When a tiger's on the loose,
And you hear his dreadful roar.
There's safety in retreat,
Behind securely bolted door.
Now, no one can deny,
The merit of a plan wherein —
The Tiger's on the outside,
And you're securely in.
But, that cat may lose the game one day —
And come again another.
If he misses you the next time,
He may settle for your brother.
The moral of this story is,
There's safety in retreat.
But if you shoot that damn cat's head off —
THAT safety can't be beat.
PART H - COMPOSITE PROTECTION
THE BACKGROUND AND THE PROBLEMS
Historically, the solution to life safety from fire that has
been applied is a STRUCTURAL solution. With the
advent of FIRE RESISTIVE construction (reinforced
concrete, protected steel) there was a belief that fire life
safety could be assured through a structure that WOULD
NOT BURN. Unfortunately, however, content fires, and
fires involving combustible interior sheathing and trim,
readily produced sufficient heat and toxic gas to snuff
out life long before the structure itself is endangered.
Thru reaction to disasters we are now at a stage of
structural fire safety based on these five factors:
A—Fire resistant design.
B —Compartmentation(limitation of spread of fire.)
C—Use of relatively slow burning interior trim,
sheathing and paneling.
D—An adequate number of enclosed exitways.
E—Isolation, or special protection for special hazards.
(Enclose the carpenter shop with fire resistive
construction, or sprinkler it. or both).
In hospitals, and other nonmobile occupancies
(occupants cannot readily flee a fire) the value of item D
(exitways) is reduced. They are installed, but many
occupants cannot use them. In order to compensate for
this more emphasis is placed on item B
(compartmentation). Fire resistant compartmentation is
employed to the extent that every room becomes an
enclosure to contain a fire; or, if the fire escapes, an
enclosure to safely contain the occupant.
This, today, is the BASIC life safety from fire concept
for a hospital. First, contain the fire. As a backup, if the
fire escapes, contain the man in a safe refuge.
Note, however, that this basic plan runs COUNTER to
the normal human reaction of the normal human being.
When a fire occurs in a fire resistant enclosed room the
conversion of solids to gases will create an internal
pressure within the room that will send smoke thru the
cracks around the door into the corridor. The normal
human reaction of the normal human being is to open
the door to see what is going on in there. The fire is no
longer contained.
The next reaction usually is to try to put the fire out.
The fire control equipment provided to fire discoverers
today virtually insures that efforts to control the fire
will FAIL a high percentage of the time.
Once a fire passes from a "small" stage to a
"substantial" stage it will produce heat at such rapidly
increasing rates that it will spread suddenly and
explosively thruout the room (when the surface
temperatures of exposed combustibles are raised to their
ignition points by the general heat content of the room
the fire will flash over all surfaces). The fire often will
spread with a rapidity and intensity that is completely
alien to the man accustomed to friendly fires in fire
places, or fires out of doors where heat is harmlessly
exhausted to the atmosphere. This change in the nature
and the intensity of the fire invariably amazes the
amateur fire fighter who is then quite likely to panic,
and flee, LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN.
The secondary line of defense for the nonmobile
occupancy is the fire resistive room enclosures - the
sanctuaries - for the occupants. When the occupant
remains calm, keeps his room door closed to the fire that
is now in the corridor, and opens the window to fresh air
the probability of survival is very good. However, the
normal human reaction of the normal human being is to
try to leave his room and flee thru the smoke and heat
filled corridor to the outdoors. Isolation in a room
during a fire must be particularly devastating to sick
people confined to bed, especially if the window is
closed.
Note that the present basic concept for fire life safety
thru structural design runs COUNTER to the normal
human behavior in some important ways. This is why
Fire Protection Engineers constantly throw up their
hands in amazement at the "weird" behavior of so many
people under fire conditions. They simply don't behave
the way they are supposed to behave. The problem,
however, is not that people are inherently unreliable.
The problem is that we are establishing a concept of fire
safety that runs counter to the human reaction of the
people involved.
THIS IS WHY FIRES SUCH AS THE RECENT ONE IN
THE MARIETTA, OHIO NURSING HOME OCCUR
PERIODICALLY.
What is the solution?
The solution lies in replacing the defensive concept of
trying to enclose and trap the fire with the positive
concept of FIRE SUPRESSION.
