VALDES v RTC BRANCH 102, QC

VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial
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court, in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose
which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody
of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
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for proper recording in the registry of marriages. (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the
hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father,
Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed
to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal

shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that
matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
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provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent
shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
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refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be
held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically
incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of
the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
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Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith
in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong
to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or
7
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
8
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership
in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
9
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of
10
nullity of the marriage.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party
who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
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manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the
trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential

matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the
"family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
12
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code,
should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
13
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
14
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine
that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the
previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on
the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
15
16
Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other
cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the
one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

BUENAVENTURA v CA
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel
Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court,
amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the
1
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and
defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus
attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,]
by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79
or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and onehalf (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the
amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein
defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their
son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such
3
incident be set for oral argument.
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the supportpendente
4
5
lite to P20,000. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of
6
merit and affirming in toto the trial courts decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the
7
son. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
8

On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the Petition for Certiorari were ordered
10
consolidated by this Court.
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in
accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM
THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF

LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR
CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13
YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE
11
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR
12
HEARING.
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY
13
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF
MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS
14
SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD
15
TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies
not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two
psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying
him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure
to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter
into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to
relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he
had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest
way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep
defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after
their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish,

anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together
but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a
breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be
awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where
damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded,
it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion,
found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no
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reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which
read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
17

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be
noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a
need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore,
the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral
damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no
leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the
Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
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marriage. . . .

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of
his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same
time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on
specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or
her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in
this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award
of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot
stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
19
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission
has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest
(par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
20
litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the
21
award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and
his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly
compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the
obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in
the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme
Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the
liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226
SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled
in this case:

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116,
New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are
conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . .
.
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what
are the parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was
disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch
Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement
package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions
amounting toP26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on
January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than those
deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code." In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement
between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant
wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the
plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as
stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its
Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of
the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the
conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has chosen
to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was
ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other
half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal
partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or
profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For
the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff
22
husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give onehalf of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his
outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits
which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as
Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants
service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendantappellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of
plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were
acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is
entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb
23
the ruling of the trial court.
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article
50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule
applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to
be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
24

In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, this Court expounded on the consequences
of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake
of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their workand industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of
the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in coownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still
in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation
to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that
void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by

final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to
be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also
meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or
spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on coownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be
stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family
Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
25
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered
by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included
or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in
common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the
basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot
26
since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 and has, therefore, attained the age
of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot,
owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of
majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation
and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from
Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in
the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of
said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of
September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the supportpendente lite in favor of the
parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ABING v WAEYAN
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner John Abing
1
(John, hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision dated October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675, reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which
affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in an ejectment suit
thereat commenced by the petitioner against the respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the good old days, lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired
properties. Later, they parted ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common
properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met and fell in love with each
other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the
couple bought a 2-storey residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned
by a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to the purchase, the tax
declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would send money to John who
deposited the same in their joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure
which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the properties
involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed the sari-sari store while
John worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they decided to partition their
properties. For the purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement.
Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto.
Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount
of P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. On the same date October 7, 1995
Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance
of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John demanded of her to vacate
the annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit
against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own
funds and thru money he borrowed from his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the
structure was under his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject
structure, which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the latter's failure to pay the
agreed balance due him under the aforementionedMemorandum of Agreement.

In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their common funds and that
the subject structure annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their original
residential house, hence the same pertained to the two of them in common.
2

In a decision dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used in the construction of
the structure in question solely came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the latter,
and accordingly ordered Juliet's eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her
to surrender possession thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and against the defendant
(Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in litigation covered by Tax
Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of the Plaintiff and turn over possession thereof to the
latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P2,500.00 a month from the
time she withheld possession of the store in litigation in June 1996 until she vacates the same
and turn over possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by way of Attorney's
fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995, affirmed that of the MTC.
Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
3

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24, 2000, reversed that of the RTC,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to possess the property and
maintain therein her business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
from 1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties which must be divided between them
upon the termination of their common law relationship.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code on conjugal
partnership... but by the rule on co-ownership.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . the parties' share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during their cohabitation
shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary.

To the CA, John's evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the construction of the annex
structure. Hence, the same pertained to both, and being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted
therefrom, adding that if ever, John's cause of action should have been for a sum of money "because he
claims that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension." According to the CA, ejectment cannot lie
against Juliet because Juliet's possession of the premises in dispute was not by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, nor did she obtain such possession thru force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John's present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement which should have been binding
between them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-sari store) is owned by
the two of them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a separate action for partition
even as the community character of the subject premises has not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the property subject of the suit
pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Departing from the factual findings of the two
courts before it, the CA found that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the
latter having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the money spent for the construction
thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of the same structure, Juliet may not be ejected
therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally eschews from, yet, given
4
the conflicting factual findings of the three courts below, the Court shall go by the exception to the
general rule and proceed to make its own assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as husband and wife from 1986
to 1995 without the benefit of marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet left
for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In
fact, Juliet was still in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his
relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names
of the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed
from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and
borrowed money in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel
Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his
affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said amount from him. With the petitioner's
own admission that the subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he allegedly borrowed from
the latter went into the construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is noted that while petitioner was
able to present in evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his
close relatives from whom he claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative
came forward to confirm petitioner's tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to support petitioner's self-serving allegation that the annex structure which housed the
sari-sari store was put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his
favor the tax declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and again that tax
5
declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership. Payment of taxes is

not proof of ownership, any more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner. Neither tax
receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to
7
possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law
spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and
is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership.
And under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a coowner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
8

