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FACTS:
- Defendant Railroad Co. operates a line through the district of Daraga. As
one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks were
emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive and a fire was
communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs alleged that Railroad Co. was conspicuously negligent in relation
to the origin of the fire for failing to exercise proper supervision over the
employees in charge of the locomotive, for allowing the locomotive to be
operated without having the smokestack protected by some device for
arresting sparks and for using Bataan coal, a fuel known to produce sparks
in great quantity. As a defense Railroad Co. alleged that the house of
plaintiff Rodrigueza stands partly on Railroads property, and because they
asked him to get the house off company land, alleged that Rodrigueza is
guilty of contributory negligence.
ISSUE:
- W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of Rodrigueza
HELD:
- YES. The defense of contributory negligence is unavailing as the
obligation of Manila Railroad stems from a breach of contract, not a quasiobligation.
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
contractual. Extra-contractual obligations have their source in the breach
or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of
certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept
of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of
society.
- The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to
mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to
indemnify the injured party.
HELD:
- NO. There is no proof the plaintiff unlawfully intruded on the railroads
property. He was there at the sufferance of the company and as long as his
house remained in the exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk
of loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by defendants
locomotive if operated and managed with ordinary care. He cannot be held
to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the
unlawful negligent acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate
and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. He has the
right to assume the other will use the care of the ordinarily prudent man.
- The fact that Rodriguezas house was on company land cannot be
imputed to him as contributory negligence. Firstly, the condition was not
created by
himself (his house was there before Railroad acquired the land). Secondly,
the house remained on the ground by toleration of the company. Thirdly,
even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not
justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
16. CUSTODIO v. CA
FACTS:
In this case, the court choose not to rely on the assertions of the
petitioner spouses that there was profuse bleeding, not only because the
statements were self-serving, but also because the petitioner spouses
were inconsistent in their testimonies. Dr. Fredelicto testified earlier, he
personally saw the bleeding, but later on said that he did not see it and
relied only on Teresita's statement that she was bleeding. He went on to
state that he scheduled the D&C operation without conducting any
physical examination on the patient. These acts of petitioners are indicia of
breach
of
their
duties
as
physicians.
19. CULION ICE, FISH v. PHIL. MOTORS (Engine change. Phil Motos had no
experience with ships. Boat set on fire)
FACTS:
January, 1925: Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on
the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil
burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of running
the boat
He made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors,
and was told by Mc Kellar that he might make inquiries of the
Philippine Motors Corporations
Cranston repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation
and had a conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to do
the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon
completion of the work.
The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in
business as an automobile agency, but, under its charter, it had
authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well
as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment therof.
sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occurred, as
the court found, was P10,000.
ISSUE: W/N the incident was due to the negligence of Phil. Motors as
experts.
HELD:
YES. It results that the judgment appealed from,
awarding damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P9,850, with interest,
must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any
disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding
of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent
mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken
precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the
fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds
himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he
attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he
was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.
Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats = negligence.
The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense,
but whether Quest was free from blame
accident is chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the
changes which Quest undertook to accomplish; and even supposing
that our theory as to the exact manner in which the accident occurred
might appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the origin of the
fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it was casus
fortuitus.
20. ABAYA v. FAVIS (Tonsilectomy operation. No negligence. Presumption
of care)
FACTS:
- Plaintiffs are the spouses Abaya who filed an action for damages against
Dr. Mariano Favis, alleging negligence in ministering to her for
tonsillectomy.
- The child of the spouses was brought to Dr. Favis for treatment from
supposed chronic follicular tonsillitis. Dr. Favis then gave instructions to
have her swabbed with colargol solution and to take calcium lactate three
times daily previous to the operation. The operation was done in Dr.
Favisclinic.
- After the operation, the patient had vomited blood several times. Hence,
Dr. Favis was called upon to check on the child. Dr. Favis stopped the blood
clot and packed the wound after giving the patient synkavit and other
coagulants.
- However, the patients vomiting of blood still continued, hence, she was
brought to the Ilocos Sur Provincial Hospital where blood transfusion was
administered.
- However, the patient still died as the process of transfusion was
proceeding.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint for damages. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
- W/N Dr. Favis is liable for the death of plaintiffsdaughter.
HELD:
- No. Even though the operation was done in the clinic of Dr. Favis and not
in the Ilocos Sur Provincial Hospital, the parents consented to it and the
evidence disclose that Dr. Favis had all the attention and care in
conducting the operation in his clinic.
- Where, as in the instant case, the qualifications of a physician are
admitted, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes
the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill
in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.
- There must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well
as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of the
patient. In the performance of Dr. Favis professional duties, there is no
fixed rule for a physician to follow. If he has the necessary qualifications,
he needs only such degree of skill and ordinary learning as this and that
circumstance may require, using the care and diligence as the best of his
- TC found for the plaintiffs. On appeal to the CA, defendants raised several
issues which the court consolidated into one.
ISSUE:
- W/N the defendants-appellants (hospital) were guilty of negligence and
mismanagement of the case of Linda Ramusan resulting to her death.
HELD:
- YES. While it is true that tetanus could have been introduced inside
Linda's body through other means beside the surgical wounds it cannot be
denied that six days before she died, she underwent a ceasarian with
appendectomy operation in the the defendant-appellant's private hospital
performed by Dr. Pedrajas. The CA agreed with the lower court's findings
that tetanus was introduced inside the body of Linda while still in the
responsibility and care of defendant-appellants.
- Firstly, there was a surgical wound which is conclusively considered a
mode of entry of tetanus. Second, six days after her operation, symptoms
were felt by Linda which is consistent with the incubation period of
tetanus. Thirdly, Linda's condition, despite medical attendance, never
improved. Fourthly, she
succumbed to death a day after. Finally, Linda's death certificate which
was issued by Dr. Pedrajas stated the immediate causes of death cerebral
anoxia and respiratory failure which are usually of death for tetanus
victims occurring within the first week.
- The facts of the case left the court with no doubt but to conclude that
tetanus was introduced inside Linda's body which proved to be fatal due to
the negligence of defendant-appellants in the management of her case.
Where the proximate cause of death of a patient is the operation handled
negligently by the hospital and physician, because tetanus germs entered
the patient's body while still in the responsibility of the hospital and
physician, compensatory damages were awarded.
22. MENDOZA v. CASUMPANG (FULL CASE dahil maiksi lang naman. Gauze
left in body after operation.
FACTS
Josephine Casumpang, substituted by her respondent husband Adriano
and their children Jennifer Adriane and John Andre, filed an action for
The discovery of the gauze and the illness she went through prompted
Josephine to file a damage suit against Dr. Mendoza before the RTC of
Iloilo City. Because Josephine died before trial could end, her husband and
their children substituted her in the case. She was a housewife and 40
years old when she died.
On March 7, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Dr. Mendoza guilty
of neglect that caused Josephines illness and eventual death and ordering
her to pay plaintiffs heirs actual damages of P50,000.00, moral damages of
P200,000.00, and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus costs of suit.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself and
dismissed the complaint in an order dated June 23, 2005.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision on March 18,
[1]
2011, reinstating the RTCs original decision. The CA held that Dr.
Mendoza committed a breach of her duty as a physician when a gauze
remained in her patients body after surgery. The CA denied her motion
for reconsideration on July 18, 2011, prompting her to file the present
petition.
Petitioner claims that no gauze or surgical material was left in Josephines
body after her surgery as evidenced by the surgical sponge count in the
hospital
record.
But she raises at this Courts level a question of fact when parties may raise
only questions of law before it in petitions for review on certiorari from the
CA. With few exceptions, the factual findings of the latter court are
[2]
generally binding. None of those exceptions applies to this case.
As the RTC pointed out, Josephine did not undergo any other surgical
operation. And it would be much unlikely for her or for any woman to
inject a roll of gauze into her cervix. As the Court held inProfessional
Services,
Inc.
v.Agana:
An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not
complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the
leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the
incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating
surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due
care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of
authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.
The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded
exemplary damages against Dr. Mendoza when, under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be awarded in cases of gross negligence.
A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He
must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and materials
used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up have been
correctly done. To provide an example to the medical profession and to
stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to a patients health, the
award of exemplary damages in this case is in order.
Further, in view of Josephines death resulting from petitioners
negligence, civil indemnity under Article 2206 of the Civil Code should be
given to respondents as heirs. The amount of P50,000.00 is fixed by
prevailing jurisprudence for this kind.
The Court also deems it just and equitable under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code to increase the award of attorneys fees from P20,000.00 to
P50,000.00.cralaw
- YES. The first item, the lost professional income by reason of the injury
for three months is proper. However, the second item, which is the
opportunity of being a district health officer in Occidental Negros was
speculative. It is evident that the damages are too speculative in nature.
The last element of damages, were the medical expenses. A person who is
entitled to recover expenses for cure as an item of damage in a civil action
for physical injuries cannot recover doctors bills for services gratuitously
rendered and the claim must furthermore be limited to medical expenses
reasonably suited to the case. Charges of professional experts retained
merely with a view to promote the success of the action for damages
should not be allowed.
24. CARLOS v. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (storm. Electric current causing death.
Meralco NOT liable but CITY ELECTRICIAN responsible)
FACTS:
- Manila Electrics street railway track on Calle Gagalangin was on the east
side of the street and its trolley wire was uncovered and carried a current
of high voltage. Above Manila Electrics wires were the insulated wires of a
telephone company. Trees towered above the wires.
- Manila was visited by a typhoon of extraordinary violence. One of the
trees was broken or uprooted and its fall broke one of the telephone
companys wires. The free end of the wire was carried by the wind across
the trolley wire of Manila Electric and striking the wet ground, established
a circuit and became charged with dangerous current.
- A child struck the live telephone wire and was killed. Alfonso Sobrevilla, a
policeman on duty, who went to the assistance was himself killed.
- Manila Electric shut off the current immediately upon receipt of order
from city electrician.
ISSUE:
- W/N Manila Electric was negligent in:
o Failing to guard its wires so a falling telephone wire would not come in
contact with them
o Not cutting off its current upon its own initiative on account of the
danger from the unusual severity of the storm which had been raging for
some time prior to the order of the city electrician
HELD:
- No. Art. 1105: No person shall be liable for events which could not
foreseen, or which having been foreseen were inevitable, with the
exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or hose in which the
obligation so declares.
- In this case, it was Manila Electrics privilege and duty to supply electric
current to the city and keep its cars running as long as possible. The people
depended on this service.
- Although the law implies a duty of using a very high degree of care in the
construction, operation and maintenance of its appliances, and that the
degree of skill and diligence should be commensurate with the danger
involve, the only precautionary measure Manila Electric could have taken
was the stringing of guard wires over the trolley wires so as to prevent the
telephone wires, suspended above, from falling on those uninsulated and
highly charged wires. However, practical experience has proved that guard
wires are not effective, because themselves liable to be blown down or
disarranged by storms.
- The city electrician was given the power to inspect all wires and other
apparatus. City authorities have real supervision and control over Manila
Electrics railway and light system.
25. PICART v. SMITH (pony case. Last clear chance. Both negligent)
FACTS:
- Picart was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge at San Fernando, La
Union.
- Before Picart had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile. Smith blew his horn to warn his
approach.
- Picart, perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or rapidity of Smiths
approach, pulled the pony up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going left.
- Appearing that Picart was not observing road rules, Smith gave two more
successive blasts. Smith guided toward his left, which is the proper side of
the road, assuming that Picart would move to the other side.
- At this stage, the pony had not yet exhibited fright.
- Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
lower court's decision and held that the bank was negligent. Hence this
appeal. Petitioner contends that it was merely doing its obligation under
the law and contract in encashing the checks, since the signatures in the
checks are genuine.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and
thus should pay damages to PRC
Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last clear chance
to prevent the fraudulent encashment hence it is the one foremost liable .
1. There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but
the presence of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted
the bank to exercise caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that
banks are in the business impressed with public interest that they are duty
bound to protect their clients and their deposits at all times. They must
treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest
degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The
diligence required of banks are more than that of a good father of a family.
2. The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously negligent
and highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. Its
own negligence must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability.
Moreover, the person who stole the checks is also an employee of the
plaintiff, a clerk in its accounting department at that. As the employer, PRC
supposedly should have control and supervision over its own employees.
3. The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of
damages while PRC should shoulder 40% of the said amount.
28. CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION v. TANJANGCO
Torts and Damages:*
(ELEMENTS/REQUISITES)
In every tort case filed under Article 2176, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence:(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;(2) the fault
or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he
must respond; and(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence and the damages incurred.*
(DEFINITION)
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly
donefrom a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates asituation involvi
ng an unreasonable risk to another because of theexpectable action of the
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from
which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar
circumstances,
would
foreseesuch an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to d
o theact or to do it in a more careful manner.*
(TEST)
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated
as follows: Did
the
defendant
in committing the
allegednegligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinar
y person would have used in the same situation?
Facts:Tanjangcos owned joined lots in Corinthian Gardens. Spouse Cuasos, on the other
hand, own a lot adjacent to the formers. Before the Cuasos constructed their
house, it was surveyed by De Dios Realty(surveyor) as per recommendation of
the petitioner association. Later on, the petitioner approved the plans
made by CB Paras Construction (builder).Corinthian conducted periodic
ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved
plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian (MRRC).
Unfortunately, after construction, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached upon the
Tanjangcos lot.
Issue:
Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and,
if so,whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
Decision: Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is tainted with
negligence.
Ratio: Petitioner is found negligent under the TEST. The MRRC provides that no new
constructions can be started without the approval of the petitioner
association. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, inth
e approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections
of on
going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuringcompliance
with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of
perimeterwalls.Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cua
sos perimeterwall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted
reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.
o The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the
landmark case of Picart v. Smith. Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation?. If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
- Negligence was attributable to Jarco Marketing.
o Employees testified that they had been for a while informing the store
that the said structure, not being nailed down was unstable, and because
the top of which was heavy could have collapsed at anytime. And while
said employees had informed the store, no concrete action to remedy the
situation nor ensure the safety of the stores employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done.
o The testimony of the child after the operation that she had done nothing
and did not come near the counter when it fell on her. Formed part of RES
GESTAE.
o RES GESTAE statements made by a person while startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gastae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.
30. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. NATIVIDAD
FACTS:
- Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a token.
- While he was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
- A fight ensued, and Navidad fell on the tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,operated by Rodolfo
Roman was coming in.
- Navidad was struck by the mving train and he was killed instantaneously.
to avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the
train, it did not instantly come to a complete stop until the jeepney was
dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision.
TC
ruled in favor of the respondents. PNR, Estranas and Saga was ordered to
jointly and severally pay approximately P2.1M CA-reduced the amount
ISSUE:
WON the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
petitioners?
HELD:
YES. Petitioners
failure
to install adequate
safety devices at the
railroad
crossing which
proximately caused the collision .
Petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into
consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward
incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to
prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an
approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the Stop,
Look and Listen signage installed in the area was poorly maintained,
hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger.
A
reliable
signaling device in
good condition,
not
just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage, is needed to
give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to
use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to
do so would be an indication of negligence.
There was NO contributory negligence on the pa
rt of the respondents.
CONTRIBUTORYNEGLIGENCE is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.
It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of
the person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury.
Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their
injury
when
they
were
not
even
aware of the forthcoming danger. Itwas established du
r i n g t h e t r i a l t h a t t h e j e e p n e y c a r r y i n g t h e respondents was
following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to five meters
ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo,
the driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the
impression that it was safe to proceed. Likewise, there was no crossing
bar to prevent them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to
forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus, relying on his
faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to
anticipate the impending danger. The maintenance of safety equipment
and warning signals at railroad crossings is equally important as their
installation since poorly maintained safety warning devices court as much
danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of safety
warning signals at railroad crossing carries with it the
presumption that they are in good working condition
a n d t h a t t h e p u b l i c m a y d e p e n d o n t h e m f o r assistance. If
they happen to be neglected and inoperative, the public may be misled
into relying on the impression of safety they normally convey
and eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.
32. LILIUS v. MANILA RAILROAD 59 Phil 758 (pagsanjan not obvious that
there was a railroad. Hit by train)
FACTS:
- Lilius (journalist, author and photorapher), his wife and daughter left
Manila for Pagsanjan for a sight-seeing trip, in their Studebaker car driven
by Lilius.
- It was the first time that Lilius drove from Calauan to Pagsanjan via
Dayap. He was never acquainted with the conditions of the road at said
points and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at
Dayap. Before reaching the crossing, there was nothing to indicate its
existence as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along the road. It
was impossible to see an approaching train.
- As several people who seemed to alight from a parked truck walked on
the opposite side of the road, he slowed down and sounded his horn for
the people to get out of the way. With his attention occupied, he did not
see the crossing but heard two short whistles.
- Immediately, the locomotive struck the car right in the center, dragging it
about 10 meters, throwing it upon a siding. Lilius wife and daughter were
thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground unconscious and
seriously hurt.
- There had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing.
Nobody was there to warn the public of approaching trains. The flagman
arrived after the collision. He had many times absented himself from his
post. The train left Bay station a little late and therefore traveled at great
speed.
ISSUE:
- Who are liable?
HELD:
- Manila Railroad alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own
negligence (not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing
at Dayap, to serve as a warning) and that of his employees, for not having
employed the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of
the said employees in the discharge of their duties.
- Although the company employed the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting its employees, it did not employ such diligence in
supervising their work and discharge of duties. It would have had a sign at
crossing, flagman at his post.
- The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order
to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of
subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.
- The employees: (1) flagman and switchman for not having remained at
his post at the crossing to warn passers-by, (2) stationmaster for failing to
send the flagman and switchman to his post on time, (3) engineer for not
having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident in view of the
absence of the flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and
continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the
crossing.
- Lilius took all precautions. He was driving at a speed which prudence
demanded, blowing his horn upon seeing persons. The only warning which
he received of the impending danger was two short blows immediately
preceding the collision.
33. WRIGHT V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 28 Phil 122 (Calesa. Slipped. A little
intoxicated. NO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE)
FACTS:
- Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street
railway in Manila and its suburbs, including Caloocan.
- Wrights residence in Caloocan fronts a street along which Manila
Electrics tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street, he is
obliged to cross
the tracks. The rails were above-ground, some 5 or 6 inches or more above
the level of the street.
- One night, Wright drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to
enter the premises, the horse stumbled and fell causing the vehicle to
strike one of the rails. This threw Wright from the vehicle and caused
injuries.
- Manila Electric was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but it is contended
that Wright was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent
at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself
properly and that such was the primary cause of the accident.
- The trial court rendered both parties negligent but awarded Wright
P1,000 because his negligence was not as great as Manila Electrics.
- Both parties appealed. Wright contends that damages were insufficient,
while Manila Electric contends that Wright would have crossed the track
safely as he had done a hundred times before if he had been sober.
ISSUE:
- W/N the negligence of Wright contributed to the principal occurrence
(he cannot recover), or only to his own injury (entitled to damages).
HELD:
- NO. Note:
o If the negligence was the primary cause of the accident, he cannot
recover.
o If the negligence had nothing to do with the accident but contributed to
his injury, then the trial court war correct in apportioning the damages.
35. U.S. V. TANEDO 15 Phil 196 (hunting wild chickens. Accidentally shot
the deceased. ACQUITTED. Evidence not enough to support conviction.
When defense is that act was accidental it falls on the state to prove that it
was not.)
FACTS:
- Taedo , with the intention of hunting wild chickens in the forest asked
the deceased where a good place would be to hunt. The deceased pointed
in the direction of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack where
he lived. Taedo spotted a wild chicken and shot it. After he shot the
chicken he heard a human cry, so he picked up the chicken and went near
the place where he
heard the noise. He saw the deceased was wounded so Taedo went back
to where his labourers were fixing the dam and asked for the help of one
of his trusted friends. They hid the body of the deceased among the cogon
grass and later that night they moved it to the well.
- The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the
deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he
confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
- CFI found the accused guilty of homicide. Taedo appealed.
ISSUE:
- W/N Taedo should be acquitted
HELD:
- YES. The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.
- It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in
the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without
intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
- In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of
the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the
commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the
defendant are his concealment and denial.
- Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not
required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the
State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the
jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the
prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the
State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct
the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was
properly held to be erroneous.
36. U.S. V. TAYONGTONG 21 Phil 476 (Painter of telephone poles hit by
automobile. ACQUITTED. Not enough evidence to prove beyond
reasonable doubt. Faulty testimonies of witness)
FACTS:
37. BARCELO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 29 Phil 351 (Lights for altar. Fire.
Acquitted. Evidence not sufficient.)
FACTS:
- Plaintiff and her sisterhood contracted Manila Electric for the installation
of four small electric lights in the arch or roof of the niche of the altar for
the better illumination of the scene beneath.
- Although not entirely finished, the workman assured the sister in charge
that it was safe to use them.
- The lights were tried at that time, were used the night of the 24th and
again on the afternoon of the 27th, a total of about 2 to 2.5 hours.
- Shortly after using the lights on the 27th a fire broke out in or near the
chapel which destroyed the building and contents.
ISSUE:
- W/N the electric company was negligent in installing the electric lights to
warrant recovery of damages.
HELD:
- NO. The burden of proof always rests on one who seeks to recover
damages on the ground of the alleged negligence of another. Before
judgment for damages can be entered in such cases, the fact of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.
