LetterToFileAndServeSubmissionsForDaly20091010 (3sofraniou)

H J AMES J OHNSON
HUMAN RIGHTS § CIVIL RIGHTS § CORRUPTION § MEDIA

D EFA M AT I O N § P R O F E S S I O N A L N E G L I G E N C E L AW
1 S T F L O O R 1 4 1 O S B O R N E S T R E E T S O U T H YA R R A V I C T O R I A 3 1 4 1
TELEPHONE: +613 9279 3932 FA C S I M I L E : + 6 1 3 9 2 7 9 3 9 5 5
Saturday 10 October 2009 *** IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION
TO: Ms Miranda Milne (CEO Legal Practitioners TO: Ms Jennifer Sheehan

Liability AVOIDANCE Committee “LPLAC”) (Associate to Associate Justice Lansdowne)
By Facsimile: 9670 5538 By Facsimile: 9603 6050
TO: Mr Joe Saltalamacchia TO: Ms Cath Mukhtar
Prothonotary, Supreme Court of Victoria (Associate to Associate Justice Daly)
By Facsimile: 9603 9400 By Facsimile: 9603 9320
(please copy to Justice Kaye)
TO: Ms Rena Sofraniou TO: Mr Peter Rashleigh
(barrister funded by LPLAC for Harwood (solicitor funded by LPLAC for barrister Richard
Andrews Lawyers) By Facsimile: 9229 5050 Ingleby) By Facsimile: 9274 5111
TO: Ms Radhika Mendis TO: Mr Howard Obst
(solicitor funded by LPLAC for Harwood (solicitor funded by LPLAC for barrister Graeme
Andrews Lawyers) Devries) By Facsimile: 9605 3499
By Facsimile: 9670 2723
TO: Ms Allison Grice TO: Ms Margaret McNamara (solicitor to the legal
(solicitor funded by LPLAC for Berry Family practitioners non-regulator "LSC")
Law) By Facsimile: 9603 9320 By Facsimile: 9679 8101
TO: Mr Gerry Davies (solicitor not funded by LPLAC TO: Berry Family Law
representing Dr David List) By Facsimile: 9399 9006
By Facsimile: 9600 0894
Dear Brothel-gate participants
AUSSIES IN WONDERLAND: WITCH HUNT, WATERGATE, WATERLOO – VICTORIAN SUPREME COURT

PROCEEDINGS 9665 OF 2007, 9263 AND 10222 OF 2008 AND 3731 AND 3766 OF 2009
Messages for Associate Justice Daly and Associate Justice Lansdowne (cc: all other recipients)
1. I refer to my facsmile of 8 October 2009 and my earlier facsmile of 1 October 2009 (providing a copy of the
transcript of Ms Sofraniou's 9 July 2009 submissions for the Second and Third Defendants (by
Counterclaim), David William Hanlon and Harwood Andrews Lawyers, marked up with my preliminary
responses to those submissions.
2. In this fragment of these proceedings, 9263 of 2008, there are of course no continuing proceedings between
the original plaintiff (the ANZ Bank via one of its subsidiaries) and myself as original defendant – those
original proceedings have settled amicably between ANZ Bank and myself, with ANZ Bank in fact pledging
MELBOURNE'S PRETTY WOMAN FRAUD AND SUPREME COURT BROTHELGATE CORRUPTION TRIALS Page 1 of Many
support for me in the continuation of the remaining fragments of these proceedings. So for convenience I
will refer to myself as 'Plaintiff' (dropping the 'by Counterclaim') and refer to the Defendants by Counterclaim
similarly as, simply, 'Defendants'.
3. As I reported in my facsimile of 8 October 2009:
However, I am “obliged” according to the Legal Services Commissioner to raise with your Honour all of
the details of my complaints against several Australian legal practitioners appearing or instructing in
these proceedings. Apart from Ms Marles herself, Ms Mendis and Ms Sofraniou, they include Mr
Gleeson and Mr Other. Please see the 2 attached letters. For reasons I don't fully understand, but
may be appropriate for my complaints against these 2 gentlemen, the Legal Services Commissioner's
investigators insist that I provide you (and therefore, them) with a separate written submission for each
of them. I should be able to provide this to you (and them) by close of business Monday next week at
the latest (12 October 2009).
I wish to amplify my comments on the transcript of Ms Sofraniou's performance before Your Honour on
9 July 2009 that it is gross professional misconduct on Ms Sofraniou's part to lie to Your Honour (there
is no point me mincing my words or using 'weasel words'), and as indeed she has lied to the Chief
Justice and Justice Coghlan in the parallel applications in the Court of Appeal, that my complaints
regarding Harwood Andrews and Berry Family law (and Graham Devries, the other Counsel appearing
in that case) were fairly and properly heard by Justice Kaye. The 'debauchery' I referred to in my
earlier submissions was a totally unlawful process. I believe that the principles of law laid down by the
High Court in August this year in the AON v ANU case underscore this. As do the principles of law (the
basic 'right', not 'privilege' but 'common law right' to a fair trial) espoused by our Chief Justice Warren in
her Re an application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 [2009] VSC 381
decision of 7 September this year.
I intend to provide you, again all goes well by close of business on Monday, a list of the ten top
reasons demonstrating the unlawfulness of process and resulting unlawfulness of decision making
before Justice Kaye during December 2008 and February 2009 in the Cressy v Johnson proceedings.
I note that Ms Sofraniou and her instructor were fully paid from the Government purse to witness all of
that 'debaucher' and 'unlawfullness. Fully paid by the Legal Practitioners Liability (Evasion) Committee
to witness that blood sport. Such is the power of the Government purse, the 'inequality of arms' that
they were not the only Government paid observers in Court during December and February. Graeme
Devries solicitor in these hearings, again fully paid by the Legal Practitioners Liability (Evasion)
Committee was sitting in the gallery for most of the hearing before Justice Kaye. Mr Obst was “getting
a good look at the enemy” as Devries charmingly called me and so informed Justice Kaye on 25
February 2009.
4. The purposes of this facsimile are:
a. To assist Your Honour, Associate Justice Daly, with some summary key points of the numerous
submissions that I have made during the course of these premature 'no case' applications by these
Defendants;
b. To discharge my “obligation” (according to the Legal Services Commissioner's office that is) to raise my
concerns about Ms Sofraniou and her instructors (Ms Mendis and Ms Newcomb) with Your Honour
Associate Justice Daly.
5. I presume (not knowing what else to do in the circumstances) that I am “obliged” to raise with Your Honour,
Associate Justice Daly, my concerns only regarding those members of Counsel and their instructors
appearing before Your Honour. On that basis:
a. I shall discharge my “obligations” of raisure in respect of Mr Gleeson, Mr Other and Mr Over by way of
separate, follow up letters.
b. I assume I do not have to raise my obligations in respect of Dr Ingleby and his instructors, or Mr Devries
and his instructors before Your Honour Associate Justice Daly; I assume I have to raise them in the Court of
Appeal.
c. I assume that I have similar raisure “obligations” in the Court of Appeal in respect of Ms Sofraniou and her
instructors for the equally dismall submissions made by Ms Sofraniou in that jurisdiction (the only difference
being in lieu of “estoppel” in that jurisdiction Ms Sofraniou is running scandalous submissions of “a few days
out of time” and hanging on to gaps in the original Notice of Appeal which have since 15 June 2009 if not
earlier, sufficiently rectified).
6. I lament that as regards (b) and (c) I am handicapped by the non-availability to me of any transcript of the 4
hearings thus far in the Court of Appeal (fragment 3665 of 2007 renumbered as 3731 of 2009) as,
unfortunately, the Learned Judges in the Court of Appeal seem to lack somewhat the learning of the Learned
Judges in the lower houses of this Honourable Court (being the Trial Division and the Masters Court) to
order the financially flush party/ies (indeed flushed from a Government purse no less) to make the transcript
available to me free of charge. My attempts to learn the Learned Court of Appeal Judges to copy the
precendents set by their learned colleagues in those two lower houses of this Honourable Court have thus
been to no avail. But perhaps it will be a matter of '5th time lucky'?
7. To achieve these purposes (and to assist in unpackaging this communication for the purposes of related
non-judicial proceedings in this dispute) I have structured this letter and these submissions as a series of
attachments as follows:
 Schedule 1 – Summary of Key Submissions by the Plaintiff
 Schedule 2 – 10 Top Reasons amplifying my preliminary comments in and attached to my two

previously mentioned facsimiles that is grossly misleading and deceiptful and gross unprofessional
misconduct for Ms Sofraniou to be asserting before Your Honour Associate Justice Daly that my
complaints against the Second and Third Defendants (David William Hanlon and Harwood Andrews)
received any sort of “fair hearing” ['twas in truth no “hearing”; and 'twas all “foul” none “fair” before
Justice Kaye];
 Schedule 3 – Selection of Evidence produced before Justice Kaye (within fragment 9665 of 2007),
produced already before the Court of Appeal (within fragment 3731 of 2009) and produced already in
these Masters Court proceedings (within fragment 9263 of 2008) demonstrating beyond any measure of
doubt the lack of “fair hearing” before Justice Kaye, the fraudulent nature of Ms Cressy's claims and the
gross misconduct of her lawyers for promoting her claims;
 Schedule 4 – Selection of Fresh Evidence to be tendered in the Court of Appeal (by forthcoming
application – in fragment 3731 of 2009) and at trial in this fragment (9263 of 2008) to demonstrate further
the fraudulent nature of Ms Cressy's claims and the gross misconduct of her lawyers;
 Schedule 5 – Various Extraneous materials (including recent newspaper reports and my letters to the
editors of the Sunday Age, the Age and the Herald Sun) for the purposes of informing the Court and the
parties of the widespread nature of the problems that have allowed Ms Cressy's fraudulent claims and
the gross misconduct of her lawyers to go “way to far” [to quote Dr Ingleby's Court step confession of 18
March 2008];
 Schedule 6 – Extraneous Materials on the shame of a land 'where justice is a game' - 'in the form of a
Bob Dylan song (The People v Rubin (The Hurricane) Curtis, and autobiographical observations from
Geoffrey Robertson (who needs no introduction) on 'The Justice Game'.
 Schedule 7 – Copies of Legal Services Commisisoner's letters (3) informing me of my “obligation” to
raise misconduct concerns regarding Ms Sofraniou and her instructors as part of these applications
before Associate Justice Daly
8. I have already raised with Associate Justice Daly my misconduct complaints regarding the repeated failures
of Ms Sofraniou and her instructors to comply with their undertaking to provide me with a copy of the
transcript of Ms Sofraniou's submissions of 9 July 2009. I trust that I have no further raisure “obligations” in
that respect.
9. If Schedule 6 seems a bit self-indulgent, allow me to quote from an article that appeared in The Age on 5
May 2007 where the learned reporter wrote:
Freedom of expression comes out the winner when rock's in the dock (Guy Blackman May 6, 2007)
For decades, socially conscious songwriters have seen it as their duty to take lawmakers, politicians and
corporate bigwigs to task, putting the Man on musical trial in styles ranging fromWoody Guthrie's folk
anthems to Green Day's anti-George Bush rants.
10. Bob Dylan's 1976 song is credited with achieving the result that a man wrongly framed for triple homicide [ie
not wrongly framed as being the de facto husband of a violent etc mentally ill prostitute – get the picture]
having his life restored to him [via being released from jail after wrongfully serving 18 years in prison for
something that he didn't do]. The full lyrics are set out in Schedule 6 along with the text of a 1988 New York
Times feature article. It takes very little tweeking, just some simple substitution of relevant proper nouns, to
apply the more powerful words of that song to these proceedings:
The Ballad of Harold James Johnson (from 'Hurricane')
Here comes the story of the [Harold James],

