• PATTON REPORT NO.
3t
DESIGNED FOR FAILURE
01975 Patton Life Safety Systems, Inc.
Water, man's greatest ally on the fire front, suffered a most
severe setback in the 1890's when the National Fire Protection
Association drew up a sprinkler system design standard. This
deadly blow was dealt to water in two ways.
First, the standard established a crazy quilt mix of rules
that made sprinklers so extremely costly that probably 98% of
the buildings constructed in this century have been
constructed without built-in fire protection. The prohibitions
against practical sprinkler systems is the primary underlying
cause of our present awsome national fire loss.
Secondly, the rules (which are mostly based on the law of
averages) sometimes permitted such weak design of sprinkler
systems that a substantial percentage of the time that
sprinklers were called upon to perform — they failed.
THE "FACTORY" SPRINKLERS
It all began when a sort of a "Factory" type of sprinkler
layout was selected as a "good, average, reliable" type of
system. Sprinkler spacing was 10 feet by 10 feet, the orifice
was approximately 1/2 inch, and the water supply had to have
approximately 15 psi at the top of the riser. No one attempted
to determine:
a) Actual density of water discharge.
b) A real relationship between water density and fire
loading (hazard).
c) The conditions which could produce excessive
operation of sprinklers, thus water depletion at the
fire site and system failure.
Since no one really knew what they were doing in the
sprinkler design (except that they were using a system that
somehow worked most of the time) soon enough the failures
began to occur. The failures were inevitable because there was
no real method of judging the level of "hazard" and no real
method of measuring "performance."
Of course, since there was a repeat of the same design
over and over again, but under vastly differing conditions —
there was a percentage of "high hazard" risks that were "too
tough" and at the other end of the scale there were "low
hazard" properties being subjected to "overkill."
During this stage of sprinkler "non-design" apparently
no one worried about the "overkill" problem, but a lot of
people did worry about the "underkill" problem. Why?
because factories were going up in smoke.
MAGIC MATHEMATICS
There began a practice years ago that to a surprising degree
still exists today. After a fire occurred in say a "black-eyed pea
canning plant" (for example) and an excessive number of
sprinklers opened (say 100), and the fire was finally controlled
with fire department hose streams; an insurance inspector
would show up at the scene the following day. He would
immediately count the open sprinklers. When he got to the
100th and final open head, he would then take that magic
number 15 (presuming 15 GPM should have come out of each
and every open head) and multiply by the 100 open heads.
Then he would promptly conclude that 1500 GPM was the
true required water flow for a "black-eyed pea canning plant."
The next step in this scientific evaluation would be the
checking out of the water supply. He would find the highest
sprinkler head was say 46 feet above the ground. Then he
would convert the elevation into being equivalent to 19.8 psi.
He would add to this the "magic number" of 15 psi (required
at the top of the riser.) This adds to 34.8 psi. The next step
was to check out the water supply to see how many gallons
actually had been available at 34.8 psi. Let us assume he found
out that the water mains would have delivered only 940 GPM
at 34.8 psi.
Well! There was the problem, he would conclude! The
sprinkler design required 1500 GPM (100 open sprinklers
ti mes 15 GPM). But, his test showed only 940 GPM had been
available at the required pressure of 34.8 psi! The water supply
was 560 gallons per minute short. NO WONDER IT FAILED!
THE SYSTEM FAILED—NOT THE WATER
SUPPLY
But of course, the inspector's analysis was absurd. The
sprinkler system did not "FAIL" at that point where 63 heads
were open and the 940 GPM that was available in the mains
was all used up. No indeed! The sprinkler system FAILED
when 4 sprinklers opened directly above the fire and FAILED
to control the fire. At this point there was 940 GPM available
to the sprinkler system — but the sprinkler system was not
capable of delivering even 60 gallons to the fire site. The
delivery system (not the water supply) was so weak that less
than 10% of the water available could be delivered to the fire.
So, the fire grew. Then more sprinklers opened. This
resulted in even less density at the fire site. Then more heads
opened. Of course, the density at the fire site dropped once
again. And so it went. The only thing significant about the
100th sprinkler opening was that was the point where the fire
department gained control over the fire.