True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a
co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. It
bears stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's
exclusive ownership of the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession thereof by virtue of a
contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet
was in possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her being a co-owner
thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of Agreement, being
unsigned by Juliet and John, has no binding effect between them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the amount of P232,397.66,
as initial payment for John's share in their common properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable
in twelve monthly installments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of record that the Agreement
was signed by the witnesses thereto. Hence, the irrelevant circumstances that the Agreement was left
unsigned by Juliet and John cannot adversely affect its binding force or effect between them, as
evidently, Juliet's initial payment of P232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had agreed
upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliet's failure to pay John the balance of the
latter's share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money against
Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED, except that portion
thereof denying effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement for being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

METROBANK v PASCUAL
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the
union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door
apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
1
S-101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a.
Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon
2
City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision, declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the
RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal
partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58
million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation,
Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties,
including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to
procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision,
and a document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The
waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but
did not incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due,
Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended,
before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of
3
the notice of sale on three issues of Remate. At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank
emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati
City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case
No. 00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property,
which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.
4

Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that the disputed lot, being
registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage
in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was subsequently declared in
default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001, judgment finding for Nicholson.
The fallo reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real estate mortgage on
the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Makati as well
as all proceedings thereon null and void.
The Court further orders defendants [Metrobank and Florencia] jointly and severally to pay
plaintiff [Nicholson]:
1. PhP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. PhP75,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
3. The costs.
SO ORDERED.

Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said lot to be conjugal, the
same having been acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. In so ruling,
the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the Family Code, providing that "all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved." To the trial court, Metrobank had not
overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the RTC concluded that the
disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without Nicholsons consent.
The RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be fatally defective. For let
alone the fact that Nicholson denied executing the same and that the signature of the notarizing officer
was a forgery, the waiver document was allegedly executed on April 9, 1995 or a little over three months
before the issuance of the RTC decision declaring the nullity of marriage between Nicholson and
Florencia.
The trial court also declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence, stating the
observation that certain data appeared in the supporting contract documents, which, if properly
scrutinized, would have put the bank on guard against approving the mortgage. Among the data referred
to was the date of execution of the deed of waiver.
The RTC dismissed Metrobanks counterclaim and cross-claim against the ex-spouses.
Metrobanks motion for reconsideration was denied. Undeterred, Metrobank appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74874.
The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTCs Decision
On January 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision affirmatory of that of the RTC, except for the award
therein of moral damages and attorneys fees which the CA ordered deleted. The dispositive portion of
the CAs Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the award of moral damages and attorneys fees which is hereby
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

Like the RTC earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to overthrow the presumption established in
Art. 116 of the Family Code. And also decreed as going against Metrobank was Florencias failure to

comply with the prescriptions of the succeeding Art. 124 of the Code on the disposition of conjugal
partnership property. Art. 124 states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy x x x.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
As to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees, the CA, in gist, held that Metrobank
did not enter into the mortgage contract out of ill-will or for some fraudulent purpose, moral obliquity, or
like dishonest considerations as to justify damages.
Metrobank moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA.
Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following issues for
consideration:
a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying Article 116
of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between
the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value.

Our Ruling
A modification of the CAs Decision is in order.
The Disputed Property is Conjugal
It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing that "[a]ll property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife," applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could not
be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage before the
8
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. CitingManongsong v. Estimo, Metrobank asserts that
the presumption of conjugal ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that
the property was acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the presumption of
conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to prove that not only was the property
acquired during the marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden Nicholson
allegedly failed to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, Metrobank cites Francisco v.
9
10
Court of Appeals and Jocson v. Court of Appeals, among other cases, where this Court held that a

property registered in the name of a certain person with a description of being married is no proof that the
property was acquired during the spouses marriage.
11

On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and Wong v.
12
IAC, contends that Metrobank failed to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property is
conjugal. He asserts that Metrobanks arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only
one postulate needs to be shown for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the
fact of acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses, as inapplicable, Francisco and Jocson, noting
that they are relevant only when there is no indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property
alleged to be conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had virtually recognized the
conjugal nature of the property in at least three instances. The first was when the bank lumped him with
Florencia in Civil Case No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as "spouses" in the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Then came the published notice of foreclosure sale
13
where Nicholson was again designated as co-mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter to vacate the
disputed lot, Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as "spouses," albeit the finality of the decree
of nullity of marriage between them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code,
is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family
Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a
showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobanks
14
submission, the Court did not, inManongsong, add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an
essential requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing
out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property
is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary condition before the
presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As
we stressed in Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership.The presumption applies even when the manner in
15
which the property was acquired does not appear. (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory. Metrobank would thrust on the Court,
invoking the two cases, the argument that the registration of the property in the name of "Florencia
Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual" operates to describe only the marital status of the title holder, but
not as proof that the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property
during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The correct
lesson of Francisco andJocson is that proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as
to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an
16
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding Metrobank having implicitly
acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the
bank having named the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or
her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of

estoppel, the same having been raised only for the first time in this petition. Besides, however Nicholson
was designated below does not really change, one way or another, the classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does
not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership
Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CAs holding, Art. 129 of the Family Code is inapplicable.
Art. 129 in part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
xxxx
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture
of such share as provided in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by Nicholson,
effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property regime, vested on Florencia full
ownership of all the properties acquired during the marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically
result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal
assets.
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal
partnerships assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4,
Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the
relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of
separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the
conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving
17
spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between
the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less
than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation
of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when
the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even
sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson.
However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided
portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in the
conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly
executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal partnership
of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A
spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid title in
the hands of an innocent buyer for value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the
auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership
to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in
question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co18
ownership." This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do soquando res non valet ut ago, valeat
19
quantum valere potest.
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is hardly a
need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for
the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or
20
mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable. Unlike private
individuals, it behooves banks to exercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property offered as security and the validity
21
of the mortgagors title must be standard and indispensable part of the banks operation. A bank that
22
failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee, as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the due diligence requirement was
not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a known duty for some interest or
ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA dated January 28,
2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC, Branch 65 in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00789, isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City is hereby declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of
Florencia thereon is concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No. 156283 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the
undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other
undivided 1/2 portion belonging to Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIO v DIO
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision and the 12 March 2007
3
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-010149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts.
They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and
respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel
Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in
her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family
assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and
hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the
petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent
did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that
respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent
married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of
collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by
nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the
allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and
embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that
respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.
DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community
of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006
Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.
DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and
5
guidance.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
6
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family
Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
7
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
8
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147
of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall
also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
10
under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of
the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value
of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered
as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation
of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
11
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which
12
are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. In
both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
13
14
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property
in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
15

In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
16
Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x
x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.