- We do not doubt that cases may arise wherein an inference of negligence
in the workmanship or in materials used may be predicated on proof of a
fire breaking out at or near a recent electrical installation under
circumstances which preclude the reasonable possibility that it its origin in
any other way. But such an inference could only be maintained on clear
and satisfactory proof that no reasonable ground exists for believing that
the fire might have originated from some other cause in which there is
HELD:
- NO. They were negligent. Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence
in this case lies in the tellers' disregard of the validation procedures in
place and BPI's utter failure to supervise its employees. Notably, BPI's
managers admitted in several correspondences with LMC that the deposit
transactions were cancelled without LMC's knowledge and consent and
based only upon the request of Alice Laurel and her husband.
- It is well to reiterate that the degree of diligence required of banks is
more than that of a reasonable man or a good father of a family. In view of
the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are
duty-bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of
care.[
- BPI cannot escape liability because of LMC's failure to scrutinize the
monthly statements sent to it by the bank. This omission does not change
the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of BPI's
tellers in failing to require the surrender of the machine-validated deposit
slips before reversing the deposit transactions, the loss would not have
occurred. BPI's negligence is undoubtedly the proximate cause of the loss.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
- LMC should have been vigilant in examining its own financial records;
hence the CA correctly reduced the amount awarded (contributory
negligence). Since the actual damages were not appealed the CA should
not have increased it.
40. PENULLAR V. PNB 120 SCRA 171 (ownership over a parcel of land
disputed. Plaintiffs failed to oppose the registration within the
reglementary period. NEGLIGENT)
FACTS:
- Genoveva Miguel filed a case against Praxedes Moya et al, predecessors
of the plaintiff Penullar for declaration of ownership of three parcels of
land. While pending, an action for application for registration was filed by
Genoveva, which Praxedes opposed.
- While both actions were pending, Praxedes was able to obtain a free
patent over the property and an original certificate of title was issued.
Another original certificate of title was issued to Josefa SIson also one of
the plaintiffs predecessors.
- Trial Judge suspended the hearing for both the cases in order for
Genoveva to investigate the original certificates of title.
- Genoveva failed to take any steps for the prosecution of her action in the
Civil case, it was therefore dismissed.
- However, she prosecuted the registration case, and the Registration
Court promulgated a decision on her favor. Since she already died, it was
her successors in interest who filed for a writ of possession which was
granted.
- A few months after, herein plaintiff Christina Penullar filed an action for
the annulment of registration against the heirs of Genoveva as well as the
encumbrance by way of mortgage constituted by heirs to PNB.
- PNB submitted by special defense that it was an innocent mortgagee for
value having granted the loans to the heirs of Genoveva.
- RTC ruled in favor of Penullar and annulled the titles issued in favor of
Genovevas heirs.
- CA modified the appeal to the effect that the mortgages in favor of PNB
are declared valid.
ISSUES:
- W/N the mortgage was VALID.
- W/N it was the negligence of the petitioners predecessors which caused
the problem.
HELD:
- Yes. A mortgage can be considered valid even if it comes from a void
certificate of title.
- Yes. Where one of two innocent parties must have to suffer due to the
act of a third person, he whose negligence had caused the damage should
be made to bear the loss.
- The predecessors Praxedes and Josefa failed to appeal the decision in the
registration case. Instead, they let the decision in the registration case gain
the status of finality; allowed without prior protest, the certificate of title
to be issued; did not even as early as possible, annotate an adverse claim
on the "titles; and they filed this case only several months afterwards, it
41. CANLAS V. COURT OF APPEALS 326 SCRA 415 (Manosca the scammer.
Able to get titles from Canlas. With IMPOSTOR Canlas spouses obtained
loan from bank. Last clear chance applicable here. Bank did not ask for ID.
Negligent)
FACTS:
- Osmundo Canlas and Vicente Manosca decided to be partners in a
business venture and to raise the capital.
- Canlas agreed to sell to Manosca his parcels of land at lower price, the
difference would be his investment in the business.
- Canlas delivered to Manosca the transfer certificates of title of the
parcels of land, the latter also gave postdated checks to Canlas, but the
later check was not sufficiently funded.
- Manosca was able to secure a loan from Asian Savings Bank worth P500,
000 with the use of the parcels of land as his security. He was accompanied
by imposters who claimed to be the Canlas Spouses. The loan was not
paid, therefore, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and eventually sold it at
an auction sale.
- Canlas instituted an action to annul the deed of real estate mortgage.
- RTC ruled in favor of Canlas ordering the REM and the auction sale to be
void and without effect.
- CA reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
- W/N the CA erred in holding that Asian Savings Bank exercised due
diligence in granting the loan application of Manosca.
HELD:
- NO. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good
father of a family; in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the
necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled
property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, holding in
trust the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the bank should
guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith, by reason of which the
bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law,
accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.
- It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was
exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity.
- Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applicable here, the
respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of
last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently,
the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude
recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
- Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Maosca
the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the owner's
copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land, it cannot
be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by
the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for
banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them.
- For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions,
whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings
Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.
42. GAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 165 SCRA 378 (two parked vehicles. Hit
old man crossing the road. The EMERGENCY RULE. Asking too much from a
mere mortal. No opportunity for rational thinking)
FACTS:
- The accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay
Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay
Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one
side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from
each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place where
the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
43. PEOPLE V. SANTOS (CA) 44 OG 1289 (Conductor was driving. Hit jeep.
Driver not driving because stomach ache or in the testimony of conductor
he was drunk. Whatever was the reason was of little consequence. Did not
exercise enough diligence in overtaking a 6x6 truck. Emergency rule does
NOT apply here)
FACTS:
- Defendants are Angel Santos, driver of the passenger truck, and Antonio
Teves, the conductor thereof.
- While the conductor, Teves was driving the passenger truck, he made an
attempt to overtake the 6x6 truck in front of them.
- In doing so, it collided with a jeepney coming from the opposite lane.
- Several passengers were thrown out and one of them Juan Flavin died.
- Angel Santos, explained that he wasn't the one driving because he had a
stomach ailment.
- Antonio Teves stated that he drove the truck because Santos was drunk.
ISSUE:
- W/N defendants are guilty of Negligince.
- Whatever the reason for Teves being the one driving the truck, the
matter is really of little consequence.
- Teves was allowed by Santos to continue driving, therefore, the former
became the latter's agent thereby becoming liable for his acts.
- Teves' negligence cannot be doubted, he tried to overtake a 6x6 truck,
therefore was bound to exercise the care and skill in doing so.
- Santos says that he is exempt from liability because of the doctrine of the
"Emergency Rule." Having come to the conclusion that he and Teves were
guilty of negligience. said rule cannot be applied. An automobile driver, it
has been said, cannot put himself in a position where in order to save
himself, he must injure someone else.
44. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION CO.V. IAC 148 SCRA 353 (petitioner took 2
shots of liqueur, He was driving. Headlights failed. Phoenix dump truck.
Parked askew. Truck driver NEGLIGENT. Cause and condition. Contributory
negligence)
FACTS:
- Dionisio was driving home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss. He had two shots of liquor.
- As he was crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding
down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation)
suddenly failed.
- He saw a dump truck owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
Phoenix Construction Inc.
- The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such
a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic.
- Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to
the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a
result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including
some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
- RTC ruled in favor of Dionisio, CA affirmed but lowered the amount of
certain damages.
HELD:
ISSUE:
- W/N the truck driver was negligent for parking the dump truck in such
manner?
HELD:
- YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
- The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was
merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United
States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have
any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United
States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely
discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
- Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the
active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that
cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be
liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing
the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are
the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act
may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as
the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created,
the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction
is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
- W/N Koh was negligent, thereby causing the collision resulting in the
death and physical injuries of the respective plaintiffs
HELD:
- NO, Koh was not negligent.
- Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
- Under the Emergency Rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought upon by his own negligence.
- Koh adopted the best means possible to avoid hitting the two boys. In
applying the Emergency Rule, he was not guilty of negligence.
- Even if he were negligent, his negligence was not the proximate cause of
the collision. There was a sufficient intervening event: the negligent act of
the truck driver which was the actual cause of the tragedy. It was the truck
drivers subsequent negligence in failing to take proper measures and
degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate
result of the resulting accident.
- The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable here. The contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party.
46. ORIX METRO LEASING & FINANCEGROUP V. MANGALINAO (multivehicular accident on NLEX. Minor children suing. Allege negligence in
selection of of Orix of employing truck drivers. Court did not rule on facts
but rules that Orix is liable because of vicarious liability on the negligent
driving of its employees)
FACTS:
This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the
death of all the passengers in one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spouses and a sibling of
the
surviving
orphaned
minor
heirs. An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the minor c
ildren of the Mangalinao spouses through their legal guardian against the registered
owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks that collided with their
parents Nissan Pathfinder.
The children imputed recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on the truck
drivers for the deaths of theirs ister and parents; while they hold Sonny and Orix
equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their respective drivers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are jointly and severally liable.
HELD:
The finding of negligence of petitioners as found by the lower courts is binding.
Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues. Settled is the rule that
this Court is not a trier of facts, and the concurrence of the findings of fact
of the courts below are conclusive. "Apetition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should include only questions of law - questions of fact are not
reviewable" save for several exceptions, two of which petitioners invoke, i.e., that the
finding is grounded on speculations, surmises, and conjectures, and that the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso Truck is liable to the heirs of the
victims of the mishap. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner
to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the
Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for
the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused.I t has
already been explained: Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by
proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for
him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility
and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He
has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles
Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him
would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape
liability by disproving his ownership.
Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner
of the amount that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury
caused to the plaintiff, which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party
complaint
against
the
owner
of
the
Fuso,
Manuel. While
the net income of the Mangalinao spouses had not been
sufficiently established, the Court recognizes the fact that the Mangalinao
heirs had suffered loss deserving of compensation. What the CA awarded
is in actuality a form of temperate damages. Such form of damages under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code is given in the absence of competent proof on the actual
damages suffered. "In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established
but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured partys
actual income."
In this case, Roberto Mangalinao, the breadwinner of the family, was a
businessman engaged in buying and selling palay and agricultural supplies
that required high capital in its operations and was only 37 at the time of his
death. Moreover, the Pathfinder which the Mangalinaos own, became a total wreck.
Under the circumstances, we find the award of P500,000.00 as temperate
damages as reasonable. Moral damages, it must be stressed, are not
intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he/she had undergone due to the other partys culpable action
and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
While the children did not testify before the court, undoubtedly, they
suffered the pain and ordeal of losing both their parents and sibling and hence, the
award of moral damages is justified.
However, the amount must be reduced to P500,000.00.
"In quasi -delicts
, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence." It is given by way of example or correction for the public
good. Before the court mayc onsider such award, the plaintiff must show
his entitlement first to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages,
which the respondents have. In the case at bench, the reckless driving of
the two trucks involved caused the death of the victims. However, we shall reduce the
amount of exemplary damages to P200,000.00.Lastly, because exemplary
damages are awarded and that we find it equitable that expenses of litigation
should be recovered, we find it sufficient and reasonable enough to grant attorneys
fees of P50,000.00.
47. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. V. CA (Cimarron v. Panel Truck. Panel
truck negligent. Cimarron though negligent in some aspects was not main
source of collision)
FACTS:
- The employees of PMCI and their family and friends were traveling along
Aguinaldo Highway on their way back from Laguna to Manila. They were
riding a Cimarron driven by Rolando Hernandez.
- Meanwhile, the Mercedes Benz panel truck of Sanitary Steam Laundry
was traveling on the opposite side of the road, from Manila to Laguna.
- The driver of the panel truck, Hernan Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney
in front of him suddenly stopped and he stepped on the brakes to avoid
hitting the jeepney. This caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and
encroach on a portion of the opposite lane.
- The panel truck then collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.
Rolando Hernandez and two other passengers aboard the Cimarron died,
and several other passengers were injured.
ISSUE:
- W/N the alleged negligence of the driver of the Cimarron contributed to
the collision between the vehicles
HELD:
- No, the negligence of the driver of the Cimarron did not contribute to the
collision between the vehicles.
- The driver was negligent because: (1) Cimarron was overloaded; (2) front
seat of Cimarron was occupied by 4 adults; and (3) Cimarron had one
headlight on. (These are violative of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code)
- Notwithstanding the alleged negligence, it was not shown how these
contributed to the collision. The violation of the statute, his negligence,
was not shown to be the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto.
- The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the truck
driver who was running the vehicle at very high speed and his tailgating
the jeepney ahead of it.
HELD:
- NO, the owner and driver of the minibus are not liable for damages.
- The proximate legal cause of the injuries suffered by Lugue was the
collision of the KC-20 and tanker truck. It was the reckless imprudence of
the driver of the KC-20 that set the other events in motion which
eventually led to the passengers of the KC-20 sustaining physical injuries.
- Driver of the minibus was not reckless. He signaled to overtake the KC-20
because the way was clear. Despite his best effort to do everything to
avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had
moved to a position blocking the way of the minibus.
FACTS:
- A KC-20 passenger bus was being driven on the right lane of the highway
facing Mariveles.
- A minibus was following said KC-20, occupying the left portion of the road
facing the same direction.
- Just as the minibus was overtaking the KC-20 from the left, a tanker trunk
coming from the right shoulder of the highway then bumped the KC-20.
- The KC-20 was thrown to the left side of the road, blocking the path of
the minibus. The minibus then bumped the KC-20 as both vehicles were on
the left lane of highway facing Mariveles.
- The KC-20 then spun and bumped a service truck which was parked on
the left side of the highway facing Mariveles.
- Finally, the KC-20 fell crumpled on the left concrete lane of the road
facing Balanga.
- Instant case was filed by Edison Lugue, a passenger of the KC-20 who
suffered injuries as a result of the collision.
- TC held all the drivers and owners of the three vehicles liable to Lugue.
Owners and drivers of the tanker truck and the minibus filed an appeal, but
only the owner and driver of the tanker truck was absolved from liability.
- Even if the driver of the minibus had a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it.
49. GABETO v. ARANETA (falling off horse case. The action was too remote
from the actual injury therefore it cannot be considered the proximate
cause)
FACTS:
- The action was instituted by Consolacion Gabeto for the purpose of
recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of
Proceso Gayetano
- Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay.
When the driver turned his horse, defendant Agaton Araneta stepped into
the street, seized the horse's bridle and caused the bit to slip from the
horse's mouth. The driver stepped down to fix the bit and the horse was
pulled over to the curb. The horse moved forward, hit a police telephone
box on a nearby post, became frightened and ran away. Ilano had alighted,
but Gayetano was still seated. After the horse ran away, Gayetano jumped
or fell from the rig and in doing so received injuries from which he soon
died.
ISSUE:
- W/N Araneta's actions were the proximate cause of the injury.
ISSUE:
- W/N the owner and driver of minibus are liable for damages
HELD:
street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering
the latter's length of 6 feet.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
51. VDA. DE BATACLAN v. MEDINA (tires burst. Turtled. 3 passengers left in
bus, diver and conductor did nothing but walk back and forth. Lighted
torches which set fire to bus. Bus company liable because the bus driver
and conductor did not warn of gasoline)
FACTS:
- Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No. 30 left the town
of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City. The bus was driven by its
regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers,
including the driver and conductor.
- At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning. while the bus was in Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to wobble until it
fell into a ditch on the right side of the road. The bus turned turtle. Some
of the passengers managed to leave the bus, others had to be helped or
pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver and the
woman behind them could not get out. Some of the passengers who had
escaped heard groans and moans from inside the bus, as well as shouts for
help as they were trapped. The bus driver and the conductor walked back
and forth and made no attempt at rescue.
- After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch, to aid the trapped passengers. Ironically, it was the lighted torch
that set the bus on fire, killing the remaining survivors.
- That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers inside
the bus were removed and duly identified. The widow of Juan Bataclan,
one of the casualties, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
ISSUE:
- W/N the bus company is liable.
HELD:
- YES. It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins
down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, and if through
some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on
fire, and the passenger dies, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the subsequent fire. In the present case and under
the circumstances obtaining in the same, the proximate cause of the death
of Batacln was the overturning of the bus, because when the vehicle
turned turtle, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural
or unexpected. When the men came to help with a lighted torch in
response to the call for help made not only by the passengers but also by
the driver and the conductor themselves, and considering that it was very
dark, and the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some
of its passengers and the call for outside help.
- The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of
the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to witnesses,
the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus. The spilt gasoline was smelt and detected from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.
52. DELGADO VDA. DE GREGORIO v. GO CHONG BING (Romera only had
student license directed to drive truck. Then Orfanel, policeman took the
wheel. Fact that Romera just a student driver was NOT proximate cause)
FACTS:
- Go Chong Bing (defendant) was the owner of a truck. He ordered Romera
to drive it and follow another truck driven by his other driver to help the
latter in crossing Sumlog River.
- Romera was at that time not a licensed driver. He only has a students
license.
- Some persons boarded the truck including policeman Orfanel. While it
was on the way, Ofanel took the wheel from Roman.
- While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, another truck was trying to
park on the left side of the road. Orfanel lowered its speed as suggested by
Romera. Orfanel tried to avoid collision by swerving to the right but it so
happened that two pedestrians were there.
- Romera shouted brake but Orfanel accidentally stepped on the gas
pedal instead hence running over Quirico Gregorio.
ISSUE:
- W/N Go Chong Bing is liable for damages.
HELD:
- No. As to the circumstances that Romera voluntarily given the wheel to
Orfanel, such was not proven by the evidence. What was proven was that
Romera warned Orfanel that he was unauthorized to give anybody the
wheel according to his masters instructions and that Romera gave the
wheel to Orfanel either out of fear or out of respect for the uniformed
officer.
- As to the allegation of negligence of defendant for letting Romera drive
the truck despite the absence of a drivers license, the court has held that
such negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. The
proximate cause was the negligence of Orfanel to which he was already
made to suffer the consequences.
53. UMALI v. BACANI (storm. Banana plant cut electric wire. Employee of
electric plant informed. But moments after 3 year old boy electrocuted.
Umali the owner of electric plant is liable. Should have cut off lines.
Parents negligence NOT proximate cause.)
FACTS:
- The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting
hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of
passers-by who were unfortunate enough to fall into it.
56. BAYASEN v. CA (Jeep went over precipice and passengers thrown out.
Unreasonable speed not proven. Skidding may have occurred without
fault. Unforeseen event.
FACTS:
- Dr. Bayasen went to a barrio to visit a patient. Two nurses rode with him
in a jeep for their use: Elena and Dolores. Elena was sitting between Dr.
Bayasen and Dolores.
- On the way, the jeep went over a precipice. The three were thrown out of
the jeep, causing the death of Elena.
ISSUE:
W/N Dr. Bayasen was negligent for driving at an unreasonable speed
HELD:
- NO. The proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear
wheels of the jeep and not the unreasonable speed of Dr. Bayasen because
there is no evidence on record to prove that he was driving at an
unreasonable speed.
- It is well known physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery
roads, as in this case, without fault on account of the manner of handling
the car.
- Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under
circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without
fault. Dr. Bayasen could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being
an unforeseen event.
- Dolores testified that Dr. Bayasen was driving his jeep moderately and
that the road was moist or wet. Further, the jeep was found at second
gear.
57. RAMOS v. C.O.L REALTY CORP (Driving along Katipunan avenue. Hit
another car which was trying to dive through barricade. Both negligent and
Ramos vicariously liable)
FACTS:
On or about 10:40 in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan
Avenue, QC, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan
owned by COL Realty Corp and driven by Aquilino Larin, and a Ford
Expedition owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo.
A passenger of the Sedan, one Estrela Maliwat sustained injuries, she was
immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment. COL realty averred that
its driver, Aquilino was slowly driving the Toyotal Altis at a speed of 510Km/h along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane
of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) For Expedition violently rammed
against the cars right rear door and fender. Upon investigation, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of QC found probable cuse to indict Rodel, the driver
of the Ford Expedition for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses
incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estrella.
COL Realty filed a complained for damages based on quasi-delict before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila. Ramos denied liability
insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino (COL Realtys) driver, which
was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos asserted that the sedan
car crossed Karipuanan Avenue from Rajah Matanda St. despite the
concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the
intersection.
ISSUE: W/N Ramos is solidarily liable for the negligence of Rodel Ilustrisimo
HELD: YES. What is clear to us is that Aquilinio recklessly ignored the
barricades and drove through it. Without doubt, his negligence is
established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. However it also
declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodels contributory negligence in
driving the Ford Expedition at a high speed along a busy intersection. We
cannot exculpate Rodel from liability. Thus having settled the contributory
negligence of Rodel this created a presumption of negligence on the part
of Ramos.
For the employer to avoid the solidariy liability for a tort committed by his
employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his
employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a
family. Ramos diver was texting with his cellphone while running at a high
speed and that the latter did not slow down alebit he knew Katipunan
Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded
with barriers. As the employer of Rodel, Ramos is solidarily liable for the
quasi-delict committed by the former.
This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code: Unless there is proof
to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realtys)
negligence which resulted in the vehicular mishap
58. SABIDO v. CUSTODIO (hanging on to the left side of bus. Hit by truck.
BOTH liable. Fact that Agripino allowed to hang on bus. BUT truck had last
clear chance.)
FACTS:
- Agripino Custodio was hanging on to the left side of the LTB bus when he
was sideswiped by a truck on the other side of the road and killed.
ISSUE:
- W/N the operator of the bus or the truck is liable for the death.
HELD:
- Both are solidarily liable
- The fact that Agripino was allowed to hang on to the left side of the bus,
makes Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages. For both the
driver and conductor were negligent, they should have never allowed
Agripino Custodio to hang on to the side of the truck.
- The truck which hit him was equally negligent. Witnessed testified that
the truck was running fast and on the middle of the road while negotiating
a sharp curve. Had the truck been more cautious, the driver would have
had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap.
