, Ramos, Himaya, and
Bersamina). The truck was driven by Montesiano (defendant) and owned
by Del Pilar. The bus was driven by Susulin (defendant) and owned by a
franchise transferred to Serrado.
- When the vehicles were approaching each other Susulin saw the front
wheels of the vehicle were wiggling. Even if he saw the truck heading
towards his lane he sped forth in an attempt to overtake another vehicle in
the belief the bus driver to be joking.
- The TC found both drivers negligent and that their liability to be solidary.
It held the owners and the drivers jointly and severally liable. Del Pilar and
Montesiano appealed. CA reversed.

- David Taylor, herein plaintiff, with his friend Manuel Claparols, went to
defendants power plant to visit an defendants employee, Murphy, who
had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
- The boys did not find Murphy in his quarters. Impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the usual interest which both seem to
have taken in machinery, the two boys did not leave the company
- They then walked across to the open space in the neighborhood of the
place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
Here, they found 20 or 30 brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
(These caps are used in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
have in themselves a considerable explosive power.)
- The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on a stick and carried
them home. On their way home, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian,
and all three went to the home of the Manuel.
- The boys made a series of experiments with the caps. One of these
consisted of opening the cap with a knife and lighted a match to the
contents. This resulted in an explosion which injured all three children.
- W/N defendant company is liable for the injuries,
- NO. Defendant was not liable to plaintiff Taylor for the injuries thus
- Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike
instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care
and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions
- Defendants negligence consists of a negligent omission; defendant did
not take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from
unknown or unseen dangers placed upon such premises.
- But even if defendant was negligent in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, this was not the proximate cause of the injury. Being so, he was
not civilly liable for such negligence. The proximate cause of the injury was
plaintiffs act of cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its

78. DEL PRADO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (Florenciano employee of Manila

Electric. Ignacio waived hand trying to board. He grabbed on to front
entrance. Florenciano accelerated. Ignacio slipped and foot crushed and
amputated. MANILA ELECTRIC NEGLIGENT. Though no obligation to stop
when Ignacio tried to board it became duty of Florenciano to stop and
observe due diligence. Ignacio liable for contributory negligence but this
was NOT proximate cause)
- Manila Electric Company was an operator of street cars. Teodorico
Florenciano was employed by said company as its motorman.
- One morning, after Florenciano had stopped to take on and let off
passengers at its appointed place, it resumed its course at moderate
- After proceeding at a short distance, plaintiff Ignacio ran across the street
to catch the car. Ignacio allegedly raised his hand as an indication to
Florenciano that he wanted to board the car.
- Florenciano eased up a little, without stopping. Ignacio caught the front
entrance of the car at the moment the car was passing.
- Before Ignacio secured his position and before his raised right foot had
reached the platform, the motorman applied power wit the result that the
car gave a slight lurch forward.
- Such sudden impulse to the car caused the plaintiffs foot to slip, and his
hand was jerked loose from the handpost. Ignacio then fell to the ground
and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car.
- The next day, his foot had to be amputated in the hospital.
by the negligence of the former in the operation of its street cars.
- YES. Manila Electric Co. was liable to Ignacio.
- There is no obligation for a street railway company to stop its cars to let
on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for
stoppage. However, in this case, when Ignacio was attempting to board the

car, it became Manila Electrics duty to do no act that would have the
effect of increasing the peril to Ignacio.
- The breach of duty was in Manila Electrics premature acceleration of the
- As to Ignacios contributory negligence, it must be treated as a mitigating
circumstance. It was not the proximate cause.
- A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of
injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he
cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the
situation in view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car
before he is planted safely on the platform.
79. ASTUDILLO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (Manila electric erected a light
pole. Conformed to minimum requirements of franchise. In a public place.
Astudilo reached and grasped a charged wire. Manila electric liable
because the stature prescribe bare minimum. Should have taken into
account dangers of placing in public place. A high degree of diligence
- An electric light pole with corresponding wires was erected in 1920 near
the Santa Lucia Gate (Intramuros). It was last inspected by the City
Electrician in 1923 or 1924. Said pole conformed to the requirements of
Manila Electrics franchise (ie, height requirements, the type of feeder
wires, etc.)
- The pole was situated in a public place where people come to stroll, to
rest and enjoy themselves.
- In 1928, plaintiff Astudillo and his companion sauntered to where the
electric post was situation. Astudillo then reached out and grasped a
charged electric wire. Astudillo died.
- W/N Manila Electric was liable to the mother of Astudillo for damages
because of the death of her son.

- YES. Manila Electric was liable for the death of Astudillo. Damages must
be paid to the mother of Astudillo.
- Electric companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. However,
they must exercise care commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
- The poles must be erected and the wires and appliances must be so
located that persons rightfully near the place will not be injured
- The cause of the injury to Astudillo was one that could have been
- Negligence came from Manila Electric in so placing its pole and wires as
to be within proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the
possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact
with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
- The franchise, ordinance, statute merely states the minimum conditions.
The fulfillment of these conditions
80. DEL ROSARIO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (trouble in wire. Burning. More
than 30 minutes after. Dismissal of grade school. Children saw the wire
which fell. Touched it. Died. Manila electric liable because did not act
- Shortly after 2 oclock in the afternoon trouble developed in a wire used
by Manila Electric to conduct electricity for lighting purposes in Manila.
Jose Noguera, who had charge of tienda nearby noticed the wire was
burning and asked someone to telephone the company to inform them
that the wire was burning. The company received the report at 2:25. The
wire soon parted and one of the charged ends fell to the ground in
- At 4 pm, the school in the neighborhood was dismissed. 3 boys were
walking home together when one motioned as if to touch the wire. The
other boy was a son of an electrician, and warned the first boy not to
touch the wire. Despite the warning, the third boy touched the wire with
his hand and received a shock which resulted in his death. His family is
suing Manila Electric for damages.This is an action for damages against the

defendant for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff's son, Jorge
- W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages.
- YES. Manila Electric was responsible for the death. The delay in leaving
this danger unguarded so long after information of the trouble was
received constituted negligence on its part. There was no contributory
negligence on the part of the child even though he touched the wire after
being warned not to do so because of his immature years and because of
the natural curiosity of children.
81. NGO SIN SING V. LI SENG GIAP & SONS,INC. (Sps Ngo constructed
building. The adjacent building owned by Li suffered structural damage. Lis
was taller than the 2 floors which the foundation could hold. Both liable
and since it cannot be determined who is more negligent 50-50)
- Spouses Ngo decided to construct a 5-storey building (NSS building) and
contracted the services of Contech as their general contractor.
- During the construction of NSS, the adjacent building LSG Building
(owned by Li) suffered structural damage
- Inspection revealed that this was caused by the excavation made by
Contech near the common boundary line exposing the foundation of LSG.
-As a sign of goodwill, Spouses Ngo agreed to have Contech make repairs
to LSG but there continued the defects which led to its demolition and
reconstruction. LSG sued Spouses Ngo & Contech to pay for the costs.
- LSG was originally a 2-storey building but Li added 2 more floors w/out
providing the necessary foundation & reinforcement causing it to sag
- W/N LSG is liable for contributory negligence
- W/N Contech & Spouses Ngo are solidarily liable

- YES, LSG was built in the 1950s w/ a building permit for only a 2-storey
building but when it burned down they added 2 floors. The foundation can
only support 2 floors, adding floors w/out reinforcing the foundation is a
manifestation of negligence.
- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
- Li contributed to the sagging of LSG building so a reduction of award is
- The allocation of damages is 50-50, because there was insufficient lateral
or subjacent support provided on the LSG lot which is attributed to
Contech who failed to observe the proper procedure prior to excavation.
- YES. Accdg to Art 2194 the responsibility of 2 or more persons who are
liable in a quasi-delict is solidary. But the court rendered judgment
determining the liability of co-defendants so they ruled that Contech is
ultimately liable and should answer for the cost of damages.
Casionan was a pocket miner. Died because bamboo he was holding hit
wires of NPC. NPCs wires were 8-10ft and not 18-20 as required. NO
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. It was his ordinary routine and just because
he was pocket miner is not a justification for NPC to leave their lines
- Noble Casionan, 19 yrs old, was a pocket miner who died by electrocution
while walking the trail leading to Sangilo because the bamboo pole he was
carrying touched the low hanging high tension wires
- Prior to the incident, there were already numerous demands to NPC to
institute safety measures which they failed to heed until the accident
where they fixed the wires and added warning signs.
- W/N there was contributory negligence from Noble?
- NO, the wires were hanging 8-10 ft instead of the required 18-20 feet, if
the lines were properly maintained then Noble would never have been

- The trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members
of the community w/ no warning to inform passerbys that accidentally
touching the wire will endanger their lives. Noble shouldnt be faulted for
doing his ordinary routine.
- Even if pocket mining was prohibited by the DENR and they were
unlicensed it is not a justification for NPC to leave their transmission lines
a check in the amount of 1M payable to Mateo Mgt. Group
international was presented for deposit and accepted at
petitioners Kawit branch.
The check was post dated Oct 9, 2003 and was drawn against
Marciano Silva with Respondent BPI Bel Air branch.
Upon receipt the petitioner sent it for clearing though the
Philippine Clearing House Corp (PCHC)
The check was cleared by BPI and credited to account of MMGI
1M. MMGIs accounts were closed and all the funds therein were
A month later Silva discovered the debit from his account. A
complaint was filed by the latter
Despite this complaint BPI credited the 1M to his account
BPI returned a photocopy of the check to Allied bank for the
reason postdated
Petitioner refused to accept. The charge slip was sent back and
forth several times between petitioner and respondent.
Respondent then asked PCHC to take custody of the check.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the PCHC arbitration committee
claiming that respondent should be entirely liable for failure to
return the check within the 24 hour reglementary period.
Respondent claimed that Allied bank should be liable entirely
because they shouldnt have accepted the post-dated check in the
first place. And the proximate cause for the loss was petitioners
acceptance of the post dated check.
Arbitration committee ruled in favor of petitioner. It noted that
respondent did not return the check within the 24 hour
reglementary period. It actually found both parties negligent

however applied the last clear chance rule and ruled finally that
the loss should be shouldered by the respondent alone.
Who is liable for the amount of the check?

Both are liable.

In this case the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause
of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the
negligence of respondent who cleared a post-dated check sent to
it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own
verification procedure.
If only the respondent exercised the due diligence required of it, it
would have realized the check was post dates
HOWEVER, in the interest of fairness, the court believes that it is
proper to consider the petitioners negligence in accepting the
post-dated checks.

84. PNR V. BRUNTY (PNR did not set up lights or flag bar to warn vehicles.
Car diring to Baguio was hit. PNR liable. Even if no statute it must exercise
diligence. Contributory negligence also present. Driving 70kph and
overtook car but PNR still liable)
- Rhonda Brunty an American visited the Phils. and w/ her Filipino host
Garcia and driver Mercelita drove a Mercedes Benz to Baguio City overtook
a car and had a collision w/ a PNR Train driven by Reyes.
- Mercelita was instantly killed while Brunty died later on. Garcia survived
but had to be transferred to Makati Med for further treatment.
- Ethel Brunty (mom) w/ Garcia sued PNR, alleging that the death and
injury were the proximate cause of the gross negligence of PNR in not
providing the necessary equipment like the flag bar or red light signal to
warn the motorist who were about to cross the railroad track & that the
flagman was only equipped w/ a flashlight. They also argue that PNR failed
to supervise its employees especially the pilot & operator of the train.
- PNR claims it exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection and
supervision of its employees. That it had no legal duty to put up a

bar/signal and it had adequate warning signs posted on the side of the
road before the crossing. PNR alleges that the proximate cause is the
negligence of Mercelita by disregarding the warning signs, whistle blast
and flashlight of the guard, he had the last clear chance.
- Whose negligence was the cause of the collision?
- W/N Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence
- W/N can the doctrine of last clear chance apply
- PNR. Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.
Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury. Its failure to put a cross bar/ signal light is
negligence and disregard of the safety of the public even if no law or
ordinance requires it bec. public safety demands that said device are
- YES, Although Mercelita was driving the car @ 70 km/hr and in fact had
overtaken a vehicle, his acts although contributing to the collision does not
negate PNR liability since there is no proof of relation between Brunty and
Mercelita. To hold a person as having contributed to his injury it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body.
- NO, the doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciable later than the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so, is chargeable. The proximate cause of the injury being
established that of PNR, we hold that the above doctrine finds no


At around 11:00 in the morning, along the national highway in
Magtalisay, San Fernando Ceby a passenger bus of Petrus Bus
Liner (passenger bus), driven by petitioner collided with a tricycle

driven by Genayas, resulting to the death and physical injuries of

several people who were all passengers of the tricycle.
The passenger bus and the tricycle were going in different
directions and the mishap occurred when the tricycle tried to
overtake a Mitsubishi pick up
Dumayag claims that he has long been a preofessional driver and
was very familiar with the roads and that upon reaching the blind
curce he stepped on accelerator to pick up speed however
suddenly a tricycle appeared on his lane and was in the process of
overtaking another vehicle. He tried to avoid the tricycle but to no
Dumayag claims that the accident would not have taken place if
the tricycle driver had not attempted to overtake another vehicle.

- W/N the overtaking of the tricycle was the proximate cause of the
- YES. The totality of evidence shows that the proximate cause of the
collision was the reckless negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily
overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of
traffic laws.
- Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was over loaded with a
total of 8 passengers.


Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited
her friend, petitioner Dr, Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the
hotels swimming pool facility. After swimming they took a
shower and when the came out of the bathroom, the entire
swimming pool area was already pitch black and there was no
longer any person around but the two of them.
They went to the main door leading to the hotel but discovered it
was locked.
Petitioner went around looking for a house phone. Petitioner
found a phone behind the lifeguards counter and a hard and

heavy counter top fell on petitioner head and knocked her down
almost unconscious.
Delia got hold of the house phone and informed the hotel
telephone operator of the incident. Not long after the hotel staff
arrived at the main entrance however it took 20-30 minutes to get
When the door opened they ice-packed the head of petitioner
and brought the hotel physician.
Petitioner experienced extreme dizziness and an uncomfortable
feeling in her stomach and she was constrained to stay at home
and missed all of her important appointments with her patients.
The had 3 sleepless nights which compelled her to consult a
Dr. Noble told her that she had a very serious brain injury based
on MRI scans and he prescribed several medicine for her
She did not get better and consulted another doctor because she
started to feel like she was losing her memory and this greatly
affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession.
Went to the US for therapy and medications. Still did not get
better. It was concluded that petitioner has post-traumatic or
post-concussion syndrome.
Respondents countered the material allegations of petitioner.
They alleged that petitioner insisted that she was fine and that
she assured the hotel Physician that she was fine. Petitioner even
disclosed to the physician that she once frll from a horse and had
a stroke had hysterectomy and is incapable of having children;
that she had a blood disorder which can cause on and off
A certification of this incident was made by the hotel and the
petitioner picked up this certification without any objection to the
contents thereof
Hotel claims that it never received any complaint from petitioner
The TC and the CA denied the petitioners claim for her failure to
prove that her serious and permanent injury was the result of the
11 June 1995 accident.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the TC claiming that since there was
no contractual relation, it is possible that this case can be one of

quasi-delict. However it found that the respondents and its

employees were not negligent. They found that the immediate
cause of the injury of petitioner was her own negligence because
petitioner knew and saw the sign that the pool closes at 7PM and
she admitted that she lifted the wooden countertop which fell on
her head. Plus the fact the she failed to substantiate the medical
symptoms she was experiencing.
ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit?

NO. petition has no merit. SC is not a trier of facts and this case
doesnt fall within any of the exceptions which allow the SC to
review the facts found by the lower court.
Neither did the SC find negligence in the actions of the Hotel. It
was incumbent on petitioner to prove the negligence of the Hotel
because there is no presumption of negligence.


- Fire broke out in a Caltex service station, the fire spreading to the
neighbouring houses burning all the personal effects inside. The plaintiffs
attributed negligence as the cause of the fire.
- W/N without proof as to the cause of the fire can the doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur apply to presume negligence on Caltex
- Gasoline is a highly combustible material but fire is not considered a
fortuitous event as it arises from some act of man. The gasoline station
with all its equipment and employees was under the control of the
appellees. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started
were Caltex and their employees but they gave no explanation. It is fair
and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of
care. The report of a police officer strengthens the presumption along w/
the statement of Flores the gas tank driver. In addition, their negligence is

seen by their failure to construct a wall high enough to prevent the fire
from leaping to neighboring houses.
- A barge owned by Luzon was being towed by tugboats Bangus and
Barbero likewise owned by Luzon when it rammed into the wooden piles
of Nagtahan bailey bridge because of the swollen and current swift of the
Pasig river causing the bridge to list.
- The Republic of the Phils. sued for damages. Luzon disclaimed liability on
the ground that it exercised due diligence in the selection & supervision of
its employees and the damage caused was by force majeure, that the
Republic has no capacity to sue and that Nagtahan bridge was an
obstruction to navigation.
- W/N the collision was caused by force majeure
- NO, the fact that Nagtahan bridge was a stationary object and
uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of
water craft, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge
exclusively controlled by Luzon ram the bridge support raises a
presumption of negligence on the part of Luzon and its employees. Luzon
stresses that they took extra precautions so the accident should be
deemed a fortuitous event but this statement precisely negates their
argument because force majeure are events not foreseeable or avoidable.
It must be impossible to foresee or avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee
the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures
adopted prove that the possibility of danger was foreseeable.
89. F.F. CRUZ & CO. v. CA (Request to create fire wall fell on deaf ears. This
was a requirement of city ordinance. Furniture shop with combustible
materials. Fire started. Res ipsa loquitur applies in this case)
- The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was
situated adjacent to the residence of the Mables.
- Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall

be constructed between the shop and Mables residence. The request was
repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.
- In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in Cruzs shop.
Cruzs employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire,
but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables house. Both
the shop and the house were razed to the ground.
- The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the
contents thereof.
- The Mables filed an action for damages against the Cruzs.
- The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award
of damages.
- W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case.
- Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. The CA,
therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows:
- Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
- The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust,
paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
- It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of
petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed.
- Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of
the Mables as required by a city ordinance that the fire could have been
caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette that gasoline and alcohol were

used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside
the shop
- Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to
construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to
support a finding of negligence.
- Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of
defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to
prevent the flames from leaping over it. Defendant's negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to
the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
- In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of
negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property
and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the
pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance
providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of
negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L- 29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA
- Genetron International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship
owned and operated by Sebastian. On April 25, 1992, Sebastian instructed
Mavalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of
machinery a reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastians
manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While in the process of complying
with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, Genetrons Isuzu Elf Truck with
plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of private jeepney
along Caypombo, Sta.Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning.
- Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained
physical injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao incurred the
most serious injuries among the passengers of the truck. He was initially
brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment but in
view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine
Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to

Capitol Medical Center by his parents, for medical reasons then to PGH for
financial consideration.
- Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as
a result of the accident and per doctors advice, his foot was amputated.
He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition,
coupled with the doctors recommendation, led his family to bring him
home where he died on Nov. 07, 1992.
- Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against
both Ong and Sebastian before the RTC of QC. After his death Macalinao
was substituted by his parents in the action.
- Trial Court: based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a reckless
and imprudent manner thereby causing the same to hit the private
jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed that Ong was driving
cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no evidence was
presented to substantiate the claim.
- CA: reversed the findings of trial court. Evidence presented by petitioners
is insufficient to support verdict of negligence against Ong.
- W/N sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of negligence
against Ong
- The evidence on record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
sufficiently establishes Ongs negligence.
- The photographs of the accident deserve substantial cogitation.
- Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth which
ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
- In this case, while there is dearth of testimonial evidence to enlighten us
about what actually happened, photographs depicting the relative
positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident took place do
exist. It is well established that photographs, when duly verified and shown
by extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the
time in question, are in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in
evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the
situation or condition of objects or premises or the circumstances of an

- Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of negligence against

Ong is the police report of the incident. The report states that the Isuzu
truck was the one which hit the left portion of the private jeepney. It must
still be remembered that although police blotters are of little probative
value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. Entries in police
records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facttherein stated, and
their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence.
- While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the foregoing
pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur,a Latin phrase
which literally means the thing or transaction speaks for itself.
- Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie
negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute
for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along
with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and
thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no
negligence on his part.
- The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. This is based in part upon the
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no knowledge, and is
therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon
the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence
- Requisites of application of res ipsa loquitur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someones negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated
- The court held that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar.
In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the
accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as

plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were not
present at the crucial moment.
- The driver of the jeepney who could have shed light on the circumstances
is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge about the cause of the
mishap are the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of
Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastians previous employee but his
co-respondent in the case as well.
92. RAMOS v. CA
- Erlinda Ramos underwent an operation known as cholecystectomy
(removal of stone in her gallbladder) under the hands of Dr. Orlino Hosaka.
He was accompanied by Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, an anesthesiologist which
Dr. Hosaka recommended since Ramos (and her husband Rogelio) did not
know any.
- The operation was schedule at 9am of June 17, 1985 but was however
delayed for three hours due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
- Dr. Gutierrez subsequently started trying to intubate her. And at around
3pm, Erlinda was seen being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The
doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm.
Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital
only four months later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated
operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on
August 3, 1999.
- RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding the defendants guilty of, at
the very least, negligence in the performance of their duty to plaintiffpatient Erlinda Ramos.
- On appeal to CA, the said decision was reversed dismissing the
complaint against the defendants. Hence this petition.
- W/N the private respondents should be held liable for the injury caused
to Erlinda and her family?
- YES.
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the

surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a

presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate
that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of
certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the
part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in
the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
- However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent
or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode
of proof, or a mere procedural of convenience since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific
proof of negligence. Hence, mere invocation and application of the
doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It
is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to
present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the
burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine
may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
- Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that
he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are within the common

knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with

the facts. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is
prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and
the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish
the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is
no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient
can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
- We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As
will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain
prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the
application of res ipsa loquitur.
- In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and
expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder.
On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and
control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive
control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically
sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit
in mind and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and
prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable
damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of
the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated.
Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does
not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this
kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube.
Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered
decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the
proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all
under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the
physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been
guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of
anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
- We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that
private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her piteous condition.

- Dr. Gutierrez (anesthesiologist) is held liable for failure to perform the

necessary pre-operative evaluation which includes taking the patient's
medical history, review
of current drug therapy, physical examination and interpretation of
laboratory data. This physical examination performed by the
anesthesiologist is directed primarily toward the central nervous system,
cardiovascular system, lungs and upper airway. A thorough analysis of the
patient's airway normally involves investigating the following: cervical
spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility, prominent central incisors,
diseased or artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental
- In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw
Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June
1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative
evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and
needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible
difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to
Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first
time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was,
therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing
with human lives lie at the core of the physician's centuries-old Hippocratic
Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear
indicia of her negligence.
- Having failed to observe common medical standards in pre-operative
management and intubation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez' negligence
resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.
- Dr. Hosaka, being the head of the surgical team (captain of the ship), it
was his responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task
in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in
his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the
operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that
respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly
intubated the patient.
- Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as

Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the
latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with
his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that
he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he
shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's
- Notwithstanding the general denial made by respondent hospital to the
effect that the respondent doctors (referred to as consultants) in this
case are not their employees, there is a showing that the hospital exercises
significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct
of their work within the hospital premises.
- The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those
of others based on the
former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they
have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on
the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the
respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove
that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
- In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with
regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians.
In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent
hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of
Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently
solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
- The CA decision and resolution are hereby modified so as to award in
favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the
following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of
promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to
the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages;

4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5)

the costs of the suit
93. JARCIA, JR. v. PEOPLE (Taxi cab hit boy on ankle. Doctors did not do
thorough examination of entire leg. Res ipsa loquitur does not apply here
because the misfortune was not in the exclusive control of the person in
charge. HOWEVER they are liable civilly for being negligent in not doing a
thorough examination.)
Private complainant Belinda Santiago lodged a complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation against the petitioners, Dr. Emmanuel
Jarcia, Jr. and Dr. Marilou Bastan, for their alleged neglect of professional
duty which caused her son, Roy Alfonso Santiago, to suffer serious physical
Upon investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab; that
he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical
treatment; that an X-ray of the victims ankle was ordered; that the X-ray
result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia; that Dr. Bastan entered the
emergency room and, after conducting her own examination of the victim,
informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that was hit, there
was no need to examine the upper leg. Despite Mrs. Santiago's protest the
doctors did not examine the upper portion of the leg of Roy. That eleven
(11) days later, Roy Jr. developed fever, swelling of the right leg and
misalignment of the right foot; that Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the
hospital; and that the X-ray revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear
hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone.
After trial and applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor the RTC found
petitioners to be guilty of simple negligence. The decision was affirmed in
toto by the CA.
(1) Whether or not res ipsa loquitor is applicable in this case.
(2) Whether of not the petitioner physicians are negligent, hence liable
for damages.
As to the first issue: This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means- "where the
thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the

defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care." The requisites for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.
However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. Ergo, the doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
Relative to the case, res ipsa loquitor does not apply since the
circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.s injury and the series of tests
that were supposed to be undergone by him to determine the extent of
the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and
Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of the Manila
Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the emergency
room. While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the
courts below seem doubtless to constitute reckless imprudence on the
part of the petitioners, this conclusion is still best achieved, not through
the scholarly assumptions of a layman like the patients mother, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witness/es. As to whether the
petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in treating
patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of expert opinion.
As to the second issue: Petitioners were negligent in their obligation. It
was proven that a thorough examination was not performed on Roy Jr
since as residents on duty at the emergency room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr.
Bastan were expected to know the medical protocol in treating leg
fractures and in attending to victims of car accidents.

Thus, simple negligence is resent if: (1) that there is lack of precaution on
the part of the offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be caused
is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan, explained the court, cannot pass on the liability
to the taxi driver who hit the victim. It may be true that the actual, direct,
immediate, and proximate cause of the injury (fracture of the leg bone or
tibia) of Roy Jr. was the vehicular accident when he was hit by a taxi. The
petitioners, however, cannot simply invoke such fact alone to excuse
themselves from any liability. If this would be so, doctors would have a
ready defense should they fail to do their job in attending to victims of hitand-run, maltreatment, and other crimes of violence in which the actual,
direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the injury is indubitably the act
In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the
extent of Roy Jr.s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss of their
duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of
argument that they did not have the capacity to make such thorough
evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to another
doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of assuring him and
his mother that everything was all right.
Moreover, the contention of petitioners that they cannot be held liable
since Roy is not their patient, since they are not the attending physicians
but merely requested by the ER does not hold water.
Physician-patient relationship exists when a patient engages the services
of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated. And in
accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents
that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such
training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his
patient, a physician is under a duty to exercise that degree of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the
same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
Stated otherwise, the physician has the obligation to use at least the same

level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to
treat the condition under similar circumstances.
There is a physician-patient relationship in this case since the petitioner
obliged themselves and examined the victim, and later assured the mother
that everything was fine and that they could go home. Their assurance that
everything is fine deprived the victim of seeking medical help.
Petitioners were absolved in the criminal charge for the reason that a
reasonable doubt existed but they are liable for damages. There is no
direct evidence proving that it was their negligence that caused the
suffering of Roy.
Respondent Dr. Carlos Gerona, treated petitioners son, Allen who
was 8 years old for a fractured wrist. Respondent administered a
U-splint and immobilized Allens wrist with a cast.
Allen re-fractured the same wrist and he was sent back to the
The x-ray examination showed a complete fracture and
displacement of the bone with fragments overlapping each other.
Allens arm was placed in a cast and Respondent advised allens
mother to bring him back for retightening of the cast.
Allen was brought back later than June and by then, the cast had
not been retightened causing a rotational deformity in Allens
arm. The deformity was caused by a re-displacement of the bone
It was agreed that a surgery would be conducted with Dr. Jabagat
as the anesthesiologist
Mother of Allen was allowed to watch the procedure through a
class panel. Dr. Jabagat, after several attempts to intubate the
patient, he failed to do so. Respondent asked Dr. Jabagat if the
operation should be postponed but Dr. Jabagat said it was okay to
proceed. Respondent checked the breathing of his patient before
beginning on the procedure.
Petitioner went out to make a phone call and wait for her son. She
was later informed that her son had died on the operating table.

The cause of his death was asphyxia due to congestion and

edema of the epiglottis
Petitioners alleged negligence on the part of the doctors.

W/N respondent is liable for the damages for Allens death.

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur does not apply in this case. The CA
correctly found that petitioners failure to present substantial
evidence of any specific act of negligence on respondents part or
of the surrounding facts and circumstances which would lead to
the reasonable inference that the untoward consequence was
caused by respondents negligence.
In fact, under the established facts, respondent appears to have
observed the proper amount of care required under the
In the instant case, the instrument which caused the damage or
injury was not even within the respondents exclusive
management and control as Dr. Jabagat was exclusively in control
and management of the anesthesia and the tube.
Here, the respondent could only supervise Dr. Jabagat to make
sure that he was performing his duties. But respondent could not
dictate upon Dr. Jabagat the particular anesthesia to administer,
the dosage thereof, or that it be administered in any particular
way not deemed appropriate by Dr. Jabagat.
Respondents specialization not being in the field of
anesthesiology, it would be dangerous for him to substitute his
judgment of Dr. Jabagats decisions in matters that fall
appropriately within the scope of Dr. Jabagats expertise.
The court cannot properly declare that respondent failed to
exercise the required standard of care as lead surgeon as to hold
him liable for damages for Allens death.
In civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by
preponderance of evidence is on the plaintiff who is asserting the
affirmative of an issue. This burden was not overcome.


On the dawn of New Years day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy, along with
her spouse and their daughter were on their way home from a
Christmas party when they were run over by a Fuso passenger
jeep registered in the name of Petitioner Oscar del Carmen and
used as a public Utility Vehicle
A criminal case was instituted and Allan (driver) was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
The father of Emilia (Geronimo Bacoy), in behalf of the 6 minor
children of Emilia filed a civil case for damages against Allan and
also impleaded the Spouses Oscar and Norma del Carmen.
Del Carmen refused to assume liability and claimed that the jeep
was merely stolen from them from Allen. He also clarified that
Allen was his jeep conductor and that it was his brother who
employed Allen. He also averred that Allens employment was
already severed before the mishap.
W/N petitioners Sps. Del Carmen should be held vicariously liable
for the mishap caused by Allen.
In this case negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa
Petitioner alleges that the jeep was merely stolen by Allen
however the carnapping case filed against Allan was already
dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence.
In this case, all the requisites for res ipsa loquitur are present.
o The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent
o The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person in charge; and
o The injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to
third person for the deaths or injuries consequent to its
operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.

96. CAPILI v. CARDENA (Tree fell on kid. Died. Capili was negligent in not
removing the tree which was posing danger to people passing by. It was a
nuisance. Capili was school principal. Should have foreseen the harm.)
- Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque
Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the
school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death.
- Her parents filed a case for damages against petitioner Capili, alleging
that a certain Lerios reported on the possible danger the tree posed. The
Cardaas averred that petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight
caused the death of their daughter.
- RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of respondent parents to
establish negligence on part of petitioner, BUT the CA reversed, reasoning
that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere
sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have
had the tree removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaa.
- The appellate court ruled that the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that
should have been removed soon after petitioner had chanced upon it.
Hence, this petition for review.
- Whether or not petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of
- Petitioner is liable.
- A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the
actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such
an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or
to do it in a more careful manner. The probability that the branches of a
dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that
is foreseeable.
- As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance
of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling
branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.

- The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of

the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the tree
was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for
application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management
or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
- While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the
mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an
inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants
part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing
or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least
permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.
- The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that
petitioners negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima
facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.
- As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance
of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an
explanation on her part as to why she failed to be vigilant. As school
principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the schools
premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by
the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility
demanded by her position.
- Petition denied.

97. REYES v. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL (Jorge feeling fever. Saw doctor.
Typhoid fever. The resident physician was Dr. Rico but shift ended and
Jorege was endorsed to Dr. Marvie Blanes. Issued medicine and conducted
a compatibility test on whether the patient would experience adverse
effects. No adverse effects and so the medicine was issued. Got worse.
- Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other
petitioners, namely, Rose Nahdja, Johnny, Lloyd, and Kristine, all surnamed
Reyes, were their children. Five days before his death on January 8, 1987,
Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he failed
to get relief from some home medication he was taking, which consisted of
analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor.
- On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his
wife. He was attended to by respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident
physician and admitting physician on duty, who gave Jorge a physical
examination and took his medical history. She noted that at the time of his
admission, Jorge was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and with
respiratory distress. Typhoid fever was then prevalent in the locality, as the
clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per month
Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered
a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge.
Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and malarial smear
were also made After about an hour, the medical technician submitted the
results of the test from which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive
for typhoid fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed
Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.
- Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also
took Jorges history and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her
impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the
accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test
with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Said test was
administered by nurse Josephine Pagente who also gave the patient a dose
of triglobe. As she did not observe any adverse reaction by the patient to
chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said
antibiotic to be administered on Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose
was administered on Jorge about three hours later just before midnight.

- At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorges
temperature rose to 41C. The patient also experienced chills and
exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr.
Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered
hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patients convulsions. When he
regained consciousness, the patient was asked by Dr. Blanes whether he
had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the past.
Jorge replied he did not
- After about 15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed
restlessness, and his convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the
emergency measures taken before and, in addition, valium was
administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the treatment and
slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or
mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around
2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty years old. The cause of his death was
Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.
- Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damage applying res ipsa
- No. There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and
that is under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Thus, courts of other
jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving
of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries
sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the
area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another
part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the
patient was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an
operation for appendicitis, among others.
- Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur were present, namely: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

- The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. In the Ramos case, the question was whether a surgeon, an
anesthesiologist, and a hospital should be made liable for the comatose
condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. In that case, the
patient was given anesthesia prior to her operation.
- Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time of her
operation, the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental
brain damage does not normally occur in a gallblader operation in the
absence of negligence of the anesthesiologist. Taking judicial notice that
anesthesia procedures had become so common that even an ordinary
person could tell if it was administered properly, we allowed the testimony
of a witness who was not an expert. In this case, while it is true that the
patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance was
rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death.
Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills
for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given
him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious
illness and professional medical help came too late for him.
- Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately
apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The
question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of
the standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the
issue of the correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can
be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.
98. PERLE CIE. D SEGUROS v. SARANGAYA III (Sarangayas owner of 3 door
apartment. Perles employee Pascual rented one door and set up office
and garage. 14 year old car. Set on fire. Res ipsa loquitur present in this
case. Pascual liable and Perle vicariously liable in employing Pascual)
- In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as Super A
Building and was subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased
out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second
and third doors of the building.
- In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its branch
manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of
lease of the first door of the Super A Building, abutting the office of

- Perla Compania renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The
left side was converted into an office while the right was used by Pascual
as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided
vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of
- On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not
bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned, and decided to
warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the
ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start. Thinking it
was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the
accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again
heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the
engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to
push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear
compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside
and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.
- Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard
two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no
time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings,
furniture and appliances.
- The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and thereafter
submitted a report to the provincial fire marshall. He concluded that the
fire was accidental. The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation
had no fire permit as required by law.
- Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property was filed against petitioner
Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to pay the amount
of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial building. At the
prosecutors office, petitioner Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the
complaint, which was granted.
- Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint based on
quasidelict against petitioners for a sum of money and damages, alleging
that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation
lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as
its employee.
- During the trial, respondents presented witnesses who testified that a
few days before the incident, Pascual was seen buying gasoline in a

container from a nearby gas station. He then placed the container in the
rear compartment of the car.
- In his answer, Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso
fortuito, hence, he was not liable for damages. He also denied putting a
container of gasoline in the cars rear compartment. For its part, Perla
Compania refused liability for the accident on the ground that it exercised
due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Pascual as its branch manager.
- W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
o <Pascual> It was a fortuitous event
- W/N Perla Compania liable under tort
o <Perla Compania> We exercised due diligence in selecting Pascual
- YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out
an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie
case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of
the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
- The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the
plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the
happening of the accident alone to establish negligence.
- The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a
defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised
to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants
responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part.
- To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
charge and

3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
- Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not
ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. Ordinary refers to the usual
course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched
on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually
occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct
evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the
evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the
- The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent
act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in
the same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of
- Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit
any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and
condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have
known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was
definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and
diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was
that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
- The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was
independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event
which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person
tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course
of conduct that aggravated the accident.[20]
- In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause
or contributory cause of the injury or loss. In a vehicular accident, for
example, a mechanical defect will not release the defendant from liability
if it is shown that the accident could have been prevented had he properly
maintained and taken good care of the vehicle.