SALAS, JR v AGUILA
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1

This petition for review on certiorari assails the 16 March 2012 Decision and the 28 June 2012
3
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The CA affirmed the 26 September
4
2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 787.
The Facts
On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila
(Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months
later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their
daughter.

On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no
5
conjugal properties whatsoever." In the Return of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff narrated
6
that Salas instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the petition.
7

On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila
(RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
8
gains, if any."
9

On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that she discovered: (a) two 200square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b) a 108-square-meter
parcel of land with improvement located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373 (collectively,
"Discovered Properties"). The registered owner of the Discovered Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September 2007. However, Salas notice
of hearing was returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To Receive."
10

On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance requesting for an Entry of
Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal
property was involved.
On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguilas manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel and the
state prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007 someone informed her
of the existence of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information and secured copies
of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas
11
(Rubina) is Salas common-law wife.
12

On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation alleging that there is no conjugal
property to be partitioned based on Aguilas petition. According to Salas, Aguilas statement was a judicial
admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to the
Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, to
wit:(1) parcels of land with improvements located in Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City;
No. 176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and
Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting toP200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles,
specifically Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX(collectively, "Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas
contended that the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby
directed to partition between themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the following properties,
without prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas:
(1) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in
San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-259299-A marked as Exhibit "A" and its
improvements;
(2) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in
San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-255497 marked as Exhibit "B" and its
improvements;

(3) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina Cortez Salas
located in Tondo and covered by TCT No. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its
improvements.
Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon bythe parties, and such partition, together
with the Order of the Court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the Registry of Deeds of the place in
which the property is situated.
SO ORDERED.

13

14

The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules, even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of
marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership
of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that the Discovered
Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila.
However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties.
On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez,
a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas
did not contribute money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan;
(4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she
authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed with
legal documentation, he registered the properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C.
Salas."
In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The RTC
found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to third
persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the
registered owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault
for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed.
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
15

On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The CA ruled that Aguilas statement in her
petition is not a judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but
Aguila found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of the RTC
decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be unfair
to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she made the admission. The CA
also ruled that Salas was not deprived of the opportunity to refute Aguilas allegations in her
manifestation, even though he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that Rubina cannot
collaterally attack a certificate of title.
In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,
Hence, this petition.

16

the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration

17

filed by Salas.

The Issues
Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision ordering the partition of the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon City and as well as
the property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and respondent.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision in not allowing Rubina C.
18
Cortez to intervene in this case
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the
19
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership. Thus, the
20
settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action.
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a
21
preponderance of evidence. Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had no
conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the RTC
found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived
Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly
registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this Court
cannot admit the same as part of the records of this case. These are the following:
(1) TCT No. T-65876 a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in
the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T-105443 in
the name of Joan Jiselle A. Salas, single;
(2) TCT No. T-68066 a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu, Batangas,
registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr.
Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, Municipal
Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and improvement)
listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of regularity. x x x.
Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in the name of [Aguila], certified true
copies thereof should have been the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is also a presumption
that properties registered in the Registry of Deeds are also declared in the Assessment Roll for taxation
22
purposes.
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their
marriage.1wphi1Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas
name were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were
entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas marriage. In
23
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that the question of whether the properties were acquired during
the marriage is a factual issue. Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding
24
on us, except under compelling circumstances not present in this case.
On Salas allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of Aguilas
manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The essence of due process is opportunity to be heard.
We hold that Salas was given such opportunity when he filed his opposition to the manifestation,
submitted evidence and filed his appeal.

On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the
contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the
registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and regularly
25
issued. The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
26
owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his
opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubinas
statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has
no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
27
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."
28

In Dio v. Dio, we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article147 of the Family
Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been
29
obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present
case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was
also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as
30
found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of
the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of coownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
16

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated March 2012 and the Resolution
dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
SO ORDERED.

VENTURA, JR. v ABUDA

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
2
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the Resolution dated 3 August 2012 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The Decision and Resolution dismissed the Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed
3
with modification the Decision dated 24 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32
(RTC-Manila).
The Facts
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although
Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages:
Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the
father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she
married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin
was alive at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960.
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State
Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter
4
purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf sometime in 1970. The Vitas property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal
5
age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
6
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband,
7
Paulino Abuda (Paulino). According to Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan and
Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties
situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php 200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were considered part of the purchase
price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
8
50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas properties and she shouldered his medical expenses.
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus,
Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-

Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Estebans signature on
the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior
marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her
9
heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the
10
beginning. Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law at the time Esteban and Socorro
were married, provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:
1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void.
During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorros daughter-in-law Conchita Ventura (Conchita). In
her first affidavit, Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a seaman, had been missing and unheard from
11
for 35 years. However, Conchita recanted her earlier testimony and executed an Affidavit of Retraction.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not affect the status of the union. It
12
applied our ruling in Nial v. Badayog:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal
rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no
legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which [the] fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering
13
such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are governed by
Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to
their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.

