SUBMISSIONS FOR VICTORIAN SUPREME COURT (COURT OF APPEAL)

HEARING 14 AUGUST 2009: PROCEEDINGS 3731 OF 2009

VICTORIAN SUPREME COURT (MASTERS COURT)
HEARING(S) BEFORE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DALY: PROCEEDINGS 9263 of 2008

Grounds for Dismissal of Application to Strike Out Appeal

1. The Legal Practitioners Liability Committee (LPLC) is seeking, on behalf of its insureds, David
William Hanlon and Harwood Andrews Pty Ltd to strike out my appeal against the Trial Judge,
Justice Kaye's refusal to hear my counterclaims against them in the context of Supreme Court
Proceedings 9665 of 2007 (reported as Cressy v Johnson Parts 1, 2 and 3 on 11, 11 and 25
February 2009).
2. The LPLC Application is vexatious and an abuse of the process of this Court. It is yet another
example of this statutory Government agency (ironically the founding client of my own private
law practice) seeking to prevent its insureds from standing trial for their civil (and criminal)
wrongs against me. This is Government oppression at its very worst.
3. The Application should be dismissed and the Court should order the LPLC and/or its insureds to
pay my costs, on a full indemnity basis in accordance with normal 'solicitor-litigant' principles.
4. I also request some consequential orders from the Court to expedite the hearing of this appeal
on grounds of urgency (see below).
5. These written submissions today are additional the written submissions that I have previously
made:
a. dated 15 June 2009 (circulated on that day by facsmile and recirculated on 3 August
2009)
b. dated 9 July 2009
c. dated 2 August 2009 (and circulated by facsimile on that day)
d. dated 9 August 2009 (and ciruclated by facsimile ton that day)
6. I also refer of course to my revised notice of appeal dated 15 June 2009 (circulated by facsmile
on that day and recirculated on 3 August 2009).

Flawed Basis of Application

7. LPLC's Counsel, Ms Sofraniou asserts that my original notice of appeal was defective. It is
common ground that my original filed notice of appeal was incomplete. As I indicated in the
letter of service (filed as an exhibit to affidavit in these proceedings) this was due to a number of
factors:

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 a. As at 11 February 2009 the Trial Judge had not yet authenticated all of his orders.
Indeed, many of his orders were glaringly ommitted from his certificates of authentication
when they did issue.
b. I was caught short (finding out only on the '13th day) that notices of appeal have to filed
within 14 days.
c. I have no litigation skills or experience whatsoever – indeed I've never seen a Notice of
Appeal before having to prepare one myself.
d. I envisage that the notice of appeal would be redrawn and settled by independent legal
representation (a process that is still ongoing).
8. I have now redrafted the notice of appeal. It is a lengthy document, by litigation lawyer
standards. Of that I have no doubt.
a. Partly this is due to my inexperience – perhaps I have included too much 'submission'
material – but that it hardly detrimental to the LPLC's insureds;
b. mostly, this is due to the staggering number of errors and misdirections committed by the
Trial Judge, including errors of process, errors of fact and errors of law.
9. The LPLC and its insureds have not suffered any disadvantage from the time it has taken me to
revise my notice of appeal. In all the circumstances, including as I am still awaiting appointment
of independent legal representation, the time I have taken to do this is not unreasonable.

10. The LPLC's Counsel, Ms Sofraniou's second argument is that I ought not be allowed to continue
my appeal because, Ms Sofraniou argues, the 14 day period for filing a notice of appeal should
be measured from 11 February 2009 (the date that the Trial Judge handed down Part 2 of his
'judgement') and not:
a. Firstly, Ms Sofraniou has also acknowledged that this is not an objection that would
ordinarlily be raised in isolation (so, presumably, it falls together with the criticism of the
incompleteness of my notice of appeal);
b. Secondly, the Trial Judge misdirected himself – it is logically foolish and a clear case of
'pre-judge-ice' and denial of natural justice tha the Trial Judge could rule on the
dependant action (my counterclaims against the LPLC's two insureds) 2 weeks before
handing down his ruling on the primary cause of action. As I have previously noted, the
Trial Judge's mistakes and injustices in publishing his 'Part 2' of his judgement, which he
could not retract by the time that he had to publish his ruling on the primary cause of
judgement, no doubt contributed to the injustices and mistakes contained in his 'Part 3' of
his judgement. Therefore the 14 days for filing of the notice of appeal should be
measured from 25 February 2009 not 11 February 2009, as the appeals against all his

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 decisions are intimately connected. Accordingly, the notice of appeal was filed in time as
against all 3 respondents.
c. Thirdly, the Court may grant leave for an appeal to be filed even after the 14 day period
has lapsed. Especially here, where it is patent that gross miscarriages of justice have
occurred, and there has been no tardiness by the Appellant in pursuing his appeal rights,
the Court should even if it were purely a matter of exercise of discretion, allow the appeal
to proceed against the all of the respondents.