- The circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual.

Clearly, there was no caso fortuito because of his want of care and
prudence in maintaining the car.
- Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered
the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the
person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was
under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the
responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. No other
person, not even the respondents, was charged with that obligation except
- Where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have
been under the management or control of a certain person and, in the
normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that
person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack
of such care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to
establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident
from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
- Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that
respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car and
had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a
building they owned.
- In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.
While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in
considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it
jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.
- In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. o fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence,
that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
- Here, petitioner-corporations evidence hardly included any rule or
regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions.
It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of
company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation
did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either.

Based on these circumstances, petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert

effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascuals car or its serviceability.
- Private respondent Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land
("Property") located in Albay. Pobre began developing the Property as a
resort-subdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort
Subdivision." The Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal
mineral water and steam were present beneath the Property and found
the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and
potentially for commercial or industrial use.
- NPC then became involved with Pobre's Property in three instances. First
was when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved
subdivision plan. Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC
filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 squaremeter portion of the Property. The trial court ordered the expropriation of
the lots upon NPC's payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of
P207,790. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells.
While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste
materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of
waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property.
NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its
dumping. Third was in 1979 when NPC filed its second expropriation case
against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the
Property. NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of
Naglagbong Well Site.
- Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation.
Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just
compensation of all the lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment
of damages.
- NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the
ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already
abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre's
opposition. The trial court granted NPC's motion to dismiss but the trial
court allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial
court admitted Pobre's exhibits on the damages because NPC failed to

- W/N NPC is liable to respondent to pay damages?
- NPC liable to pay temperate and exemplary damages.
- NPC's abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we
cannot award moral damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it.
We also cannot award attorney's fees in Pobre's favor since he did not
appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of
attorney's fees.
- Nonetheless, we find it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages
to Pobre.
- The court may award temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, if the court finds that a
party has suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved
with certainty from the nature of the case. As the trial and appellate courts
noted, Pobre's resort subdivision was no longer just a dream because
Pobre had already established the resort-subdivision and the prospect for
it was initially encouraging. That is, until NPC permanently damaged
Pobre's Property. NPC did not just destroy the property. NPC dashed
Pobre's hope of seeing his Property achieve its full potential as a resortsubdivision.
- The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain
- Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen's property rights. The power of
eminent domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with
circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we
hold NPC liable for exemplary damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages
or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
- Petition denied for lack of Merit. Decision of the Court of Appeals



- On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the

caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner,
when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion
jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by
its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot.
- The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the
petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional Trial
Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but
deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's
contributory negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 private
respondent and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next
five years
- The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the
petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not
liable at all.
- In its own decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the rulings of the trial
court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and
disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent.
- W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner guilty of
negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176
of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial
- To say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of
petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central to recompense the private respondent for
the death of Julio Famoso, their main source of support, who was killed in
line of duty while in its employ. It is not only a matter of law but also of
compassion on which we are called upon to rule today. We shall state at
the outset that on both counts the petition must fail.
- Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the
locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose because
they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are
described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" thick which are
attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned.
Although they could be removed only with special equipment, the fish

plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the
scene of the accident.
- There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose
inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the
petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to
Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and
supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district
were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were
reported every hour. 3 The petitioner should therefore have taken more
prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was
finally lost because of its negligence.
- The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such
derailments is of course not acceptable. And neither are we impressed by
the claim that the brakemen and the conductors were required to report
any defect in the condition of the railways and to fill out prescribed forms
for the purpose. For what is important is that the petitioner should act on
these reports and not merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not
easy to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it
should stress all the more the need for the responsible employees of the
petitioner to make periodic checks and actually go down to the railroad
tracks and see if the fish plates were in place.
- It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way back and
that it had passed the same rails earlier without accident. The suggestion is
that the rails were properly aligned then, but that does not necessarily
mean they were still aligned afterwards. It is possible that the fish plates
were loosened and detached during its first trip and the rails were as a
result already mis-aligned during the return trip. But the Court feels that
even this was unlikely, for, as earlier noted, the fish plates were supposed
to have been bolted to the rails and could be removed only with special
tools. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at the scene of the
mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been
removed long before.
- At any rate, the absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or reason
is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa
loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 4 thus: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the

management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the

absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.


- Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider were the owners or operators of a Ford
pick-up car. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 31, 1970,
their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was then only sixteen (16) years
of age, without proper official authority, drove the for pick-up, without due
regard to traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary
precaution to prevent injury to persons or damage to property. The pickup
car was overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer,
who was then a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and
required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for
more than two (2) years; that as a result of the physical injuries sustained
by Annette, she suffered unimaginable physical pain, mental anguish, and
her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock and spent a
considerable sum of money for her treatment.
- The complaint was only filed on January 5, 1975.
- At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only Ferrer and counsel were present.
As such the Pfleiders were declared in default and the court rendered
judgment against them.
- Upon filing a motion for reconsideration, respondent judge, without
setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving defendants
from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint states no cause of
action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his
parents at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity the mother, are only responsible for the damages caused by
their minor children who live in their company; and (b) that the defense of
prescription is meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than four
(4) years after the date of the accident, and the action to recover damages
based on quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant
petition for mandamus.

- W/N the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private
respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.

Having received no reply from petitioner, Respondent filed with the

housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for specific
performance which rendered judgment in favor of respondents.

- Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates
involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically
plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the
defense of prescription. The defense of prescription, even if not raised in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such
defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading
- It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the
same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this
particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants
had been declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the
evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is
based is already barred by the statute of limitations
- In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with
the question of prescription. Actions for damages arising from physical
injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. The four-year
period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the

WON Respondents right to bring the instant case against petitioner has
already prescribed?

102. SOLID HOMES, INC. V. TAN 465 SCRA 137

In law, a cause of action exists when the following requisites concur, to wit:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2)an obligation on the part on the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.

On April 7,1980, Solid Homes sold to spouses Uy a subdivision lot and
thereafter spouses Uy sold the same lot to spouses Tan.
From then on, respondents visited their property a number of times, only
to find out the sad state of development thereat. There was no
infrastructure & utility system of water. Worse, squatters occupy their lot
On Dec. 18,1995, respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the
needed utility system & clear the area of squatters by the end of January

WON in the event respondents opt to rescind the contract, should
petitioner pay them the price they paid for the lot plus interest or the
current market value thereof? CURRENT MARKET VALUE.
Petitioner argued that the 10 yrs prescriptive period should be reckoned
from April 7, 1980 when they sold the lot to spouses Uy or at the latest on
February 1985. The SC disagree because it is from the time an act is
performed or an omission incurred which is violative of plaintiffs right, that
signals the accrual of a case of action.
Thus, the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from the
date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of action arises when that
which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have
been done is done.

In this case, it was only on Dec. 18, 1995 when respondent made a written
demand upon petitioner to construct which are unquestionably in the
nature of an obligation to do.
Under Art. 1169, party who is under obligation to do something incurs
delay only from the time the obligee demands either judicially or extra
judicially for the fulfillment of obligation.

In this case, respondent made their written demand upon petitioner to

perform what is incumbent upon it only on Dec.18, 1995, it was only from
that date when 10 yrs prescriptive period commenced to run.

deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the
existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the
presence of fault or negligence in its commission.

Equity and justice dictate that the injured party should be paid the market
value, otherwise, respondent would enrich themselves at the expense of
the lot owners when they sell the same lot at the present market value.

- W/N the father is liable for injury deliberately caused by his minor son.

Indeed, there would be unjust enrichment if respondents Solid Homes, Inc.

& Purita Soliven are made to pay only the purchase price plus interest. It is
definite that the value of the subject property already escalated after
almost two decades from the time the petitioner paid for it. Equity and
justice dictate that the injured party should be paid the market value of
the lot, otherwise, respondents Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven would
enrich themselves at the expense of herein lot owners when they sell the
same lot at the present market value. Surely, such a situation should not
be countenanced for to do so would be contrary to reason and therefore,
unconscionable. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic
adherence that what is inconvenient or contrary to reason is not allowed in


443 SCRA 522, 544-548
- Pepito Cadano was beat up by Rico Fuellas
- Pepito sustained a broken arm
- Cadano spouses filed a case against the father of Rico
- Agapito Fuellas, the father of Rico, contends that the act of the minor
must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being
no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but

- YES. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means", while on the other hand, gives them the "right
to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.
- The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not
apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil
Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which
cover equal or identical cases.


- Carlos Bangkili, then 19, committed the crime of homicide with less
serious injuries.
- Balos Paleyan was killed while another person was wounded.

- On November 21, 1960, upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced

accordingly, but the decision made no pronouncement as to the civil
indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of the deceased.
- Paleyan filed a case for indemnity against the mother of Carlos.
- W/N as the mother of Carlos who had him in her custody at the time he
committed the offense, should be adjudged liable with him for the amount
which he was sentenced to pay, considering that he was then a minor of 19
- YES. The mother is liable.
- The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not
apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil
Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which
cover equal or identical cases.
- The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case, but
submits that its application should be relaxed, considering that her son,
although living with her, was already 19 years of age and hence mature
enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense,
however, and does not exempt the appellant from her responsibility as
parent and natural guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any
exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." There is no such
proof in this case.

- Monfort played a prank on Cuadra, she threw a headband at Cuadra,
Monfort said it was an earthworm.
- Cuadra turned around and her right eye was hit by the object.
- She was hurt so she rubbed the eye and treated it with powder.
- She told her parents what happened and was taken to the hospital for
- She underwent operation and stayed there for 23 days.
- The Cuadra parents initiated a suit against Alfonso Monfort seeking actual
damages, moral damages, and attorneys fees.
- RTC and CA found for the petitioners.
- W/N the father of Monfort is liable for the acts of his son in the case at
- NO. Although 2180 states, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
- In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury
was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason
to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.

- YES. As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there

being no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave
properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates,
he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the
record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the
damage caused upon plaintiff child.
- 10 year old Adelberto Bundoc shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing her death.
- Tamargos parents filed a civil case against Bundocs natural parents
whom he was living with at the time.
- Before this incident took place, Spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
Adelberto which was granted after the shooting.
- Bundocs natural parents claimed that they were not the indispensible
parties to the action, but the adopting parents.
- RTC dismissed the complaint because the natural parents were found not
to be the indispensible parties.
that should be held liable and
therefore be treated as the indispensible parties.
- YES. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code states that Parents
and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code.
- The family code also provides that Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
- We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not

consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so

as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in
the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act
that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
- Case remanded and the Bundoc spouses are to be tried.
- Petitoners son, Wendell Libi, and respondents daughter Julie Ann
Gotiong, both minors, were for more than two years before their death,
sweethearts. Gotiong broke up with him when she found him to be sadistic
and irresponsible in December 1978. In January 1979, Libi bugged Gotiong
trying to get her back. She refused and he began threatening her. Gotiong
resided with her best friend Alfonso at that time.
- Libi and Gotiong were found dead that same month at the home of the
Libis. They died from a single gun shot wound from a firearm registered
under Cresencio Libi.
- Gotiongs parents filed a civil case for damages arising from the vicarious
liability of the Libi;s under Art. 2180.
- The TC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed.
- W/N the Libis are vicariously liable under Article 2180.

- YES. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent

and child relationship consists of the instruction and supervision of the
child. We cannot help but entertain serious doubts about the diligence
exercised since Libi could not have gotten hold of the gun if the locked
boxs key (where they claim the gun was stored) was kept properly. They
were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and
knowing the activities of their children.
- The civil liability of parents for quasi delicts of their minor children is
direct and primary, not subsidiary. It is also subject to the defense of lack
of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family. The minor-transgressor shall be answerable or
shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in the case of
the insolvency of the parents or guardian.
- Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control or who live in their company, unless it is proven that
the former acted with due diligence to prevent such damages,
- That primary liability is based on Article 101 of the RPC. The enforcement
of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death
or inacapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve from the father
to the mother to the guardian. But the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youth offender. Under the
Family Code, however, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender.
- Pabling Daffon shot classmate Alfredo Amadora in the auditorium of
Colegio de San Jose. He was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Alfredos parents filed a civil action to recover damages
against CSJ, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Pabling and two other students.
- The CFI found the school officials liable for damages. The CA, however,
reversed the CFI decision because: 1) Art 2180 was not applicable since CSJ
was not a school of arts and trades; 2) the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident since the semester had

already ended; 3) there was no clear identification of the gun; and 4) the
defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
- In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend that Alfredo went to
school to finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite for graduation;
hence, he was under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents, on the other hand, contend that Alfredo went to school to
submit his physics experiment; hence, he was no longer under their
custody since the semester had already ended.
- W/N Art 2180 applies to establishments which are technically not schools
of arts and trades
- W/N private respondents are liable for damages under Art 2180
- YES. Art 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
Teachers, in general, shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the cannon of reddendo singula
singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and
heads of establishments of arts and trade to the word apprentices.
- NO. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over his students,
regardless of the nature of the school where he is teaching. The injury
subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school or any of
its personnel and equipment. It may be inflicted by any student regardless
of the school where he is registered.
- The student is under the custody of school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has already begun or has already ended. As long as
it can be shown that the student is in the school in the pursuit of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school continues.
- The teacher-in-charge is liable for his students torts as he is designated
to exercise supervision over them. Moreover, the teacher is liable
regardless of the students age.
- In this case, none of the private respondents were held liable. The rector,
dean of boys, and high school principal cannot be held liable because they

were not teachers-in-charge. The physics teacher was not negligent. The
school cannot be held directly liable since Art 2180 only speaks of teacher
or head of the school of arts and trades.
- PARTIAL DISSENT (Melencio-Herrera)
- Restrictive meaning given to teacher as teacher-in-charge
contravenes the concept of substitute parental authority.
- School may be held liable as an employer for damages caused by their
employees under Art 2180.


- Reynaldo Pasco, together with two companions, while walking inside the
campus of Araneta University, after attending classes, was accosted and
mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias
"Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University.
Pasco was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was
hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he
underwent surgery to save his life.
- A case was filed against Maidis and the University based on Art. 2180.
- The University claims that the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code under which it was sued applies only to vocational
schools and not to academic institutions. The CFI granted the Motion to
dismiss on that ground.
- W/N the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 (Lastly, teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.) is equally applicable to academic institutions.
- We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to
educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the
issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the
school or the university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads)
is liable. We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision

concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads." (But the other Justices

dissented, they didnt really discuss why so kind of useless. They did say
though that the school is liable as an employer for the failure of the
teacher or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents, which can still be denied if they show due diligence.)

113. YLARDE V. AQUINO 163 SCRA 697

- Petitioners in this case are the parents of Novelito Ylarde, who died as a
result of injuries suffered after being crushed by a huge boulder.
- Novelito was among 18 students, aged ten to eleven, requested by their
teacher, herein private respondent, Edgardo Aquino to help dig a hole
beside a one-ton concrete block where the said block may be buried.
When the hole was deep enough to accommodate the block, Aquino went
to see Banez who was about 30m away. He left the boys to level the soil
around the hole, and allegedly told them not to touch the stone.
- A few minutes after he left, the boys jumped into the pit. One of them
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide towards the pits
opening. The concrete block pinned Ylarde before he could get out.
- Petitioners suit was dismissed by the lower court for the ff reasons: 1)
digging was in line with WorkEd; 2) Aquino exercised utmost diligence; and
3) Ylardes death was due to his own reckless imprudence. The CA affirmed
the lower courts decision. Hence, this petition.
Art 2176, and Soriano (the school principal) as head of school under Art
- Aquino - YES, Soriano - NO
- Soriano is not liable since he is the head of an academic institution. Only
heads of schools of arts and trades are liable for torts committed by their
students (Amadora v CA).
- Aquinos negligent act of leaving his students in such a dangerous site is
the proximate cause of Ylardes death. He left the children to level the soil

around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was
on the brink of falling. He went to an area where he would not be able to
check on the childrens safety, and left the children close to the excavation,
an obviously attractive nuisance.
- Natural for the children to play around
- The boulder falling into the pit was a natural consequence of its weight
and the loose soil
- A teacher in loco parentis should make sure that the children are
protected from all harm while in his company. In this case, petitioner was
clearly negligent in his duty.
- PETITION GRANTED - Aquino pays damages

- Art 2180 provides that: xxx Teachers or heads of establishments of arts

and trades are liable for damages caused by their pupils and students of
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The phrase so long
as they remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time.
- Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school,
or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Castro. As such, Salvosa and BCF
cannot be held solidarily liable under the provision of Art 2180.


- Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution. It is also an
institution of arts and trade. It not purely or exclusively an academic
institution because of a technical-vocational department.
- There is an ROTC Unit within the premises of BCF, which is under the full
control of AFP.
- The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy Abon as its armorer. As such, Abon
received his appointment from AFP. He also received salary from AFP.
- Abon was also a commerce student of BCF.
- On March 3, 1977, in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon
Castro, a student of the University of Baguio. Abon used an unlicensed
firearm which he got from the armory of the ROTC Unit of BCF.
- Castro died, and Abon was convicted for Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30 of AFP.
President and Chairman of BCF, Salvosa, and BCF can be held
solidarily liable with Abon for damages under Art 2180, as a consequence
of tortuous act of Abon
- NO. Salvosa and BCF cannot be held solidarily liable with Abon for
damages under Art 2180.

- Carlitos Bautista, a 3rd year Commerce student at PSBA, was stabbed on
Aug 30, 1985 at the 2nd floor premises of PSBA.
- It was established at the assailants were not members of the schools
academic community, but were elements from outside the school.
- W/N under Article 2180, PSBA was liable for the Bautistas death.
- NO. Under Art 2180, PSBA was not liable. (However, PSBA was not
necessarily exculpated from liability. PSBA may be held liable under breach
of contractual obligation or under provision of Art 21.)
- Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. Under Art 2180, the damage should have been caused or inflicted
by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in custody.
- The above situation does not exist in present case because the assailants
of Carlitos were not students of PSBA for whose acts the school could be
made liable.

- In the morning of Aug 13, 1982, while in the premises of Republic Central
Colleges (Colleges), Maximinio Soliman was attacked, assaulted, striked,
and shot plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver by Jimmy
Solomon, a security guard employed by R.L. Security Agency.
- If not for the timely medical assistance given to him, Soliman could have
been dead.

the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the
school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

W/N under Art 2180, Colleges should be held liable for the injuries
sustained by Soliman

- Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of FEU when he was shot
by Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises
- Saludaga was rushed to the hospital due to the wound he sustained
- Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the
shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no
formal complaint was filed against him
- Saludaga thereafter filed a complaint for damages against FEU on the
ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe
and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning

- NO. Colleges was not liable under Art 2180.
- Art 2180 does not apply because Colleges was not the employer of Jimmy
Solomon. The employer of Solomon was R.L. Security Agency. Colleges was
only a client of R.L. Security Agency.
- Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of
such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of an agency has no
hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of guards cannot, in
the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose
premises or property are protected by the security guards.
- Soliman cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of
security guard Solomon.
- Solimans cause of action is not limited to the one under Art 2180.
Colleges may be held liable for acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of Colleges.
- As held in PSBA vs. CA, an implied contract may be held to be established
between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand,
and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract
results in obligations for both parties. In said case, there is an implicit or
built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where looms around


553 SCRA 741

- Whether or not FEU should be held liable for damages
- YES. FEU is liable
- Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law student in FEU. As such, there
was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On
Saludaga's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of
the school. On the other hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to
impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to
ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the
- when Saludaga was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard
who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima
facie showing that FEU failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe
and secure environment to its students
- Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for

breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning

environment, FEU is liable to Saludaga for damages.
- FEU also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and
confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the
qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not
proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201
files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy.
- Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to
check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on
the part of the school. A learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the
security agency it hired.
- However, FEU cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code because FEU are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a
principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element
of control as to treat FEU as the employers of Rosete
- The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the
St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic, but because of short
notice, did not allow their son to join, but merely allowed him to bring
food to the teachers with the directive that he should go back home.
However, because of the persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went with
the group to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to
her rescue, but in the process it was Ferdinand himself who drowned.
Respondent spouses filed a complaint against St. Francis High School and
the teachers, contending that the death of their son was due to the failure
of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the
family in preventing their son's drowning.
- TC found in favor of the spouses because the teachers had not made an
actual and physical observation of the water before they allowed the
students to swim. CA held that although the picnic was not a school

sponsored activity, the principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its
planning stage, and thus held that the school was liable.
- W/N there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will
warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs.
- NO. In order for St. Francis to be held liable for negligence, their own
negligence or the negligence of those under them would have to be
shown. Respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed
their son to join the excursion. This was shown by the fact that the father
gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic without knowing where it
would be held, and also by the fact that a witness testified that the mother
said she cooked adobo so her son could join the picnic.
- Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his
employee, the act or omission which caused the damage or prejudice must
have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in performance of their
assigned tasks. The picnic was not a school activity, and mere knowledge
by the principal in the planning of the picnic did not in any way show
consent in holding of the same. The teacher who planned the picnic did
her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any
untoward incident. She even invited PE instructors and scout masters who
have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming, and they even had
life savers. Petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no
moral damages can be assessed against them.


- Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at PCST. She
went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives, as
she was reared in a poor family. Regino enrolled in logic and statistics
subjects under respondents Gamurot and Baladad. PCST held a fund raising
campaign and required each student to pay for two tickets at 100P each.

The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who

purchased tickets with additional students in their test scores, those who
refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance
parties, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. Both Gamurot and Baladad
allegedly disallowed her from taking her final examinations.
- W/N PCST is liable for a tort
- NOT DECIDED. CA had dismissed the case so the SC ordered the TC to
reinstate the complaint and continue the proceedings.
- Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise
bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable
for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act
that violated the contract may also be a tort.
- In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (case #12) Justice Fisher elucidated: When
such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under
such conditions that the same act with constitutes a breach of the contract
would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had
no contract existed between the parties.
- The case is about St. Marys liability for damages arising from an accident
that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit
the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
- Sherwin Capistranos was part of the campaigning group.
- On the day of the incident, Sherwin rode a Mitsubishi Jeep owned by
Vicencio Villanueva. It was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and
a student of the same school.
- James Daniel was driving the car recklessly so it turned turtle.
- Actually it was the detachment of the steering that caused it.

- Sherwin Capistranos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the

- William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case
claiming damages for their son Sherwin Carpitanos against James Daniel Sr.
and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys
Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City.
- St. Marys Academy was ordered to pay the complainants for damages.
- In case of the insolvency of St. Marys Academy, James Daniel and Guada
Daniel were also ordered to pay Capistrano. Daniel is only subsidiarily
- James Daniel was a minor during the commission of the tort and was
under the special parental authority of James Daniel II. He was adjudged to
have subsidiary liability with his parents.
- Whether the St. Marys should be liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Capistranos.
- Whether the Capistranos are entitled to the award of moral damages.
- No to both issues.
- Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: 1. The school, its administrators and teachers. 2.
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special
parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
- Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.
- In this case, there was no finding that the act or omission considered
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident.
- Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of the petitioner or the reckless driving of

James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
- There was no evidence that the petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the Jeep of respondent Vicencio Villanueva. IT was
Ched Villanueva who had custody, control and possession of the Jeep.
- The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause
of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
- St. Marys cannot be held liable for moral damages. Though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. In this case
the cause was not attributable to St. Marys Academy.


- Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic
institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC).
- One afternoon, Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the third
floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature.
- He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out.
- Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and
yelled several times for help.
- When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In
the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell
down three stories.
- Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious
multiple physical injuries.
- An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed against the CLC,
the members of its Board of Directors and the Administrative Officer of
Marymount School
- CLCs defense: there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism
of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or

- W/N CLC should be held liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
- The fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door
could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact
that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management
or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
- CLC are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their
school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student
had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something
was wrong with the door.
- Ernesto was the owner of a private bearing license. Around 2 am, May 11,
1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a MERALCO
electric post.
- MERALCO then demanded reparation from Ernesto and upon rejection,
sued him for damages based on tort, alleging that he was the employer of
- Ernestos main defense was that Nestor was not his employee. RTC ruled
in favor of MERALCO which the CA affirmed.
- Who bears the burden of proving employer-employee relationship
between the owner of the car and the driver at the time of the accident?

burden of proof, or the duty to present evidence on the fact in issue
necessary to establish his claim as required by Rule 131, Sec 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
- Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under
Article 2180 is liable for torts provided the following are shown: (1)
employment relationship and (2) employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.
- No evidence whatsoever was adduced by MERALCO to show the
employment relationship. Trial court merely presumed its existence. It
even shifted the burden to Ernesto by saying that he did not present any
proof to substantiate his allegation
- Although the law recognizes presumption juris (law) or presumption
hominis (fact), both are not applicable in the case at bar. There is no law
directing the deduction made by the courts below from the particular facts
presented to them by the parties. Neither is there a sufficient base from
the facts proved, or not denied for the inference that the petitioner is the
employer of Nestor.
- The case of Amor v. Soberano was missaplied because the vehicle
involved in that case was a 6x6 truck, which reasonably raised the factual
presumption that it was engaged in business and that its driver was
employed by the owner of the vehicle.
At around 1:45 in the afternoon of August 27, 1997, a Toyota Corolla Taxi
with a Plate No. of PYD-128, being driven by Redentor Completo, owned
and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad and a bicycle rode by the
herein respondent, Amando Albayda Jr., figured in a mishap along the
intersection of 8 and 11 Streets, Villamor Air Base leaving a deep
indentation on the rear right of the taxicab and causing serious physical
injuries on the part of the respondent. Albayda was brought to the
Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However, he was
immediately transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical
Center (AFPMC) on V. Luna Road, Quezon City, because there was a

fracture on his left knee and there was no orthopedic doctor available at
PAFGH. From August 21, 1997until February 11, 1998, he was confined
therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23,1998 until
March 22, 1998.The respondent filed a complaint for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay City. On the other hand, Completo filed a countercharge of damage to property through reckless imprudence against
Albayda which was later dismissed. The case was raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 45, where Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages
against petitioners Completo and Abiad. After Submission of the parties
respective pleadings, a pre-trial conference was held. On December 8,
1998,RTC issued a pre-trial order. Whereby both parties alleged their
defenses. On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the
judgment if which favoured the herein plaintiff [Albayda] and against
the defendants [Completo and Abiad].
ISSUES: (1) WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who
caused the collision.
(2) WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family.
(3)WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorneys fees to Albayda had
no basis.
RULING:(1) No. As stated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides
that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of the motorists negligence
is a question of fact. It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab
because due to overspeeding. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda.
(2) Yes. Under article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees, but the employers
responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed all the diligence of

a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of

their employees.
(3) No. Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty. Moral damages are awarded in qausidelicts causing physical injuries. The permanent deformity and the scar left
by the wounds suffered by Albayda will forever be a reminder of the pain
and suffering that he had endured and continues to endure because of petitioners


- This involves 3 cases that differ in their facts only with respect to the
injury suffered by the plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs Yamada, Karabayashi, and Uyehara hired an automoile from
Bachrach for a trip to Cavite Viejo. The car was driven by a chauffeur
supplied by the taxicab company.
- On the return trip from Cavite Viejo, while crossing the tracks of Manila
Railroad in San Juan, the automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs
- The trial court rendered the taxicab company Bachrach alone liable upon
finding that the driver drove upon the railroad tracks without observing
the precautions which ordinary care and prudence would require, without
reducing speed and without taking any precaution looking to determine
whether there was danger from a train or locomotive. It found the driver
guilty of gross negligence and that said negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident.
- Bachrach contends that the view of the railroad tracks in both directions
was obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that it
was impossible for a person approaching the crossing, even though on
guard, to detect by sight the approach of a train. Also, that it has been a
custom among automobile drivers to pass over the crossing without
changing speed.
- W/N the driver is negligent
- W/N Bachrach Co., as master of the driver, is liable
- W/N Manila Railroad is liable

- YES. The driver is negligent.
- For a distance of 12-15 meters from the crossing, a view of the track is
wholly unobstructed.
- Assuming the view was obstructed, it was clearly the duty of the driver to
reduce the speed of his car and the noise thereof to such an extent that he
would be able to determine from the unrestricted and uninterrupted use
of all his faculties whether a train was near.
- A person must use ordinary care and prudence in passing over a railroad
crossing. While there is no absolute rule as to the precise precautions, it is
always incumbent on him to use ordinary care and diligence.
- What acts are necessary to constitute such care and diligence must
depend on the circumstances of each particular case. Especially when the
view of the tracks is obstructed, it is the drivers duty to slacken speed,
reduce noise or do any other act necessary.
- Railroad trains rarely pass over tracks without noise and their presence is
generally easily detected by persons who take ordinary precautions.
- YES. Bachrach, as master of the driver is liable.
- Art. 1902 provides when a person himself is liable for negligence. Articles
1903-1908 and 1910 provide when a person shall be liable for injuries
caused, not by his own negligence, but by the negligence of other persons
or things.
o Art. 1903: Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of
their branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
o Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes:
1. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee or in the supervision over him after the selection, or both.
2. The presumption is juris tantum, thus may be rebutted
- If the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relived. In this case,
Bachrach failed to comply with the requisite of supervision.

- Ordinarily, where a passenger rides in a public vehicle, contributory

negligence is not imputable to the passenger, unless said passenger has or
is in the position to have and exercise some control over the driver with
reference to the matter wherein he was negligent.
- The owner of a public conveyance is a carrier and the driver or the person
managing it is his servant. Neither of them is the servant of the passenger.
- NO. Manila Railroad is not liable.
- There is abundant evidence to support the trial courts findings that the
employees of the railroad company fully performed their duty as the train
approached the crossing. The bell was rung and whistle was blown to give
due and timely warning.


SCRA 231, 71 OG 4863
- Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck owned by Phil-American
- The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, owned by Philippine
Rabbit. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the
bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days.
- Complaint for damages was filed by the Bus Company against PhilAmerican Forwarders, Pineda and Balingit.
- Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.
W/N Balingit could be held liable under art. 2180 as manager
- NO. The term manager used under art. 2180 is used in the sense of an
employer. A mere manager, who is not an owner is regarded as an
employee and thus cannot be held liable like an employer for tortuous acts
of the employees.
COURT 212 SCRA 637

- Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar

of petitioner Filamer Christian Institute. Allan Masa, the son of the Filamer
President and the school driver, is tasked with driving the school vehicle to
and from the house of the school President (where both Allan and
Funtecha reside). Allan drives the jeep home so he can use it to fetch the
students in the morning of the next day.
- One afternoon, while on the way home, Allan allowed Funtecha to drive
the school vehicle. According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with
glaring lights nearly hit them, so they had to swerve to the right to avoid a
collision. They heard a sound as if something had bumped against the
vehicle, but did not stop to check. The vehicle had swerved and hit a
pedestrian, who later died. The heirs of the pedestrian sued Filamer for
damages arising out of the employer-employee relationship of Filamer and
Funtecha. Filamer claims they are not liable as Funtecha was not an
authorized driver, and that he is merely a working scholar who is not
considered an employee under the Labor Code
- W/N Filamer is liable
- YES. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his own enjoyment, but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for
purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes
any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the damage. Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived
some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the
employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance
of his master's business.
- With regard to the labor code provision cited, an implementing rule on
labor cannot be used by an employer to avoid liability under the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official
appointment to driver's position in order that petitioner may be held

responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that he was
driving for the benefit of Filamer at the time of the accident. In the
absence of evidence that petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes
upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete
(Editha) was brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando,
La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed
via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic
sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac
The following day, Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from
the fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also
appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner
advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or
"raspa." The procedure was performed by the petitioner and Editha was
discharged the next day. On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again
brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe
abdominal pains. She was found to have a massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a
procedure for hysterectomy
and as aresult, she has no more chance to bear a child. Respondents: f irst
, petitioners failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha
during her first day of confinement at the LMC; second , petitioner
recommended that a D&C procedure be performed on Editha without
conducting any internal examination prior to the procedure;
third , petitioner immediately suggested a D&C procedure instead of
closely monitoring the state of pregnancy of Editha.
Petitioner: it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to
be discharged against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to return
for check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her lifethreatening condition on;that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by
her very abnormal pregnancy known as placenta increta,
which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal placental
implantation; that whether or not a D&C procedure was done by her or

any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage
of gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the same.
RULING: Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which
consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the
profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances. There are four elements involved in medical negligence
cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to
support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr.Augusto M.
Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. He testified that the
rupture occurred minutes prior to the hysterectomy or right upon
admission on September 15, 1994 which is about 1 months after the
patient wasdischarged, after the D&C was conducted. It is evident that the
D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas
uterus. The defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article
2179 of the Civil Code are:Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
mayr ecover damages, but the courts shall mitigate thedamages to be
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission
played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. The Court notes
the findings of the Board of Medicine: When complainant was discharged
on July 31,1994, hereinrespondent advised her to return on August 4,

1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. This advise was clear in
complainants Discharge Sheet.
However, complainant failed to do so.
This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the
doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted.
Had she returned, the respondent could have examined her thoroughly.
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the
defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.
Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the
plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of
its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.


Raymond Olavere, victim of a stabbing incident was rushed to the
emergency room of Bicol Regional Medical Center. He was
attended to by Nurse Arlene Balares and Dr. Realuyo- the
emergency room resident physician.
Prents of Raymond arrived at hospital
Dr Realuyo recommended that the patiend undergo emergency
exploratory laparotomy he informed parents he needed 500cc of
blood type O needed for the operation.
Went to PNRC to secure the required blood
Raymond was wheeled into the operating room. During that time
Drs. Zafe and Cereno were busy opering on a gun shot victim and
assisting thme was the head of the anesthesoiology departnemnt
Dr. Tatad
Just before the operation on gun shot victim finished a woman
pregnant with triplents was brought into the room
After gun shot victim, Dr. Tatad worked immediately on the
woman giving birth.

Zafe and Cereno then examined Raymend and found that his
blood pressure was normal and nothing in him significant.
Parents arrived with the bag of blood which they handed to Dr.
Immediately after pregnant woman operation done, they started
on Raymond
While operation ongoing Rayomnd suffered from cardiac arrest
and was pronounced dead.
His death certificate indicate that the immediate cause of death
was hypovolemic shock or cessation of the functions of the organs
of the body due to loss of blood.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners were grossly negligent in the performance of
their duties?