- It seems from evidence that both trucks did not keep close to the right
side of the road which caused them sideswiped each other. By not driving
their trucks in the proper lane, both drivers were negligent.
- Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. The
Negligence of the first two (driver and conductor of the bus) would not
have produced the death of Agripino, without the negligence of the truck
driver.
- The truck drivers negligence was the last, in point of time, for Agripino
was on the running board of the carriers bus sometime before the truck
came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, the truck had the
last clear chance.
- Jurisprudence provides the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or persons, although acting independently of each other
are in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a singly injury to a
third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury. Even
though his act alone might not have cause the entire injury, or the same
damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor.
59. TEAGUE v. FERNANDEZ (Stampede. Non-compliance with the city
ordinance. The school is liable)
FACTS:
- Realistic Institute, owned and operated by Teague, was a vocational
school situated on Gil-Armi Building. A fire broke out in a store ten meters
away from the institute.
- The instructresses tried to calm down the students. They told them not to
be afraid as the building was made of concrete and the fire was across the
street. They instructed them to go down the stairway two by two, or to use
the fire escapes.
- No part of the building caught fire. But after the panic was over, four
students, including Fernandezs sister Lourdes were found dead and
several others injured after the stampede.
- CA ruled that the institutes non-compliance with the City Ordinance
(which required a building to have at least two unobstructed staircases)
was an act of negligence and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the death of Lourdes. The institute had only one staircase, while a
second was under construction.
- Teague contends that the violation of the ordinance was only a remote
cause and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened
independent causes which produced the injury. It relates the chain of
events: (1) violation of ordinance, (2) fire across the street, (3) shouts of
Fire! Fire!, (4) panic, (5) stampede, and (6) death.
ISSUE:
te
HELD:
- YES. Proximate cause applies. It is true that Teagues non-compliance
with the ordinance was ahead of and prior to the other events in points of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would
pose a danger to the occupants of the building.
- This specific situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen,
was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one
stairway available.
- American Jurisprudence: The general principle is that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by
the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the
manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent.
- The overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and
overcrowding was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by
requiring at least 2 stairways.
- Proximate legal cause that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his
contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not
complying with a duty impose on him by law. It is therefore immaterial
that the loss was due to a fortuitous event, since it was his negligence in
not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.
61. CALALAS v. CA (extension seat. Hit by truck causing injuries. The
demand arose from a contract of carriage. Negligence need not be proven.
Plus jeep not properly parked and overloaded)
FACTS:
- Sunga took a passenger jeep owned and operated by Calalas. She was
given an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the
rear end of the vehicle as the jeep was filled to capacity.
- As Sunga gave way to an outgoing passenger, a truck bumped the left
rear portion of the jeep resulting in Sungas injury.
- Sunga filed against Calalas while Calalas filed a third-party complaint
against the truck driver. Calalas contends that the negligence of the truck
driver was the proximate cause of the accident and negates his liability.
ISSUE:
W/N Calalas was negligent.
HELD:
- Sungas action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict
- In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligator, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.
- Further, the jeep was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
from the highway, and Calalas took in more passengers than allowed,
violating R.A. No. 4136.
- Calalas should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeep with its body
protruding into the highway.
- The doctrine of proximate case is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. In quasi-delict, the
BUT the Cheah spouses are also liable for contributory negligence for
accommodating a complete stranger and thereby leading to their being
swindled.
63. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISE INC, v. PARAS
64. MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BANKING (supposed to buy only Diamicron
for elevated blood sugar but instead was given Dormicum a sleeping pill by
the employee of Mercury Drug. Fell asleep on the wheel and entered into
car accident. MERCURY LIABLE. Public interest. Proximate cause was the
sale of sleeping pills)
FACTS:
- Sebastian Baking went to DR. Sys clinic for tests and after which was
given a prescription for Diamicron for his elevated blood sugar. He
proceeded to buy the medicine at Mercury Drug where the saleslady
misread the prescription and instead gave him Dormicum a potent
sleeping tablet because of this he entered into a car accident (he fell
asleep on the wheel). He went back to Dr. Sy and was shocked to find out
he was given the wrong medication. He filed suit.
- Mercury alleges that Banking was negligent in driving his car which was
the proximate cause of the accident.
ISSUES:
- W/n Baking as negligent and is the proximate cause of the damage?
HELD:
- NO. generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of
care and diligence in selling medicines.
- Obviously, Mercurys employee was grossly negligent in selling
Dormicum. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and
death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very
cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified the medicine
she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The
care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the
skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands
- The undersigned has assumed the engagement toward Messrs. "M. Novo
y Co., S. en Cta.," that he will, commencing with this date, lease from them
the barge Varadero for P175 per month; likewise and from the same date,
a dredging scoop, at the rental price of P100 per month. Mr. J. E.
Ainsworth shall be liable for any loss or damage to the said barge and
dredging scoop during the existence of this contract.
- After 5 days use by Ainsworth, both were lost at sea and totally
abandoned. On the same day, Ainsworth also got Novos consent to have
its steam launch, Amelia, tow the barge from Cebu to Bohol for P60.
- Ainsworth now refuses to pay for rental for five days use, value of the
barge and dredging scoop and launch of the Amelia.
- Ainsworth also claims from Novo value of 10 tons of coal belonging to the
defendant which was on board the barge; and that this coal, which was
also lost, was worth P130, an amount which the Novo owed the defendant
and had not paid him, although its payment had been demanded.
ISSUE:
- W/N Novo is entitled to collect from Ainsworth value of barge, scoop and
launch of Amelia
- W/N Ainsworth is entitled to collect from Novo value of coal
HELD:
- NO. Article 840 of the Code of Commerce prescribes as follows: "The
losses and damages suffered by a vessel and her cargo by reason of
shipwreck or standing shall be individually for the account of the owners,
the part of the wreck which may be saved belonging to them in the same
proportion.
- Article 1902 of the Civil Code also provides: "A person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done."
- The barge was not excessive for the capacity of the boat; that the ways
and means employed by the defendant in loading the barge did not tend in
any manner to show cause for the accident that occurred; that the towage
was effected under the exclusive direction of the captain of the launch, an
employee of the plaintiff firm, which owned the said launch; and that there
was no proof that the two laborers, placed by the defendant on board the
barge, performed any acts which might have contributed to the foundering
of the vessel, or failed to perform their duties.
- The same rule is applicable with respect to the loss of the coal by the
foundering of the barge. The plaintiff cannot be held liable therefore.
- BUT Ainsworth should pay Novo the amount for said rentals.
66. CENZO v. ATLANTIC GULF (Ocumen was a layer of gas pipes employed
by Atlantic. Went to the East side of the trench to answer call of nature
and was buried. Atlantic NOT liable. No right to be there and exercised
diligence of good father)
FACTS:
- This is an action for damages against the defendant for negligently
causing the death of the plaintiff's son, Jorge Ocumen.
- Ocumen was the employee of Atlantic, in laying gas pipes. He was
assigned to fill up the west end of the trench, while there was no work
being done in the east end.
- However, Ocumen went to the east end to answer a call of nature and
was buried in dirt when the bank caved in. He was killed before he could
be released.
ISSUE:
- W/N Atlantic should be held liable for his death
HELD:
- NO. The Employers' Liability Act was passed to obviate the injustice to
workmen that employers should escape liability where persons having
superintendence and control in the employment were guilty of negligence
causing injury to workmen.
- The obligations of the master ... continue in force, not only during all the
time in which his servants are actually engaged in his service, but also
during the time reasonably occupied by them on his premises in going to
and returning from their work and in intervals of rest between. ... But he is
under no obligation to keep in safe condition for their use any part of the
premises to which their duties do not call them and to which he has not
given them permission to go.
- The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for
any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or
stray away.
it was acts of god, the proximate cause was the negligence of NPC. NPC
negligent in seeing that no harm done to the general public.
- This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.
ISSUE:
- W/N the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.
FACTS:
- There was a storm in Ilocos Norte which caused flooding in the area of
the plaintiffs.
HELD:
- NO. The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the
owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under
article 1902 of the same code.
- The statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person
liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that
the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is
therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
- In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of
the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which
he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
- If action is to be based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that
there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the
animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation
on those points.
- The next morning while the flood was still waist deep, Isabel Lao Juan
(deceased) ventured out of their house to see if her store merchandise
were damaged by the storm.
- Suddenly, Isabel shouted Ay! and went under the water. Her
companions wanted to help her but they were afraid to go near her
because they saw a dangling electric wire moving in a snake like fashion.
- Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters
away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida
and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ
Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.
- The body of the deceased was later fished out bearing 1st degree burns
and an electrically charged wound.
- In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967,
Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power
Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations
in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or
short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag
NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the
ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to
the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As
he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric
wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the other end was
seeming to play with the current of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972)
Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein,
he returned to the NPC Compound.
ISSUE:
- W/N the company is liable to pay damages.
HELD:
- YES. We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor. The respondent
CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated
from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's
negligence that death took place.
- Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in
seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been
shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the
victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event.
- When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would
not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am.
Jur., p. 649).
70. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN v. REYES (Reyes: He was having coffee
at Hotel Nikko when he was approached by Dr. Violeta Filart and invited to
a party for the hotels manager. Reyes lined up in the buffet but he was
told to leave by one Ruby Lim. He claims she spoke in loud voice. Claimed
damages for embarrassment. LIM: She was polite in asking Reyes to leave.
Court believes in Lim. 20 years in hotel business. And absence of any
motive of Lim to humiliate. Doctrine of self- inflicted injury not applicable
here.)
Facts according to plaintiff
Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly
known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00
oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at
the lobby of Hotel Nikko.
- He saw Dr. Violeta Filart in the hotel and he was invited by Filart to a
party for hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.
- After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes
lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who
claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were
making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party
(huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).
- Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual
damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees
Facts according to defendant Lim
- Lim narrated that she asked Reyes to leave since the party was to be kept
private for the managers close friends
- She inquired as to the unwarranted presence of Reyes and upon knowing
that he did not want to leave after Ms. Fruto discreetly asked her to leave,
Ms. Lim took it upon herself to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
- She did so in a discreet manner
ISSUE:
- Which story merits credibility; consequently should the Hotel be liable for
damages?
HELD:
- The Court believes that defendant has a more plausible story, thus the
Hotel is not liable for damages.
- In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that
she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are
virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
- Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave
was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this
regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration
that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first
verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration
of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect
of such dignity. - Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act
of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that
Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad
judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
- NOTE: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents
is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation
to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
71. TAMAYO v. GSELL (Braulio Tamayo is minor son of Plaintiff.
Inexperienced and without preparation. Assigned in cleaning part of
machine where pieces of wood were stuck. Hand got amputated. Gsell
liable. Duty of masters or superintendents to warn employees as to the
dangers of the work and instruct them. Duty comes with employment.)
FACTS:
- This case is an action for damages against Gsell for injuries suffered by
Braulio Tamayo, minor son of plaintiff.
- Due to his inexperience in the work to which, for the first item and
without any preparation or instruction, he had been assigned in essaying
to clean that part of the machine where the pieces of wood from the strips
were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and the right finger
of his right hand was served. He was thereupon taken to the General
Hospital, where he received medical treatment until he was released.
- RTC ruled for the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- NO. The plaintiffs disobedience played a factor to his injury.
- It is therefore not proper to hold the defendant entirely liable.
- Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the
failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages
that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to
himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his
act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
- Court awarded 2500 as damages, this was originally 5000, but reduced on
account of the negligence attributable to the plaintiff.
73. TEH V. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI (Plaintiff landed on waters and pilot
did all necessary operations however plaintiff walked towards propeller.
Medjo bobo. And his arm was caught by revolving blafe. The PHIL AERIAL
TAXI NOT LIABLE. Pilot was well experienced. They exercised the diligence
required of them. It was plaintiff which was NOT AN ORDINARY MAN OF
PRUDENCE. Did not wait for Banca but instead walked along the pontoons
toward the propeller. Medjo bobo. Only his reckless negligence was cause)
FACTS:
- Plaintiff is passenger of defendant.
- The plane landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait.
- The pilot did all the necessary operations to prevent further serious
damage.
- The plaintiff walked toward the propeller, hit his head, and his arm was
caught by the revolving blades.
- The plaintiff did this despite being told frantically not to.
- The plaintiff didnt follow the usual procedure in the discharge of the
passengers
ISSUE:
- W/N defendant entity is liable.
HELD:
- NO. The pilot in charge of the plane has had fourteen years of experience,
having first learned to fly during the World War. He is duly licensed by the
Department of Commerce of the United States and by the Department of
Commerce and Communications of the Government of the Philippine
Islands.
- The contract entered into by the plaintiff Teh Le Kim and the defendant
entity Philippine Aerial Taxi Co., Inc., was that upon payment of the price
of the passage, which the carrier had received, the latter would carry the
former by air in one of its hydroplanes and put him, safe and sound, on the
beach at Iloilo. After an uneventful flight, the hydroplane, which carried
the plaintiff and his companion, arrived at the Iloilo beach, as usual, with
nothing more left to do but to take the plaintiff and his companion, safe
and sound, ashore. In order to do this, it was necessary to wait for the
propeller to stop, turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore,
take the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end thereof, place
them in a banca and take them ashore. By sheer common sense, the
plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an
aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run
the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He ought to know
furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait
for a banca to take him ashore.
- Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals given him from the shore
by the representatives of the consignee firm, the plaintiff herein, not being
a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked
along one of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller, while
the banca which was to take him ashore was still some distance away and
the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the
passenger and the driver. They have contract of carriage. Carrier presumed
to be negligent unless overcome by evidence)
FACTS:
- The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and
driven by Manalo to bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
- Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack, The right rear wheel of the truck
was detached so the driver stepped on the brake as a result of which, the
jeep who was running unbalanced made a u-turn so that the front part
face the south where it come from and its rear face the north where it is
going.
- The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bumped the jeep
resulting in the death of the three passengers of the jeepney and injuries
to others.
- The two drivers were charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of
San Miguel Tarlack.
- Probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the
case of Delos Reyes was dismissed and Manalo was convicted by the court
of first instance of Pangasinan.
- Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery
of civil damages before the court of first instance impleading both the
defendant and the respondent.
- The CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the
IAC.
ISSUE:
- W/N Manalo was negligent.
HELD:
- YES. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo
and the Mangune spouses. They failed to exercise the precautions that are
needed precisely pro hac vice. The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last
clear chance in this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit
between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles and not in a suit
where passengers demand responsibility from a carries to enforce its
contractual obligation.
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently and
ISSUE:
HELD:
- The driver of the cargo truck was negligent
- The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own
acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
77. TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (David Taylor and his friend went to
the power plant of manila electric to visit another friend. Finding he was
not there. Roamed the premises. Found 30 brass fulminating caps. Took it
home. Opening the cap with a knife. Caused injuried. Manila Electric NOT
liable. The proximate cause was the opening of the brass cap.)
76. BUSTAMANTE V. COURT OF APPEALS (Bus and truck driver. They were
found to be both negligent. Bustamante was one of passengers. Last clear
chance does not apply because this is a suit between the passenger and
the driver. This is a breach of contract of carriage)
FACTS:
- A gravel and sand truck collided with a bus, several passengers of the bus
were thrown out and died (Bustamante, Jocson, Ramos, Himaya, and
Bersamina). The truck was driven by Montesiano (defendant) and owned
by Del Pilar. The bus was driven by Susulin (defendant) and owned by a
franchise transferred to Serrado.
- When the vehicles were approaching each other Susulin saw the front
wheels of the vehicle were wiggling. Even if he saw the truck heading
towards his lane he sped forth in an attempt to overtake another vehicle in
the belief the bus driver to be joking.
- The TC found both drivers negligent and that their liability to be solidary.
It held the owners and the drivers jointly and severally liable. Del Pilar and
Montesiano appealed. CA reversed.
FACTS:
- David Taylor, herein plaintiff, with his friend Manuel Claparols, went to
defendants power plant to visit an defendants employee, Murphy, who
had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
- The boys did not find Murphy in his quarters. Impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the usual interest which both seem to
have taken in machinery, the two boys did not leave the company
premises.
- They then walked across to the open space in the neighborhood of the
place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
Here, they found 20 or 30 brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
(These caps are used in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
have in themselves a considerable explosive power.)
- The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on a stick and carried
them home. On their way home, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian,
and all three went to the home of the Manuel.
- The boys made a series of experiments with the caps. One of these
consisted of opening the cap with a knife and lighted a match to the
contents. This resulted in an explosion which injured all three children.
ISSUE:
- W/N defendant company is liable for the injuries,
HELD:
- NO. Defendant was not liable to plaintiff Taylor for the injuries thus
incurred.
- Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike
instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care
and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly.
- Defendants negligence consists of a negligent omission; defendant did
not take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from
unknown or unseen dangers placed upon such premises.
- But even if defendant was negligent in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, this was not the proximate cause of the injury. Being so, he was
not civilly liable for such negligence. The proximate cause of the injury was
plaintiffs act of cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its
contents.
car, it became Manila Electrics duty to do no act that would have the
effect of increasing the peril to Ignacio.
- The breach of duty was in Manila Electrics premature acceleration of the
car.
- As to Ignacios contributory negligence, it must be treated as a mitigating
circumstance. It was not the proximate cause.
- A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of
injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he
cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the
situation in view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car
before he is planted safely on the platform.
79. ASTUDILLO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (Manila electric erected a light
pole. Conformed to minimum requirements of franchise. In a public place.
Astudilo reached and grasped a charged wire. Manila electric liable
because the stature prescribe bare minimum. Should have taken into
account dangers of placing in public place. A high degree of diligence
needed)
FACTS:
- An electric light pole with corresponding wires was erected in 1920 near
the Santa Lucia Gate (Intramuros). It was last inspected by the City
Electrician in 1923 or 1924. Said pole conformed to the requirements of
Manila Electrics franchise (ie, height requirements, the type of feeder
wires, etc.)
- The pole was situated in a public place where people come to stroll, to
rest and enjoy themselves.
- In 1928, plaintiff Astudillo and his companion sauntered to where the
electric post was situation. Astudillo then reached out and grasped a
charged electric wire. Astudillo died.
ISSUE:
- W/N Manila Electric was liable to the mother of Astudillo for damages
because of the death of her son.
HELD:
- YES. Manila Electric was liable for the death of Astudillo. Damages must
be paid to the mother of Astudillo.
- Electric companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. However,
they must exercise care commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
- The poles must be erected and the wires and appliances must be so
located that persons rightfully near the place will not be injured
- The cause of the injury to Astudillo was one that could have been
forseen.
- Negligence came from Manila Electric in so placing its pole and wires as
to be within proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the
possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact
with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
- The franchise, ordinance, statute merely states the minimum conditions.
The fulfillment of these conditions
80. DEL ROSARIO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. (trouble in wire. Burning. More
than 30 minutes after. Dismissal of grade school. Children saw the wire
which fell. Touched it. Died. Manila electric liable because did not act
immediately)
FACTS:
- Shortly after 2 oclock in the afternoon trouble developed in a wire used
by Manila Electric to conduct electricity for lighting purposes in Manila.
Jose Noguera, who had charge of tienda nearby noticed the wire was
burning and asked someone to telephone the company to inform them
that the wire was burning. The company received the report at 2:25. The
wire soon parted and one of the charged ends fell to the ground in
shrubbery.
- At 4 pm, the school in the neighborhood was dismissed. 3 boys were
walking home together when one motioned as if to touch the wire. The
other boy was a son of an electrician, and warned the first boy not to
touch the wire. Despite the warning, the third boy touched the wire with
his hand and received a shock which resulted in his death. His family is
suing Manila Electric for damages.This is an action for damages against the
defendant for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff's son, Jorge
Ocumen.
ISSUE:
- W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD:
- YES. Manila Electric was responsible for the death. The delay in leaving
this danger unguarded so long after information of the trouble was
received constituted negligence on its part. There was no contributory
negligence on the part of the child even though he touched the wire after
being warned not to do so because of his immature years and because of
the natural curiosity of children.
81. NGO SIN SING V. LI SENG GIAP & SONS,INC. (Sps Ngo constructed
building. The adjacent building owned by Li suffered structural damage. Lis
was taller than the 2 floors which the foundation could hold. Both liable
and since it cannot be determined who is more negligent 50-50)
FACTS:
- Spouses Ngo decided to construct a 5-storey building (NSS building) and
contracted the services of Contech as their general contractor.
- During the construction of NSS, the adjacent building LSG Building
(owned by Li) suffered structural damage
- Inspection revealed that this was caused by the excavation made by
Contech near the common boundary line exposing the foundation of LSG.
-As a sign of goodwill, Spouses Ngo agreed to have Contech make repairs
to LSG but there continued the defects which led to its demolition and
reconstruction. LSG sued Spouses Ngo & Contech to pay for the costs.
- LSG was originally a 2-storey building but Li added 2 more floors w/out
providing the necessary foundation & reinforcement causing it to sag
ISSUE:
- W/N LSG is liable for contributory negligence
- W/N Contech & Spouses Ngo are solidarily liable
HELD:
- YES, LSG was built in the 1950s w/ a building permit for only a 2-storey
building but when it burned down they added 2 floors. The foundation can
only support 2 floors, adding floors w/out reinforcing the foundation is a
manifestation of negligence.
- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
- Li contributed to the sagging of LSG building so a reduction of award is
warranted.
- The allocation of damages is 50-50, because there was insufficient lateral
or subjacent support provided on the LSG lot which is attributed to
Contech who failed to observe the proper procedure prior to excavation.
- YES. Accdg to Art 2194 the responsibility of 2 or more persons who are
liable in a quasi-delict is solidary. But the court rendered judgment
determining the liability of co-defendants so they ruled that Contech is
ultimately liable and should answer for the cost of damages.
