JUDICIAL POWER

Miranda vs Aguirre
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was
approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was
enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City
of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of
provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a
proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the
said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent
component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the
people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political
question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question
but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or
not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division,

abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.

Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.

Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the
Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and
voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion
of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus,
denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
THEORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Angara v. Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct
7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said
district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935,
the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the
Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara.
On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said
date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua
argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can
take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject
to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.

approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of

Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.

October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in

form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation

with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.

the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,

Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.

by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various

petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is

Facts:

unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the

Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules

the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue:

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and

resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment

Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in
law or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no
justiciable issue was presented before it.

proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the

constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn

Held:
The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by
the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual

justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it not at all

the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government.

case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person

Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are

challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a

to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to

personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or

which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or

will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of

executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues

constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. The Court found the existence in

Commissioner: The powers of government are generally considered

divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the

full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally

Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of

vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose

the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a

resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a

given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice courts of justice

provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue

determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the

of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government.

government as well as those of its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of

jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but also
a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature a duty which cannot
be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable
political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted
within such limits.

must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of

Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said
right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to
our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power
granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative
power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the
basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts
to censorship.
ISSUE:

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the

Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

merits of the second impeachment complaint. More importantly, any

HELD:

discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of

No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU

did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary
of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.

what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely

political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation.
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
Prematurity
PACU v. Secretary of Education
95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership
of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit
should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person
may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also
gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership
of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational
institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all
education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline,
civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the
organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are
offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and
regulation by the State over all schools.

Mariano v. COMELEC

Issue:

FACTS:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents.

Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859
(An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City
to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same attempts
to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective officials
disregarding the terms previously served by them, which collides with the
Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).
ISSUE:
Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with
merit.
HELD:
No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality
of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Cutaran V. DENR
There is no justiciable controversy because the applications are still
pending. Hence, there is not government act to speak of and rule upon.

Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

Facts:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to
a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be
voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may
participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed
"operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering
of age for membership in the SK.

Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections,
petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to
any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK
elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the
same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684,
the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for
membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not
have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under
Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and
voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002
election. Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.
The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in
maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable
controversy, those petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is
alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.
Lozano v. Nograles
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as
concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of
Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend
or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members
of Congress, convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly to
amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a
justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by
this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for

amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the

House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987
Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of the same as the
separate voting of the members of each House (the Senate and the House
of Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a vote of three-fourths
of all the Members of Congress (i.e., of the members of Congress
without distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong to).
Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of
House Resolution No. 1109.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While
some may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule
of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot
hurdle the bar of justiciability set by the Court before it will assume
jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.
The Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual
cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims,
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court from
deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the court
give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive
action
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of
ripeness. In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with
whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is
the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed
by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether

an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of

government before the courts may step in.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of
judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained
of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the
House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual
convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence,
no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In
short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an
uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive
act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is
still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial
oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for
ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts
are devoid of jurisdiction
A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1)
he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the
remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the
elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue.
Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for
significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation
of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult
constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners personal stake in this case
is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of
any legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners
that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. A taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is

undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public

funds in this case as of yet.
The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized
and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
mandates courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving
rights
which
are
legally
demandable
and
enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to
the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of
personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine,
such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the
ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their
cerebral deficit.
Mootness
Atlas Fertilizer v. Sec of DAR
Facts:
This is a consolidated case questioning the constitutionality Sections 3 (b),
11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657. That the said provision extends
agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the
Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands. The said
provisions being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
by similarly treating of aquaculture and agriculture lands when they are
differently situated. That the said provisions distort employment benefits
and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other
industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3 of Art. XIII of the Constitution
mandates the State to promote equality in economic and employment
opportunities and that the questioned provisions deprived petitioner of its
government-induced investments in aquaculture even as Sec. 2 and 3 of
Art. XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to respect the freedom of
enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns of
investments and to expansion and growth.
In the petitioner's argument they contended that in the case of Luz Farms,
Inc v. Secretary of Agrarian and Reform, the Court has already ruled

impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands. That in
aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only incidental
to and not the principal factor in productivity and hence, as held in the
above-mentioned case, they too should be excluded from RA 6657 just as
land devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the
same reason.
While this case is pending RA 7881 was approved by Congress amending
RA 6657.
Issue:
Whether or not the said provisions of RA 6657 are unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The question regarding the constitutionality of the above-mentioned
provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of RA 7881
and RA 7881 expressly stat that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded
from the coverage of RA 6657.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails
the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants,
advisers
and
assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study
and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
Constitution,
and
the
manner
of
implementing
them.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

Held:
In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as
a
citizen
and
taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has
not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim
that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated,
nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the
issues
raised.
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to
raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus,
payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is
apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as
amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by
the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken
from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the
Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI
of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the
necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a
taxpayers interest in this particular issue.
Lacson v. Perez
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation
No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP
and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of

several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter

effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas
corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of
Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue
thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein
the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and
trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are
allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless
arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6,
2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and
academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the
police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the
rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are
not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and
prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly
arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person
must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer
responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the
detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be
charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the
validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any
intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold

departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief
regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being
that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime,
furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is
to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined
from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of
Malacaang.

Defunis v. Odegaard
Facts.
Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington Law School, a state
operated university. DeFunis argued that the Universitys admissions
policies and criteria were racially discriminatory. However, DeFunis was
allowed to attend the law school during the case and was in his third year
when the case was heard by the Court. Further, the University has agreed
to let him graduate upon completion of his last year.
Issue.
Does an actual controversy exist between the parties, capable of redress
by the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court)?
Held.
The Court ordered the parties to address the issue of mootness before
they proceeded to any other claims in the petition. The Court reasoned
that federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot
affect the rights of litigants in the cases before them. This requirement
stems from Article III of the Constitution, under which the exercise of
judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy. No
amount of public interest would be sufficient to create an actual case or
controversy, and the case was rendered moot because DeFunis was going

to graduate from the law school regardless of the Courts ruling. Thus, the
case was rendered moot. *T+he controversy between the parties has thus
clearly ceased to be definite and concrete.
Dissent.
There were numerous potential litigants who would be affected by a
decision on the legal issues presented. Further, 26 amici curiae briefs were
filed by parties in this case. The public interest would be best served by
reviewing these issues now, as they would inevitably find their way back
into the federal court system. There was a stronger interest in litigating
these issues immediately to avoid repetitious litigation that would
inevitably occur due to the high public interest in this issue.
Discussion. A case is considered moot if a justiciable controversy existed
when a case was filed, but circumstances after filing indicate the litigant no
longer has a stake in the controversy. In such a situation, the Supreme
Courts jurisdiction is not invoked, and the Court will not even hear the
other issues presented.
EXCEPTIONS TO MOOTNESS
Sanlakas v. Exec Secretary
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers
and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and
direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood
Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding
the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took
place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the
same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders
were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State
of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS
AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners
contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no
factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is
a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18,
Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress
within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend
that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to
bring suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise
of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military

authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of
usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since
the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested
on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to
challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Pimental v. Ermita
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as
secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an
acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other
senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel
averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of
the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10,
Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of

the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and

not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while
Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue
temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is

in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents
confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also
be the permanent appointee.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting
capacity.

Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292
also provides that the president may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.

ISSUE:

PROPER PARTY

Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself
provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the
provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this
case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and
when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments
this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the
president. The choice is the presidents to make and the president
normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be
constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose.
An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great
trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to
an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

Joya vs. PCGG

Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be
raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or
controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a
citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty
of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if
the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public
funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act

constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the

request of a taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a
Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York, selling 82 Old
Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth
of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale,
COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already
opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled
and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which
provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined
as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the
case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of
the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers Suit:

ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an
agreement with Christies of New York for the sale of the artworks
RULING:
On

jurisdiction

of

the

Court

to

exercise

judicial

review

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or

validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that
there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the
constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.
Standing

of

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed
exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for
mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment
of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer
questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement
of
public
funds.