The man the authorities came to blame
For somethin' that he never done.
...
All of [James's] cards were marked in advance

The trial was a pig-circus, he never had a chance.
...
...
[Harold James] was falsely tried.
The crime was [defacto hubby] guess who testified?
[Cressy] and [Devries] and they both baldly lied
And the [judges and lawyers], they all went along for the ride.
How can the life of such a man

Be in the palm of some fool's hand?
To see him obviously framed
Couldn't help but make me feel ashamed to live in a land
Where justice is a game.
Now all the criminals in their coats [wigs and] ties

Are free to drink martinis and watch the sun rise
While [James] sits like Buddha in a [court room well]
An innocent man in a living hell.
That's the story of the [Harold James],

But it won't be over till they clear his name
And give [his kids] back the time [that's been g]one.
...
11. And who better to give the first and last word on The Justice [as a] Game syndrome in full flight in these
proceedings than Geoffrey Robertson? Virtually every paragraph of his 'Foreword' and his 'Afterword' in his
1998 Autobiography 'The Justice Game' has direct application to these proceedings, with the decisions
leading up to and including and the 'reasons' and the 'orders' handed down by Justice Kaye.
12. These filthy little family lawyers have obviously filled their pockets on the wealth of many a broken family
tragically left “up the creek” in family court proceedings. But what on earth possessed them in their stupidity,
incompetence and arrogance to spec $400,000 of time and energy to bankroll this latest round of blackmail
from an obviously mentally ill fraudulent, compulsive liar - putting through the mangle a man who is a top-tier
commercial and government lawyer of 19 years goodstanding (with a list of professional achievements and
capacities that these dumb fools can only delude themselves as thinking they might achieve and capace
also). Spare a thought for poor Ms Cressy, with the tragic childhood of pre-school sexual abuse and
parental neglect, followed by teenage years of drugs, drunkeness, sexual exploitation, violence crime and
prostitution. And now to be done over by these fucked up family lawyers pretending to be “her” lawyers
when they are just using her to get at the fruits of my lifetime of very hard work and achievement.
13. It will take me years, once all of this litigation ends some time around 2015 or so, to make up to my Johnson
children and to Ms Cressy's children for the harm that these injustice game playing family law wigs have
done to them. The harm to Ms Cressy's children in the meantime or even in the past 2 years may already
be irreversible. Even though Ms Cressy may be beyond proper help by now, I would like to think that
something can be done to give her children a bit of a chance of a normal life – the sort of life that I was at
least able to give them, part-time, at huge financial, emotional and energy expense and risk to myself.
14. Ms Cressy can no doubt plead various insanity defences to her crimes as exposed in these proceedings.
But her lawyers? While group lobotomy sessions might do them good (and would certainly do good
protecting the public from further predation and exploitation from them), allowing them the luxury of insanity
defences hardly seems fair.
15. I lament my loss of wealth, income and privacy, and the lost time nurturing my children. Imagine how Ms
Cressy feels, mentally ill and vulnerable and exploited by “her” lawyers. Just imagine what more drugs,
alcohol, prostitution, scams and violence she is up to. And just think of the risk, the insecurity, and the
damage done to her children.
16. Ms Cressy's lawyers and their lawyers and other wigs (including wigs on the bench), and the heads of the
Government departments and statutory oligarchs that are protecting them (out of the proceeds of millions of
dollars so far from the Government purse), should be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted by the
regulators, the law enforcement agencies, the courts and our democratically elected parliamentary
representatives. The innocent, the children should be compensated and protected and made safe. The
mentally ill (Ms Cressy, her two eldest children and by this stage probably also her youngest, daughter) need
to be treated, counselled and protected.
17. And the regulators, the law enforcement agenices, our democratically elected parliamentary representatives
and the statutory oligarchs should then put in place internal and structural reforms to make sure that such
our courts and laws, and Australian children and families can no longer be abused in these sorts of dirtly
little games which are all about and only about putting plunder into dirty wig's pockets.
Kind regards from your most patient and optimistic of social and law reformers.
JAMES JOHNSON
Schedule 1 – Summary of Key Submissions by the Plaintiff
The No Case to Answer Applications
1. Separate 'no case to answer' applications have been presented before Your Honour, Associate Justice
Daly, being applications by:
 Ms Sofraniou instructed by Ms Mendis and Ms Newcomb, and all funded by the Legal
Practitioners Liability EVASION Committee, for the Second and Third Defendants (David William
Hanlon and Harwood Andrews Lawyers)
 Mr #, instructed by Mr Rashleigh, and all funded by the Legal Practitioners Liability EVASION
Committee, for the Fourth Defendant (Richard Ingleby of the Victorian Bar);
 Mr Other, instructed by Ms Grice, and all funded by the Legal Practitioners Liability EVASION
Committee, for the Fifth and Sixth Defendant (James Turnbull and Berry Family Law);
 Mr MacNamara, instructed by Mr Obst, and all funded by the Legal Practitioners Liability
EVASION Committee, for the Seventh Defendant (Graeme Devries of the Victorian Bar)
 Mr Gleeson and Ms Davies, instructed by , and all funded by another professional indemnity
insurer (probably AON), for the Eighth Defendant (David List)
2. There are only two slight differences in these applications. Neither difference is material to the
adjudication of these applications.
3. The first is that Mr Gleeson makes a summary judgement application for his client separate from his 'no
case to answer' application.
4. The second is that Ms Sofraniou raises for her client a Melbourne Port Authority v Anshun 'estoppel
application' – on the difficult and false pretext that my November 2008 restatement of my February 2008
claims against her two clients constitutes a second set of proceedings (rather than a restatement of my
first pleadings). That is a question of fact which the Court of Appeal should in due course rule in my
favour (part of fragment number 3731 of 2009) currently before the Court of Appeal.
No jurisdiction to hear 'no case to answer applications'
5. Putting aside Mr Gleeson's summary judgement application and Ms Sofraniou's Anshun estoppel
application, the basic point is that Associate Justice Daly, sitting in the Masters Court has no jurisdiction
to hear or grant any of these 'no case to answer applications'.
6. The appropriate time for a Defendant to make a 'no case to answer' application is after pre-trial
procedures (including discovery and interrogatories) are completed, after the statement of claim and the
defence are completed, after the jury has been empanelled, after all pre-trial issues (such as those
arising under the Human Rights Charter Section 35 Notice in these proceedings, and the federal
constitutiona law issues) are completed and, most importantly, after the trial has commenced and after
the Plaintiff has presented and closed his case.
7. It is premature for the Defendants to be bringing 'no case to answer applications' in the Masters Court
jurisdiction at this very early stage in the proceedings. The prematurity of these applications is
underscored by the admissions made by Mr Other, Counsel for James Turnbull and Berry Family Law in
April 2009 when Mr Other conceded from the bar table that there were serious issues of liability and
contribution that his clients faced in the Plaintiff's claim, which were different and give risk to conflicts
and possibly claim and counterclaim as between his clients James Turnbull and Berry Family Law and
their client (Ms Cressy). Mr Other's astonishing claim not to know whether his clients still represented
Ms Cressy in some fragments of these proceedings have been answered in the affirmative by Mr
Turnbull and by Mr Berry (principal of Berry Family Law) in Affidavits sworn by them in June 2009 and
used that month in the fragments of proceedings 9665 of 2007 (before Justice Kaye again on 24 and 25
June 2009) and in fragment of proceedings 3731 of 2009 (before Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Coghlan).
8. The fact is that the Plaintiff is still seeking funding for independent legal representation to settle his
pleadings and argue his case, and there is plenty of time for any gaps in his pleadings to be closed (and
indeed for his claims to be strenghthened as he has foreshadowed as against both the current crop of
Defendants and some additional defendants). It is also a fact that that the Plaintiff's pleadings are
unlikely to be finalised until after not just the usual discovery and interrogatory processes are completed,
but also not until significant Human Rights Charter issues and federal constitutional law issues are
adjudicated. These facts also underscore the prematurity of the Defendants' 'no case to answer
applications.
9. The federal constitional law issues are more obvious in the claim and proposed defence put forward by
Mr Gleeson for the Eighth Defendant. But similar constitutional law issues also arise in respect of the
Plaintiff's claim against Daniel O'Dwyer (a current sitting Federal Magistrate) who has not made any 'no
case to answer application' and indeed has so far failed even to file an appearance. And federal
constitutional law issues also arise in the claims against the Second through to Seventh Defendants via
the Plaintiff's claims against them in negligence and asserting any common law “barristers immunity rule”
as federally unconstitutional to the extent that it has not been abolished, in Victoria at least, as a result of
the coming into force of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsiblities Act.
10. The fact that the Legal Practitioners Liaiblity Committee has funded 4 separate city law firms and 4
separate city barristers, one apiece for the Second and Third Defendants (jointly), the Fourth Defendant
(alone), the Fifth and Sixth Defendant (jointly) and the Seventh Defendant (alone) also is smoking gun
evidence that they do not have a united 'no case to answer' position against the Plaintiff's claims but
rather have different kinds and contributory exposures to the Plaintiff's claims. This fact reinforces the
admissions made by Mr Other from the bar table as described above.
11. It is not necessary to comment on the Plaintiff's assertion that these applications are no more than the
flexing of financial muscles and resources of the Defendants (all of them funded by professional
indemnity insurers) to oppress and vex the Plaintiff who suffers from no significant financial muscle or
resources whatsoever as a byproduct of the very legal proceedings and conduct of the Defendants that
is the source of his claims. Though there is considerable economic force and logic, and gamesmanship
analysis to those claims which is relevant on the question as to orders for the Plaintiff for costs against
the Defendants (and contributions between them).
12. The Plaintiff also correctly asserts that in the shadow of his pending appeal in the Court of Appeal of
almost all of the rulings and orders and judgements handed down by Justice Kaye, these 'no case to
answer' applications by the Defendants, if Associate Justice Daly were to uphold those applications this
would amount to interfering (possibly, perverting) the course of justice in those Court of Appeal
proceedings. And this is something that an Associate Justice presiding in the Masters Court jurisdiction
could not be thought to have the capacity to do. The Plaintiff correctly asserts that the Defendants land
their egal representatives and litigation funders (except, but as will be shown irrelevantly, perhaps the
Eighth Defendant and his legal representatives and litigation funder) ought to have know at the otuset
that in their applications they are seeking orders in the Masters Court jurisdiction that if granted would
interfer in appeal proceedings on foot in the Court of Appeal and that therefore their applications had no
prospects of success. The orders would also interfere in pending Court of Appeal proceedings in
respect of the Plaintiff's application under Section 35 of the Human Rights Charter. And the orders
would also interfere in the pending High Court proceedings on the federal constitutional issues arising
from the Plaintiff's claims and the Defendants' defences. This is another factor relevant to the dismissing
of these applications, and in framing of the orders for the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff his costs.
Ms Sofraniou's Anshun estoppel application similarly doomed to failure
13. Having determined that these 'no case to answer applications' were doomed to failure and this ought to
have been recognised by the Defendants, their legal representatives and their litigation funder at the
outset, the next question is whether Ms Sofraniou's 'Anshun' argument in some way assists the Second
and Third Defendants to salvage their situation. It does not. Firstly, the Plaintiff seems on solid ground
in arguing that Justice Kaye erred in law (one of a number of factors contributing the the absence of a
fair trial) by failing to acknowledge the Plaintiff's consolidation application on foot as at 2 December 2008
and the strength of his submissions that day that his claims against the Second and Third Defendants as
drawn by him (again, and in difficult circumstances) and filed under proceedings numbered 9263 of 2008
were a revised version of his claims against the Second and Third Defendants as drawn by him (also in
difficult circumstances and contrary to his non-litigation skills set) in February of 2008. The fact that the
propriety of Justice Kaye's ruling to proceed to trial in December 2008, notwithstanding all of the other
uncompleted pre-trial steps and irregularities of process), and forcing Mr Johnson back onto his
February 2008 written claims against the First, Second and Third Defendants, rather than allowing him
the benefit of his November 2008 version of his claims is something that is up for adjudication in the
Court of Appeal. Clearly it would be inappropriate for the Masters Court to purport to rule on this appeal
point. And if it did, to what effect would that Masters Court ruling have, other than to beget another
appeal back to the Trial Division which of course cannot sit in appellate jurisdiction over itself either. The
Masters Court is not a court of appellate jurisdiction from the Trial Division and ought not and should not
interfere in this process. The fact that such a situation could arise where an Associate Justice in the
Masters Court is asked to consider exercising appellate jurisdiction over a ruling emanating from the
Trial Division which is subject to a pending ruling in the Court of Appeal demonstrates that one or more
substantial defects of process must have occurred.
14. So far as an Anshun estoppel application can be successfully entertained, clearly there must first be
'ultimate findings'. The findings of the Trial Division, namely the findings of Justice Kaye in the Cressy v
Johnson proceedings cannot by any stretch of legal imagination be called 'ultimate findings'. They are
subject almost in their entirity of appeal to the Court of Appeal. There is every likelihood that the Court
or Appeal will not deliver the 'ultimate findings' as there is every indication, given a determined Plaintiff
and Defendants with access to the bottomless purse of a Government agency, that the findings of the
Court of Appeal (fragment of proceedings number 3731 of 2009) will be the subject of applications for
leave to appeal (if not full blown appeals) to the High Court. If that transpires, then and only then will
there be 'ultimate findings' not capable of further appeal. Only then could an application based on
Anshun estoppel be legitimately made.
Mr Gleeson's 'no case to answer' and 'summary judgement' applications both fail
15. The next question that arises is whether Mr Glesson's 'no case to answer' or 'summary judgement'
application might somehow succeed where the applications of the other Defendants must fail in these
proceeedings. But again the answer is that these are really one and the same 'no case to answer'
applications and they fail for the same reasons of prematurity as do the other applications.
16. Firstly, the Masters Court is not, for the purposes of these applications, a Court of evidence. The onus
on the Eighth Defendant is extremely high. The Plaintiff is entitled to the assumption that all facts
necessary to prove his claim against the Eighth Defendant can and will be found in the Plaintiff's favour.
17. The Plaintiff's claims are essentially two. The first is that Justice Kaye's three key findings of fact are all
untrue and by publishing falsehoods as true the Eighth Defendant acted negligently towards the Plaintiff
and defamed (maliciously or otherwise) the Plaintiff.
18. Justice Kaye's three key findings were (a) a finding that Ms Cressy and Mr Johnson lived together as a
de facto couple from 1998 to 2007, together with the findings (b) that Ms Cressy was a “devoted wife”
and homemaker and caring mother to Mr Johnson's children; and (c) that Ms Cressy earned substantial
amounts of money as a prostitute which she gave to Mr Johnson to buy properties (in Mr Johnson's