The inspector believed that the system failed because more
than 63 heads opened. But he was wrong. The truth was that
63 heads opened because the system had already failed.
CONFUSIONS CAST IN CONCRETE
No self-respecting insurance inspector is going to walk away
from half a factory without making a "true and proper"
report.
 Since the sprinkler design produced non-calculated densities
over an indeterminate area protecting undefined fire
potentials, there sure was nothing to be gained by analyzing
that piping system up in the roof. If you don't know what it's
supposed to do to begin with, how are you going to equate it?
Equate it to what?
But if you can count the heads, multiply by a magic
number, produce a "required" water supply, and test the real
water against the theoretical water need; then you really have
something — or so the inspectors reasoned.
Having dtermined that a black-eyed pea canning plant
needed 1500 GPM, but in this case only had 940, the inspector
would promptly file a report in triplicate to the home office.
The actuaries, most of whom wouldn't have recognized a
sprinkler head if it walked up and bit them, could then pump
the data into their computer systems of the day. The following
Spring an executive committee of underwriters would meet
and vote that a sprinkler system serving a black-eyed pea
canning factory would require a 2000 GPM water supply (note
the safety factor). If you had a black-eyed pea canning plant —
but didn't have 2000 GPM, you simply could not install an
"approved" system. Of course, you could always install a new
water supply — and then install the sprinkler system, but this
was not always practical.
No two thousand GPM, no sprinklers. Let it burn. As you
can see, it was all very, very scientific.
HALLELUJAH, WE'RE O.K.
Of course, things didn't always work out so badly with the
magic mathematics. Many times the sprinklers worked just
fine. For example, the very next day our brilliant inspector
might be off to visit a fire damaged tire warehouse. The night
before, a fire had started in a stack of tires, and pretty soon
two sprinklers opened above the fire.
Now, this warehouse had the magic 15 psi at the roof,
which meant that there was about 7 psi at the orifices of the
opened sprinklers. The tire stack was delivered a water density
of about 0.16 GPM/Sq. Ft., which was a nice density for a
school — but not so nice for tire storage. So, with only a small
density falling on a very hot fire, the fire got a little hotter.
But, this was the highest density the system would ever
deliver. The next thing you know, three more sprinklers
opened, and the density at the fire dropped to 0.12 GPM/Sq.
Ft. This didn't do the fire much good at all, so it flamed a
little higher. And so, shortly, another five sprinklers opened.
Of course, the density dropped again to 0.09 and the fire
burned much fiercer. Well, surprise, surprise, another ten
sprinklers opened. Things were getting rather desperate now,
because the density was down to 0.05 and the fire was
spreading fast. But, at this point the cavalry arrived in the
form of the Fire Department. They got their heavy streams
working and because they arrived in time, quick control was
achieved.
The inspector arrived the following day and true to form,
he counted up 20 open sprinklers. Of course, he promptly
multiplied by 15 and determined that 300 GPM was the magic
number. So, this time he found that the sprinklers had
"controlled" the fire with only 300 GPM, while the water
supply was good for a thousand. "Great! This just goes to
show what those sprinklers can really do when the water's
right", he advised the owner. This time the inspector was able
to report a "successful" sprinkler operation, and this too went
into the tables confirming the validity of the system. His only
complaint was all that water thrown around by the fire
department because, after all the sprinklers had the fire licked
2
even before they arrived, didn't they?
I would like to report that this sprinkler system "control"
of the rubber tire warehouse fire helped bring down the water
supply demand for the black-eyed pea canning factory, but
things did not work that way. Water supply "failure" proved
you needed more water, but if the system "worked" this only
proved the sprinkler system was a very reliable system when
properly fed by water.
SPRINKLER HYDRAULICS EXPLAINED
The single most important thing to understand about
sprinkler system design is that nearly all fires start off small.
( As with all rules, there are exceptions. But, once the
fundamentals are understood, then the exceptions can be
handled.)
The second thing to know about fire sprinkler systems is
that initially only one to four sprinklers open. These are the
ones closest to the fire. (Again, there are some exceptions, but
let's learn the fundamentals before going on to the unusual
problems.)