Note that even very small scale compartmentation will
permit a fire of substantial size to freely develope. It is
far better to PUT THE FIRE OUT. The fire suppression
concept (sprinklers) has been the backbone of industrial
fire protection. There is no structural solution that has
had the reliability and cost effectiveness of automatic
fire suppression.
It is now time to incorporate fire suppression as the
BASIC solution to fire in structural 'designed to contain
people where protection of human life, not property is
the primary need.
I am recommending for all new hospitals a concept of
COMPOSITE PROTECTION. This concept of composite
protection will include FIRE SUPPRESSION as the
primary control for fire, structural design (fire resistance
and subdivision) as the secondary control, and
horizontal exits as the last resort of all new hospital
construction.
But it would be a mistake to simply superimpose the
existing industrial (property protection oriented)
sprinkler system on top of the existing excessively
compartmented hospital. The blending of
SUPPRESSION with STRUCTURAL DESIGN should be
accomplished with more finesse.
The sprinkler system must be more economical, and
EVEN MORE RELIABLE. The added safety of
suppression will permit some relaxation in structural
requirements.
With these thoughts in mind I propose the following
basic fire life safety design for hospitals.
SUPPRESSION
There are three commonly employed suppression
systems, one mechanical and two human.
They are sprinklers, fire brigade (or trained employees),
and the public fire department (paid or volunteer).
The suppression concept I propose requires three things:
1. That all three systems be employed.
2. That the reliability of each be improved.!
3. That they be coordinated and simultaneously
initiated.
The industrial sprinkler system is reputed to have an
unreliability record (failure rate) of 3.8%!But this is an
inaccurate statistic in that many successes are not
reported, while presumably all failures are reported.
However, there is no doubt that industry is accepting a
failure rate for property protection that is not
acceptable in a hospital where lives are concerned. How
can the reliability of the sprinkler system be improved ?
Fire records also indicate that the sprinkler system that
is electrically supervised has a reliability in excess of
99t. Further, there is clear indication that if electric
supervision of the system is combined with an inspection
and maintenance contract with a reputable sprinkler
contractor, and if in addition the sprinkler system is
ENGINEERED rather than designed by the "book", as
is customary, a reliability that is very close to 100%can
be achieved.
True, this is only near perfection, not total perfection;
but there is no structural solution that achieves
perfection either.
Because large piping and huge water supplies are not
needed for a hospital sprinkler system it is quite possible
to install a 99.9%plus reliable system more economically
than the presently accepted industrial model which is
reputed to be 96.2%,reliable.
It is this concept of mechanical suppression I
recommend.
Near perfect mechanical protection, however, is still not
enough. It must be teamed with a concept of human fire
suppression that is as reliable as we can make it.
The one glaring weakness in connection with the public
fire department is that too often the professional fire
fighter remains unalerted as the fire destroys lives and
property. A direct electrical connection (or through
central station) from the sprinkler system to the fire
department will correct this. A fire department that is
given EARLY notification of a fire in a light hazard
occupancy can perform a superb job of fire control.
The third fire control system is the brigade — or
employee with the extinguisher. Here is the notoriously
bad actor; the man or the team that opens the door to
let the trapped fire loose, that fails to control the fire,
that fails to call the fire department until it is too late.
Surely it is best not to count too heavily on this human
suppression system.
Not so.
There is one reason and only one reason for the
consistant failure of the amateur fire fighter. That is that
we have EQUIPPED HIM AND TRAINED HIM FOR
FAILURE. We have established conditions under which
a high rate of failure is a CERTAINTY.
The February 1970 Society of Fire Protection Engineers
Magazine, Fire Technology, contains a report by
Salzberg, Vedvarka and Maatman on "Minimum Water
Requirements for Suppression of Room Fires." The test
program described demonstrated that room size fires
(flashover has already occurred spreading fire completely
thruout the room) can be READILY extinguished by
water in the form of a spray, with an application rate of
only 7 GPM. Extinguishment was achieved with an
extremely modest total quantity of water of 14 to 20
gallons. This is a very modest water requirement indeed.