name only), being properties that Mr Johnson could not have afforded to buy out of my own earnings
and borrowings.
19. At least until such time as 'ultimate findings' have been delivered by a Court of competent jurisdiction,
the Plaintiff is entitled for the purposes of applications of this kind to the assumption that those findings
of fact are false. It might be added that the Plaintiff did produce substantial evidence and deliver
substantial arguments of law before Justice Kaye to support his position that those three findings were
incorrect. The Plaintiff has reproduced that evidence in these Masters Court proceedings, and has
reproduced that evidence in the Court of Appeal proceedings (on the appeal from those findings of
Justice Kaye). That evidence of the Plaintiff is substantial (and according to applications foreshadowed
by the Plaintiff is to be supplemented by equally strong fresh evidence in the Court of Appeal). But the
Masters Court, for the purposes of these applications, is not a court of evidence. and to all intents and
purposes must assume Mr Johnson is succesful in persuading the Court of Appeal to reverse these Trial
Division findings of fact.
20. Mr Gleeson argues for the Eighth Defendant also argues, for the purposes of these proceedings that the
Eighth Defendant enjoys certain special statutory immunities from legal action – irrespective of the facts
of the case. Mr Gleeson argues, wrongly, that these immunities should be construed as broadly as
possible. The Plaintiff argues, correctly, that such immunities if they are valid as a matter of federal law
(and therefore as a matter of federal constititional law) then they constitute an exception from certain
basic human rights principles recognised by the common law for centuries prior too the enactment of the
Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act. Those basic human rights, argues the
Plaintiff, are the right to equality under thhe law and the right to a fair hearing. The Plaintiff argues that
any statutory exceptions to those basic human rights principles must first be examined for statutory (and
constitutional) validity and then must be carefully and narrowly construed.
21. Without needing to look at difficult questions of statutory interpetation and constitutional law posed by
the Plaintiff (the latter being of course outside the jurisdiction of the Masters Court or indeed any other
part of the Victorian Supreme Court) the Eighth Defendants' claims for statutory immunities under State
(defamation) legislation and federal (family law) legislation must fail. Mr Gleeson conceded in his
submissions that any statutory immunity that may validly exist as a matter of law will only avail the Eighth
Defendant provided that the Eighth Defendant was only acting in accordance with a proper mandate in
the preparation and contents of his written report. If the Eighth Defendant departed from the proper
bona fide purposes for which he was lawfully engaged, then to that extent at least, he loses any shield of
immunity afforded to him by statute. The Eighth Defendant's difficulty is, again, one of prematurity. The
Eighth Defendant may well choose to run these statutory defences at trial, which will require a
measuring of evidence put by the Plaintiff that the Eighth Defendant was not acting bona fides, or that
the report he wrote was not a proper report within the scope intended by the federal family law legislation
and and evidence led by the Eighth Defendant at trial to make out the defence. The difficulty for the
Eighth Defendant is that Mr Gleeson conceeded in his submissions that the statutory immunities are only
available to the Eighth Defendant (assuming they are statutorily valid) if the Eighth Defendant acted in
accordance with his legally valid mandate and his report was properly within the scope legally
contemplated by the family law legislation.
22. It is therefore not necessary, or even possible or worthwhile for Associate Justice Daly to reflect on the
evidence already produced by the Plaintiff to suggest that the Eighth Defendant's conduct or his report
puts him outside the scope of any statutory immunities or defences. The Plaintiff is entitled, at this early
stage in the proceedings to the Masters Court assuming for the purposes of these applications that the
trial division will make findings on these evidentiary aspects that are favourable to the Plaintiff and
adverse to the Eighth Defendant.
23. Likewise it is not not necessary, or even possible or worthwhile for Associate Justice Daly to reflect on
the legal arguments already outlined by the Plaintiff as to why the statutory immunities suggested by Mr
Gleeson are of no legal effect, or at least of no legal avail to the Eighth Defendant. Some of those
arguments rely on difficult issues of ordinary statutory interpretation. Some of those arguments resort to
issue of federal constitutional law, which is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the High Court.
24. Likewise it is not necessary, or even possible or worthwhile for Associate Justice Daly to reflect on the
Plaintiff's constitional law hypothesis that large sections of the Family Law Act, and indeed the family law
courts (including the federal magistrates court) are constitutionally invalid. This hypothesis follows
simply from the family court (including the federal magistrates court) not being a 'court' per se but rather
a tribunal that purports to exercise judicial functions – which is unconsititonal on a direct application of
the boilermakers case principle that the judicial arm of (federal) government must be kept separate and
distinct from the executive arm. The Plaintiff's argument is that a family law court, whenever it appoints
an (misleadingly named) independent childrens lawyer takes on executive government powers (such
as the manufacture of 'evidence' often of dubious or even counterproductive quality via commissioning
reports from experts such as the Eighth Defendant and/or psychiatrists. The independent childrens
lawyer is in effect a coronial aid to the Judge, so the Judge in effect becomes a party to the proceedings
in which he also sits in judgement. Clearly it is not the function of a court for the judge to be
representated as a party in the litigation, or to commission the creation of evidence. Such steps are
anathma to the 'adversarial system' of a true court, including heretical to the principle of judicial
independence that is a hallmark of common law courts. And there is nothing in the federal constitution
as the boilermaker case and subsequent cases on the separation of powers have held, that allows the
federal parliament to create a body that carries out both judicial and executive (tribunal) functions at the
same time. These are issues of substantial consequence for the family law court system; issues for the
High Court to grapple with. They are not issues within any jurisdiction of the Masters Court or any higher
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Complaints of Professional Misconduct
25. Before considering the Legal Services Commissioner's costs application (and the Plaintiff's entitlemeent
to orders for costs against the Legal Services Comissioner), and the question of appropriate orders for
the Defendants to pay the Plaintiffi his costs on the failure of their applications, it is necessary to
consider the complementary jurisdictions of the Legal Services Commissioner and this Court for dealing
with misconduct complaints the Plaintiff has made against some members of Counsel and instructing
solicitors appearing in these applications before Associate Justice Daly.
26. The threshold question is whether these complaints can or must be considered by Associate Justice
Daly at all. This turns upon whether the Legal Services Commissioner is correct at law in advising the
Plaintiff that he is “obliged” to raise with Associate Justice Daly his concerns with the conduct of the
other lawyers involved in these applications or whether those concerns have “nothing to do with these
proceedings” as Justice Kaye concisely ruled at various times (and notably on the morning of 25
February 2009) in the context of the Cressy v Johnson proceedings before Justice Kaye.
27. The Plaintiff has mentioned in his submissions two decisions. The first is an unreported decision of
Justice Gray in 1993 of Delahunty v Howell and Mann which arose under the former Legal Profession
Practice Act of 1958 and a much earlier professional regulatory regime. That decision, Justice Kaye
indicated he was most reluctant to follow – even to the point of declaring it irrelevant several times during
the course of the proceedings before him. The second decision Alakshir's case is a VCAT decision
(Senior Member Howell) of last year applying Delahunty v Howell and Mann.
28. It would seem that Justice Kaye in the Cressy v Johnson proceedings was very clear in his reasons
that Delahunty v Howell and Mann was irrelevant to the very same issue when Mr Johnson sought to
comply with his raisure “obligations” in respect of his complaints to the Legal Services Commissioner
over the conduct of the Second, Third, (query Fourth?), Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Defendants.
29. As an Associate Justice in the Masters Court, Associate Justice Daly is bound by doctrine of precedent
to apply Justice Kayes reasons on this issue, namely, that misconduct complaints of the magnitude that
the Plaintiff has made against those Defendants, and makes against Ms Sofraniou and her two
instructors are properly to be investigated by the Legal Services Commissioner, who has the statutory
powers, funding allocation, resources and time and specialisation to investigate these claims (although
the Victorian State Ombudsman's Annual Report for 2008-09 casts serious doubt on the accuracy as
opposed to the legitimate intent of these claims).
30. Accordingly, Asosciate Justice Daly ought bow out of extensive hearing of these misconduct complaints
and ought give clear direction to the Legal Services Commissioner to fulfil her Office's statutory duties
and responsibilities as the peak, one step regulator of Victoria's barristers and solicitors and to cease to
issue these “raisure obligation” misinformation letters which misconceive the roles and functions and
capacities of the Courts to do the Legal Services Commissioners statutory role for her.
31. Associate Justice Daly should exercise her residual and inherent disciplinary powers in respect of the
delays and failures to provide to the Plaintiff a copy of the transcript of the 9 July 2009 morning session –
a fully 2 month delay. But otherwise misconduct complaints are the sole effective domain of the Legal
Services Commissioner.
32. Associate Justice Daly should exercise her residual and inherent disciplinary powers in respect of the
Plaintiff's complaints of mischeivous and inappropriate submissions by Mr Other, Mr Over and Mr
Gleeson. [These to be shortly addressed by separate misconduct submissions.]
33. Associate Justice Daly might note in her written reasons (for the Legal Services Commissioner to pick up
on and investigate) that Ms Sofraniou's submissions on 9 July 2009 and previously, that Mr Johnson
received an extensive and fair hearing before Justice Kaye of his claims against the Second and Third
Defendants were extraordinary and unseemly submissions having regard to the Ten Top Reasons (plus
ten more) advanced by Mr Johnson as to why the trial of his claims against them before Justice Kaye
was anything but a “fair hearing”.
Legal Services Comissioners' Costs Application
34. Based on that set of findings, the Legal Services Commissioners costs application against the Plaintiff is
misconceived and was always doomed to failure.
35. To succeed the Legal Services Commissioner would have to show that it was inappropriate for the
Plaintiff to include the Legal Services Commissioner as a party in these proceedings. But the Legal
Services Commissioners own letters to Mr Johnson (including those sent in respect of his 2008
complaints against David Hanlon and others at Harwood Andrews, and his January 2009 complaint
against Graeme Devries and his instructors, and the Legal Services Commissioner's letters of last
month) each wrongly assert that Mr Johnson has an “obligation” to raise in detail his concerns during the
course of the court proceedings that those legal practitioners are involved in. The Legal Services
Commissioner therefore is herself making the raising of her role and her responsiblities a significant
issue (and for Justice Kaye, an unwanted and annoying intereference) in the court proceedings. This
mitigates against the Court awarding (rewarding) the Legal Services Commissioner with orders that Mr
Johnson meet any of her offices legal costs. It motivates in favour of the Court ordering the Legal
Services Commissioner to pay Mr Johnson the amount of his legal costs, calculated as a solicitor-litigant
(there being no need to distinguish between periods that Mr Johnson was self-represented and those
periods when he was technically represented via his incorporated legal practice Sutton Lawyers Pty
Ltd).
36. The Legal Services Commissioner's costs application fails at a second hurdle. This is Justice Kaye's
observations to the effect that the Legal Services Commissioner was totally wrong as a matter of law in
telling Mr Johnson to raise every aspect of his complaint against David Hanlon and others at Harwood
Andrews (and therefore by consistent application of faulty logic which the Legal Services Commissioner
continues to faultily apply even up to mid-September 2009, his complaints against Graeme Devries and
his instructors and Ms Sofraniou and her instructors) with the judge in the court proceedings in which
they are acting. Based on those observations, Mr Johnson voluntarily withdrew his formal claims against
the Legal Services Commissioner. Mr Johnson communicated that withdrawal to the Chairman of the
Legal Services Board, a statutory body of which the Legal Services Commissioner is the chief executive
officer. It was only some 4 weeks later that the Legal Services Commissioner filed significant
applications in these proceedings. Mr Johnson had valid reasons for informing the Chairman of the
Legal Services Board that he was unilaterally withdrawing his formal claims against its chief executive
officer. As a matter of broad corporations law, as the chief executive and board member of the Legal
Services Board the Legal Services Commissioner is deemed to have knowledge of all information in the
hands of her fellow board members, including her chairman. It is inconceivable that the Chairman of the
Legal Services Board kept it secret from his chief executive for 4 weeks
37. There is a third stumbling block to the Legal Services Commissioner's costs application. Costs orders
are in the discretion of the Court. Where a government agency is seeking orders for costs against a
citizen, the roles of state and citizen are a relevant factor. Here the State agency is charged with
statutory duties, powers and responsibilities and the citizen is one of those that the State agency is
charged to protect. The citizen has legitimate claims that the State agency failed to perform and indeed
according to the Victorian State Ombudsman's Annual Report for 2008-09 has a frightening history of
widespread performance failures. The citizen sought and obtained judicial clarification of the State
agency's duties and responsiblities, incuring considerable discomfort and expense in the process. Even
though the citizen has informed the State agency of the judicial clarification of its duties and
responsiblities it seems still to be unheeding of them. Worse, the citizen makes a prima facie argument
that the State agency is making reprisals against him (including as one example the withholding for five
months despite seven requests and contrary to 4 statutory laws, a psychiatric report of enormous value
to him in legal proceedings; including as a second example this costs application).
38. If that were not bad enough, there is a fourth stumbling block with a calderbank offer letter that the
Plaintiff has extended to the Legal Services Commissioner that she has ignored.
39. For these reasons the Legal Services Commissioners Cost application must fail. The Legal Services
Commissioner should be ordered to pay the Plaintiff $23,100 being the amount of the Plaintiff's legal
costs assessed on a full-indemnity basis (calculated as set out in his affidavit of 2 October 2009) in
accordance with applicable solicitor-litigant principles (Chorley's case – 1884 QBD decision) as
described in the relevant extracts cited by him from Professor Gerald dal Pont's treatise on The Law of
Costs. Having regard to the financial resources of the Legal Services Commissioner and the financial
circumstances of the Plaintiff, the Legal Services Commissioner should be ordered to pay this amount to
the Plaintiff by bank cheque, clear of set off or deductions within 5 days.
Other Orders as to Payment of the Plaintiff's Costs (Second to Seventh Defendants)
40. For all of the above reasons the Second to Seventh Defendants inclusive should be ordered to pay the
Plaintiff's costs being $136,400 (calculated 248 hours at $550 per hour (this averages as 8 hours per
week for 31 weeks, from 17 March 2009 to 13 October 2009) calculated as the amount of the Plaintiff's
legal costs assessed on a full-indemnity basis in accordance with applicable solicitor-litigant principles
(Chorley's case – 1884 QBD decision) as described in the relevant extracts cited by him from Professor
Gerald dal Pont's treatise on The Law of Costs. Having regard to the financial resources of these
Defendants and the financial circumstances of the Plaintiff, these Defendants should be ordered to pay
this amount to the Plaintiff by bank cheque, clear of set off or deductions within 5 days, in the following
amounts:
 Second and Third Defendants – $34,100

