HILARIO vs.

SALVADOR
G.R. No. 160384 . April 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. , J .
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of
land located in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with
the RTC of Romblon against herein, respondent, alleging that
as co-owners, they are entitled to possession of the lot, and
that respondent constructed his house thereon without their
knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite
demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to
vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.
The complaint, however, failed to allege the assessed value
of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners were able to present
during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which shows
that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.
The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the failure to allege
the value of the land. The motion was denied.
Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the
material allegations of the complaint, contending that
petitioners had no cause of action against him since the
property in dispute was the conjugal property of his
grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and
Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal,
the CA reversed the decision, holding that the action was one
for the recovery of ownership and possession of real
property, and that absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the action (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691).
The CA then ordered the refiling of the case in the proper
court.
ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action
HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction
since their action is an accion reivindicatoria, an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction
falls within the said court. This argument is without merit.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving
title to or possession of land is now determined by the

assessed value of the said property and not the market value
thereof. [] In the case at bar, the complaint does not
contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the
property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take
judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of land. The Court
noted that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in
evidence at ax de c l a r a t ion, showing that the assessed
value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00. The
petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence
the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the
property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even
assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991
was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had
jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, since the case
involved title to or possession of real property with an
assessed value of less than Php20,000.00. As the Court of
Appeals had held:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion
reinvindicatoria [sic] is, as RA 7691 discloses, the
assessed value of the property in question.
For properties in the provinces, the RTC has
jurisdiction
if
the
assessed
value
exceeds
Php20,000.00, and the MTC, if the value is
Php20,000.00 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality
where the property is located, and is contained in the
tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent
tax declaration secured and presented by the
plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark
made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million
pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no
evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact
that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the
tax declaration that should be consulted and no other
kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is
Php5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the
territory where the property is located, and not the
court a quo. 24

In an obiter, the Court discussed the nature of an accion

publiciana, thus:
The action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or
one for the recovery of possession of the real property
subject matter thereof. It does
not involve a claim of ownership over the property. An
accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the
recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It
involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the
said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is
one for the recovery of pos session of the right to possess. It
is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding
of possession of the realty. []
The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before
the RTC, including the RTC decision, are null and void, since
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.
Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the
distinction between an
accion reivindicatoria and an accion publiciana is
inappropriate. The issue to be resolved by the court is: which
court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the RTC? It is immaterial
whether the case is one for accion reivindicatoria or accion
publiciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I
submit that what should have been discussed in the obiter is
that if the claim of co-ownership by the defendant is true,
may a plaintiff co-owner then file an action in ejectment
against another co-owner?
Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring
such an action against another co-owner who takes exclusive
possession of and asset ownership in himself alone. The
effect of the action will be to obtain recognition of the coownership.
The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from
possession because as co-owner, he also has the right to
possess.

SAMPAYAN vs . COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 156360.
January 14, 2005 GARCIA , J .
FACTS:
On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and
Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo Vasquez and
Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry
against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered and
occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS225, and built a house thereon without their knowledge,
consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly
effected through strategy and stealth. In their complaint,
Crispulo and Florencia asserted that they were co-owners
pro-indiviso of the said lot, their mother Cristita Quita being
the ownerand actual possessor thereof. Upon the latters
death and while they were absent from the said lot, Cesar
Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, allegedly built a
house on the lot, to their exclusion. After repeated demands,
Cesar Sampayan allegedly refused to vacate the said lot.
Thus, they filed an action for unlawful detainer.
In his defense, Cesar Sampayan asserted that his
occupation of the lot was by tolerance of the lots true
owners, Mr. and Mrs. Terrado, who were then residing in
Cebu. The permission was given by the lots overseer, Maria
Ybanez. Sampayan further asserted that Crispulo and