No. they were not negligent

In order to claim a wrong commmited by a medical professional, a
patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a
physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she
did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that the failure or action caused injury to the
patient.13 Stated otherwise, the complainant must prove: (1) that
the health care provider, either by his act or omission, had been
negligent, and (2) that such act or omission proximately caused
the injury complained of.
The best way to prove these is through the opinions of expert
witnesses belonging in the same neighborhood and in the same
general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians
stems from the formers realization that the latter possess
unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence, the indispensability of
expert testimonies.
The petitioners could not work on Raymon immediately because
they needed an anesthesiologist. They did not know of the
protocol that there was one available on call

Given that Dr. Tatad was already engaged in another urgent

operation and that Raymond was not showing any symptom of
suffering from major blood loss requiring an immediate operation,
We find it reasonable that petitioners decided to wait for Dr.
Tatad to finish her surgery and not to call the standby
anesthesiologist anymore. There is, after all, no evidence that
shows that a prudent surgeon faced with similar circumstances
would decide otherwise
Here, there were no expert witnesses presented to testify that the
course of action taken by petitioners were not in accord with
those adopted by other reasonable surgeons in similar situations.
Neither was there any testimony given, except that of Dr. Tatads,
on which it may be inferred that petitioners failed to exercise the
standard of care, diligence, learning and skill expected from
practitioners of their profession.
In medical negligence cases, it is settled that the complainant has
the burden of establishing breach of duty on the part of the
doctors or surgeons. It must be proven that such breach of duty
has a causal connection to the resulting death of the patient.22 A
verdict in malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or
conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable
medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.
The parents of Raymond failed in this respect. Aside from their
failure to prove negligence on the part of the petitioners, they
also failed to prove that it was petitioners fault that caused the
injury. Their cause stands on the mere assumption that
Raymonds life would have been saved had petitioner surgeons
immediately operated on him; had the blood been cross-matched
immediately and had the blood been transfused immediately.
There was, however, no proof presented that Raymonds life
would have been saved had those things been done. Those are
mere assumptions and cannot guarantee their desired result.
Such cannot be made basis of a decision in this case, especially
considering that the name, reputation and career of petitioners
are at stake.
The Court understands the parents grief over their sons
death.1wphi1 That notwithstanding, it cannot hold petitioners
liable. It was noted that Raymond, who was a victim of a stabbing

incident, had multiple wounds when brought to the hospital.

Upon opening of his thoracic cavity, it was discovered that there
was gross bleeding inside the body. Thus, the need for petitioners
to control first what was causing the bleeding. Despite the
situation that evening i.e. numerous patients being brought to the
hospital for emergency treatment considering that it was the
height of the Peafrancia Fiesta, it was evident that petitioners
exerted earnest efforts to save the life of Raymond. It was just
unfortunate that the loss of his life was not prevented.
- Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was
then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar
Estrada ("Dr. Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as
early as December 1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester of
pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and
development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous
complication of pregnancy.
- Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild
labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to
see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised
her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center ("CMC").
- On 26 May 1976, Corazon was admitted at the CMC after the staff nurse
noted the written admission request of Dr. Estrada. Rogelio Nogales
("Rogelio") executed and signed the "Consent on Admission and
Agreement" and "Admission Agreement." Dr. Rosa Uy ("Dr. Uy"), who was
then a resident physician of CMC, conducted an internal examination of
Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify him of her findings.
- Based on the Doctor's Order Sheet, around 3:00 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered
for 10 mg. of valium to be administered immediately by intramuscular
injection. Dr. Estrada later ordered the start of intravenous administration
of syntocinon admixed with dextrose, 5%, in lactated Ringers' solution, at
the rate of eight to ten micro-drops per minute.
- According to the Nurse's Observation Notes, Dr. Joel Enriquez ("Dr.
Enriquez"), an anesthesiologist at CMC, was notified at 4:15 a.m. of
Corazon's admission. Subsequently, when asked if he needed the services

of an anesthesiologist, Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Dr. Estrada's refusal,

Dr. Enriquez stayed to observe Corazon's condition.
- At 6:00 a.m., Corazon was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the
CMC. At 6:10 a.m., Corazon's bag of water ruptured spontaneously. At 6:12
Corazon's cervix was fully dilated. At 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to
experience convulsions.
- At 6:15 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of ten grams of
magnesium sulfate. However, Dr. Ely Villaflor ("Dr. Villaflor"), who was
assisting Dr. Estrada, administered only 2.5 grams of magnesium sulfate.
- At 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to
extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical
tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic, cyanotic, weak
and injured condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and
resuscitated by Dr. Enriquez and Dr. Payumo.
- At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which
rapidly became profuse. Corazon's blood pressure dropped from 130/80 to
60/40 within five minutes. There was continuous profuse vaginal bleeding.
The assisting nurse administered hemacel through a gauge needle as a side
drip to the ongoing intravenous injection of dextrose.
- At 7:45 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with
bottled blood. It took approximately 30 minutes for the CMC laboratory,
headed by Dr. Perpetua Lacson ("Dr. Lacson"), to comply with Dr. Estrada's
order and deliver the blood.
- At 8:00 a.m., Dr. Noe Espinola ("Dr. Espinola"), head of the ObstetricsGynecology Department of the CMC, was apprised of Corazon's condition
by telephone. Upon being informed that Corazon was bleeding profusely,
Dr. Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to sign a
"Consent to Operation."
- Due to the inclement weather then, Dr. Espinola, who was fetched from
his residence by an ambulance, arrived at the CMC about an hour later or
at 9:00 a.m. He examined the patient and ordered some resuscitative
measures to be administered. Despite Dr. Espinola's efforts, Corazon died
at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum."

- On 14 May 1980, petitioners filed a complaint for damages15 with the

Regional Trial Court of Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, Dr.
Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, and a certain Nurse J. Dumlao for
the death of Corazon. Petitioners mainly contended that defendant
physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and
management of Corazon's condition. Petitioners charged CMC with
negligence in the selection and supervision of defendant physicians and
hospital staff.
- The TC found Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages. CA affirmed.
- W/N CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.
- YES. There is no single evidence pointing to CMC's exercise of control
over Dr. Estrada's treatment and management of Corazon's condition. It is
undisputed that throughout Corazon's pregnancy, she was under the
exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. At the time of Corazon's admission
at CMC and during her delivery, it was Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor,
who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that CMC had a part in
diagnosing Corazon's condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges
at CMC, such fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC. CMC
merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities. when Corazon was about to
give birth, which CMC considered an emergency. Considering these
circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an independent
- The question now is whether CMC is automatically exempt from liability
considering that Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor-physician.
- In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The
hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the
hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent
authority." In Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, the Illinois Supreme
Court explained the doctrine of apparent authority in this wise:
o [U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the
hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor,
unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an

independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as
o "For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who
was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2)
where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the
plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and
acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct
of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence."
o The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not require
an express representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be
negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if the hospital
holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care without informing
the patient that the care is provided by independent contractors.
o The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied
if the plaintiff relies upon the hospital to provide complete emergency
room care, rather than upon a specific physician.
- The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to
determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician.
- The first factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was
alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this
regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient
that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a
representation may be general and implied.
- The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of
estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel,
an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon." Estoppel rests on this rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it."

- In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its
medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent
authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada
was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such
- First, CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its
medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada. Upon Dr. Estrada's request for
Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily accommodated
Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition.
- Second, CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC
letterhead. Prior to Corazon's admission and supposed hysterectomy, CMC
asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which reinforced
Rogelio's belief that Dr. Estrada was a member of CMC's medical staff.
- Without any indication in these consent forms that Dr. Estrada was an
independent contractor-physician, the Spouses Nogales could not have
known that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor. Significantly, no
one from CMC informed the Spouses Nogales that Dr. Estrada was an
independent contractor. On the contrary, Dr. Atencio, who was then a
member of CMC Board of Directors, testified that Dr. Estrada was part of
CMC's surgical staff.
- Third, Dr. Estrada's referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr.
Espinola, who was then the Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department of CMC, gave the impression that Dr. Estrada as a member of
CMC's medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed
specialists in treating Corazon
- The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes
characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
- CMC's defense that all it did was "to extend to [Corazon] its facilities" is
untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals,
such as CMC, are in the business of treatment.
- The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to
Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do
the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon's death

due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms,

being in the nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against
hospitals. Besides, a blanket release in favor of hospitals "from any and all
claims," which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would
be contrary to public policy and thus void.
- Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of
establishments like hospitals but may only mitigate liability depending on
the circumstances. When a person needing urgent medical attention
rushes to a hospital, he cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital
on the terms of admission and operation. Such a person is literally at the
mercy of the hospital. There can be no clearer example of a contract of
adhesion than one arising from such a dire situation. Thus, the release
forms of CMC cannot relieve CMC from liability for the negligent medical
611 SCRA 282
- Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital
(Medical City) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the
sigmoid. Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of Medical City,
performed an anterior resection surgery upon her. During the surgery, he
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil
obtained the consent of Atty. Enrique Agana, Natividads husband, to
permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy upon Natividad.
- Dr. Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy. Afterwards, Dr.
Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed.
- After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her
anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They
told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgical
operation performed upon her. Dr. Ampil recommended that Natividad
consult an oncologist to treat the cancerous nodes which were not
removed during the operation.

- Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to

seek further treatment. After four (4) months of consultations and
laboratory examinations, Natividad was told that she was free of cancer.
Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines.
- Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two (2)
weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her
vagina. Dr. Ampil was immediately informed. He proceeded to Natividads
house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring
1.5 inches in width. Dr. Ampil then assured Natividad that the pains would
soon vanish.
- Despite Dr. Ampils assurance, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad
to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined
thereat, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of a foreign object in
her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. The
gauze had badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had
formed in her reproductive organ which forced stool to excrete through
the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the
situation. Natividad underwent another surgery.
- Natividad and her husband filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City),
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
- Pending the outcome of the above case, Natividad died. TC found PSI, Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes jointly and severally liable. CA released Fuentes
from liability.
- PSI contends that the Court erred in finding it liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, there being no employer-employee relationship between it
and its consultant, Dr. Ampil. PSI stressed that the Courts Decision in
Ramos holding that an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians for the
purpose of apportioning responsibility had been reversed in a subsequent
Resolution. Further, PSI argues that the doctrine of ostensible agency or
agency by estoppel cannot apply because spouses Agana failed to establish
one requisite of the doctrine, i.e., that Natividad relied on the
representation of the hospital in engaging the services of Dr. Ampil. And
lastly, PSI maintains that the doctrine of corporate negligence is misplaced

because the proximate cause of Natividads injury was Dr. Ampils

- W/N PSI is liable.
- YES. An employer-employee relationship exists between the Medical City
and Dr. Ampil. Consequently, both are jointly and severally liable to the
- PSI merely offered a general denial of responsibility, maintaining that
consultants, like Dr. Ampil, are independent contractors not employees of
the hospital. Even assuming that Dr. Ampil is not an employee of Medical
City, but an independent contractor, still the said hospital is liable to the
- Atty. Agana categorically testified that one of the reasons why he chose
Dr. Ampil was that he knew him to be a staff member of Medical City, a
prominent and known hospital.
- It must be stressed that under the doctrine of apparent authority, the
question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act
placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business,
is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the
particular act in question. In these cases, the circumstances yield a positive
answer to the question.
- The challenged Decision also anchors its ruling on the doctrine of
corporate responsibility. The duty of providing quality medical service is no
longer the sole prerogative and responsibility of the physician. This is
because the modern hospital now tends to organize a highly-professional
medical staff whose competence and performance need also to be
monitored by the hospital commensurate with its inherent responsibility
to provide quality medical care. Such responsibility includes the proper
supervision of the members of its medical staff. Accordingly, the hospital
has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the
treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians practicing in its

- Unfortunately, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did not conduct an
immediate investigation on the reported missing gauzes to the great
prejudice and agony of its patient. Dr. Jocson, a member of PSIs medical
staff, who testified on whether the hospital conducted an investigation,
was evasive.
- Not only did PSI breach its duty to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously
liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.
- Moreover, there is merit in the trial courts finding that the failure of PSI
to conduct an investigation established PSIs part in the dark conspiracy of
silence and concealment about the gauzes
Legal Facts:
Respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy
of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center
(SLMC) on July 7, 1993 and results showed that Angelica was suffering
from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, (highly malignant) cancer of the
bone because of that a necessity of amputation was conducted by Dr,
Tamayo on Angelicas right leg in order to remove the tumor and to
prevent the metastasis that chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo,
which he referred to petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist. The
respondent was admitted to SLMC on August 18, 1993; however, she died
eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of chemotherapy
first cycle. Respondents brought their daughters body to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem
examination after the refusal of the hospital to release the death
certificate without full payment of bills. The Medico-Legal Report showed
that the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation. The
respondents filed charges against the SLMC and physicians involve for
negligence and failure to observe the essential precautions in to prevent
Angelicas untimely death. Petitioner denied the allegation for damages as
she observed best known procedures, highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs despite all efforts the patient died.

The trial court was in favor of the petitioner and ordered to pay their
unpaid hospital bill in the amount of P139, 064.43, but the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision supporting the respondents pray.
In this case medical malpractice is proven because the four essential
elements of such action are present based upon the doctrine of informed
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice
action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had
a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to
disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not
have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment." Informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to
significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment that would
alter her decision to undergo. The physician is not expected to give the
patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him
a reasonable general explanation in nontechnical terms.
The trial court however dismissed the case. It found that the doctor was
not liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and
employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs on Angelica [though] despite all efforts said patient
died. CA reversed
But the SC reversed the decision of the CA based on a 9-5 vote.
Policy Formation:
In all sorts of medical procedures either invasive or not, medical institution
must have a certificate of competency in rendering standards of care to
delicate medical procedures before initiating a general protocol that would
establish a guideline principle in a form of proper disclosure of such
procedure and presenting a consent or waiver to their patients so that

In Dr. Rubi Li, vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman, as parents/heirs of
deceased Angelica Soliman, Respondents, G.R. No. 165279, promulgated
on June 7, 2011, the Court ruled that medical malpractice is proved base
on lack/impaired informed consent, and reasonable expert testimony
subject a breach of duty causing gross injury to its patient.
145. LUCAS V. TUAO 586 SCRA 173
Facts: Peter Lucas contracted sore eyes in his right eye. He was referred to Dr.
an ophthalmologist at St. Lukes.
Upon consultation with Dr.
(9 days since the problems began), he was
already taking Maxitrol to address the problem. Upon examination, Tuano
Peter with
or sore
eyes. He prescribed Spersacet-C6 eyedrops for Peter and told the latter to
return for follow-up after a week. A week later,
told Peter that the sore
eyes in the latters right eye had already cleared up and he could discontinue the SpersacetC. However, The same eyedeveloped Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC)so Tuan o
prescribed to the former a steroid
-based eye drop calledMaxitrol. On a later check-up,
instructed the former to
taper down the dosage of Maxitrol , because the EKC in hisright eye had already
resolved. Dr.
specifically cautioned Peter that , being a steroid, Maxitrol
had to be withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur.
Peter would go back and forth to Tuanos clinic to complain about the worsening condition
of his right eye. In theseinstances, Tuano would prescribe different meds to
counter the recurring EKC. On Dec. 1998, Peter had no vision in hisright eye;
right eye appeared to be bloody and swollen. Tuano ordered the immediate
discontinuation of Maxitrol and prescribed other meds. Peter went to see
another ophthalmologist, Dr. Batungbacal. Dr. Batungbacals diagnosis was
Glaucoma and
recommended Laser Trabeculoplasty. Dr.
was at a loss as to how to balance
the treatment of Peters EKC vis--vis the presence of glaucoma thus he referred

Peter to Dr. Agul to who concurred on Peters condition and recommended the same
medication. Also, Peter was prodded by his friends to seek a second medical opinion. Thus
he consulted Dr. MarioV. Aquino who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma.
He informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal except
for the tubular vision in Peters right eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr.
Aquino essentially told Peter that the latters condition would require
lifetime medication and follow-ups. Thus, he underwent 2 procedures of
the laser trabeculoplasty.Claiming to have steroid- induced glaucoma and
blaming Tuan o for the same
, Peter filed a complaint for damages against
. He averred that as the direct consequence of his prolonged use of
Maxitrol, he suffered from steroid induced glaucoma as well as incurable
impairment of vision which may lead to permanent blindness. They prayed
that prayed that
be adjudged liable for compensation for his
impaired vision, actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys
fees.In his defense, Tuano asserted that the drug-induced glaucoma is
temporary and curable and that Steroids are prescribed to treat EKC.
Contrary to Peters fallacious claim, he did NOT continually prescribe the
drug Maxitrol because it was discontinued as soon as EKC disappeared and was
resumed only when EKC reappeared. He stressed that Peters glaucoma can only be due to
other causes not attributable to steroids

long standing glaucoma; and that in fact steroidswere in fact beneficial as they
provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier.RTC dismissed the
complaint for insufficient evidence. Upon appeal, CA also dismissed it.
Issue: Did Lucas fail to prove that Tuano ignored the standard medical procedure for
ophthalmologists as well as administered medication with recklessness and
exhibited an absence of competence and skills expected of him?
Held: YES. The case at bar is a medical negligence case against a physician based on the
latters professional negligence.
In order to prevail, the petitioner is required to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and
learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result
ofsuch failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages. Such claim for
damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176
of the Civil Code.In medical negligence/malpractice cases, there exists a

physician-patient relationship. To hold the physician liable for damages, 4

elements must be shown to co-exist: (1) duty (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation. There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper
performance of such duty when the patient is injured in body or in health. Proof
rests upon the testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded
to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence
which physicians in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and
exercise in like cases. Proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is
insufficient; there must be a causal connection between said breach and the
resulting injury - injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done. In other words, negligence must be the proximate cause
of the injury or that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. To establish the proximate cause, one must similarly use
testimony to present to the court a realistic assessment of the likelihood that the physicians
alleged negligence caused the patients injury.
No question that a physician-patient relationship developed between Dr.
and Peter
. The onus probandi was on
the patient to establish before the trial court that the physicians ignored st
andard medical procedure. Howecer, there was absolute failure on
the part of petitioners to present any expert testimony to establish: (1)
the standard of care to be implemented by competent physicians 2) that,
in his treatment of Peter, Dr.
failed in his duty to exercise said standard of care
that any other competent physician would use, 3) that the injury or his glaucoma was the
result of his useof Maxitrol, as prescribed by Dr.
. Failure to prove the first element alone is already fatal. Petitioners
maintain thatDr.
failed to follow in Peters case the required procedure for the
prolonged use of Maxitrol
Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr.
under the circumstances , we have no means todetermine whether he was able to
comply with the same. The Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate or weigh the
attendant facts to state with confidence that the acts complained of,
indeed, constituted negligence. Critical and clinching factor in a medical
negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence
which the evidence established and the plaintiffs injuries

. It is necessary to prove not only that he has been injured and defendant has been at
fault, but also that the defendants fault caused the injury. Causation must
be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent
expert testimony - proof that Peters glaucoma would not have occurred but for
supposed negligent conduct
.What constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question that
should have been presented to experts. If no standard is established the courts
have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach. Absent expert medical
opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in speculations
- Litonjua bought and delivered to her son, Ramon Ramirez, who
owns and manages a garage, an automobile, in order to help him in
his business. Ramirez leased this car to Leynes to be used by the
latter in transporting passengers from Balayan to Tuy, Batangas at
the rate of Php 20 a day. Ramirez furnished Leynes a driver and a
machinist with the car. While passing Balayan to Tuy, the car did not
yield to the driver when he turned to a corner in the streets of
Balayan because of a defective steering gear.
- As a consequence, the car ran across the street and rammed
against the wall of a house where plaintiffs daughter was then
leaning and crushed her to death. Plaintiff brought suit for damages
against both Litonjua and Leynes to pay damages. Leynes appealed.
Plaintiff likewise appealed the dismissal of the case against Litonjua.
- W/N Litonjua is liable.
- W/N Leynes is liable.
- NO. Though the mother purchased the automobile, she turned it
over to the garage of her son for use therein. The establishment
belonged to the son, Ramon Ramirez, and he had the full
management and control of it and received all the profits therefrom.
So far as appears, the contract with Leynes was made without her
knowledge or consent by Ramirez as the owner and manager of the

International Garage. While she may have been in one sense the
owner of the machine, that fact does not, under the other facts of the
case, make her responsible for the results of the accident.
- NO. Though the chauffeur who was driving the machine was a
servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of
the automobile belonged to him and the automobile was operated
under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making
him responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in
the automobile itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only
establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when
that liability shall cease. It says:
o The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damages.
- From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of
a law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employees shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
- This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. In the case before us
the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear of the
automobile immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was
negligent in selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to
maintain it in good condition after selection, and the burden of proof
was on him to show that he had exercised the care of a good father
of a family.
- As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the
machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in
good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a

standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their

particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The
machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred
and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice,
either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering
gear. From the commencement of the use of the machine until the
accident occurred sufficient time had not elapsed to require an
examination of the machine by the defendant as a part of his duty of
inspection and supervision. While it does not appear that the
defendant formulated rules and regulations for the guidance of the
drivers and gave them proper instructions, designed for the
protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence shows, as
we have seen, that the death of the child was not caused by a failure
to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused by a defect in the
machine as to which the defendant has shown himself free from


- McLoughlin used to stay at Sheraton Hotel, until he met Tan.
- Tan convinced him to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana.
- Lopez was the manager of the hotel, while Lainez and Payam had
custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxes.
- McLoughlin rented a safety deposit box. He was aware of the
procedure that the box could only be opened through the use of two
keys (one with the registered guest and the other with the
management of the hotel).
- In several instances after trips to and from the Philippines,
McLoughlin discovered that the amounts of money inside the
envelopes he kept in the safety deposit boxes were reduced.
- When he discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez
and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box
with the key assigned to him.
- Lainez and Payam uses the following defenses:
o McLoughlin made Sheratons employees believe that Tan was his
spouse for she was always with him

o Their Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box relieved

them of liability
- W/N the hotel is liable
- YES. If only the employees exercised due diligence in taking care
of McLoughlins safety deposit box, they should have confronted him
as to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter had been
observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of
times at the early hours of the morning. Tans acts should have
prompted the management to investigate her relationship with
- Tropicana was guilty of concurrent negligence in allowing Tan, who
was not the registered guest, to open the safety deposit box of
McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter was also guilty of
negligence in allowing another person to use his key.
- Art. 2180, par. 4 provides that the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
- If an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer
was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the
victim to prove the negligence of such employer
- Art. 2003 provides that the hotel-keeper cannot free himself from
responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for
the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotelkeeper and the guest whereby the
responsibility of the former as set forth in Arts. 1998 to 2001 is
suppressed or diminished shall be void.



- Sy engaged a taxicab owned and operated by Malate Taxicab and

Garage, Inc. driven by Catalino
- He told the driver to turn to the right but the driver did not heed him.
- Later, the taxi collided with an army wagon driven by Sgt. Dequito.
- Sy filed an action based upon a contract of carriage.
- Malate claims that the collision was not due to the negligence of its
driver but to that of Sgt. Dequito.

- YES. The complaint is based on a contractual obligation of
transportation of passenger, which Malate Taxicab failed to carry out,
and the action is entirely different and independent from that in the
third-party complaint which is based on alleged tortuous act
committed by the third-party defendant Sgt. Dequito. (Thus, the thirdparty complaint is not a prejudicial question.)
- The court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence
on the part of Malate Taxicab in order to hold it responsible to pay
the damages sought for by Sy, for the action initiated therefore is
based on a contract of carriage and not on tort.
- When Sy rode the taxi, Malate Taxicab assumed the express
obligation to transport him to his destination safely, and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstance,
and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault and negligence of the carrier.
- This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved, and it was incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has
exercised extraordinary diligence.
- Art. 1733: Common carriersare bound to observe extraordinary
diligencefor the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
- Art. 1755: using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances
- Art. 1756: In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted

negligently, unless they prove that they observe extraordinary

diligence as prescribed in Arts. 1733 and 1755.

149. BELIZAR V. BRAZAS 2 SCRA 526; 59 OG 8376

- Brazas, Hilario and Baldonilo were employees of the Bureau of
Public Highways operating Samar Express Transit
- Belizar filed a complaint against them due to their gross negligence
in not providing the ferry boat with safety devices. One of his autotrucks being transported from one bank to the other fell into the river
and was submerged in water.
- The employees contend that Belizar has no cause of action against
them because they are being sued in their official capacities, and
therefore the claim for damages should be directed against the State
- W/N Belizar can sue the employees
- YES. The fact that the duties and positions of the employees are
indicated does not mean that they are being sued in their official
capacities, especially as they present action is not one against the
- Belizar elected to sue the employees personally for their negligent
acts. Art. 2180 provides for the liability of an employer for the
tortuous acts of his employees. This, however, does not exempt the
employees from personal liability, especially if there are no persons
having direct supervision over them, or if there is proof of the
existence of negligence on their part.
- The injured party can bring an action directly against the author of
the negligent act or omission, although he may sue as joint
defendants such author and the person responsible for him.


151. GENSON V. ADARIE 153 SCRA 512 (Genson was highway district
engineer. Sued because bucket fell on nape and paralyzed Adarle. SC:
Argument for non-suability does not apply. Not necessarily sued in official
capacity. No sufficient basis for master-servant doctrine in tort law to
apply. Buensalido was not working overtime as a government employee.
No malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on part of Genson to hold him
liable for the acts of Buensalido)
- Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of
junk. Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away
scrap iron from the said compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or about
312.00 a month.
- At 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day,
while the Adarle was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a
truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of the
payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket
suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back portion of his head just below
the nape of his neck.
- He was paralyzed from the knee down to his toes. The petitioner,
Genson, was sued among others, as Highway District Engineer.
- W/N Genson can be held liable for damages
- NO. Petitioner's Identification as the Highway District Engineer in the
complaint filed by the private respondent did not result in the said
complaint's becoming a suit against the government or state.
- In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that "the fact that the duties
and positions of the defendants are indicated does not mean that they are
being sued in their official capacities, especially as the present action is not
one against the Government." Furthermore, the accident in the case at bar
happened on a non-working day and there was no showing that the work

performed on that day was authorized by the government. Therefore

principle of non-suability of the state does not apply.
- Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence when
the accident occurred, any liability on his part would be based only on his
alleged failure to exercise proper supervision over his subordinates.
- There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in
tort law to apply. Buensalido was not working overtime as a government
employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an
"employer" for purposes of tort liability who may be liable even if he was
not there. No evidence was presented to show that an application for
overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's
office was ever filed.
- Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith
- Petitioner was sued in his official capacity, and the most that was
imputed to him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross
indifference in the performance of his official duties. Verily, this is not
imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is more was not convincingly
proven. We see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of
Genson to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.

152. Genato Commercial Co. v. MRR 14 CAR 509

- Genato imported 200 bags of chicpeas from Portugal. It was
discharged from the SS Toledo on Jan. 2, 1962 into the custody
of the defendant Manila Port Service. The cargo was not delivered to
the plaintiff consignee because of a
strike of some employees of Genato Corp, and the employee of
defendant MPS refused to handle or release the goods, as they were
affiliated with the Associated Workers Union on strike.
- An employee of Genato who was getting the cargo was mauled by
the MPSs employees and one of its officials ordered the Genatos
broker to unload the cargo. As a result thereof the cargo
deteriorated. MPS seeks exemption form its failure to deliver the
cargo upon the grounds that it was not in any way negligent when
the prestation became impossible under the circumstances of the

strike and the refusal of its employees to handle the same; that the
tortuous provisions of Art. 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
inapplicable in this case where a contractual obligation is involved.
- W/N Manila Railroad can be held liable
- YES. Manila Railroads liability for breach of its contractual
obligation cannot be excused by the refusal of its employees to
handle the cargo. The prestation did not by such refusal become
legally or physically impossible under Art. 1266 of the Civil Code.
- Since it discharges its obligations only through its officials and
employees, the unlawful acts of said officials and employees of
mauling Genatos employee who was taking the cargo, did not
render the obligation legally or physically impossible without its fault.

153.. Ramos et al. v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. 19 SCRA 289

- There was collision involving the car of Placido Ramos and a
tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA which was driven by its
driver Bonficacio. Pepsi-Cola and bonifacio ordered to pay solidarily
by the trial court. CA affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it
found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by absolving
defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability,
- PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its
driver Bonifacio. Bonifacion was first hired as a member of the bottle
crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a
driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking
him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination
and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second,
the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and
that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In
view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or
selection of defendant driver'.

- "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised

all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license;
he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as
to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service."
Defendant Company has taken all these steps.
-Cola can be held liable
- NO. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
- The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection,
or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et
de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. father of a family to
prevent damage.
- A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all
damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very
explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that
it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's
liability is his own negligence, not that of his employees. The former
is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and
supervise his erring employees. We do not and have never
followed the respondent superior rule

154. Phil, Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Court of

Appeals 350 SCRA 46

- Ford issued several checks for payment of its percentage taxes in
favor of the Commissioner of Internal revenue
- The proceeds of the checks however were diverted to accounts of a
syndicate purportedly through the help of employees of Ford and
- One of the Checks were recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the General
Ledger Accountant of Ford because there was allegedly an error in
the computation of the tax due to the BIR.
With Riveras instruction, PCIB replaced the check with two of its
own ManagersChecks
These checks were later deposited by alleged members of a
- The other checks were diverted through a co-conspirator named
Roberto Castro who was a pro-manager of the San Andres Branch
of PCIB.
In connivance with one Winston Dulay, Castro himself
subsequently opened a Checking Account in the name of a fictitious
person denominated as Reynaldo Reyes in the Meralco Branch of
PCIBank where Dulay works as Assistant Manager.
After an initial deposit of P100.00 to validate the account, Castro
deposited a worthless Bank of America Check in exactly the same
amount as the first FORD check (Exh. A, P5,851,706.37) while
this worthless check was coursed through PCIBs main office
enroute to the Central Bank for clearing, replaced this worthless
check with FORDs Exhibit A and accordingly tampered the
accompanying documents to cover the replacement.
- Ford sought to hold drawee bank, Citibank, and collecting bank,
PCIB, liable for the value of the checks since they were made to pay
the percentage taxes anew.
- The CA held Citibank solely liable for the value of the checks
- W/N the fraud committed by an employee of Ford would bar the
latter from recovering the value of the checks;
- W/N PCIB is liable because of the acts of its employees.

- NO. Foremost, we must resolve whether the injured party, Ford, is

guilty of the imputed contributory negligence that would defeat its
claim for reimbursement, bearing in mind that its employees,
Godofredo Rivera and Alexis Marindo, were among the members of
the syndicate.
- Since a master may be held for his servants wrongful act, the law
imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if that act is
negligent or wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third
person, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or
wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is liable. The general
rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person
and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or
agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming, of
course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury of which complaint is made.
- It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the
transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their
actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks
payable to the CIR. The degree of
Fords negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the
proximate cause of the injury to the parties.
- The Board of Directors of Ford, we note, did not confirm the request
of Godofredo Rivera to recall Citibank Check No. SN-04867. Riveras
instruction to replace the said check with PCIBanks Managers
Check was not in the ordinary course of business which could have
prompted PCIBank to validate the same.
- As to the preparation of Citibank Checks Nos. SN-10597 and
16508, it was established that these checks were made payable to
the CIR. Both were crossed checks. These checks were apparently
turned around by Fords employees, who were acting on their own
personal capacity.
- Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was
committed by a drawer-payors confidential employee or agent, who
by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the
fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does not entitle
the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of
some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule

likewise applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by

the confidential employees who hold them in their possession.
- YES. On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera
to negotiate the checks. The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify
whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank
Check No. SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and
prudence required in the circumstances.
- Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect
the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of BIR,
PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the
unwarranted instructions given by the payor or its agent. As aptly
stated by the trial court, to wit:
- x x x. Since the questioned crossed check was deposited with
IBAA [now PCIBank], which claimed to be a depository/collecting
bank of the BIR, it has the responsibility to make sure that the check
in question is deposited in Payees account only.
- Even considering arguendo, that the diversion of the amount of a
check payable to the collecting bank in behalf of the designated
payee may be allowed, still such diversion must be properly
authorized by the payor. Otherwise stated, the diversion can be
justified only by proof of authority from the drawer, or that the drawer
has clothed his agent with apparent authority to receive the proceeds
of such check.
- Citibank further argues that PCI Banks clearing stamp appearing at
the back of the questioned checks stating that ALL PRIOR
GUARANTEED should render PCIBank liable because it made it
pass through the clearing house and therefore Citibank had no other
option but to pay it.
- It had the responsibility to make sure that the check in question is
deposited in Payees account only. Thus, it is the duty of the
collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in
payees account only.

- Demetrio Maxion was a farmer in the municipality of Fabian,

- The farmers of that region were using an irrigation system known
as the Binday System which was supported by the Bued river
through a cryde Wing Dam constructed out of Wooden logs and
loose material
- The Manila Railroad constructed a line of the railroad from San
Fabian to Camp One, the course of which skirts along the north side
of the Bued River in the Barrio of Binday.
- One night, during a heavy rainfall the river rose and the dam
overflowed and began to undermine the buttresses of the bridge of
the railroad line
- Information of this occurrence soon reached the official in charge of
the maintenance of this branch of the railroad, with headquarters at
San Fabian, and on the morning of September, 1911, the inspector,
Jose D. Ramirez, repaired to the place with a gang of about fifty
workmen to look after the bridge and take the necessary measures
to avoid further injury to the structure and to the railroad. Arriving on
the spot, Ramirez found himself confronted with a situation
calculated to create alarm.
- He therefore sent three men into the river with directions to make
an opening in the dam near its center. This order was obeyed, and
three stakes were removed which, as it proved, constituted the key
to the support of the dam, for the water poured through the opening,
and the aperture widened until practically the whole dam was swept
away. As a consequences of this, the pressure against the bridge
was relieved, as had been foreseen as probable, and the structure
was thus saved from further injury.
- As soon as the farmers became aware of the destruction of the
dam, measures were at once taken to replace it but Ramirez
opposed it.
- Since the dam which diverted water into the irrigation system was
not in place, the crops of the Barrio inevitably failed.
- Maxion now comes to the court seeking damages.

155. .Maxion v. MRR 44 Phil 597


exercised due
diligence in selecting its employees

- In the first place, it is pointed out that the supposed liability of the
defendant company is derived from acts done by Jose D. Ramirez,
an employee of the company of proven experience and long service;
and it is insisted that the
defendant company had used due precaution in placing him in the
responsible position occupied by him at the time those acts were
done. From this it is insisted that the company is entitled to the
benefit of the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the responsibility of the master for the negligent acts
and omissions of his servant shall cease when the master has
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
- We are of the opinion, however, that the point is not well taken; for
it affirmatively appears in this case that the acts done by Ramirez,
which caused the damages, were in effect approved by his
superiors, in representation of the company itself, and that so far
from exercising the diligence of a good father of a family to avert the
threatened damage to the plaintiff's crops after the dam was
destroyed, no steps were taken by the company to avert that
damage, and the persons most interested were not themselves
permitted to repair the dam. The responsibility of the company must
therefore be considered not to be affected by the circumstance that
due care had been used in the original choice of the agent.

156. Smith & Co. v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co. 55

Phil 517
- On August 30, 1926, the steamer Helen C, belonging to the
defendant, the Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., under the
command of Captain Miguel Lasa, in the course of its maneuvers to
moor at the plaintiff's wharf in the port of Olutanga, Zamboanga,
struck said wharf, partially demolishing it and throwing the timber
piled thereon into the water.