It is available in just about every dwelling, let alone
every hospital. However, what is the tool we provide the
NONPROFESSIONAL with to fight these readily
controllable tires? The answer is that we give him an
extinguisher that put out exactly 2-1/2 gallons of water
with a duration of discharge of approximately 50
seconds. Clearly inadequate. Further, this discharge is in
the form of a straight stream, not a spray.
The report cited above also demonstrated that even 20
GPM was inadequate for room size fires when used as a
straight stream.
I repeat these statistics for emphasis. With 7 GPM and a
spray nozzle room size fires are readily controlled in two
or three minutes. But, if a straight stream is used 20
GPM is inadequate. An extinguisher puts out 2-1/2 to 3
GPM in a straight stream and is fully exhausted in less
than one minute. Some types of extinguishers are fully
discharged in as little as 10 seconds.
It is as clear as the nose on an elephant that we are
supplying the amateur with a fire suppression tool that is
GUARANTEED NOT to control a high percentage of
the fires he is likely to encounter.
The concept which I propose for the amateur fire fighter
is a very simple one. Give him a tool that he knows how
to use, one that can produce the 6-10 gallons of water a
minute that is needed to achieve fire control for room
size fires, and give him the three minutes or more of
operating time that he needs to do the job.
A light weight hose that is flexible, easily operated, and
is equipped with a spray nozzle will promptly and
efficiently extinguish the type of fires that the amateur
encounters in the hospital. Further, the water spray will
knock down the heat quite rapidly and permit the
amateur to get close to the fire so that he can do a job
On it.
And now there is one further thing that must be done.
Just as the sprinkler is wired to the fire department, so
must we wire in the fire fighter. When we give the fire
fighter a tool that can control the fire that he is likely to
encounter, we also have given him a tool that can be
electrically supervised. Just as water flow in a sprinkler
system can cause an alarm to be transmitted to the
public department, so can water flow in the hose station.
One word of caution is in order with regard to the hose,
however. Present underwriter approved hose intended
for use by building occupants is large, bulky, heavy
when filled with water, inflexible, and extremely
difficult to handle and put into operation in confined
areas, and has other disadvantages as well. It can be
handled by a professional fire fighter, but, ironically, the
professional always brings his own hose. There is a need
for fire hose that can be put into operation and be easily
handled by one nurse. This rules out all presently
approved fire hose. Again, it is important that we not
permit antiquated concepts and regulations to stand in
the way of providing the fire safety that is so badly
needed.
Note that when I talk about fire suppression I am not
just talking about a sprinkler system. I am talking about
an improved sprinkler system, a fire brigade, and a fire
department that will all be SIMULTANEOUSLY
initiated.
AN ECONOMICALLY PRACTICAL COMPOSITE
SOLUTION
Today, many people pay little more than lip service for
safety. Some of the blame for this must be shared by
those safety "experts" who argue that when it comes to
the matter of human life the COST OF PROTECTION
has no place in the considerations. "When life is at stake,
you don't argue dollars," they say. This philosophy,
more often than not, is a cover up for the fact that
costly recommendations are being submitted without
support of evidence of their worth.
There is no inexhaustable supply of money for safety
purposes. Those who believe that safety does not have to
be economically acceptable usually end up by
demanding too much and obtaining too little.
Maximum safety can be achieved only by gaining
maximum value for each safety dollar spent. Note that a
level of absolute safety is never achieved. When a level of
optimum safety per dollar expended is arrived at
additional dollars may buy additional safety, but the law
of diminishing returns applies here as it does in all other
areas of expenditure.
This is precisely what has happened in terms of
STRUCTURAL fire protection for hospitals.
Because the structural fire safety has its limitations,
disasters have occurred in the compartmented
"fireproof" building, and after each disaster additional
STRUCTURAL requirements have been applied, each
adding to the cost, but providing reduced increments of
additional safety.
It is clear, however, that the inclusion of extremely
reliable SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS into the picture
WILL dramatically improve the overall fire safety of the
hospital.
In fact, If we could guarantee an ABSOLUTE
CERTAINTY of fire suppression — instead of high
reliability — the need for ALL structural requirements
would be voided.
Total reliance on suppression with the complete
elimination of structural requirements, of course, is not
being recommended. This could prove to be as bad, and
possibly worse, than the present practice of putting all
the eggs in the structural basket.