Valencias action had long prescribed, inasmuch as the said

lot had already been owned and possessed by the spouses
Oriol since 1960, as evidenced by the latters payment of
taxes. The Oriols, in turn, sold half the land to the Terrados.
Together, they maintained possession of their respective
portions.
Both the plaintiff siblings and defendant Sampayan
submitted their respective evidence consisting of affidavits
and tax declarations. Meanwhile, the MCTC judge also
conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, where he
found improvements. The findings in the ocular inspection
have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his
predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by
planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land
in question. The MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that it
is clear that defendants have been in possession for more
than one year and that the appropriate remedy would have
been accion publiciana or lenaria de possession. Upon appeal
to the RTC, it reversed the decision, relying on the
involvement of Cristita Quita, plaintiffs mother, in a
cadastral case involving the lot in 1957.
Sampayan then appealed to the CA, which denied the
same. Thus this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry would
prosper
HELD: YES. In Sarmiento vs. CA, the Court held:
[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint
should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. . . .
It is clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to
acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough
that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the
plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was
deprived thereof by the defendant through force,

intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. The complaint in

this case makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant
circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing
rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no
moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over
the case. The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had prior physical
possession
HELD: YES. To begin with, the Court is at once confronted by
the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during
his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he
saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now
petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have
introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut
trees, and others on the land in question, adding that
[N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once
upon a time been in possession of the land, and
categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita,
the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in
possession of the said property since 1957, openly,
exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an
owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.
x x x
The Court noted that in the assailed decision herein, the
Court of Appeals
attached much significance to the fact that private
respondents mother, Cristita Quita, was an oppositor in
Cadastral Case No. 149. The Court ruled and held that the
mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not,
by itself, establish prior physical possession because not all
oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots
or lands subject thereof.
SANTOS v s . AYON
G.R. No. 137013, Ma y 6, 2005, SANDOVAL -GUTIERREZ,
J.
FACTS: In 1996, the petitioner, Santos, filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City a
complaint for illegal detainer against the respondents,

spouses Ayon. In his complaint, he averred that a building

used by the respondents as a warehouse, encroached on a
portion of his land. As early as 1985, he had allegedly
already informed respondents that the said building occupies
a portion of his land, but allowed them to continue using the
building. In 1996, needing the entire portion of his lot, he
demanded that respondents remove the part of the building
encroaching
on his property, but respondents refused and continued to
occupy the contested portion.
The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the
respondents to vacate and surrender possession of the
property. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTCC
judgment, and upheld the finding that respondents
occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance.
On petition for review however, the CA held that petitioners
proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before
the RTC and not anaction for unlawful detainer, and thus
dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the MTCC properly exercised jurisdiction
over the complaint.
HELD: YES. All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of
possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising
therefrom. The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction
over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the
question of ownership over the litigated property in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership.
The Court found no error in the MTCC assuming
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint.
A complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding
of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here,
there is an allegation in petitioners complaint that
respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by
virtue of his tolerance.

Petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer

springs from respondents failure to vacate the questioned
premises upon his demand sometime in 1996.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is
lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the
possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made
by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals 391
SCRA 351 is applicable in this case: A person who occupies
the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him.

GANILA vs . COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150755, 06/28/2005 QUISUMBING, J .

Whether private respondent properly filed complaints for

unlawful detainer

FACTS:
Private respondent, Violeta Herrera, filed 21
ejectment complaints in the MCTC, which ordered the 21
defendants, now petitioners,
to vacate the property in
question (Lot 1227). The RTC sustained the decision as to 19
defendants but dismissed the case against
2. The 19
defendants who were ordered to vacate Lot 1227 filed a
petition for review with the CA based on two arguments,
namely: first, that they possessed lot 1227 in good faith for
more than 30 years in the concept of owners, and second,
that there was no withholding of possession since private
respondent was not in prior possession of the lot.

YES. If only to stress the fundamental principles

related to the present controversy, jurisdiction over unlawful
detainer suits is vested in Municipal Trial Courts. And in
ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the allegations of the complaint. In the case for ejectment,
private respondents allegations sufficiently present a case of
unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227,
(2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses
thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners
refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The
Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of
her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer
between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to
vacate the lot upon lawful demand
of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the
lot after her demand, petitioners continued possession
became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against
respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis.

I S S U E S / H E L D:
Whether prior
physical
possession by the plaintiff is
necessary for a complaint for unlawful detainer to prosper
NO. While petitioners assert that this case involves
only deprivation of possession, they confuse the remedy of
an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In
unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is
not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of
possession. Actual and prior physical possession of a
property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry
cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is
necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his
possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or
expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact that
petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically
entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior
lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a
suit for unlawful detainer simply because prior lawful
possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or
admitted. Unlike in a forcible entry where defendants, by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the
palintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession, here
there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot
by any of these acts.