- W/N the Company can be held liable for the alleged negligence of
Captain Lasa.
- NO. In the Rakes case, this court based its decision expressly on
the principle that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to a
culpa not arising from a contract.
- On this point the court said:
The acts to which these articles (1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code) are applicable are understood to be those not growing out or
preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or
quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same Code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359, 365.).
- It is not true that proof of due diligence and care in the selection of
and instructions to a servant relieves the master of liability for the
former's acts; on the contrary, such proof shows that the liability
never existed.
- As Manresa (vol. VIII, page 68) says, the liability arising from an
extra-contractual wrong is always based upon a voluntary act or
omission, which, while free from any wrongful intent, and due to
mere negligence or carelessness, causes damaged to another. A
master who takes all possible precaution in selecting his servants or
employees, bearing in mind the qualifications necessary for the
performance of the duties to be entrusted to them, and instructs
them with equal care, complies with his duty to all third parties to
whom he is not bound under contract, and incurs no liability if, by
reason of the negligence of such servants though it be during the
performance of their duties as such, third parties should suffer
damages. It is true that under article 1903 of the Civil Code, the law
presumes that the master, if regarded as an establishment, has been
negligent in the selection of, or instruction to, its servants, but that is
a mere juris tantum presumption and is destroyed by the evidence of
due care and diligence in this respect.

- The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's
wharf collapse was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate
and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted
his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F.
C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by
the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down
by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore
absolved from all liability.

- The subsidiary civil liability of the master, according to the

provisions of article 103 of said Revised Penal Code, arises and
takes place only when the servant, subordinate or employee
commits a punishable criminal act while in the actual performance of
his ordinary duties and service, and he is insolvent thereby rendering
him incapable of satisfying by himself his own civil liability.








159. Duquillo v. Bayot 67 Phil 131

157. Marquez v. Castillo 68 Phil 568



- Pio duquillo, father of plaintiff, had to go to Masbate.

- The defendants driver ran over Fernanda Marquez on whom the

plaintiffs were dependent for support.

- He asked Fernandez, driver of Bayots trucks engaged in the

transportation business, to drive for him.

- The defendant alleged that he exercised the diligence of a good

father of a family and that the accident was the exclusive fault of the

- Fernandez refused because he wasnt in charge of the truck Pio


- However, the defendant was not inside the car when it was driven
by the driver, nor did he know that the car was taken by the driver.
- W/N the defendant is liable.
- NO. This fact decides the question because it clearly shows that
the accident did not occur in the course of the performance of the
duties or service for which said chauffeur Mariano Capulong had
been hired. The defendant did not hire him to do as he pleased,
using the defendant's car as if it were his own. His duties and service
were confined to driving his master's car as the latter ordered him,
and the accident did not take place under said circumstances.

- However Pio was able to convince Fernandez to agree.

- After a short distance, Fernandez saw his friend James McGurk,
and invited him to have a pleasure ride with them.
- They made a stopover because they saw a party was going on.
- Fernandez drank, and started to have a terrible headache.
- Since he wasnt feeling well, McGurk took over the driving.
- Shortly after, the truck overturned causing the death of Pio
- W/N Bayot is liable.

- NO. Under the facts established the defendant cannot be held

liable for anything. At the time of the accident, James McGurk was
driving the truck, and he was not an employee of the defendant, nor
did he have anything to do with the latter's business; neither the
defendant nor Father Ayson, who was in charge of the business,
consented to have any of her trucks driven on the day of the
accident, as it was a holy day, and much less by a chauffeur who
was not in charge of driving it; the use of the defendant's truck in the
circumstances indicated was done without her consent or
knowledge; it may, therefore, be
said, that there was not the remotest contractual relation between
the deceased Pio Duquillo and the defendant.

by the employees of Resources. It is settled that an employer's

liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious
conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his

160. Universal Aquarius, Inc. v. Quezon City Human

Resources Mgmt. Corp. 533 SCRA 38

161. Campo et ai. v. Camarote & Genilge 100 Phil 459; 53

OG 2794


- Juan Camarote was the registered owner of a jeep and Gregorio
Gemilga was his driver.

- Human Resource Management Corporation is engaged in

supplying manpower to establishments.

- The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or injury,

the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer
or, independently, in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability
when an employees conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of
employment.Unquestionably, when Resources' employees staged a
strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of their
employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages
caused by the strike staged by its employees.

- It supplied Universal with 74 workers.

- The employees staged a strike and caused the business
operations of the Universal to be disrupted.
- The same can be said about Marmans depot, owned by Tan,
which adjoined Universals plant.

- On August 30, 1953 as Gemilga drove the jeep along the road in
Davao, it bumped against the rear of another which 2 passengers
had just boarded.
- Felix Giluano suffered many physical injuries and he later died.

- Universal and Tan sued Resources for damages.

- A criminal case was filed against Gemilga to which he pleaded



- Another case was filed against Gemilga and Camarote for


- W/N Human Resources Management Corporation is liable for the

act of the employees in conducting a strike.
- NO. A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals
that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike effected

- The lower court rendered judgment against Camarote

- W/N owner of the automobile can be held liable even if he was not
in the car at time of the accident

- YES. A comparison between the Spanish civil code and the civil
code of the Philippines shows that paragraph 5 of the latter is not
contained in the former. This paragraph reads as follows:
- Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry
- Under the new civil code, the owner of the vehicle is included
among the persons who may respond for the acts of their employees
who cause damage to third persons in the course of their
- The mere fact that the driver was a professional driver is not a
sufficient exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family which
would exempt him from responsibility. The Court took judicial notice
of the fact that licenses are easy to obtain.
- The owner should have examined the applicant for employment as
to his qualifications, his experience and record of service.

162. Keppel Cebu Shipyard Inc. v. Pioneer Ins. & Surety

163. DUAVIT V. COURT OF APPEALS 173 SCRA 490 (petitioners jeep was
hit by jeep OWNED by DUAVIT but driven by SABINIANO. Jeep taken
without duavits consent and Sabiniano was not even his employee.
Cannot be held liable)

- The jeep that Sabiniano was not his; it is owned by Duavit but was taken
without his consent and Sabiniano was not even his employee.
- W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be
held liable under 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither
driven by an employee nor taken with the consent of the owner
- NO. The owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving
the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge
and by a person not employed by him as held in Duquillo v. Bayot.
- To hold defendant liable for the accident caused by the negligence of
Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor his employee would be absurd as
it would be like holding the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident
caused by the person who stole such vehicle.
(Petitioners Cargo truck being driven by Luna. Hit a jeep. De Leon
Brokerage alleges that Luna not in performance of duties during time of
mishap. De Leon is liable. Not sufficiently proven that Luna was NOT in
exercise of duties)
- Petitioners cargo truck was being driven by Employee Augusto Luna.
- Cargo truck collided with a passenger jeepney Angeline Steen.
- Petitioner alleges that Luna was not in the performance of his duties
when the accident took place and that he was not inside the vehicle at the
time of the mishap.
- RTC and CA found the petitioner solidarily liable with Luna.

- Antonio Sarmiento and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep, another jeep
driven by Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped the plaintiffs jeep.

- W/N petitioners defenses both absolve him of liability.

- Both plaintiffs suffered injuries for which they are now seeking damages.

- NO to both defenses.

- As to the first, this was not sufficiently proven in court that Luna was
acting against the instructions of petitioner.
- As to the second, petitioner invites attention to Art. 2184, of the Civil
Code, and insists that it is only in the instance covered thereby when
the owner of the motor vehicle is riding therein at the time of the mishap
that the employer becomes solidarily liable with the driver for any
accident resulting from the latter's negligence. That article refers to
owners of vehicles who are not included in the terms of Art. 2180 "as
owners of an establishment or enterprise."
- Petitioner is solidarily liable with Luna, however the former can recover
from the latter whatever he pays the victim
165. FABRE, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS 259 SCRA 426 (Fabre spouses
owned Mazda Minibus for Services of Students. Slippery road. Injuries.
Fabre is liable. This involves contract of carriage. Did not have to be
engaged in the business of public transportation. The provision on
common carriers makes no distinction. Not excused by diligence of a good
- The Fabre spouses are the owners of a Mazda Minibus, they used it
principally as a bus service for students in St. Scholasticas College in
- The driver was Porfirio Cabil.
- Private respondent arranged for the transportation of 33 of its members
from Manila to La Union and back for P3,000.
- During the trip on the way to La Union, while travelling at 50 km per hour
on a slippery road due to rain, Cabil came upon a sharp curve.
- As he made the turn, the bus skid to the left and rammed a fence, a
coconut tree also fell and smashed its front portion.
- Several passengers were injured.
- RTC ruled for the passengers, CA affirmed.
- W/N the petitioners are liable.

- YES. As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage.
Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of
public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to apply to them.
- Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public.
- The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a
sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think
that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
- As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise "extraordinary
diligence" for the safe transportation of the passengers to their
destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
- Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
- This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
- Petitioners are jointly and severally liable with the driver.


- A competent driver of the car owner suddenly hit the plaintiff who was
about to board the car. The driver was passing the oncoming car upon the
wrong side.
- W/N the owner of the car is liable for the negligence of the driver.
- NO. The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his
driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case.
- An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for
such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive
up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any
effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so,
becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results
produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly
or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
- In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the
time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of
the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity
to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that
the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and
the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to
charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
168. CAEDO V. YU KE THAI 26 SCRA 410

- The incident took place at EDSA, at about 5:30 a.m. of March 24, 1958.
Marcial Caedo was driving his car on his way from Q.C. to the airport. With
him in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the car driven by Rafael Bernardo; with him was Yu
Khe Thai.
- A carretela was in front of the car driven by Bernardo, but instead of
slowing down or stopping behind the carretela until the lane was clear,
Bernardo veered the car to the left in order to pass.
- Bernardo caught the forward rim of the rigs left wheel, wrenching it off
and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where
it collided with the vehicle driven by Caedo.
- W/N Bernardo was liable for the accident
- W/N Bernardos employer, Yu Khe Thai, was solidarily liable with him
- YES, Bernardo was liable for the accident. The collision was directly
traceable to Bernardos negligence.
- NO, Yu Khe Thai cannot be held solidarily liable with him.
- Art 2184 is applicable:
- ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
- Basis of masters liability is paterfamilias, not respondeat superior.
- Negligence cannot be imputed upon Yu Khe Thai because:
He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver.
He was not himself at the wheel.
He could not have anticipated Bernardos sudden decision to pass the
carretela on its left side. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and
warn the driver accordingly
169. SERRA V. MUMAR 668 SCRA 335

170. PLEYTO V. LOMBOY 432 SCRA 329

- The vehicular accident was between a Phil Rabbit Bus Lines bus driven by
Pleyto and a car where Lomboy was a passenger. It happened around
11:30 a.m. of Mary 16, 1995, along MacArthur Highway in Tarlac.
- Pleyto tried to overtake a tricycle in front of it, but hit it instead. Pleyto
then swerved the bus to into the left opposite lane and smashed head-on
the car driven by Asuncion, whose passenger was Lomboy. Both Asuncion
and Lomboy died.
- W/N Pleyto was liable for the accident
- W/N Phil Rabbit Bus Lines may be held solidarily liable with Pleyto
- YES. Pleyto was liable. Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations when
he overtook the tricycle despite the presence of an oncoming car in the
other lane. Article 2185 lays down the presumption that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
- Pleyto was not able to rebut such presumption. Thus, he is liable for the
- YES, Phil Rabbit Bus Lines may be held solidarily liable with Pleyto.
- When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises a juris tantum presumption that
the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family.
- Phil Rabbit Bus Lines only presented several documents of various tests
and pre-qualification requirements imposed upon Pleyto before hiring, but
non was presented to prove due diligence in the supervision of its
- Failing to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part, Phil Rabbit Bus
Lines is solidarily liable with Pleyto.

- At about 5:00 a.m. of October 14, 1987, a passenger jeepney driven by
Mallari, Jr. and owned by Mallari, Sr. collided with the delivery van of
Bulletin Publising Corp.
- Mallari, Jr. went to the left lane of the highway to overtake a Fiera which
had stopped on the right lane. After he overtook the Fiera and while
negotiating a curve in the highway, he collided with the delivery van of
Bulletin. The impact caused the passenger jeepney to turn around and fall
on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers, one of whom was
Israel Reyes, who died.
- W/N Mallari, Jr. was liable for the accident
- W/N Mallari, Sr., the owner of the passenger jeepney was liable for the
- YES, Mallari, Jr. was liable for the accident. He recklessly operated the
passenger jeepney. In a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic
rules, he overtook a vehicle while traversing a curve on the highway. This
was a violation of Sec 41 (a) and (b) of R.A. 4136.
- Under Article 2185, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating a traffic regulation. Mallari, Jr. failed to
present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. As such,
he was liable.
- YES, Mallari, Sr. was liable for the accident also. The negligence and
recklessness of Mallari, Jr. was binding on Mallari, Sr. who was the owner
of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the
fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in
order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the
- Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari
Sr. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard
for all the circumstances, and any injury or death that might be suffered by

its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the

172. AONUEVO V. COURT OF APPEALS 441 SCRA 24 (Driving bicycle, hit
by Anonuevo. Anonuevo alleged that the bicycle did not observe the
ordinances and therefore liable under Art 2185. NO. and no contributory
negligence. 2185 does not apply to non-motorized vehicles. Motorized
vehicles have to observe a higher degree of care. The negligence was solely
on Anoneveo who was speeding.
- Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while
Aonuevo was driving his car in the opposite lane. The car was owned by
P&G, his brothers employer. Aonuevo hit Villagracia while making a left
- Villagracia instituted an action for damages against P&G and against
Aonuevo. P&G was held liable. Aonuevo does not dispute the findings of
toritious conduct on his part and is appealing based on the alleged
negligence of Villagracia.
- Aonuevo claims that Villagracias bicycle had no safety gadgets, nor was
it registered, as both of which were required by a municipal ordinance.
Aonuevo claims that these violations of traffic regulations make
Villagracia guilty of negligence under Art. 2185
- W/N 2185 applies by analogy to non-motorized vehicles
- NO. At the time 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of nonmotorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure
obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If this had been the evil
sought to be prevented, the framers would have expanded the provision to
include non-motorized vehicle. The fact that there has long existed a
higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising
from the special nature of a motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the qualification under Art 2185 exists precisely to
recognize such higher standard. Standards applicable to motor vehicles are
not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.

- Aonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act
was the proximate cause of the accident. The court held that Villagracia
would not have been able to avoid this injury had his bicycle been up to
par with safety regulations, especially considering Aonuevo was already
speeding as he made the turn.
- The fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of
the accident may have shown some degree of negligence on his part, but
such negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was
a contributing cause of the injury.
- To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a casual link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. Aonuevo was held solely responsible.
- Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a
speeding Tamaraw. Soriano was thrown 5 meters away and the Tamaraw
stopped 25 meters from the point of impact. The driver of the Tamaraw
refused to bring Soriano to the hospital. Soriano was brought to the
hospital by a school bus, but he eventually died. His heirs filed a complaint
for damages against Macasasa (driver) and Mendoza (owner of the
- Mendoza claims she is not liable because she exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family of her employee.
- TC found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth using the gap in
the fance rather than the pedestrian overpass. CA reversed and ordered
Mendoza to pay the Soriano heirs.
W/N there was sufficient legal basis to award damages
- YES. The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules. He failed
to maintain a safe speed and he refused to aid the accident victim. Under
2185, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations.

- Under 2180, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Petitioner was
held primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Macasasa
since she failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in supervising Macasasa. Soriano was held guilty of contributory
negligence and the award of damages was reduced.
- Plaintiff was riding on a motorcycle, at a speed of 10-12 miles per hour, at
the same time, the General Hospital ambulance, in violation of the Motor
Vehicle Act, turned suddenly into the right side of Taft Avenue, without
having sounded any whistle or horn, and struck the plaintiff.
- Plaintiff was severely injured and his mental and physical conditions were
noticeably depreciated. (He used to be one of the best constructor of
wooden buildings but after the accident, he had to dissolve the partnership
he had formed with the engineer, etc.)
- It was held that the collision between the motorcycle and the ambulance
was due solely to the negligence of the chauffer.
- Merritt was authorized through an Act to bring a suit against the
Government to fix the responsibility of the collision and to determine the
amount of damages.
- Did the Government in enacting the Act, simply waive its immunity from
suit or did it concede its liability to the plaintiff?
- The general rule is that the Government cannot be sued by an individual
without its consent. In this case, plaintiff was authorized to bring this
action against the Government "to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance and to determine the amount
of damages, if any, to which Merritt is entitled on account of said collision.
- It is NOT for this court to determine whether the Government intends to
make itself liable for damages. Under the American jurisprudence, the
state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers and agents whom
it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment.

- The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the

fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve
it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest.
- As to scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the
state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract: By
consenting to be sued, a State simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself
to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
- It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling
plaintiff's controversies with the State. Nowhere in the act is there a
whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit
shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of
damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the
court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left
the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this
state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not
have left so important a matter to mere inference, it would have done so
in express terms.
- The state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its
agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such
- The responsibility of the State is limited by Article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special agent (Definition of Special Agent: one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official.) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided in him.
- The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through
a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions

imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or

technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner
laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
- Rosete's house was razed by fire which originated from a building used as
a bodega by the Emergency Control Administration (ECA)
- Fire started when a certain Frayno recklessly ignited his cigarette-lighter
near a five-gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained
- Officers of the said ECA, an office or agency of the Government, were
impleaded because of storing gasoline in the warehouse contrary to the
provisions of city ordinances of Manila

- ECA not a branch or office of the government, it was an agency set up for
specific purposes which were not attainable through the official functions
entrusted by law to the government or its branches.
- The ECA was one of the groups of SPECIAL AGENTS created by the
government for activities ordinaroly ungovernmental in character (e.g.
PNB, NDC, etc.).
- In qualifying the special agent with the adjective "special", the Civil Code
aimed at distinguishing it from the regular or ordinary agent of
government, which refers to all officers and employees in the public

- Rosete filed a claim for damages in the office of the Insular Auditor. The
latter denied the claim of Rosete against the Government. Hence, this


- Torralba was employed as driver of the Provincial Government of Ilocos
Norte detailed to the office of the District Engineer

- W/N the Government is liable inasmuch as ECA is a special agent of the


- Torralba pleaded guilty to homicide through reckless imprudence

- Officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the Government within
the definition or scope provided for in Merrit v. Government: responsibility
of the state is limited to the case where it acts through a SPECIAL AGENT
(one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, FOREIGN TO
THE EXERCISE OF THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE if he is a special official - so
that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
- The above-mentioned concept does not apply to any executive agent
who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.

- While driving his freight truck in compliance with his duties, he ran over
Palafox who died as a result.
- Heirs filed a separate civil action against the employer province, the
Distric Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer and Torralba.
- W/N the province could be faulted becuase Torralba is a special agent.
- Appellants invoke the doctrine of repondent superior as illustrated in
Mendoza v. De Leon, concerning the liability of municipal corporations for
negligent acts of their employees. In that case it was enunciated that if the
negligent employee was ENGAGED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary
or business functions - THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT LIABLE.
- The construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the
driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental
activities. Province is not liable to pay.

- The Irrigation Service Unit, an office/agency under the Dept of Public
Works and Communication was sued for tort and the Sheriff of Manila
garnished the deposit of the ISU in the PNB, Manila.
- The ISU being an office in the govt and its fund is a public fund. It is being
shown that the ISU was guilty of tort, however the sate not its fund is not
liable because the ISU was not a special agent. Under Art 2180 the state is
liable only for tort caused by its special agent.


- Plaintiff was the grantee of an exclusive lease privilege under Act No.
1643 of the Philippine Commission. After a little over one year, plaintiff
was forcibly ejected under and pursuant to a resolution adopted by the
defendants-members of the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan.
- Thus, plaintiff brought action against such individual members for
damages. Act No. 1643 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding
ground, ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any
municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for
such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been previously
approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality
or township is located.
- W/N the municipality is liable for acts of its officers or agents in the
performance of governmental functions.
- It depends. In this case, it is not liable.
- When the acts of its officers come within the powers which it has as
agent of the state, it is exempt from liability for its own acts and the acts of
its officers; if the acts of the officer or agent of the city are for the special
benefits of the corporation in its private or corporate interest, such officer
is deemed the agent or servant of the city, but where the act is not in
relation to a private or corporate interest of the municipality, but for the

benefit of the public at large, such acts by the agents and servants are
deemed to be acts by public or state officers, and for the public benefit.
- Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being
delegated to the municipal governments. The state being immune for
injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly
governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in
the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by
- A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance
of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration
of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or
individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is
concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents
within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to
the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals.
- As to such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for
these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.
- The leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified
period of time is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease,
when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the
municipality is bound to respect.
- It cannot be said that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby
making the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid reason
at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for the interests of
the municipality. The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the
damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of
lease of the ferry privilege in question.
- The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No.
159 to manage the town fiesta celebration on January 1959. It also passed
creating the 1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee which in
turn organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage, with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman.

- The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2

stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose
Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage and as constructed the
stage for the "zarzuela"
- The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an
association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in
Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the
performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla.
- The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some
speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began
but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed
and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned
underneath. Fontanilla was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where
he died in the afternoon of the following day
- Heirs brought action to enforce liability against the Municipality. Won in
- W/N the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a
municipality's governmental or public function or is it or a private or
proprietary character?
- Fontanilla Heirs: Municipality liable for acts because fiesta is in exercise of
its proprietary acts
- Municipality: As a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an
exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to
answer for the negligence of any of its agents
- The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public,
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the
corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the
public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial public, and political

Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit
and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial
private and corporate.
- This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which
result in an injury to third persons.
- If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental
function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality
unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so
long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they
did not act wantonly and maliciously.
- With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto.
- The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must
answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in
the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from
contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions
herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable,
accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of
liability co-exist.
- It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitionermunicipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's
officers, employees, or agents.
- We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as
Sander The Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta
in January of 1959; it created a committee in charge of the entertainment
and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call for
the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla
was one of the participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that
he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.

180. SANTOS V. SANTOS 92 PHIL. 281; 48 OG 4815


- Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on
P. Burgos Avenue as a result of which he suffered injuries. He filed a
complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer,
city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
- Whether the present case is governed by Sec.4 of Rep. Act No. 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held
for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of
the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions, or by Art 2189 of the
Civil Code which provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by , any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
- The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code correctly. Art 2189 of the
Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces, cities
and municipalities x x x liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by, any person by reason specifically of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision. In other words said Sec. 4 refers
to liability arising from negligence in general regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Art. 2189 governs liability due to defective condition of
a road, said Art. 2189 is decisive thereon.
- The City of Manila was ordered to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
- Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that
it was flooded with ankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he

stepped on an uncovered opening w/c could not be seen because of dirty

- A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced
his left leg to a depth of 1 inches. His left leg swelled and he developed
fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/crutches for 15 days and
could not operate his school buses.
- He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose
administration the Sta. Ana had been placed by virtue of Management and
Operating Contract.
- TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and
absolved City of Manila.
- W/N City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with Asiatec.
- YES. In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA
409, which City of Manila is invoking in this case, establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of City Of Manila while Art 2189 CC governs the
liability due to defective streets, public buildings and other public works
in particular and is therefore decisive in this case.
- It was also held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control and
supervision by the province, city or municipality over the defective public
building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such
province, city or municipality.
- In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market
remained under the control of the City as evidenced by:
o the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that prior
approval of the City is still needed in the operations.
o Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such control and supervision in his
letter to Finance Sec. Virata (The City retains the power of supervision
and control over its public markets)
o City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose
primary duty is to take direct supervision and control of that particular
public market
o Sec. 30 of Tax Code The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate
supervision, administration and control over public markets

- It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the
public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their
marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have been taken during good
weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have
been placed under the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should
have seen to it that the openings were covered.
- It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5
months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings
that during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow
of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No
warning sign of impending danger was evident.
- Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle
of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had it
been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence
of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
- Asiatec and Cityy are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.
- Isauro Elizalde accompanied by his wife, while driving his jeep southwards
came upon a hole on the south end of said bridge right on his way, about 1
meter in diameter and 8 ft. deep, surrounded by boulders, thus blocking
his lane. To avoid it he swerved his jeep abruptly to the left side of the
road where he was confronted by a steep embankment. He swerved his
jeep back to the right to get into his lane after passing the boulders and
the destroyed portion of the road but he collided with the truck of
defendant Hermanos de Yap driven by Dulcesimo Dacoy who came from
the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Isauro Elizalde died on
the spot in his jeep while his wife who was found on the road, severely
injured but was still alive, died soon after in the hospital.
- The left end of the truck's fender was bent while the portion of its left
hood just below the front headlight and its edge just above the left front
wheel were slightly dented. The jeep which was enveloped in flames from
the incident was badly damaged. The road where the two vehicles collided
is a straight one and judging from the sketch made by the police
investigator both drivers could have noticed each other even when they
were yet far from each other. The same sketch also shows that the jeep
had already passed the boulders and the destroyed portion of the road and
was way beyond such hazards when the collision took place.

- By reason of this incident, the plaintiffs as heirs of both deceased sued

the Hermanos de Yap but the suit was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs to
prosecute. However, same plaintiffs filed the present complaint on May
16, 1966, which, aside from the original defendant, now includes the City
of Davao and City Engineer Samuel Dumlao alleging that while Hermanos
de Yap was negligent not only because its driver operated their truck
carelessly, recklessly, and negligently, but also because it was itself
negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees, the City of
Davao and City Engineer Samuel Dumlao were also negligent in not
repairing the road where the accident took place and in not taking the
necessary precautions to warn the public of the hazards on said road,
thereby causing the collision which resulted in the destruction of the jeep
and also in the death of its occupants.
- W/N Dumlao, as city engineer may be held liable.
- NO. Article 2189 of the Civil Code does not include any city officials. This
proposition is quite clear from the language of the cited provision and
needs no further elaboration to show its validity. The aforecited provision
o Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the
defective condition of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works under their control or supervision.
Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of
his authority or jurisdiction. The question, therefore, is whether petitioner
did act in any of the manner aforesaid.
- Dumlao contends that he was not sued in his personal capacity, but in his
official capacity. Neither was malice or bad faith alleged against him in the
complaint, much less proven by the evidence, as the respondent court
made no such finding of malice or bad faith.
- He was sued in his official capacity, and the most that was imputed to
him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference in the

performance of his official duties. Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith
or malice, and what is more was not convincingly proven.
- Based on the complaint there was no sufficient cause of action was
alleged, and the evidence utterly fails to provide a basis for imposing on
petitioner the liability as has been declared against him jointly with his codefendants, the City of Davao and Hermanos de Yap, by the trial court. The
latter defendants must have already satisfied the judgment against them,
for they no longer took appeal from the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals, and the private respondents did not bother to file their brief in
this instant proceedings, for they did not even ask for extension of time to
do so if they had any desire to file the appellees' brief.
- There remains the only question of whether Section 5 of R. A. No. 4354
under which the respondent Court of Appeals found petitioner properly
included as a defendant whom it considered sued in his private capacity,
was properly applied by said Court. In its own words, the Court of Appeals
(Second Division) said that "the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Act
4354) which took effect on June 19, 1965, cannot retroact to effect (sic) a
case that occurred on February 28, 1964." But surprisingly, the same Court
went on to say: "Moreover, in the case of defendant City Engineer Samuel
Dumlao, his inclusion in the complaint, as shown in paragraph 3 thereof is
in his private capacity and conforms with the provision of Section 5 of Act
4354." This very patent inconsistency may well be said to reflect how
infirm is the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as
petitioner, who incidentally has long retired, is concerned.
- A governor and a Mayor filed a criminal charge which was dismissed for
being groundless. They were sued.
- W/N the City government may be held liable for the criminal acts of its
- The prosecution of a crime is a governmental function, not a corporation
action. In the discharged thereof, the Province or City or Municipality is not
liable for tortuous acts of its officers. Only the public officers acting

tortuously (beyond the scope of their authority) are personally liable

because the mantle of immunity from suit accorded to their office is not
available for their tortuous acts.
- Areglado willfully inflicted injuries on Benjamin Araneta. The necessity of
plastic surgery was established by competent evidence. The injuries left
permamnent deformity and something like an inferiority complex as well
as a pathological condition on the left side of the jaw. To arrest the
degenerative process taking place in the mandible and restore the injured
boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical intervention was needed for
which the doctors charges would amount to Php 3, 000 exclusive of
hospitalization fees, expenses, and medicines. Also, this operation would
most likely have to be repeated to effectuate a complete cure, while
remova; of the scar on the face obviously demanded plastic surgery. But
the TC only allowed for damages not exceeding Php 1, 000. 00 and the bills
were already paid.
already incurred but not yet paid or which had been assessed as necessary
but has yet to be paid.
- YES. The SC increased the award of compensatory damages from Pesos
1,000 to Pesos 18,000, after finding that Benjamin Araneta sustained
permanent deformity and something like an inferiority complex as well
as a pathological condition on the left side of the jaw caused by the
defendant Dario Arreglado who inflicted the injury upon him voluntarily;
that to arrest the degenerative process taking place in the mandible and to
restore the injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical intervention
was needed; that a repair, however, skillfully conducted, is never
equivalent to the original state; and that because of the injury, the boy had
suffered greatly.
- To require him to first pay the said obligation before he may demand
indemnity for it would subject the injured party to some more financial
embarrassment by compelling him to either borrow money or pay the

same or open himself to suit for it by the doctor if he cannot or refuses to

so and thereby incur more and additional expenses and liabilities.

186. PACIS V. MORALES 613 SCRA 607

FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against
respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died
in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store
in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and
Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales
was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store
customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a
drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the
store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from
the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the
gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return
the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off,
the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however,
was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting
circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for
homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of
their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual
damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the
plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision
and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial courts
Decision reinstated.

This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners
son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under
Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action
for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their
claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners
opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent
whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim
for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC,
the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article
2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own
negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and
selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership
will be suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in
his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from

ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive
use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly
negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is
open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely
unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent
himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair
defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence
required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care
required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt
him from liability in this case.
- In 1902, plaintiff and Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract for the
conveyance of a tract of land owned by the latter to the former; the deed
should be executed as soon as the title to the land should be perfected by
proceedings in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens certificate
should be produced in the name of Endencia.
- In 1906, a decree in favor of Endencia was entered but no Torrens title
was issued. Upon entry of the decree, Daywalt and Endencia entered into
another contract with a view to carry out the original agreement into
effect. The 2nd contract was not executed since no Torrens title was issued
until the period for performance contemplated in the contract expired.
- In 1908, a 3rd agreement was entered into: that upon receiving the
Torrens title, Endencia was to deliver the same to the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank in Manila, to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in
San Francisco, where it was to be delivered to the plaintiff upon payment
of a balance of P3,100.

- In the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the Torrens title, it
was found that the boundaries inclosed was 1,248 ha instead of 452 ha
stated in the contract.
- As such, after the issuance of the Torrens title, Endencia was reluctant to
convey the title to Daywalt, contending that she did not intend to transfer
as big a property as that contained in the title and that she was
misinformed of its area.
- Daywalt filed an action against Endencia for specific performance. On
appeal before the SC, Daywalt obtained a favorable decision, However, no
damages was sought or awarded in the case against Endencia.
- Daywalt filed an action against respondent for interference in contractual
relations based on the ff. background:
- Respondent was the original owner of the property and owned an
adjacent tract of land managed by Fr. Sanz, a member of the Order.
- Fr. Sanz was well acquainted with Endencia and exerted over her an
influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as to the
personal friendship which existed between them. Teodorica appears to be
a woman of little personal force.
- Fr. Sanz was fully aware of the contracts with Endencia and with its
- Between 1909 and 1914, large number of cattle of respondent was
pastured in the subject property.
- When the Torrens title was issued, it was delivered to respondent for
safekeeping and only turned it over upon order of the SC in 1914.
- W/N petitioner is entitled to P24,000 as compensation for pasturing
cattle from 1909 to 1913.
- W/N respondent is liable for interference in contractual relations.
- 1. No. It is improbable to pasture 1,000 cattle in 1,248 ha of wild Mindoro
land. There is no reason to suppose that the value of the property was
more (40 per head monthly) before the petitioner obtained possession of
it and from which respondent rented it at 50 per hectare annually.
- 2. No. Defendants believed in good faith that the contract could not be
enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into
effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was prompted
by no mean or improper motive. Teodorica would have surrendered the

documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence
and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. But the idea
that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the
desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle
upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff
cant be credited.
- What constitutes legal justification for interference - If a party enters into
contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthful
climate, and a third person, with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one
who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no action will lie.
But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the
indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff," the intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract
- If performance is prevented by unlawful means such as force,
intimidation, coercion, or threats, or by false or defamatory statements, or
by nuisance or riot, the person is, under all the authorities, liable for the
damage which ensues.
- Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a
contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade
performance, the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in
damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose
behalf he intermeddles.
- Cuddy, owner of the film, Zigomar, entered into a contract with Gilchrist,
to rent the film for a week at 125, starting May 26.
- Before said date, Cuddy returned money to Gilchrist and told him that
Espejo and his partner would rent film for 350.
- Court issued mandatory injunction ordering Cuddy to deliver film to
Gilchrist and an ex parte prelim injunction restraining Espejo and partner
from receiving and exhibiting film until further orders from court
- W/N Espejo and partner were liable for interfering with the contract
between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing the identity of one of the
contracting parties

- YES. The mere right to compete could not justify appellants in
intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away Gilchrists contractual rights.
Liability arises from unlawful acts and no from contractual obligations, as
they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist
- 1314, CC: Any 3rd person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
- Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered
into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI).
Subjects of four (4) lease contracts were premises located at Binondo,
Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had
a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy
the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.
- When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but
Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co.
was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co.
including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein
respondent corporation.
- So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek
Giok's grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his
own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing.
- On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua
Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25% increase in rent effective
September 1, 1989. The rent increase was later on reduced to 20%
effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees' demand. Again on December
1, 1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these
letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that failure of
the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest
on the lessee's part, and agreement to the termination of the lease.
Private respondents did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease
contracts were not rescinded.