Petitioners

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply

concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic
wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve
the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly
Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the
preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties.
Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the
people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that
with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners

have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of
law
in
violation
of
the
Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in
law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private
persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations
established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman
was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido
R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs
to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the
public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these
paintings
when
they
were
placed
on
exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were
given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from
foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion
personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the
revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to
the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the
Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that
the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties
were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory
defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised
only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority
to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
question
their
alleged
unauthorized
disposition.
Requisites

for

Mandamus

Suit

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned

citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v.

Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of
mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the
fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the
1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act
because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the
continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at
most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action
for
mandamus.
When

Taxpayer's

Suit

may

prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action
filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done
by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental
acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure
involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public
properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings
and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with
public
money.
Actual

Controversy

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual

case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot
and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before
us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin
respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks
on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the issues
raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public
interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in
the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

Agan v. PIATCO
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)
for the implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement
proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two
daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals
on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as
amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo
and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc.
(PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo
Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC
awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was
incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to
PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of
PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA
Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government
granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal
during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other

charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997

Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession
period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service
date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period,
PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and
operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts
with various service providers to offer international airline airport services,
such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support,
aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and
other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service
providers, claiming that they would lose their job upon the
implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for
prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing
the legality of the various agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she
will not honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branchs legal
offices have concluded (as) null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected
with public interest.

RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the
Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and obligate
the government to pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal
and/or Terminal Complex.
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms

prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any

privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national
emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take
over the operation of any business affected with public interest. The
duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long
the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary
takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the business
and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is not required
to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is
no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private
entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim
just compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as the
temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power
and not of its power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation
wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the government to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. It is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining
whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the
State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power.
Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its
exercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be
a source of obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to
arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay
reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant
to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.

CHREA vs.CHR
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations
Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All

Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these

special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting
an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant
positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said
staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the
DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied
the request.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum,
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA)
in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and
reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement
of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling,
and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action
is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE:
Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior
approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD:
the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is

REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are
disallowed.

PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that

provided for under R.A. No. 6758. )

1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position

Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the
Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish
and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the

imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of
any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is
consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3,
Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the
Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as
erroneously held by the CA. The word to administer means to control or
regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is
encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case
of PRA v. Buag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other
benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite
approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position classification
system of the national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC
grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees
and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the
Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is,
nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution
affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should not be
interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of
Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the
DBMs function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of
Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and

Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national
resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of
the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems
essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and
efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of
compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the
upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in
the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or
approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three
letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now
estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously
sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys
fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the
CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But the
Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of
Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC,

the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant
of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions,
which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the
Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human
Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police
commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly
clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions.
As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum
what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside
control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom
to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to
22
23
time. In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is understood that it
is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with
fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag
obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522,
while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR

as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and

implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage
to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is,
nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy
by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share
the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding,
all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without
approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority
is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified
Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA
6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is
the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the implementation hereof shall
be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
26
authorized under compensation standardization laws.
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi
considering that there exists no official written record in the Commission
recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is
there anything in the records to show that its president has the authority
to sue the CHR.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of
cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here,
petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR,

protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a

select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the
injury test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid,
potentially entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of its
budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the
benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.

interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to

implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed
the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the
CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs
personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon
the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this
technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was
neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice, and due process.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary
Standardization Law of providing equal pay for substantially equal work
and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM,
in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by
the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the
General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to
justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
provided by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM discerned
that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management
Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to
upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and
four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from
support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and
administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The

Facts:
In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to
reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands
were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila
Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into
an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded
and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring
lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311
and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands.
Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which
would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of
public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a
writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands
by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events,
under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an
Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of
the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec.
3
Art.
XII
of
the
1987
Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the
amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations
but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject
to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain

inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only
then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain,
which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.

KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia

FACTS:
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Secretary Oscar
M. Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman, Remedios A.S.
Fernando that will allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers
rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate
for a period of one (1) year to be implemented on August 6, 1990. The
Memo read as is the liberalization of regulations in the transport sector
and to move away gradually from regulatory policies and make progress
towards greater reliance to market forces: Chairman Fernando informed
Sec. Orbos that the Memo is not legally feasible and recommended for
further studies because (1) under Public Service Act rates should be
approved by public service operators; there should be publication and
notice especially to affected sectors; and a public hearing be held; (2) it
was untimely due to an earthquake happened on July 16; (3) it will trigger
upward adjustment in bus fares especially in trips bound for Northern
Luzon; and (4) DOTC should consider reforms that will be uplifting after the
earthquake. On December 5, 1990 the Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare
rate increase. On December 14, 1990 LTFRB released a fare schedule based
on a straight computation. On March 30, 1992 DOTC Sec. Pete Nicomedes
Prado issued Department Order No 92-587 defining the framework on the
regulation of transport services. Then on October 8, 1992 DOTC Sec. Jose
B. Garcia issued a memorandum to LTFRB for the swift action on the
adoption of the rules and procedures to implement Department Order No.
92-587 that laid down the deregulation and other liberalization policies for
the transport sector. LTFRB issued on February 17, 1993

On March 16, 1994. Kilusang Mayo Uno anchors its claim on two (2)
grounds. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus
operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later
increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over
and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for
the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the
establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for
a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is
illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court
and petitions before the LTFRB.
LTFRB dismissed because of lack of merit.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining, prohibiting and preventing respondents from implementing the
bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum
circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels
duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was
likewise enforced on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses,
jeepneys, and taxicabs.
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the
petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They
further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRBs authority to set a fare
range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications
for certificates of public convenience.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners have the right to petition of this case?
HELD:
(1) YES. KMU has a locus standi (or ability of a party to demonstrate to the
court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged
to support that partys participation in the case) which is inherent in the
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.
NO. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED and the challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely:
DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent
LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they
affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney
operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed
transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a
service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and
placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed
service to the oppositor. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June
20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare
rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned
administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.

John
Hay
Peoples
Alternative
Coalition
[GR
119775,
24
October
En Banc, Carpio-Morales (J): 9 concur, 2 took no part

vs.

Lim
2003]

Facts:
Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of Military
Reservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion
and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and
for other purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set
out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases
under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases
Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as
their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City
of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious
aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in
accordance with the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created

the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and
bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by
the President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ incentives
ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses
therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized
financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the
President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the
concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark
military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and
Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX)
and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private
corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands,
preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of
Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations
and recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA,
TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby
they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the
Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which
would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of
turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally
envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The
Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in
response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of
Camp John Hay. By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the
barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or
coverage of any plan or program for its development. By a subsequent
Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an
abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being
occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military reservation.
Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian
adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development
of Camp John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things,
a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the
making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in
employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base

area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management

and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine
barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of
businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals
of the sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a
SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the
mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution
requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty taxes which
may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. The
resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in
determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the
sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the
camp's property and the economic activity therein from local or national
taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed
Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its
concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential
proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in
accordance with the provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution
was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by
the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation
420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area
covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic
Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples Alternative
Coalition, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and
declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the
main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420 as well as the
legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement
between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning
the validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.
Held:
It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised,
the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following

requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local
government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the
country.'" The grant by the law on local government units of the right of
concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal
standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that
communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its
utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in
assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such
that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest
in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the
question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the
enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social
existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T.
Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the
time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties
included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of
whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall and Yaranon, as city
officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of
1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation 420,
have legal standing to bring the present petition.
IBP v. Zamora
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP
questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of

the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article
XVI of the Constitution.