The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro and Esteban in the properties. It found
that:
with respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo, Manila covered by
TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared that
part of it was first acquired by her father Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968 when he purchased the right
of Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she x x x bought the right to one-half of the remaining property
occupied by Ampiano Caballegan. However, during the survey of the National Housing Authority, she
allowed the whole lot to be registered in her fathers name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits "8" to
"11" x x x. These documents prove that that she has been an occupant of the said property in Vitas,
14
Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got married in June, 1980.
Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, x x x
Evangeline professed that in 1978, before her father met Socorro Torres and before the construction of
the BLISS Project thereat, her father [already had] a bodega of canvas (lona) and a sewing machine to
sew the canvas being sold at 903 Del Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also operating
Vangies Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, which was evidenced by Certificate of
Registration of Business Name issued in her favor on 09 November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS project
was constructed in 1980, the property became known as Units D-9 and D-10. At first, her father [paid] for
the amortizations for these two (2) parcels of land but when he got sick with colon cancer in 1993, he
asked respondents to continue paying for the amortizations x x x. [Evangeline] paid a total
of P195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces of receipts x x x and the aggregate amount
15
of P188,596.09 for Unit D-10, as evidenced by 36 receipts x x x.
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties.
Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and
16
Delpan properties.
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
17

In its Decision dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged Decision of the court a quo STANDS.
SO ORDERED.

18

The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code, and not
Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions between a
man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad

faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
19

The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of Appeals, and held that the foregoing provision applies
"even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the effectivity of the Family
20
Code." The CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas
and Delpan properties. Edilberto was unable to provide any documentation evidencing Socorros alleged
21
contribution.
On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
23
Resolution dated 3 August 2012.

22

which was denied by the CA in its

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each
other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be
24
based on the actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar in
his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution
25
do not apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if:
(1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that
the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is coowned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December
1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban
26
Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone.1wphi1 The
phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that
27
Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership
over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not
vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt of our
ruling in Borromeo:
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence
with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a
title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles
of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies
that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not
28
sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property
29
was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the
purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of
her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to
the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan
property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the
Delpan property.1wphi1 On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s
alleged monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who
30
is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 148

AGAPAY v PALANG
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled
"Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving
the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private
respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or
Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months
after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia
Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire
duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife
and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in
1
Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone
in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen2
year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe,
Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by
Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
3
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
4
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In
5
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. Two years later, on
February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private
respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265).
Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is
registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son
Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property,
having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming
aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint
after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal
property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the

parties, particularly of Kristopher Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at
Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old
house standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land situated at
Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced
by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father, Miguel Palang,
the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan,
under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the former (Kristopher)
executes, within 15 days after this decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever
renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal
properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975,
otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate
action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its
decision on July 22, 1994 with the following dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in hereby REVERSED and
another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein
plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffsappellants.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute
sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay
and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate
court erred in not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to
inherit from Miguel's estate. Third, respondent court erred, according to petitioner, "in not finding that

there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristopher A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be
8
considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence,
the Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action. Petitioner
assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no dispute that the
transfer of ownership from the original owners of the riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and
the spouses Cespedes, respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are notcapacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage
on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was
still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de factoseparation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
9
presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
10
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy
the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was
only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
11
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from
the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their
adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was
purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property
was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in
Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property
in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their
compromise agreement "in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property
12
between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership." Separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment
13
when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the
parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so
inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23,
1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that
Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be
14
placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
15
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise,
16
the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to
Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred
in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who
are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate
of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
17
recovery of ownership and possession."
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered as partydefendant in the case at bar following the trial court's decision which expressly found that Kristopher had
not been impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court's jurisdiction
18
through his mother/guardian ad litem. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been
impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda cannot be called his
guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for
Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity
19
of suits. Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need for
probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights has
been pointed out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

TUMLOS v FERNANDEZ
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired
during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence,
mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 19, 1998
1
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the October 7, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial
2
Court (RTC). The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the questioned orders of the court a
quo dated October 7, 1997 and November 11, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The judgment of the court a quodated June 5, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
3
private respondents.
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows:
Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June 5, 1997 affirming in toto the appealed
judgment of the [MTC] is hereby reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision
4
of the [MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case.
Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6756, an action for ejectment filed
before Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against [herein Petitioner] Guillerma
Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996, the said spouses
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE
SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had
allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven
(7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few
months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by
the said defendants; that they have demanded several times [that] the defendants . . . vacate the
premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building; and that they
have also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing rentals for
seven (7) years and payment of P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven
(7) years, but the said demands went unheeded. They then prayed that the defendants be
ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals, as well as to
jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred
therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner
of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She then asked
for the dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the MTC required the parties to
submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within
ten (10) days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position paper on November 29,
1996, while the [respondents] filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto
their marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the Contract to Sell over the
disputed property. The MTC thereafter promulgated its judgment on January 22, 1997[.]
xxx

xxx

xxx

Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two other] defendants alleged in their memorandum
on appeal that [Respondent] Mario Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous
relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was further
alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around
ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees
of the other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent Mario] deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario]
accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two other] defendants further averred that it was
only recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject
premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. In short, their presence there
[was] only transient and they [were] not tenants of the Fernandez spouses.
On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.
The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on
July 3, 1997, alleging that the decision of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for
failing to point out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was based vis-vis the statements of issues they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They also averred
that the Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as "Mario P.
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez," should not be given credence as it
was falsified to appear that way. According to them, the Contract to Sell originally named
"Guillerma Fernandez" as the spouse of [Respondent Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its
judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers naming the [respondents] as the
buyers after the latter presented their marriage contract and requested a change in the name of
the vendee-wife. Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner
thereof, and that the [respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to deprive her of her rights
to enjoy and use the property as recognized by law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The [RTC], in determining the question of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession,
ruled therein that the Contract to Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be
authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez.
Hence, the contract presented by the [respondents] cannot be given any weight. The court further
ruled that Guillerma and [Respondent Mario] acquired the property during their cohabitation as
husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From such findings, the court
concluded that [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject property and could
not be ejected therefrom.
The [respondents] then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of reversal, but the same
5
was denied by the [RTC].
As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this Petition filed by Guillerma Tumlos only.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA rejected petitioner's claim that she and Respondent Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the
disputed property. The CA ruled:
From the inception of the instant case, the only defense presented by private respondent Guillerma is her
right as a co-owner of the subject property[.]