Orders for Costs

11. I seek an order for costs in accordance with standard 'solicitor-litigant' principles. While I profess
to have no knowledge or skill in litigation matters, I believe the relevant principles are that a
successful solicitor-litigant is entitlled to recover costs on a failed application as a matter of
public policy, because his costs can be accurately measured by the court, but subject to the
proviso that he cannot double up by recovering costs of attendances (on himself) or giving
instructions (to himself). I hand up copies of relevant paragraphs from Professor Gerald Dal
Pont's treatise Law of Costs [paragraphs 7.38 to 7.40] where the learned Professor discusses
the relevant case law and principles.
12. I seek an order for costs fixed on a full indemnity basis in the sum of $6,600.00 – being my costs
only of the appearances in this matter today ($2,200 half day at 4 hours at $550 per hour), and
the previous appearance in June (half day at $2,200) and for (only) 4 hours of preparation (at
$550 per hour) for today's hearing. While I have prepared substantial written submissions, I am
not seeking full recovery of my time, which runs into close to 40 hours) as much of this time
would have to be spent by me in any case in preparation for the hearing of the appeal.
Accordingly, I see these as costs that are properly reserved pending the (successful) outcome of
my appeal.

Consequential Orders
13. I seek consquential orders that the hearing of the appeal be set down for early hearing as a
matter of urgency, based on an estimate of a 3 – 4 hour hearing.
14. The urgency lay in the fact that:
a. other actions are proceeding [No. 9263 of 2008] (subject to other appeal to the Court of
Appeal No. 3766 of 2009) depend on the outcome of this present appeal, and yet the
Trial Division has refused to grant a stay of those other proceedings pending the outcome
of this appeal. Frankly, it is hard to understand how it is that the Court of Appeal and the

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 Masters Court can be hearing overlapping applications on the same issues, in respect of
the same dispute and proceedings at the same time.
b. The Trial Judge in proceedings No. 9665 of 2007 made a number of oppressive and
exessively erroneous orders with respect to the forced sale of my properties and
application of proceedings of sale (including as late as 25 June 2009). The Court of
Appeal on 15 May 2009 refused to stay the execution of those orders – despite the fact
that I proved in only 40 minutes of submissions the extent of the errors made by the Trial
Judge and the necessity for these to be reversed on appeal. On the successful granting
of my appeal, the harm and damage caused to me will be reduced if those orders have
not yet been executed.

15. I also request that the Court Order or otherwise require undertakings from the LPLC's insureds
to procure the transcript of all hearings in the Court of Appeal in these proceedings and make
those transcripts available to me free of charge. I am at a considerable disadvantage wearing
hats of client, witness, counsel and instructor (not to mention living with the economic hardship
and physical danger that these vexatious and fraudulent proceedings have occasioned me). In
this regard I note that both the LPLC Counsel, Ms Sofraniou, and the LSC's Counsel, Mr Other
gave undertakings to Associate Justice Daly on 9 July 2009 that they would obtain and provide
to me free of charge the transcripts of proceedings before her Honour that morrning and that
afternoon, respectively. On the basis of those undertakings, Her Honour did not make specific
orders with regard to provision of the transcript, as Her Honour had done on the previous
occasion. While the LSC's Counsel complied with that undertaking within a week. Ms Sofraniou
on the otherhand has still not complied with her undertaking. Even after I reminded her after
waiting patiently for 2 weeks for her to comply, she has still not complied. Ms Sofraniou's
failure to comply with that undertaking has impeded my preparation for today's hearing and
continues to impede my ability to respond to her submissions in the Masters Court.

Further Submissions for urgent listing of appeal (3-4 hour hearing)

16. I believe that this appeal can be heard very quickly, in a matter of 3 or 4 hours. I have learned
that High Court appeals restrict the parties to 20 minutes of oral submissions. I would see no
problems with the Court of Appeal hearing this appeal according to this High Court practice.
17. In my submissions of #
18. #