 Fourth Defendant - $34,100;
 Fifth and Sixth Defendant - $34,100;
 Seventh Defendant - $34,100
Other Orders as to Payment of the Plaintiff's Costs (Eighth Defendant)
41. For all of the above reasons the Eighth Defendant should be ordered to pay the Plaintiff's costs being
$27,500 (calculated as 50 hours at $550 per hour) calculated as the amount of the Plaintiff's legal costs
assessed on a full-indemnity basis in accordance with applicable solicitor-litigant principles (Chorley's
case – 1884 QBD decision)
Other Matters (Declaration of effective service on First Defendant)
42. The Plaintiff should be given declarations that all documents in this fragment of proceedings number
9263 of 2008 that have been served by him directly on the Sixth Defendant (as opposed to documents
merely served indirectly on the Sixth Defendant via its solicitors on the record in this fragment of
proceedings number 9263 of 2008) have also been validly and effectively served on the First Defendant.
43. The Plaintiff has provided substantiation, in the form of the first page of an affidavit of Peter Berry, the
principal of the Sixth Defendant, sworn in June of this year, to the effect that the Sixth Defendant
continues to represent the First Defendant in the fragments of these proceedings 9665 of 2007 and 3731
of 2009 and it clear on the Court record that the Sixth Defendant has not filed any notice of ceasing to
represent the First Defendant in either of those two fragments of the proceedings.
44. It is of course grossly inappropriate for the Sixth Defendant to assert that it can properly accept service
of process in some fragments of these proceedings and not in others – especially given that the Plaintiff
has demonstrated that his claim filed in this fragment of proceedings number 9263 of 2008 is no more
than a November 2008 revision of his February 2008 written claim against the First (and Second and
Third) Defendant and the failure of Justice Kaye to allow MrJohnson to substitute (upgrade) to his
November 2008 version of his document for the trial in December 2008 is a proposition that may well be
vindicated by the Court of Appeal in the fragment of these proceedings that is 3731 of 2009 (where the
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Defendants continue to represent the First Defendant).
45. Associate Justice Daly should order the Sixth Defendant to within 48 hours file a notice of appearance
on behalf of the First Defendant.
46. Services by any party of documents directly on the Sixth Defendant shall continue to constitute effective
service on the First Defendant until such time as the Sixth Defendant files notices of ceasing to act in all
three of these fragments of these proceedings numbers 9665 of 2007, 9263 of 2008 and 3731 of 2009.
- o0o -
Schedule 2 – 10 Top Reasons amplifying my preliminary comments in and attached to my two previously
mentioned facsimiles that is grossly misleading and deceiptful and gross unprofessional misconduct for Ms
Sofraniou to be asserting before Your Honour Associate Justice Daly that my complaints against the Second
and Third Defendants (David William Hanlon and Harwood Andrews) received any sort of “fair hearing” ['twas in
truth no “hearing”; and 'twas all “foul” none “fair” before Justice Kaye];
I handnoted may of Ms Sofraniou's outrageous and unprofessional submissions on pages 192 to 264 of the
transcript for this fragment of proceedings 9263 of 2008. The following are some of these which warrant
scrutiny from a professional conduct (and criminal conduct) perspective.
According to Ms Sofraniou's submissions before Associate Justice Daly on 9 July 2009:
 At page 220 (line 18) “... Your Honour need not fear that there has been any aspect of the manner [sic,
matter?] left unconsidered by Justice Kaye in his complete exoneration of the practitioners on those
issues “[that they were “doing nothing more than representing their client in accordance with their duty”].
[Not true]
 At page 223 (line 8) “... Your Honour has already looked at the transcript, that exhibit of Mr Hanlon's
where His Honour had pointed out and noted in the judgement Mr Johnson's express disavow of the
idea that Mr Hanlon knew that the – that Ms Cressy's claims were fraudulent as he would put it.” [Not
true]
 At page 224 (line 26) “That language, abuse of process and whether there was ulterior purpose was
expressly disavowed by Justice Kaye in Cressy v Johnson No.1 in the parts of the judgement that I have
extracted ...” [Not true]
 At page 226 (line 1) “... once Ms Cressy was held to be succesful in those claims the idea that there
could be a rehearing for Harwood Andrews and Mr Hanlon as to whether or not they were involved in
supporting or bringing of fraudulent claims is not a matter that is open to be relitigated.” [Justice Kaye's
holdings are ridiculous, subject to appeal, those claims are certainly not yet “successful”. This
is not a relitigation of issues but an attempt for first and proper hearing of issues that Kaye
excluded with his refusal to allow Mr Johnson to trial them based on his most recent November
2008 version of his claims against them.]
 At page 227 (line 15) “For the issue estoppel purposes it's the submission that I've already made that
this fails once, one accepts that the issue as to whether Ms Cressy has a fraudulent claim or not has
been decided.” [This is yet to be decided by the Court of Appeal and/or High Court and the
process cannot be interfered with by a Masters Court application which has no appellate
jurisdiction over those higher courts.
 At page 228 (line 20) “This [blackmail scheme] wass a cause of action not permitted to be ventillated
before Justice Kaye. Where Mr Johnson tried to argue this cause of action [nb] His Honour said quite
rightly [sic] that it wasn't covered under the counter claim that His Honour was dealing with [nb].
 At page 229 (line 16) “... Justice Kaye embarked on quite strong language defending the legal
practitioners who face an action before the court just [nb, nnb] by defending [sic] their client consistent
with their duty [sic] ... it is incumbent on the court not to permit officers of the court to be subjected to a
second round of attacks in a second ...” [This is an outrageous deception of the basic point that
Justice Kaye erred in shotgunning Mr Johnson to trial in December 2008 without due process
and tying him down to a February 2008 draft of his claims when he had filed in the Court a
November 2008 revised version and reasonably expected trial to be towards the end of 2009 after
proper pre-trial procedures had been observed.]
 At page 230 (line 7) “ ... extending their services free of charge... A smear campaign ... having the
temerity to commence and act and appear and take steps pursuant with those earlier proceedings.” [I'm
confused – who has smeared whom here? There should only ever have been one proper hearing
of all proceedings not the fragmentation that Justice Kaye engineered.]
 At page 231 (line 11) “Justice Kaye did all he could by throwing out the case for no case to answer
delivering solicitors indemnities costs, defending in his hearing the right of parties [sic, other than Mr
Johnson it seems] not to face unsubstantiated allegations ... without more. The idea that here is a
second round and it can all be run all over again ...” [This is not a second round and the things to be
run are those that Justice Kaye unlawfully exculded from being run in the unlawful first time
round.]
 At page 231 (line 30) “This is really an attempt to relitigate and reopen Justice Kaye's findings by calling
them grossly untrue in this counterclaim .... “ [Wow. First there were no Justice Kaye's findings in
November 2008 when this document was drafted and filed in Court. Secondly. The appeal to the
Court of Appeal, fragment proceedings number 3731 of 2009 comes properly and closes to a
relitigation and reopening of his February 2009 findings. Nothing rediculous about that. This
application in the Masters Court, which lacks appellate jurisidiction over Justice Kaye is the
rediculous fragment of these proceedings – vexatious and abuse of process by Ms Sofraniou
and those she represents.]
 At page 234, line 4 “... there's nothing unusual about it.” [... save the repeated unusual fact that the
Court ignored my submissions on every ocassion and didn't bother to require Ms Cressy's
lawyers to stump up any security for costs before granting them holtus boltus whatever
interlocutory relief (“judgment first. trial second”) they wished to ask from the Court. That's
mighty unusual, mighty suspicious from a human rights and due process perspective.]
 At page 238 (line 25) “... any judicial determination should be final, binding and conclusive”. [Trial
Judges are omnipotent and infallible and their decisions should never be subject to appeal, so
let's abolish the Court of Appeal and the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. Is this lady for
real?]
 At page 239 (line 31) “Here those ultimate facts are Ms Cressy did make out her claim that she is in a
domestic relationship at the relevant time. That contribution was payable. That constructive trusts were
held over her properties in her interests.” [My God. These false findings are not “ultimate facts”
they are “errors of fact” that are subject to appeal and no “ultimate facts” exist until overturned
by an appellate court.]
 At page 242 (line 29) “... these defendants have already faced hearing ...” [This is sick]
Ms Sofraniou is guilty of making some of these submissions before Chief Justice Warren and Justice Coghlan in
the Court of Appeal [but handicapped by non-availability to me of the transcript of those hearings, I am unable to
quote for Your Honours her precise submissions.
Here are the Ten Top Reasons (in ascending order) demonstrating the unlawfulness of process and resulting
unlawfulness of decision making before Justice Kaye during December 2008 and February 2009 in the Cressy
v Johnson proceedings. And Ms Sofraniou and her instructors being fully-paid witnesses to these ten
attrocities, it is gross professional misconduct to assert to Your Honour Associate Justice Daly that my claims
against Ms Cressy's original solicitors, David William Hanlon and Harwood Andrews were fully and fairly heard
by Justice Kaye.
10. Turn Out Your Pocketses Ms Cressy's lawyers were so without evidence for her claims that they resorted to
alll sorts of lawless shinanigans. With no discovery, they subpoenae Mr
Johnson's banks (who delivered up documents without objecting to those
subpoenas as they should have objected given their privacy duties to their
customer). Those subpoenaed documents turned up on 2 December 2009 and
did nothing but endorse the truth of Mr Johnson's case and the deceipt of Ms
Cressy's outlandish claims.
Under cross examination Mr Johnson was compelled to turn out his pocketses, to
disgorge his victorian drivers licence. Otherwise Devries and the Trial Judge
were going to assume (falsely) that it showed Mr Johnson as having the same
residential address as Ms Cressy. Of course, it didn't. Mr Johnson had to drive
(despite a debilitating back ache that left him without sleep for the first 4 nights of
the trial and lingering pain into the second week) for over an hour, each way, to
retrieve his Victorian drivers licence (which again strenghtened the truth of his
case) rather than being damned by this false assumption from this false, abuse of
process.
Haven't Ms Cressy's lawyers and the Trial Judge heard of pre-trial discovery and
notices to produce?
9. Ms Cressy's Case Contains Ms Cressy's hard evidence of a 9 year de facto relationship consisted of 2
No Evidence valentines cards, one February 1999 and one February 2000. And that's it. The
first recorded that Mr Johnson and Ms Cressy were dating of sorts as at February
1999. The latter recorded that Ms Cressy and Mr Johnson were not even in
speaking contact as ast February 2000.
Otherwise, Ms Cressy's evidence consisted of her contradictory, unconvincing