xxx

xxx

xxx

This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma, as correctly held by the trial court.
No other evidence was presented to validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. As
previously stated, it was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitionerhusband without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her
memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. Such contentions and documents
should not have been considered by the . . . (RTC), as they were not presented in her affidavit/position
paper before the trial court (MTC).
xxx

xxx

xxx

However, even if the said allegations and documents could be considered, the claim of co-ownership
must still fail. As [herein Respondent] Mario Fernandez is validly married to [Respondent] Lourdes
Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract dated April 27, 1968, p. 45, Original Record), Guillerma and Mario
are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relations governing their supposed
cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines[.]
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The care given by one party [to] the home, children, and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the other, is not included in Article 148 (Handbook
on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p. 209). Hence, if actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares
(Agapay, supra at p. 348, citing Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines
Volume I by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1990 ed., p. 500).
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject
property was presented. Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase
price of the subject apartment building, We find no basis to justify her co-ownership with [Respondent
Mario]. The said property is thus presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and
Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other
proof to the contrary (please see Article 116 of the Family Code).
The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent Mario] has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in
her custody, and that to eject them from the apartment building would be to run counter with the
obligation of the former to give support to his minor illegitimate children, which indispensably includes
dwelling. As previously discussed, such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based on evidence
presented for the first time on appeal.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that
the need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand. . . .1wphi1.nt

In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the RTC instead presumed that Guillerma
and her children needed support from [Respondent Mario]. Worse, it relied on evidence not properly
presented before the trial court (MTC).
With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto Tumlos, a close perusal of the records shows that
they did not file any responsive pleading. Hence, judgment may be rendered against them as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein, as provided for in
Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. There was no basis for the public respondent to
7
dismiss the complaint against them. (emphasis in the original)
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in not outrightly dismissing the
petition for review filed by respondents.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not the co-owner of the property in litis.
III. Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in applying Art. 148 of the Family Code in the
case at bar.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the substantive right of support vis--vis the
8
remedy of ejectment resorted to by respondents.
In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property? (b)
Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit? We shall also discuss these preliminary matters: (a)
whether the CA was biased in favor of respondents and (b) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of herein respondents. This bias, she argues, is
manifest in the following:
9

1. The CA considered the respondents Petition for Review despite their failure to attach several
pleadings as well as the explanation for the proof of service, despite the clear mandate of Section
10
11 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court and despite the ruling in Solar Team
11
Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort.
2. It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not attached.
3. It considered respondents' Reply dated May 20, 1998, which had allegedly been filed out of
time.
4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first determining whether to give
12
due course to the Petition, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this wise:
It is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural error after we have rendered the
decision. More importantly, when the private respondent filed their comment to the petition on
April 26, 1998, they failed to question such alleged procedural error. Neither have they
questioned all the resolutions issued by the Court after their filing of such comment. They should,
13
therefore, be now considered in estoppel to question the same.
We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never raised these matters before the CA. She cannot be
allowed now to challenge its Decision on grounds of alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an
14
afterthought. In this light, she cannot invoke Solar because she never raised this issue before the CA.
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitioners part to rely, on the one hand, on
these procedural technicalities to overcome the appealed Decision and, on the other hand, assert that the
RTC may consider the new evidence she presented for the first time on appeal. Such posturing only
betrays the futility of petitioner's assertion, if not its absence of merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the court of origin, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
did not have jurisdiction over the "nature of the case," alleging that the real question involved is one of
ownership. Since the issue of possession cannot be settled without passing upon that of ownership, she
maintains that the MTC should have dismissed the case.
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership may be passed upon by the MTC to settle the issue
15
of possession. Such disposition, however, is not final insofar as the issue of ownership is
16
concerned, which may be the subject of another proceeding brought specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now move on to petitioners substantive contentions.
First Issue:
Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents' action for ejectment is her claim of coownership over the property with Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she
presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse. The MTC found this document
insufficient to support her claim. The RTC, however, after considering her allegation that she had been
17
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence presented before it, ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the RTC could no longer be
considered because they had not been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded
18
that "[t]he claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven . . ."
We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering the evidence presented before it.
Nonetheless, we reject her claim that she was a co-owner of the disputed property.
Evidence Presented on
Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence presented by petitioner, the CA relied
on the doctrine that issues not raised during trial could not be considered for the first time during
19
appeal.

We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or issues belatedly raised during the appeal
before the RTC. The defense invoked by petitioner at the very start was that she was a co-owner. To
support her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell dated November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario
Fernandez was legally married to her. The allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a mere
elaboration of her initial theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on considerations of fair play. Respondents
never objected when the assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. Thus, they cannot claim
unfair surprise or prejudice.
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under
Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC, we cannot accept petitioner's
20
submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As
correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the
Family Code which provides:
21

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
22
23
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the
24
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
25
between the man and his lawful wife.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the
RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally
married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with
Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by
26
Article 148 of the Family Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out that "[t]he Family Code has filled
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, petitioners argument that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the
acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say
that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired
27
rights. In this case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to
28
resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively.