The third thing to know is that once the initial sprinklers
open, whether it be one or four, there will be no additional
sprinklers that open unless there are special design or control
problems. There are two excellent reasons why a fire does not
open excessive heads.
First, when the heated gases rise and strike the ceiling, and
flow outward, the temperature drops as the gases move away.
Heat is being dissipated rapidly (it is still a small fire), and
cooler air is mixing with the hot gases. So, a sprinkler eight
feet from the fire is subjected to a higher temperature than
one fifteen feet away. The sprinkler subjected to the higher
temperature will open first.
A second reason why "close-in" heads open before
"far-out" heads is because the velocity of the hot gas moving
by the "close-in" head is much greater. The velocity of a gas
along the plane of the ceiling decreases as the ratio of the
square of the distance from "ceiling zero." Did you ever cool
soup by blowing across the surface of a spoonful? Think of the
close-in head being subject to a very hot wind; and the far-out
head in cooler, and also more stagnant, air. So, the sprinklers
directly over the initial small fire will open first. With only one
to four sprinklers open, the system water pressure is at its
maximum. Any further opening of sprinklers will drop system
pressure and reduce density at the fire.
The conditions for automatic fire control are never going to
be better. The fire is at its earliest, most readily controllable
state. The density and pressure directly above the small fire is
at its maximum. If the system can't control the fire now — at
this point — conditions will deteriorate.
THE SECRET
INGREDIENTS OF FIRE CONTROL
I call them "secret ingredients" because for more than 75
years the insurance industry and the NFPA-13 sprinkler
committee has been able to ignore them. These ingredients
are:
1 Initial density at the fire site.
2. Initial pressure at the fire site.
(The sad but true fact is that neither the insurance rules or
the NFPA-13 rules consider "initial" density or "initial"
pressure, the two most important factors of sprinkler design.
This still holds true even today.)
If one to four sprinklers open, and the water is discharged
over the fire, and then additional sprinklers open, it is certain
that one or both of these undesirable conditions exists:
 1. Inadequate water density delivered to the fire.
2. Inadequate cooling of the ceiling temperatures.
The insurance industry, with its Mickey Mouse sprinkler
engineering rules, virtually guarantees that one or both of the
above conditions will exist in a high percentage of the cases
where sprinklers are called upon for protection!
The NFPA statistics indicate that the "standard" sprinkler
system FAILS nearly 4% of the time it is called upon to
operate, which is horrible enough — but, if we were to set the
failure point of sprinklers at that point where the FIFTH
sprinkler opens, then the failure rate would be nearly
TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE TIME!
PRESSURE
The Australian sprinkler system out performs the American
system. Why?
One reason is that all sprinkler systems in Australia are tied
into the fire department so a prompt and automatic response
is guaranteed. The Australian fire department gets in early.
But there's another reason and it is that pressure is
increased in the system above the check valve (with a small
pump to prevent false alarms due to water surge). The
sprinkler system is made into a "pressure tank." Even though
that initial burst of high pressure discharge may last only for
30 or 60 seconds, it will drop ceiling temperature RIGHT
NOW! Extra heads won't open — and water density at the fire
site is maximized. The British experience with small pressure
tanks confirms this also.
Why don't we use high pressure on sprinkler systems in the
U.S.? Well, the policy of the insurers, including the two
insurance industry testing laboratories, have worked against it.
Look at the U.L. or F.M. pump listings. With very few
exceptions the only "approved" pumps are 500 GPM and
greater. The installed cost of a fire pump is $10,000 to
$15,000 and up. There is no way to install a low cost high
pressure pump on a sprinkler system. The price is too high for
90% of the buildings that need protection.
And, even more devastating, the sprinkler design rules do
not recognize the advantages of high pressure. An "almost
certain to fail" sprinkler layout (the pressure will drop to 7 psi
at the orifice with only two heads open) is given equal status
with a high pressure system.
DENSITY
Since most "standard" sprinkler systems installed in the
U.S. produce an "unknown" density the statistical correlation
between "density", "fire loading", and "failure" is almost
non-existant. Mickey Mouse engineering has deprived us of
good performance data.