and uncorroborated testimony. With the Trial Judge making serious findings as to
her dishonesty in the witness box, her dishonesty to earlier judges, and
dishonesty with the police. The Trial Judge also made serious findings as to her
commiting acts of aggravated burglary, to steal and conceal evidence
establishing the fraudulent nature of her claims.
Ms Cressy and her lawyers were clearly informed that Mr Johnson denied any
de facto relationship with Ms Cressy and denied sharing a residence with her
(other than for a period in 2001 – 2003 to save Ms Cressy and her children from
being homeless). Their failure to bring the sort of evidence (testimony from
relatives, friends, acquaintances, neighbours and indica of ordinary family life –
photo albums, birthday cards, family videos) were all a deafening silence as to
the falsehood of her claims.
Ms Cressy's statement of claim asserted she gave Mr Johnson deposit monies

when he bought his properties. No evidence was produced at trial to support this
claim. The Trial Judge found that these claims were falsehoods.
Ms Cressy's statement of claim asserted a number of sources of income for the

period relevant to her claim. Again no evidence was produced at trial to support
these claims. There was no evidence of Ms Cressy earning even a single dollar,
let alone giving Mr Johnson a single dollar, or even buying Mr Johnson a cup of
coffee at any time relevant to the period of Ms Cressy's claim. The Trial Judge
called this, time and time again “the paucity of the evidence”. It was no “paucity”
but a total absence of credible, reliable evidence for the Plaintiff's case.
8. Forget about Mr Johnson's Mr Johnson called one of Ms Cressy's neighbours whom he did not know prior to
Full Case of Evidence the commencement of legal hostilities. Ms Cressy's neighour testified that Ms
Cressy lived as a single mother with her children and that Mr Johnson was a non-
live with father figure to the children. Ms Cressy's neighbour also testified to #
Mr Johnson called one of Ms Cressy's boyfriends of 2000 – 2003, whose
relationship with Ms Cressy was confirmed by evidence of a Senior Detective
from the Purana Taskforce.
Mr Johnson produced the birth certificate for Ms Cressy's youngest child, which
lists him as the biological father, and records his residential address as at June
2000 which was some 15 kilometres and postcodes apart from Ms Cressy's
residential address from 1998 to 2001 (as recorded on the same birth certificate).
Justice Kaye needs to attend both Rob Hulls judicial reform school and Chief
Justice Warren's judicial reform school to learn the evidentiary value of important
statutory records like birth certificates.
Mr Johnson produced independent witnesses and substantial documentation