82. NATIONAL POWER CORP. V. HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIMAN (Noble
Casionan was a pocket miner. Died because bamboo he was holding hit
wires of NPC. NPCs wires were 8-10ft and not 18-20 as required. NO
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. It was his ordinary routine and just because
he was pocket miner is not a justification for NPC to leave their lines
dangling)
FACTS:
- Noble Casionan, 19 yrs old, was a pocket miner who died by electrocution
while walking the trail leading to Sangilo because the bamboo pole he was
carrying touched the low hanging high tension wires
- Prior to the incident, there were already numerous demands to NPC to
institute safety measures which they failed to heed until the accident
where they fixed the wires and added warning signs.
ISSUE:
- W/N there was contributory negligence from Noble?
HELD:
- NO, the wires were hanging 8-10 ft instead of the required 18-20 feet, if
the lines were properly maintained then Noble would never have been
electrocuted.
- The trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members
of the community w/ no warning to inform passerbys that accidentally
touching the wire will endanger their lives. Noble shouldnt be faulted for
doing his ordinary routine.
- Even if pocket mining was prohibited by the DENR and they were
unlicensed it is not a justification for NPC to leave their transmission lines
dangling.
83. ALLIED BANK V. BPI 692 SCRA 186
FACTS:
a check in the amount of 1M payable to Mateo Mgt. Group
international was presented for deposit and accepted at
petitioners Kawit branch.
The check was post dated Oct 9, 2003 and was drawn against
Marciano Silva with Respondent BPI Bel Air branch.
Upon receipt the petitioner sent it for clearing though the
Philippine Clearing House Corp (PCHC)
The check was cleared by BPI and credited to account of MMGI
1M. MMGIs accounts were closed and all the funds therein were
withdrawn.
A month later Silva discovered the debit from his account. A
complaint was filed by the latter
Despite this complaint BPI credited the 1M to his account
BPI returned a photocopy of the check to Allied bank for the
reason postdated
Petitioner refused to accept. The charge slip was sent back and
forth several times between petitioner and respondent.
Respondent then asked PCHC to take custody of the check.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the PCHC arbitration committee
claiming that respondent should be entirely liable for failure to
return the check within the 24 hour reglementary period.
Respondent claimed that Allied bank should be liable entirely
because they shouldnt have accepted the post-dated check in the
first place. And the proximate cause for the loss was petitioners
acceptance of the post dated check.
Arbitration committee ruled in favor of petitioner. It noted that
respondent did not return the check within the 24 hour
reglementary period. It actually found both parties negligent
however applied the last clear chance rule and ruled finally that
the loss should be shouldered by the respondent alone.
ISSUE:
Who is liable for the amount of the check?
HELD:
-
84. PNR V. BRUNTY (PNR did not set up lights or flag bar to warn vehicles.
Car diring to Baguio was hit. PNR liable. Even if no statute it must exercise
diligence. Contributory negligence also present. Driving 70kph and
overtook car but PNR still liable)
FACTS:
- Rhonda Brunty an American visited the Phils. and w/ her Filipino host
Garcia and driver Mercelita drove a Mercedes Benz to Baguio City overtook
a car and had a collision w/ a PNR Train driven by Reyes.
- Mercelita was instantly killed while Brunty died later on. Garcia survived
but had to be transferred to Makati Med for further treatment.
- Ethel Brunty (mom) w/ Garcia sued PNR, alleging that the death and
injury were the proximate cause of the gross negligence of PNR in not
providing the necessary equipment like the flag bar or red light signal to
warn the motorist who were about to cross the railroad track & that the
flagman was only equipped w/ a flashlight. They also argue that PNR failed
to supervise its employees especially the pilot & operator of the train.
- PNR claims it exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection and
supervision of its employees. That it had no legal duty to put up a
bar/signal and it had adequate warning signs posted on the side of the
road before the crossing. PNR alleges that the proximate cause is the
negligence of Mercelita by disregarding the warning signs, whistle blast
and flashlight of the guard, he had the last clear chance.
ISSUES:
- Whose negligence was the cause of the collision?
- W/N Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence
- W/N can the doctrine of last clear chance apply
HELD:
- PNR. Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.
Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury. Its failure to put a cross bar/ signal light is
negligence and disregard of the safety of the public even if no law or
ordinance requires it bec. public safety demands that said device are
installed.
- YES, Although Mercelita was driving the car @ 70 km/hr and in fact had
overtaken a vehicle, his acts although contributing to the collision does not
negate PNR liability since there is no proof of relation between Brunty and
Mercelita. To hold a person as having contributed to his injury it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body.
- NO, the doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciable later than the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so, is chargeable. The proximate cause of the injury being
established that of PNR, we hold that the above doctrine finds no
application.
ISSUE:
- W/N the overtaking of the tricycle was the proximate cause of the
accident.
HELD:
- YES. The totality of evidence shows that the proximate cause of the
collision was the reckless negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily
overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of
traffic laws.
- Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was over loaded with a
total of 8 passengers.
heavy counter top fell on petitioner head and knocked her down
almost unconscious.
Delia got hold of the house phone and informed the hotel
telephone operator of the incident. Not long after the hotel staff
arrived at the main entrance however it took 20-30 minutes to get
inside.
When the door opened they ice-packed the head of petitioner
and brought the hotel physician.
Petitioner experienced extreme dizziness and an uncomfortable
feeling in her stomach and she was constrained to stay at home
and missed all of her important appointments with her patients.
The had 3 sleepless nights which compelled her to consult a
neurologist.
Dr. Noble told her that she had a very serious brain injury based
on MRI scans and he prescribed several medicine for her
condition.
She did not get better and consulted another doctor because she
started to feel like she was losing her memory and this greatly
affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession.
Went to the US for therapy and medications. Still did not get
better. It was concluded that petitioner has post-traumatic or
post-concussion syndrome.
Respondents countered the material allegations of petitioner.
They alleged that petitioner insisted that she was fine and that
she assured the hotel Physician that she was fine. Petitioner even
disclosed to the physician that she once frll from a horse and had
a stroke had hysterectomy and is incapable of having children;
that she had a blood disorder which can cause on and off
headaches.
A certification of this incident was made by the hotel and the
petitioner picked up this certification without any objection to the
contents thereof
Hotel claims that it never received any complaint from petitioner
The TC and the CA denied the petitioners claim for her failure to
prove that her serious and permanent injury was the result of the
11 June 1995 accident.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the TC claiming that since there was
no contractual relation, it is possible that this case can be one of
NO. petition has no merit. SC is not a trier of facts and this case
doesnt fall within any of the exceptions which allow the SC to
review the facts found by the lower court.
Neither did the SC find negligence in the actions of the Hotel. It
was incumbent on petitioner to prove the negligence of the Hotel
because there is no presumption of negligence.
seen by their failure to construct a wall high enough to prevent the fire
from leaping to neighboring houses.
88. REPUBLIC v. LUZON STEVEDORING
FACTS:
- A barge owned by Luzon was being towed by tugboats Bangus and
Barbero likewise owned by Luzon when it rammed into the wooden piles
of Nagtahan bailey bridge because of the swollen and current swift of the
Pasig river causing the bridge to list.
- The Republic of the Phils. sued for damages. Luzon disclaimed liability on
the ground that it exercised due diligence in the selection & supervision of
its employees and the damage caused was by force majeure, that the
Republic has no capacity to sue and that Nagtahan bridge was an
obstruction to navigation.
ISSUE:
- W/N the collision was caused by force majeure
HELD:
- NO, the fact that Nagtahan bridge was a stationary object and
uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of
water craft, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge
exclusively controlled by Luzon ram the bridge support raises a
presumption of negligence on the part of Luzon and its employees. Luzon
stresses that they took extra precautions so the accident should be
deemed a fortuitous event but this statement precisely negates their
argument because force majeure are events not foreseeable or avoidable.
It must be impossible to foresee or avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee
the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures
adopted prove that the possibility of danger was foreseeable.
89. F.F. CRUZ & CO. v. CA (Request to create fire wall fell on deaf ears. This
was a requirement of city ordinance. Furniture shop with combustible
materials. Fire started. Res ipsa loquitur applies in this case)
FACTS:
- The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was
situated adjacent to the residence of the Mables.
- Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall
be constructed between the shop and Mables residence. The request was
repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.
- In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in Cruzs shop.
Cruzs employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire,
but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables house. Both
the shop and the house were razed to the ground.
- The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the
contents thereof.
- The Mables filed an action for damages against the Cruzs.
- The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award
of damages.
ISSUE:
- W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case.
HELD:
- Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. The CA,
therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the
Mables.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows:
- Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
- The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust,
paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
- It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of
petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed.
- Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of
the Mables as required by a city ordinance that the fire could have been
caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette that gasoline and alcohol were
used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside
the shop
- Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to
construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to
support a finding of negligence.
- Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of
defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to
prevent the flames from leaping over it. Defendant's negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to
the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
- In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of
negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property
and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the
pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance
providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of
negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L- 29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA
181.]
90. LAYUGAN v. IAC
91. MACALINAO v. ONG
FACTS:
- Genetron International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship
owned and operated by Sebastian. On April 25, 1992, Sebastian instructed
Mavalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of
machinery a reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastians
manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While in the process of complying
with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, Genetrons Isuzu Elf Truck with
plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of private jeepney
along Caypombo, Sta.Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning.
- Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained
physical injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao incurred the
most serious injuries among the passengers of the truck. He was initially
brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment but in
view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine
Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to
Capitol Medical Center by his parents, for medical reasons then to PGH for
financial consideration.
- Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as
a result of the accident and per doctors advice, his foot was amputated.
He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition,
coupled with the doctors recommendation, led his family to bring him
home where he died on Nov. 07, 1992.
- Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against
both Ong and Sebastian before the RTC of QC. After his death Macalinao
was substituted by his parents in the action.
- Trial Court: based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a reckless
and imprudent manner thereby causing the same to hit the private
jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed that Ong was driving
cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no evidence was
presented to substantiate the claim.
- CA: reversed the findings of trial court. Evidence presented by petitioners
is insufficient to support verdict of negligence against Ong.
ISSUE:
- W/N sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of negligence
against Ong
HELD:
- The evidence on record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
sufficiently establishes Ongs negligence.
- The photographs of the accident deserve substantial cogitation.
- Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth which
ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
- In this case, while there is dearth of testimonial evidence to enlighten us
about what actually happened, photographs depicting the relative
positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident took place do
exist. It is well established that photographs, when duly verified and shown
by extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the
time in question, are in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in
evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the
situation or condition of objects or premises or the circumstances of an
accident.
plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were not
present at the crucial moment.
- The driver of the jeepney who could have shed light on the circumstances
is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge about the cause of the
mishap are the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of
Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastians previous employee but his
co-respondent in the case as well.
92. RAMOS v. CA
FACTS:
- Erlinda Ramos underwent an operation known as cholecystectomy
(removal of stone in her gallbladder) under the hands of Dr. Orlino Hosaka.
He was accompanied by Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, an anesthesiologist which
Dr. Hosaka recommended since Ramos (and her husband Rogelio) did not
know any.
- The operation was schedule at 9am of June 17, 1985 but was however
delayed for three hours due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
- Dr. Gutierrez subsequently started trying to intubate her. And at around
3pm, Erlinda was seen being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The
doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm.
Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital
only four months later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated
operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on
August 3, 1999.
- RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding the defendants guilty of, at
the very least, negligence in the performance of their duty to plaintiffpatient Erlinda Ramos.
- On appeal to CA, the said decision was reversed dismissing the
complaint against the defendants. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
- W/N the private respondents should be held liable for the injury caused
to Erlinda and her family?
HELD:
- YES.
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the
latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with
his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that
he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he
shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's
condition.
- Notwithstanding the general denial made by respondent hospital to the
effect that the respondent doctors (referred to as consultants) in this
case are not their employees, there is a showing that the hospital exercises
significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct
of their work within the hospital premises.
- The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those
of others based on the
former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they
have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on
the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the
respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove
that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
- In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with
regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians.
In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent
hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of
Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently
solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
- The CA decision and resolution are hereby modified so as to award in
favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the
following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of
promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to
the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages;
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care." The requisites for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.
However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. Ergo, the doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence
is
absent
and
not
readily
available.
Relative to the case, res ipsa loquitor does not apply since the
circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.s injury and the series of tests
that were supposed to be undergone by him to determine the extent of
the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and
Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of the Manila
Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the emergency
room. While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the
courts below seem doubtless to constitute reckless imprudence on the
part of the petitioners, this conclusion is still best achieved, not through
the scholarly assumptions of a layman like the patients mother, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witness/es. As to whether the
petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in treating
patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of expert opinion.
As to the second issue: Petitioners were negligent in their obligation. It
was proven that a thorough examination was not performed on Roy Jr
since as residents on duty at the emergency room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr.
Bastan were expected to know the medical protocol in treating leg
fractures and in attending to victims of car accidents.
Thus, simple negligence is resent if: (1) that there is lack of precaution on
the part of the offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be caused
is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan, explained the court, cannot pass on the liability
to the taxi driver who hit the victim. It may be true that the actual, direct,
immediate, and proximate cause of the injury (fracture of the leg bone or
tibia) of Roy Jr. was the vehicular accident when he was hit by a taxi. The
petitioners, however, cannot simply invoke such fact alone to excuse
themselves from any liability. If this would be so, doctors would have a
ready defense should they fail to do their job in attending to victims of hitand-run, maltreatment, and other crimes of violence in which the actual,
direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the injury is indubitably the act
of
the
perpetrator/s.
In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the
extent of Roy Jr.s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss of their
duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of
argument that they did not have the capacity to make such thorough
evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to another
doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of assuring him and
his mother that everything was all right.
Moreover, the contention of petitioners that they cannot be held liable
since Roy is not their patient, since they are not the attending physicians
but merely requested by the ER does not hold water.
Physician-patient relationship exists when a patient engages the services
of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated. And in
accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents
that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such
training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his
patient, a physician is under a duty to exercise that degree of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the
same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
Stated otherwise, the physician has the obligation to use at least the same
level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to
treat the condition under similar circumstances.
There is a physician-patient relationship in this case since the petitioner
obliged themselves and examined the victim, and later assured the mother
that everything was fine and that they could go home. Their assurance that
everything is fine deprived the victim of seeking medical help.
Petitioners were absolved in the criminal charge for the reason that a
reasonable doubt existed but they are liable for damages. There is no
direct evidence proving that it was their negligence that caused the
suffering of Roy.
94. BOLINTAO v. GERONA
FACTS:
Respondent Dr. Carlos Gerona, treated petitioners son, Allen who
was 8 years old for a fractured wrist. Respondent administered a
U-splint and immobilized Allens wrist with a cast.
Allen re-fractured the same wrist and he was sent back to the
hospital.
The x-ray examination showed a complete fracture and
displacement of the bone with fragments overlapping each other.
Allens arm was placed in a cast and Respondent advised allens
mother to bring him back for retightening of the cast.
Allen was brought back later than June and by then, the cast had
not been retightened causing a rotational deformity in Allens
arm. The deformity was caused by a re-displacement of the bone
fragments.
It was agreed that a surgery would be conducted with Dr. Jabagat
as the anesthesiologist
Mother of Allen was allowed to watch the procedure through a
class panel. Dr. Jabagat, after several attempts to intubate the
patient, he failed to do so. Respondent asked Dr. Jabagat if the
operation should be postponed but Dr. Jabagat said it was okay to
proceed. Respondent checked the breathing of his patient before
beginning on the procedure.
Petitioner went out to make a phone call and wait for her son. She
was later informed that her son had died on the operating table.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent is liable for the damages for Allens death.
HELD:
-
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur does not apply in this case. The CA
correctly found that petitioners failure to present substantial
evidence of any specific act of negligence on respondents part or
of the surrounding facts and circumstances which would lead to
the reasonable inference that the untoward consequence was
caused by respondents negligence.
In fact, under the established facts, respondent appears to have
observed the proper amount of care required under the
circumstances.
In the instant case, the instrument which caused the damage or
injury was not even within the respondents exclusive
management and control as Dr. Jabagat was exclusively in control
and management of the anesthesia and the tube.
Here, the respondent could only supervise Dr. Jabagat to make
sure that he was performing his duties. But respondent could not
dictate upon Dr. Jabagat the particular anesthesia to administer,
the dosage thereof, or that it be administered in any particular
way not deemed appropriate by Dr. Jabagat.
Respondents specialization not being in the field of
anesthesiology, it would be dangerous for him to substitute his
judgment of Dr. Jabagats decisions in matters that fall
appropriately within the scope of Dr. Jabagats expertise.
The court cannot properly declare that respondent failed to
exercise the required standard of care as lead surgeon as to hold
him liable for damages for Allens death.
In civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by
preponderance of evidence is on the plaintiff who is asserting the
affirmative of an issue. This burden was not overcome.
FACTS:
On the dawn of New Years day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy, along with
her spouse and their daughter were on their way home from a
Christmas party when they were run over by a Fuso passenger
jeep registered in the name of Petitioner Oscar del Carmen and
used as a public Utility Vehicle
A criminal case was instituted and Allan (driver) was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
The father of Emilia (Geronimo Bacoy), in behalf of the 6 minor
children of Emilia filed a civil case for damages against Allan and
also impleaded the Spouses Oscar and Norma del Carmen.
Del Carmen refused to assume liability and claimed that the jeep
was merely stolen from them from Allen. He also clarified that
Allen was his jeep conductor and that it was his brother who
employed Allen. He also averred that Allens employment was
already severed before the mishap.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners Sps. Del Carmen should be held vicariously liable
for the mishap caused by Allen.
RULING:
YES.
In this case negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
Petitioner alleges that the jeep was merely stolen by Allen
however the carnapping case filed against Allan was already
dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence.
In this case, all the requisites for res ipsa loquitur are present.
o The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent
o The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person in charge; and
o The injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to
third person for the deaths or injuries consequent to its
operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.
96. CAPILI v. CARDENA (Tree fell on kid. Died. Capili was negligent in not
removing the tree which was posing danger to people passing by. It was a
nuisance. Capili was school principal. Should have foreseen the harm.)
FACTS:
- Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque
Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the
school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death.
- Her parents filed a case for damages against petitioner Capili, alleging
that a certain Lerios reported on the possible danger the tree posed. The
Cardaas averred that petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight
caused the death of their daughter.
- RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of respondent parents to
establish negligence on part of petitioner, BUT the CA reversed, reasoning
that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere
sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have
had the tree removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaa.
- The appellate court ruled that the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that
should have been removed soon after petitioner had chanced upon it.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of
Cardaa?
HELD:
- Petitioner is liable.
- A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the
actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such
an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or
to do it in a more careful manner. The probability that the branches of a
dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that
is foreseeable.
- As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance
of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling
branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.
97. REYES v. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL (Jorge feeling fever. Saw doctor.
Typhoid fever. The resident physician was Dr. Rico but shift ended and
Jorege was endorsed to Dr. Marvie Blanes. Issued medicine and conducted
a compatibility test on whether the patient would experience adverse
effects. No adverse effects and so the medicine was issued. Got worse.
FACTS:
- Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other
petitioners, namely, Rose Nahdja, Johnny, Lloyd, and Kristine, all surnamed
Reyes, were their children. Five days before his death on January 8, 1987,
Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he failed
to get relief from some home medication he was taking, which consisted of
analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor.
- On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his
wife. He was attended to by respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident
physician and admitting physician on duty, who gave Jorge a physical
examination and took his medical history. She noted that at the time of his
admission, Jorge was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and with
respiratory distress. Typhoid fever was then prevalent in the locality, as the
clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per month
Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered
a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge.
Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and malarial smear
were also made After about an hour, the medical technician submitted the
results of the test from which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive
for typhoid fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed
Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.
- Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also
took Jorges history and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her
impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the
accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test
with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Said test was
administered by nurse Josephine Pagente who also gave the patient a dose
of triglobe. As she did not observe any adverse reaction by the patient to
chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said
antibiotic to be administered on Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose
was administered on Jorge about three hours later just before midnight.
- At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorges
temperature rose to 41C. The patient also experienced chills and
exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr.
Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered
hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patients convulsions. When he
regained consciousness, the patient was asked by Dr. Blanes whether he
had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the past.
Jorge replied he did not
- After about 15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed
restlessness, and his convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the
emergency measures taken before and, in addition, valium was
administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the treatment and
slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or
mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around
2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty years old. The cause of his death was
Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damage applying res ipsa
loquitur?
HELD:
- No. There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and
that is under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Thus, courts of other
jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving
of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries
sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the
area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another
part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the
patient was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an
operation for appendicitis, among others.
- Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur were present, namely: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
- The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. In the Ramos case, the question was whether a surgeon, an
anesthesiologist, and a hospital should be made liable for the comatose
condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. In that case, the
patient was given anesthesia prior to her operation.
- Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time of her
operation, the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental
brain damage does not normally occur in a gallblader operation in the
absence of negligence of the anesthesiologist. Taking judicial notice that
anesthesia procedures had become so common that even an ordinary
person could tell if it was administered properly, we allowed the testimony
of a witness who was not an expert. In this case, while it is true that the
patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance was
rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death.
Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills
for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given
him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious
illness and professional medical help came too late for him.
- Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately
apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The
question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of
the standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the
issue of the correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can
be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.