But it is sad to relate, even in recent years when "hydraulic
design" was being applied to sprinklers, the old fairy tales were
still fouling up the designs and the performance data. The
inspector who counted 100 open heads in the black-eyed pea
canning factory is still setting the design parameters for even
the "highly protected risk" rated properties today.
Historically, here is what has happened:
1. Mickey Mouse engineering produced sprinkler systems
that were low pressure, low density and guaranteed to
fail.
2. The sprinkler systems did fail and the opening of 25,
50, 100 and even 200 sprinklers were not that unusual.
3. The insurers became convinced that from 1000 to
5000 GPM was needed for a "good" supply, and they
keyed their testing to very low densities over very large
areas.
3
4. In the testing programs they "choked" down the
valves to test for "minimum" pressure and densities.
Sure enough, by testing at low pressure and density,
they would open all the sprinklers in three counties, and
"prove" the need for huge water supplies and a hundred
open sprinklers.
5. They built all this foolishness into the hydraulic
design standards.
6. Everytime a sprinklered factory burns down they've
"proven" themselves "right."
AN EXAMPLE
The FIA high piled stock tests is an example. In most of
the tests the water supply was choked down to produce a low
density. There are examples:
Series 1, Pile height 21', shredded paper in cardboard
cartons
Test 1 — density 0.20 GPM/Sq. Ft. — 12 sprinklers
opened
Test 3 — density 0.40 GPM/Sq. Ft. — 4 sprinklers
opened
Series 1, Pile height 21', 2 lb. Polystyrene in each
cardboard carton
Test 4 — 0.4 GPM/Sq. Ft. — 26 sprinklers opened
Test 7 — 0.6 GPM/Sq. Ft. — 6 sprinklers opened
Note the very dramatic ability to reduce the number of
open sprinklers with a higher density.
But did FIA conduct many 0.6 GPM/Sq. Ft. tests, or even
higher density tests? No. Only one test run at a density above
0.40 GPM/Sq. Ft.
The FIA moved right into the fairy tale of:
a) low density design
b) open most the heads in the building
c) put Lake Michigan on a tower
For example, at the time of the tests I worked for the
Distilling Industry, and the FIA recommendations (which
eventually became "legal" recommendations) also covered 21
foot high "alcohols in bottles." The FIA recommended system
for a "high hazard" whiskey cased goods warehouse would
have a density of 0.45 GPM/Sq. Ft. over 6000 to 12,000 Sq.
Ft. (depending on "conditions"). This, in effect, was designing
for up to 120 open sprinklers and a water supply of up to
6000 GPM.
Later, we in the Distilling Industry went into Factory
Mutual laboratories, and tested this 21 foot high storage of
whiskey in bottles in cartons, applied a 0.6 GPM/Sq. Ft. and
controlled this fire with 4 (yes, just 4) sprinklers using only
190 GPM. Fantastic wasn't it? The regulations said 6000 GPM,
we did it with 200 GPM.
But I considered 0.6 GPM/Sq. Ft. to be marginal and
wanted to test at 0.8 density to get a quicker "kill" — but this
plan met with very strong opposition from insurance executives
who advised my superiors against it. fought like hell to get
0.6) One of their objections was that such densities are
"impractical", but this only proved how little they knew
about sprinkler design because it is possible to design for an
initial density of 0.8 GPM/Sq. Ft. or even 1.5 GPM/Sq. Ft.
while at the same time knocking 40% to 50% off the cost of
the protection.
So, much of the sprinkler testing in recent years, including
the high rack tests, were creating new fairy tales rather than
dispelling the old fairy tales. I will wager that 90% of the
sprinklers in use today will deliver less than 10% of the water
available to the fire site.
 APPARENT REFORM
In 1971 and 1972 we outflanked the "sprinkler experts"
with our Life Safety System concepts. Ironically, many of the
"experts" concluded that the "new" concepts of design
(actually, I had laid all the ideas on the insurers years ago)
were O.K. for "saving life" but would not qualify for
"property protection." But this was fuzzy thinking on two
counts:
1) How do you "save life" and also burn down the
building?
2) The concepts applied were originally developed in
tests involving "high hazard" fire risks.