- So Ping Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of his

grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without the knowledge
and permission of the corporation. The corporation, prevented from using
the premises for its business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous interference.
- W/N So Ping Buns acts constituted tortuous interference.
- NO. While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic
interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others,
however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend
the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of
any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes
damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering
into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent
appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and
nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter
Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's
- Elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a)
existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person
of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person
without legal justification or excuse.
- As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be
duly established. The second element, on the other hand, requires that
there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists.
Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to
state a cause of action for tortuous interference. A defendant in such a
case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of.
While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless
be aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead
to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the
parties in the contract.
- Justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists
where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not
exist where the actors motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this,

some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers

interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an
individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely
de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he
acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial
position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic
interest in the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if the
impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives
- Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate
court, two parcels of land. A few months after the sale, Lapuz filed a
complaint for torts and damages against Lagon.
- Lapuz claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai
Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the property)
in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the provisions
agreed upon was for Lapuz to put up commercial buildings which would, in
turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants
would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai
Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but
since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be
completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
- When Bai Tonina Sepi died, Lapuz started remitting his rent to the courtappointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised
him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that Lagon, representing himself as the new
owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He
thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the
heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his
leasehold rights over it.

existence of Lapuzs lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi,

constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner should be held liable

for damages.
- NO. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the
other contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as
interference with contractual relations. The interference is penalized
because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the
benefits that should result therefrom.
- Lapuz presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease
renewal. While the contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization
thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but not the
veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of
petitioners counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and
subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court
appeared to be incontestable proof that Lapuz and the late Bai Tonina Sepi
actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until
overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document
continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its
execution and delivery.
- Lagons purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of
his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused
by improper motives. A person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is
impelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit
motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable
for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
- Lagon claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers
(the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any
existing lease contract.
- He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed
no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe
deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An
examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the
leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had
no record of the same.
- Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such
knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. Lagon may be held liable only when there was no legal

justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the
defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by
purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of
interference cannot be justified.
- Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of Lapuz that
Lagon induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The
induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose
one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show
that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property
was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely
nothing to influence their judgment. Lapuz himself did not proffer any
evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private
respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai
Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith
on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim
of tortuous interference was never established.
- Inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable for tortuous
interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for private
respondents losses.
- This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury.
Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt,
loss or harm which results from the injury


- On September 8, 1948, Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila,
(ATLANTIC) sold and assigned all its rights in the Dahican Lumber
concession to Dahican Lumber Company (DALCO) for the total sum of
$500,000.00, of which only the amount of $50,000.00 was paid.
Thereafter, to develop the concession, DALCO obtained various loans from
the People's Bank & Trust Company (BANK) amounting, to P200,000.00. In
addition, DALCO obtained, through the BANK, a loan of $250,000.00 from
the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C., evidenced by five promissory
notes of $50,000.00 each, maturing on different dates, executed by both
DALCO and the Dahican America Lumber Corporation, a foreign

corporation and a stockholder of DALCO, (DAMCO), all payable to the

BANK or its order.
- As security for the payment of the abovementioned loans, on July 13,
1950 DALCO executed in favor of the BANK the latter acting for itself
and as trustee for the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C. a deed of
mortgage covering five parcels of land situated in together with all the
buildings and other improvements existing thereon and all the personal
properties of the mortgagor located in its place of business. On the same
date, DALCO executed a second mortgage on the same properties in favor
of ATLANTIC to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price of
the lumber concession amounting to the sum of $450,000.00. Both deeds
contained the following provision extending the mortgage lien to
properties to be subsequently acquired referred to hereafter as "after
acquired properties" by the mortgagor
- Upon DALCO's and DAMCO's failure to pay the fifth promissory note upon
its maturity, the BANK paid the same to the Export-Import Bank of
Washington D.C., and the latter assigned to the former its credit and the
first mortgage securing it. Subsequently, the BANK gave DALCO and
DAMCO up to April 1, 1953 to pay the overdue promissory note.
- After the date of execution of the mortgages, DALCO purchased various
machineries, equipment, spare parts and supplies in addition to, or in
replacement of some of those already owned and used by it on the date
aforesaid. Pursuant to the provision of the mortgage deeds quoted
theretofore regarding "after acquired properties," the BANK requested
DALCO to submit complete lists of said properties but the latter failed to
do so. In connection with these purchases, there appeared in the books of
DALCO as due to Connell Bros. Company (Philippines) a domestic
corporation who was acting as the general purchasing agent of DALCO
(CONNELL) the sum of P452,860.55 and to DAMCO, the sum of
- On December 16, 1952, the Board of Directors of DALCO, in a special
meeting called for the purpose, passed a resolution agreeing to rescind the
alleged sales of equipment, spare parts and supplies by CONNELL and
DAMCO to it. Thereafter, the corresponding agreements of rescission of
sale were executed between DALCO and DAMCO, on the one hand and
between DALCO and CONNELL, on the other.
- On January 13, 1953, the BANK, in its own behalf and that of ATLANTIC,
demanded that said agreements be cancelled but CONNELL and DAMCO

refused to do so. As a result, on February 12, 1953; ATLANTIC and the

BANK, commenced foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Norte against DALCO and DAMCO.
- W/N DALCO & DAMCO are liable for damages suffered by the bank.
- YES. Creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to defraud
them; and that any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Similar
liability is demandable under Arts. 20 and 21 which may be given
retroactive effect (Arts. 225253) or under Arts. 1902 and 2176 of the
Old Civil Code.
- The facts of this case, as stated heretofore, clearly show that DALCO and
DAMCO, after failing to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity,
conspired jointly with CONNELL to violate the provisions of the fourth
paragraph of the mortgages under foreclosure by attempting to defeat
plaintiffs' mortgage lien on the "after acquired properties". As a result, the
plaintiffs had to go to court to protect their rights thus jeopardized.
Defendants' liability for damages is therefore clear.
- Dingcong brothers are co-lessees in the upper floor of the house owned
by Saenz
- Brothers established the central hotel in the building where they were
the managers
- A guest, Echivarria, occupied room 10 of the hotel for P30 per month
- Kanaans occupied the lower floor of the hotel where they established a
- Echivarria let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing
- A bucket was placed underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping
water the bucket overflowed
- Water seeped through the floor the merchandise in the bazaar below
got wet and damaged worth around P1T
- Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers (brothers
Dingcong) and Echivarria (person who let the faucet leak)

- CFI absolved 1 Dingcong brother only (kasi namatay na yung isa) but held
Echivarria liable
- CA reversed holding Dingcong liable for the damages

- YES. Dingcong, as a co-lessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for
the damage caused by things that thrown or falling from the hotel (Art.
1910 of the Codigo Civil)
- Echivarria was a guest of the hotel and was the direct cause of the
damage. But Dingcong did NOT exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family. He knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair,
presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only
provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks
- Judgment Affirmed
- Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La
Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were
riding caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree. The bus,
owned by petitioner and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino, came from San
Fernando, La Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur.
- It appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school
building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by
Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but that
instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and raced
with the overtaking bus.
Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post, crashed
against a tree and then burst into flames.
- Among those who perished were Timoteo Mapanao, Francisca
Lacsamana, Narcisa Mendoza and Gregorio Sibayan, whose heirs sued
petitioner and the latter's driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for damages for
breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also
sued petitioner and the driver for damages. The complaints were filed in
the Court of First Instance of La Union.

- TC found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the
drivers of the two buses and held both, together with their respective
employers, jointly and severally liable for damages. CA found that only
petitioner Francisca Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of
contract of carriage. The driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, cannot be made
jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter's
employee and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage.
- W/N Aquino may also be held liable.
- YES. It should make no difference therefore whether the respondents
were brought in as principal defendants or as third-party defendants. As
Chief Justice Moran points out, since the liability of the third-party
defendant is already asserted in the third-party complaint, the amendment
of the complaint to assert such liability is merely a matter of form, to insist
on which would not be in keeping with the liberal spirit of the Rules of
Court. 4
- Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs
from contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict. In case of
injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well
as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for
damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under
the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.
- Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense
that petitioner as well as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana
are jointly and severally liable for the damages awarded by the trial court.
The disallowance of moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 is correct
and should be affirmed.
195. RIVERA V. CRESPO 12 CAR 518

- Philippine Bar Association (PBA), a civic-non-profit association, decided to

construct an office building on its lot. The construction was undertaken by
the United Construction, Inc. on an "administration" basis, on the
suggestion of Juan J. Carlos, the president and general manager of said
corporation. The proposal was approved by plaintiff's board of directors
and signed by its president Roman Ozaeta, a third-party defendant in this
case. The plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the
other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The building was
completed in June, 1966.
- In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit
Manila and its environs and the building in question sustained major
damage. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the building to
tilt forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the building in view of its
precarious condition. As a temporary remedial measure, the building was
shored up by United Construction, Inc. at the cost of P13,661.28.
- On November 29, 1968, PBA commenced this action for the recovery of
damages arising from the partial collapse of the building against United
Construction, Inc. and its President and General Manager Juan J. Carlos as
defendants. PBA alleges that the collapse of the building was accused by
defects in the construction, the failure of the contractors to follow plans
and specifications and violations by the defendants of the terms of the
- Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the architects
who prepared the plans and specifications, alleging in essence that the
collapse of the building was due to the defects in the said plans and
specifications. Roman Ozaeta, the then president of the plaintiff Bar
Association was included as a third-party defendant for damages for
having included Juan J. Carlos, President of the United Construction Co.,
Inc. as party defendant.
- The damage sustained by the PBA building was caused directly by the
August 2, 1968 earthquake whose magnitude was estimated at 7.3 they
were also caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared by
the third-party defendants' architects, deviations from said plans and
specifications by the defendant contractors and failure of the latter to
observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of the building and
of the contractors, architects and even the owners to exercise the requisite
degree of supervision in the construction of subject building.

- The trial court agreed with the findings except as to the holding that the
owner is charged with full nine supervision of the construction. The Court
sees no legal or contractual basis for such conclusion. IAC affirmed but
- W/N an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-which caused the
failure of the building, exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise
liable because of their negligence.
- The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein
is Article 1723 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
o Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years
from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason
of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the
ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice
fags within the same period on account of defects in the construction or
the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any
violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the
- Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of
any of the causes of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
- The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the
- On the other hand, the general rule is that no person shall be responsible
for events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were
inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code).
- An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and
exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no
amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected,
could have been prevented. (1 Corpus Juris 1174).
- There is no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous
event or an act of God.

- To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code,
for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must
concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent
of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must
be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
- Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there
concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for
in Article 1170 of
the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape
- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that
the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and
all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the
whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the
rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
- Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with
an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability
by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God.
To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be
free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or
damage may have been occasioned.
- The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants
petitioners was established beyond dispute both in the lower court and in
the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co., Inc.
was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and
specifications. and to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in
the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision;
while the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or
defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. As correctly
assessed by both courts, the defects in the construction and in the plans

and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA
building unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For this
reason the defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim exemption
from liability.
- Such negligence is equivalent to bad faith. One who negligently creates a
dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God
for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.
- As already discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth
to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity were hardly affected by
the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross
negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not
have occurred.
- WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and
considering the special and environmental circumstances of this case
In 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), KRAFT hired Czarina Malvar as its
Corporate Planning Manager. She rose in the ranks and became
the VP for Finance in the SEA of Kraft Foods Internation. KFPIs
mother company. In 1999, the chairman of the board of KFPI and
concurrently the VP and Area Director for SEA, sent Malvar a
memo directing her to explain why no administrative sanctions
should be imposed on her for possible breach of trust and
confidence and for willful violation of company rules and
regulations. She was places under preventive suspension and
ultimately she was served a notice of termination.
Malvar, aggrieved, filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
illegal dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal
and ordered her reinstatement
The judegment became final and executory however Malvars
award was reduced.
Both parties appealed the computation of the NLRC. While
pending appea, Malvar and the respondents entered into a
compromise agreement wherein Malvar would be paid 40M
pesos. Malvar moved to withdraw the case

Before the court could act on the motion to dismiss/withdraw a

motion for intervention to protect the Attys rights was filed.
It appears that, to the intervenors surprise, Malvar
unceremoniously and without any justifiable reason terminated
its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case.
The intervenor indicated that Malvars precipitate action had
baffled, shocked and even embarrassed the intervenor, because it
had done everything legally possible to serve and protect her
interest. It added that it could not recall any instance of conflict or
misunderstanding with her, for on the contrary, she had even
commended it for its dedication and devotion to her case.

W/N Malvars motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of the
execution of the compromise agreement was proper
W/N the Motion for Intervention to protect attys rights can
prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover?


A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties

undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or put an end
to one already commenced. The client may enter into a
compromise agreement with the adverse party to terminate the
litigation before a judgment is rendered therein. If the
compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy.
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the
intervention of the atty. It is important for the client to show,
however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely
affect third persons who are not parties to the agreement.
By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the
atty client relationship at any time with or without cause. But this
right is not unlimited because good faith is required in terminating
the relationship
In fine it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive
a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the
special instance and request of his client. The attorney who has
acted in good faith and honesty in representing and serving the

interests of the client should be reasonably compensated for his

The intervenor was dismissed without a justifiable cause and
therefore in this case, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of
intervenors leagal services but also attempted to camouflage her
intent to defraud her lawyer.
Is KRAFT liable? The respondents would be liable if they were
shown to have connived with Malvar in the execution of the
compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the
intervenor of its attys fees. Therefy they would be solidarily liable
with her for the attys fees as stipulated in the written agreement
under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interefered with
the intervenors professional relationship with Malvar.
The circumstances show that Malvar and the respondents needed
an escape from greater liability towards the intervenor, and from
the possible obstacle to their plan to settle to pay.
Thereby, she and the respondents became joint tort-feasors who
acted adversely against the interests of the INtervenor.
Joint tort-feasors are those who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act
together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of
each other, unite in causing a single injury.


- Iloilo Cold Storage was granted authority by the Municipal Council of
Iloilo to construct an ice and cold storage plant in Iloilo. Sometime after
the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby residents
complained that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their
health and comfort.
- The Municipal Council conducted an investigation and passed a resolution
requiring the closing or suspension of operations of Iloilo Cold Storage.
- Iloilo Cold Storage applied for and was granted a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the Municipal Council from enforcing the resolution.

- W/N the Municipal Council had the power to declare the plant of Iloilo
Cold Storage as a nuisance
- W/N the Municipal Council had the power to abate such nuisance
- NO. The power to declare whether or not the plant of Iloilo Cold Storage
was a nuisance can conclusively be declared by the established courts of
law or equity alone. The resolutions of officers or of boards organized by
force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision.
- Nuisances may be abated by an individual, but they must in fact exist.
This precise power, and no more, is conferred by the statute on cities and
towns. If the authorities of a city abate a nuisance under authority of an
ordinance of the city, they are subject to the same perils and liabilities as
an individual, if the thing is in fact not a nuisance.
- The charter of the city confers upon it the power to prevent and restrain
nuisances, and to declare what shall constitute a nuisance but this does
not authorize it to declare a particular use of property a nuisance, unless
such use comes within the common law or statutory idea of a nuisance.
- NO. The smoke from the plant was a nuisance per accidens, and as such,
it cannot be abated without judicial hearing and judgment as to its
- There was no judicial determination that there was a nuisance and there
was no opportunity offered to Iloilo Cold Storage to contest that matter.
Municipalities can only declare and abate nuisances in cases of necessity,
without citation and without adjudication as to whether there is in fact a
- A nuisance which affects the immediate safety of persons or property or
which constitutes an obstruction to the streets and highways under
circumstances may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
- Just remember: nuisance per se may be summarily abated without
judicial hearing and judgment; nuisance per accidens need hearing, no
summary abatement


- A suit for permanent injunction was instituted against the erection and
operation of a combined brewery and ice plant on Calle General Solano on
the ground that it will be a nuisance. The suit was brought by 22 residents
and property owners of Calle General Solano. The street had long been a
fashionable residence and the dwellings located upon it were large and
expensive. At the time of the institution of the suit, the area was slowly
becoming a trading and manufacturing center due to the fact that it was
near transportation facilities both by land and water. There was already an
existing coal yard, warehouse, cigarette factory and brewery.
- W/N the street was purely residential
- NO. The Court held that the locality surrounding the site of the proposed
plant was not a strictly residential district as to justify that the plant would
be incongruous with its surroundings. This fact is reinforced by the fact
that another brewery was operating in the same neighborhood, and the
fact that there was no showing that the proposed plant would be operated
carelessly so as to materially increase the noise, smells and smoke levels in
the area.
- One who settles in a district which has a natural watercourse especially
beneficial for transportation purposes, or who remains in a neighborhood
which was initially residential but becomes a trading center, must submit
to the ordinary annoyances and discomforts that are incidental to the
reasonable and general conduct of such business.
- Whether a lawful business will be a nuisance is a question of fact to be
determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case.
- The extraordinary remedy of injunction to prevent or remove a nuisance
will be granted only where there is a strong

- Six class suits were filed against the City Engineer of Manila to enjoin him
from carrying out his threat to demolish the houses of petitioners upon the
ground that the houses constitute public nuisances.
- Petitioners are all groups of people who have settled in areas without the
permission of the authorities. Petitioners contend that they are united to
notice and hearing before their houses are demolished, they allege that
the city engineer sought to deprive them of their property without due
process of law.
- W/N the city engineer should be enjoined
- NO. Prior to expressing his intent to demolishing the houses, the city
engineer advised and ordered petitioners to remove said houses within a
specified period. Petitioners did not question the sufficiency of the periods
stated in the notices, and have never asked respondent to give them an
opportunity to show that their houses do not constitute public nuisances.
It is not disputed that the houses stand on public streets.
- According to the CC, one of the listed nuisances is anything which
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water. The houses constructed without
governmental authority on public streets and waterways, obstruct at all
times the free use by the public of said streets and waterways, and
accordingly constitute nuisances per se aside from public nuisances.
Summary removal thereof, without judicial process or proceeding may be
authorized by the statute or municipal ordinance, despite the due process
- Petitioner Velasco sold to Meralco 2 lots which were adjacent to his
house. Meralco constructed a substation which reduces high voltage
electricity to a current suitable for distribution to the companys
consumers. Only an interlink wall separates the property of Meralco from
that of petitioner. Petitioner claims that the unceasing sound that
emanates from the substation is an actionable nuisance, and is claiming

damages for health problems which he alleges can be attributed to the

- W/N the noise from the Meralco substation is an actionable nuisance
- YES. In this case Velasco presented evidence to show his medical
conditions are the result of lack of sleep which was caused by the
persistent noise. Although the court considered his allegations as
exaggerated, the court ordered the decibel level to be measured. The tests
showed that the decibel level at petitioners house was considerably higher
than that of the neighborhood in general. Damages due were mitigated by
the fact that the noise was not the exclusive factor of petitioners illness,
because petitioner also had financial worries. Also, Velasco was shown to
be passive in that he did not take any steps to abate the nuisance or
remove himself from the affected area as soon as the deleterious affects
became noticeable.
- As a general rule, everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary
inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this
level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the
prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually
brings, the neighbor who cases such disturbance is held responsible for the
resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance. A noise may be an
actionable nuisance if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of
ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a
particular person who is of specially sensitive characteristics will not
render the noise an actionable nuisance. Noise becomes actionable only
when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the
locality and of the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be
fixed by any definite measure of the particular case. The test is whether
rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the
noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond
the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of
holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to the uses which
involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it
within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner

who though creating a noise is acting with reasonable regard for the rights
of those affected by it.
- The determining factor when noise alone is not intensity or volume. It is
that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.








203. RAMCAR V. MILLAR ET AL. 6 SCRA 517; 116 PHIL 825

- Ramcar operates and maintains an auto repair and body building shop in
General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila
- Private respondents reside near or around the shop. They filed an action
to abate Ramcar as a nuisance.
- CFI Manila ruled in favor of Ramcar but the Court of Appeals reversed and
ordered the abatement of Ramcar, hence, Ramcar filed a petition for
review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
- W/N Ramcar could be regarded as nuisance and thus may be abated.
- W/N inaction of the legislative body of Manila precludes the court to
determine the existence of nuisance.
- W/N the award of damages to in favor of private respondents is provided
for by law.
- RAMCAR IS A NUISANCE. Ramcar argues that it was granted license to
maintain a garage, hence, allowed to do business in that particular area.
A city ordinance enumerates what businesses may be done in that area
and one is to maintain a garage and gasoline service stations. Inasmuch
involves the use of tools and machinery with the concomitant noise
created by the use of tools and machines. Ramcars business is not merely
- NO. While Sec18 of RA 409 grants legislative powers to the municipal
board to declare, prevent, and provide for the abatement of nuisances,


- The Supreme Court ordered the abatement of only the portion of
Ramcars business which exceeds that of a garage.


60 PHIL 465
- The municipal council of Iloilo enacted an ordinance prohibiting the
storing and sale of lumber and the keeping of lumber stores on certain
streets. The ordinance considers such establishments as public nuisance
and owners were given 6mos. to move from the date of effectivity of said
- Plaintiffs are merchants residing on those streets mentioned. The filed
suit to annul the ordinance on the ground that it is illegal and in violation
of their rights.
- W/N the municipality of Iloilo may enact such kind of ordinance.
- YES. The Revised Administrative Code conferred power to municipalities
such as the police power including the power to abate public nuisances
and to divide its territory into commercial and residential zones.
- The municipality of Iloilo justified the enactment of the ordinance by
saying that the areas declared therein was thickly populated, center of
commercial/industrial/residential establishments and the presence of
lumber stores poses a threat to public safety and health.
- Power of municipalities, in the exercise of their police power, to regulate
and abate public nuisance is indisputable, WHEN THE MEASURE TAKEN TO
OF THE LOCALITY under the maxim salus populi suprema lex (the welfare
of the people is the supreme law).
- Reasonable zoning regulations may be proper exercise of the municipal
police power. Zoning is not a taking of property like the power of eminent

domain inasmuch as it merely regulates the use of property within certain

may be merely A RIGHT THING IN THE WRONG PLACE (right love at the
wrong time? Haha!) pig-in-the-parlor-instead-of-the-barnyard doctrine.
- Municipality of Iloilo done nothing but to safeguard the health, safety,
and welfare of its inhabitants, and it is perfectly fair that the herein
plaintiffs should abide by the provisions thereof which are in accordance
with the old and well-known maxim: SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX.
















- The City of Manila enacted an Ordinance authorizing the establishment,
equipping and construction of a garbage and refuse disposal plant.
- After rejecting bids, new specifications by the city government officials,
were drawn up which were approved by the Awards Committee.
- An Invitation to Bid was published in the Official Gazette.
- San Rafael Homeowners Assoc. asked for a restraining order to stop the
scheduled bidding because the advertised bidding for an incinerator was in
excess of the citys authority because an incinerator is a nuisance per se.

- NO. It is pointless to go into an academic discussion of the relative merits
of the composting and the incineration methods of garbage and refuse
disposal for purposes of deciding whether or not at this state prohibition
should issue to stop the bidding called for by the City of Manila. The
instant petitions for that purpose are premature.

- This Court cannot and should not substitute its judgment this early for
that of the respondents and on a purely theoretical basis rule that the bids
submitted should not be opened, or if opened should not be accepted,
because not one of the plants therein offered to be established would
serve the purpose envisaged and because, if so established, it would so
pollute the environment as to constitute a nuisance.
- If and when such a result becomes a reality, or at least an imminent
threat, that will be the time the petitioners may come to court.
- This does not preclude them from going to court again because a
continuing nuisance calls for a continuing remedy.
- Sum: Action to avoid possible nuisance is premature when the bidding for
materials for the incinerator is still going on and where no incinerator has
yet actually existed.
- Farrales was a holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari
goods. When the building where she had her stall was demolished, she
was ordered to move to another temporary place.
- Instead of moving to the place directed, she built a temporary shack on
the cement passageway at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market
without seeking prior permit or permission from any city official.
- Police threatened to demolish this shack. Farrales asked for the issuance
of an injunction from the court, but after hearing, and upon failure to
present a proper permit, the court denied the injunction sought.
- The police demolished the shack
- Farrales now claims that the shack was not a nuisance, or if it was a
nuisance, it was one per accidens and not per se, and therefore could only
be abated only after the corresponding judicial proceeding. The proper
procedure should have been for either the City Engineer or the City Health
Officer to commence legal proceedings for the abatement of this
- W/N the demolition was proper
- YES. Farrales had (1) no permit to put up the stall; (2) its location was an
obstruction to the free movement of people; and (3) the shack was not a

building within the meaning of the Charter of the City of Baguio relied
upon by Farrales and under which the power to cause buildings, dangerous
to the public, to be made secure or torn down is vested in the City
Engineer, subject to the approval of the City Mayor.
- Although Art. 702 of the Civil Code says that it is the District Officer that
shall determine whether or not abatement without judicial proceedings is
the best remedy against a public nuisance, the failure to observe this
provision is not in itself a ground for the award of damages. Art. 707
presents only 2 cases where a public official extrajudicially abating a
nuisance will be liable for damages:
o If he causes unnecessary injury; or
o If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real
- None of the above was present in this case. It may even be said that there
was a judicial proceeding. The denial of Farrales petition for injunction
upon her failure to produce a permit was in effect an authority for the
police to carry out the act which was sough to be enjoined.


- Upon orders of the Mayor of Daet, two policemen and six laborers nailed
together lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the
sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. This barricaded the barbershop of
Pascual, and store of Lourdes.
- The Mayor filed a complaint for judicial abatement of the stalls alleging
that they constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. On the
other hand, the mayor and policemen were charged with grave coercion.
- W/N the fencing off was proper
- YES. The barbershop did constitute a public nuisance as defined under
arts. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code.
- There is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the
defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk,
especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the
health of the general public passing through the street and also of the

unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly
structures in the place.
- Even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or
toleration for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a
nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood.
- The Mayor merely implemented the recommendation of the Municipal
Health Officer. Having acted in god faith, he has no criminal liability. He
had the right to do so.
- Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property or anything else which:
o Injures or engenders the health or safety of others; or
o Annoys or offends the senses; or
o Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality; or
o Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or
o Hinders or impairs the use of property.
- Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals
may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not include in the
foregoing definition.
- Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
o A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
o A civil action; or
o Abatement, without judicial proceedings


NBI 10 SCRA 395
- 51 slot machines and paraphernalia were being operated by the owners
in Pasay City pursuant to licenses issued by Pasay City.
- Later, the slot machines covered by the license, together with other slot
machines operated without license, were seized under and by virtue of
search warrants issued by a judge of the CFI of Rizal.

- W/N the 51 slot machines constitute a nuisance per se or will be devoted,

if released to some unlawful use
- NO. R.A. No. 183 which is the Charter of Pasay City, expressly authorizes
its municipal board to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for slot
machines, a power not granted to the municipal council of Caloocan. The
Municipal Board of Pasay has passed Municipal Ordinance No. 106 fixing
the amount of the license fees and the owners have paid said amounts.
- The mere possession of a slot machine or even its operation for
amusement and not for profit does not constitute a crime. A slot machine
is not a gambling devise per se because it can be operated legally as well
as illegally


- Canlas spouses were granted a permit for the construction of a house.
Their purpose was to establish, operate and maintain in said house a
private hospital with an accommodation of fifteen beds, two of which
would be for charity cases. When half of the house was finished they
opened therein a medical clinic of five emergency beds, one of which was
for charity. Subsequently, they applied from the Director of Hospitals for
authority to operate and maintain the aforementioned hospital. The
Provincial Board of Tarlac passed a resolution recommending approval of
said application, which was approved.
- Meanwhile, Jaime Tayag had obtained a permit to construct a ricemill in
front of the Canlas Clinic, just across the street. Chapter VII of Municipal
Ordinance No. 44 of Concepcion, Tarlac, requires a sanitary permit issued
by the local health officer, for operation of any establishment which may
exhale foul odor or cause physical discomfort to such degree as to
constitute a nuisance. Purporting to act pursuant to such ordinance, the
municipal health officer of Concepcion revoked or cancelled the

aforementioned permit issued to Tayag, who was advised of this action in

a letter.
- Since Tayag was about to proceed with the construction of his ricemill
despite this communication, the Canlas spouses, against him, a complaint,
alleging that should the ricemill be eventually constructed, the operation
of the Canlas Clinic "which has been in actual operation since January,
1959, rendering hospitalization, medical aid, cure and treatment, not only
to the people of the municipality of Concepcion, but, also, to the people of
the neighboring municipalities" would have to be stopped altogether
"because the smoke, vapor, palay husk dust and dirt and the constant
noise generated from the operation of said ricemill would not be
conducive to the quiet, cleanliness, tranquillity and fresh air and
wholesome atmosphere needed and prescribed in the hospital area, its
environs and surroundings for the health, comfort and well-being of its
inmates and patients", and "that the Bureau of Hospitals has made it clear
that if and should the said ricemill be eventually constructed and begin
operation, the permit already issued for the said hospital . . .would be
revoked and cancelled and the Canlas Clinic itself would be ordered
closed", thereby working irreparable loss, damage and injury to petitioners
herein, who had already spent not less than P40,000 for the construction
of their aforementioned house and the equipment necessary for the
operation of said hospital.
- TC granted a preliminary injunction which was dissolved
- W/N the writ of preliminary injunction was properly granted.
- YES. The motion for its dissolution was not verified and merely relied
upon abstract conclusions
- Also, it is obvious that, the operation of a hospital is a matter that, not
only concerns its owners or operators, but also, if not more particularly
affects the health and welfare of the community, and that the damage
sustained by the latter, in consequence, either of the obstruction to the
proper operation of said hospital or of its closing, can not possibly
compensated in full..
- Then, too, it would appear that respondent Judge issued the order
complained of on account of "very reliable in formation" he had received
privately, to the effect that "these days a ricemill can be operated without

causing any noise or emitting any smoke in such a way as (not) to be a

nuisance to the neighborhood. In dissolving the writ, the court claimed
that after the construction of Tayag's ricemill, the Court intended to
inspect the same "and see whether it really can be operated without noise
or smoke" and that, if the ricemill is smoke while in was then found to
"cause noise and emit smoke while in operation", the court would
"immediately enjoin its operation". This process of reasoning entails such a
serious error of judgment as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
- Indeed, the main action was filed by petitioners herein for the purpose of
joining and prohibiting Tayag from the constructing a ricemill, so that,
upon the construction thereof, said action would become futile. Besides,
the intention of respondent Judge to prohibit the continuance of the
operation of said ricemill, should it later be found to be a nuisance, is not
sufficient to offset the harm already done to the operation of the hospital,
specially the injury suffered by the patients therein and the public in
general, which are hardly susceptible of estimation or compensation.
- Needless to say, by permitting Tayag to construct his building, and
purchase and install the machinery for the operation of the ricemill,
respondent Judge exposed him to much greater damage than that which
could possibly have resulted had the writ of preliminary injunction been
maintained until the final disposition of the case.























- A quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It
was purchased in 1946 by Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It was
being used as a warehouse for copra.
- By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said
land was declared for the exclusive use of port facilities.

- On 24 May 1989, the mayor of the town ordered the demolition of the
Quonset because it was a non conforming structure (beyond the zone
where warehouses were allowed)
- W/N the mayor had the power to extrajudicially order the demolition of
the Quonset; whether it can be justified as removal of a nuisance per se.
- NO. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal
Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local
Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted
judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances"
- While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a
nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The
nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
- [Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor
can they authorize the extra judicial condemnation and destruction of that
as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things
must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . .
the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate
industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation,
that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board.
The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial
tribunal. (Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]).
- Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by
virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga)
when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its
property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing
before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did
constitute a nuisance in law.
- During the incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958,
the municipality leased an Area of 1,350 square meters (a portion alleged

to be part of the town plaza) to the defendants subject to the condition

that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes;
- The defendants religiously paid the rentals until 1967; that thereafter, the
defendants refused to pay the rentals; that the incumbent mayor
discovered that the defendants filed a "Cadastral Answer" over the lot;
that the defendants refused to vacate the place despite efforts of the
- The national government had allotted an appropriation for the
construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza but the said
construction which was already started could not continue because of the
presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants
- On October 10, 1990, the petitioner Judge issued two (2) orders. The first
order denied the motion to dismiss. The second order granted the
petitioner municipality's motion for a writ of possession "with the ancillary
writ of demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of
this case, to the end that the public construction thereon will not be
- On October 19, 1990, the petitioner municipality implemented the orders
- The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not have authority
to issue a writ of possession and a writ of demolition
- W/N the petitioner municipality is entitled to a writ of possession and a
writ of demolition even before the trial of the case starts.
- YES, but determination of the cadstral court is a prejudicial question to
this case
- Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following remedies against a
public nuisance:
o A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
o A civil action; or
o Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
- The petitioner municipality had three remedies from which to select its
cause of action. It chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession
of the parcel of land occupied by the private respondents. Obviously,
petitioner municipality was aware that under the then Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance

before the municipality may summarily abate a public nuisance. On the

premise that the parcel of land forms part of a public plaza, the petitioners
now contend that the Judge was justified in issuing the writ of possession
and writ of demolition.
- There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for
the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such
structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law.
Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use
and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties.
- However, not only did the municipality avoid the use of abatement
without judicial proceedings, but the status of the subject parcel of land
has yet to be decided.
- It is to be noted that even before the Proclamation, the parcel of land
was the subject of cadastral proceedings before another branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. At the time of the filing of the
instant case, the cadastral proceedings intended to settle the ownership
over the questioned portion of the parcel of land under Proclamation No.
365 were still pending. One of the claimants in the cadastral proceedings is
private respondent Vicente Medina who traced his ownership over the
subject parcel of land as far back as 1947 when he allegedly bought the
same from a Subanan native.
- Considering therefore, the nature and purpose of the Cadastral
proceedings, the outcome of said proceedings becomes a prejudicial
question which must be addressed in the resolution of the instant case.
- Technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise in the instant case since
the two actions involved are both civil in nature. However, we have to
consider the fact that the cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the
real owner/s of the disputed parcel of land. In case respondent Vicente
Medina is adjudged the real owner of the parcel of land, then the writ of
possession and writ of demolition would necessarily be null and void. Not
only that. The demolition of the constructions in the parcel of land would
prove truly unjust to the private respondents.
- The legality of the occupation by the private respondents of the subject
parcel of land is still to be resolved in the cadastral proceedings. In the
event that respondent Vicente Medina is declared owner of the subject
parcel of land, necessarily, the private respondents would be entitled to

just compensation for the precipitate demolition of their buildings. On the

other hand, if private respondent Medina is declared to have no rights
over the subject parcel of land then, the private respondents would not be
entitle to any compensation for the demolition of their buildings. In such a
case the private respondents are considered squatters and therefore, the
demolition of their buildings would turn out to have been justified.















- Farolan (acting commissioner of customs) and Parayno (acting chief of
Customs Intelligence) has not released the shipment of OPP film
waste/scrap for making fibers and films.
- Customs claim that the products is of higher class considered as
polypropylene film which is restricted by LOI. BOI is in conflict in their
opinion. Solmac sued Farolan and Parayno claims not releasing it is not
done in good faith. RTC: damages in their private capacity. But Farolan not
liable, first name is different, must be Ramon not Damian.
- GOOD FAITH refers to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Good faith is always presumed and it is upon who alleges the contrary that
the burden of proof lies.
- Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable
absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith.
1934: Pedro de la Cruz. 1949: lease public lot for 15 years. Upon
death of Pedro, children sold their share to Emil Ong and Jose
1966: share of Lourdes Agbayani was sold to Saba. Saba wrote to
Emil and jose that all rentals shall be delivered to him but no
avail. She sued them.

Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse

injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. It is not enough that injuries have
arisen, it is essential that they have sprung from wrongful act or
omission, fraud, malice or bad faith which was the proximate
cause. The law could not impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
One who exercises his rights does no injury. damnum adsque
injuria rule. Saba was in good faith in filing collection suit.
A person may have erred but error alone is not a ground for moral
damages. Whatever worries, anxieties and expenses respondents
may have suffered were only such as are usually caused to a party
haled into court as a defendant in a litigation.