establishing his residential address from mid-2003 onwards was 668 Bourke
Street Melbourne – a totally separate 15 kilometres from Ms Cressy's household
for all of that period, being the whole of the period relevant and fatal to Ms
Cressy's claims.
Mr Johnson's earnings and bank statements and 100% funding of all of his
properties was fully established with all of his fee slips, many of his tax returns, all
of his borrowing documents and property contracts tenderered in evidence. This
evidence was corroborated by independent testimony of his mortgage broker.
7. “I am in truth a beautiful Ms Cressy's case depended solely on her credibility. This was totally dashed by
liar” her criminal conduct (as found by the judge) leading up to the trial, and his
findings of dishonesty and lying to police and from the witness box. It was also
totally dashed by being totally contradicted by all of the independent and reliable
evidence provided as part of Mr Johnson's case.
Ms Cressy's testimony was of no evidentiary value (except for the purposes of

proscution for the crimes she thereby commited). The Trial Judge found her to
be an unreliable liar. The psychiatrist report prepared by Dr Entwistle (used by
her barrister Graeme Devries and the Trial Judge for ulterior and unlawful
purposes on the first morning of the “trial”) included the serious diagnosis that Ms
Cressy was “well practised” at deceiving people. Ms Cressy's own journals as
tendered in evidence by Mr Johnson in February 2009 after finding them
abandonned by her in her former residence established that she is a self-
confessed compulsive liar. “I am in truth a beautiful liar.”
It is compelling on questions of crediblity of Ms Cressy and Mr Johnson (having

regard to Brigginshaw principles and the seriousness of any findings of
dishonest as to Mr Johnson's testimony, as a barrister and solicitor and officer of
the court of 19 years good standing) that the Trial Judge's findings be reversed
on appeal as a matter of law. Baumgartner v Baumgartner is the High Court
precedent that has relevance to these proceedings on this, and only on this
credibility issue. This is especially as Mr Johnson's testimony was, as he
deliberately explained at the outset of his evidence in chief, merely corroborative
of the independent evidence and independent witness testimonies produce by
him as part of his case to minimise the risk to himself of being landed with false
allegations of dishonest testimony.
6. The Two Day Trial This was the result of gross professional misconduct by Ms Cressy's lawyers.
(Fries With That Order) Obtaining a directions hearing that Mr Johnson was unaware of until months
later. Asserting to the Listing Master it would be a 2 day hearing. Failing to
inform the Listing Master of Mr Johnson's 3 – 4 week estimate. And failing to
inform the Listing Master that no pre-trial steps had yet been completed
(including formal discovery and finalising of pleadings).
5. No Right to Discovery The Trial Judge's insistence on allowing Ms Cressy's their unlawfully gotten 2
December 2008 trial date overlooked the gross unlawfulness of process that
resulted from skipping pre-trial stages including discovery. As the High Court
commented in Johnson v Johnson (2000 pretrial discovery is critical for the
parties and for the Court in these sorts of property claims (and that case involved
a bona fide and undisputed legally married couple – not a fraudulent de facto
claim by a desperate and mentall ill woman).
4. Mr Johnson has No Right to The Trial Judge's insistence on allowing Ms Cressy's their unlawfully gotten 2
Rewrite his claim before the December 2008 trial date resulted in another abuse of process in that Mr
Trial Johnson was held bound to litigate on his February 2008 statement of claims
against Ms Cressy and her original lawyers and deprived of a fair hearing which
required him relying on his November 2008 updated statement of claims against
them. It is a small step of consistent logic for the Court of Appeal to strike down
that procedural error by Justice Kaye, according to the principles of 'fair hearing”
described by the High Court in August this month in AON v ANU.
3. A New Set of Lies Conversely, and unlawfully as the High Court ruled in August this year in AON v
ANU, the Trial Judge allowed Ms Cressy's lawyers to totally change her claims
on the third day of a four week trial. But unlike ANU in that case, here it was after
the plaintiff had completed presentation of her case. And also unlike ANU in that
case, here the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to subtantiate her claims, in
circumstances where there were simply no excuses for her or her lawyers for not
bringing any evidence to trial.
2. Warping A Secret Like in the Rubin Hurricane Curtis case, Ms Cressy's barrister, Graeme Devries
Psychiatric Report – Look withheld important evidence that he was obliged to disclose to Mr Johnson not
Who's Calling Who Crazy only pre-trial but when he handed it up to Justice Kaye on the first morning of the
Trial. This was the Entwisle Psychiatric report – containing reports on Ms
Cressy's state of mental illness as diagnosed by Dr Entwistle. This report was
whithheld from Mr Johnson despite repeated requests of Devries and the Trial
Judge during the hearing. This report was withheld from him up until May 2009
when it was reluctantlly surrendered to him by the Legal Services
Commissioner's delegate in the context of a malicously false attack on the state
of Mr Johnson's mental health (which was summarily dismissed once the
independent psychiatrist reported that Mr Johnson suffered from no mental
illnesses),
Devries misused the Entwistle Psychiatric report to cast false aspersions as to Mr

Johnson's fitness and right to defend himself against Ms Cressy's claims. Devries
should have discharged his duty of candour to the Court and the administration of
justice by admitting to the Judge that it demonstrated Mr Johnson's claims that
Ms Cressy was mentally ill and criminally inclined were all true. Devries should
have discharged his duties to the Court by withdrawing Ms Cressy's claims as the
claims of a mad woman as they are (as the lack of substantiation demonstrates).
Devries should have informed his instructors that their client was mentally ill and
that their retainer agreements with her were therefore unenforceable as she
lacked the mental capacity to comprehend and be bound by them and lacked the
mental capacity to give instructions and to receive advice properly.
1. No Right to Defend Yourself The Trial Judge has created a frightening situation where a defendant's basic
human and common law right to defend himself in legal proceedings has been
downgraded from a “right” to a “privilege”. And at that, a “privilege” that can be
lost on an applicatio by a plaintiff's counsel to have the defendant declared
mentally handicapped at the outset and on the morning of the commencement of
a trial. This applicatoin.
This is a dangerous development in the common law of Victoria. How far does it
extend? Are only self-represented solicitor-litigants susceptible to having their
right to defend themselves reduced to a lost “privilege”? What about other
professional and unprofessional persons? Are all solicitor-litigants susceptible or,
as on the facts, only those of 18 or fewer years good standing in the profession?
Devries failed “against [Justice Kaye's] better judgement” to have Him declare me
as mentally unfit to self-represent myself Yes Justice Kaye actually worded it that
way – an interesting self-comment on his faculties of judgemen, considering in
next to no time Justice Kaye was grandiously (and I believe excessively and for
ulterior purposes) signing my praises as a highly intelligent man with natural
abilities as an advocate for someone who had barely ever stood in a Court before
(despite being a fully practising commercial and government lawyer of 18 years
good standing). How bi-polar. How narcisstic personality syndromed (or
disordered – it being a question of degree). One wonders what sort of personality
profiling is applied to candidates for judicial office in this State. Apart from this
wonder, just imagine what impact all of this confusion, frustration and
unlawfulness of conduct by Devries, in the space of the first few hours of the first
day (2 December 2008) had in prejudicing the Trial Judge against me. Not only
was I not expecting or prepared to go to trial (I wanted a proper trial date, after
discovery, after interrogatories, after applciation for empanneling a jury and after
pleadings had been finalised) and yet here I was having to cross-examine a
malicious expert witness David List and prove what I and everyone who has ever
known me has always taken for granted (that I''m a very intelligent, very educated,
very sane, very caring and compasionate man) in order to wind back my right to
defend myself against these fraudulent claims.
The prejudicial effect of this gross misconduct by Devries, this unlawful

application, this nasty injustice game, cannot be understated. It is plainly
readable, dripping from every paragraph of the transcripts (including Justice
Kaye's over the top interruptions and voice controls – like a dog trainer, with me
Chihuahua) and every paragraph of his published 'reasons'.
Every single one of these features (except in isolation the lighter weight, tenth ground) is sufficient grounds in its
own right for my appeal (fragment 3731 of 2009) to succeed on all points in the Court of Appeal. Let alone the
combined force of ten of them. Indeed, in AON v ANU senior counsel for AON (no other than Mr JJ Gleeson,
who appears in these proceedings for Dr List) asserted to the Full High Court that AON's case was a landmark
case. And AON rested solely on Ground 3. That is, according to longstanding High Court precedent (Johnson
v Johnson (Ground 5 and Ground 8); Brigginshaw v Brigginshaw (Grounds 8 and 9); Baumgarter v
Baumgartner (Ground 7) and recent High Court precedent AON v ANU (Ground 3 and probably Ground 5).
Grounds 1 and 2 are so fundamental (like all of Grounds 1 to 7) that they really require no specific reference to
precedent – they are indispensible and non-disposable features of every “fair hearing”, human rights recognised
not only by the Victorian Parliament's Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act but by the
common law also (see for example Chief Justice Warren's reasons handed down in Re Major Crimes
(Investigative Powers) Act confirming the common law too recognises the defendants right to a “fair trial”.
I have ruled the line arbitrarily at 10 Top Reasons. There were other unlawful features of the “trial” before
Justice Kaye.
I have set out another ten reasons below. These are in arbitrary order, save that Ms Sofraniou and her
instructors witnessed all of Grounds 11 to 15 inclusive. As Justice Kaye prematurely retired them from the field
prior to luncheon on 11 February 2009, Ms Sofraniou and her instructors did not witness Grounds 16 to 20.
But Mr Obst, solicitor representing Graeme Devries in this fragment of proceedings 9263 of 2008 continued fully
paid out of the Government purse (the Legal Pracitioners Liability EVASION Committee) to witness the
debauchery described in Grounds 16 to 20 inclusive. I believe that Mr Obst was present at all days of the “trial”
before Justice Kaye save for the first and possibly all or part of the second day. So Mr Obst would not have
witnessed at first hand Grounds 1 and 2 and not all of Ground 12, But I believe he was otherwise a fully-paid
witness to all of Grounds 3 to 20 inclusive.
Other than Ground 6, these 20 Grounds relate only to the unlawfullness of the “trial”. Other than Ground 14,
they do not include any of the many unlawful goings on in Courts (including the Practice Court and Masters
Court, Federal and State Magistrates Courts) prior to 2 December 2008 or since 25 February 2009. Nor do
they include any of the many unlawful goings on outside of Court
11. Ulterior Purpose It seems abundantly clear that, in circumstances of a fair hearing according to
due process and an “equality of arms” and patient and considerate judge and
proper assessment of evidence and application of laws, Ms Cressy's lawyers
could never if they had turned their minds to it, have assessed Ms Cressy's
claims as having merit or having a ghost of a chance of succeeding at trial.
However substantial public embarrassment and financial harm could be