Whether private respondent should have filed an action to

recover possession de jure, as argued by petitioners on
appeal
NO. Petitioners contention that private respondent
should have filed an action to recover possession de jure with
the TC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The
distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a
plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of
the land is settled in our jurisprudence. Petitioners present
contention was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC.
Raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel.
They should have raised it in the proceedings before the
MCTC. In our view, this issue is a mere afterthought, when
the MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot
be raised by the petitioners for the first time on appeal.
The Court noted with dismay petitioners insistence
that it must order the MCTC to conduct the requisite

preliminary conference. The summary character of

ejectment suits will be disregarded if the Court would allow
petitioners to further delay this case by allowing a second
preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings,
designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or the right to possession over the property
involved. It is a timely procedure designed to remedy the
delay in the resolution of such cases.
In sum, the Court found no reversible error much less
any grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of
Appeals. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latters tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His
status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term
of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand
to vacate.

ROSS RICA SALES CENTER vs. SPS. ONG

G.R. No. 132197. 08/16/2005, TINGA , J .
FACTS: The spouses Ong are the original owners of 3 parcels
of land which they occupy. They sold it to Mandaue Prime
Estate Realty, which then sold it to Ross Rica Sales Center,
Inc. The spouses Ong filed an action to annul the sale and
transfer of property to Mandaue Prime Estate Realty and at
present, the case is still pending. In the meantime, an
ejectment case was filed against spouses Ong in the MTC,
which ruled against the latter. On appeal to the RTC, the
judgment was affirmed by a decision dated March 1, 1997.
The spouses Ong received a copy of the decision on April 28,
1997.
The spouses Ong first filed a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC (May 8, 1997) but on the very next day filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied on June 23, 1997. The
spouses Ong received a copy of the order on July 9, 1997. On
July 24, 1997 respondents filed with the CA a motion for an
additional 10 days to file their Petition for Review, which they
would eventually file on July 30, 1997.
The CA gave their petition for review due course and
reversed the decision of the RTC on the finding that the
action filed was not one for unlawful detainer based on two
grounds: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners
were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or
implied, between the parties that would qualify the case as
one of unlawful detainer.

ISSUES/HELD
Whether
the
complaint
satisfies
the
jurisdictional
requirements for a case of
unlawful detainer properly
cognizable by the MTC
- YES. Well-settled is the rule that what determines
the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought. In Javelosa vs. Court of the Appeals, it
was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was
unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a
case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an
action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant
is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.
Hence, the phrase unlawful withholding has been held to
imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in
the beginning, having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is
being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba vs. Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from
plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in
the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have
refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully
withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and
depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; is already
sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
Likewise, the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz provides for a
liberal approach in
considering the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful
detainer, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of
pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests
upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry

and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve

perturbation of social order which must be restored as
promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure
should be carefully avoided.
Whether the case should be considered as one for accion
reivindicatoria, and thus the jurisdiction would lie with the
RTC
- NO. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is
the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from
accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of
possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal
where the issue is material possession or possession de
facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of
possession is primordial, while the issue of ownership is
generally unessential. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only
sought to recover physical possession of the subject
property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the
parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction
to try the ejectment case. Even if respondents claim
ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the
conclusion would be the same, for mere assertion of
ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not
oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.
This Court in Ganadin vs. Ramos stated that if what is prayed
for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter
if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the
pending actions for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and
Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case
No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.
In Drilon vs. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the filing of an
action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for
annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest
the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there
may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible
entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or
reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for
are not the same.