Dutch spouse bought a residential lot but PR Builders has not

developed lot. Spouse to rescind contract to sell and sue PR.
In pari delicto. An exception to such rule where, even as the intent
to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning
real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the
Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize
because the buyer cased the rescission of the contract before the
execution of the final deed transferring ownership.
Under Art 1414, one who repudiates the agreement and demands
his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to
Hulst is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500,
representing purchase price paid to PR.
No damages may be recovered on the bases of a void contract;
being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie
between the parties involved. Hulst is not entitled to actual,
interest, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Manila Times published an article charge P193k was spent in

administering P200k. Chinese of Cebu files complaint against
wealthy Manila Merchant taken from the file of clerk of court of

Tek Hee, supposed to order hardware products from US but bad

reputation because article.
ACTUAL actual pecuniary damages sustained and not damages
for injury to his feelings and reputation.
PECUNIARY damages in tort where the injury is clearly proved,
but not the exact amount of damages. The very nature of injuries
on such could not be fully compensated by money damages.
Pecuniary damages for LOSS of ANTICIPATED PROFITS must not be
only capable of proof, but must be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty both in nature and cause from which they
proceed. No recovery can be had for loss of profits which are
uncertain, contingent, conjectural, or speculative, it must be
borne in mind that since profits are prospective they must be
uncertain and problematic in some extent, and on that account or
on account of difficulties in way of proof, a person complaining of
breach of contract cannot be deprived of all remedy.
Damages must be established by competent evidence the amount
of such, courts cannot give judgment for a greater amount than
those actually proven.
Exception: ill will or express malice punitive damages are
allowed in discretion of court. The article was false, published
with intent to injure the plaintiffs feelings, and to degrade him in
public estimation- implied malice. If the charge complained of is
injurious and no justifiable motive for it is apparent, malice is
inferred from the falsity of the charge.


-Mendoza, owner of theatre in Naga, rented a movie, Himala ng
Birhen in time for Maskarra festival. It would be shown on Sept
LVN Pictures sent it thru PAL on Sept 17, it loaded to the plane but
sent back to Manila.
It was received by Mendoza only on Sept 20. Sued to recover 3k
damages loss of profit.
Art 2201 damages only those foreseen at the time of perfection
of contract. PAL could not foresee that Mendoza suffered
damages in the delay in delivering the film his plans to exhibit
on fiesta were not called to PALs attention.

228. LASAM V. SMITH 45 PHIL 657

Smith owner of car garage, Lasam rented one with their licensed
driver. Driver let his unlicensed assistant to drive, car fell on
embankment. Conflict if reckless driving or defect on steering
Smiths liability to Lasam was contractual, Smith is liable unless it
is shown that the accident was due to a fortuitous event.
Expenses incurred as a result of accident greatly exceeded the
amount of damages awarded since damages resulting from
negligence in the fulfilment of a contractual obligation, the courts
have a discretionary power to moderate the liability according to
the circumstances.

R check-in in hospital for laparoscopic operation to know the

cause of her infertility. IO failed to arrive as scheduled still on
return filght form Hawaii. She forgot to consider time difference.
No gross negligence. Common human knowledge that excitement
attends the preparations for the honeymoon. Her negligence
could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its
characterization as gross. The doctors negligence not being gross,
the spouses are not entitled to recover moral damages.
NO Exemplary damages absent of wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. NOR attorneys fees not
compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest
The list of expenses cannot replace receipts when they should
have been issued as a matter of course in business transactions,
as in the case of purchase of gasoline and of food.


Lucio Algarra filed a civil action for personal injuries received from
a car collision due to the negligence of Sixto Sandejas causing him
to be hospitalized for 10 days, four of five days of which he could
not leave his bed.
After being discharged, he still continued to receive medical
treatment and that he had done no work since he was not yet

entirely recovered. He also spent to pay the doctor P8 and

medicine P2, the expense totalling to P110
Algarra sells the products of a distillery and earns 10%
commission which averages to P50/month. He had around 20
regular customers which took him 4 years to build who order in
small quantities and require regular and frequent
deliveries. Since his accident, his wife tried to keep up with the
business but only 4 regular customers remained.
W/N there is actual or compensatory damage despite absence of
malicious intent (since negligence)? How is the damage
plaintiff personal injuries commission agent about 20
regular customers. Lost 4 customers. WON value of loss which she
suffered can be extended to pain which she experienced by
reason of accident.
Reparation, to be efficacious and substantial, must rationally
include generic idea of complete indemnity. Fraud is not an
Only when there exists a natural and true relation between such
nonfulfillment and the damages, whatever reason there may be
to demand them on another account.
FORESEEABILITY if such result and the chain of events
connecting it with the act complained of had occurred to his
mind, the same would have seemed natural and probable and
according to the ordinary course of nature.
MEASURING damages no distinction is made between damage
caused maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through
mere negligence in so far as the civil liability of the wrongdoer is
concerned. Defendant to repair damage done to put plaintiff in
the same position.
Exemplary or punitive damages malicious or wilful intention to
cause damages aggravating circumstance.
Nominal damages only a technical violation of the plaintiffs
rights resulting in no substantial injury to him. Mere
noncompliance with the obligations of a contract is not sufficient
to sustain a judgment for damages. It must be shown that
damages actually existed.

A release or compromise for personal injury sustained by

negligence attributed to the defendant company was held a bar to
an action for the recovery of further damages.
Performance not proven to be destructive or injurious and
generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have
ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or
The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be determined
from the evidence submitted to the court.
Profits are not excluded from recovery because they are profits;
but when excluded, it is on the ground that there are no criteria
by which to estimate the amount with the certainty on which the
adjudications of courts, and the findings of juries should be based.
Mere fact that loss cannot be ascertained with absolute accuracy,
is no reason for denying claim.

231. RAAGAS V. TRAYA 22 SCRA 839


Raagas 3 year old son was ran over by a truck. But Traya claims
truck was fully loaded and running low speed.
Actual damages must be proved, courts cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount
of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damages had
been suffered and on evidence of actual amount.
No damages of any kind unforeseen event or fault of boy or his

232. ANGELES V. LERMA (CA) 45 OG (NO. 6) 2589

L arrived at airport to attend business & hired Dollar Taxi as
carrier. It was owned by Q, bumped with other private car. L
suffered injury.
TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES in motor vehicle mishaps resulting
in injury of passenger, actual expenses incurred in shuttling back
and forth between places to confer with lawyer, filing case, and
attending trials, are the natural and probable consequences of
carriers breach of obligation Art 2201 CC.

No Exemplary damages- defendant is mere owner and operator of

common carrier and does not participate in or ratify the negligent
act of his driver



Tin purchased lot 54 and estero lot constructed house 72 sqm

but found that estero lot is government property. Sued Tin.
If one cannot obtain the thing agreed upon, through no fault of
his, but through the fault of the obligor, its stands to reason that
he should be indemnified the reasonable value of the thing.
Indemnification for damages comprehends not only the value of
the loss suffered, but also the profits which the obligee failed to
obtain, had he sold it, at the time. Lucro cessante price which
the thing could have commanded on the date that the obligation
should have been fulfilled and was not difference in the price
from date of acquisition to the presentation of complaint.



C 4th year medical student, injured when bus which he is in

crossed train tracks and bumped engine of the train. Unconscious
for 35 days. Helpless condition physically and mentally.
guilty of breach of contract but only liable for actual damages not
moral damages.
Actual damages income that C could have earned if he should
finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board
exams must be deemed to be within the same category because
they could have reasonably foreseen by the parties at the time he
No moral damages because plaintiff spouse not the party to the
contract of carriage nor can invoke quasi-delict since they were
not themselves injured as a result of the collision between the bus
and train.


A person injured by breach of contract cannot recover damages

for any loss which he might have avoided with ordinary care and
at reasonable expense.
Where plaintiffs had entered into a contract with a corporation
which was subsequently dissolved and whose liabilities had been
assumed by another person who, through misleading
representation and failure to carry out the contract, caused losses
to plaintiff he must share the damage.



mechanic illegally dismissed claims incompetent and

insubordinate, absent w/o permission. But ER offered to come
back but he denied demanding higher wage
Action based on a wrongful discharge is one to recover damages
for breach of contract. EE should have accepted the offer even
under old contract, as long as it does not involve a renunciation of
any right already accrued.
Mere acceptance of the offer of defendant would not constitute a
waiver of his right to recover damages for the time intervening
from the date of the wrongful discharge to the time when he
returned to work under the new offer which would consist in the
loss of wages for that period, and any other damages which might
have been sustained and which plaintiff could prove.
RATIO: to require an EE to labor if he is given the opportunity; and
it does not permit him to remain idle and collect his wages
nevertheless when he has an opportunity to return to his former
The damages in an action for wrongful discharge are prima facie
the amount of wages for the full term. ER, when he wrongfully
discharges an EE, becomes, with respect to the EE, a debtor in bad



DC was permitted to cut woods in hacienda but when Got became

the Manager again, prevent him from taking cut wood and piled
in different places on the hacienda.

No damages against company DC did nothing tending to prevent

said damages or at least to minimize them, when he could have
done so by appealing to the officers of the company for relief.
Company conceded him all the facilities in order that he might
comply with his obligations, entered into during the time said
concession was in force, to furnish various firms and persons with



B about to ride electric car after letting his 2 children ride, he fell
off, dragged and rear wheels passed over his left foot. It was
amputated. He was a 45-year old chief marine engr with a salary
of 375. He was awarded costs of expenses incurred but not for the
amputation of his left foot.
2 kinds of damages: damages for the loss actually sustained and
for the profit which the injured party may have failed to realize.
His incapacity to continue in the practice of his profession has put
an end to one of his activities and has certainly destroyed the
principal source of his professional earning in the future.


driver of a bus ran over D a USVA pensioner who died. Only
daughter sued.
Award of pension to deceased accident victim which was lost by
his death sure income that was cut short by defendant. Award
of pension of 1 year.
Civil liability of bus owner for death caused by his driver,
subsidiary, and insurance proceeds paid to heir of victim by
insurance credited in favor of erring driver.

Nicolas Cuenca sued Northwest Airlines for forcing him to move from
first class to economy class on a connecting flight from Manila-OkinawaTokyo. The lower court ruled in his favor and awarded him moral
damages, exemplary damages with legal interest thereon, plus attorneys
fees. On appeal, CA affirmed but eliminated the exemplary award, and
moral damages was converted into nominal damages.
Northwest appealed questioning, among others, the award for nominal
damages, citing Medina vs. Cresciencia and Quijano vs. PAL where the
Court disallowed moral damages.
The court held that the two cited cases are not in point. In the first case,
the nominal damages was deleted, because the aggrieved party was
already awarded compensatory damages. Here, the manner in which he
was rudely forced to move with knowledge that he was an official
representative of the
Philippines shows that he deserves to be awarded damages. The award
of P20,000 may well be considered as nominal. Since Northwest had
acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner, said award may also
be considered exemplary.
Nominal damages cannot exist with compensatory damages.


Shauf filed a complaint for damages against respondents for
discrimination. The trial court ruled in favor
of Shauf and awarded damages to complainant. CA reversed. The Court did
not grant the award of actual
or compensatory damages for supposedly unearned income if Shauf had
been hired for being highly
speculative. She was never employed, therefore she had never acquired
any vested right to the salaries.
Attorneys fees was granted.


49 OG 2769
When one Hermengildo Co was boarding a passenger truck, the passenger
truck driven by Surro hit the
former. Co died due to the accident. His family file a suit for damages. The
court granted damages for
Cos expected earnings for the next four years. As to damages:
- In fixing indemnity awarded to plaintiffs due to the death of their father,
the following are
- tender ages of plaintiffs at time of death
- age and life expectancy of the deceased
- state of health of the deceased at the time of death
- earning capacity of the deceased
- actual pecuniary damages
- pain and suffering o the deceased and plaintiffs
- pecuniary situation of the party liable.
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a
deceased has no fixed basis and it is
left to the discretion of the court. The amount recoverable depends on the
facts and circumstances of
each case. The Court upheld the lower court in limiting the damages based
on earning capacity to four
years, because use of the American Experience Table of Mortality is not




Concolacion Junio, 22 and Soloria, 18, brought these actions in the

court of CFI to recover from Manila Railroad, damages sufferd by
them in an accident that occurred at the realroad crossing in
Pangasinan, when the automobile in which they were in collided
with one of the locomotives of Manila Railroad.
At around 11:40 at night the plaintiffs were travelling on the raod
and they arrived at an intersection. The car tried to cross the track
and was hit.
Junios right leg was amputated and her right arm fractured.
Soloria received various injuries on on her head.
On such nifht the gates were not lowered and no notice was
placed that the gates were temporarily out of order.
As a general rule, the rights and obligations between the public
and a railroad company at a public corssing are mutual and
In this case, the driver alleges that he slowed down. While the
engineer insits that he rang the bell and sounded the whistle
before reaching the corssing.
TC absolved the defendants. An appeal was taken.
Who was negligent?
Both Manila Railroad and Driver of the car were negligent.
Manila Railroad because it failed to operate the gates
Driver for failure to observe caution and slow down before the
If the driver was the one who instituted the action, it would not
prosper due to contributory negligence.
But the persons who instituted the action are appelants who were
mere passengers of the car.
It is a well recognized principle of law that the negligence of a
driver, who, in turn is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be
imputed to a passenger who has no control over him in the
management of the vehicle.
In re: damages.
With respect to Soloria, we do not find any difficulty because
evidence shows she spent only P300 for her treatment and stay at
the hospital. Her injuries are not of such nature to entitle her to a

further indemnity. The damages to which she is entitled may,

therefore be assessed at the amount stated above.
In resepct to Junio. She was a dancer earning from her dancing.
She lost her right leg and sufferd a fracture in her arm. She should
be awarded sum of P2,500 as damages and P500 as indemnity for
expenses incurred by her in her treatment, medical attendance
and stay in hospital.


expires on Feb. 18, 1970. On July 31, 1970, petitioner leased the same to
Mobil filed action to declare lease agreement void, claiming it exercised its
option to lease within the period agreed upon; petitioner denied allegation
and claimed damages in counterclaim
Trial Court found for Mobil; CA reversed ruled Mobil was not able to
exercise option to lease and petitioner entitled to rental fees which she
shouldve received from Shell from the time the action was instituted
(injunction was issued and petitioner was ordered not to receive rental
fees from Shell when case was pending)
BUT CA did not award damages (rental fees she shouldve received) as her
counterclaim for damages was dismissed by Trial Court and she failed to
appeal the same.
Issue: w/n Javellana entitled to damages for wrongful filing of case against
Petitioner entitled to damages.
At any rate, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, 11 and,
We find it unfair and unjust to deprive the petitioner of the rentals on her
property due to a mere technicality.
The contract of lease was executed on July 21, 1970 and in force for 20
years unless sooner cancelled by Shell by the 10th or 15th year.
The rentals which petitioner would have received if not for filing of the
case by Mobil and the injunction was 912,000.00 up to the end of the 13th
year, but since she was given advance rental, rental due her is 792,000.




250. DA JOSE V. ANGELES 708 SCRA 506
251. PEOPLE V. TAAN 506 SCRA 219
253. PEOPLE V. ELING 553 SCRA 724
255. DAVILA V. PAL 49 SCRA 497
256. PEOPLE V. BAGUIO 196 SCRA 459

259. PEREA V. ZARATE 679 SCRA 208


Petitioner Javellana executed Option to Lease contract with Mobil covering
3 parcels of land in Makati to be used as gasoline station. The option

Maxino sold hacienda, fishponds and agricultural tools used

therein for 70,000 with condition the vendee shall assume
payment of an obligation, secured by mortgages on the property
in favour of RFC. Vendee Bautista sold same property for 80k to
San Jose Dev. Co. Represented by Guballa.
Maxino sold same property to Guballa for 80k.
Guballa had outstanding obligation of 30k to Bautista, and latter
filed action to recover the debt; impleaded Maxino as party-

defendant for allegedly conspiring with Guballa to defraud

Trial Court awarded 30k to Bautista but denied other damages,
both in plaintiffs claim and in defendants counterclaim


Issue: w/n Maxino entitled to damages as counterclaim?


No. Maxino in bad faith

Maxino contend that Bautista maliciously filed case against them
which was groundless and false; allegedly suffered damages
(mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings etc.)
Bautista filed action against them as she suspected Maxino and
Guballa connived with each other and wanted to defraud her.
Guballa failed to pay the balance of the purchase price of the
properties, while the two entered into a contract of sale over the
same properties with knowledge that the same was already sold
by Bautista to RFC.
Maxino not entitled to damages.
There must be evidence to justify a claim for damages.
Where it appears that plaintiffs were not motivated by malice or
spite in impleading defendants, because plaintiffs had sufficient
cause to suspect that said defendants had conspired with their codefendants to defraud plaintiffs, a counterclaim for damages on
the ground of "malicious filing" of complaint will not prosper.

Yes, but should be modified.

CA awarded 864,000 as net loss income for the 30 yrs remaining
life expectancy of Bernardo.
The amount corresponding to the loss of earning capacity is based
mainly on two factors: 1) number of years on the basis of which
the damages shall be computed 2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the widow and her children should be fixed.
Court modified the damage awarded, considering the quality and
nature of life of a meat vendor.
The formula for life expectancy: 2/3 x (80 33 *age of deceased*)
The normal life expectancy is 31 and 1/3 yrs. BUT Court reduced it
to 25 years as it is hard to conceive that Jose would still be
working for the full stretch of the remaining 31 years of his life.
Must make allowances and reduce his life expectancy.

Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 age of deceased)
Net annual income = Gross annual income necessary living expenses
Reduced to simple terms:
Net Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x Net annual income
Court awarded 675,000.



Bernardo, upon getting supply of pork in a jeepney for his

business, was electrocuted as the antenna of the jeep touched an
open electric wire of Petitioner Benguet Electric.
Trial Court disallowed award for net loss income because of
contradictory and untrustworthy testimony of spouse; CA ordered
payment of damages including net loss income relying on
testimony of Bernardos sister.
Issue: w/n damages awarded proper?

Legaspi oil and private respondent Bernard Oseraos, had several
transactions for the sale of copra. Oseraos was to sell Copra to
Legaspi Oil. There were 2 previously concluded transactions
between the two. The third contract was for the sale of 100 tons
of copra at an agreed price of P79.00 per 100 kilos.
The price of copra was fluctuating at this point in time.
They then entered into another contract for another sale of 100
tons of copra at 82.00 per 100 kilos. The agreed price in this
contract was slightly higher than the last contract.

In all these contracts, the selling price had always been stated as
total price rather than per 100 kilos. However, the parties had
understood the same to be per 100 kilos.
Oseraos failed to deliver a substantial amount of Copra. Demands
were made upon him however he failed to comply leading Legaspi
Oil to cancel the contract, he purchased copra at the standard
market price which was higher than the price agreed on by the
parties. This amount and the excess was to be charged against

Thus Oseraos is to pay Legaspi 46,152.76 as damages.

Petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent spouses,
both physicians, a cable gram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New
York, admitting the respondent-wife for a rotating internship in
said hospital, as a consequence of shich she was unable to signify
her acceptance and the position was given to someone else.
An action to recover damages was granted by the court.



W/N private respondent Oseraos is liable for damages arising

from fraud or bad faith in deliberately breaching the contract of
sale entered into by the parties.

Private respondent is guilty of fraud in the performance of his

obligation. Despite the several demands upon him, Oseraos still
failed to comply.
Under the foregoing undisputed circumstances, the actuality of
Oseraos fraud cannot be gainsaid. In general, fraud may be
defined as the coluntary execution of a wrongful act, or a wilfull
omission, knowing and intending the effects which naturally and
necessarily arise from such act or omission.
The fraud referred to in Art 1170 of the CC is the deliberate and
intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of obligation; it is
distinguished from negligence by the presence of deliberate
intent, which is lacking in the latter.
Under Art 1170 of the CC, those who in the performance of their
obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who
in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
The next inquiry is the amount of damages which Oaeraos is to
pay Legaspi Oil.
Legaspi oil paid 46,152.76 more than he would have paid had
private respondent completed delivery of the copra as agreed


Was the award for damages proper?

The SC agrees with the finding of the trial court and the Appellate
Court that petitioner was grossly negligent in having admitted
failing to deliver the cablegram, particularly considering that
respondents had received another telegram, identically
addressed, delivered to them by Eastern Extension, another cable
The SC also agrees with the finding that such failure caused
respondents financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of
earning for approximately 6 months, serious anxiety and sleepless
nights, for which petitioner should be held liable, and which
should be corrected for the public good.
A telegraphic company is a public service corporation owing
duties to the general public and is liable to any member of the
public to whom it owes a duty for damages proximately flowing
from a violation of that duty.


In the evening of Jan 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of
his brother Joel Castillon and borrowed his motorcycle. He then
invited his friend Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City.
Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider

Past 10p.m., after eating supper at a restaurant and drinking a

bottle of beer, they traversed the highway in high speed. They
figured in an accident with a Tamaray jeepney, owned by
petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which
was travelling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn.
The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and
injuries to Sergioo. Respondents, the heirs of Ray, thus filed an
action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment
against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was
subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for
the damages caused to the motorcycle.
After a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in
favor of the Castillon heirs but reduced the Lamberts liability by
20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On the claim of
Joel Castillon, the evidence shoes that he is not the real owner of
the motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly,
his complaint was dismissed. The CA affirmed the decision of the

1. did the CA err in not applying the doctrine that drivers or vehicles who
bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accidents? In other words, was Lambert negligent?
2. Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?
Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate
cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages.
1. NO. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first
establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which
claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as
that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which, the
result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to
the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.
- those who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. In this case,

the evidence sufficiently contradicts this, which is the sudden left turn by
Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.
2. Yes. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of
damages in account of the victims negligence. Article 2179 reads as
follows: When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and provimate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defentants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The underlying
precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in
full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant
must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
- The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies
depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was
established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the
motorcycle at t high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has
imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective
- These circumstances although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The
contribution of these circumstances are real considered and determined in
terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, the heris of Castillon shall
recover only up to 50% of the award.
The Evangelistas were the owners of a residential lot in Rizal
In May 1945: Evangelistas borrowed Php100 from Floreza
November 1945: Floreza occupied the residential lot and built a
house of light materials with the consent of Evangelistas
Additional Loans were made by the Evangelistas totaling to P740
Jan 1949: Floreza demolished the house of light materials and
constricted one of strong material assessed at P1400. Floreza has
not been paying any rentals since the beginning of their

August 1949: Evangelistas sold, with a right to repurchase within 6

years, their land to Floreza for P1000.
Seven months before the expiry of the repurchase period, the
Evangelistas were able to pay in full. Floreza refused ro vacate
the lot unless he was first reimbursed for the value of the house
he built.
Evangelistas filed a complaint. CFI ruled on Art 448 of the Civil
Code saying that Evangelistas have the choice between
purchasing the house or selling the land to Floreza.
CA ruled that Art. 448 was inapplicable and that Floreza was not
entitled to the reimbursement of his house and could remove the
same at his own expense

1. W/N Floreza was entitled to the reimbursement of the cost of his house.
2. W/N he should pay rental of the land
1. No. Issue of reimbursement is not moot because if Floreza has no right
of retention, then he must pay damages in the form of rentals. Agree with
the CA that Art 448 is inapplicable because it applies only when the builder
is in good faith (he believed he had a right to build). Art 453 is also not
applicable because it requires both of the parties to be in bad faith.
Neither is Art 1616 applicable because Floreza is not a vendee a retro. The
house was already constructed in 1945 (light materials) even before the
pacto de retro was entered into in 1949. Floreza cannot be classified as a
builder in good faith nor a vendee a retro who made useful improvements
during the pacto de retro, he has no right to reimbursement of the value of
the house, much less to the retention of the premises until he is paid.
His rights are more akin to a usufructuary under Art 579, who may make
on the property useful improvements but with no right to be indemnified
thereof, He may, however, remove such improvements should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property.
2. Yes. From the time the redemption price was paid in Jan 1955, Florezas
right to use the residential lot without rent ceased. He should be liable for
damages in the form of rentals for the continued use of the lot for P10
monthly from January 3, 1955 until the house was removed and the
property vacated by Floreza.


Petitioner Francisco Perfecto was a candidate for congressman in
Catanduanes. He lost in the election
He filed with the Comelec an administrative complaint against the
members of the board of election inspectors including private
respondent, Juliana Vista. The complaint charged that the said
members of the board of election inspectors were guilty of nonfeasance, malfeasance and misfeasance for wilfull failure to
comply with the instructions, orders, decisions and rulings of the
Commission in connection with the performance of their duties
relative to the conduct of the elections.
As a consequence, private respondent Vista, assisted by her
husband, filed an action for damages alleging that the above
charges were false and without basis and had been instituted
maliciously in order to harass, annoy, demean, degrade and
expose her to public ridicule. She sought moral damafes and
exemplary damages in addition to attys fees and expenses.
Evidence shows that Vista was the poll clerk, however, it had been
shown that she did not act as poll clerk on election day because
she was ill and had been running with fever for several days.
ISSUE: W/N Vista is entitled to compensatory damages
Actual or compensatory damage are those recoverable because of
pecuniary loss- in business, trade, property, profession, job or
occupation, and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof
is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages wil be given.
With respect to compensatory damages assuming that they are
recoverable under the theory that petitioner had filed a clearly
unfounded suit against respondent, the same constitutes a tort
against the latter that makes the former liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omissions complained of. These damages, cannot, however, be
presumed and must be duly proved. Well settled is the rule that
even if the complaint filed by one against the other is clearly

unfounded this does not necessarily mean, in the absence of

specific facts proving damages, that said defendant really suffered
actual damage over and above attorneys fees and costs.


SCRA 242
Roberto R. Luna was killed in a vehicular collision involving a gokart driven by the deceased and a Toyora car diven by Luis dela
Rosa, a minor of 13 years old who had no license.
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Luna, the CFI granted
compensatory damages including:
o P1,650,000.00 unearned earnings
o P12,000 as compensatory damages
o P50,000.00 loss of companionship.
The CA modified such judgment
o P450,000.00 as unearned earnings.
Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate
courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether the award for unearned earnings should remain at
P450,000.00 or should revert back to the original P1,650,000.00 originally

The CA erred in reducing the amount.

The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on 2 factors, namely: (a)
deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived 30 more years; and (b)
that his annual net income was P55,000.00 computed at
P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal
The CA reduced the expected life span of Luna to 10 years after
taking into account the fact that the deceased had been engaged
in car racing as a sport, having participated both here and abroad.
The CA then determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000
less P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000
multiplied by 10 years of life expectancy.

The SC found that the CA in reducing Lunas life expectancy was

not based on any evidence on record. Go-kart racing cannot be
categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low
slung, low powered vehicles. It was error on the part of CA to
have disturbed the determination of the TC which it had
previously affirmed.
Similarl, it was error for the CA to reduce the net income of the
deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but without
at the same time increasing his annual gross income.
NPC and NAMERCO, as representative of International
Commodities Corporation (ICC) entered into a contract for the
purchase by NPC from ICC of 4,000 tons of crude sulfur for its
Maria Cristina Plant in Iligan City. In the contract, it was stipulated
that the sulfur will be delivered within 60 days from notice of the
establishment of a letter of credit.
Failure to deliver would subject the seller and surety the payment
of liquidated damages at the rate of 2/5 of one percent of the full
contract price for the first 30 days and 4/5 of 1% thereafter until
complete delivery is made.
Namerco failed to deliver due to ICCs inability to secure shipping
space. NPC suffered losses, as it was forced to shut down their
Iligan plant for an entire month.
NAMERCO was made solely liable for the non-fulfillment of the
obligation, because he made representations contrary to the
instructions of ICC. The Court therefore held that Namerco, while
an agent, acted beyond his authority, and is therefore liable.
Since the contract explicitly stated that failure to ship is not a
fortuitous event that will exempt the party from liability, the
Court ruled that Namerco should pay NPC the damages indicated
in the contract. Since Namerco is liable, it is bound under the
contract of sale and it follows that it is bound by the stipulation
for liquidated damages in that contract.

As to the damages: With respect to the legal rate of interest on

the damages from the filing of the complaint in 1957, it would be
manifestly inequitable to collect interest on the damages
especially considering that the disposition of this case has been
considerably delayed due to no fault of the defendants.
The Court held that it cannot only nominal damages, since it is
contrary to the intention of the parties. In the contract, it is clearly
provided that liquidated damages are recoverable for delay in the
delivery of the sulfur, and with more reason for non-delivery.
No proof of pecuniary loss is required for the recovery of
liquidated damages. The stipulation for liquidated damages is
intended to obviate controversy in the amount of damages. The
Court reduced the liquidated damages because of Namercos
persistent efforts of Namerco to secure shipping space. Damages
due was reduced to P45,100 equivalent to the bidders bond or to
about 10% of the selling price of the sulfur.

penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or

The governing law then is Article 2227 of the Civil Code, viz.:
"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable." For this reason, we do not really have to strictly
view the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees in the light of such
factors as the amount and character of the services rendered, the
nature and importance of the litigation, and the professional
character and the social standing of the attorney. We do concede,
however, that these factors may be an aid in the determination of
the iniquity or unconscionableness of attorneys' fees as liquidated
The factors of amount and character of services rendered, nature
and importance of litigation, professional character and social
standing of the attorney may be an aid in determination of the
iniquity or unconscionableness of the award.



Blanco was sued by Polytrade for damages as he failed to pay a

delivery of rawhide (to be converted to leather and leather
For failing to answer the suit, he was declared in default and
among those awarded in favor of Polytrade Corporation is
attorneys fee of P51,961.63 which is equivalent to 25% of the
principal indebtedness of Blanco to Polytrade. Blanco now claims
that said judgment against him is exorbitant and unconscionable.
The Court held that while it was not in the sales confirmation
order, it was stated in the trust receipts executed by defendant in
favor of plaintiff: All obligations of the undersigned under this
agreement of trust shall bear interest at the rate of one
percentum per month from the date due until paid.
As to the award of attorneys fees, the Court held that the
attorneys fees awarded here is not the fee recoverable by the
attorney from his client. It is in the nature of liquidated damages
and the stipulation therefore is aptly called a penal clause. Art.
2227 states that liquidated damages, whether indemnity or


Luzon entered into a distributorship agreement with Sy wherein
Luzon would supply 60 metric tons monthly for two years of ipilipil leaves at a price stipulated therein. Sy in return would extend
to Luzon a revolving capital of P4,000 payable at P50 per
In the contract it stated that violation of the contract xxx will give
the aggrieved party the right to collect liquidated damages in the
sum of P20,000.
Luzon was only able to deliver 133.2 metric tons of ipil-ipil leaves.
Sy on the other hand failed to give Luzon succeeding revolving
capital. Luzon filed suit against Sy for having violating the
contract. Trial court ruled against Sy.
On appeal, Sy is asking for reduction if not a reversal of the
While the parties have agreed upon P20,000 liquidated damages,
the Court deemed it equitable to reduce the amount since Luzon
also did not comply with the agreement. It was reduced to


University Publishing (company) entered into a contract with
Albert where Albert will submit his manuscript for publication by
the company, and the company upon sale of the books will pay
Albert certain amounts totaling P30,000 (paragraph 4 of the
contract). By the time of the suit, the company was only able to
pay Albert P7,000. It was proven by the facts that the company
was remiss of its obligation to pay, and Albert complied with his
obligation to submit his manuscript.
The Court ruled that the stipulation in paragraph 4 of the contract
may be considered as liquidated damages to be paid in case of
breach of the contract. However, the Court reduced the amount
of liquidated damages as a result of the breach to P15,000,
because evidence was lacking to show the amount that should
accrue to the plaintiff as his share in the proceeds of the sale and
the amount of profits that plaintiff would derive from the sale of
the books.
PHIL 333

Bolinao Electronics and Joes Radio entered into a dealership

agreement where Bolinao obliged itself to sell and deliver to Joes
Radio 500 TV sets.
Joe made a downpayment. The contract stipulates that in case
Bolinao fails to comply with the agreement, it would return to
Joes the amount that the latter had deposited with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum, plus damaged equivalent to 20% of the
total cost of 250 TV sets.
While the first shipment of 250 TV sets was delivered and paid
for, the second shipment was not delivered. Joes paid to Alto,
who was subrogated to the rights of Bolinao, the partial payment
for the second shipment.
They entered into another agreement, but this was also not
complied with by Alto. For such failure, Joe sued Alto.
Alto claims that the second agreement novated the first
agreement, therefore, it is not liable for the liquidated damages
found in the first agreement. The Court however held that there

was neither express stipulation in the second contract nor every

point in the first and second agreement incompatible with each
other as to render the first agreement novated.
As to the damages:
The Court reduced the amounts recoverable by Joes Radio.
The amount of P49,378.77 should bear interest at 6% from the
date the amended and supplemental complaint was filed, because
the debtor incurs in default only from the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands fulfillment of the obligation.
In view of partial performance of the agreement, Alto is entitled
to an equitable reduction of the liquidated damages irrespective
of whether the stipulation for damages was intended as a penalty
or as indemnity.
SCRA 458

OVEC (lessor) and Sy (lessee) entered into a lease agreement over

some properties in Cabanatuan City. Sy failed to pay rentals and
amusement taxes.
A latter agreement was forged, but Sy was still unable to pay
OVEC. OVEC locked up the premises and prevented Sy and his
employees from entering the buildings.
Sy filed a suit for reformation of the lease agreement, damages
and injunction. The court ruled against Sy and in favor of OVEC
who may recover damages.
Both appealed. OVEC on the fact that the injunction bond was not
made liable for all damages awarded by the court. Sy on the ruling
that the remaining deposit still in the possession of OVEC can be
As to Sy, the Court held that there was nothing contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy when there is
a provision which calls for such forfeiture in the agreement.
This provision in the agreement is a penal clause and made for the
purpose of insuring the performance thereof. Art. 1228 of the
NCC does not require proof of actual damages suffered by the
creditor is not necessary for a penalty to be demanded.

Exceptions are: (1) when there is a stipulation to the contrary, (2)

when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the agreed penalty; (3)
when the obligor is guilty of fraud.


CORP. 700 SCRA 134
Petitioner J Plus Asia entered into a Construction Agreement
whereby Martin E Mabunay undertook to build the formers 72room condominium/hotel located in Boracay Island.
The project cost P42M, was to be completed within one year.
Down payment was fully paid.
Payment of the balance of the contract price will be based on
actual work finished
Mabunay also submitted the required Performance Bond in the
amount equivalent to 20% down payment.
Further along the line and near the date set for completion, it was
discovered that only 31.39% complete.
Petitioner terminated the contract and sent Demand letters to
Mabunay. Demands were unheeded. Petitioner filed a Request for
Arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration
CIAC rendered its decision and made Awards in favor of J PLUS.
CIAC ruled that Mabunay had incurred delay which entitled
Petitioner to the stipulated liquidated damages and unrecouped
down payment.
Petitioners claim against the performance Bond included the
liquidated damages provided in the COntruction Agreement, as
o Article 12- Liquidated Damages. Time is of the essence in
this agreement. Should the Contractor fail to complete
the Project within the period stipulated herein or within
the period of extension granted by the OWNER, plus one
week grace period, without any justifiable reason, the
CONTRACTOR hereby agrees The contractor shall pay the OWNER liquidated
damages equivalent to 1/10 of 1% od the
contract amount for each day of delay after any

and all extensions and 1 week grace period until

completed by the contractor.
The contractor, even after paying for the
liquidated damages due to unexecuted works
and/or delays shall not relieve it of the
obligation to complete and finish the
o Liquidated damages payable to the OWNER shall be
automatically deducted from the contractors collectibles
without prior consent and concurrence by the
o To give full force and effect to the foregoing, the
CONTRACTOR hereby, without necessity of any further
act and deed, authorizes the OWNER to deduct any
amount that may be due under XXX and/or to collect
such amounts from the Performance Bond filed by the
CONTACTOR in this Agreement.
A stipulation for liquidated damages is attached to an obligation
in order to ensure performance and has a double function: (1) to
provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the
coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach. The amount agreed upon
answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the
completion of the project. As a precondition to such award,
however, there must be proof of the fact of delay in the
performance of the obligation.
Though there are vague provisions in the agreement of the
performance bond, the rest of the recitals in the bons
unequivocally declare that it secured the full and faithful
performance of Mabunays obligations under the Construction
Agreement with petitioner.
By its nature, a performance of Mabunays obligations under the
Construction Agreement with petitioner. By its nature, a
performance bond guarantees that the contractor will perform
the contract, and usually provides that if the contractor defaults
and fails to complete the contract, the surety can itself complete
the contract or pay damages up to the limit of the bond.
Moreover, the rule is that if the language of the bond is

ambiguous or uncertain, it will be construed most strongly against

a compensated surety and in favor of the obliges or beneficiaries
under the bond, in this case petitioner as the Project Owner, for
whose benefit it was ostensibly executed.