Orders Sought on Appeal

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 19. As regards the actions between Ms Cressy and myself in proceedings No. 9665 of 2007, I am
seeking orders that all of Justice Kaye's orders in proceedings No. 9665 of 2007 be quashed (if
that is the right word) and for my counterclaims to be upheld, with consquential reversal of costs
orders on a full-indemnity basis. I am seeking orders under rule 63.23 that my costs be paid by
Ms Cressy's lawyers – not just Berry Family Law .and Graeme Devries but also by David William
Hanlon and Harwood Andrews Lawyers.
20. As regards the actions between myself and Hanlon and Harwood Andrews, I am content if:
a. all costs orders against me are quashed;
b. Ms Cressy's lawyers are ordered to pay my costs (on solicitor-litigant principles) both for
the period April 2008 to April 2009 when I was represented by my own law firm, Sutton
Lawyers Pty Ltd but also for the period since April 2009 that Sutton Lawyers Pty Ltd has
ceased to represent me;
c. that my claims against Hanlon and Harwood Andrews be remitted to the Trial Division for
adjudication [in accordance with my Amended (Defence and) Counterclaim file as
number 9263 of 2008 and as may be amended from time to time in those proceedings –
eg onc.e I appoint independent legal representation, once discovery and interrogatories
and other pre-trial steps are completed] and by way of trial before Judge and Jury [since
clearly a Trial Judge cannot be expected to be finder of fact and finder of law in a trial of
this kind.]
21. On 2 December 2008 the Trial Judge should have reprimanded Ms Cressy's lawyers for having
the proceedings set down for trial on a bogus 2 day estimate. The Trial Judge should have
stood the matter down (as per my submissions that day, which he failed to fairly or properly
consider) for further directions for pre-trial processes like discovery ['essential' to 'a dispute of
this kind' according to unanimous High Court law made in Johnson v Johnson [2000] 211 CLR
448, pleadings could be finalised, I could obtain independent legal representation s It is perhaps
fortunate that many of the denials of justice occasioned by the Trial Judge can be rectified via a
proper hearing of the issues pursuant to proceedings 9263 of 2008.
22. It was wrong for the Trial Judge to insist that the trial go ahead, and on the basis that I was
forced to proceed according to my February 2008 first draft Counterclaim, and was shut out from
proceeding on the basis of my recently amended Counterclaim of November 2008. This is
underscored by the Trial Judge allowing Ms Cressy's lawyers to substitute a completely different
Amended Statement of Claim at the conclusion of her part of the case [Her Counsel Graeme
Devries did not close the plaintiff''s case at the end of the Third Day, he kept it open until the start
of the 4th Day purely to file the radically Amended Statement of Claim. Overnight, and after
completing her evidence (and still without any evidence to support either her original or new

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 pleadings), Ms Cressy changed her story from that of being a dutiful wife and mother (a regular
Mrs Brady) to a story that she was a high income earning prostitute and financially supporting
me from the proceeds of her vice. I believe that living of the earnings of a prostitute is a crime,
the crime of 'maintenance' in this State. And yet the Trial Judge found me guilty of this crime
(according to civil court standards) despite Ms Cressy not bringing forward any proof that she
was (a) prostituting herself during the relevant period 2002 – early 2007; (b) that she was
earning anything, from prostitution or otherwise, during that relevant period; (c) that she ever so
much as brought, or even made me a cup of coffee out of her financial resources. This is
frightening stuff. And how much independent evidence did I bring to court, eye witnesses,
contracts, bank statements, fee slips, tax returns, to demonstate that (i) I was more than fully
financially self-sufficient (ii) at all relevant times Ms Cressy and I did not even share the same
postcode, let alone the same home etc etc... How did the Trial Judge misdirect himself so badly
that he ignored the indepenent evidence (contrary to High Court laws made in Johnson v
Johnson [2000], he ignored other High Court laws made in Brigginshaw v Brigginshaw (time
and again, I am accused of perjury, burglary, living off the earnings of a prostitute etc), and
Jones v Dunkel – serious allegations being made against me without a skerrick of evidence
other than Ms Cressy's oral testimony to support them. The Trial Judge even, after finding that
Ms Cressy committed perjury, even aggravated burglary to steal and conceal/destroy key
evidence, the Trial Judge misdirected himself as to
23. In the course of his Part 3 of his published judgement the Trial Judge makes wild and
scandalous allegations that he regards me as unable to tell the truth? This is most disconcerting
as, before putting myself into the witness box to question myself in chief, I made it very clear to
His Honour by way of submission that I was apprehensive of any findings that I was other than
100% truthful (what lawyer of 18 ½ years good standing and high profile in the profession would
not be apprehensive, especially given Ms Cressy's lawyers woeful history of professional
misconduct). I made it very clear to His Honour that I would be confining my testimony only to
giving corroborative evidence, that is testimony that corroborates the independent evidence
provided to Him as part of my cases. In my closing submissions on 13 February 2009 I asked
His Honour to shut his eyes to all of my testimony, and to shut his eyes to all of Ms Cressy's
testimony and to just look at the independent evidence as it would be decisive of the issues in
the proceedings. I did not know at the time, but I was directing His Honour to do exactly what he
was required to do as a matter of law (laws made by a unanimous High Court in Johnson v
Johnson [2000]. How did the Trial Judge misdirect himself that, because of his animosity to me
(prejudice and bias that fairly dripps from all 3 parts of his published judgements), he was
entitled to shut his eyes to all of the independent evidence, and could base all of his material