occasioned to Mr Johnson the longer the caveats (and the proceedings
supporting them from lapsing) remained on foot.
It is difficult to think of a more “ulterior purpose” for issuing legal proceedings,

even without regard to the separate 'abuse of process steps' (such as Harwood
Andrews unlawful interference in the police investigation of Ms Cressy's
aggravated burglary on Mr Johnson etc etc).
Devries (and Ms Sofraniou's subsequent) de quoique (or tit for tat) allegations
that I sued Harwood Andrews etc for ulterior purposes are risable. Quite clearly I
sued them for acting unlawfully (as a matter of civil and criminal laws) and
causing me harm by addiing their legal muscle (feeble as it is) and their
underhanded tactics to fuel up this latest escalation in years of blackmailing and
threats that I have endured from Ms Cressy so as to keep my reputation, my
children their mother (Mrs Johnson) and even Ms Cressy's children 'safe' from
her madness and violence.
12. Torture and Other Human Mr Johnson was in incredible physical pain for the whole of the first week of the
Rights Abuses trial. Forced to from 5 am Monday morning through until 3 am the Thursday
morning with heavy pain, heavy medication (that he is not used to taking) and
without sleep. Added to this was the emotional torture of the financial calamity
caused by Ms Cressy and her lawyers (directing her) and their caveats and
interference in his damage control attempts to sell his properties. Added to this
was the emotional strain on his loved Mr Johnson's loved ones, including Mrs
Johnson, the three Johnson children and including Ms Cressy's three children.
13. Misdescribing The Evidence Graeme Devries suggested to the Trial Judge at the beginning of his 2 plus days
of 'closing submissions' that this case turned entirely on the Judges assessment
of the credibility of Ms Cressy (see above) and Mr Johnson (see above). That
was farcical. Presumably he wrote this before coming to trial and discovering to
his horror that Mr Johnson's case contained substantial evidence and Mr
Johnson's testimony was merely (to keep him safe) corroborative and
summarising that substantial body of evidence.
Graeme Devries undertook classic 'comparing apples with lemons' analysis of my

financial records coming up with such classics as suggesting that in 2005 and
2006 I was spending well beyond my earnings. My 4 years of feeslips (including
some from the second half of 2006 attached to schedule 3, demonstrated at all
relevant times my earnings were 150% - 200% of my expenditures. And upping
on this falacy by suggesting that Ms Cressy was a source of funds for my
application to my property portofolio. [Slighting over the equally obvious question
I put in my closing submissions 'where's the evidence [that she ever earned a
single dollar during the relevant period?' and 'What kind of a lawyer makes such
claims in written court documents without first gathering and assessing evidence
to substantiate it?
Ms Cressy's journals found by me during the break in the trial and disclosing
details of many other men she has scammed and sought to scam in her honey
traps; Devries suggests to the Judge 'these are just stories made up by someone
who likes to tell stories.” Yes. Likes to tell stories indeed. Don't they.
14. Judicial and Parliamentary Devries obtained unlawful orders in the Federal Magistrates Court prohibiting me
Contempt from using materials and evidence from the custody proceedings I initiated in that
Court in these Supreme Court proceedings. Those orders were unlawful
because they breached the express statutory rights given to litigants (let alone
the desirable public policy of keeping all relevant courts fully informed) under
section 121 of the Family Law Act.
It was a contempt of federal and State parliament for the Federal Magistrate to
make these orders and a contempt of his court and the Supreme Court as well. It
was double-double contempts for Graeme Devries, no spring chicken as a
barrister, to seek these contemptuous orders in the first place.
The unlawfulness was escalated by these orders being onesided (contra the
concept of 'equality under the law'. Devries could use the custody application
evidence and materials (and even misdescribe and misuse them) in the Supreme
Court as the orders gripped only me. Leaving me at risk of prosecution and jail
(in the federal magistrates court). Justice Kaye regarded me hostilely as the
source rather than the target of this nonesense. And this leveraged up the bias
and prejudice right from the first morning that destined this to be anything but a
fair hearing on any of the issues before him.
15. Judicial Outbursts These were two of the more extraordinary of many emotional and bizarre
outbursts by the Trial Judge. What is a Court if not a place to hear and resolve
Ten Plaintiff's in waiting (hopefully lawfully by some lawful process) peoples problems. It is a Court of
have died during this Law not a tennis court for games to be played and all sorts of rackets to be
hearing carried on. Or am I still too naïve?
The Trial Judge's outburst that 10 plaintiff's in waiting had died while he was
hearing this case. Did I bring this case? Am I less worthy of justice than those
I'm not interested in peoples
10 plaintiffs? Were any of them as fraudulent and vexatious and criminal as Ms
problems, I'm here for a trial
Cressy? Were any of their lawyers as fraudulent and vexatious and (criminally?)
– pleadings and evidence
unprofessional as Ms Cressy's lawyers or, it would seem, as her lawyers'
and submissions.
lawyers?
And what about the number of defendants in waiting who died while waiting to
defend themselves against those actions? Aren't defendant in waiting mortality
rates of equal concern to the judiciary as plaintiff mortality rates?
And why am I personally responsible and deserving of punishment and/or

exclusion of basic rights to justice (fair hearing, equality under the law, due
process etc etc) because the State's lawyers seem to drum up more litigations
than there are State provided Court rooms to house them?
16. Devries Gives False Devries spent more than 2 days in closing submissions. That's more than twice
Evidence From the Bar as many hours as he spent in presenting Ms Cressy's bogus claims. He was
Table even coaxed back for a third day by the Trial Judge, who insisted what Devries
had to say was all very important. [In contrast to the Trial Judge's heckling and
abusing Mr Johnson and telling him to finish up and shut up almost half hourly].
It turns out (Mr Johnson having left the building so as to leave Devries full rein to
incriminate himself further) Devries spent a large portion of his speaking from the
bar leading false evidence from the bar table.
Thus – (1) Devries led false evidence that Mr Johnson was (in addition to being a
workaholic corporate lawyer and devoted non-live with dad to two families of
three children, and a budding property tycoon) working a secret life as a male
prostitute. Firstly, this never happened. Secondly, there was absolutely nothing
in evidence or even any such allegation during the course of the trial proper.
(2) Devries asserted that Mr Johnson had failed to demonstrate that all of the
money that Ms Cressy earned as a prostitute during some undefined period
[query, 2002 to 2006] was not 'flushed down the toilet'. But again, there was no
evidence from Ms Cressy as to even a dollar of earnings at any time during this
period from any source. Mr Johnson produced her handwritten, abandonned
diaries showing she worked as a prostitute pre-2001 and again post-mid 2007
(being outside of the period relevant to her claim). And it is not for a defendant to
disprove a plaintiff's case (though Mr Johnson did this beyond any measure of
rational doubt) but for the plaintiff to present a case. There was nothing in
evidence from Ms Cressy's presented case. Mr Johnson had no obligation in fact
or in law to prove that anything was flushed down the toilet. Though there is an
appropriate analogy to Devries performance and career in his stupid statement.
(3) Mr Devries invented evidence of Mr Johnson and Ms Cressy arguing, like

dutiful husbands and wives do, about Ms Cressy working at night serving the
prostitution needs of the male populace of Melbourne. And yet there was no
evidence of anything like this nonesense produced at trial. Indeed, Ms Cressy's
statements that she was working as a prostitute (unreliable as they were except
to the extent documented for the period post-mid-2007), including her admissions
to Dr Entwistle (query also to Dr List) as recorded in his (their) reports were that
Ms Cressy worked only during school hours so, she claimed, not to be neglecting
the needs of her children. Indeed Mr Devries made a point of scheduling
Practice Court hearings with the Practice Court Judge's blessings not to fall on
Tuesdays, Wednesdays or Thursdays during 2008 as those were Ms Cressy's
brothel days [nb not nights].
It has never been the role of a plaintiff's counsel to manufacture false evidence
from the bar table during what are supposed to be closing submissions
summarising the evidence given during the presentation of the plaintiff's case.
That Devries did this, and that the Trial Judge allowed this and rested his
'reasons' in equal measure on Devries bar table false evidence and Ms Cressy's
witness box false evidence – contrary to the independent evidence which he
should have looked at primarily (and could have looked at exclusively) to form his
judgement (compare Johnson v Johnson) is a damning set of grounds on which
Justice Kaye's February 2009 findings will not be sustained by any appellate
court.
17. Bias and Tacit Collusion Examples of bias and tacit collusion are separately enumerated above. These
include the unlawful insanity inquisition (Ground 1) the continued non-disclosure
of the Dr Entwistle Report (Ground 2), the 2 Day Trial (Ground 6), the new set of
lies (
18. Champetery and Two family law firms (Harwood Andrews Lawyers and then Berry Family Law)
Maintenance have each rack up over $100,000 in legal fees on credit to a client of Ms Cressy's
obvious lack of crediblity and ill mental health and criminal inclinations. In total
they have racked up over $400,000 in legal costs. Champetery and maintenance
remains a crime in most States of Australia (Victoria and New South Wales
unfortunately being the two recent exceptions). Champetery and maintenance
remains a crime for all of the very good policy reasons demonstrated by their
misconduct in this case.
19. Grand Theft Larceny As the materials attached to schedule 4 show, all the while Berry Family Law and
Devries argue that Ms Cressy is entitled to the 'fruits' of Justice Kaye's
judgements, they plan to steal those fruits from their mentally ill client.
And underscoring their bungling incompetence, Berry Family Law post these
confessions of their crookedness (see schedule 4) not to their mentally ill client
but to me so that I can report them to the Court and relevant regulatory bodies.
20. Blind leading the Blind That should be, the mad leading the mad. Ms Cressy lacks the mental capacity
to give instructions and to receive legal advice. The Federal Attorney-General
has recently publicly criticised “lawyers [who will] let you down” for
overcharging and sharp fee practices. Even if Harwood Andrews and Berry
Family Law were capable of complying with professional rules for disclosure of
fee arrangments with uplift, Ms Cressy lacks the mental capacity to receive those
disclosures or, indeed, to enter into a legally binding retainer agreement with
them.
Schedule 3 – Selection of Evidence produced before Justice Kaye (within fragment 9665 of 2007), produced
already before the Court of Appeal (within fragment 3731 of 2009) and produced already in these Masters Court
proceedings (within fragment 9263 of 2008) demonstrating beyond any measure of doubt the lack of “fair
hearing” before Justice Kaye, the fraudulent nature of Ms Cressy's claims and the gross misconduct of her
lawyers for promoting her claims.
Justice Kaye's key finding was the false finding (a) that Ms Cressy and I lived together as a de facto couple from
1998 to 2007, together with the equally absurd findings (b) that Ms Cressy was a “devoted wife” and
homemaker and caring mother to my children; and (c) that Ms Cressy earned substantial amounts of money as
a prostitute which she gave to me to buy properties (in my name only), being properties that I could not have
afforded to buy out of my own earnings and borrowings.
Each of these findings were demonstrably illusional and scandalous. The attached sample of the independent
evidence produced at trial proves this beyond any measure of doubt:
Schedule 4 – Selection of Fresh Evidence to be tendered in the Court of Appeal (by forthcoming application –
in fragment 3731 of 2009) and at trial in this fragment (9263 of 2008) to demonstrate further the fraudulent
nature of Ms Cressy's claims and the gross misconduct of her lawyers;
Recall (from schedule 3) that stice Kaye's key finding was the false finding (a) that Ms Cressy and I lived
together as a de facto couple from 1998 to 2007, together with the equally absurd findings (b) that Ms Cressy
was a “devoted wife” and homemaker and caring mother to my children; and (c) that Ms Cressy earned
substantial amounts of money as a prostitute which she gave to me to buy properties (in my name only), being
properties that I could not have afforded to buy out of my own earnings and borrowings.
Each of these findings were demonstrably illusional. The sample from the independent evidence produced at
trial and reproduced as attached to Schedule 2 proves this beyond any measure of doubt. And the following
sample of “fresh” evidence to be produced at trial in fragment of proceedings 9263 of 2008 and (application
pending) in Court of Appeal fragment 3731 of 2009 further proves this:
Schedule 5 – Various Extraneous materials (including recent newspaper reports and my letters to the editors of
the Sunday Age, the Age and the Herald Sun) for the purposes of informing the Court and the parties of the
widespread nature of the problems that have allowed Ms Cressy's fraudulent claims and the gross misconduct
of her lawyers to go “way to far” [to quote Dr Ingleby's Court step confession of as early as 18 March 2008];
 Various newspaper articles from the Herald Sun, The Age and the Weekend Australian, of 9/10/09 and
10/10/09.
 Copy my letter to the editor, The Sunday Age, dated 5 October 2009.
 Copy my letter to the editor, The Age, dated 10 October 2009.
 Copy my letter to the editor, Herald Sun, dated 10 October 2009.
Schedule 6 – Extraneous Materials on the shame of a land 'where justice is a game'
 Full lyrics to the Bob Dylan song Hurricane;