98. PERLE CIE. D SEGUROS v. SARANGAYA III (Sarangayas owner of 3 door
apartment. Perles employee Pascual rented one door and set up office
and garage. 14 year old car. Set on fire. Res ipsa loquitur present in this
case. Pascual liable and Perle vicariously liable in employing Pascual)
FACTS:
- In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as Super A
Building and was subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased
out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second
and third doors of the building.
- In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its branch
manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of
lease of the first door of the Super A Building, abutting the office of
Matsushita.
- Perla Compania renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The
left side was converted into an office while the right was used by Pascual
as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided
vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of
supervision.
- On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not
bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned, and decided to
warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the
ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start. Thinking it
was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the
accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again
heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the
engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to
push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear
compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside
and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.
- Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard
two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no
time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings,
furniture and appliances.
- The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and thereafter
submitted a report to the provincial fire marshall. He concluded that the
fire was accidental. The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation
had no fire permit as required by law.
- Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property was filed against petitioner
Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to pay the amount
of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial building. At the
prosecutors office, petitioner Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the
complaint, which was granted.
- Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint based on
quasidelict against petitioners for a sum of money and damages, alleging
that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation
lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as
its employee.
- During the trial, respondents presented witnesses who testified that a
few days before the incident, Pascual was seen buying gasoline in a
container from a nearby gas station. He then placed the container in the
rear compartment of the car.
- In his answer, Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso
fortuito, hence, he was not liable for damages. He also denied putting a
container of gasoline in the cars rear compartment. For its part, Perla
Compania refused liability for the accident on the ground that it exercised
due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Pascual as its branch manager.
ISSUES:
- W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
o <Pascual> It was a fortuitous event
- W/N Perla Compania liable under tort
o <Perla Compania> We exercised due diligence in selecting Pascual
HELD:
- YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out
an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie
case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of
the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
- The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the
plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the
happening of the accident alone to establish negligence.
- The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a
defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised
to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants
responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part.
- To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
- Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not
ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. Ordinary refers to the usual
course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched
on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually
occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct
evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the
evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the
accident.
- The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent
act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in
the same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
- Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit
any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and
condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have
known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was
definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and
diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was
that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
- The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was
independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event
which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person
tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course
of conduct that aggravated the accident.[20]
- In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause
or contributory cause of the injury or loss. In a vehicular accident, for
example, a mechanical defect will not release the defendant from liability
if it is shown that the accident could have been prevented had he properly
maintained and taken good care of the vehicle.
ISSUE:
- W/N NPC is liable to respondent to pay damages?
HELD:
- NPC liable to pay temperate and exemplary damages.
- NPC's abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we
cannot award moral damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it.
We also cannot award attorney's fees in Pobre's favor since he did not
appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of
attorney's fees.
- Nonetheless, we find it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages
to Pobre.
- The court may award temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, if the court finds that a
party has suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved
with certainty from the nature of the case. As the trial and appellate courts
noted, Pobre's resort subdivision was no longer just a dream because
Pobre had already established the resort-subdivision and the prospect for
it was initially encouraging. That is, until NPC permanently damaged
Pobre's Property. NPC did not just destroy the property. NPC dashed
Pobre's hope of seeing his Property achieve its full potential as a resortsubdivision.
- The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain
authority.
- Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen's property rights. The power of
eminent domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with
circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we
hold NPC liable for exemplary damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages
or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
- Petition denied for lack of Merit. Decision of the Court of Appeals
Affirmed.
plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the
scene of the accident.
- There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose
inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the
petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to
Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and
supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district
were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were
reported every hour. 3 The petitioner should therefore have taken more
prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was
finally lost because of its negligence.
- The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such
derailments is of course not acceptable. And neither are we impressed by
the claim that the brakemen and the conductors were required to report
any defect in the condition of the railways and to fill out prescribed forms
for the purpose. For what is important is that the petitioner should act on
these reports and not merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not
easy to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it
should stress all the more the need for the responsible employees of the
petitioner to make periodic checks and actually go down to the railroad
tracks and see if the fish plates were in place.
- It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way back and
that it had passed the same rails earlier without accident. The suggestion is
that the rails were properly aligned then, but that does not necessarily
mean they were still aligned afterwards. It is possible that the fish plates
were loosened and detached during its first trip and the rails were as a
result already mis-aligned during the return trip. But the Court feels that
even this was unlikely, for, as earlier noted, the fish plates were supposed
to have been bolted to the rails and could be removed only with special
tools. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at the scene of the
mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been
removed long before.
- At any rate, the absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or reason
is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa
loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 4 thus: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
ISSUE:
- W/N the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private
respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.
HELD:
- NO. DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION NOT DEEMED WAIVED.
- Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates
involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically
plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the
defense of prescription. The defense of prescription, even if not raised in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such
defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading
- It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the
same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this
particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants
had been declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the
evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is
based is already barred by the statute of limitations
- In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with
the question of prescription. Actions for damages arising from physical
injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. The four-year
period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the
accident
ISSUE:
WON Respondents right to bring the instant case against petitioner has
already prescribed?
In law, a cause of action exists when the following requisites concur, to wit:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2)an obligation on the part on the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.
Facts:
On April 7,1980, Solid Homes sold to spouses Uy a subdivision lot and
thereafter spouses Uy sold the same lot to spouses Tan.
From then on, respondents visited their property a number of times, only
to find out the sad state of development thereat. There was no
infrastructure & utility system of water. Worse, squatters occupy their lot
&
its
surrounding
areas.
On Dec. 18,1995, respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the
needed utility system & clear the area of squatters by the end of January
1996.
NO
WON in the event respondents opt to rescind the contract, should
petitioner pay them the price they paid for the lot plus interest or the
current market value thereof? CURRENT MARKET VALUE.
HELD:
Petitioner argued that the 10 yrs prescriptive period should be reckoned
from April 7, 1980 when they sold the lot to spouses Uy or at the latest on
February 1985. The SC disagree because it is from the time an act is
performed or an omission incurred which is violative of plaintiffs right, that
signals the accrual of a case of action.
Thus, the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from the
date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of action arises when that
which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have
been done is done.
In this case, it was only on Dec. 18, 1995 when respondent made a written
demand upon petitioner to construct which are unquestionably in the
nature of an obligation to do.
Under Art. 1169, party who is under obligation to do something incurs
delay only from the time the obligee demands either judicially or extra
judicially for the fulfillment of obligation.
deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the
existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the
presence of fault or negligence in its commission.
Equity and justice dictate that the injured party should be paid the market
value, otherwise, respondent would enrich themselves at the expense of
the lot owners when they sell the same lot at the present market value.
ISSUE:
- W/N the father is liable for injury deliberately caused by his minor son.
HELD:
- YES. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means", while on the other hand, gives them the "right
to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.
- The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not
apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil
Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which
cover equal or identical cases.
FACTS:
- Monfort played a prank on Cuadra, she threw a headband at Cuadra,
Monfort said it was an earthworm.
- Cuadra turned around and her right eye was hit by the object.
- She was hurt so she rubbed the eye and treated it with powder.
- She told her parents what happened and was taken to the hospital for
treatment.
- She underwent operation and stayed there for 23 days.
- The Cuadra parents initiated a suit against Alfonso Monfort seeking actual
damages, moral damages, and attorneys fees.
- RTC and CA found for the petitioners.
ISSUE:
- W/N the father of Monfort is liable for the acts of his son in the case at
bar.
HELD:
- NO. Although 2180 states, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
- In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury
was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason
to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.
- DISSENTING OPINION
already ended; 3) there was no clear identification of the gun; and 4) the
defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
- In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend that Alfredo went to
school to finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite for graduation;
hence, he was under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents, on the other hand, contend that Alfredo went to school to
submit his physics experiment; hence, he was no longer under their
custody since the semester had already ended.
ISSUE:
- W/N Art 2180 applies to establishments which are technically not schools
of arts and trades
- W/N private respondents are liable for damages under Art 2180
HELD:
- YES. Art 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
Teachers, in general, shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the cannon of reddendo singula
singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and
heads of establishments of arts and trade to the word apprentices.
- NO. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over his students,
regardless of the nature of the school where he is teaching. The injury
subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school or any of
its personnel and equipment. It may be inflicted by any student regardless
of the school where he is registered.
- The student is under the custody of school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has already begun or has already ended. As long as
it can be shown that the student is in the school in the pursuit of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school continues.
- The teacher-in-charge is liable for his students torts as he is designated
to exercise supervision over them. Moreover, the teacher is liable
regardless of the students age.
- In this case, none of the private respondents were held liable. The rector,
dean of boys, and high school principal cannot be held liable because they
were not teachers-in-charge. The physics teacher was not negligent. The
school cannot be held directly liable since Art 2180 only speaks of teacher
or head of the school of arts and trades.
- PETITION DENIED.
- PARTIAL DISSENT (Melencio-Herrera)
- Restrictive meaning given to teacher as teacher-in-charge
contravenes the concept of substitute parental authority.
- School may be held liable as an employer for damages caused by their
employees under Art 2180.
around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was
on the brink of falling. He went to an area where he would not be able to
check on the childrens safety, and left the children close to the excavation,
an obviously attractive nuisance.
- Natural for the children to play around
- The boulder falling into the pit was a natural consequence of its weight
and the loose soil
- A teacher in loco parentis should make sure that the children are
protected from all harm while in his company. In this case, petitioner was
clearly negligent in his duty.
- PETITION GRANTED - Aquino pays damages
FACTS:
- Carlitos Bautista, a 3rd year Commerce student at PSBA, was stabbed on
Aug 30, 1985 at the 2nd floor premises of PSBA.
- It was established at the assailants were not members of the schools
academic community, but were elements from outside the school.
ISSUE:
- W/N under Article 2180, PSBA was liable for the Bautistas death.
HELD:
- NO. Under Art 2180, PSBA was not liable. (However, PSBA was not
necessarily exculpated from liability. PSBA may be held liable under breach
of contractual obligation or under provision of Art 21.)
- Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. Under Art 2180, the damage should have been caused or inflicted
by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in custody.
- The above situation does not exist in present case because the assailants
of Carlitos were not students of PSBA for whose acts the school could be
made liable.
116. SOLIMAN, JR. V .TUASON 209 SCRA 47
FACTS:
- In the morning of Aug 13, 1982, while in the premises of Republic Central
Colleges (Colleges), Maximinio Soliman was attacked, assaulted, striked,
and shot plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver by Jimmy
Solomon, a security guard employed by R.L. Security Agency.
- If not for the timely medical assistance given to him, Soliman could have
been dead.
the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the
school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
ISSUE:
W/N under Art 2180, Colleges should be held liable for the injuries
sustained by Soliman
FACTS:
- Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of FEU when he was shot
by Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises
- Saludaga was rushed to the hospital due to the wound he sustained
- Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the
shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no
formal complaint was filed against him
- Saludaga thereafter filed a complaint for damages against FEU on the
ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe
and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning
HELD:
- NO. Colleges was not liable under Art 2180.
- Art 2180 does not apply because Colleges was not the employer of Jimmy
Solomon. The employer of Solomon was R.L. Security Agency. Colleges was
only a client of R.L. Security Agency.
- Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of
such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of an agency has no
hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of guards cannot, in
the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose
premises or property are protected by the security guards.
- Soliman cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of
security guard Solomon.
- Solimans cause of action is not limited to the one under Art 2180.
Colleges may be held liable for acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of Colleges.
- As held in PSBA vs. CA, an implied contract may be held to be established
between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand,
and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract
results in obligations for both parties. In said case, there is an implicit or
built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where looms around
ISSUE:
- Whether or not FEU should be held liable for damages
HELD:
- YES. FEU is liable
- Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law student in FEU. As such, there
was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On
Saludaga's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of
the school. On the other hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to
impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to
ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the
campus.
- when Saludaga was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard
who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima
facie showing that FEU failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe
and secure environment to its students
- Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for
sponsored activity, the principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its
planning stage, and thus held that the school was liable.
ISSUE:
- W/N there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will
warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs.
HELD:
- NO. In order for St. Francis to be held liable for negligence, their own
negligence or the negligence of those under them would have to be
shown. Respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed
their son to join the excursion. This was shown by the fact that the father
gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic without knowing where it
would be held, and also by the fact that a witness testified that the mother
said she cooked adobo so her son could join the picnic.
- Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his
employee, the act or omission which caused the damage or prejudice must
have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in performance of their
assigned tasks. The picnic was not a school activity, and mere knowledge
by the principal in the planning of the picnic did not in any way show
consent in holding of the same. The teacher who planned the picnic did
her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any
untoward incident. She even invited PE instructors and scout masters who
have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming, and they even had
life savers. Petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no
moral damages can be assessed against them.
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
Jeep.
- There was no evidence that the petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the Jeep of respondent Vicencio Villanueva. IT was
Ched Villanueva who had custody, control and possession of the Jeep.
- The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause
of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
- St. Marys cannot be held liable for moral damages. Though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. In this case
the cause was not attributable to St. Marys Academy.
ISSUE:
- W/N CLC should be held liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
HELD:
- YES
- The fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door
could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact
that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management
or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
- CLC are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their
school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student
had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something
was wrong with the door.
122. MARTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS 205 SCRA 591
FACTS:
- Ernesto was the owner of a private bearing license. Around 2 am, May 11,
1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a MERALCO
electric post.
- MERALCO then demanded reparation from Ernesto and upon rejection,
sued him for damages based on tort, alleging that he was the employer of
Nestor.
- Ernestos main defense was that Nestor was not his employee. RTC ruled
in favor of MERALCO which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
- Who bears the burden of proving employer-employee relationship
between the owner of the car and the driver at the time of the accident?
HELD:
- HE WHO ALLEGES MUST PROVE HIS ALLEGATION! MERALCO had the
burden of proof, or the duty to present evidence on the fact in issue
necessary to establish his claim as required by Rule 131, Sec 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
- Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under
Article 2180 is liable for torts provided the following are shown: (1)
employment relationship and (2) employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.
- No evidence whatsoever was adduced by MERALCO to show the
employment relationship. Trial court merely presumed its existence. It
even shifted the burden to Ernesto by saying that he did not present any
proof to substantiate his allegation
- Although the law recognizes presumption juris (law) or presumption
hominis (fact), both are not applicable in the case at bar. There is no law
directing the deduction made by the courts below from the particular facts
presented to them by the parties. Neither is there a sufficient base from
the facts proved, or not denied for the inference that the petitioner is the
employer of Nestor.
- The case of Amor v. Soberano was missaplied because the vehicle
involved in that case was a 6x6 truck, which reasonably raised the factual
presumption that it was engaged in business and that its driver was
employed by the owner of the vehicle.
123. HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO V. ALBAYDA,JR. 624 SCRA 97
FACTS:
At around 1:45 in the afternoon of August 27, 1997, a Toyota Corolla Taxi
with a Plate No. of PYD-128, being driven by Redentor Completo, owned
and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad and a bicycle rode by the
herein respondent, Amando Albayda Jr., figured in a mishap along the
th
th
intersection of 8 and 11 Streets, Villamor Air Base leaving a deep
indentation on the rear right of the taxicab and causing serious physical
injuries on the part of the respondent. Albayda was brought to the
Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However, he was
immediately transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical
Center (AFPMC) on V. Luna Road, Quezon City, because there was a
fracture on his left knee and there was no orthopedic doctor available at
PAFGH. From August 21, 1997until February 11, 1998, he was confined
therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23,1998 until
March 22, 1998.The respondent filed a complaint for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay City. On the other hand, Completo filed a countercharge of damage to property through reckless imprudence against
Albayda which was later dismissed. The case was raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 45, where Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages
against petitioners Completo and Abiad. After Submission of the parties
respective pleadings, a pre-trial conference was held. On December 8,
1998,RTC issued a pre-trial order. Whereby both parties alleged their
defenses. On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the
judgment if which favoured the herein plaintiff [Albayda] and against
the defendants [Completo and Abiad].
ISSUES: (1) WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who
caused the collision.
(2) WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family.
(3)WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorneys fees to Albayda had
no basis.
RULING:(1) No. As stated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides
that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of the motorists negligence
is a question of fact. It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab
because due to overspeeding. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda.
(2) Yes. Under article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees, but the employers
responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed all the diligence of
HELD:
- YES. The driver is negligent.
- For a distance of 12-15 meters from the crossing, a view of the track is
wholly unobstructed.
- Assuming the view was obstructed, it was clearly the duty of the driver to
reduce the speed of his car and the noise thereof to such an extent that he
would be able to determine from the unrestricted and uninterrupted use
of all his faculties whether a train was near.
- A person must use ordinary care and prudence in passing over a railroad
crossing. While there is no absolute rule as to the precise precautions, it is
always incumbent on him to use ordinary care and diligence.
- What acts are necessary to constitute such care and diligence must
depend on the circumstances of each particular case. Especially when the
view of the tracks is obstructed, it is the drivers duty to slacken speed,
reduce noise or do any other act necessary.
- Railroad trains rarely pass over tracks without noise and their presence is
generally easily detected by persons who take ordinary precautions.
- YES. Bachrach, as master of the driver is liable.
- Art. 1902 provides when a person himself is liable for negligence. Articles
1903-1908 and 1910 provide when a person shall be liable for injuries
caused, not by his own negligence, but by the negligence of other persons
or things.
o Art. 1903: Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of
their branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.
o Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes:
1. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee or in the supervision over him after the selection, or both.
2. The presumption is juris tantum, thus may be rebutted
- If the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relived. In this case,
Bachrach failed to comply with the requisite of supervision.
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that he was
driving for the benefit of Filamer at the time of the accident. In the
absence of evidence that petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes
upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
139. CAYAO-LASAM V. SPOUSES RAMOLETE 574 SCRA 439
FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete
(Editha) was brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando,
La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed
via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic
sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac
pulsation.
The following day, Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from
the fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also
appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner
advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or
"raspa." The procedure was performed by the petitioner and Editha was
discharged the next day. On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again
brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe
abdominal pains. She was found to have a massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a
procedure for hysterectomy
and as aresult, she has no more chance to bear a child. Respondents: f irst
, petitioners failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha
during her first day of confinement at the LMC; second , petitioner
recommended that a D&C procedure be performed on Editha without
conducting any internal examination prior to the procedure;
third , petitioner immediately suggested a D&C procedure instead of
closely monitoring the state of pregnancy of Editha.
Petitioner: it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to
be discharged against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to return
for check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her lifethreatening condition on;that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by
her very abnormal pregnancy known as placenta increta,
which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal placental
implantation; that whether or not a D&C procedure was done by her or
any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage
of gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the same.
RULING: Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which
consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the
profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances. There are four elements involved in medical negligence
cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to
support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr.Augusto M.
Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. He testified that the
rupture occurred minutes prior to the hysterectomy or right upon
admission on September 15, 1994 which is about 1 months after the
patient wasdischarged, after the D&C was conducted. It is evident that the
D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas
uterus. The defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article
2179 of the Civil Code are:Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
mayr ecover damages, but the courts shall mitigate thedamages to be
awarded.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission
played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. The Court notes
the findings of the Board of Medicine: When complainant was discharged
on July 31,1994, hereinrespondent advised her to return on August 4,
1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. This advise was clear in
complainants Discharge Sheet.
However, complainant failed to do so.
This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the
doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted.
Had she returned, the respondent could have examined her thoroughly.
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the
defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.
Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the
plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of
its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.
Zafe and Cereno then examined Raymend and found that his
blood pressure was normal and nothing in him significant.
Parents arrived with the bag of blood which they handed to Dr.
REaluyo
Immediately after pregnant woman operation done, they started
on Raymond
While operation ongoing Rayomnd suffered from cardiac arrest
and was pronounced dead.
His death certificate indicate that the immediate cause of death
was hypovolemic shock or cessation of the functions of the organs
of the body due to loss of blood.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners were grossly negligent in the performance of
their duties?
HELD:
-
independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as
follows:
o "For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who
was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2)
where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the
plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and
acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct
of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence."
o The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not require
an express representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be
negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if the hospital
holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care without informing
the patient that the care is provided by independent contractors.
o The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied
if the plaintiff relies upon the hospital to provide complete emergency
room care, rather than upon a specific physician.
- The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to
determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician.
- The first factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was
alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this
regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient
that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a
representation may be general and implied.
- The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of
estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel,
an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon." Estoppel rests on this rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it."
- In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its
medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent
authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada
was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such
authority.
- First, CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its
medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada. Upon Dr. Estrada's request for
Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily accommodated
Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition.
- Second, CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC
letterhead. Prior to Corazon's admission and supposed hysterectomy, CMC
asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which reinforced
Rogelio's belief that Dr. Estrada was a member of CMC's medical staff.
- Without any indication in these consent forms that Dr. Estrada was an
independent contractor-physician, the Spouses Nogales could not have
known that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor. Significantly, no
one from CMC informed the Spouses Nogales that Dr. Estrada was an
independent contractor. On the contrary, Dr. Atencio, who was then a
member of CMC Board of Directors, testified that Dr. Estrada was part of
CMC's surgical staff.
- Third, Dr. Estrada's referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr.
Espinola, who was then the Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department of CMC, gave the impression that Dr. Estrada as a member of
CMC's medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed
specialists in treating Corazon
- The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes
characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
- CMC's defense that all it did was "to extend to [Corazon] its facilities" is
untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals,
such as CMC, are in the business of treatment.
- The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to
Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do
the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon's death
- Unfortunately, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did not conduct an
immediate investigation on the reported missing gauzes to the great
prejudice and agony of its patient. Dr. Jocson, a member of PSIs medical
staff, who testified on whether the hospital conducted an investigation,
was evasive.
- Not only did PSI breach its duty to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously
liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.