Executive Secretary vs. The Court of Appeals

[GR 131719, 25 May 2004]
Facts:
Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on 15 July 1995. The Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act
of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the 7 April 1996 issue of the Manila
Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment
Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a
petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section
2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
OWWA Administrator, and POEA Administrator from enforcing the assailed
provisions of the law. In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil.
alleged that RA 8042 was self-executory and that no implementing rules
were needed. It prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order
to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal
recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section 9
on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments. On 1 August 1995, the
trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of
only 20 days therefrom. After the Executive Secretary, et al. filed their
comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the
amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof 11 other
corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented
in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Executive Secretary, et al. from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6

subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10,

paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of RA 8042. Arco-Phil averred
that the provisions of RA 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution (i.e. discrimination against unskilled workers, discrimination
against licensed and registered recruiters, among others) In their answer
to the petition, the Executive Secretary, et al. alleged, inter alia, that (a)
Acro-Phil has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition
was premature as the rules implementing RA 8042 not having been
released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of
the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the
exercise of the police power of the State. After the respective counsels of
the parties were heard on oral arguments, the trial court issued on 21
August 1995, an order granting Acro-Phils plea for a writ of preliminary
injunction upon a bond of P50,000. Acro-Phil posted the requisite bond
and on 24 August 1995, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the enforcement of Section 2, subsections (g) and (i,
2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7,
subsections (a) & (b); Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section
11; and Section 40 of RA 8042, pending the termination of the
proceedings. The Executive Secretary, et al. filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court. They asserted that Acro-Phil is not the
real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court, as it was inconceivable
how a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustain direct injury as
a result of the enforcement of the law. They argued that if, at all, any
damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the licensed
and registered recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant
workers discriminated against who would sustain the said injury or
damage, not Acro-Phil. On 5 December 1997, the appellate court came out
with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed
order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The
appellate court, likewise, denied the Executive Secretary, et al.s motion
for reconsideration of the said decision. They thus filed a petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether ACRO-Phil has locus standi.

Held:
PARTLY YES. ACRO-Phil has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in
representation of the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies
impleaded in the amended petition. The modern view is that an
association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view
fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An
association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct
interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has
standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. In Telecommunications
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, the
Court held that standing jus tertii would be recognized only if it can be
shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party,
or that the right of the third party would be diluted unless the party in
court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claims. Herein,
ACRO-Phil filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court for and in behalf of its 11 licensed and registered
recruitment agencies which are its members, and which approved
separate resolutions expressly authorizing ACRO-Phil to file the said suit for
and in their behalf. The Court note that, under its Articles of Incorporation,
ACRO-Phil was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and
supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment
industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and
exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general
membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection
of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual,
company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower
recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to
accomplish the purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil is, thus, the
appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its
members are in every practical sense identical. ACRO-Phil asserts that the
assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights of its members and the
officers and employees thereof. ACRO-Phil is but the medium through
which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression
of their voices and the redress of their grievances. However, ACROPHIL has
no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers.
The Court notes that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its

petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the 11

licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent,
ACRO-Phil failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment
agencies for which ACRO-Phil filed the suit are specifically named in the
petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of
suits.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona
In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an
on-line lottery system which will establish a national network system that
will in turn expand PCSOs source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC)
won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it
alleged that:
1.

PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is

75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group
Berhad);

2.

PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from

holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or
joint venture with any person, association, company or entity;

3.

The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a

telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a
franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any
person may be allowed to set up such;

4.

PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign

Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install,
establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications
systems.

PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona,
Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that
PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e.,
the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it

will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e.,
Contract of Lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD:

Plaintiff sued Congress, hoping to compel release of detailed funding

records of CIA funding. Plaintiff based his standing to sue on his status as a
United States taxpayer.
Issue.
Is taxpayer status sufficient to establish standing to bring suit in this case?

Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.

1.

On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign

ownership was reduced to 40% though.

2.

On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by

B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or
foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and
PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between
PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they
used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their
agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build, operate, and
manage the network system including its facilities needed to
operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk
and all it does is to provide its franchise in violation of its
charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a
violation of Act No. 3846.

TAXPAYERS STANDING
US v. Richardson
Brief Fact Summary. Richardson, the Plaintiff-Respondent (Plaintiff) sued
Congress. He alleged that public reporting under the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Act of 1949 violates Article I, s 9, cl. 7 (the Act) of the
United States Constitution (Constitution), the statement and account
clause.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Standing is denied to generalized grievances.
Facts.

Held.
No.
Appeals
court
ruling
reversed
and
remanded.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) applied the twoprong test developed in.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on
Elections
[GR
159139,
13
January
2004]
Facts: On 7 June 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which
authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a
computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). On 22 December 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act
8436 authorizing Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for
the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the poll body
to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment,
devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials. Initially intending to implement the automation during the 11
May 1998 presidential elections, Comelec -- in its Resolution 2985 dated 9
February 1998 -- eventually decided against full national implementation
and limited the automation to the ARMM. However, due to the failure of
the machines to read correctly some automated ballots in one town, the
poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu.
In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both
national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional
ACMs had been acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of
time constraints. On 29 October 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution
02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to

conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election
System; namely, Phase I - Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase
II - Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic
Transmission. On 24 January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Executive Order 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund
the AES for the 10 May 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she
authorized the release of an additional P500 million. On January 28, 2003,
the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid." On
11 February 2003, Comelec issued Resolution 5929 clarifying certain
eligibility criteria for bidders and the schedule of activities for the project
bidding. Out of the 57 bidders, the Bidding and Awards Committee (BAC)
found the Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total Information
Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they
were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In its Report on the
Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC
and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical
evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on 15 April
2003, promulgated Resolution 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The
Commission publicized this Resolution and the award of the project to
MPC on 16 May 2003. On 29 May 2003, five individuals and entities
(including the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines,
represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol)
wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested
the award of the Contract to MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the
manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein
the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural
requirements, they sought a re-bidding. In a letter-reply dated 6 June
2003, the Comelec chairman -- speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head
executive assistant -- rejected the protest and declared that the award
"would stand up to the strictest scrutiny." Hence, the present petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether ITF, et. al. have the locus standi to file the case questioning
the validity of the election computerization bidding.
Held: The issues central to the case are "of transcendental importance and
of national interest." As alleged, Comelecs flawed bidding and
questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact

directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Any taint on
the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would
inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government.
Further, the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement
of public funds are in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest
requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.
Truly, our nations political and economic future virtually hangs in the
balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be
no serious doubt that the subject matter of the case is "a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of
"paramount public interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact
alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal
policy of the Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching
significance to our society." ITF, et. al.s legal standing should therefore be
recognized and upheld. Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are
allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public
funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or
when petitioner(s) seek to restrain respondent(s) from "wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."
Herein, Ma. Corazon M. Akol, Miguel Uy, Eduardo H. Lopez, Augusto C.
Lagman, Rex C. Drilon, Miguel Hilado, Ley Salcedo, and Manuel Alcuaz Jr.,
suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public
funds are properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the
bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the
award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they
seek to restrain the Commission On Elections; Comelec Chairman Benjamin
Abalos Sr.; Comelec Bidding And Award Committee Chairman Eduardo D.
Mejos And Members Gideon De Guzman, Jose F. Balbuena, Lamberto P.
Llamas, And Bartolome Sinocruz Jr.; Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.; And
Mega Pacific Consortium from implementing the Contract and, necessarily,
from making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant
thereto. Thus, the Court hold that ITF, et. al. possess locus standi.

Jumamil vs. Caf, et al.