No Evidence of Actual Joint

Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners claim that she is a co-owner of the property.
29
In Agapay, the Court ruled:
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed that the actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. (emphasis ours)
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase
the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with
Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any
event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides
that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the
conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment
of petitioner from the premises.
Second Issue:
Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to repudiate her claim regarding the
filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil and Michael Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts to an
admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for support, she advances the theory that the childrens right to
support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to
exercise their possessory right over their property. It is summary in character and deals solely with the
issue of possession of the property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they have a better right to
possess it than does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their
tolerance.1wphi1.nt
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure to repudiate petitioner's claim of filiation is not
relevant to the present case.1wphi1 Indeed, it would be highly improper for us to rule on such issue.
30
31
Besides, it was not properly taken up below. In any event, Article 298 of the Civil Code requires that
32
there should be an extrajudicial demand. None was made here. The CA was correct when it said:
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed to
consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code]
expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid
33
except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MALILIN, JR v CASTILLO
MENDOZA, J.:
1

This is a petition for review of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1998 in CA
G.R. CV No. 48443 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration of its decision dated November 7,
1996, and of the resolution dated December 21, 1998 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
2

On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of
Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner and
respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after
a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they
set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the
board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and
petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondent's name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded
from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties
had been registered solely in her name.
3

In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with
petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other
individuals and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She denied that
she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to
their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in
petitioner's action for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and
registered solely in her name.
4

On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance with Rule 34
5
of the Rules of Court. She contended that summary judgment was proper, because the issues raised in
the pleadings were sham and not genuine, to wit:
A.
The main issue is Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of coownership share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are
admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still valid and subsisting marriages,
even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties,
under the law, considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of
marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife (?)
B.
As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be considered as an unregistered co-owner of the real
properties under the Transfer Certificates of Title duly registered solely in the name of defendant
Ma. Elvira Castillo? This issue is also true as far as the motor vehicles in question are concerned
6
which are also registered in the name of defendant.

On the first point, respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner
could not validly claim a part of the subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio,
7
applies only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to contract marriage. In the parties' case, their
union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised
by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as husband and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership
could exist between them.
As to the second issue, respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be considered an unregistered coowner of the subject properties on the ground that, since titles to the land are solely in her name, to grant
petitioner's prayer would be to allow a collateral attack on the validity of such titles.
8

Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. He contended that the case presented
genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by the Family Code which
now allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership even though a man and a woman living together are
not capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was constituted when
he and respondent agreed to register the properties solely in the latter's name although the same were
acquired out of the profits made from their brokerage business. Petitioner invoked the following provisions
of the Civil Code:
Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal
title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in
favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.
Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intention to
hold it for, or transfer it to another grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose
benefit is contemplated.
9

On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision granting respondent's motion for summary
judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues involved were purely legal.
The trial court also sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's action for partition amounted to a
collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title covering the subject properties. It held that even if
the parties really had cohabited, the action for partition could not be allowed because an action for
partition among co-owners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present
case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in question. For these reasons, the trial court
dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996, ordered the case remanded to the court of origin
10
for trial on the merits. It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that an
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title
over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the
case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the
action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the
defendant to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's action for partition was a
collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner
sought to compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was
his share, petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized their validity.
Finally, the appellate court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed
by Art. 148 of the Family Code.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. On May 7, 1998, nearly two
years after its first decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion and reconsidered its prior
decision. In its decision now challenged in the present petition, it held
Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy on whether this suit is a collateral attack on the titles in
issue, it must be underscored that plaintiff-appellant alleged in his complaint that all the nine (9) titles are
registered in the name of defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, except one which appears in the
name of Eloisa Castillo (see par. 9, Complaint). However, a verification of the annexes of such initiatory
pleading shows some discrepancies, to wit:
1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) = Elvira T. Castillo, single
2. TCT No. 168208 (Annex B) = do
3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) = do
4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = do
5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) = do
6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) = Steelhaus Realty & Dev. Corp.
7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) = do
8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) = do
9. TCT No. (92323) 67881 (Annex I) = Eloisa Castillo
In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be declared as 1/2 co-owner of the real properties covered by
the above listed titles and eventually for their partition [par. (a), Prayer; p. 4 Records]. Notably, in order to
achieve such prayer for a joint co-ownership declaration, it is unavoidable that the individual titles
involved be altered, changed, cancelled or modified to include therein the name of the appellee as a
registered 1/2 co-owner. Yet, no cause of action or even a prayer is contained filed. Manifestly, absent
any cause or prayer for the alteration, cancellation, modification or changing of the titles involved, the
desired declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on
the subject titled in this suit.
It is here that We fell into error, such that, if not rectified will surely lead to a procedural lapse and a
possible injustice. Well settled is the rules that a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but
respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an action for reconveyance or, if
the property had passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Verily, plaintiffappellant should have first pursued such remedy or any other relief directly attacking the subject titles
before instituting the present partition suit. Apropos, the case at bench appears to have been prematurely
filed.
Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the appellant will in effect rule and decide against the properties
registered in the names of Steelhouse Realty and Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, who are
not parties in the case. To allow this to happen will surely result to injustice and denial of due process of
11
law. . . .