When reliable suppression systems are introduced the
question at hand is this — "What is the proper level of
structural protection for a hospital IN CONJUNCTION
WITH the high quality suppression system "
In short, what is the proper level of COMPOSITE
protection?
The gain in safety per dollar expended on suppression
will be great because the present level of fire suppression
reliability is low. The reduction ' in safety thru the
reduction in structural protection expenditures will be
low because of the redundency and limited value of
some of the structural requirements. Thus, on a trade off
basis there is a potential for both savings and safety gain.
There are also gains to be made in greater freedom of
design, and efficiency of the physical plant layout. Time
and study will reveal the point of maximum safety per
expended dollar.
FUTURE DISASTERS
There is one more thing the suppression concept can
accomplish. It can also head off future, more restrictive,
structural and occupancy requirements. For instance, at
present there is a great deal of concern over the toxicity
of the products of combustion produced by the burning
or the decomposition of some plastics and other building
materials. Present laboratory tests that pass on the
acceptability of building materials measure the rate of
flame spread and the amount of smoke generated
(obscuration) but do not deal with toxicity.
Some of the chemicals used to reduce the flame spread
of some materials, and thus qualify the materials as
"firesafe" can actually increase the toxicity of the gases
produced.
However, when we consider the total fire loading in a
hospital occupancy the combustible contents may be
more significant than the combustible portion of the
structure itself. But the combustibility of the contents,
(furniture, supplies, etc.) generally is not regulated. The
contents can provide the primary fuel which will cause
the combustible sheathing and trim, if any, to also burn
and release very toxic gases if that is the nature of the
materials.
Details on the Marietta nursing home fire are sketchy,
but there is reason to believe that this is exactly what
happened there. That there was a CONTENT FIRE that
also involved carpeting. Because heat rises combustibles
burn in inverse relationship to their height above floor
level. Therefore, carpeting may have had the least role in
the spread of fire at Marietta.
If this is so, the reader may ask, "Why, then has there
been so much concern about floor covering since this
fire ? "
I think the real reason is that carpeting was the only
"built in" structural feature that could be labeled
"nonapproved." If it were not for the carpeting being in
the picture at this nursing home there would have been a
disaster in a completely standard fire resistive,
compartmented structure, (There was also the lack of a
corridor smoke barrier, but this could only have
reduced, but not prevented, the loss of life.)
So, if it were not for the carpeting the structural system
itself would have to be blamed for the failure.
But it WAS the system that failed. Note that the fire was
a classic fire resistive, compartmented structural fire.
1. The fire, when discovered, was small and
contained within one fire resistive cubicle.
2. Under conditions of stress the door to the involved
room was left open.
3. The fire spread to the hallway.
4. There were the usual fire suppression weaknesses.
5. Under panic conditions people did not think to
Richard M. Patton, Loss Control Consultant, 647 Colts
Neck Road, Freehold, N. J. 07728 — Telephone No.
(201) 431-2752
R.M. Patton
Loss Control Consultant
647 Colts Neck Road
Freehold, New Jersey 07728
(201) 431-2752
close doors to the corridor, and open windows to
the outdoors.
6. During the high stress conditions there was a delay
in a call to the fire department.
Who can blame humans for failing under the stress of the
conditions? The concept of controlling a fire by trapping
it, or by enclosing each human in his own cubicle if the
fire escapes, demands too much of the people involved.
It was system failure, of course, because a fire control
concept that does not effectively deal with the critical
needs of putting the fire out, before it becomes a
holocaust, is like permitting a tiger to stalk the halls
ready to enter any open door to kill.
If we do not deal with the SYSTEM there will be
additional tragedies, and each time there will be a
searching for a "cause" to hang one's hat on and another
area for tighter regulations.
There will also be charges leveled against employees and
hospital administrations who fail to control the fire with
equipment that often is not capable of controlling the
fire, who do not think to calmly close doors under panic
conditions, who have human reactions under great stress.
There will also be innocent victims who die needlessly.
I do not argue against reasonable controls on the
combustibility of carpeting. What I do say is that the
carpeting is being used as a reason NOT to examine the
validity of present concepts of structural fire safety.
A new concept of prompt positive fire suppression not
only will guarantee the maximum practicable level of
human safety from fire, it will permit the widest
practical latitude in structural design, arrangement of
operations, and use of materials.