But, since we were producing a new sprinkler design
standard (BOCA-100) and since the experts wanted to kill this
standard before it got off the ground, miraculous changes
came about in NFPA-13. After NFPA-13 was revised (by 60%
according to the estimates of one member), appropriate
experts appeared at the BOCA hearings to advise that
"BOCA-100 wasn't needed any more — NFPA-13 now did it
all."
Well, I felt in my heart that this sudden change in NFPA-13
was more smoke screen than reform, but only time would tell
for sure.
Now, with BOCA-100 available, and the experts apparently
resigned to it, the smoke screen is lifting and it seems the more
things change with NFPA, the more they are the same.
DESIGN FOR FAILURE
One of the things we did with our research and the BOCA
rules was we tested out densities for light hazard properties
and found that a density of 0.025 GPM/Sq. Ft. was adequate
for control (British tests also confirmed this). So, believing
that the safety factor should be added at the fire site (not at
the other side of the building) we threw in a 4 to 1 safety
factor, made the minimum design density 0.1 GPM/Sq. Ft.,
and the design area 800 Sq. Ft. minimum (generally 4
sprinklers in the light hazard property).
The NFPA-13 group promptly followed our lead and took
0.1 density as a minimum for light hazard hydraulics (even
though the "cookbook": system will not produce it). But then
they "Mickey Moused" it by throwing in twice the area (1500
Sq. Ft.) thinking that "double the area" is a safety factor (it
isn't). But, not being content with this misreading, they
immediately went to 3000 Sq. Ft. as a minimum area for
"combustible construction" (what's this got to do with it?).
This quadrupling of the area of sprinkler operation was applied
even if the interior sheathing of the walls and ceiling was
gypsum wallboard.
PATTON LIFE SAFETY SYSTEMS, INC.
6075 Cleveland Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43229
Next came another hooker. We proved (my God, i
obvious) that walls contain the heat. A fire in one room w
set off one or more sprinklers in the room on fire — but it w
not open sprinklers in another room three doors down t
hallway. The only possible way to do this would be for t
sprinklers to FAIL — and if the sprinklers in the first roe
FAIL — what good are the sprinklers three rooms away goi
to do when the fire burns its way over there?
But, of course, the guys who write the NFPA sprinkler rul
seem to be a special breed, and now they've got the rules s
up for 3000 Sq. Ft. of open sprinklers, even if there's
separate rooms.
They want a "safety factor" you may say. But do they g
one? Let's assume 20 small hotel rooms, with 20 baths and
closets, and a hallway all comprising 3000 Sq. Ft. This requir
perhaps 70 sprinklers. Now, hydraulically, if the most dista
sprinkler is set to "minimum" pressure 7 psi (very weak) ti
average "standard" head is going to actually dischar
probably 20 GPM (not 15) which means the pipes and pum
have to be sized for 1,400 GPM. The NFPA rules have creatf
a monster.
But, we can't possibly design such a ridiculous system f
most of the light hazard properties. What's the alternativ
Only one. Choke down each and every sprinkler head. With a
inch orifice each sprinkler will discharge one-fourth the wat
of the standard sprinkler. Now, we are down to 350 GPM ov
the 3000 Sq. Ft., which is still very excessive, but tolerable.
But what have we done to ourselves? We have met ti
NFPA rules. But to do it we have choked down the water f
the first few heads that open to the point where syste
FAILURE becomes a strong possibility. And, if the system
the room fails (because of throttled density) and the fire do
leave the room, why the game is surely lost because the syste
has been weakened all about.
As always, the experts will prove themselves right I
burning down the place. The inspector will be in the next d.
and say, — "See, we knew that 70 heads could open all along
How right they were. By their engineering, a hundred op
heads is far too few.
This "design for failure" is not only now being built in
"calculated" light hazard properties — it has already be
built into the ordinary and extra hazard calculated syster
throughout the country.
The thing that frightens me most of all is that those rn.
who write the rules of sprinkler design — our "experts" if yi
will — know so little about what they are doing — that they
not even comprehend their errors. They go blithly forwar
supremely confident in their fairy tales, causing untc
damage, destroying lives, and making a mockery of fire safe
— and we all must suffer for it.