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first decision of November 7, 1996, was correct in
applying the Roque ruling and in rejecting respondent's claim that she was the sole owner of the subject
properties and that the partition suit was a collateral attack on the titles; (2) the Court of Appeals correctly
rules in its first decision that Art. 148 of the Family Code governs the co-ownership between the parties,
hence, the complaint for partition is proper; (3) with respect to the properties registered in the name of
Steelhouse Realty, respondent admitted ownership thereof and, at the very least, these properties could
simply be excluded and the partition limited to the remaining real and personal properties; and (4) the
12
Court of Appeals erred in not holding that under the Civil Code, there is an implied trust in his favor.
The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court, is proper. We rule in the negative.
First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary judgment is proper only when, based on
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after summary hearing, it is shown that except as
to the amount of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any material fact in the action and the
1
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, i.e., an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished
from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set-up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial, summary
14
judgment is not proper.
In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist. Petitioner anchors his claim of coownership on two factual grounds: first, that said properties were acquired by him and respondent during
their union from 1979 to 1992 from profits derived from their brokerage business; and second, that said
properties were registered solely in respondent's name only because they agreed to that arrangement,
thereby giving rise to an implied trust in accordance with Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code. These
allegations are denied by respondent. She denies that she and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife. She also claims that the properties in question were acquired solely by her with her own money and
resources. With such conflicting positions, the only way to ascertain the truth is obviously through the
presentation of evidence by the parties.
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived together as husband and wife
because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to
marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them.
We disagree.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are without
15
impediment to marry each other, or in which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous.
Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the
Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are
incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
16

In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be

owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry
each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they could not have owned
properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a
man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through
their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus
co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein. Consequently, whether petitioner
and respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged coownership are genuine and material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been
acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired
before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil
Code, then it should be excluded.
Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:
Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff assisted by defendant, their
customs brokerage business grew and out of the profits therefrom, the parties acquired real and
personal properties which were, upon agreement of the parties, listed and registered in
17
defendant's name with plaintiff as the unregistered co-owner of all said properties.
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the
legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in
favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each." We do not think this is correct. The legal relation
of the parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the properties
acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contributions of money, property or industry shall constitute
18
a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other. The
provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer material since a trust relation
already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioner's action on the ground that the same amounted to a
collateral attack on the certificates of title involved. As already noted, at first, the Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioner's action does not challenge the validity of respondent's titles. However, on reconsideration,
it reversed itself and affirmed the trial court. It noted that petitioner's complaint failed to include a prayer
for the alteration, cancellation, modification, or changing of the titles involved. Absent such prayer, the
appellate court ruled that a declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition would involve an indirect or
collateral attack on the titles. We disagree.
19

A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, 48
provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified,

or canceled except in a direct proceeding. When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of
the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title
was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
20
thereof.
In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in Roque regarding the nature of an action for
partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second,
the conveyance of his lawful shares. He does not attack respondent's titles. Petitioner alleges no fraud,
mistake, or any other irregularity that would justify a review of the registration decree in respondent's
favor. His theory is that although the subject properties were registered solely in respondent's name, but
since by agreement between them as well as under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these properties
and as such is entitled to the conveyance of his shares. On the premise that he is a co-owner, he can
validly seek the partition of the properties in co-ownership and the conveyance to him of his share.
21

Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, in which a parcel of land bequeathed in a last will and testament was
registered in the name of only one of the heirs, with the understanding that he would deliver to the others
their shares after the debts of the original owner had been paid, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the
registration of the land in the name of only one of the heirs, the other heirs can claim their shares in "such
22
action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator."
Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on the ground that to order partition will, in
effect, rule and decide against Steelhouse Realty Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, both
strangers to the present case, as to the properties registered in their names. This reasoning, however,
ignores the fact that the majority of the properties involved in the present case are registered in
respondent's name, over which petitioner claims rights as a co-owner. Besides, other than the real
properties, petitioner also seeks partition of a substantial amount of personal properties consisting of
motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing petitioner's complaint for partition on grounds
of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove ownership
over the claimed real and personal properties. The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is unjustified since
both ends may be amply served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered
in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and
the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the
merits.
SO ORDERED.

CARIO v CARIO
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy
between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of
2
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on
June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom
he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992,
with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and]
3
Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS)
4
and burial (SSS).
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least onehalf of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death
benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.
Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of,
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended
that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage
5
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO
(sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this
archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may
6
serve.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the
amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS
OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
8
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
9
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
10
case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence
of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
11
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
12
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
13
14
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic
15
v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by
the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that
they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her

pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and
chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt
from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
16
according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman
17
are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
18
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary,
it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal
wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any

impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during
the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them,
19
even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if
the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good
faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in
the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to
his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
20
Government Service Insurance System, where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of
the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as
putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death
should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as
such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with
respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
21
partnership of the first marriage.
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior
and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court
determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.

22

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified
that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only
for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she
could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule
applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for
filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of
the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
23
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even
if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as
to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

SAGUID v CA
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
1
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
2

Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met
3
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided
4
to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. Their cohabitation
was not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid
5
Brothers." Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in
Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence,
however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate
6
and end up their 9-year cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property
with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged
that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00
in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer,

she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a
total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First Allied
7
Development Bank. Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of
8
9
P21,046.08. She further stated that she had a total of P35,465.00 share in the joint account deposit
10
which she and the petitioner maintained with the same bank. Gina declared that said deposits were
11
spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and other personal properties.
12

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house
were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private
respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said
house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small
quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work
continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house
was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses
because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents. From his
income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which
was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was
spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as
13
required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.
14

On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 21, 1997 order, which was
15
denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner
filed another motion for reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision
which reads:

16

was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D and directing the
defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos
(P70,000,00) which the latter actually contributed to its construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal properties, to
return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

17

On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award of P50,000.00 as
18
moral damages was deleted for lack of basis. The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order
which declared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and
the defendants non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant
petition based on the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT
CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC
THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE
COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING
ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF
19
HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to
present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial courts decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pretrial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his
20
evidence ex parteand the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy of the
21
defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to
22
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really stress the fact that the
defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is
23
already on record.
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not
represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private
respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be
represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for
24
25
extension to file answer, the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses, and
26
several other motions. If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23, 1997
order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for
extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged
receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a
brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
27
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to
relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a
non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts
to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members
28
the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the
plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief.
While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even
before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was
required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said
circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre29
trial," that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.
Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to
marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation
30
with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which
applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the
same married man. Under this regime, "only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
31
32
to their respective contributions ..." Proof of actual contribution is required.
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is
before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
33
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of
34
the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
35

36

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of coownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without
basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of
37
the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
38
opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law
gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the
39
plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
40
allegation is not evidence.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the
41
record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and
December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties
came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that
both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of
proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the

disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not
questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed
for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents coownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the
construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the
amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of Appeals correctly
deleted the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
64166 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to
the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private
respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.