- Moreover, there is merit in the trial courts finding that the failure of PSI
to conduct an investigation established PSIs part in the dark conspiracy of
silence and concealment about the gauzes
143. DR. RUBI LI V. SPOUSES SOLIMAN 651 SCRA 32
Legal Facts:
Respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy
of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center
(SLMC) on July 7, 1993 and results showed that Angelica was suffering
from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, (highly malignant) cancer of the
bone because of that a necessity of amputation was conducted by Dr,
Tamayo on Angelicas right leg in order to remove the tumor and to
prevent the metastasis that chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo,
which he referred to petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist. The
respondent was admitted to SLMC on August 18, 1993; however, she died
eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of chemotherapy
first cycle. Respondents brought their daughters body to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem
examination after the refusal of the hospital to release the death
certificate without full payment of bills. The Medico-Legal Report showed
that the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation. The
respondents filed charges against the SLMC and physicians involve for
negligence and failure to observe the essential precautions in to prevent
Angelicas untimely death. Petitioner denied the allegation for damages as
she observed best known procedures, highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs despite all efforts the patient died.
The trial court was in favor of the petitioner and ordered to pay their
unpaid hospital bill in the amount of P139, 064.43, but the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision supporting the respondents pray.
Holding:
In this case medical malpractice is proven because the four essential
elements of such action are present based upon the doctrine of informed
consent.
Reasoning:
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice
action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had
a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to
disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not
have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment." Informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to
significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment that would
alter her decision to undergo. The physician is not expected to give the
patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him
a reasonable general explanation in nontechnical terms.
The trial court however dismissed the case. It found that the doctor was
not liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and
employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs on Angelica [though] despite all efforts said patient
died. CA reversed
But the SC reversed the decision of the CA based on a 9-5 vote.
Policy Formation:
In all sorts of medical procedures either invasive or not, medical institution
must have a certificate of competency in rendering standards of care to
delicate medical procedures before initiating a general protocol that would
establish a guideline principle in a form of proper disclosure of such
procedure and presenting a consent or waiver to their patients so that
possible
future
medico-legal
suits
will
be
prevented.
Synthesis:
In Dr. Rubi Li, vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman, as parents/heirs of
deceased Angelica Soliman, Respondents, G.R. No. 165279, promulgated
on June 7, 2011, the Court ruled that medical malpractice is proved base
on lack/impaired informed consent, and reasonable expert testimony
subject a breach of duty causing gross injury to its patient.
144. AQUINO V. HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CALAYOG 678 SCRA 609
145. LUCAS V. TUAO 586 SCRA 173
Facts: Peter Lucas contracted sore eyes in his right eye. He was referred to Dr.
an ophthalmologist at St. Lukes.
Upon consultation with Dr.
(9 days since the problems began), he was
already taking Maxitrol to address the problem. Upon examination, Tuano
diagnosed
Peter with
conjunctivitis
or sore
eyes. He prescribed Spersacet-C6 eyedrops for Peter and told the latter to
return for follow-up after a week. A week later,
told Peter that the sore
eyes in the latters right eye had already cleared up and he could discontinue the SpersacetC. However, The same eyedeveloped Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC)so Tuan o
prescribed to the former a steroid
-based eye drop calledMaxitrol. On a later check-up,
instructed the former to
taper down the dosage of Maxitrol , because the EKC in hisright eye had already
resolved. Dr.
specifically cautioned Peter that , being a steroid, Maxitrol
had to be withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur.
Peter would go back and forth to Tuanos clinic to complain about the worsening condition
of his right eye. In theseinstances, Tuano would prescribe different meds to
counter the recurring EKC. On Dec. 1998, Peter had no vision in hisright eye;
right eye appeared to be bloody and swollen. Tuano ordered the immediate
discontinuation of Maxitrol and prescribed other meds. Peter went to see
another ophthalmologist, Dr. Batungbacal. Dr. Batungbacals diagnosis was
Glaucoma and
recommended Laser Trabeculoplasty. Dr.
was at a loss as to how to balance
the treatment of Peters EKC vis--vis the presence of glaucoma thus he referred
Peter to Dr. Agul to who concurred on Peters condition and recommended the same
medication. Also, Peter was prodded by his friends to seek a second medical opinion. Thus
he consulted Dr. MarioV. Aquino who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma.
He informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal except
for the tubular vision in Peters right eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr.
Aquino essentially told Peter that the latters condition would require
lifetime medication and follow-ups. Thus, he underwent 2 procedures of
the laser trabeculoplasty.Claiming to have steroid- induced glaucoma and
blaming Tuan o for the same
, Peter filed a complaint for damages against
. He averred that as the direct consequence of his prolonged use of
Maxitrol, he suffered from steroid induced glaucoma as well as incurable
impairment of vision which may lead to permanent blindness. They prayed
that prayed that
be adjudged liable for compensation for his
impaired vision, actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys
fees.In his defense, Tuano asserted that the drug-induced glaucoma is
temporary and curable and that Steroids are prescribed to treat EKC.
Contrary to Peters fallacious claim, he did NOT continually prescribe the
drug Maxitrol because it was discontinued as soon as EKC disappeared and was
resumed only when EKC reappeared. He stressed that Peters glaucoma can only be due to
other causes not attributable to steroids
long standing glaucoma; and that in fact steroidswere in fact beneficial as they
provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier.RTC dismissed the
complaint for insufficient evidence. Upon appeal, CA also dismissed it.
Issue: Did Lucas fail to prove that Tuano ignored the standard medical procedure for
ophthalmologists as well as administered medication with recklessness and
exhibited an absence of competence and skills expected of him?
Held: YES. The case at bar is a medical negligence case against a physician based on the
latters professional negligence.
In order to prevail, the petitioner is required to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and
learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result
ofsuch failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages. Such claim for
damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176
of the Civil Code.In medical negligence/malpractice cases, there exists a
. It is necessary to prove not only that he has been injured and defendant has been at
fault, but also that the defendants fault caused the injury. Causation must
be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent
expert testimony - proof that Peters glaucoma would not have occurred but for
Dr.
supposed negligent conduct
.What constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question that
should have been presented to experts. If no standard is established the courts
have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach. Absent expert medical
opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in speculations
146. BAHIA V. LITONJUA & LEYNES 30 PHIL 624
FACTS:
- Litonjua bought and delivered to her son, Ramon Ramirez, who
owns and manages a garage, an automobile, in order to help him in
his business. Ramirez leased this car to Leynes to be used by the
latter in transporting passengers from Balayan to Tuy, Batangas at
the rate of Php 20 a day. Ramirez furnished Leynes a driver and a
machinist with the car. While passing Balayan to Tuy, the car did not
yield to the driver when he turned to a corner in the streets of
Balayan because of a defective steering gear.
- As a consequence, the car ran across the street and rammed
against the wall of a house where plaintiffs daughter was then
leaning and crushed her to death. Plaintiff brought suit for damages
against both Litonjua and Leynes to pay damages. Leynes appealed.
Plaintiff likewise appealed the dismissal of the case against Litonjua.
ISSUE:
- W/N Litonjua is liable.
- W/N Leynes is liable.
HELD:
- NO. Though the mother purchased the automobile, she turned it
over to the garage of her son for use therein. The establishment
belonged to the son, Ramon Ramirez, and he had the full
management and control of it and received all the profits therefrom.
So far as appears, the contract with Leynes was made without her
knowledge or consent by Ramirez as the owner and manager of the
International Garage. While she may have been in one sense the
owner of the machine, that fact does not, under the other facts of the
case, make her responsible for the results of the accident.
- NO. Though the chauffeur who was driving the machine was a
servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of
the automobile belonged to him and the automobile was operated
under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making
him responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in
the automobile itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only
establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when
that liability shall cease. It says:
o The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damages.
- From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of
a law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employees shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.
- This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. In the case before us
the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear of the
automobile immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was
negligent in selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to
maintain it in good condition after selection, and the burden of proof
was on him to show that he had exercised the care of a good father
of a family.
- As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the
machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in
good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a
HELD:
- YES. The complaint is based on a contractual obligation of
transportation of passenger, which Malate Taxicab failed to carry out,
and the action is entirely different and independent from that in the
third-party complaint which is based on alleged tortuous act
committed by the third-party defendant Sgt. Dequito. (Thus, the thirdparty complaint is not a prejudicial question.)
- The court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence
on the part of Malate Taxicab in order to hold it responsible to pay
the damages sought for by Sy, for the action initiated therefore is
based on a contract of carriage and not on tort.
- When Sy rode the taxi, Malate Taxicab assumed the express
obligation to transport him to his destination safely, and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstance,
and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault and negligence of the carrier.
- This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved, and it was incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has
exercised extraordinary diligence.
- Art. 1733: Common carriersare bound to observe extraordinary
diligencefor the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
- Art. 1755: using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances
- Art. 1756: In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
151. GENSON V. ADARIE 153 SCRA 512 (Genson was highway district
engineer. Sued because bucket fell on nape and paralyzed Adarle. SC:
Argument for non-suability does not apply. Not necessarily sued in official
capacity. No sufficient basis for master-servant doctrine in tort law to
apply. Buensalido was not working overtime as a government employee.
No malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on part of Genson to hold him
liable for the acts of Buensalido)
FACTS:
- Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of
junk. Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away
scrap iron from the said compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or about
312.00 a month.
- At 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day,
while the Adarle was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a
truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of the
payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket
suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back portion of his head just below
the nape of his neck.
- He was paralyzed from the knee down to his toes. The petitioner,
Genson, was sued among others, as Highway District Engineer.
ISSUE:
- W/N Genson can be held liable for damages
HELD:
- NO. Petitioner's Identification as the Highway District Engineer in the
complaint filed by the private respondent did not result in the said
complaint's becoming a suit against the government or state.
- In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that "the fact that the duties
and positions of the defendants are indicated does not mean that they are
being sued in their official capacities, especially as the present action is not
one against the Government." Furthermore, the accident in the case at bar
happened on a non-working day and there was no showing that the work
strike and the refusal of its employees to handle the same; that the
tortuous provisions of Art. 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
inapplicable in this case where a contractual obligation is involved.
ISSUE:
- W/N Manila Railroad can be held liable
HELD:
- YES. Manila Railroads liability for breach of its contractual
obligation cannot be excused by the refusal of its employees to
handle the cargo. The prestation did not by such refusal become
legally or physically impossible under Art. 1266 of the Civil Code.
- Since it discharges its obligations only through its officials and
employees, the unlawful acts of said officials and employees of
mauling Genatos employee who was taking the cargo, did not
render the obligation legally or physically impossible without its fault.
FACTS:
- Ford issued several checks for payment of its percentage taxes in
favor of the Commissioner of Internal revenue
- The proceeds of the checks however were diverted to accounts of a
syndicate purportedly through the help of employees of Ford and
PCIB.
- One of the Checks were recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the General
Ledger Accountant of Ford because there was allegedly an error in
the computation of the tax due to the BIR.
With Riveras instruction, PCIB replaced the check with two of its
own ManagersChecks
These checks were later deposited by alleged members of a
syndicate.
- The other checks were diverted through a co-conspirator named
Roberto Castro who was a pro-manager of the San Andres Branch
of PCIB.
In connivance with one Winston Dulay, Castro himself
subsequently opened a Checking Account in the name of a fictitious
person denominated as Reynaldo Reyes in the Meralco Branch of
PCIBank where Dulay works as Assistant Manager.
After an initial deposit of P100.00 to validate the account, Castro
deposited a worthless Bank of America Check in exactly the same
amount as the first FORD check (Exh. A, P5,851,706.37) while
this worthless check was coursed through PCIBs main office
enroute to the Central Bank for clearing, replaced this worthless
check with FORDs Exhibit A and accordingly tampered the
accompanying documents to cover the replacement.
- Ford sought to hold drawee bank, Citibank, and collecting bank,
PCIB, liable for the value of the checks since they were made to pay
the percentage taxes anew.
- The CA held Citibank solely liable for the value of the checks
ISSUE:
- W/N the fraud committed by an employee of Ford would bar the
latter from recovering the value of the checks;
- W/N PCIB is liable because of the acts of its employees.
HELD:
exercised due
diligence in selecting its employees
HELD:
- In the first place, it is pointed out that the supposed liability of the
defendant company is derived from acts done by Jose D. Ramirez,
an employee of the company of proven experience and long service;
and it is insisted that the
defendant company had used due precaution in placing him in the
responsible position occupied by him at the time those acts were
done. From this it is insisted that the company is entitled to the
benefit of the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the responsibility of the master for the negligent acts
and omissions of his servant shall cease when the master has
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
- We are of the opinion, however, that the point is not well taken; for
it affirmatively appears in this case that the acts done by Ramirez,
which caused the damages, were in effect approved by his
superiors, in representation of the company itself, and that so far
from exercising the diligence of a good father of a family to avert the
threatened damage to the plaintiff's crops after the dam was
destroyed, no steps were taken by the company to avert that
damage, and the persons most interested were not themselves
permitted to repair the dam. The responsibility of the company must
therefore be considered not to be affected by the circumstance that
due care had been used in the original choice of the agent.
- W/N the Company can be held liable for the alleged negligence of
Captain Lasa.
HELD:
- NO. In the Rakes case, this court based its decision expressly on
the principle that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to a
culpa not arising from a contract.
- On this point the court said:
The acts to which these articles (1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code) are applicable are understood to be those not growing out or
preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or
quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same Code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359, 365.).
- It is not true that proof of due diligence and care in the selection of
and instructions to a servant relieves the master of liability for the
former's acts; on the contrary, such proof shows that the liability
never existed.
- As Manresa (vol. VIII, page 68) says, the liability arising from an
extra-contractual wrong is always based upon a voluntary act or
omission, which, while free from any wrongful intent, and due to
mere negligence or carelessness, causes damaged to another. A
master who takes all possible precaution in selecting his servants or
employees, bearing in mind the qualifications necessary for the
performance of the duties to be entrusted to them, and instructs
them with equal care, complies with his duty to all third parties to
whom he is not bound under contract, and incurs no liability if, by
reason of the negligence of such servants though it be during the
performance of their duties as such, third parties should suffer
damages. It is true that under article 1903 of the Civil Code, the law
presumes that the master, if regarded as an establishment, has been
negligent in the selection of, or instruction to, its servants, but that is
a mere juris tantum presumption and is destroyed by the evidence of
due care and diligence in this respect.
- The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's
wharf collapse was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate
and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted
his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F.
C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by
the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down
by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore
absolved from all liability.
158.
Meralco
v.
Castillon
688
SCRA
455
FACTS:
FACTS:
- However, the defendant was not inside the car when it was driven
by the driver, nor did he know that the car was taken by the driver.
ISSUE:
- W/N the defendant is liable.
HELD:
- NO. This fact decides the question because it clearly shows that
the accident did not occur in the course of the performance of the
duties or service for which said chauffeur Mariano Capulong had
been hired. The defendant did not hire him to do as he pleased,
using the defendant's car as if it were his own. His duties and service
were confined to driving his master's car as the latter ordered him,
and the accident did not take place under said circumstances.
FACTS:
FACTS:
- Juan Camarote was the registered owner of a jeep and Gregorio
Gemilga was his driver.
- On August 30, 1953 as Gemilga drove the jeep along the road in
Davao, it bumped against the rear of another which 2 passengers
had just boarded.
- Felix Giluano suffered many physical injuries and he later died.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- YES. A comparison between the Spanish civil code and the civil
code of the Philippines shows that paragraph 5 of the latter is not
contained in the former. This paragraph reads as follows:
- Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry
- Under the new civil code, the owner of the vehicle is included
among the persons who may respond for the acts of their employees
who cause damage to third persons in the course of their
employment.
- The mere fact that the driver was a professional driver is not a
sufficient exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family which
would exempt him from responsibility. The Court took judicial notice
of the fact that licenses are easy to obtain.
- The owner should have examined the applicant for employment as
to his qualifications, his experience and record of service.
- The jeep that Sabiniano was not his; it is owned by Duavit but was taken
without his consent and Sabiniano was not even his employee.
ISSUE:
- W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be
held liable under 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither
driven by an employee nor taken with the consent of the owner
HELD:
- NO. The owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving
the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge
and by a person not employed by him as held in Duquillo v. Bayot.
- To hold defendant liable for the accident caused by the negligence of
Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor his employee would be absurd as
it would be like holding the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident
caused by the person who stole such vehicle.
164. DE LEON BROKERAGE V. COURT OF APPEALS 4 SCRA 517; 114 PHIL
437
(Petitioners Cargo truck being driven by Luna. Hit a jeep. De Leon
Brokerage alleges that Luna not in performance of duties during time of
mishap. De Leon is liable. Not sufficiently proven that Luna was NOT in
exercise of duties)
FACTS:
- Petitioners cargo truck was being driven by Employee Augusto Luna.
- Cargo truck collided with a passenger jeepney Angeline Steen.
- Petitioner alleges that Luna was not in the performance of his duties
when the accident took place and that he was not inside the vehicle at the
time of the mishap.
- RTC and CA found the petitioner solidarily liable with Luna.
FACTS:
- Antonio Sarmiento and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep, another jeep
driven by Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped the plaintiffs jeep.
ISSUE:
- W/N petitioners defenses both absolve him of liability.
- Both plaintiffs suffered injuries for which they are now seeking damages.
HELD:
- NO to both defenses.
- As to the first, this was not sufficiently proven in court that Luna was
acting against the instructions of petitioner.
- As to the second, petitioner invites attention to Art. 2184, of the Civil
Code, and insists that it is only in the instance covered thereby when
the owner of the motor vehicle is riding therein at the time of the mishap
that the employer becomes solidarily liable with the driver for any
accident resulting from the latter's negligence. That article refers to
owners of vehicles who are not included in the terms of Art. 2180 "as
owners of an establishment or enterprise."
- Petitioner is solidarily liable with Luna, however the former can recover
from the latter whatever he pays the victim
165. FABRE, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS 259 SCRA 426 (Fabre spouses
owned Mazda Minibus for Services of Students. Slippery road. Injuries.
Fabre is liable. This involves contract of carriage. Did not have to be
engaged in the business of public transportation. The provision on
common carriers makes no distinction. Not excused by diligence of a good
father)
FACTS:
- The Fabre spouses are the owners of a Mazda Minibus, they used it
principally as a bus service for students in St. Scholasticas College in
Malate.
- The driver was Porfirio Cabil.
- Private respondent arranged for the transportation of 33 of its members
from Manila to La Union and back for P3,000.
- During the trip on the way to La Union, while travelling at 50 km per hour
on a slippery road due to rain, Cabil came upon a sharp curve.
- As he made the turn, the bus skid to the left and rammed a fence, a
coconut tree also fell and smashed its front portion.
- Several passengers were injured.
- RTC ruled for the passengers, CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
- W/N the petitioners are liable.
HELD:
- YES. As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage.
Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of
public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to apply to them.
- Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public.
- The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a
sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think
that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
- As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise "extraordinary
diligence" for the safe transportation of the passengers to their
destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
- Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
- This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
- Petitioners are jointly and severally liable with the driver.
166. SARIA V. MANGUBAT 4 CAR 777
FACTS:
- The incident took place at EDSA, at about 5:30 a.m. of March 24, 1958.
Marcial Caedo was driving his car on his way from Q.C. to the airport. With
him in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the car driven by Rafael Bernardo; with him was Yu
Khe Thai.
- A carretela was in front of the car driven by Bernardo, but instead of
slowing down or stopping behind the carretela until the lane was clear,
Bernardo veered the car to the left in order to pass.
- Bernardo caught the forward rim of the rigs left wheel, wrenching it off
and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where
it collided with the vehicle driven by Caedo.
ISSUE:
- W/N Bernardo was liable for the accident
- W/N Bernardos employer, Yu Khe Thai, was solidarily liable with him
HELD:
- YES, Bernardo was liable for the accident. The collision was directly
traceable to Bernardos negligence.
- NO, Yu Khe Thai cannot be held solidarily liable with him.
- Art 2184 is applicable:
- ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
- Basis of masters liability is paterfamilias, not respondeat superior.
- Negligence cannot be imputed upon Yu Khe Thai because:
He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver.
He was not himself at the wheel.
He could not have anticipated Bernardos sudden decision to pass the
carretela on its left side. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and
warn the driver accordingly
169. SERRA V. MUMAR 668 SCRA 335
FACTS:
- At about 5:00 a.m. of October 14, 1987, a passenger jeepney driven by
Mallari, Jr. and owned by Mallari, Sr. collided with the delivery van of
Bulletin Publising Corp.
- Mallari, Jr. went to the left lane of the highway to overtake a Fiera which
had stopped on the right lane. After he overtook the Fiera and while
negotiating a curve in the highway, he collided with the delivery van of
Bulletin. The impact caused the passenger jeepney to turn around and fall
on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers, one of whom was
Israel Reyes, who died.
ISSUE:
- W/N Mallari, Jr. was liable for the accident
- W/N Mallari, Sr., the owner of the passenger jeepney was liable for the
accident
HELD:
- YES, Mallari, Jr. was liable for the accident. He recklessly operated the
passenger jeepney. In a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic
rules, he overtook a vehicle while traversing a curve on the highway. This
was a violation of Sec 41 (a) and (b) of R.A. 4136.
- Under Article 2185, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating a traffic regulation. Mallari, Jr. failed to
present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. As such,
he was liable.
- YES, Mallari, Sr. was liable for the accident also. The negligence and
recklessness of Mallari, Jr. was binding on Mallari, Sr. who was the owner
of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the
fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in
order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the
passenger.
- Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari
Sr. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard
for all the circumstances, and any injury or death that might be suffered by
- Aonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act
was the proximate cause of the accident. The court held that Villagracia
would not have been able to avoid this injury had his bicycle been up to
par with safety regulations, especially considering Aonuevo was already
speeding as he made the turn.
- The fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of
the accident may have shown some degree of negligence on his part, but
such negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was
a contributing cause of the injury.
- To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a casual link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. Aonuevo was held solely responsible.
173. MENDOZA V. SORIANO 524 SCRA 260
FACTS:
- Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a
speeding Tamaraw. Soriano was thrown 5 meters away and the Tamaraw
stopped 25 meters from the point of impact. The driver of the Tamaraw
refused to bring Soriano to the hospital. Soriano was brought to the
hospital by a school bus, but he eventually died. His heirs filed a complaint
for damages against Macasasa (driver) and Mendoza (owner of the
Tamaraw).
- Mendoza claims she is not liable because she exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family of her employee.
- TC found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth using the gap in
the fance rather than the pedestrian overpass. CA reversed and ordered
Mendoza to pay the Soriano heirs.
ISSUE:
W/N there was sufficient legal basis to award damages
HELD:
- YES. The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules. He failed
to maintain a safe speed and he refused to aid the accident victim. Under
2185, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations.
- Under 2180, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Petitioner was
held primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Macasasa
since she failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in supervising Macasasa. Soriano was held guilty of contributory
negligence and the award of damages was reduced.
174. MERRITT V. GOV'T OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS 34 PHIL 311
FACTS:
- Plaintiff was riding on a motorcycle, at a speed of 10-12 miles per hour, at
the same time, the General Hospital ambulance, in violation of the Motor
Vehicle Act, turned suddenly into the right side of Taft Avenue, without
having sounded any whistle or horn, and struck the plaintiff.
- Plaintiff was severely injured and his mental and physical conditions were
noticeably depreciated. (He used to be one of the best constructor of
wooden buildings but after the accident, he had to dissolve the partnership
he had formed with the engineer, etc.)
- It was held that the collision between the motorcycle and the ambulance
was due solely to the negligence of the chauffer.
- Merritt was authorized through an Act to bring a suit against the
Government to fix the responsibility of the collision and to determine the
amount of damages.
ISSUE:
- Did the Government in enacting the Act, simply waive its immunity from
suit or did it concede its liability to the plaintiff?
HELD:
- The general rule is that the Government cannot be sued by an individual
without its consent. In this case, plaintiff was authorized to bring this
action against the Government "to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance and to determine the amount
of damages, if any, to which Merritt is entitled on account of said collision.
- It is NOT for this court to determine whether the Government intends to
make itself liable for damages. Under the American jurisprudence, the
state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers and agents whom
it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment.
- ECA not a branch or office of the government, it was an agency set up for
specific purposes which were not attainable through the official functions
entrusted by law to the government or its branches.
- The ECA was one of the groups of SPECIAL AGENTS created by the
government for activities ordinaroly ungovernmental in character (e.g.
PNB, NDC, etc.).
- In qualifying the special agent with the adjective "special", the Civil Code
aimed at distinguishing it from the regular or ordinary agent of
government, which refers to all officers and employees in the public
service.
- Rosete filed a claim for damages in the office of the Insular Auditor. The
latter denied the claim of Rosete against the Government. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT LIABLE.
- Officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the Government within
the definition or scope provided for in Merrit v. Government: responsibility
of the state is limited to the case where it acts through a SPECIAL AGENT
(one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, FOREIGN TO
THE EXERCISE OF THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE if he is a special official - so
that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
- The above-mentioned concept does not apply to any executive agent
who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.
DISSENTING OPINION
- While driving his freight truck in compliance with his duties, he ran over
Palafox who died as a result.
- Heirs filed a separate civil action against the employer province, the
Distric Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer and Torralba.
ISSUE:
- W/N the province could be faulted becuase Torralba is a special agent.
HELD:
- NO. TORRALBA IS NOT A SPECIAL AGENT.
- Appellants invoke the doctrine of repondent superior as illustrated in
Mendoza v. De Leon, concerning the liability of municipal corporations for
negligent acts of their employees. In that case it was enunciated that if the
negligent employee was ENGAGED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary
or business functions - THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT LIABLE.
- The construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the
driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental
activities. Province is not liable to pay.
177 REPUBLIC V. PALACIO 23 SCRA 899
FACTS:
- The Irrigation Service Unit, an office/agency under the Dept of Public
Works and Communication was sued for tort and the Sheriff of Manila
garnished the deposit of the ISU in the PNB, Manila.
HELD:
- The ISU being an office in the govt and its fund is a public fund. It is being
shown that the ISU was guilty of tort, however the sate not its fund is not
liable because the ISU was not a special agent. Under Art 2180 the state is
liable only for tort caused by its special agent.
benefit of the public at large, such acts by the agents and servants are
deemed to be acts by public or state officers, and for the public benefit.
- Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being
delegated to the municipal governments. The state being immune for
injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly
governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in
the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by
statute.
- A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance
of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration
of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or
individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is
concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents
within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to
the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals.
- As to such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for
these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.
- The leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified
period of time is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease,
when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the
municipality is bound to respect.
- It cannot be said that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby
making the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid reason
at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for the interests of
the municipality. The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the
damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of
lease of the ferry privilege in question.
179. TORIO V. FONTANILLA 85 SCRA 599
FACTS:
- The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No.
159 to manage the town fiesta celebration on January 1959. It also passed
creating the 1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee which in
turn organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage, with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman.
Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit
and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial
private and corporate.
- This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which
result in an injury to third persons.
- If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental
function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality
unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so
long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they
did not act wantonly and maliciously.
- With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto.
- The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must
answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in
the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from
contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions
herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable,
accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of
liability co-exist.
- It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitionermunicipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's
officers, employees, or agents.
- We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as
Sander The Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta
in January of 1959; it created a committee in charge of the entertainment
and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call for
the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla
was one of the participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that
he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.
- It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the
public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their
marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have been taken during good
weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have
been placed under the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should
have seen to it that the openings were covered.
- It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5
months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings
that during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow
of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No
warning sign of impending danger was evident.
- Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle
of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had it
been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence
of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
- Asiatec and Cityy are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.
183. DUMLAO V. COURT OF APPEALS 114 SCRA 247
- Isauro Elizalde accompanied by his wife, while driving his jeep southwards
came upon a hole on the south end of said bridge right on his way, about 1
meter in diameter and 8 ft. deep, surrounded by boulders, thus blocking
his lane. To avoid it he swerved his jeep abruptly to the left side of the
road where he was confronted by a steep embankment. He swerved his
jeep back to the right to get into his lane after passing the boulders and
the destroyed portion of the road but he collided with the truck of
defendant Hermanos de Yap driven by Dulcesimo Dacoy who came from
the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Isauro Elizalde died on
the spot in his jeep while his wife who was found on the road, severely
injured but was still alive, died soon after in the hospital.
- The left end of the truck's fender was bent while the portion of its left
hood just below the front headlight and its edge just above the left front
wheel were slightly dented. The jeep which was enveloped in flames from
the incident was badly damaged. The road where the two vehicles collided
is a straight one and judging from the sketch made by the police
investigator both drivers could have noticed each other even when they
were yet far from each other. The same sketch also shows that the jeep
had already passed the boulders and the destroyed portion of the road and
was way beyond such hazards when the collision took place.
performance of his official duties. Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith
or malice, and what is more was not convincingly proven.
- Based on the complaint there was no sufficient cause of action was
alleged, and the evidence utterly fails to provide a basis for imposing on
petitioner the liability as has been declared against him jointly with his codefendants, the City of Davao and Hermanos de Yap, by the trial court. The
latter defendants must have already satisfied the judgment against them,
for they no longer took appeal from the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals, and the private respondents did not bother to file their brief in
this instant proceedings, for they did not even ask for extension of time to
do so if they had any desire to file the appellees' brief.
- There remains the only question of whether Section 5 of R. A. No. 4354
under which the respondent Court of Appeals found petitioner properly
included as a defendant whom it considered sued in his private capacity,
was properly applied by said Court. In its own words, the Court of Appeals
(Second Division) said that "the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Act
4354) which took effect on June 19, 1965, cannot retroact to effect (sic) a
case that occurred on February 28, 1964." But surprisingly, the same Court
went on to say: "Moreover, in the case of defendant City Engineer Samuel
Dumlao, his inclusion in the complaint, as shown in paragraph 3 thereof is
in his private capacity and conforms with the provision of Section 5 of Act
4354." This very patent inconsistency may well be said to reflect how
infirm is the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as
petitioner, who incidentally has long retired, is concerned.
184. PALMA V. GRACIANO 99 PHIL 72
FACTS:
- A governor and a Mayor filed a criminal charge which was dismissed for
being groundless. They were sued.
ISSUE:
- W/N the City government may be held liable for the criminal acts of its
officers.
HELD:
- The prosecution of a crime is a governmental function, not a corporation
action. In the discharged thereof, the Province or City or Municipality is not
liable for tortuous acts of its officers. Only the public officers acting
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners
son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under
Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action
for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their
claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners
opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent
whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim
for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC,
the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article
2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own
negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and
selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership
will be suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in
his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive
use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly
negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is
open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely
unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent
himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair
defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence
required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care
required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt
him from liability in this case.
187. DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS 39 PHIL 587
FACTS:
- In 1902, plaintiff and Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract for the
conveyance of a tract of land owned by the latter to the former; the deed
should be executed as soon as the title to the land should be perfected by
proceedings in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens certificate
should be produced in the name of Endencia.
- In 1906, a decree in favor of Endencia was entered but no Torrens title
was issued. Upon entry of the decree, Daywalt and Endencia entered into
another contract with a view to carry out the original agreement into
effect. The 2nd contract was not executed since no Torrens title was issued
until the period for performance contemplated in the contract expired.
- In 1908, a 3rd agreement was entered into: that upon receiving the
Torrens title, Endencia was to deliver the same to the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank in Manila, to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in
San Francisco, where it was to be delivered to the plaintiff upon payment
of a balance of P3,100.
- In the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the Torrens title, it
was found that the boundaries inclosed was 1,248 ha instead of 452 ha
stated in the contract.
- As such, after the issuance of the Torrens title, Endencia was reluctant to
convey the title to Daywalt, contending that she did not intend to transfer
as big a property as that contained in the title and that she was
misinformed of its area.
- Daywalt filed an action against Endencia for specific performance. On
appeal before the SC, Daywalt obtained a favorable decision, However, no
damages was sought or awarded in the case against Endencia.
- Daywalt filed an action against respondent for interference in contractual
relations based on the ff. background:
- Respondent was the original owner of the property and owned an
adjacent tract of land managed by Fr. Sanz, a member of the Order.
- Fr. Sanz was well acquainted with Endencia and exerted over her an
influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as to the
personal friendship which existed between them. Teodorica appears to be
a woman of little personal force.
- Fr. Sanz was fully aware of the contracts with Endencia and with its
developments.
- Between 1909 and 1914, large number of cattle of respondent was
pastured in the subject property.
- When the Torrens title was issued, it was delivered to respondent for
safekeeping and only turned it over upon order of the SC in 1914.
ISSUE:
- W/N petitioner is entitled to P24,000 as compensation for pasturing
cattle from 1909 to 1913.
- W/N respondent is liable for interference in contractual relations.
HELD:
- 1. No. It is improbable to pasture 1,000 cattle in 1,248 ha of wild Mindoro
land. There is no reason to suppose that the value of the property was
more (40 per head monthly) before the petitioner obtained possession of
it and from which respondent rented it at 50 per hectare annually.
- 2. No. Defendants believed in good faith that the contract could not be
enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into
effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was prompted
by no mean or improper motive. Teodorica would have surrendered the
documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence
and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. But the idea
that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the
desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle
upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff
cant be credited.
- What constitutes legal justification for interference - If a party enters into
contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthful
climate, and a third person, with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one
who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no action will lie.
But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the
indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff," the intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract
broken.
- If performance is prevented by unlawful means such as force,
intimidation, coercion, or threats, or by false or defamatory statements, or
by nuisance or riot, the person is, under all the authorities, liable for the
damage which ensues.
- Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a
contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade
performance, the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in
damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose
behalf he intermeddles.
188. GILCHRIST V. CUDDY 29 PHIL 542
FACTS:
- Cuddy, owner of the film, Zigomar, entered into a contract with Gilchrist,
to rent the film for a week at 125, starting May 26.
- Before said date, Cuddy returned money to Gilchrist and told him that
Espejo and his partner would rent film for 350.
- Court issued mandatory injunction ordering Cuddy to deliver film to
Gilchrist and an ex parte prelim injunction restraining Espejo and partner
from receiving and exhibiting film until further orders from court
ISSUE:
- W/N Espejo and partner were liable for interfering with the contract
between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing the identity of one of the
contracting parties
HELD:
- YES. The mere right to compete could not justify appellants in
intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away Gilchrists contractual rights.
Liability arises from unlawful acts and no from contractual obligations, as
they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist
- 1314, CC: Any 3rd person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
189. SO PING BIEN V. COURT OF APPEALS 314 SCRA 751
FACTS:
- Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered
into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI).
Subjects of four (4) lease contracts were premises located at Binondo,
Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had
a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy
the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.
- When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but
Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co.
was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co.
including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein
respondent corporation.
- So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek
Giok's grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his
own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing.
- On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua
Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25% increase in rent effective
September 1, 1989. The rent increase was later on reduced to 20%
effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees' demand. Again on December
1, 1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these
letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that failure of
the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest
on the lessee's part, and agreement to the termination of the lease.
Private respondents did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease
contracts were not rescinded.
existence of Lapuzs lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi,
justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the
defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by
purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of
interference cannot be justified.
- Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of Lapuz that
Lagon induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The
word
induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose
one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show
that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property
was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely
nothing to influence their judgment. Lapuz himself did not proffer any
evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private
respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai
Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith
on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim
of tortuous interference was never established.
- Inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable for tortuous
interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for private
respondents losses.
- This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury.
Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt,
loss or harm which results from the injury
- CFI absolved 1 Dingcong brother only (kasi namatay na yung isa) but held
Echivarria liable
- CA reversed holding Dingcong liable for the damages
ISSUE:
HELD:
- YES. Dingcong, as a co-lessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for
the damage caused by things that thrown or falling from the hotel (Art.
1910 of the Codigo Civil)
- Echivarria was a guest of the hotel and was the direct cause of the
damage. But Dingcong did NOT exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family. He knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair,
presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only
provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks
- Judgment Affirmed
193. VILUAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 16 SCRA 742
FACTS:
- Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La
Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were
riding caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree. The bus,
owned by petitioner and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino, came from San
Fernando, La Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur.
- It appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school
building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by
Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but that
instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and raced
with the overtaking bus.
Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post, crashed
against a tree and then burst into flames.
- Among those who perished were Timoteo Mapanao, Francisca
Lacsamana, Narcisa Mendoza and Gregorio Sibayan, whose heirs sued
petitioner and the latter's driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for damages for
breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also
sued petitioner and the driver for damages. The complaints were filed in
the Court of First Instance of La Union.
- TC found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the
drivers of the two buses and held both, together with their respective
employers, jointly and severally liable for damages. CA found that only
petitioner Francisca Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of
contract of carriage. The driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, cannot be made
jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter's
employee and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage.
ISSUE:
- W/N Aquino may also be held liable.
HELD:
- YES. It should make no difference therefore whether the respondents
were brought in as principal defendants or as third-party defendants. As
Chief Justice Moran points out, since the liability of the third-party
defendant is already asserted in the third-party complaint, the amendment
of the complaint to assert such liability is merely a matter of form, to insist
on which would not be in keeping with the liberal spirit of the Rules of
Court. 4
- Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs
from contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict. In case of
injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well
as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for
damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under
the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.
- Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense
that petitioner as well as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana
are jointly and severally liable for the damages awarded by the trial court.
The disallowance of moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 is correct
and should be affirmed.
194. ABADILLA V. COLOMBRES ET AL. 9 CAR 859
195. RIVERA V. CRESPO 12 CAR 518
196. JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS V. COURT OF APPEALS 144 SCRA 596
FACTS:
- The trial court agreed with the findings except as to the holding that the
owner is charged with full nine supervision of the construction. The Court
sees no legal or contractual basis for such conclusion. IAC affirmed but
modified.
ISSUE:
- W/N an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-which caused the
failure of the building, exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise
liable because of their negligence.
HELD:
- The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein
is Article 1723 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
o Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years
from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason
of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the
ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice
fags within the same period on account of defects in the construction or
the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any
violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the
contractor.
- Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of
any of the causes of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
- The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the
building.
- On the other hand, the general rule is that no person shall be responsible
for events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were
inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code).
- An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and
exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no
amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected,
could have been prevented. (1 Corpus Juris 1174).
- There is no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous
event or an act of God.
- To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code,
for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must
concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent
of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must
be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor.
- Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there
concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for
in Article 1170 of
the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape
liability.
- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that
the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and
all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the
whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the
rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
- Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with
an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability
by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God.
To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be
free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or
damage may have been occasioned.
- The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants
petitioners was established beyond dispute both in the lower court and in
the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co., Inc.
was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and
specifications. and to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in
the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision;
while the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or
defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. As correctly
assessed by both courts, the defects in the construction and in the plans
and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA
building unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For this
reason the defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim exemption
from liability.
- Such negligence is equivalent to bad faith. One who negligently creates a
dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God
for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.
- As already discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth
to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity were hardly affected by
the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross
negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not
have occurred.
- WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and
considering the special and environmental circumstances of this case
197. MALVAR V. KRAFT FOOD PHILS. INC. 705 SCRA 242
FACTS:
In 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), KRAFT hired Czarina Malvar as its
Corporate Planning Manager. She rose in the ranks and became
the VP for Finance in the SEA of Kraft Foods Internation. KFPIs
mother company. In 1999, the chairman of the board of KFPI and
concurrently the VP and Area Director for SEA, sent Malvar a
memo directing her to explain why no administrative sanctions
should be imposed on her for possible breach of trust and
confidence and for willful violation of company rules and
regulations. She was places under preventive suspension and
ultimately she was served a notice of termination.
Malvar, aggrieved, filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
illegal dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal
and ordered her reinstatement
The judegment became final and executory however Malvars
award was reduced.
Both parties appealed the computation of the NLRC. While
pending appea, Malvar and the respondents entered into a
compromise agreement wherein Malvar would be paid 40M
pesos. Malvar moved to withdraw the case
ISSUES
W/N Malvars motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of the
execution of the compromise agreement was proper
W/N the Motion for Intervention to protect attys rights can
prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover?
HELD:
-
ISSUE:
- W/N the Municipal Council had the power to declare the plant of Iloilo
Cold Storage as a nuisance
- W/N the Municipal Council had the power to abate such nuisance
HELD:
- NO. The power to declare whether or not the plant of Iloilo Cold Storage
was a nuisance can conclusively be declared by the established courts of
law or equity alone. The resolutions of officers or of boards organized by
force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision.
- Nuisances may be abated by an individual, but they must in fact exist.
This precise power, and no more, is conferred by the statute on cities and
towns. If the authorities of a city abate a nuisance under authority of an
ordinance of the city, they are subject to the same perils and liabilities as
an individual, if the thing is in fact not a nuisance.
- The charter of the city confers upon it the power to prevent and restrain
nuisances, and to declare what shall constitute a nuisance but this does
not authorize it to declare a particular use of property a nuisance, unless
such use comes within the common law or statutory idea of a nuisance.
- NO. The smoke from the plant was a nuisance per accidens, and as such,
it cannot be abated without judicial hearing and judgment as to its
existence.
- There was no judicial determination that there was a nuisance and there
was no opportunity offered to Iloilo Cold Storage to contest that matter.
Municipalities can only declare and abate nuisances in cases of necessity,
without citation and without adjudication as to whether there is in fact a
nuisance.
- A nuisance which affects the immediate safety of persons or property or
which constitutes an obstruction to the streets and highways under
circumstances may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity.
- Just remember: nuisance per se may be summarily abated without
judicial hearing and judgment; nuisance per accidens need hearing, no
summary abatement
- Six class suits were filed against the City Engineer of Manila to enjoin him
from carrying out his threat to demolish the houses of petitioners upon the
ground that the houses constitute public nuisances.
- Petitioners are all groups of people who have settled in areas without the
permission of the authorities. Petitioners contend that they are united to
notice and hearing before their houses are demolished, they allege that
the city engineer sought to deprive them of their property without due
process of law.
ISSUE:
- W/N the city engineer should be enjoined
HELD:
- NO. Prior to expressing his intent to demolishing the houses, the city
engineer advised and ordered petitioners to remove said houses within a
specified period. Petitioners did not question the sufficiency of the periods
stated in the notices, and have never asked respondent to give them an
opportunity to show that their houses do not constitute public nuisances.
It is not disputed that the houses stand on public streets.
- According to the CC, one of the listed nuisances is anything which
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water. The houses constructed without
governmental authority on public streets and waterways, obstruct at all
times the free use by the public of said streets and waterways, and
accordingly constitute nuisances per se aside from public nuisances.
Summary removal thereof, without judicial process or proceeding may be
authorized by the statute or municipal ordinance, despite the due process
clause.