[GR 144570, 21 September 2005]
Facts:
In 1989, Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against Mayor Jose J.
Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del
Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7,
Series of 1989 (Resolution 7). Resolution 7, enacting Appropriation
Ordinance 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the
construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo
Public Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the petition was
amended due to the passage of Resolution 49, series of 1989 (Resolution
49), denominated as Ordinance 10, appropriating a further amount of
P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public
market. Prior to the passage of these resolutions, Mayor Cafe had already
entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the
municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of P40, 000 each.
Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of Cafe, et al. The
construction of the stalls which Jumamil sought to stop through the
preliminary injunction in the RTC was nevertheless finished, rendering the
prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the stalls were then
awarded by public raffle which, however, was limited to those who had
deposited P40,000 each. Thus, the petition was amended anew to include
the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents. Jumamil alleges that
Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were passed
for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private
respondents, some of which were close friends and/or relative of the
mayor and the sanggunian, who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for
each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award
the would be constructed stalls to all private respondents; that resolutions
and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication that the
special privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private
respondents may be availed of by anybody who can deposit the amount of
P40,000; and that nor there were any prior notice or publication pertaining
to contracts entered into by public and private respondents for the

construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that the same

can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00. The Regional
Trial Court dismissed Jumamils petition for declaratory relief with prayer
for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order, and ordered
Jumamil to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000 to each of the 57
private respondents. On appeal, and on 24 July 2000 (CA GR CV 35082),
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Jumamil filed
the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue [1]:
Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to bring the petition for
declaratory relief
Held [1]:
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest
in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a
generalized grievance. The term interest means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a
persons constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or
ordinance, he has no legal standing. Jumamil brought the petition in his
capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and
not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the the
mayor and the members of the Sanggunian in passing the ordinances and
entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer
need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as
taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The
resolutions being assailed were appropriations ordinances. Jumamil
alleged that these ordinances were passed for the business, occupation,
enjoyment and benefit of private respondents (that is, allegedly for the
private benefit of respondents) because even before they were passed,
Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease
contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. Private
respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the municipal

treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during

the construction of the stalls. The deposits, however, were needed to
ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was
gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily
limited only to those who advanced their personal funds for their
construction. Jumamil did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It
was only in the Remark to Comment he filed in the Supreme Court did he
first assert that he (was) willing to engage in business and (was)
interested to occupy a market stall. Such claim was obviously an
afterthought.
Issue [2]:
Whether the rule on locus standi should be relaxed.
Held [2]:
Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or
interest are procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public
of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of the Government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack
of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised. But, even if the Court disregards Jumamils lack of
legal standing, this petition must still fail. The subject
resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of P2,280,000 for the
construction of the public market stalls. Jumamil alleged that these
ordinances were discriminatory because, even prior to their enactment, a
decision had already been made to award the market stalls to the private

respondents who deposited P40,000 each and who were either friends or
relatives of the mayor or members of the Sanggunian. Jumamil asserted
that there (was) no publication or invitation to the public that this
contract (was) available to all who (were) interested to own a stall and
(were) willing to deposit P40,000. Respondents, however, counter that
the public respondents act of entering into this agreement was
authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per Resolution 180 dated
10 October 1988 and that all the people interested were invited to
participate in investing their savings. Jumamil failed to prove the subject
ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was
asking the Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of
Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should have clearly established that such
ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who
were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His
unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice.
Furthermore, there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of
official duty, absent any showing to the contrary.
VOTERS STANDING
Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]
Facts:
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9
February 2001. Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on
8 February 2001 passed Resolution 84 certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were
due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided that the
Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had
canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del

Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13

candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution 01-005 also provided that
the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the
thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years
of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President.
Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and
13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino
and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for
prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and
Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the
candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the
winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat.
Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution
01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and
Mojica contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to
be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2)
it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of
candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the
candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646.
Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC
canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May
2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate
Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen
seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without
issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to
Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's
standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they
do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that
they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01005 and 01-006.
Issue:
Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.

Held:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury because of the challenged governmental act. The requirement of
standing, which necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, relates
to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
(1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of
standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in
their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001,
Tolentino and Mojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance.
This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a
large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.
Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers,
that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special
election held on 14 May 2001 tax money *was+ x x x extracted and spent
in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power or that there *was+ misapplication of such funds by
COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose.
On the other hand, the Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the
right of suffrage. The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount
interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court accords the same
treatment to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their capacity as
voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage,
considering that the issue raised in the petition is likely to arise again.

GOVERNMENTAL STANDING
People vs. Vera
[GR 45685, 16 November 1937]
First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result
Facts:
The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party,
and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case
entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et
al." (Criminal case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and
GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim
of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard
the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15
October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a
protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both
in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the
testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January
1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to
indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with
reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the
court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate
penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6
months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all
other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four
successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935,
and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu
Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for
certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936,
denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a
second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before
the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine

Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent

of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and
that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila,
Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the
Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June
1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera
presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation
to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April
1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not
been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that
its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section
11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make
said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their
respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary
opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality
on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect
to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28
June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that
Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands
convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's
petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an
exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to
file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was
supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on
14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937,
but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng
because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed
by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August
1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for
the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said
case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said
judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all

parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear

before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal
of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of
judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the
postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set
the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded
to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order.
Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have
been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People
came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to
what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila
which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on
him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent
inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this
court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled
hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the
issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21
August 1937.

enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the

state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
FACIAL CHALLENGE
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R.NO. 148560 Nov. 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is
so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are
mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged
vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses
the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue:
Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Issue
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the
validity of the law using the facial challenge.

Held:
YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General
and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates
the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the

Ruling
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute
vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.
Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance
since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or
construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case
since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be

upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude .On the other

hand, over breadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds
that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected
speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned
are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free
speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one
to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is
evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined
than real.

NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Arceta vs. Mangrobang
[GR
152895,
15
June
Resolution En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 12 concur, 1 on official leave

2004]

Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta
with violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an Information (Criminal Case 1599CR), alleging in an Information that on or about 16 September 1998, Arceta
issued a Regional Bank check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 December
1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in CASH, well-knowing that at the time of
issue she did have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to
pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to make arrangement
for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice.

Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the
Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. She
reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move
would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court
would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence. On
21 October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be without
prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to
suspend proceedings in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a
temporary restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing
Checks Law (BP 22). On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law (MeTC of Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183),
alleging in the Information that on or about the month of January 2000, Dy
issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the amount of P2,500,000.00
dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well knowing at the time of
issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was
subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and with
intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the
amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank
that said check has been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta,
Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that BP
22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move on her part to
quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in
view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with the Supreme
Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law voided for
Constitutional infirmity.
Issue:
Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the
present economic and financial crisis, else due to the undue burden made
upon the MeTC by bouncing checks cases.
Held:
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the
established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial

review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and
appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when
these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a
question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due
regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, the Court was unable
to agree that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the
Court find the constitutional question raised to be the very lis mota
presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is
doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the
contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us
that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the
Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial
crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally
infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is
precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to
strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice
tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be
deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities.
Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened
immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the
alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of
dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
MANDATORY NOTICE
Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 128448, 1 February 2001]
Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur
Facts:
Spouses Alejandro and Lilia Mirasol are sugarland owners and planters. In
1973-1974, they produced 70,501.08 piculs of sugar, 25,662.36 of which
were assigned for export. The following crop year, their acreage planted to
the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 piculs of sugar, with 23,696.40

piculs marked for export. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the
Mirasols' sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 19741975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols
signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered
PNB as the Mirasols' attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latter's
sugar in both domestic and export markets and to apply the proceeds to
the payment of their obligations to it. Exercising his law-making powers
under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential
Decree 579 in November, 1974. The decree authorized the Philippine
Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the
United States and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was
determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of
Trade and Industry, and finally, by the Office of the President. The decree
further authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. Finally, the decree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar
abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national government,
after commissions, overhead expenses and liabilities had been deducted.
The government offices and entities tasked by existing laws and
administrative regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the
purchase price of export sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at
P180.00 per picul. PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the
Mirasols for crop years 1975-1976 and 1976-1977. These crop loans and
similar obligations were secured by real estate mortgages over several
properties of the Mirasols and chattel mortgages over standing crops.
Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly
accounted for, were more than enough to pay their obligations, the
Mirasols asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their
export sugar. PNB ignored the request. Meanwhile, the Mirasols continued
to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from
their current accounts with said bank. PNB then asked Mirasols to settle
their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these demands for
payment, the Mirasols on 4 August 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties
valued at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid
overdrawn account of P1,513,347.78. On 10 August 1982, the balance of
outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by the Mirasols to PNB stood
at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due
and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose

the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale
of the mortgaged realties, PNB still had a deficiency claim of
P12,551,252.93. The Mirasols continued to ask PNB to account for the
proceeds of the sale of their export sugar for crop years 1973-1974 and
1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset
their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its
stance that under PD 579, there was nothing to account since under said
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National
Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the
Philippines for public purposes. On 9 August 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit
for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB with the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Civil Case 14725). On 16 June 1987,
the complaint was amended to implead PHILEX as party-defendant. After
trial on the merits, the trial court decided in favor of the Mirasols (1)
declaring PD 579 and all circulars, as well as policies, orders and other
issuances issued in furtherance thereof, unconstitutional and therefore,
NULL and VOID being in gross violation of the Bill of Rights; (2) Ordering
PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the whole
amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price
of 25,662 piculs in export sugar for crop year 1973-1974 at an average
price of P300.00 per picul, deducting therefrom however, the amount of
P180.00 already paid in advance plus the allowable deductions in service
fees and other charges; (3) and also, for PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and
severally, the Mirasols the whole amount corresponding to the unpaid
actual price of 14,596 piculs of export sugar for crop year 1974-1975 at an
average rate of P214.14 per picul minus however, the sum of P180.00 per
picul already paid by PNB and PHILEX in advance and the allowable
deduction in service fees and other charges; and (4) directing PNB and
PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the sum of P50,000.00 in
moral damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the
costs of the litigation. The same was, however, modified by a Resolution of
the trial court dated 14 May 1992, which adding the following paragraph:
"This decision should however, be interpreted without prejudice to
whatever benefits that may have accrued in favor of the plaintiffs with the
passage and approval of Republic Act 7202 otherwise known as the 'Sugar
Restitution Law,' authorizing the restitution of losses suffered by the
plaintiffs from Crop year 1974-1975 to Crop year 1984-1985 occasioned by
the actuations of government-owned and controlled agencies." The

Mirasols then filed an appeal with the appellate court (CA-GR CV 38607),
faulting the trial court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the
mortgage contracts, as well as the foreclosure of their mortgaged
properties, and the trial court's failure to award them the full money
claims and damages sought from both PNB and PHILEX. On 22 July 1996,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court (1) declaring the dacion en
pago and the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties valid; (2) ordering
the PNB to render an accounting of the sugar account of the Mirasol[s]
specifically stating the indebtedness of the latter to the former and the
proceeds of Mirasols' 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 sugar production sold
pursuant to and in accordance with PD 579 and the issuances therefrom;
(3) ordering the PNB to recompute in accordance with RA 7202 Mirasols'
indebtedness to it crediting to the latter payments already made as well as
the auction price of their foreclosed real estate and stipulated value of
their properties ceded to PNB in the dacion en pago; and (4) whatever the
result of the recomputation of Mirasols' account, the outstanding balance
or the excess payment shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of RA
7202. On 28 August 1996, the Mirasols moved for reconsideration, which
the appellate court denied on 23 January 1997. The Mirasols filed the
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties
have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive
order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all Regional Trial Courts. Furthermore, BP 129 grants Regional Trial
Courts the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with the
Constitution. However, Rule 64, Section 3 (Notice to Solicitor General) of
the Rules of Court provides that "in any action which involves the validity
of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be
notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation,

and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question." The purpose of the
mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to
decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of
a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice
would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. The mandatory
notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and
similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in
"any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there
is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for
construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty,
presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General
is mandatory. Herein, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil
Case 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or
by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the
constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did
not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the
trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned
presidential decrees.
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
JOVITO R. SALONGA vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO
GR 59524. February 18, 1985.
FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of
August, September and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles,
California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as
a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA
building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military
authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the
birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's
residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were
among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together
with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he
suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP
Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was place in the custody and

detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General

Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA).
Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar
Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and
damage to property. Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila
including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was
shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused
injuries to a number of persons. The President's anniversary television
radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor
Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. The next day,
newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that
Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and
transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held
incommunicado for some time. More bombs were reported to have
exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A
meeting of the General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980.
Minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the
International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the
Philippine International Convention Center, as mall bomb exploded. Within
the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued
against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by
Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the
military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center
where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of
bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer
showed Salonga the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge
or charges against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts
have dropped the case against petitioner Salonga.
HELD:
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State
authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as
constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's

functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the
petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive
and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while
his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape
but we nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA
624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be
created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15,
the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers
under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on
the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity.
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the
pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one
withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of
murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the
petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise
of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decision sever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence
miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a
co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as
an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have
taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court
reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an
information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the
records.
Javier v. COMELEC
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to
be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the
same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass

but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further

orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the
outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC,
the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a
winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself
as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was
nd
made by only the 2 Division but the Constitute requires that it be
proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier
was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition
close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The
SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial
but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that.
They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise
they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches

a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already
made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared
script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there.
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
due process.

Inot v. ICA
Facts

PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump

boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined
to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision
to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Salazar vs. Achacoso and Marquez

FACTS:
A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the
complainants PECC Card, it was further alleged that Salazar did not posses
a license to operate as a recruitment agency. POEA through its Director on
Licensing and Regulation, issued a warrant of arrest and seizure against the
petitioner.

Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

ISSUE:

Ruling:

Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of

arrest and seizure is valid?

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to

justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme
Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent

HELD:
Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may
issue warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may not exercise this power.
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of

Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.

MODE OF SITTING
MMDA v. Jancom
Facts of the case:
After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom
won a contract for the MMDAs San Mateo waste management project. A
BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec 19, 1997,
between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by the
Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR
Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA
chair
Prospero
Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too
close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but
Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the
Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the
closure
of
the
dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste
management projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the
Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater
Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding
the BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste
management
contract.
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of
appealing, the MMDA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA went
to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was not
binding because it was not signed by the President, the conditions
precedent to the contract were not complied with, and there was no valid
notice
of
award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for
appeal instead of for certiorari, because a certiorari would only apply in
cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the

petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from
the final decision. Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has
become final and gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any
substantive
aspect.
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the
court took it up just the same, if only to put the petitioners mind to rest.
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the
Civil
Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only
allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract does not bear
the signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in the
contract
were
not
complied
with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the governments fault;
though the President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway his
signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should
comply with the conditions had not yet started to run because the contract
had not yet taken effect, precisely because of the absence of the
Presidents signature.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid
and perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the
consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still
ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the
President.
Voting:
vitug,
panganiban,
Sandoval
Gutierrez
concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign partner of Jancom
Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be
rendered only by the Supreme Court en banc?

On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which says:
A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a
majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
of at least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme
Court (Sec 4 (3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
People v. Gacott
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
Facts:
On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law
(C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against
respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to
Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to
prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic
Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or
authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out
that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of
Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however,
respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the
Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law
contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another
law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of
March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to
file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.
Issue:

No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact
that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of
LOI No. 2 reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972,
Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National Government, the
following agencies of the Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or
activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis
supplied).
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former
President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and
effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in
the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President
Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1.
Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly
revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect
of law.
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely

abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari

JURISDICTION

Held:

Tirol vs. Commission on Audit

Yes.The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is

quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275
aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not
have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even
assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in
his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI

FACTS:
During petitioner's capacity as the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII, he
and some officials of the Lalawigan National High School in Eastern Samar
entered into a contract with Fairchild Marketing and Construction in the

total

amount

of

P80,000.

Upon filing of complaint by the Teachers and Employees Union, COA

investigated the transaction and found that there was malversation of
public funds. Instead of a competitive public bidding, the purchase of
certain supplies and equipment was done through a negotiated contract,
which
resulted
in
an
overprice
of
P35,100.
Petitioner's main allegation is that the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV)
and check were previously reviewed by his subordinates before he
approved and signed them. Said act, therefore, only constitutes a
ministerial
act
on
his
part.
But the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rejected petitioner's defense
because had he carefully scrutinized the documents he would have
discovered that the purchases were made without competitive public
bidding. Moreover, the magnitude of the amount involved would prevent a
reasonable mind from accepting the claim that petitioner was merely
careless or negligent in the performance of his functions.
Accordingly, it was recommended that petitioner and co-petitioners be
indicted for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended for
entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government. An information was subsequently
filed with the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioner and two others with
the
aforementioned
offense.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's ruling
but the Motion was dismissed, prompting petitioner to file the instant
petition, seeking reversal of the Ombudsman's assailed Resolution and
Order.
Petitioner alleged that (1) his participation was limited to signing of the RIV
and the check as a matter of routine; (2) that the RIV did not involve the
determination of the price of the supplies and equipment; (3) that the
signing of the check was authority vested in him as the DECS Regional
Director; and (4) that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
public functions by public officers should apply in his favor.