ATIENZA v DE CASTRO
GARCIA, J.:
1

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated April 29,
2
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, as reiterated in its Resolution of
September 16, 2005, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 61, in an action for Judicial Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by the herein petitioner
Lupo Atienza against respondent Yolanda de Castro.
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro
as accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a
married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out
of their union, two children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship
turned sour until they parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial
partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his
complaint, docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject property was
acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is coowned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by Yolanda
sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in
Yolandas name without his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because

at the time, their affair was still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that
Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his share
thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property for
Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having
bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman.
3

In a decision dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the
contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in
equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City to be owned in common by plaintiff LUPO
ATIENZA and the defendant YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share alike and ordering the partition
of said property between them. Upon the finality of this Decision, the parties are hereby directed to submit
for the confirmation of the Court a mutually agreed project of partition of said property or, in case the
physical partition of said property is not feasible because of its nature, that either the same be assigned to
one of the parties who shall pay the value corresponding to the share of the other or that the property to
be sold and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between the parties after deducting the expenses
incident to said sale.
The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein
arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her own
name with her own money. She maintained that the documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are
the best evidence to prove who actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as
Lupos assertions casting doubt as to her financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.
4

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision of April 29, 2005, reversed and set
aside that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE .
The subject property is hereby declared to be exclusively owned by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De
Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that under the
provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the evidence on record and attending
circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by
competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the
subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution of September 16,
5
6
2005, Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article 144 of the
Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject
property because with or without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof,

adding that under Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or both of
them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and
governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
We DENY.
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their
8
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
9
10
contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required.
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
11
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
12
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family
Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
13
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil cases, the
burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense.
The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
14
warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
15
not evidence.
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount
needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to
the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the
Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987,
all entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the
petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the records
of the case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of judgment in its findings of fact and
appreciation of evidence with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of the disputed
property and ultimately the rightful owner thereof. Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled to
respect and shall not be disturbed, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked or misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case.

In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally
entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as
consideration for the disputed property, [Lupo] diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by
painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any property. Instead of
proving his ownership, or the extent thereof, over the subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a
mere attack on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs
of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his actual
contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a limited access to the funds
of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts for their behalf do
not prove that the money she used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter, came
from said withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent financial capacity of the
parties.1wphi1 On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the President and General
Manager of two corporations and on the other is [Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that
[Lupo] is financially well heeled than [Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda]
had taken advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)
As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only
did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In
contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no
relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven
by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation
is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in
support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed
property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure
to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership.
There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she
derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as
a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented
her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented
her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to
pay the purchase price of the subject property.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the herein
challenged decision and resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

BORROMEO v DESCALLAR
PUNO, C.J.:

What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country
as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the
Torrens system?
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he
transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met
respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress
at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of
additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antoniettas
residence at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision,
1
Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10,
2
1986 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of
3
Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on
the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as buyer on page 3, and at
the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 over the properties were issued in respondents name alone.
4

Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, and per Decision of the
5
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich
began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons for only two
months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate
business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and
some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for
about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to
6
petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." On July 26, 1991, when
petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18,
1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties
which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties
since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it
was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and
absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to
defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien,
was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.

At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed
property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his
witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still
employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under
litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is
not only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrichs financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is
7
not disputed.
xxx
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter
part of 1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a
month and was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu
City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which
she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all
stated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she
supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was personally interviewed by her in
connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true
because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during this time she was already
earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra business, it would be
highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since it is the
observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty
as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when
she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by
him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her
8
children.
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under
litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more
than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a
month as salary and tips of more or lessP2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her
family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and
accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for
9
her and her children who were already abandoned by her husband.
xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell
dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16,
1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she
has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty,
sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she
needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of
these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was still going smoothly and
10
harmoniously. [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials and
three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790,
24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792
in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff
Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they
appear to convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Descallar;
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00 and
litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.

11

12

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower
court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the
subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the
title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong
Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United
Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De
Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of
the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
13
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENTS JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING
JAMBRICHS PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS
NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND
ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELLREASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST
14
HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an
Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was
assigned to Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of
not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as
admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were
unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family,
with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the
motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left standing was already scrap.
15
Further, the Child Study Report submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz
are (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners
coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She
was even renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of
great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself
16
and her children.
The DSWD Home Study Report

17

further disclosed that:

[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the
waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the]
English language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to support
[her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled
every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The
Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly the children who were malnourished. After a
few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent place. He told Antonietta
that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at that
18
time accepted the offer for the sake of the children.
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and
during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the
properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of
legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as
buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks
issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the
installment payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.

(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months,
where she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject
properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are
accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the
instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court
did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also does not
help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each
19
other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It
is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution
20
do not apply.
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having
found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is
the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?
21

It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the
22
fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A
23
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
24
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
25
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. This is the
situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two
sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7,
26
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
27
28
Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land
is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be
transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only
Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal
29
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries
30
31
v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in

the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying
United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were]
void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs
in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong
materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds
of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent
to pay petitioner P25,000 as attorneys fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of
suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
32
subsequent cases, is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more
public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV
No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.