Limjoco and Tan entered into a contract whereby Tan gave

Limjoco earnest money to purchase a piece of property. Limjoco
on the other hand will prepare a deed of sale for the
consummation of the sale.
The contract stated that in case Limjoco fails to execute the deed
of sale within the 60-day period, Limjoco shall return the earnest
money plus another P5,000. If Tan fails to pay, the earnest money
is forfeited.
The sale was not consummated due to Limjoco. Limjoco filed suit
claiming (among other things) that the liquidated damages
assailed in the fifth assignment of error as immoral.
The Court ruled that the provision in the agreement for liquidated
damages is not immoral.
He was under no compulsion to enter into such stipulation. After
entering into such agreement, petitioner cannot thereafter turn
his back on his word and seek relief from the courts that the
penalty is unconscionable or iniquitous.

280. LAMBERT V. FOX 26 PHIL 588

Plaintiff and defendant became the two largest stockholders in
the new corporation called John R. Edgar & co., Inc. A few days
after the incorporation was completed plaintiff and defendant
entered into the following agreement:
o The undersigned mutually and reciprocally agree not to
sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any part of their
present holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co. Inc.,
till after one year from the date hereof
o Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the
other the sum of P1,000 pesos as liquidated damages,

unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer,

or other disposition be obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox, sold his stock in
the said corporation to E. C. McCullough & Co. of manila, a strong
competitor of the said John R. Edgar & co., Inc.
The trial court decided the case in favor of Fox upon the ground
that the intention of the parties as it appeared from the contract
in question was to the effect that the agreement should be good
and continue only until the corporation reached a sound financial
basis, and that that event having occurred some time before the
expiration of the year mentioned in the contract, the purpose for
which the contract was made and had been fulfilled and the
defendant accordingly discharged of his obligation thereunder.
SC: In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the
contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that
it shall last only nine months. Whatever the object was in
specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract
should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that
their purposes would not be subversed in any less time.
The appellee urges that the plaintiff cannot recover for the reason
that he did not prove damages.
In this jurisdiction penalties provided in contracts of this character
are enforced. It is the rule that parties who are competent to
contact may make such agreements within the limitations of the
law and public policy as they desire, and that the courts will
enforce them according to their terms.
The only case recognized by the Civil Code in which the court is
authorized to intervene for the purpose of reducing a penalty
stipulated in the contract is when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly fulfilled and the court can see that the
person demanding the penalty has received the benefit of such. In
such case the court is authorized to reduce the penalty.
In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and
liquidated damages, so far as legal results are concerned.
Defendant was made to pay plaintiff the P1000 with interest.



Tabora bought from the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company

several sets of American Jurisprudence. Tabora made a partial
payment of P300.00 leaving a balance of P1,382.40. The books
were delivered and receipted by Tabora.
In the midnight of the same date, a fire broke our in the locality
and it burnt all the buildings on the block, including the law office
and library of Tabora.
Tabora reported this to the publishing company. They gave him
several volumes of Phil Reports in good will. However, Tabora
failed to pay the monthly installments agreed upon on the
balance of the purchase price notwithstanding the long time that
had elapsed.
Petitioner instituted an action and prayed that defendant pay 25%
of the amount due as liquidated damages.
Defendant, in his answer, pleaded force majeure.
SC: This contention cannot be sustained. While as a rule the loss
of the object of the contract of sale is borne by the owner or in
case of force majeure the one under obligation to deliver the
object is exempt from liability, the application of that rule does
not here obtain because the law on the contract entered into on
the matter argues against it. It is true that in the contract entered
into between the parties the seller agreed that the ownership of
the books shall remain with it until the purchase price shall have
been fully paid, but such stipulation cannot make the seller liable
in case of loss not only because such was agreed merely to secure
the performance by the buyer of his obligation but in the very
contract it was expressly agreed that the loss or damage to the
books after delivery to the buyer shall be borne by the buyer.

INC. 659 SCRA 139







Having breached the contract it entered with petitioner,
respondent ABB is liable for damages pursuant to Articles 1167,
1170, and 2201 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, a repairman who
fails to perform his obligation is liable to pay for the cost of the
execution of the obligation plus damages. Though entitled,

petitioner in this case is not claiming reimbursement for the

repair allegedly done by Newton Contractor, but is instead asking
for damages for the delay caused by respondent ABB.
Under Article 1226 of the Civil Code, the penalty clause takes the
place of indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in
case of non-compliance with the obligation, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary. In this case, since there is no
stipulation to the contrary, the penalty in the amount of P987.25
per day of delay covers all other damages claimed by petitioner.
Article 1226 of the CC further provides that if the obligor refuses
to pay the penalty, such as in the instant case, damages and
interests may still be recovered on top of the penalty. Damages
claimed must be the natural and probable consequences of the
breach, which the parties have forseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. Thus, in
addition to the penalties, petitioner seeks to recover as damages
production loss, labor cost and rental of the crane. The petitioner
however, was not able to prove with reasonable certainty that it
indeed incurred production losses during the relevant period.
The petitioner, however, was not able to prove with reasonable
certainty that it indeed incurred production losses during the
relevant period. It may not be amiss to say that competent proof
and a reasonable degree of certainty are needed to justify a grant
of actual or compensatory damages; speculations, conjectures,
assertions or guesswork are not sufficient.
Besides, consequential damages, such as loss of profits on
account of delay or failure of deliver, may be recovered only if
such damages were reasonably forseen or have been brought
within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a
breach at the time of or prior to contracting. Considering the
nature or the obligation in the instant case, respondent ABB, at
the time it agreed to repair petitioners Kiln Drive Motor, could
not have reasonably foreseen that it would be made liable for
production loss, labor cost and dental of the crane in case it fails
to repair the motor or incurs in delay in delivering the same,
especially since the motor under repair was a spare motor. For
the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to recover
production loss, labor cost and the rental of the crane.

RE: Attys Fees. The petitioner is not entitled to the award of

attys fees. Jurisprudence required that the factual basis for the
award of attys fees must be set forth in the body of the decision
and not in the dispositive portion only. In this case, no explanation
was given by the RTC in awarding attys fees in favor of the
petitioner. In fact, the award of attys fees was mentioned only in
the dispositive portion of the decision.


SCRA 565



ASS. CO. INC. 597 SCRA 450
In the present case, the factors considered by the CA were the
absence of bad faith on the part of Urban and the fact that the
project was 97% complete at the time it was turned over to
Insular. IN addition, we noted that insular is likewise not entirely
blameless considering that it failed to pay Urban P1,144,030.94
representing the balance of unpaid charge orders anf to return
the retention money.
Had insular released the said amount upon demand, the same
could have been used by Urban to comply with its obligations to
purchase the needed construction materials and to expedite the
completion of the project. Under the circumstances, we find that
this omission on the part of Insular justifies a reduction of the
liquidated damages.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom
of the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as they see
fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, and good
custom, public policy or public order. Nevertheless courts may
equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contract where, as in

the instant case, the principal obligation has been partly

performed and where the penalty is iniquitous.
Petitioners Tolomeo Ligutan and Leonidas dela Llana obtained a
loan from respondent Security Bank and Trust Co. Petitioners
executed a promissory note binding themselves, jointly and
severally, with an interest of 15.189% per annum upon maturity
and to pay a penalty of 5% every month on the outstanding
principal and interest in case of default and also a 10% attys fees
if the matter were indorsed to a lawyer for collection.
The obligation matured, the petitioners were not able to settle
the obligation; the bank gave an extension, still yet no payment.
Since the petitioners still defaulted, the former filed a complaint
for recovery of the due amount.
ISSUE: W/N the interest and penalty charge imposed by private
respondent bank on petitioners loan are manifestly exorbitant, iniquitous
and unconscionable?
The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity
without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the
measure of damages caused by the breach. Although a court may
not at liberty ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on such
terms and conditions as they see fir that contravene neither law
nor morals, good customs, public order or public policy, a
stipulated penalty, nevertheless, may be equitably reduced by the
courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable or if the principal
obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with.
The question of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can
be partly subjective and partly objective. Its resolution would
depend on such factors as, but not necessarily confined to, the
type, extent and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the
obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences, the
supervening realities, the standing and relationship of the parties,
and the like, the application of which, by and large, is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.

The CA exercised good judgment in reducing the stipulated

penalty interest from 5% - 3% a month. It was also held that the
15.189% per annum stipulated interest and the 10% attorneys is
reasonable and not excessive. The interest prescribed in loan
financing arrangements is a fundamental part of the banking
business and the core of a banks existence.


CORP.. 474 SCRA 510
Roblett filed a bid in Kuwait to subcontract the supply of skilled
and semi-skilled workers for a refinery project. Roblett filed a bid
bond of 1% of tital proposed tender price or 159,781.05 KD.
Philguarantee issued a counter guarantee.
Roblett was granted the project and was required to issue the
performance bond, but the Central Bank disappeoved.
Kuwait deemed the subcontract breached and the bid bond was
The amount of P18,M is not part of the principal debt but it
represents rather the interest and penalty charges on the
advances made by petitioner to BKME as of the time of filing og
the complaint.
Hence, the appropriate interest rate to be applied thereon is 12%
per annum reckoned from the time of finality of judgment until
fully paid as said amount constituted a judgment award.
INTEREST RATE 12%- penalty and interest- runs from time of
finality of judgment
Interest rate per annum on principal amount- runs from date of
filing of complaint.
Gobonseng applied for a credit card with a monthly credit limit of
10K from Unibancard. He accumulated P179,638.74 he defaulted
in paying. It earned 3% monthly interest exorbitant and 5%
monthly penalty.
Where the contract stipulates the rate of interest and the amount
of penalty to be paid in case of failure to pay the obligation within
a given period, both the penalty and the interest can be collected
by the creditor.

It is only when the parties to a contract have failed to fix the rate
of interest or when such amount is unwarranted that the court
will apply the 12% interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of
The court has to enforce the contractual stipulations in the
manner that they have been agreed upon for as long as they are
not unconscionable or contrary to morals and public policy.


Ybanez obtained a loan secured by Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
from Panco Filipino. The loan was used for the construction of a
commercial building in Cebu City.
The Loan was increased and the REM was amended. Respondents
Ybanez eceduted a Promissory Note for the sum of P1,225,000
payable in 15 years with a stipulated interest of 21% per annum.
And a monthly surcharge of 3%Monthly payments of 22,426 were
to be paid.
Repondents paid from 1983-1988.
From 1989 onwards respondents stopped paying. They aver that
Banco Filipino ceased poerations and was not allowed to continue
business, having been placed under liquidation.
Respondents lawyer wrote to the acting Liquidator of Banco
FIlipono and requested that the plaintiff return the mortgaged
property since it had sufficiently profited form the loan and that
the interest and penalty charges were excessive.
Petitioner bank denied such.
Banco Filipino was closed in 1985 however was re-opened in
1994. Within such period it did not transact any business with its
In 1994, Ybanez was served a Notice of Extra Judicial Sale on their
property. In response to this they filed a suit for Injuction,
Accounting and Damages alleging that there were no legal and
factual basis for foreclosure proceedings since the loan had been
fully paid.
Lower court rendered decision that Banco Filipino should redere a
correc accounting of the oblgations of Ybanez and that interest
must be reduced to 17% instead of 21%

Both parties appealed

ISSUE: is the 21% legal? Is the 3% monthly surcharge valid?


It is an elementary rule of contracts that the contracting parties

are free to stipulate the terms of their contract for as long as the
terms are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy, public order and national interest.
The said stipulation is binding between the parties.
In the loan agreement between the parties in this case, the toal
interest and other charges exceeded the perscirbed 21% ceiling.
Hence the imposition of the 3% monthly sucrcharge, as the penal
clause to the obligation, violated the limit imposed by the Usury
Law. Said surcharge of 3% montly must be declared null and void.


As aptly held by the court a quo, however, respondents cannot be obliged
to pay the interest of the loan on the ground that the supposed agreement
to pay such interest was not reduced to writing. Article 1956 of the Civil
Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing.68 Thus, the collection of interest in loans or forbearance of money
is allowed only when these two conditions concur: (1) there was an
express stipulation for the payment of interest; (2) the agreement for the
payment of the interest was reduced in writing.69 Absent any of these two
conditions, the money debtor cannot be made liable for interest. Thus,
petitioner is entitled only to the principal amount of the loan plus the
allowable legal interest from the time of the demand,70 at the rate of 6%
per annum
Viloria was the manager of Service Center of Philippines. When he
resigned he filed a complaint to collect his share in the profitsharing agreement of the company. The company refused and
instead sought to recover the unliquidated cash advances.
CB Circular No. 416: July 29, 1974

By virtue of the authority granted to it under Sec 1 of

Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the
Usury Law, the monetary Board, in its Resolution No.
1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods,
or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the
absence of express contract as to such rate of interest,
shall be 12% per annum.
The legal rate of interest before July 29, 1974 was only 6% and
only on such date that it was increased to 12% by CB Circular No.

Liam Law loaned 10k without interest to Olympic. Olympic was
granted an extension of 3 months but the loan was increased to
The 6K for attorneys fees and legal interests, and other costs.
Failed to pay. O claims 6k as usurious interest.
6k additional for 10k principal is lawful as it is considered as
liquidated damages.
Usury law is now legally non-existent under the CB Circular No.
905. Interest chargeable now depends upon agreement of lender
and borrower. Ruled of Court as to the allegations of usury being
procedural in nature, considered repealed with retroactive effect.
Usury Law; CB Circular No. 905; suspension of ceilings for interest rates
does not authorize excessive and unconscionable interest rates; effect of
void stipulation of usurious interest.
296. LIM V. DBP 700 SCRA 210


SCRA 139
Kamalig purchased fertilized from Philphos and they were issued a
Sales Official Reciept. Kamalig would resell the fertilizer to
customers and shall issue delivery orders, and shall present it to
Philphos in order for warehouse release.
Philphos claims Kamalig has made overwithdrawals, it demanded
to pay and if they failed to do so they would charge 34% interest
per annum.
34% interest per annum on the principal claim of Philphos was its
unilateral act and no evidence was presented that it was
stipulated by the parties.
Art 1956: no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing.
It only presented demand letters which imposes such. Demand
letters are not sufficient proof of agreement on the 34% interest
per annum.
Padilla asked for a loan of 1.8M with 18% interest per annum. The
contract stipulates that interest will be within limits allowed by
Bank can increase the interest but can also decrease, in
accordance with the maximum interest rate imposed by law or
Monetary Board. In four months, the 18% interest rate raised to
PD 116 Sec 2 provides that Monetary Board: interest rate charges
for loans or renewal thereof shall not be made oftener than once
every twelve months.
In the case at bar, increases in interest is null and void, if
Monetary Board is not authorized to make changes for more than
every 12 months, even less so may a bank which is subordinate to
the Board.
PNB relied on its own Board Resolution but such are neither laws
nor resolutions of the Monetary Board. CB Circular No. 905
removed Usury Law ceiling interest rates but it did not authorize

PNB to unilaterally and successively increase the agreed interest

rates from 18% to 48% in violation of PD 116.
This is a Violation of the mutuality principle of contracts. The
increases in violation of Credit Agreement that its terms may be
amended only by an instrument in writing signed by a party to be
bound as burdened by such amendment.
Padilla never agreed in writing to pay interest increased fixed by
PNB beyond 24% per annum.
Floriendo as president of Reymill Realty Corporation obtained a
loan from Metrobank of P1M secured by a real estate mortgage
over his 4 parcels of land in Pangasinan. Floriendo signed a
promissory note fixing the rate of interest at 15.466% per annum
for the first 30 days, subject to upward/downward adjustment
every 30 days thereafter, and a penalty charge of 18% per annum.
The interest rate reached a high of 30.244% and petitioner was
not able to pay the loan. He filed a complaint for reformation of
the contract.
The court held that the unilateral increases without petitioners
assent is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.
The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed
modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the
agreement. The rate of interest is always a vital component, for it
can more or break a capital venture. Court reformed the contract
insofar as the interest rate beyond 15.44% per annum should not
be imposed by the bank without the consent of petitioner.
Spouses Beluso obtained a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit
Agreement from UCPB secured by a real estate mortgage over
parcels of land owned by the spouses. On the promissory notes,
UCPB charged interests from 18% to 34%. Spouses were unable to
UCBP foreclosed on the mortgaged properties
In the promissory notes, the interest rates will be determined at
the rate indicative of DBD retail rate or as determined by the
branch head
Spouses filed a complaint for accounting, etc.

CA ruled that the interest rate was void. UCPB assails the decision
in that the interest charges, penalty charges, attys fees were
erroneously excluded from the computation of the total amount
due and demandable from spouses Beluso.
The Court held that both choices DBD retail rate or as
determined by the branch head- are dependent solely on the will
of UCPB.
As to UCPBs contention, excess in such demand does not nullify
the demand itself, which is valid with respect to the proper
amount. While the interest was void, the demand made by UCPB
is valid.
The spouses are considered in default with respect to the proper
amount and the interests and penalties.
The court imposed the 12% legal interest, since what it avoided
was merely the stipulated rate of interest and not the stipulation
that the loan shall earn interest.
The court also upheld the stipulation providing compounding
interest, which the parties may stipulate in their contract.

301. BULOS, JR. V. YASUMA 527 SCRA 727

Petitioner, Dr. Lim and Atty. Tabalingcos obtained a loan from
respondent Koji Yasuma, evidenced by a promissory note signed
solely by Dr. Lim.
The note provides for interest rate of 4% for a period of 3 months
until January 10, 1989. In case of failure to pay, the extension will
be considered running under the same terms until fully paid. If the
note will be brought to court for collection, an additional amount
of 10% of the principal amount plus attorneys fees thall be paid.
The note was secured by a REM. Petitioner executed a deed of
assumption wherein he assumed the loan obligation of Dr. Lim.
They failed to pay and Mr. Yasuma eventually sent them demand
letters and subsequently filed a complaint in the RTC for collection
of sum of money.
The RTC ruled that petitioners pay respondent the balance of
their loan plus interest at 21% per annum.
CA affirmed the decision in toto.

SC: ruled that the 21% interest has no legal and factual bases.
Under the promissory not, the loan shall incur in interest at 4%
per month or at 48% per annum.
While the Usury law has been suspended by CBC No. 905, and
parties to an agreement have been given a wide latitude to agree
on any interest, still the stipulated interest rates re illegal if they
are unconscionable.
The court still found the reduction of interest rate to 21% per
annum non proper. The court cidted Eastern Shipping Lines to
determine what interest rate should apply. The legal interest of
12% should apply computed from the date of judicial demand.
Another 12% interest per annum is imposed on petitioners
monetary liability to respondent from the date of finality of the
decision until it is fully paid.


Christina Reyes extended a loan to Svendsen for P200,000 to bear
interest at 10$ a month. After partially paying his obligation, he
failed to pay the balance
A suit was filed and Svendsen paid Cristina with a check which was
dishonored for DAIF. Svendsen was prosecuted for estafa.
Under the judgment he was obligated to pay the amount of
P160,000 as civil indemnity to Cristina Reyes.
Svendsen questions the amount, and states that the interest rate
of 10% a month, not being in writing and unconscionable, should
not have been included in the civil indemnity.
The Court agreed with petitioner Svendsen that while CB Circilar
905 lifted the ceiling on usurious rates, parties are not given carte
blanche liberty to stipulate whatever interest rate they may
The Court imposed a 12% per interest on the P200,000 loan plus
12% interest to be computed from the date of judicial demand.
After the judgment becomes final and executory until the
obligation is satisfied, the total amount due shall bear interest at
12% per annum
The city of Manila wanted to obtain a piece of land to build its
cemetery. The land was owned by the Zobel children.

A purchase price was agreed upon. A contract was drawn which

stated the installments to be paid. The first installment shall draw
no interest, but the latter 5 installments shall draw interest at 5%
per annum, payable to the creditors upon the date when they
shall fall due. However, it was opposed by the auditor of the
Governor General.
The first payment and the succeeding payment were not paid due
to the opposition. The Zobels filed a complaint for fulfillment of
the obligation
The Trial judge did not impose any interest on the first
The Supreme court held that legal interest should be imposed,
since the stipulation that it shall bear no interest was given on the
premise that it was to be paid on the date stipulated.
After default, defendant became liable for interest as damages
regardless of the absence of any stipulation for interest and
regardless of the statement that his installment shall draw no
As to the other installments, the contract allowed the contract
rate of 5% per annum from the date of execution of the final deed
of sale.
Under Art 1109 of the Civil Code, the interest that had accrued up
to the filing of the complaint must be consolidated as of that date
with the capital, after which the whole shall bear interest at the
contract rate of 5% per annum until paid.
The court also cited section 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which is only applicable to debts and claims with respect to which
no stipulation for interest has been made, and Art.1109 of the
Civil Code providing for interest upon interest, which is only
applicable to obligations containing a stipulation for interest.



Donna is claiming P30,000 from Inouye as administrator of the

estate of K.S. Ohta. The promissory note contained a stipulation
that if the obligation became subject to judicial action, a certain
per centum of the principal should be added to cover expenses of

The court held that the interest should run not from the time that
the claim was present in the estate of the deceased but on the
date when judgment was rendered by the lower court.


Crop loan account granted to Soriano. Soriano would deliver
piculs of export sugar as payment but a part of such did not
include the proceeds of the sale. Total indebtedness continued to
charge 7% per annum compounded every six months
Accrued interest draws legal interest from the time that the suit is
filed for its recovery. Where the plaintiff is entitled to the
payment of interest on the various amounts due from the
defendant by way of damages, and said interest did not arise from
an obligation of the defendant to pay the same on a contractual
basis, because the event which gave rise to plaintiffs right to
recover interest was not a conventional obligation, but
defendants default in crediting the plaintiff with the proceeds of
the sale of sugar, interest is not collectible on the accrued
CORP 429 SCRA 30
- First Metro opened a current account with METROBANK of 100M with
And the VP Ong made a deposit upon the request of his friend.
Elizabeth Eusebio- Calderon was charged by her aunt Teresita
Eusebio, Amelia Casanova and cousin Manolito Eusebio with 3
counts of Estafa
According to private complainants, petitioner assured them that
the checks will be honored upon maturity. They gave her the
money because she showed them her pieces of jewelry which
convinced them that she has the ability to pay the loans
In her defesne, petitioner admits that she issued the checks bit
alleges that it was not done to defraud her creditors

After trial, the lower court rendered a joint decision finding

petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but ruled that her
liability for the interest checks was only civil, thereby acquitting
the accused but must pay indemnity

1. did the CA err in finding the appellant civilly liable to complainants with
respect to the interest in the principal loan despite the dismissal of the
interest checks by the RTC?
2. Is the interest agreed upon by the parties usurious?
3. Should the private respondents file a separate civil complaint for the
claim of Sum of Money

The court finds the petition meritorious.

When the petitioner appeald her conviction, the dismissal of the
interest checks by the lower court did not preclude the CA from
reviewing such decision and modifying her civil liability. The
appeal conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and
rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the
judgement appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.
An accused who is acquitted of Estafa may nevertheless be held
civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so
warrant. Petitioner Elizabeth Calderon is clearly liable to the
private respondents for the amount borrowed. The CA found that
the former did not employ trickery or deceit in obtaining money
from the private complainants, instead, it concluded that the
money obtained was undoubtedly loans for which petitioner paid
interest. The checks issued by petitioner as payment for the
principal loan constitute evidence of her civil liability which was
deemed instituted with the criminal action
The civil liability of the petitioner includes only the principal
amount of the loan. With respect to the interest checks she issies,
the same are void. There was no written prrof of payable interest
except for the verbal agreement that the loan shall earn 5%
interest per month.
Interest imposed must be the legal 12%


SCRA 472
310. BARENG V. COURT OF APPEALS 107 PHIL 641; 58 OG 1314
Bareng bought from Algegria a cinematographic equipment for
15K. 10K was paid, and 5K balance was to be paid through 4
promissory Notes.
1 installment of 1K paid. When Bareng was about to pay the
Second, Ruiz claims that he is co-owner of such equipment and
asks Bareng to stop paying.
Algegria demanded for payment but only 400 was paid
Algegria and Ruiz reached a compromise and sued B for the
RTC; pay 3,600 + legal interest
Bareng claims he is not liable for interest since suspension of
payment was justified
SC: Right of suspension of payment ended as soon as the vendor
has caused the disturbance or dancer tor cease, when
compromise between A & R was reached.
Obligation to pay any unpaid balance thereof did not cease to be
liquidated and determined simply because vendor and vendee, in
the suit for collection, disagreed as to its amount.
If vendee is in default in the payment of the price of the thing
sold, under Art 2209 CC, he is liable to pay legal interest from the
date of filing of complaint unless he deposits in Court the amount
due at the start of the action.
CO. 100 PHIL 679



Mercantile Insurance Co. Sought repayment of the amount it had
paid to the insured consignee of damaged shipment.
The court ruled that Eastern Shipping filed this complaint to
address the following
- W/N a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can be
solidary, or joint and several.
-W/N payment of legal interest is to be computed from the time the
complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered;
-W/N the applicable rate of interest it 12% or 6%

12% to be computed from default, i.e. judicial or

extrajudicial demand
When an obligation not constitutuing a loan or forbearance of
money is breached, an interest in the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at 6% per
o If amount of damages is established with reasonable
certainty, interest runs from the time it is judicially or
extrjudicially demanded.
o If amount is not yet certain at the time demand is made,
interest runs only from the date the judgement of the
court is made.
o Actual base for computation of legal interest shall be the
amount finally adjudged.
o When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest becomes 12% per annum from such finality until
satisfaction. The interim period being a forbearance of

After surveying the decisions on interest, the court resolved to establish a

rule of thumb in inposing interest.



- When an obligation, regardless of its source (law, contracts, q-contracts,

etc) is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
- The provisions under the title on Damages of CC will govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.
- An award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest as well as accrual is imposed as follows:
When the obligation is breached and it consists in a sum of money
o If interest is stipulated
The interest due shall be that stipulated in
The interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded.
o If no interest stipulated




Escano, Silos and Ortigas entered into a contract where Escano
and Silos obliged themselves to free Ortigas of his obligation with
The RTC ordered Escano, Silos and one Matti to pay Ortigas the
amount it had paid to PDCP with legal interest of 12% per annum.

Escano filed this complaint claiming that they are not liable for
interest, and if at all the proper interest it 6% not 12%
The court ruled that petitioners are liable for interest at 12% per
annum to be computed from judicial or extrajudicial demend,
because the Undertaking consisted of a payment in a sum of
money. Court affirmed the RTC.



The complaint arose from Haos refusal to vacate the premises,

which was owned by Catungal.
Hao refused to leave on the basis of a right of first refual
agreement that she had with the buildings former owner.
The court a quo ruled that Hao should leave the building and pay
Catungal back rentals with interest.
As to the interest, the Court ruled that the back rentals is
equivalent to a loan or forbearance of money and imposed the
interest rate of 12% per annum from the time of extrajudicial
demand on Sept 27, 1988.




Respondent and petitioner entered into a fire insurance contract
whereby petitioner insured the stocks-in-trade against fire, loss,
damage or liability.
The stocks were burned. Respondent sought to collect
indemnification but petitioner denied.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should pay respondent.
Petitioner filed this petition questioning the decision and
questioning the 12% interest per annum on the face value of the
policy imposed by the court.
The court ruled that petitioner should pay respondent. On the
issue of the interest to be imposed, the Court first explained that
forbearance in the context of the usury law is a contractual
obligation of lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of
time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to pay a loan or debt
when due and payable.
Since the insurance claim is evidently not a forbearance of money,
goods or credit, the interest rate was fixed by the court at 6%

329. CATUNGAL V. HAO 355 SCRA 29

A lease agreement was entered into between petitioner

Manufacturers Building and Philippine Merchant Marine School
(PMMS) on three portions of petitioners building. PMMS failed to
pay their monthly rentals. They entered into a compromise
agreement where PMMS will pay the rentals with 2 % interest
per month.
PMMS still failed to pay, and it offered too pay petitioner the
rentals with interest at 12% per annum or 1% per month.
Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the rentals.
The Trial court ruled that PMMS pay the rentals at 12% per
annum interest.
Manufactirer claims that the 2 % interest per month should be
The court ruled that the 12 % interest should be upheld. Based on
the deed of the second mortgage, the parties agreed to a 12%
interest per annum.
The rate of interest which they had earlier agreed upon was
obliterated or superseded by the new agreement.
Petitioner cannot also compound the interest, because there was
no agreement either in the compromise agreement or deed of
second mortgage which states that the interest will be
Art 1959 of the CC clearly provides that interest due and unpaid
shall not earn interest, unless the contracting parties stipulate to

capitalize the interest due and unpaid, which is added to the

principal, shall earn new interest.




334. PVTA V. TENSUAN 188 SCRA 628



On appeal, CA affirmed but eliminated the exemplary award, and

moral damages was converted into nominal damages.
Northwest appealed questioning, among others, the award for
nominal damages, citing Medina v. Cresencia and Quijano v. PAL
where the Court disallowed moral damages.
The court held that the two cited cases are not in point
In the first case, the nominal damages was deleted, because the
aggrieved party was already awarded compensatory damages.
Here the manner in which he was reudely forced to move with
knowledge that he was an official representative of the
Philippines shows that he ddeserves to be awarded damages.
The award of P20,000 may well be considered as nominal. Since
Northwest had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner, said award may also be considered exemplary.
Nominal damages cannot exist with compensatory damages.

CORP. 368 SCRA 611

342. ELEGIR V. PAL 676 SCRA 463


Nicolas Cuenca sued Northwest Airlines for forcing him to move
from first class to economy class on a connecting flight from
The lower court ruled in his favor and awarded him moral
damages, exemplary damages with legal interest thereon, plus
attorneys fees.

344. MEDINA ET AL. V CRESENCIO ET AL 99 PHIL 506; 52 OG 4606

A passenger jeepney driven by one Brigidio Avorque smashed into
a Meralco post resulting in the death of one of its passengers,
husband of Emerencia M. Vda de Medina. A criminal case was
filed where the driver was found guilty or reckless imprudence.
The heirs reserved the right to file a separate civil action.
They brought suit against the driver, appellant Guillermo
Cresencia the registered owner and one Rosario Avorque the real
owner of the jeepney.
Court ruled that Brigido Avorque and Guillermo Cresencia jointly
and severally pay the heirs compensatory damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, moral damages, attorneys fees
and costs
As to the issue of damages, the Court deleted the award by way of
nominal damages, since nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The purpose of nominal damages is to
vindicate or recognize a right that has been violated, in order to
preclude further contest thereon; and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any lass suffered by him.
Since the court has already awarded compensatory and
exemplary damages that are themselves in recognition that
plaintiffs right was violated, the award of nominal damages is

unnecessary and improper. A P10,000 award cannot, in common

sense, be deemed nominal.
Ssangyong Corporation filed a suit against MCC for the latters
failure to fulfill its side of the contract.
The courts ruled in favor of Ssangyong and ordered MCC to pay
damages. In its 4 assigned error, MCC questions the award of
As to actual damages, the court ruled that these were not duly
proven by the proper documentation and competent proof. It was
The court awarded nominal damages, since petitioner knowingly
breached its contractual obligation and obstinately refused to pay
despite demands from respondent. For such inattention and
sensititity, MCC must be held liable for nominal damages.
Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is
technically violated and must be vindicated against an invation
that has produced no actual present loss of any kind of where
there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or
actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. The
court awarded nominal dmages of P200,000.

347. PAL V. LAO LIM 684 SCRA 224

348. INGAL V. PEOPLE 547 SCRA 632
Ingal was convicted for murder of Domingo
RTC and CA did not award damages


Rosenda Nuqui and her son Sotero Dionisio entered into a
contract with Ildefonso Yap for the sale of some lands which
included the land then occupied by Mindanao Academy.
The conract was subsequently annulled/rescinded. The court also
ruled that Yap should pay Mindanao Academy and its shareholder
nominal and exemplary damages.
Yap questions: Are the shareholders entitled to nominal and
exemplary damages?
The court held that they were not.
Their interest, if there were any, were already represented by the
corporation itself, which was the proper plaintiff.

No cause of action accrued to them separately as individuals

other than that for moral damages due to extreme anguish,
serious anxiety and wounded feelings.
Court eliminated the award for nominal and exemplary damages.
The lower courts ruling out the claim for moral damages to the
corporation also rules out any award for such nominal and
exemplary damages to the stockholders.

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be

awarded 1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim.
2) actual or compensatory damages 3)moral damages
4)exemplary damages and 5)temperate damages
Court awarded mandatory civil indemnity of 50,000. No actual
damages were awarded as hospitalization and funeral expenses
were not supported by receipts.
Temperate damages awarded as it cannot be denied that the
heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss althouth the exact
amount was not proved
Moral damages also awarded because it is mandatory in cases of
murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof other
than the death of the victim.


Armovit, US resident, and his family spent Christmas vacation in
the Philippines. They purchased roundtrip tickets from US to
Manila ffrom Northwest airlines.
On day of departure, they were informed that the plane already
departed despite being on tome for the scheduled flight on their


tickets; there was an erron on the part of the Airline when it

stamped the wrong time on the tickets.
They were made to wait for a day before a flight can be acquired
for them
They filed an action for damages, CA modified lower court
judgement and deleted award of moral damages and nominal
Deletion of nominal damages proper.
Actual and compensatory damages was already awarded- it was
shown that petioners were made to wait for confirmation of next
available flight in a hotel where they incurred expenses of 1,300
for their meals. Since there was certainty as to the pecuniary loss
and violation of right, nominal damages need not be awarded.


Araneta, a merchant of good standing in the Philippines engages
in import and export, maintained an account with Bank of
There were 3 instances when the checks he issied and drawn
against said bank were erroneously dishonored due to account
Araneta filed action for moral, exemplary, temperate, and
compensatory damages
CA deleted award for compensatory and temperate damages
ISSUE: W/N on the basis of finding of the CA there is reason to conclude
that the petitioner did sustain some pecuniary loss although no sufficient
proof of the amount thereof has been adduced?