 Text of a 1988 New York Times feature story on the release from prison of Reuben (The Hurricane)
Curtis.
 Complete and unabridged 'foreword' and 'afterword' sections from Geoffrey Robertson's autobiography
'The Justice Game'. ( © Vantage, 1998)
Hurricane (complete and unabridged lyrics
Pistol shots ring out in the barroom night

Enter Patty Valentine from the upper hall.
She sees the bartender in a pool of blood,
Cries out, "My God, they killed them all!"
Here comes the story of the Hurricane,

Put in a prison cell, but one time he could-a been
The champion of the world.
Three bodies lyin' there does Patty see

And another man named Bello, movin' around
mysteriously.
"I didn't do it," he says, and he throws up his hands
"I was only robbin' the register, I hope you
understand.
I saw them leavin'," he says, and he stops
"One of us had better call up the cops."
And so Patty calls the cops
And they arrive on the scene with their red lights
flashin'
In the hot New Jersey night.
Meanwhile, far away in another part of town

Rubin Carter and a couple of friends are drivin'
around.
Number one contender for the middleweight crown
Had no idea what kinda shit was about to go down
When a cop pulled him over to the side of the road
Just like the time before and the time before that.
In Paterson that's just the way things go.
If you're black you might as well not show up on the
street
'Less you wanna draw the heat.
Alfred Bello had a partner and he had a rap for the

cops.
Him and Arthur Dexter Bradley were just out
prowlin' around
He said, "I saw two men runnin' out, they looked
like middleweights
They jumped into a white car with out-of-state
plates."
And Miss Patty Valentine just nodded her head.
Cop said, "Wait a minute, boys, this one's not dead"
So they took him to the infirmary
And though this man could hardly see
They told him that he could identify the guilty men.
Four in the mornin' and they haul Rubin in,

Take him to the hospital and they bring him upstairs.
The wounded man looks up through his one dyin'
eye
Says, "Wha'd you bring him in here for? He ain't the
guy!"
Yes, here's the story of the Hurricane,
Four months later, the ghettos are in flame,

Rubin's in South America, fightin' for his name
While Arthur Dexter Bradley's still in the robbery
game
And the cops are puttin' the screws to him, lookin'
for somebody to blame.
"Remember that murder that happened in a bar?"
"Remember you said you saw the getaway car?"
"You think you'd like to play ball with the law?"
"Think it might-a been that fighter that you saw
runnin' that night?"
"Don't forget that you are white."
Arthur Dexter Bradley said, "I'm really not sure."

Cops said, "A poor boy like you could use a break
We got you for the motel job and we're talkin' to
your friend Bello
Now you don't wanta have to go back to jail, be a
nice fellow.
You'll be doin' society a favor.
That sonofabitch is brave and gettin' braver.
We want to put his ass in stir
We want to pin this triple murder on him
He ain't no Gentleman Jim."
Rubin could take a man out with just one punch

But he never did like to talk about it all that much.
It's my work, he'd say, and I do it for pay
And when it's over I'd just as soon go on my way
Up to some paradise
Where the trout streams flow and the air is nice
And ride a horse along a trail.
But then they took him to the jailhouse

Where they try to turn a man into a mouse.
All of Rubin's cards were marked in advance
The trial was a pig-circus, he never had a chance.

The judge made Rubin's witnesses drunkards from
the slums
To the white folks who watched he was a
revolutionary bum
And to the black folks he was just a crazy nigger.
No one doubted that he pulled the trigger.
And though they could not produce the gun,
The D.A. said he was the one who did the deed
And the all-white jury agreed.
Rubin Carter was falsely tried.

The crime was murder "one," guess who testified?
Bello and Bradley and they both baldly lied
And the newspapers, they all went along for the ride.
How can the life of such a man

Be in the palm of some fool's hand?
To see him obviously framed
Couldn't help but make me feel ashamed to live in a
land
Where justice is a game.
Now all the criminals in their coats and their ties

Are free to drink martinis and watch the sun rise
While Rubin sits like Buddha in a ten-foot cell
An innocent man in a living hell.
That's the story of the Hurricane,
But it won't be over till they clear his name
And give him back the time he's done.
Copyright ©1975 Ram's Horn Music
Judge Drops Murder Charges In the Hurricane Carter Case (New York Times Saturday, February
27 1988 on section 1 page 35 of New York edition)
A Superior Court judge today formally dismissed 22-year-old triple murder charges against Rubin
(Hurricane) Carter a week after prosecutors said they would not seek a third trial of the former boxer.
“I'm joyous with the result and deeply satisfied that justice finally has been done and the charges are
dismissed,” said Mr Carter's attorney, Myron Beldock, after the judge, Ralph V. Martin, signed the order
dismissing the indictment against Mr Carter and John Artis.
Mr Carter had served 19 years in prison before a Federal judgge in 1985 voided his second conviction
and ordered his release on grounds that the conviction was tainted by racial bias and the withholding of
information from the defence.
Schedule 7 – Copies of Legal Services Commisisoner's letters (3) informing me of my “obligation” to raise
misconduct concerns regarding Ms Sofraniou and her instructors as part of these applications before Associate
Justice Daly
 Ms Sofraniou
 Ms Mendis (whom I was verbally advised on 7 October 2009 is registered with the Legal Services Board
as an Australian legal professional)
 Ms Newcomb

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H J AMES J OHNSON

HUMAN RIGHTS § CIVIL RIGHTS § CORRUPTION § MEDIA

Saturday 10 October 2009 *** IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION

TO: Ms Miranda Milne (CEO Legal Practitioners TO: Ms Jennifer Sheehan

Dear Brothel-gate participants

AUSSIES IN WONDERLAND: WITCH HUNT, WATERGATE, WATERLOO – VICTORIAN SUPREME COURT

3. As I reported in my facsimile of 8 October 2009:

4. The purposes of this facsimile are:

 Schedule 1 – Summary of Key Submissions by the Plaintiff

 Schedule 2 – 10 Top Reasons amplifying my preliminary comments in and attached to my two

The Ballad of Harold James Johnson (from 'Hurricane')

Here comes the story of the [Harold James],

All of [James's] cards were marked in advance

How can the life of such a man

Now all the criminals in their coats [wigs and] ties

That's the story of the [Harold James],

The No Case to Answer Applications

No jurisdiction to hear 'no case to answer applications'

Ms Sofraniou's Anshun estoppel application similarly doomed to failure

Complaints of Professional Misconduct

Legal Services Comissioners' Costs Application

Other Orders as to Payment of the Plaintiff's Costs (Second to Seventh Defendants)

 Second and Third Defendants – $34,100

Other Orders as to Payment of the Plaintiff's Costs (Eighth Defendant)

Other Matters (Declaration of effective service on First Defendant)

According to Ms Sofraniou's submissions before Associate Justice Daly on 9 July 2009:

Otherwise, Ms Cressy's evidence consisted of her contradictory, unconvincing

Ms Cressy's statement of claim asserted she gave Mr Johnson deposit monies

Ms Cressy's statement of claim asserted a number of sources of income for the

Mr Johnson produced independent witnesses and substantial documentation

Ms Cressy's testimony was of no evidentiary value (except for the purposes of

It is compelling on questions of crediblity of Ms Cressy and Mr Johnson (having

Devries misused the Entwistle Psychiatric report to cast false aspersions as to Mr

The prejudicial effect of this gross misconduct by Devries, this unlawful

However substantial public embarrassment and financial harm could be

It is difficult to think of a more “ulterior purpose” for issuing legal proceedings,

Graeme Devries undertook classic 'comparing apples with lemons' analysis of my

And why am I personally responsible and deserving of punishment and/or

(3) Mr Devries invented evidence of Mr Johnson and Ms Cressy arguing, like

 Full lyrics to the Bob Dylan song Hurricane;

Hurricane (complete and unabridged lyrics

Pistol shots ring out in the barroom night

Here comes the story of the Hurricane,

Three bodies lyin' there does Patty see

Meanwhile, far away in another part of town

Alfred Bello had a partner and he had a rap for the

Four in the mornin' and they haul Rubin in,

Four months later, the ghettos are in flame,

Arthur Dexter Bradley said, "I'm really not sure."

Rubin could take a man out with just one punch

But then they took him to the jailhouse

The trial was a pig-circus, he never had a chance.

Rubin Carter was falsely tried.

How can the life of such a man

Now all the criminals in their coats and their ties

That's the story of the Hurricane,

Copyright ©1975 Ram's Horn Music

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