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 findings ('live together', 'earnings, 'value of home duties', 'financially supporting me from earnings
as a prostitute' etc) on uncorroborated, self-contradictory testimony of Ms Cressy (whom self-
confessed in her diaries to being a “in truth beautiful [compulsive] liar”. Surely after his findings
as to her lies and deceipts (including commission of aggravated burglary to steal and
conceal/destroy evidence), Ms Cressy's testimony was of zero credibility without the highest of
independent corroboration?
24. In my submissions of 9 August 2009 I provide comments on the judgement published by the Trial
Judge as Cressy v Johnson (No.2).
25. At paragraph 4, the Trial Judge notes that my allegations against Harwood Andrews and Hanlon
are 'very serious' and if true [sic] include allegations of fraud, malice and criminality.
a. At some point in early 2006, Ms Cressy approached Harwood Andrews Lawyers who at
that time had a longstanding and profitable (for them) commercial relationship with me.
b. Allegedly I have fathered a love child (now 9 years old) to Ms Cressy, a woman who
clearly has sever emotional and mental health and social problems. This statement can't
be disputed by the evidence.
c. Harwood Andrews filed caveats against portfolio of 6 properties, ultimately depriving me
of control of my properties and resulting in my financial ruin. Harwood Andrews may
initially have thought that Ms Cressy's claims were genuine. But how they could have
thought this I don't know. But never at any time, not when they issued these caveats,
not when they issued procceedings in this Court to stop those caveats lapsing, never at
any time [as demonstrated at the trial] did Harwood Andrews have any evidence - other
than Ms Cressy's increasingly bizarre stories- to excuse their heaving handed conduct in
grabbing my properties. Ms Cressy's lawyers did not produce a proper body of evidence
at trial in December 2008. Clearly they did not have a proper body of evidence gathered
before they issued proccedings in November 2008. Clearly they did not have a proper
body of evidence in May 2007 when they issued caveats. Ditto for all of the 'practice
court' summary judgement applications during 2008.
d. Worse, Harwood Andrews and David Hanlon became put on notice at an alarming rate
as to the lack of credibility (and overall instability) of Ms Cressy. Ms Cressy's assault and
battery of her children and her home in September 2007 (because she didn't like the
custody/access orders she consented to 3 days earlier); Ms Cressy's aggravated
burglary of me in November 2007 (where David Hanlon interfered with and perverted a
police investigation into the aggrevated burglary by (i) coaching Ms Cressy on what to
say to try to avoid the rap; and (ii) by pressuring the police by subpoenaing my stolen
papers and belongings into the family law act proceedings [they had no relevance or

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 connection to those proceedings, or even to these Supreme Court proceedings, as
demonstrated by the fact that these were fully accessible to Ms Cressy's lawyers but not
put forward in evidence in any of the Court proceedings).
26. In short, Harwood Andrews may be barristers and solicitors, but like Berry Family Law and
Graeme Devries after them, they are plain, ugly blackmailers and extortionists.
27. I have no doubt that they will answer for their wrongs in the criminal courts. They must also
answer for their wrongs in the civil courts, they must be tried for their “fraud” (the civil equivalent
of blackmail, extortion, accessory after the fact to aggravated burglary, contempt of court and
perversion of the course of justice).
28. The Trial Judge misdirected himself, writing that it is not the law that lawyers have to 'judge their
client's case.' I believe that this is the first law of lawyering – to gather evidence and assess the
strenghts and weaknesses of the client's case – before you give advice, and certainly before you
issue proceedings at the Titles Office or in a Law Court. Isn't this something all lawyers swear to
uphold as part of their oaths of admission as officers of the Court? Calinan's Case (White
Industries Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (A Firm) springs prominently to mind at this point.
29. In short, this case has nothing whatsover to do with Part 9 of the Property Law Act or principles
of constructive trust (which I would have thought have in any case been codiffied within Part 9
anyway). It is a case of barristers and solicitors committing blackmail and fraud and gross
neglect of their duties to the profession and their duties to the Court to be upholders of the law.

Harold James Johnson

Defendant, Plaintiff by Counterclaim, Appellant and Respondent, Solicitor and Counsel
For proceedings No. 9665 of 2007, No. 9263 of 2008, No. 10222 of 2008, No. 3731 of 2009 and No.
3766 of 2009.

14 August 2009

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