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be

the subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered,
modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that
purpose in
accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of
the respondents
can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose.
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim
ownership over
the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to
determine in an
action for unlawful detainer.

subsequently issued Tax Declaration No. 02-2460R for the

separated lot.
Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio
Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and
refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner.
Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint for
recovery of possession and ownership against respondent
before the MTC.
In his
Answer with Counterclaims, respondent Bugarin
contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in
the 4,473 square-meter lot, covered by the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011, and that he has been
in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955.
In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, respondent failed
to allege that the questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P13011 and instead asserted that he planted fruit-bearing
trees in the property. Respondent further pleaded the
defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.
The MTC decided in favor of respondent declaring him as the
owner of the
controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The
complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove
prior physical possession and ownership thereof.
The decision was affirmed by the RTC. Petitioner further filed
a petition for review before the CA, but the same was denied
for insufficiency of evidence and petitioners failure to
adduce evidence to prove either ownership or prior physical
possession.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has a cause of action for forcible
entry against respondent

PERALTA -LABRADOR v s . BUGARIN

G.R. No. 165177.
August 25, 2005 YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.
FACTS: Petitioner Peralta-Labrador was the owner of a 400
sq. m. parcel of land, purchased in 1976 from the spouses
Pronto.
In 1990, the DPWH constructed a road which
traversed her lot and separated 108 sq. m. from it. She was

HELD: NO. In Lopez vs. David Jr., it was held that an action
for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time
bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of
the action. Thus, the Court has nullified proceedings in
theMTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in
which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession
had exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one year
period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion

publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an

ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty
independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted
before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is
an action to recover ownership as well as possession.
It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for
forcible entry because she alleged prior physical possession
of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry
thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the
unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior
to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause
of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had
no jurisdiction to entertain the case. Therefore petitioners
complaint should have been filed with the proper RTC.
On this point, the Court held in Bongato vs. Malvar that:
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting
process, and that the restrictive time-bar is prescribed to
complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed,
the one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual
entry to the land. However, when entry is made through
stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned about it.
After the lapse of the one-year period, the party
dispossessed of a parcel
of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a
plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an
accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

Syllabus
Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a
municipal airport. The safe path of glide to one of the runways
of the airport passed directly over respondents' property at 83
feet, which was 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the
barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. It was used 4% of the
time in taking off and 7% of the time in landing. The
Government leased the use of the airport for a term of one
month commencing June 1, 1942, with a provision for renewals
until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever was earlier. Various military aircraft of
the United States used the airport. They frequently came so
close to respondents' property that they barely missed the tops
of trees, the noise was startling, and the glare from their
landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This
destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and caused
loss of sleep, nervousness, and fright on the part of
respondents. They sued in the Court of Claims to recover for an
alleged taking of their property and for damages to their poultry
business. The Court of Claims found that the Government had
taken an easement over respondents' property, and that the
value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was
$2,000; but it made no finding as to the precise nature or
duration of the easement.
Held:
1. A servitude has been imposed upon the land for which
respondents are entitled to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-267.
(a) The common law doctrine that ownership of land extends to
the periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world.
Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261.
(b) The air above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a public highway and part

of the public domain, as declared by Congress in the Air

Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938. Pp.328 U. S. 260-261, 328 U. S. 266.
(c) Flights below that altitude are not within the navigable air
space which Congress placed within the public domain, even
though they are within the path of glide approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority. Pp. 328 U. S. 263-264.
Page 328 U. S. 257
(d) Flights of aircraft over private land which are so low and
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land are as much an appropriation of
the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it.
Pp. 328 U. S. 261-262, 328 U. S. 264-267.
2. Since there was a taking of private property for public use,
the claim was "founded upon the Constitution," within the
meaning of 141(1) of the Judicial Code, and the Court of
Claims had jurisdiction to hear and determine it. P. 328 U. S.
267.
3. Since the court's findings of fact contain no precise
description of the nature or duration of the easement taken, the
judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court
of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings. Pp. 328
U. S. 267-268.
(a) An accurate description of the easement taken is essential,
since that interest vests in the United States. P. 328 U. S. 267.
(b) Findings of fact on every "material issue" are a statutory
requirement, and a deficiency in the findings cannot be rectified
by statements in the opinion. Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268.
(c) A conjecture in lieu of a conclusion from evidence would not
be a proper foundation for liability of the United States. P. 328
U. S. 268.
104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751, reversed and remanded.
The Court of Claims granted respondents a judgment for the
value of property destroyed and damage to their property
resulting from the taking of an easement over their property by
low-flying military aircraft of the United States, but failed to

include in its findings of fact a specific description of the nature

or duration of the easement. 104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751.
This Court granted certiorari. 327 U.S. 775. Reversed and
remanded, p. 328 U. S. 268.