Petitioner cited the cases of Arias v. Sandiganbayan and Magsuci v.

Sandiganbayan where the Court held that heads of office may rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those
who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.
In his comment, the Solicitor General contends that there was a conspiracy
of silence and inaction and because of that petitioner was guilty of
negligence. He further asserverates that it is beyond the ambit of the
Court's authority to review the power of the Ombudsman in prosecuting
and
dismissing
a
complaint
filed
before
it.
In his Reply, petitioner states that the petition does not involve a review of
the factual finding of the Ombudsman but rather its conclusion based on
undisputed
facts.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the issue is a question of law, and may therefore, be
reviewed
by
the
Supreme
Court
(2) Whether or not the defense of good faith and regularity of
performance of duty may be raised by the accused
(3) Whether or not there is conspiracy as would warrant conviction of the
accused
HELD:
From the pleadings, it is clear that the questions raised by the petitioner
are questions of fact rather than of law. What petitioner wants to happen
is for the Supreme Court to review the evidence and determine whether in
fact he acted in good faith and that no conspiracy existed among the
accused.
The rulings in Arias and Magasuci are inapplicable to petitioner because
the petitioners in the said cases were indicted and submitted themselves
to trial before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted them for the offense
charged. In Arias, the Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner
becasue there was no evidence that the Government suffered undue

injury. And in Magsuci, the reversal by the Court of the judgment of

conviction was based on a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and
that there has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any
irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Acia.
In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy,
while in this case, there is only the claim of peitioner that he acted in good
faith and that there was no conspiracy. The Ombudsman believes
otherwise and the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of
the
said
Office.
Moreover, this case is an appeal under Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which has
been declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto for increasing
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent.
Also, there is no right of appeal available since the Section mentions only
appeals from all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions
of
the
Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court also found that the petition was in fact a modified
form of forum shopping as shown in the other case filed.

was proper, the question has become academic (bc the graduation already
proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the
teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board,
exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against
judicial function
ISSUE:
WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The
exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the
action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought
before a tribunal for hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce
judgment and render a decision.

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED, and
the Resolution of 20 March 1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office
of the Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are AFFIRMED."

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs
to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)

Santiago vs Bautista
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970 [Judicial Power]

It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what

the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter
in controversy.

FACTS:

Judicial power is defined:

Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before
his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking
of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and
teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents
filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine
when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is
the subject matter of adjudication.

 The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before

them.

Held: NO

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

Ratio:

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor
quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary
that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board
clothed with power and authority to determine

The important thing is Rodriguez' Vote during and immediately after the affair. His vote in
Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4. His calculations
recorded on Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not bother to fill out the
blank spaces in his own form, and merely set down his conclusions giving one to Imperial, 2
to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for "Voice", "English", "Stage Personality"
etc. In other words what countedwas the vote.

Felipe vs. Leuterio

March 12, 1950: Benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga with 8
st
prize was awarded to Nestor Nosce
and 2ndto Emma Imperial. Four days after, Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of
Judges protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a
mathematical mistake which was refused. She then filed a complaint in CFI. The grades
given by judges were tallied and the contestant receiving the lowest number (1 was
st
highest) got 1 prize. Nosce and Imperial both got the lowest number of 10.
The chairman, with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding 1sthonors to Nosce
nd
and 2 to Imperial.
For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained blank spaces in which,
after the names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge could not jot
down the grades he thought the contestants deserved according to "Originality", "
Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice".
From such data he made up his vote. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of
94 and therefore should rank 3rdplace in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez,
her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that she copped first place
in the speaking joust.

Issue/s:
WON courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical
competition.

Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the

Word apply the highest tenets of sportmanship :finally of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no
murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to
its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.

No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs

was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did
not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed
winners of thecompetition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords
some reason for doubting theexistence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where
occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courtsare cautious before allowing it,
being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally
acceptedviews thereon.

We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned
out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts
of general jurisdiction. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered
some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of
one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "
Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As
stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared
winner by the board of referees or judges.

Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of
"damnum absque injuria".This is oneof them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would
be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual
judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
DELIBERATIONS
VOTING
Cruz v. DENR
FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law
violate
the
rights
of
private
landowners.
ISSUE:
Whether

or

not

the

IPRA

law

is

unconstitutional.

HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the
IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural
resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

REQUIREMENTS AS TO DECISIONS

DIZON V JUDGE LOPEZ

A complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of the Constitution, serious
misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with her decision
in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Engineer
Fernando S. Dizon."

FACTS:

April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of

falsification of private document. The promulgation of the
judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the
decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy
of the decision on him.
The judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the
decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy
of the decision on him. The accused and his counsel were told to
return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but although
petitioner and his father by turns went to the court to obtain a
copy of the decision they were not able to do so.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to
furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight
months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April
22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, Sec.14 of the
Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law
on which they are based and Sec.15 of the same Art. VIII, which
provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions
within three months from the date of their submission.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment
was promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her
decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the
process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until
the day of its promulgation. Respondent judge states that after
the dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent
gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of
Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the

decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in
furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was
unintentional.
The Deputy Court Administration believes that Judge Lopez
should be given admonition for her negligence, but recommends
that the other charges against her for violation of the
Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed
for lack of merit.

ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not the respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution.
YES.
RATIO:

The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the
Constitution which provides:

All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of

this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months
for all lower collegiate courts and three months
for all other lower courts.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the
decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that
must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such
judgment is based. However, the Court finds the other charges
against respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial by reason of respondent's failure to furnish him with
a copy of the decision until after one year and eight months is

without basis. Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy

of the complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or
file a motion for reconsideration. Nonetheless, certain factors
mitigate respondent judge's culpability. Except for this incident,
respondent's record of public service as legal officer and agent of
the National Bureau of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and
later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17
years and as Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is
unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED
with WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of will
be dealt with more severely.
Asiavest v. CA
In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to pay US$1.8
million or its equivalent, with interest, to Asiavest Ltd. Apparently,
Heras guaranteed a certain loan in Hong Kong and the debtor in
said loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest, ran after Heras.
But before said judgment was issued and even during trial, Heras
already left for good Hong Kong and he returned to the
Philippines. So when in 1987, when Asiavest filed a complaint in
court seeking to enforce the foreign judgment against Heras, the
latter claim that he never received any summons, not in Hong
Kong and not in the Philippines. He also claimed that he never
received a copy of the foreign judgment. Asiavest however
contends that Heras was actually given service of summons when
a messenger from the Sycip Salazar Law Firm served said
summons by leaving a copy to one Dionisio Lopez who was Heras
son in law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced against
Heras in the Philippines.
HELD:
No. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated
(Asiavest was able to adduce evidence in support thereto) and

Heras was never able to overcome the validity of it, it cannot be

enforced against Heras here in the Philippines because Heras was
not properly served summons. Hence, as far as Philippine law is
concerned, the Hong Kong court has never acquired jurisdiction
over Heras. This means then that Philippine courts cannot act to
enforce the said foreign judgment.
The action against Heras is an action in personam and as far as
Hong Kong is concerned, Heras is a non resident. He is a non
resident because prior to the judgment, he already abandoned
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong law on service of summons in in
personam cases against non residents was never presented in
court hence processual presumption is applied where it is now
presumed that Hong Kong law in as far as this case is concerned is
the same as Philippine laws. And under our laws, in an action in
personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal
service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible
if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not
found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case
against him. Without a personal service of summons, the Hong
Kong court never acquired jurisdiction. Needless to say, the
summons tendered to Lopez was an invalid service because the
same does not satisfy the requirement of personal service.
PETITION FOR REVIEW/MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Martinez v. CA
Facts
Salvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of
experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana,
California law firm when a client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her boyfriend
out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently
charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property
of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury,

which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement.

Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent
himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was
denied by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: "There is no
constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right.
The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth
Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not
violate due process or equal protection guarantees."
Question
Does a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to choose to
represent himself on direct appeal?
Conclusion
Legal provision: Right to Counsel
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the
Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on
direct appeal from a criminal conviction. "We are not aware of any
historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal,"
wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by
the Sixth Amendment "are presented strictly as rights that are available in
preparation for trial and at the trial itself" and that the Amendment "does
not include any right to appeal," Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t necessarily
follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a
right to self-representation on appeal." Justice Stevens added "[o]ur
experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense,
particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced
criminal defense attorney." Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G.
Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.
PERIODS FOR DECIDING CASES
Maquiran v. Judge Lopez

This is an administrative complaint for gross negligence filed by Patria

Maquiran against Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
109, Pasay City.
It appears that on August 31, 1990, complainant Patria Maquiran filed a
suit for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 7548, arising from the death
of her husband due to an accident. The case, entitled Heirs of Pablo
Maquiran and Jean Castillo v. Manila Aero Transport System, Inc., Captain
Anastacio Maravilla and Maria Basilonia So, was assigned to respondent
judge. The case was submitted for decision in August 1994 after the parties
had submitted their memoranda. On March 25, 1996, counsel for
i[1]
complainant moved for the resolution of the case. However, up to the
time the complaint in this case was filed on September 16, 1999, no
decision had as yet been rendered by respondent judge.
In her comment, dated January 10, 2000, respondent judge claimed that
she had finally decided the case and given copies of the decision to the
parties. She explained that during the almost five years that the case was
pending decision, many things had happened to her: that she was confined
in the hospital and was scheduled for an operation for the removal of a
mass in her uterus, but for her extremely high blood pressure; that her
parents died and she was left with the responsibility of having to take care
of her retardate sister and a brother who was suffering from a nervous
breakdown; that as Executive Judge, she was given additional
administrative duties; and that she had to conduct continuous hearings by
reason of the designation of her court as a Special Criminal Court.
The Office of the Court Administrator found respondent administratively
liable and recommended that she be ordered to pay a fine of P4,000.00 for
inefficiency with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
Except as to the penalty recommended, we find the report of the OCA well
taken.
Under Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution, lower courts have three
months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them
for resolution. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the
required period. Indeed, this Court has constantly impressed upon judges

 may it not be said without success the need to decide cases promptly
and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice
denied. For delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith
and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, failure of judges to render
judgment within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency
ii[2]
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.

handedly brought them in and out of the hospital because all her ablebodied relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering
from diabetes and hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of
absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in addition to
her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondents family
iv[4]
suffered financial reverses because of estafa committed against them.

This is not the first time respondent judge is being sanctioned for failure to
iii[3]
decide a case within the time for doing so. In Dizon v. Lopez, she was
found guilty of delay in the decision of a case and inefficiency, thus:

Considering that the case was respondents first one and that her failure to
decide the case on time was occasioned by the death of her parents,
financial reverses of the family, and respondents poor health factors
which this Court considered mitigating respondent was simply given a
reprimand and a warning:

Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was
promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was
already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing
it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation.
Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had been read
to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker
II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text
of the decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of falsification of private document under Art. 172, par 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing
complainant with a copy of the decision was unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision
and to a series of personal problems which contributed to this delay in the
release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2) stenographers to
attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her to make use
of the Social Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the
period January to December 1993, she had to dispose of 285 cases, apart
from the fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil, and
land registration cases as well as special proceedings filed in her court
which required the holding of hearings in the mornings and in the
afternoons. During the same period, she went through some personal
tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised
from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This was followed by the death
on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez, who had been under
respondents care for the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On
September 17, 1993, respondents father died of diabetes, a renal failure,
pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one who single-

If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been
read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the
decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took
respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to
do so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her
decision by a series of personal and other problems which leads the Court
to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished
the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied
for extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of
v[5]
judgment until she had finished it.
However, respondent judge was again found administratively liable in
vi[6]
Ricafranca, Jr. v. Lopez, for failure to decide a case until five years after
it was submitted for resolution. It is noteworthy that her excuse is the
same one given in this case, to wit:
That on or about those dates, the undersigned was in and out of the
hospital for the removal of a mass on both (sic) her uterus and in fact was
scheduled for operation several times and was rolled in and out of the
operating table (sic) five (5) times only to be brought out of the operating
room upon advice of her cardiologist because of extremely high blood
pressure.
Likewise, on or about said times, she lost both her parents and had to take
care of her handicapped sister (a retardate) and a brother (who is suffering
from a nervous breakdown and always lost his way) and the undersigned
single-handedly has to look for him at least (sic) he dies of hunger and

exposure to the elements, thus even aggravating further her health

condition.
Additionally, she was designated as one of the Special Criminal Courts and
lately as the only Family Court continuously hearing cases mornings and
afternoons not to mention her administrative duties as a former executive
vii[7]
judge and representing courts in other official functions.
While again noting respondents predicament in mitigation of her liability,
this Court imposed on her a fine of P5,000.00. This Court said:
We note that this is not the first time that an administrative case was
filed against respondent judge for delay in deciding a case pending before
her sala. In 1997, in the case of Dizon v. Lopez, the Court reprimanded
respondent judge for a similar offense. Nonetheless, we also note, as in
the case of Dizon, that there were factors beyond the control of
respondent that prevented her from giving her full attention to her official
duties and responsibilities at the time. Aside from the fact that she was
afflicted with a grave illness, she also had to take care of her sister and
brother who were both suffering some disability. Although these do not
justify her failure, they nonetheless serve to mitigate her culpability. In the
light of these circumstances, we hold that the imposition of a fine of five
viii[8]
thousand pesos upon respondent judge is just and reasonable.
The reasons adduced by respondent judge for her failure to decide
Civil Case No. 7548 for a period of five years is unsatisfactory. While
respondent judge claimed that she had decided the case and had in fact
furnished the parties copies of the same, she did not state when she had
done so. It would appear that she did so only shortly before she filed her
comment on the complaint in this case on January 10, 2000, after a delay
of more than five years. Hence, her excuse. Although we are inclined to be
compassionate, respondent must realize that compassion has its limits.
After all, respondent could have asked for time within which to decide
cases, although not for such a long time as five years. Then, too, she could
have gone on sick leave. But for her not to decide a case for five years
cannot be wholly excused. A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure
to decide cases within the reglementary period, but not her failure to
ix[9]
request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time.
Respondent likewise blames her failure to decide Civil Case No. 7548

on her administrative duties as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court

of Pasay City and the fact that she was required to conduct continuous
trials because her court had been designated a Special Criminal Court.
However, she could have declined her designation as Executive Judge. She
could also have asked to be relieved of her other duties. But she never did
so.
RE: Delays in the SB
Issue

Before

The

Court

The sole issue to be determined by the Court is whether the respondent

Sandiganbayan Justices may be held administratively liable for their actions
which unduly delayed the execution of the final sentence of conviction of
accused
Velasco.
The

Courts

Ruling

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no grave

misconduct or violation of a specific provision of the Code of Judicial
Conduct to have been committed by the Sandiganbayan Justices.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of
a
rule
of
law
or
a
standard
of
behavior.
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of
an
established
rule
must
be
established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the
execution of the final judgment against accused Velasco were shown to be
in respectful deference to the Courts action on the various petitions filed
by the former, who apparently exhausted what he perceived were valid
available remedies under the law. Records are bereft of evidence showing
any trace of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of the rules as to hold them administratively liable for grave misconduct.
However, the becoming modesty that the Sandiganbayan Justices have

exhibited in this case cannot detract from the fact that the judgment of
conviction of accused Velasco should have been immediately executed,
absent any restraining order from the Court, in violation of the Court's
directive in A.M. Circular No. 07-7-12-SC, adopting amendments to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, inter alia. Thus, Section 7 of Rule 65 now states:
SEC.
7.
Expediting
proceedings;
injunctive
relief.