201. VELASCO V. MANILA ELECTRIC 40 SCRA 342
FACTS:
- Petitioner Velasco sold to Meralco 2 lots which were adjacent to his
house. Meralco constructed a substation which reduces high voltage
electricity to a current suitable for distribution to the companys
consumers. Only an interlink wall separates the property of Meralco from
that of petitioner. Petitioner claims that the unceasing sound that
emanates from the substation is an actionable nuisance, and is claiming
who though creating a noise is acting with reasonable regard for the rights
of those affected by it.
- The determining factor when noise alone is not intensity or volume. It is
that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
202.
CARDONA
V.
DE
BROZAS
CAR
219
UMALI
206.
CITY
V.
OF
AQUINO
MANILA
1
V.
CAR
LAGUIO,
339,
JR.
58
455
OG
248
SCRA
308
HELD:
- NO. It is pointless to go into an academic discussion of the relative merits
of the composting and the incineration methods of garbage and refuse
disposal for purposes of deciding whether or not at this state prohibition
should issue to stop the bidding called for by the City of Manila. The
instant petitions for that purpose are premature.
- This Court cannot and should not substitute its judgment this early for
that of the respondents and on a purely theoretical basis rule that the bids
submitted should not be opened, or if opened should not be accepted,
because not one of the plants therein offered to be established would
serve the purpose envisaged and because, if so established, it would so
pollute the environment as to constitute a nuisance.
- If and when such a result becomes a reality, or at least an imminent
threat, that will be the time the petitioners may come to court.
- This does not preclude them from going to court again because a
continuing nuisance calls for a continuing remedy.
- Sum: Action to avoid possible nuisance is premature when the bidding for
materials for the incinerator is still going on and where no incinerator has
yet actually existed.
209. FARRALES V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA 44 SCRA 239
FACTS:
- Farrales was a holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari
goods. When the building where she had her stall was demolished, she
was ordered to move to another temporary place.
- Instead of moving to the place directed, she built a temporary shack on
the cement passageway at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market
without seeking prior permit or permission from any city official.
- Police threatened to demolish this shack. Farrales asked for the issuance
of an injunction from the court, but after hearing, and upon failure to
present a proper permit, the court denied the injunction sought.
- The police demolished the shack
- Farrales now claims that the shack was not a nuisance, or if it was a
nuisance, it was one per accidens and not per se, and therefore could only
be abated only after the corresponding judicial proceeding. The proper
procedure should have been for either the City Engineer or the City Health
Officer to commence legal proceedings for the abatement of this
nuisanc.
ISSUE:
- W/N the demolition was proper
HELD:
- YES. Farrales had (1) no permit to put up the stall; (2) its location was an
obstruction to the free movement of people; and (3) the shack was not a
building within the meaning of the Charter of the City of Baguio relied
upon by Farrales and under which the power to cause buildings, dangerous
to the public, to be made secure or torn down is vested in the City
Engineer, subject to the approval of the City Mayor.
- Although Art. 702 of the Civil Code says that it is the District Officer that
shall determine whether or not abatement without judicial proceedings is
the best remedy against a public nuisance, the failure to observe this
provision is not in itself a ground for the award of damages. Art. 707
presents only 2 cases where a public official extrajudicially abating a
nuisance will be liable for damages:
o If he causes unnecessary injury; or
o If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real
nuisance.
- None of the above was present in this case. It may even be said that there
was a judicial proceeding. The denial of Farrales petition for injunction
upon her failure to produce a permit was in effect an authority for the
police to carry out the act which was sough to be enjoined.
unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly
structures in the place.
- Even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or
toleration for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a
nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood.
- The Mayor merely implemented the recommendation of the Municipal
Health Officer. Having acted in god faith, he has no criminal liability. He
had the right to do so.
- Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property or anything else which:
o Injures or engenders the health or safety of others; or
o Annoys or offends the senses; or
o Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality; or
o Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or
o Hinders or impairs the use of property.
- Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals
may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not include in the
foregoing definition.
- Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
o A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
o A civil action; or
o Abatement, without judicial proceedings
216.
REYES
ET
AL.
217.
FARRALES
218.
MAGTIBAY
V.
V.
VILLEGAS
DACANAY
V.
GOCO
ET
AL.
8
1
12
CAR
302
CAR
687
CAR
418
- On 24 May 1989, the mayor of the town ordered the demolition of the
Quonset because it was a non conforming structure (beyond the zone
where warehouses were allowed)
ISSUE:
- W/N the mayor had the power to extrajudicially order the demolition of
the Quonset; whether it can be justified as removal of a nuisance per se.
HELD:
- NO. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal
Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local
Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted
judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances"
- While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a
nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The
nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
- [Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor
can they authorize the extra judicial condemnation and destruction of that
as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things
must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . .
the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate
industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation,
that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board.
The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial
tribunal. (Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]).
- Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by
virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga)
when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its
property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing
before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did
constitute a nuisance in law.
220. TAMIN V. COURT OF APPEALS 208 SCRA 863
FACTS:
- During the incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958,
the municipality leased an Area of 1,350 square meters (a portion alleged
TELMO
V.
BUSTAMANTE
592
SCRA
552
-
222.
TAYABAS
V.
PEOPLE
517
SCRA
488
Raagas 3 year old son was ran over by a truck. But Traya claims
truck was fully loaded and running low speed.
Actual damages must be proved, courts cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount
of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damages had
been suffered and on evidence of actual amount.
No damages of any kind unforeseen event or fault of boy or his
parents
B about to ride electric car after letting his 2 children ride, he fell
off, dragged and rear wheels passed over his left foot. It was
amputated. He was a 45-year old chief marine engr with a salary
of 375. He was awarded costs of expenses incurred but not for the
amputation of his left foot.
2 kinds of damages: damages for the loss actually sustained and
for the profit which the injured party may have failed to realize.
His incapacity to continue in the practice of his profession has put
an end to one of his activities and has certainly destroyed the
principal source of his professional earning in the future.
Nicolas Cuenca sued Northwest Airlines for forcing him to move from
first class to economy class on a connecting flight from Manila-OkinawaTokyo. The lower court ruled in his favor and awarded him moral
damages, exemplary damages with legal interest thereon, plus attorneys
fees. On appeal, CA affirmed but eliminated the exemplary award, and
moral damages was converted into nominal damages.
Northwest appealed questioning, among others, the award for nominal
damages, citing Medina vs. Cresciencia and Quijano vs. PAL where the
Court disallowed moral damages.
The court held that the two cited cases are not in point. In the first case,
the nominal damages was deleted, because the aggrieved party was
already awarded compensatory damages. Here, the manner in which he
was rudely forced to move with knowledge that he was an official
representative of the
Philippines shows that he deserves to be awarded damages. The award
of P20,000 may well be considered as nominal. Since Northwest had
acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner, said award may also
be considered exemplary.
Nominal damages cannot exist with compensatory damages.
245. ALCANTARA ET AL. V. SURRO & MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 93 PHIL 472;
49 OG 2769
When one Hermengildo Co was boarding a passenger truck, the passenger
truck driven by Surro hit the
former. Co died due to the accident. His family file a suit for damages. The
court granted damages for
Cos expected earnings for the next four years. As to damages:
- In fixing indemnity awarded to plaintiffs due to the death of their father,
the following are
considered:
- tender ages of plaintiffs at time of death
- age and life expectancy of the deceased
- state of health of the deceased at the time of death
- earning capacity of the deceased
- actual pecuniary damages
- pain and suffering o the deceased and plaintiffs
- pecuniary situation of the party liable.
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a
deceased has no fixed basis and it is
left to the discretion of the court. The amount recoverable depends on the
facts and circumstances of
each case. The Court upheld the lower court in limiting the damages based
on earning capacity to four
years, because use of the American Experience Table of Mortality is not
required.
ISSUE:
HELD:
-
expires on Feb. 18, 1970. On July 31, 1970, petitioner leased the same to
Shell.
Mobil filed action to declare lease agreement void, claiming it exercised its
option to lease within the period agreed upon; petitioner denied allegation
and claimed damages in counterclaim
Trial Court found for Mobil; CA reversed ruled Mobil was not able to
exercise option to lease and petitioner entitled to rental fees which she
shouldve received from Shell from the time the action was instituted
(injunction was issued and petitioner was ordered not to receive rental
fees from Shell when case was pending)
BUT CA did not award damages (rental fees she shouldve received) as her
counterclaim for damages was dismissed by Trial Court and she failed to
appeal the same.
Issue: w/n Javellana entitled to damages for wrongful filing of case against
her?
Held:
Petitioner entitled to damages.
At any rate, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, 11 and,
We find it unfair and unjust to deprive the petitioner of the rentals on her
property due to a mere technicality.
The contract of lease was executed on July 21, 1970 and in force for 20
years unless sooner cancelled by Shell by the 10th or 15th year.
The rentals which petitioner would have received if not for filing of the
case by Mobil and the injunction was 912,000.00 up to the end of the 13th
year, but since she was given advance rental, rental due her is 792,000.
Held:
-
Formula:
Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 age of deceased)
Net annual income = Gross annual income necessary living expenses
Reduced to simple terms:
Net Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x Net annual income
Court awarded 675,000.
FACTS:
Legaspi oil and private respondent Bernard Oseraos, had several
transactions for the sale of copra. Oseraos was to sell Copra to
Legaspi Oil. There were 2 previously concluded transactions
between the two. The third contract was for the sale of 100 tons
of copra at an agreed price of P79.00 per 100 kilos.
The price of copra was fluctuating at this point in time.
They then entered into another contract for another sale of 100
tons of copra at 82.00 per 100 kilos. The agreed price in this
contract was slightly higher than the last contract.
In all these contracts, the selling price had always been stated as
total price rather than per 100 kilos. However, the parties had
understood the same to be per 100 kilos.
Oseraos failed to deliver a substantial amount of Copra. Demands
were made upon him however he failed to comply leading Legaspi
Oil to cancel the contract, he purchased copra at the standard
market price which was higher than the price agreed on by the
parties. This amount and the excess was to be charged against
Oseraos.
265. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORP. V. BARRIOS 119 SCRA 461
FACTS:
Petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent spouses,
both physicians, a cable gram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New
York, admitting the respondent-wife for a rotating internship in
said hospital, as a consequence of shich she was unable to signify
her acceptance and the position was given to someone else.
An action to recover damages was granted by the court.
ISSUE:
-
HELD:
-
ISSUE:
HELD:
-
ISSUES:
1. did the CA err in not applying the doctrine that drivers or vehicles who
bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accidents? In other words, was Lambert negligent?
2. Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?
Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate
cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages.
HELD:
1. NO. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first
establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which
claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as
that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which, the
result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to
the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.
- those who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. In this case,
the evidence sufficiently contradicts this, which is the sudden left turn by
Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.
2. Yes. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of
damages in account of the victims negligence. Article 2179 reads as
follows: When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and provimate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defentants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The underlying
precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in
full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant
must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.
- The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies
depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was
established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the
motorcycle at t high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has
imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective
helmet.
- These circumstances although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The
contribution of these circumstances are real considered and determined in
terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, the heris of Castillon shall
recover only up to 50% of the award.
267. FLOREZA V. DE EVANGELISTA 96 SCRA 130
FACTS:
The Evangelistas were the owners of a residential lot in Rizal
In May 1945: Evangelistas borrowed Php100 from Floreza
November 1945: Floreza occupied the residential lot and built a
house of light materials with the consent of Evangelistas
Additional Loans were made by the Evangelistas totaling to P740
Jan 1949: Floreza demolished the house of light materials and
constricted one of strong material assessed at P1400. Floreza has
not been paying any rentals since the beginning of their
transactions.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Floreza was entitled to the reimbursement of the cost of his house.
2. W/N he should pay rental of the land
HELD:
1. No. Issue of reimbursement is not moot because if Floreza has no right
of retention, then he must pay damages in the form of rentals. Agree with
the CA that Art 448 is inapplicable because it applies only when the builder
is in good faith (he believed he had a right to build). Art 453 is also not
applicable because it requires both of the parties to be in bad faith.
Neither is Art 1616 applicable because Floreza is not a vendee a retro. The
house was already constructed in 1945 (light materials) even before the
pacto de retro was entered into in 1949. Floreza cannot be classified as a
builder in good faith nor a vendee a retro who made useful improvements
during the pacto de retro, he has no right to reimbursement of the value of
the house, much less to the retention of the premises until he is paid.
His rights are more akin to a usufructuary under Art 579, who may make
on the property useful improvements but with no right to be indemnified
thereof, He may, however, remove such improvements should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property.
2. Yes. From the time the redemption price was paid in Jan 1955, Florezas
right to use the residential lot without rent ceased. He should be liable for
damages in the form of rentals for the continued use of the lot for P10
monthly from January 3, 1955 until the house was removed and the
property vacated by Floreza.
282. CONTINENTAL
INC. 659 SCRA 139
CEMENT
CORP.
V.
ASEA
BROWN
BOVERI,
DOCTRINE:
Having breached the contract it entered with petitioner,
respondent ABB is liable for damages pursuant to Articles 1167,
1170, and 2201 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, a repairman who
fails to perform his obligation is liable to pay for the cost of the
execution of the obligation plus damages. Though entitled,
284. DBP. V. FAMILY FOODS MANUFACTURING CO. LTD. 594 SCRA 461
It is only when the parties to a contract have failed to fix the rate
of interest or when such amount is unwarranted that the court
will apply the 12% interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of
money
The court has to enforce the contractual stipulations in the
manner that they have been agreed upon for as long as they are
not unconscionable or contrary to morals and public policy.
292. LIAM LAW V. OLYMPIC SAWMILL CO. INC. 129 SCRA 439
Liam Law loaned 10k without interest to Olympic. Olympic was
granted an extension of 3 months but the loan was increased to
16K.
The 6K for attorneys fees and legal interests, and other costs.
Failed to pay. O claims 6k as usurious interest.
6k additional for 10k principal is lawful as it is considered as
liquidated damages.
Usury law is now legally non-existent under the CB Circular No.
905. Interest chargeable now depends upon agreement of lender
and borrower. Ruled of Court as to the allegations of usury being
procedural in nature, considered repealed with retroactive effect.
293. ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK V. TUBLE 677 SCRA 519
294. PEOPLE V. ARCILLAS 677 SCRA 624
295. ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH-IN-LENDING, INC.V. BANGKO SENTRAL
MONETARY BOARD 688 SCRA 530
DOCTRINE:
Usury Law; CB Circular No. 905; suspension of ceilings for interest rates
does not authorize excessive and unconscionable interest rates; effect of
void stipulation of usurious interest.
296. LIM V. DBP 700 SCRA 210
CA ruled that the interest rate was void. UCPB assails the decision
in that the interest charges, penalty charges, attys fees were
erroneously excluded from the computation of the total amount
due and demandable from spouses Beluso.
The Court held that both choices DBD retail rate or as
determined by the branch head- are dependent solely on the will
of UCPB.
As to UCPBs contention, excess in such demand does not nullify
the demand itself, which is valid with respect to the proper
amount. While the interest was void, the demand made by UCPB
is valid.
The spouses are considered in default with respect to the proper
amount and the interests and penalties.
The court imposed the 12% legal interest, since what it avoided
was merely the stipulated rate of interest and not the stipulation
that the loan shall earn interest.
The court also upheld the stipulation providing compounding
interest, which the parties may stipulate in their contract.
SC: ruled that the 21% interest has no legal and factual bases.
Under the promissory not, the loan shall incur in interest at 4%
per month or at 48% per annum.
While the Usury law has been suspended by CBC No. 905, and
parties to an agreement have been given a wide latitude to agree
on any interest, still the stipulated interest rates re illegal if they
are unconscionable.
The court still found the reduction of interest rate to 21% per
annum non proper. The court cidted Eastern Shipping Lines to
determine what interest rate should apply. The legal interest of
12% should apply computed from the date of judicial demand.
Another 12% interest per annum is imposed on petitioners
monetary liability to respondent from the date of finality of the
decision until it is fully paid.
The court held that the interest should run not from the time that
the claim was present in the estate of the deceased but on the
date when judgment was rendered by the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. did the CA err in finding the appellant civilly liable to complainants with
respect to the interest in the principal loan despite the dismissal of the
interest checks by the RTC?
2. Is the interest agreed upon by the parties usurious?
3. Should the private respondents file a separate civil complaint for the
claim of Sum of Money
HELD:
-
FACTS:
Mercantile Insurance Co. Sought repayment of the amount it had
paid to the insured consignee of damaged shipment.
The court ruled that Eastern Shipping filed this complaint to
address the following
ISSUES:
- W/N a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can be
solidary, or joint and several.
-W/N payment of legal interest is to be computed from the time the
complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered;
and
-W/N the applicable rate of interest it 12% or 6%
319. RAYMUNDO V. GALEN REALTY & MINING CORP. 707 SCRA 515
314. FIRESTONE TIRES & RUBBER CO. V. DELGADO 104 PHIL 920
315. REFORMINA V. TOMOL, JR. 139 SCRA 260
316. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. CA 234 SCRA 78
Escano filed this complaint claiming that they are not liable for
interest, and if at all the proper interest it 6% not 12%
The court ruled that petitioners are liable for interest at 12% per
annum to be computed from judicial or extrajudicial demend,
because the Undertaking consisted of a payment in a sum of
money. Court affirmed the RTC.
328. BANGIS V. HEIRS OF SERAFIN & SALUD ADOLFO 672 SCRA 468
329. CATUNGAL V. HAO 355 SCRA 29
337. SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO. V. RTC MAKATI, BR. 61 263 SCRA 483
338. SOLANGON V. SALAZAR 360 SCRA 379
339. PNB V. COURT OF APPEALS 263 SCRA 765
340. EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS 322
SCRA 73
341. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP. V. ALFA RTW MANUFACTURING
CORP. 368 SCRA 611
HELD:
-
HELD:
-
HELD:
-
As to Juana Soberano, the Court ruled that she cannot also claim
moral damages. In a breach of contract of carriage, moral
damages are recoverable only where the defendant acted in
wanton, reckless, oppressive, malevolent conduct or
negligence so gross as to amount to malice. The Court held
that the facts assailed by the Soberanos as amounting to bad faith
did not really prove bad faith. That the accident was due to the
negligence of its driver does not justify inference of bad faith on
the part of the defendant companies.
HELD: Yes
- Yes. Defendant cancelled the reservations by mistake,
and deliberately and intentionally withheld the
information from plaintiff the fact of said cancellation,
letting them go on believeing that their first class
reservations stood valid and confirmed -> agents forgot
to mention the cancellation and/or relied on last minute
cancellation of other passengers for reinstatement of the
Lopez party in first class seats
- Defendant willfully and knowingly places itself into the
position of having to breach its contracts
- Bad faith: breach of a known duty though some motive of
interest or ill-will
- At time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, in
breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe their
reservation had not been cancelled
- Moral damages were properly awarded since Lopez was a
former vice president and was Senate President Pro
Tempore at the time of the incident, hence suffered
social humiliation; his wife, who was already sick before
the flight, suffered physical discomfort and suffering;
other party members were also awarded moral damages
377. ZULUETA V. PAN AMERICAN 43 SCRA 397
378. ORTIGAS V. LUFTHANSA 64 SCRA 610; 71 OG 6383
379. PANAM V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 186 SCRA
687
380. YUTUK V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 2 SCRA 337; 112 PHIL 271;
58 OG 7057
381. NORTHWEST AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS 186 SCRA 440
405.
PEOPLE
V.
RUIZ
110
155
Martinez filed a case for damages against the owner and driver of
the taxi cab she was riding for injuries sustained by her when it
bumped another taxi cab. She appealed questioning the failure of
the lower courts to award moral and exemplary damages under
analogous cases under Art. 2219.
The Court held that a breach of contract cannot be considered
included in analogous cases, because the definition of quasidelict in 2176 expressly excludes pre-existing contractual relation.
The Fores case provides for exceptions: where the mishap results
in the death of a passenger or where it is proved that the carrier
was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result.
Since appellant did not allege fraud, malice or bad faith, nor any
allegation of wanton or gross negligence, no moral damages are
awardable. Exemplary damages are also not recoverable, since
he must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages
felony is also liable, and Art. 2219 of the Civil Code which states
that the moral damages may be recovered in criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries, libel, slander and other form of
defamation. The Court still reduced the award of damages for her
having acted under passion and obfuscation.
HELD:
NO. The trial court was justified in not requiring appellee to pay
exemplary damages there being no evidence whatever that he
had any participation in the wrongful act committed by his
employee. The rule is that exemplary damages are imposed
primarily upon the wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of
similar acts in the future.
Such punitive damages cannot ba applied to his master or
employer except only to the extent ot his participation or
ratification of the tact because they are penal in character.
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, exemplary damages may only be
imposed when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.
427. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO..V,. INEZ CHAVEZ & CO.18
SCRA
356;
64
OG
1758
428. ABROGAR V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 157 SCRA
571
429.
ANTONIO
V.
SANTOS
538
SCRA
MASMUD
V.
NLRC
579
SCRA
509
433.
MIRANDA
V.
CARPIO
658
SCRA
197
.
434. RGM INDUSTRIES INC. V. UNITED PACIFIC CAPITAL CORP.
675 SCRA 400
435. MARTINEZ V. BARREDO 81 PHIL 1; 45 OG 4922
-
The court held that Bolinao cannot be held liable. One of the
conditions for an employer to be subsidiarily liable is that the
employee must have committed the crime within the discharge of
his duties.
Since Silvestre went beyond his duty as a security guard in robbing
the place, Bolinao cannot be held subsidiaily liable.
The order of the court for the restitution of the stolen car to the
offended party when the criminal case have already been decided
resulting in the conviction of the accused is correct.
Such restitution shall be made even if it be found in the hands of a
buyer in good faith without prejudice to the latters right to claim
against the person liabile to him.
The only exception is when the thing has been acquired by a third
person in a manner which bars action for recovery.