Centeno, former counsel of Ventanilla, failed to perfect appeal of
latter in a separate case within the reglementary period.
Ventanilla seeks to recover damages.
Not entitled to actual damages as there was no certainty that the
amount of P4,000 he was claiming in the first case will be
adjudged to him. Not entitiled to temperate damages considering
that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has
been awarded nominal damages by the TC, such award precludes
the recovery of temperate or moderate damages.
As regards nominal damages, considering that nominal damages
are not indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or
reconition of a right violated or invaded, the award of 200 is

The financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable

asset, it being a significant part of the foundation of his business.
Any adverse reflection constitutes some material loss to him.
Injury to ones commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business
firm is oftern hard to show with certainty in terms of mony, and
such injury may be recovered wven in the absence of definite
proof of direct pecuniary loss; the wrongful acts of the
respondent which had adversely affected his credit being
sufficient for the puspoes.
Claim for temperate damges is legally justified. But since the Bank
tried to rectify the error soon after it was discovered, although
the rectification came after the damage had been caused, the
award of 5,000 as temperate damages is sufficient


SSS committed an erreor by foreclosing the mortgage contract of
Soccorro C Cruz instead of Soccoro J. Cruz
SSS may be held liable for nominal damages when it refused to
acknowleddge its mistake.
This type of damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying
private respondents for any loss sufferd by them but to vindicate

or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by

petioner SSS


Robes corp. questions the award of nominal damages to
Robes failed to deliver TCT to respondent even after full payment
There was a clause in the contract that within 6 months from the
full payment of the lot, pet. Corp shall be liable for the full
amount with 4% interest per annum on the total amount paid. It
contends that such clause amounts to a penalty clause.
The SC held that the 4% cannot be in the form of a penalty
because respondent even without such stipulation is entitled to
legal interest
The payment of nominal damages Is warranted since the
respondent wasnt able to prove the amount of actual damages.
Art 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Art 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or
in every case where any property right has been invaded.
Under the foregoing provisions, nominal damages are not
intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the
vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are
recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of
which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages
ebeing left to the discretion of the court according to the
circumstances of the case.
SCRA 209


Petitioner contracted the services of PVT respondent to transport

their merchandise. After substantial compliance in one year, PVT
pulled out their trucks therby causing damge to plaintiffs.
Petitioners contend the ruling of the CA when it deleted the
award for temperate damages and moral damages
The SC held that there was no evidence to prove that it should get
an award for temperate damages. Temperate damages are given
when the court is satisfied that there has been a pecuniary loss
but its amount is uncertain.
There can still be award for moral damages because it
surreptitiously pulled out its trucks in the middle of operations
but it was reduced for being excessive.

361. LAZATIN V. TWANO 2 SCRA 842; 112 PHIL 733; 61 OG 2473


Twano filed this present case to recover the balance of the

purchase price of two auto-trucks which were sold by Lazatin to
They filed for a wwrit of attachment on the amount deposited,
but the Sheriff refused to deliver the sum. The lower court
dissolved the writ. The proceedings continued.
In its counterclaim, Twano claims that they are entitled to moral
damages for the wrongful attachment. The trial court rendered
judgment ordering Lazatin to pay, among others, moral damages.
The Court held that jurisprudence shows that to recover damages
for the wrongful issuance and levy of an attachment is identical or
is analogous to the ordinary action for malicious prosecution.
Therefore, for moral damages are to be recovered in connection
with the writ of attachment under consideration, malice is an
essential ingredient thereof. It must be alleged and established
that the writ was maliciously sued out. Moral damages denied.




Petitioner Enervida filed a complaint against spouses dela Torre

(respondents) praying that the deed of sale executed by his

deceased father be declared null and void and he be allowed to

repurchase the land.
The Spouses claim that Enervida had no cause of action against
them, because (1) the father of Enervida is still alive, (2) he is not
the only son of his father, (3) the sale of the property did not take
place within the prohibited period provided in the Public Land
The lower court ruled in favor of Spouses dela Torre. Enervida
questions the judgment including the amount of P2,000 as actual
moral and exemplary damages.
The Court deleted the said award for damages citing its decision
Deogracias Malonzo vs. Gregoria Galang (109 Phil 16). It explained
in that case that while Art. 2208 (on attorneys fees) expressly
mentions that attorneys fees may be recovered when a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceedings filed, there is no mention
of such situation in Art. 2219 (on moral damages).
The Court also did not find that it could fall under analogous
cases. In addition, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary
for moral damages, it is essential that the claimant satisfactorily
prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art. 2217)
and its causal relation to defendants acts.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designated to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Moral damages are not
corrective or exemplary damages.



Juana Soberano was one of the passengers of a bus owned by

MRR which fell into an accident, causing damages to Soberano.
Soberano appealed questioning the lower courts dismissal of the
case and disallowance of the damages they were claiming against
the said company.
The lower court correctly denied the moral damages claimed by
Jose Soberano. In case of physical injuries, moral damages are
recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin,
unless there is statutory provision to the contrary. Since it was
Juana who sustained the bodily injuries, Jose cannot claim for
moral damages.

As to Juana Soberano, the Court ruled that she cannot also claim
moral damages. In a breach of contract of carriage, moral
damages are recoverable only where the defendant acted in
wanton, reckless, oppressive, malevolent conduct or
negligence so gross as to amount to malice. The Court held
that the facts assailed by the Soberanos as amounting to bad faith
did not really prove bad faith. That the accident was due to the
negligence of its driver does not justify inference of bad faith on
the part of the defendant companies.



For failure to pay taxes under Ordinance No. 11 as amended by

Ordinance No. 110, City Treasurer Magno issued a warrant of
distraint and levy against the properties of SMB. S
MB filed a present action against Magno, for Magno to release
the seized trucks and also for moral and exemplary damages. The
court ruled in favor of Magno. In its appeal, SMB questions,
among others, the award for moral and exemplary damages to
The Court deleted the award for moral damages. Moral damages
may be awarded where the pleading alleges and it is proved that
moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like was
experienced by the claimant.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary, it is essential that
the claimant satisfactorily prove the factual basis of the damages
and its causal connection to defendants acts. Moral damages are
in the category of an award, designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the


367. MAMBULAO LUMBER V. PNB 22 SCRA 292; 64 OG 10942

The case began from foreclosure proceedings initiated by PNB on

the properties of Mambulao. As to the chattel mortgage, Mambulao
claims that according to its agreement, the suit should be filed in the
CFI of Manila and not in Camarines Norte. Mambulao raised this
appeal and asserts its claim for moral damages.
The Court held that there is no legal or factual basis for moral
damages. An artificial person, like herein appellant corporation,
cannot experience physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock or social humiliation which
are basis of moral damages. A corporation may have a good
reputation that may be besmirched, but this cannot be applied to the
case at bar. The Court explained that (1) Mambulao had already
ceased operations at the time of the foreclosure sale, and (2) the
effect would have been the same if the suit was filed in Camarines
Norte or in Manila.



AMEC filed a complaint against two broadcasters of FBNI and FBNI

for the statements the broadcasters gave in their radio show. The
courts ruled that the statements were indeed libelous and held
the broadcasters and FBNI liable for damages. FBNI appealed the
As to damages, FBNI claims that AMEC is not entitled to moral
damages, citing the Mambulao case, that a juridical person cannot
experience physical suffering, wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish or moral shock.
The Court held that AMEC is entitled to moral damages under
Sec. 7 of Art. 2219 in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Since the said section does not qualify if the
plaintiff should be a natural or juridical person, a juridical person
such as AMEC may claim moral damages. Also, when a broadcast
is ruled as libelous per se, the law implies damages. Evidence of
an honest mistake or want of character or reputation of the party
goes only in mitigation of such damages. The plaintiff need not

introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to

recover damages in libel per se.


- Purefoods conducted pre-bidding for supply and
installation of 2 generators in its Marikina plant.
- Awarded the contract to Far East Mills Supply
Corporation through a letter to the latters President
- After performance bond and contractors all risk
insurance was complaied with, Purefods unilaterally
cancelled the contract due to significant factors which
it uncovered
- Purefoods awarded the contract to Jardine
- Femsco filed an action for damages against both parties,
specifically for unwarranted interference and inducement
against Jardine.
- RTC dismissed case against Jardine but ruled in favor of
Femsco against Purefoods; CA reversed finding Jardine
liable and orderd both parties to pay moral damages
- W/N Femsco is entitled to moral damages from
Purefoods and Jardine?
- From Purefoods, Yes; Jardine, no
- There was already a perfected contract between
Purefoods and Femsco, contrary to the formers assertion
that there was a counter-offer which was not accepted
by femsco, hence not binding
- Femscos compliance with requirement in the letter by
Purefoods to its President considered as acceptance of
- As to Jardine, it alleged as defense that it had no
knowledge or existing contract between Purefoods and

Femsco, and that Femsco is an artificial person not

entitled to moral damages.
- The Court has awarded in the past moral damages to a
corporation whose reputation has been besmirched
- While it may seem that petiioners Purefoods and JArdine
connived to deceive respondent Femsco, we find no
specific evidence on record to support such perception.


- Meralco disconnected power supply to TECs two
buildings for alleged meter-tampering
- TEC paid the differential billing under protedt but after
another inspection Meralco allegedly discovered the
electric meters were tampered again, TEC paid under
protest again
- TEC filed an action for damages against Meralco and
Ultra, the latter being the lessee in TECs building subject
of meter tampering
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was justified in disconnecting the electric
power supply in TECs buildings
- No. There was no palpably drastic difference between
the energy consumption or respondent during the period
when the meters were allegedly tampered and during
the period when the meters were already fixed.
- Moral damages were deleted, however, as TECs claim
for damages was premised allegedly on the damage to its
goodwill and reputation

As a general rule, a corporation is not entitled to moral

damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or sentiments like wounded
feelings, etc.
The only exception to this rule is when the corporation
has a reputation that is debased, resulting in its
humiliation in the business realm.
But in such a case, it is imperative for the claimant to
present proof to justify the award.
It is essential to prove the existence of the factual basis
of the damage and its causal relation to petitioners acts
In the present case, the records are bereft of any
evidence that the name or reputation of TEC has been
debased as a result of petitioners acts.


- Bernabe filed a case against Ventura for falsification of
private documents; Ventura was acquitted
- Subsequently, she filed an action for damages against
Bernabe for allegedly filing the criminal charge with
malicious intent and without justifiable cause or motice
other than to wreck vengeanece on the plaintiff and her
- Bernabe filed motion to dismiss on grounf that there
must be a finding by the Court in the criminal case which
rendered the decision aquitting Ventura that the offense
charged if false and malicious or orders the prosecution
of the complaining witness
- Trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action
ISSUE: W/N there was malicious prosecution

It is not necessary that ther must be a judicial finding that

the case was filed with malicious intent before an action
predicated on such cause of action can be filed.
All the aggrieved party in the case of malicious
prosecution has to prove is that he ahs been denounced
or charged falsely of an offense by the defendant, and
that the latter knows that the charge was false, that the
said defendandt acted with malice and damages has
been suffered.
In criminal cases, findings of fiscal for probable cause are
not decisive factors in considering w/n there was
malicious prosecution, that finding will ultimately depend
on the attendant circumstances in the case
Even though a fiscal might have proceeded with the
prosecution of the criminal case, malice can still be
shown in prosecuting the case
Appealed decision reversed and remanded to court of

374. RCPI V. VERCHEZ 481 SCRA 384

- Grace Verchez-Infante communicated to her sister
though RCPI that the need for money for their sick
- RCPI only delivered the message 25 days after
- Their mother died
- Verchez filed action for damages against RCPI for a
allegedly violating their contract, alleging further that the
delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early
demise of their mother
- RCPI put up the defense of force majeure due to radio
noise and interference
ISSUE: W/N Verchez is entitled to moral damages?

Yes, there was a breach of contract when RCPI failed to

deliver the message at the earliest possible time
Requisites for award of moral damages are present:
o Evidence of besmirched reputation or physical,
mental or psychological suffering sustained by
o Culpable act or omission factually established
o Prood that the wrongful act or omission of
defendant is proximate cause of damages
sustained by claimant
o The case is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Art 2219 and art 2220
Failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram disturbed the filial
tranquility of the family as the family members blamed
each other for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency
Moral damages may be awarded to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
After RCPIs first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it
did not inform Grace of the non-delivery thereof and
waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again.

375. FORES V. MIRANDA 105 PHIL 266; 57 OG 1939

- Fores was registered owner of a jeep which figured in an
accident resulting to the injury of Miranda
- Court ruled Fores liable as it was proved that she was still
the owner of the vehicle despite alleged alienation of the
same to another person.
ISSUE: w/n Fores shoulde be liable for damages?
- SC sustained findings of lower courts regarding
ownership of the vehicle
- Miranda, however, was not entitled to damages

There was a breach of contract of carriage in this case. In

delicts or quasi-delicts, moral damages may be awarded
when physical injuries result from such acts
In breach of contract, bad faith or fraudulent intent must
be present before moral damages may be awarded
The definintion of quasi-delict in Art 2176 expresssly
excludes the cases where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation btween the parties (exception to this
rule is if the accident resulted to the death of the
But the exceptional rule of Art 1764 makse it all the more
evident that where the injured passenger does not die,
moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved
that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith.
Mere carelessness of the driver does not constitute or
justify an inference of malice or bad faith.

376. LOPEZ V. PAN AMERICAN 16 SCRA 431; 63 OG 5536


Senator Lopez had first class accommodations with

defendant company for Tokyo-San Francisco flight
- When Lopez party arrived in Tokyo, they found our that
they were not booked in the first class seats, and were
constrained to take the tourist class seats instead.
- There was a mistake on part of the defendants agent
when he mistakenly cancelled the reservation of the
wholw party, when he was only supposed to cancel the
reservation of 2 members of the party
- Lopez filed action for damages; defendant puts up
defense of lack of bad faith in breach of contract
ISSUES: w/n Lopez entitled to moral damages w/n cancellatio of
contract was due to bad faith?

- Yes. Defendant cancelled the reservations by mistake,
and deliberately and intentionally withheld the
information from plaintiff the fact of said cancellation,
letting them go on believeing that their first class
reservations stood valid and confirmed -> agents forgot
to mention the cancellation and/or relied on last minute
cancellation of other passengers for reinstatement of the
Lopez party in first class seats
- Defendant willfully and knowingly places itself into the
position of having to breach its contracts
- Bad faith: breach of a known duty though some motive of
interest or ill-will
- At time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, in
breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe their
reservation had not been cancelled
- Moral damages were properly awarded since Lopez was a
former vice president and was Senate President Pro
Tempore at the time of the incident, hence suffered
social humiliation; his wife, who was already sick before
the flight, suffered physical discomfort and suffering;
other party members were also awarded moral damages
378. ORTIGAS V. LUFTHANSA 64 SCRA 610; 71 OG 6383
58 OG 7057


- Petitioners are relatives of passengers of Compania
Maritima for the injury to and death of the victim as a
result of the sinking of M/V Mindoro.
- They filed a complaint for damages against the company
- The court found Maritima negligent for failure to install
an important device such as the radar which could have
enabled the ship to pass though the river and to safety.
- They were found negligent together with the captain of
the ship
- The court denied the claim for moral damages
- Under Art 2219 and 2220 of the NCC, moral damages is
not recoverable in damage action based on a breach of
contract of transportation, except:
o Where the mishap resulted in death of a
passenger and
o Where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of
fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result.
- The exceptions do not apply since Reyes survived the
incident and there was no evidence to show that
Maritima was guilty of bad faith.
- Mere carelessness of the carrier does not per se
constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on
its part.
- Private Respondent Haguisan was employed as a Security

When he left work, he asked MMIC (Former employer) to

issue an employment certificate.
MMIC Admin Officer Guita issued such certificate stating
that he was removed from work because he was
physically unfit to work.
Haguisan filed a complain for damages against Guita on
the allegedly false and derogatory statement regarding
his mental state
The court held that Guita was not liable for moral
damages and found that he in writing the said statement,
he was not mean and malicious.
Since there is nothing in the record that showed Guitas
bad faith, he was not liable for moral damages.
The court understood the statement as only unfit to work
as a security guard.


- Capco entrusted 2 stock certificates to Macasaset for
- When he demanded the return of te said stock
certificates, Macasaet was unable to produce them
- Macasaet gave him instead of his own stock certificate
which had greater value of Capcos original stocks
- Eventually the other stock certificates was returned to
- In its receipt, Capco wrote ALL CLEARED. Nonetheless,
Capco filed a complaint for damages against MAcasaet,
claiming that due to Macasaets delay in producing his
stock certificates, he lost a great amount of money
because he was unable to break a deal.
- The court held the indorsement in the stock certificate
outweighed their argreement of having them in trust for
safekeeping only.

The court also denied the award for moral damages.

Macasaets good faith when he immediately replaced
Capcos stick which covered more than the original
certificate and that Macasaet took steps to recover the
stock certificates.
Considering that in the absence of malice and bad faith
moral damages cannot be awarded.

386. MAGLUTAC V. NLRC 189 SCRA 767

- Maglutac filed a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming
that his alleged dismissal was part of a vendetta drive
against his parent who dared to expose the massive and
fraudulent diversion of company funds to the company
presidents private accounts.
- The court held that the Commart were liable for moral
damages. In addition to reliefs granted under the Labor
code, other forms of damages wuch as those under the
CC may be granted.
- Quoting Primero v. IAC Moal damages would be
recoverable, for example, where the dismissal of the
employee was not only effected without suthorized
cause and/or due process but was attended by bad faith
or fraud and was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
- Commart was held solidarily liable with one Jesus
Maglutac (company president). The Court held this to be
appropriate, especially since Commart became insolvent
during the pendency of the cas.e


SCRA 209

Jose Alejandro filed a complaint for damages against

American Express for his experience in the USA where his
Amex card was confiscated by the sales personnel of the
establishment under the express orders of American
He claims moral damages for the embarrassment that he
The court denied the award for moral damages, because
the cations of Amex showed lack of bad faith.
It was logical to have the card confiscated because it was
only a means for them to guard themselves.
Whaterver humiliation or embarrassment he suffered,
none was maliciously intended by the petitioner.


INC. 587 SCRA 551; 629 SCRA 276
INC. 692 SCRA 544
- Strebel filed a complaint for damages against Fuigueras
for malicious prosecution, unjust vexation, in proposing
to build a drainage though their property, making use of
official influence to begin an action against Strebel.
- The court denied the award for moral damages, Art 2219
states that moral damages may not be recovered in cases
of crime or tort, unless either results or causes physical
injuries. While malicious prosecution is a ground for

moral damages, the court held that since the act

happened before the NCC, it was not applicable to the
case at bar.
OG 6599

warrant the award of moral damages, an inseparable liability to the

punitive portion of the sentence imposed on all convicted rapists.







396. MERCADO V. LIRA 113 PHIL 112; 3 SCRA 124









108 PHIL 414


- A woman was raped by a faith healer. The faith healer led the woman to
believe that having a sexual intercourse with him is a part of a ritual that
would bring back the husband of the woman. When the woman refused,
she was later given something to drink that made her unconscious. She
was later abused by the faith healer.
- The award of moral damages in this case is justifiable. As a victim of rape,
complainanat undeniably felt mental anguish and distress. And having to
face public trial that would expose the lurid details of her unhappy
experience that too had the effect of besmirching her reputation to





121 SCRA 865



petitioner was a jeweler. respondents posed as millionaire buyers.

However, they did not pay for the jewels, rather they pawned
them to different pawnshops. Plaintiff claims for moral damages.
CA denied because she was not able to plead the same during her
the SC granted the award for moral damages. It is enough that it
was made mention in the pleading. It was enough that she
stated during her testimony how the defendant abused her good


- plaintiffs sexually assaulted the defendant. Defendant filed for moral
damages. Palintiffs countered that it was excessive.
- while it is true that social dignity does not depend upon the wealth or
poverty of the person, the amount necessary to repair the damage thereto
depends on her own social and financial means as well as the financial
standing of the offender.
-The SC reduced the amount because both of them were financially


Medroso was convicted of homicide through reckless

imprudence, which happened after he bumped his BHP dump
truck causing the death of another. He was driving without a
The Court granted moral damages, since it is recoverable when
the offense results in physical injuries and as in this case, death.
Exemplary damages was also awarded and was jusitified by the
fact that he was driving the dump truck in a negligent and careless
manner of which he hit a pedestrian.
Exemplary damages are corrective in nature and are imposed by
way of example or correction for the public use. (Art. 2229)
The Court in imposing exemplary damages aimed to deter others
from taking into their hands a motor vehicle without being
qualified to operate it on the highways thereby converting the
vehicle into an instrument of death.



409. TAN KAPOC V. MESA 134 SCRA 231


Masa filed a complaint against Tan Kapoe for malicious

prosecution for six criminal cases it had filed against Masa.
The Court held that the filing of unfounded successive complaints
prove that Tan Kapoe was liable for moral damages. Not a single
on prospered. Masa was humiliated due to these actions.
The award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate
amount may not be the usual way of awarding said damages.
However, there can be no question that the entitlement to moral
damages have been established, exemplary damages may be
awarded. And the latter may be awarded even if it is not
expressly asked in the complaint nor proved.

410. MUNSAYAC V. DE LARA 23 SCRA 1086; 65 OG 9684


Plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages for the injuries he suffered

when he was riding as a passenger on a jeepney owned and
operated by defendant. The court awarded exemplary damages
because the defendant failed to placate the suffering of plaintiff.
Defendant questions the award for damages.

The Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages

are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good. In contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if
the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive
or malevolent manner. (Art. 2232)
The Court held that Munsayac (defendant, appellant) cannot be
liable for said damages, because it was not proved that he had
previously authorized or knowingly ratified the recklessness of
his driver. Art. 2232 cannot cover acts subsequent to the breach
such as failure to placate the suffering of plaintiff.

Martinez filed a case for damages against the owner and driver of
the taxi cab she was riding for injuries sustained by her when it
bumped another taxi cab. She appealed questioning the failure of
the lower courts to award moral and exemplary damages under
analogous cases under Art. 2219.
The Court held that a breach of contract cannot be considered
included in analogous cases, because the definition of quasidelict in 2176 expressly excludes pre-existing contractual relation.
The Fores case provides for exceptions: where the mishap results
in the death of a passenger or where it is proved that the carrier
was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result.
Since appellant did not allege fraud, malice or bad faith, nor any
allegation of wanton or gross negligence, no moral damages are
awardable. Exemplary damages are also not recoverable, since
he must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages

412. OCTOT V. YBANEZ 111 SCRA 79


Octot filed a complaint for illegal dismissal as Security Guard of

the Regional Health Office of Cebu of which Ybanez is the director.
Despite Ybanezs efforts to reinstate Octot under government
orders, Octot instead filed a complaint for backwages and

The Court ruled that Ybanez was in good faith in dismissing

Octot since he was merely following government directives. LOI
No. 647 which ordered reinstatement also emphasized that there
was no backwages to be awarded to reinstated employees.
Moral damages is denied beause the delay in reinstatement was
due to Octots own fault and negligence for having delayed and
ignored the process.
Exemplary damages are not generally recoverable in special civil
action for mandamus unless defendant patently acted with
vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise of honest
Jurisprudence sets conditions when exemplary damages may be
o By way of example or correction only in addition , among
others to compensatory damages and cannot be
recovered as a matter of right
o The claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages
o The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, as
when the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

felony is also liable, and Art. 2219 of the Civil Code which states
that the moral damages may be recovered in criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries, libel, slander and other form of
defamation. The Court still reduced the award of damages for her
having acted under passion and obfuscation.

416. ROTEA V. HALILI 109 PHIL 495


On August 17, 1952, a bus owned by Respondent Halili crashed

and Jose Rotea was injured in the accident. The driver Angel
Bascon was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. Bascon was found guilty and ordered him to pay
liquidated damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Because Bascon was insolvent, the liability fell upon the employer,
the Respondent Halili. Rotea made demands, but Halili ignored
him so he was forced to file a case against him paying for
P13,513.00 as liquidated and exemplary damages, as well as
P2,000.00 as attys fees.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rotea and ordered Halili to pay:
o P3,513.00 liquidated damages
o P500 attorneys fees
The trila court did not allow the collection of exemplary damages.
ISSUE: W?N the Employer is subsidiarily liable for exemplary damages
that were adjudged against his employee.



415. MATURA V. LAYA 92 SCRA 268)


Petitioner Matura was found guilty of grave oral defamation and

slight physical injuries. She questions the conviction and also the
award for moral and exemplary damages. She claims that since
there is no aggravating circumstance, no exemplary damages may
be awarded (2230).
The Court held that moral damages is justified under Art. 100 of
the RPC which provides that every person criminally liable for a

NO. The trial court was justified in not requiring appellee to pay
exemplary damages there being no evidence whatever that he
had any participation in the wrongful act committed by his
employee. The rule is that exemplary damages are imposed
primarily upon the wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of
similar acts in the future.
Such punitive damages cannot ba applied to his master or
employer except only to the extent ot his participation or
ratification of the tact because they are penal in character.
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, exemplary damages may only be
imposed when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.

417. TANKEH V. DBP 709 SCRA 19


The litigation was commenced in the CFI of Manila by respondent

Oscar Laz, the husbanf of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner
Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Lazos cause of action was the third anf last abortion of his wife to
the said doctor.
The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married.
She had another abortion, and less than 2 years later, she again
became pregnant and had another abortion when the husband
was campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the doctor to pay
ISSUE : W/N the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus
Fixing a minimum award of P3,000 for the death of a person, does
not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. It is easy to
see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on accounr of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a couse of action did accrie on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmissiokn to anyone can take the place from one that lacked
juridical personality.
As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: the court ruled that
evidently because the appellees indifference to the previous
abotions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clealy indicated
that he eas unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affection.
He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
caused thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learing of the third abortion, the appellee

does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and

criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to
have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large payment.


DOCTRINE: On the matter of attorneys fees, it is an accepted
doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the
exception rather than the rule, and counsels fees are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit.
The power of the court to award attorneys fees under article
2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the
text of the decision, and not onlu in the decretal portion thereof,
the legal reason for the award of the attorneys fees.
420. ABOBON V. ABOBON 678 SCRA 399
- To be recoverable, moral damages must be capable of
proof and must be actually proved with a reasonably
degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswoerk in determining the
fact and amount of damages. Yet, nothing was adduced
here to justify the grant of moral damages. What we
have was only the allegation on moral damages, with the
comlaint stating that the respondents had been forced to
litigage, and that they had suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety and wounded feelings from the
petitioners refusal to resoter the possession of the land
in question to them. The allegation did not suffice, for
allegation was not proof of the facts alleged.

The court cannot also affirm the exemplary damages

granted in favor of the respondents. Exemplary damages
were proper only if the respondents, as the plaintiffs,
show their entitlement to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages. Yet, they did not establish their
entitlement to such other damages.
As to attorneys fees, the general rule is that such fees
cannot be recovered by a successful litigant as part of the
damages to be assessed against the losing party because
of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate.
Indeed, prior to the effectivity of the present CC, such
fees could be recovered only when there was a
stipulation to that effect. It was only under the present
CC that the right to collect attorneys fees in the cases
mentioned in Article 2208 of the Civil Code came to be
reocognized. Such fees are now included in the concept
of actual damages.
Even so, whenever attorneys fees are proper in a case,
the decision rendered therein should still expressly state
the factual basis and legal justification for granting them.
Granting them in the dispositve potion of the judgment is
not enough. A discussion of the factual basis and legal
justification for them must be laid out in the body of the
decision. Considering that the award of attys fees on
favor of the respondents fell short of this requirement,
the court disallows the award for want of factual and
legal premises in the body of the decisiokn.
The requirement for express findings of fact and law has
been set in order to bring the case within the exception
and justify the award of the attorneys fees.

Otherwise, the award is a conclusion without a premise,

its basis being improperly left to speculation and


From the very opening sentence of Art. 2208, it is clearly
intended to retain the award of attorney's fees as the
exception in our law, as the general rule remains that
attorney's fees are not recoverable in the absence of a
stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound
policy to self a premium on the right to litigate. In the
case at bar, the Court is faced with the question of
whether or not the award of attorney's fees made by the
respondent judge in favor of respondent Mendoza falls
under the exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208,
considering the established fact of the absence of any
stipulation regarding attorney's fees.
In view of the declared policy of law that awards of
attorney's fees remain the exception rather than the
general rule, it must be stressed once again that it is
necessary for the court to make express findings of facts
and law that would bring the case within the exception
and justify the grant of such award. The matter of
attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the
dispositive portion of the decision. The text itself must
expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being
awarded. 6 The Court, after reading through the text of
the appealed decision, finds the same bereft of any
findings of fact and law to justify the award of attorney's
fees. The matter of such fees was touched but once and
appears only in the dispositive portion of the decision.
Simply put, the text of the decision did not state the

reason why attorney's fees are being awarded, and for

this reason, the Court finds it necessary to disallow the
same for being conjectural.
658 SCRA 741
- Although attorneys fees are not allowed in the absence
of stipulation, the court can award the same when the
defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
incur expenses to protect his interest or where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing
to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just, and
demandable claim.
- Still, the award of attorneys fees to the winning party
lies within the discretion of the court, taking into account
the circumstances of each case. This means that such an
award should have factual, legal, and equitable basis, not
founded on pure speculation and conjecture. Further, the
court should state the reason for the award of attorneys
fees in the body of the decision. Its unheralded
appearance in the dispositive portion is, as a rule, not
- Here, however, although the RTC did not specifically
discuss in the body of its decision its basis for awarding
attorneys fees, its findings of fact clearly support such an
award. For instance, the RTC found, based on the record,
that Bongar persistently and clearly violated the terms of
its contract with Alcatel. It failed to finish the works by
October 29, 1991, the stipulated date. It sought on
December 1, 1991, more than a month after it was in
violation, to finish its job by May 31, 1992, an extra seven
months for just a three-month project. Worse, when
Alcatel had to take over the job to save its own

undertaking to PLDT, Bongar refused to return to Alcatel

the uninstalled materials that it provided for the
works.3 Alcatel was forced to litigate to protect its
423. PIROVANO V. DE LA RAMA S/S 96 PHIL 335; 51 OG (NO.2)
NLRC 269 SCRA 733






















675 SCRA 400
435. MARTINEZ V. BARREDO 81 PHIL 1; 45 OG 4922

A Taxicab owned by Fausto Barredo driven by one Rosendo

Digman collided in a thoroughfare with a car driven by Ma. Luisa
Martinez. Martinez filed an information against Digman. Digman
was convicted, sentenced to pay a fine of P605.97 with subsidiary
improsionment in case of insolvency and to pay indemnity to
Martinez. Digman failed to pay indemnity, so Martinez filed a
complaint against Barredo as Digmans employee to hold BAreddo
subsidiarily liable under Art 102 and 103 of the RPC.
W/N a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay an
indemnity is conclusive in an action against his employer for the
enforcement of the latters subsidiary liability under articles 102
and 103 of the RPC.
The court held in the affirmative. A finding of guilt in a criminal
case based on proof beyond reasonable dount should not be
nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance
of evidence.

Epstein commenced the civil action against Sembrano (the driver)

and appellant MD Transit.
Sembranfo was declared in default. MD Transit alleges that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection of its employees
ISSUE: W/N the liability sought to be enforced arose from a crime, as
contended by Epstein, or from a quasi-delict, as urged by appellant.
The Court rules it was a crime. The allegations in his complaint
was clear that MD Transit is subsidiarily liablie for all damages
caused by the negligence of its employee in the performance of
his duties. And prayed that Sembrano be ordered, and upon his
inability, appellant herein, to pay the damages claimed in said
Sembrano is primarily liable, while appellants liability is
secondary, which is typical civil liability pursuant to articles 102
and 103 of the RPC. As to his defense, of diligence as an employer,
the defense of MD transit is immaterial, since this liability arose
from the crime.
The judgement of convition in a criminal case is not only
asmissible in evidence in the civil case against the employer, but
also conclusive upon his subsidiary liability arising from the
employees criminal liability.

438. CEREZO V. TUAZON 426 SCRA 167





David Epstein, herein plaintiff, was hit by a Pasay-bound Bus of

MD Transit causing serious physical injuries. He filed a criminal
case against the driver.
The court convicted the driver but refrained from making
pronouncement on his civil liability since Epstein reserved his right
to file a separate civil action for damages.

A Country Bus Lines passenger bus bumped into a tricycle driven

by Tuazon. Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against the
owners, Spouses Cerezo and bus driver Danilo Foronda.
Mrs. Cerezo questions the validity of the jurisdiction of the TC
over her person and as to her liability.
According to her, since the TC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda, she cannot be held liable.
Tuaxon also failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages
The court held that Mrs. Cerezos claims are bereft of merit.
Tuazons present action is based on a quasi delict under the CC
and not delict under RPC.
Tuazon alleged in his complaint, that Mrs. Cerezo without
exerceision due care and diligence in the supervision and

management of her employees buses hired Foronda as her

To differeniate, in quasi-delict, the employers liability is primary
and direct.



Accused Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and to pay damages. Accused
jumped bail and remains at large.
Employer PRBL filed an appeal.
It claims that the judgement has not yet become final and
executory because it had timely filed its notice of appeal.
W/N employers notice of appeal stayed the finality of the
The Court held that it cannot.
Since an appeal of a conviction reopens the case and puts the
convicted party into a position where the penalty imposed can be
changes into a higher penalty, only the convicted party can
interpose such appeal. SIince he had jumped bail and is at large,
he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal
As to employers liability in the finding of guilt, the Court ruled
that since according to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 civil action for recover of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives, reserves the right to institute or separately institutes the
civil actionprior to the criminal action.
Here, the employers liability is subsidiary.
The TC need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liabily of the
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however,
evidence must be presented establishing that (1) the are indeed
employers of the convicted, (3) that they are engages in some
kind of industry, (3) that the crime was comiitted by the
employees in the discharge of their duties, and (4) that the
execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to


(Same facts as others, employer claims he is not liable)
The defese that the employment of the diligence to be a
good father of a family will exempt the parties
secondarily liable from the damages based on the
subsidiary liability of employers in the RPC.

Aizons employee was convicted of reckless driving which caused

injury to its passengers.
Since the driver was found insolvent, a Subsidiary Writ of
Execution was served against employer felipe Aizon.
Aizon claims that for him to be liable, the complainant must first
institute a separate civil action, and in case of insolvency, the
driver must suffer subsidiary imprisonment.
The court held that pursuant to Art. 103, an employer may be
subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in a criminal
action when (1) the employer is engages in any kind of industry,
(2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties, (3) employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil
Citing Miranda v. Malate Garage, the decision convicting the
employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to civil liability but also with regard to its amount
because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but
follows that of his employee.



Baza Marketing had an employment contract with Bolinao

Security wherein the former will supply security guards to Baza.
Among the security guards assigned was Jose Silvestre. Jose
Silvestre was convicted of robbing Baza of office equipments.
Finding Silvestre insolvent, Baza claims that Bolinao is subsidiarily

The court held that Bolinao cannot be held liable. One of the
conditions for an employer to be subsidiarily liable is that the
employee must have committed the crime within the discharge of
his duties.
Since Silvestre went beyond his duty as a security guard in robbing
the place, Bolinao cannot be held subsidiaily liable.



The subsidiary character of the employers liability merely imports

that his property is not to be seized without exhausting first the
property of the servant.
In a complaint agains the employer to enforce his subsidiary civil
liability, it is not necessary to allege that the employee is



447. DE LOS SANTOS V. TAN KHEY (CA) 58 OG 7693

The order of the court for the restitution of the stolen car to the
offended party when the criminal case have already been decided
resulting in the conviction of the accused is correct.
Such restitution shall be made even if it be found in the hands of a
buyer in good faith without prejudice to the latters right to claim
against the person liabile to him.
The only exception is when the thing has been acquired by a third
person in a manner which bars action for recovery.



449. US V. BAGGAY 20 PHIL 142

456. PEOPLE V. BAYOT 670 SCRA 285

450. TELERIA V. GARCIA (CA) 40 OG 115




446. JOAQUIN V. ANICETO 12 SCRA 308; 63 OG 10838



452. MIRANDA V. MALATE GARAGE 99 PHIL 670; 52 OG 5145

The issue tendered by the defendant refers to the amount of

damages the defendant is made subsidiarily liable by the RPC
which already appears in the decision rendered against its
employee in the criminal case.
The decision is binding and conclusive not only to the liability but
also to the amount.
An employers liability cannot be separated from his employee
that is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary.


A boy died as he was run over by a taxi.
The court granted the right to institute the civil action
Parents brought suit against the operator. Operator
denied saying that his liabily is governed by the RPC
making his liability subsidiary but no civil action has been
filed against the driver.
The court held that the civil action, the employer being
primarily and directly responsible in damages under Art
1902 and 1903 in the CC.

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