The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent
from
further
proceeding
with
the
case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10)
days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, judicial courtesy may no longer be invoked by the Sandiganbayan
Justices in the execution of the final judgment against accused Velasco.
This lapse in judgment on the part of the Sandiganbayan Justices deserves
admonition.

pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. The

power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be
required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and
powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and
being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to
exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty And
while it executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will
carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its
character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution.
Garcia v. Macaraig
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and
San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly
created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970
to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and
functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room cannot be
properly established due to problems as to location and as to
appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized
that it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court,
he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the
Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on
extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had
earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The
Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and
instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail,
whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

JUSTICES
Appointments And Qualifications
NO NONJUDICIAL WORK FOR JUDGES
MANILA ELECTRIC v. PASAY TRANSIT
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not

Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge.
Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as
required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while
he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge.
Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the
the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as
Judge.
HELD:
No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence.
Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the
bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of
being a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his
control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court
looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being
detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the
courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in
collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other
great departments of the government must always be kept clear and
jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our
government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be
gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in
the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of
said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific
constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them,
have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any
temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus
of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional
scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this
Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters
submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and
prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect,
by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as

the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is
best that this practice is discontinued.
SALARY
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial
Court seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or
compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary,
which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en
banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs
the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the
judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the
issue once and for all.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the
payment of income tax.
HELD:
No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general
taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other
branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is
provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be
decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which
may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries
of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other
members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of
the judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the

incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary but such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which
were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia
vs David.
REMOVAL
Facts:
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a
letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter was said to be from
concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for
disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and
asking
him
(Gonzales)
to
do
something
about
it.
The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam
Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made by Cuenco against
Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco was asked to
show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for making
serious
accusations
against
Fernan.
Issue:

of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,
cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other
court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from
office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is
because under the Constitution, members of the SC may be removed only
by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by
any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his
office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would
be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the
Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party
convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial
and
punishment
according
to
law.
The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer
are entitled to immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is
that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed
before such liability may be determined. A member of the SC must first be
removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and
then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that
is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.

ACT AS PET

Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term
of
office

Macalintal v. PET

Held:

Facts:

A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is

required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the
office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency

Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and

may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

2.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the
SCs decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the
establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art
VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it
violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm
footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be
the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President
under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:
1.

The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts
of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to
resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial
power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in
Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for
the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
SUPERVISION OF LOWER COURTS
Maceda v. Vasquez

Issue:
1.
2.

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1,

Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the
Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vicepresidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a
judicial power.

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional

Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin
Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph
of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized
what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court
by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the
last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the

Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified
his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which
have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and
in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5
civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates
of
service
for
17
months.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior
courts

involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to

Held:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to
the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for
his
felonious
act.

have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred
to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and
administrative aspect is involved therein.
Facts:

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation
of
powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation
of
powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on
said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether
said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of

Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries,
malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and
assault upon a person in authority. Alumbres alleged that on May 20, 1997,
at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he
requested petitioner Judge Caoibes (Presiding Judge of RTC 253) to return
the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not
answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish
talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right
eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was
thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. He prayed that
criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with

Caoibes vs. Ombudsman

the SC praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the

Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court

ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using

which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts

the same facts as above.

and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by
itself whether acriminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,

On June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file
a counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a

counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to

personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination

the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the Ombudsman

as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule

hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is

should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on

already investigating the case. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the

the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending

Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary

with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not

determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent

know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect

Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive

for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in

supervision and control.

determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court

On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for
referral to the SC stating that under Section 15 (1) ofRepublic Act No. 6770,

passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative
concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.

it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges. It likewise

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that

denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so

Issue:

is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives

and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the

a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

case pending resolution of the administrative case

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of
Held:

administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary

Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial

who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office

court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and

furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme

court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper

Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all

administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof.

courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman

No other branchof government may intrude into this power, without

cannot determine for itself and by itself whether acriminal complaint

running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The

Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court

WHEREFORE, the petitionfor certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismissthe complaint filed by

On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, the 332nd PC/INP
Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield

respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this

Court for appropriate action. (Caoibes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177,

yielded two common graves containing the 7 bodies. Seven (7) separate

July 19, 2001)

complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and 18 other

TEMPORARILY ASSIGN JUDGES TO OTHER STATIONS IN PUBLIC INTEREST

persons. The municipal court found probable cause against the accused

ORDER A CHANGE OF VENUE OR PLACE OF TRIAL TO AVOID

MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

and ordered their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the

People vs. Sola

court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Pablo

The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in

Sola and two others have since been released from detention. The

mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of

witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that

venue.

if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from

The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a

Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are

reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before
the court should resolve the motion for bail.

official with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been
released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. There
have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the

Facts:
families of the witnesses.
CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of
Issues:
the deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused
Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.

1. Whether or not change of venue is proper

2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by

Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital

the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the

offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular

accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted.

trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a

reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved

Held:
in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
Change of venue
Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the
case to Bacolod City. However, the case proceeds with this discussion: To
compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses
will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the
judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established. The witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. They are
afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any
of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or
testify falsely to save their lives.
Right of bail
The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing.

opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the

order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.
Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept
of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to
keep the balance true. This norm which is of the very essence of due
process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be
given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It
does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the
municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as
searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character.
(People vs. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981)

APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF ENTIRE JUDICIARY

Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and protection of
constitutional rights
RE: Req. for Special Div

statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his
freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court,
to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also
said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme
Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not
embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING PLEADING, PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE

Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

Admission to the Practice of Law

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case.
Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to
investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court,
acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez
directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal
informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview
where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that
the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court,
[while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given
due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme
Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the

Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute

contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the
Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute
the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements
very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the
Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What
Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic
and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the
judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not

to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a

private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his
criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly
the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached
him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of
law.

In re: Cunanan
FACTS
OF
THE
CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful
candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general
ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although
for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%,
194870%
1949-74%,
1950-1953

75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been
discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress
for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the
president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto,
the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the
Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials
and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public
interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure
in
the
exams.
ISSUES

OF

THE

CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal
profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if
it
is
CONSTITUTIONAL.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained
firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of
admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the
practice
of
the
profession
is
concededly
judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The
primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue
to
reside
in
this
court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure
are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in
judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted
by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.

Reasons
for
Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility
of
the
Supreme
Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only
the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated
the
Constitution.

3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement
the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must
elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the
bare
minimum.)
4.
It
is
a
class
legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:
Under

the

authority

of

the

unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law and grave

misrepresentation.
The Office of the Bar Confidant found that the respondent indeed
appeared before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers as counsel for
Bunan
in
the
May
2001
elections.
Supreme Court agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. True, respondent here passed the
2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-pledged
lawyer.

court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of

1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and
therefore
void
and
w/o
force
and
effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those
petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are
denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a
GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are
considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for
admissions or not.)
Aguirre v. Rana
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. On May 21, 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oathtaking of the successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Mae Aguirre filed against respondent a petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with

Wherefore, respondent Edwin L.Rana is DENIED admission to the

Philippine Bar.
Integration of the Bar

In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 568 (AC 1928)

FACTS:
Atty. Marcial Edillon was disbarred due to non-payment of his IBP dues,
hence the petitioner on this case. He claimed that the provisions of Sec. 10
of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is unconstitutional as he is being
compelled, as a precondition in maintaining his good standing as a lawyer,
to pay and settle his dues to the IBP. Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take
and refused to admit full competence of the court in this matter. But after
some time in realization, his recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his
subsequent communication with the court. He appealed that his health,
advanced age, and concern to his former clients welfare be considered in
his prayer so that he can again practice law.

ISSUE:

HELD:

Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the bar.

Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered
to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was
vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as
far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted
and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle
that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been
put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to
the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is
sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even
one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the
basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would

HELD: YES.
RATIO:
Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure to
abide entails loss of such privilege. Considered in addition was the two (2)
years Atty. Edillon was barred to practice law, and the dictum of Justice
Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban that the power to discipline, especially
if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised in a preservative and not
on the vindictive principle. After contrition on the part of the petitioner,
the court finds reinstatement in order.
TENURE
De La Llana vs. Alba
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its
validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be
removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law
would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security
of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court
can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by
the legislature by such statute (BP 129).

save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be

preferred.

Held:

THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a

Francisco I. Chavez vs. Judicial Bar Council (JBC)

Facts:

representative of congress should be construed as to having only one

representative that would come from either house, not both. That the
framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative. The motion was denied.

The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision
rendered July 17, 2012 that JBCs action of allowing more than one
member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
Respondent contends that the phrase a representative of congress refers
that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and
that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of
congress as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have
their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.
Issue:
W/N the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House
of Representatives to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution.