Heidegger and the Properties of Being

Joshua Tepley | jtepley@nd.edu

University of Notre Dame
Draft (12/12/2011) | DO NOT QUOTE
***
Abstract: It is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between
different kinds of being, most notably between the kind of being possessed by
human beings and the kinds he calls presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand.
Nevertheless, there has been very little discussion in the literature about what
exactly these kinds of being are. In this paper I provide an answer to this
question: I argue that the various thick kinds of being countenanced by the
early Heidegger are properties of the entities which have these kinds of being.
One exciting consequence of this position is that it creates a new opportunity for
dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers. If what Heidegger
refers to as kinds of being just are properties, then analytic philosophers should
have no trouble understanding a large part of what the early Heidegger is doing,
namely offering a novel account of which properties different kinds of entities
especially human beingshave.

1. Introduction
The primary goal of Martin Heideggers Being and Time is to reopen the question of the
meaning of being, or what it means to say of something that it is or exists. One piece of his
answer to this question is that vastly different kinds of entities are or exist in different ways.1 In
his terms, vastly different kinds of entities have different kinds of being (Seinsarten).2 Most
importantly, human beingsthe kind of entity Heidegger refers to as Daseinhave their own
distinctive kind of being, which is sharply distinguished from the kinds of being possessed by

Heidegger never provides a complete answer to this question: Being and Time is roughly the first third of a
much larger planned but unfinished project.
2
Because the word being is a mass noun, we cannot give it a plural form when we wish to refer distributively
to, for example, the being of two entities which are such that the being of one is of a different kind than the being of
the other. Heidegger uses the expression kinds of being to play this role, and I shall follow suit in this paper. In
other words, the expression kinds of being shall be used to refer, not to kinds of being, but to being of more than
one kind.

Tepley | 2
other kinds of entities (e.g., artifacts, animals, and abstracta). The bulk of Being and Time
consists of phenomenological descriptions of the various structures that make up this particular
kind of being.
Commentaries on Being and Time generally focus on explicating these descriptions, the
latter of which are frequently accused of being opaque. By contrast, relatively little attention has
been paid, either in these commentaries or in Heidegger scholarship more generally, to what
exactly these structures are, let alone the kinds of being of which they are structures. In this
paper I provide answers to these questions. More specifically, I argue that kinds of being and
their structures are properties of the entities which have these kinds of being.
One exciting consequence of this position is that it provides a new opportunity for
dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers. While many analytic philosophers
balk at talk of being (and all the more at different kinds and structures of it), they are
perfectly comfortable with talk about properties.3 If what Heidegger refers to as kinds and
structures of being just are properties, then this incredulity can be avoided, for on this view
Heideggers theory of being is (partly) just a novel account of which properties are had by
different kinds of entitiesespecially human beings.4 Once analytic philosophers are clear on
which properties Heidegger is talking about, there can be constructive engagement between them
and Heideggerians over whether or not entities really have these properties.

This is true even of analytic philosophers who are nominalists. Such philosophers are more likely to find talk
about properties intelligible than they are talk about being, even if they think that the former is ultimately false
or misleading.
4
Of course Heideggerians will insist that this account also concerns the being of these entities. Whether or not
this is true is an entirely separate issue. One can imagine some analytic philosophers agreeing with Heideggerians
that entities do indeed have the properties Heidegger ascribes to them while disagreeing that these properties have
anything to do with the being of these entities. A position of this sort is suggested (though not endorsed) by Peter
van Inwagen (see his Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment, p. 475 fn. 4 and Ontology, Identity, and
Modality: Essays in Metaphysics, p. 4; cf. van Inwagens Metaphysics, pp. 287-289 and Meta-ontology, pp. 234235).

Tepley | 3
The body of this paper is divided into four parts. In the first part (2) I provide some
essential background about kinds of being and their structures which is necessary in order to
understand the arguments that follow. In the second part (3) I argue that Daseins kind of being
is best understood as what I shall call a complex property of Dasein. In the third part (4) I
argue that thick kinds of being other than Daseins (e.g., presence-at-hand and readiness-tohand) are also properties (though not necessarily complex properties) of the entities which have
these kinds of being. In the fourth part (5) I consider and rebut four objections to these claims.

2. Kinds and Structures of Being

2.1 Kinds of Being
According to the early Heidegger, vastly different kinds of entities have different kinds of
being (Seinsarten). These kinds of being include, at the very least, care (Sorge),5 readiness-tohand (Zuhandenheit), and presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). While there is some debate over
which kinds of entities have these different kinds of being, a typical view is that care is possessed
by human beings (the kind of entity Heidegger refers to as Dasein), readiness-to-hand by
artifacts (e.g., tools, das Zeug), and presence-at-hand by concreta.6 There is evidence in Being
and Time and the contemporaneous lectures (e.g., The Basic Problems of Phenomenology) that
Heidegger countenanced other kinds of being in addition to these three, including life (Leben),
the kind of being possessed by living things;7 subsistence (Bestehen), the kind of being possessed

It is important to note that the word care (Sorge) means something very particular for Heidegger. It should
not be confused with the care of ordinary language. Also, some Heidegger scholars will prefer to say existence
(Existenz) rather than care. This terminological issue is irrelevant to what follows.
6
Given the extensions of these kinds of being, one naturally wonders whether the very same entity can have
more than one of these kinds of being. Unfortunately, there is not enough space to take up this very interesting issue
here.
7
See Sein und Zeit (hereafter SZ), pp. 46, 50, and 241.

Tepley | 4
by abstracta (e.g., numbers);8 a thin or generic kind of being (Seiendheit, beingness) possessed
by everything, regardless of whichever other thick kind (or kinds) of being it also possesses;9
and a super-thick kind of being (Sein berhaupt, being as such), the explication of which is the
ultimate goal of the unfinished project of which Being and Time is but the first part.10 (See Table
1 for a side-by-side comparison of these various kinds of being.) In light of this variety, it is
important to note at the outset that the thesis of this paper, that kinds and structures of being are
properties, is limited to thick kinds of being (e.g., care, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand)
and their structures. I make no claim about whether the thin or super-thick kinds of being (i.e.,
beingness and being as such) should also be understood in this way.
Kind of Being
Care
Life
Readiness-to-hand
Presence-at-hand
Subsistence
Beingness
Being as such

Extension
Human beings (Dasein)
Living things
Artifacts
Concreta
Abstracta
Everything
?

Thickness

Thick

Thin
Super-thick

Structures
Existentials
Categories
?
?

Table 1
2.2 Structures of Being
The early Heidegger claims that different thick kinds of being have different structures,
which he calls structures of being (Seinsstrukturen). He divides these structures into two
kinds: existentials (Existenzialien) and categories (Kategorien).11 Existentials is his name for

See SZ 153 and 333; and Die Grundprobleme der Phnomenologie (hereafter GP), pp. 37.
See GP 18 and 37. Heidegger uses the word Seiendheit (beingness) to refer to this generic kind of being
only well after the publication of Being and Time (see, for example, Einfhrung in die Metaphysik, pp. 23-24). I
owe the distinction between thick and thin conceptions of being to Peter van Inwagen, who in turn credits the
terms to Professor Wilfried VerEecke (see van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics,
p. 4 fn. 4).
10
See, for example, SZ 17, 27, and 436-437.
11
See SZ 44.
9

Tepley | 5
the structures of Daseins being (care);12 categories is his name for the structures of every
other thick kind of being (e.g., presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand). We should not think,
however, that structures associated with latter kinds of being are all the same; the structures
associated with presence-at-hand may be different from the structures associated with readinessto-hand despite the fact that they are both categories.
Heidegger repeatedly refers to structures of being (Seinsstrukturen) as characteristics of
being (Seinscharaktere)13 and determinations of being (Seinsbestimmungen). Thus,
according to Heidegger, structures of being are characteristics or determinations.14 Since the
words characteristic and determination are synonymous with property (as well as aspect,
attribute, feature, quality, and trait), we can also say that Heidegger understands
structures of being as properties. In saying this, however, we do not mean to imply anything
substantive about the nature of these properties. In particular, we should not assume that
structures of being are properties of the very same sort as those paradigmatic of medium-sized
material things, such as redness and roundness. Structures of being may be fundamentally
different from properties of this sort while being properties nonetheless.15

12

Here and in what follows I will often speak of the being of Dasein rather than its kind of being. These
two expressions are meant to co-refer.
13
One might object that character of being is a more literal translation of Seinscharaktere than
characteristic of being. Nevertheless, character and characteristic are synonyms: if we say that a ball has a
shiny character, we can also say that it has a shiny characteristic (or the characteristic of being shiny). Macquarrie
and Robinson, the original English translators of Sein und Zeit, often translate Charakter as characteristic (see,
for example, their translations of SZ 42, 54, 63, and 64).
14
This inference assumes that Heidegger is not using Seinscharaktere and Seinsbestimmungen as technical
terms. I think this assumption is reasonable given that Heidegger nowhere introduces them as such as he does so
often with other technical terms of his.
15
I will also bracket the issue of whether structures of being are particulars or universals, i.e., whether they can
be instantiated by (at most) one thing or by (possibly) multiple things.

Tepley | 6
If structures of being are properties, as Heidegger suggests they are, then surely they are
properties of something or other; i.e., they are instantiated.16 What instantiates them? There are
two obvious possibilities: (a) the kind of being to which these structures belong, or (b) the
entities which have the kind of being to which these structures belong. While the expression
characteristics of being suggests the first of these, (a), this cannot be correct. Consider
substantiality (Substanzialitt), a structure of presence-at-hand, the kind of being possessed by
substances and other concreta.17 If structures of being are properties of the kind of being to
which these structures belong, then substantiality is a property of presence-at-hand, in which
case presence-at-hand is a substance. But this is simply not the case: it is not presence-at-hand
which is a substance but rather (some of) the entities which have presence-at-hand as their kind
of being. Similar arguments can be made using other structures of being: if understanding
(Verstehen), a structure Daseins being,18 is a property, then surely it is a property of Dasein and
not of Daseins being, for it is Dasein and not Daseins being which understands (in Heideggers
very particular sense of this term). Thus, structures of being are not properties of the kinds of
being to which they belong, but rather of the entities which have those kinds of being.19

3. Daseins Kind of Being

Now that we have some idea of what structures of being are, let us turn our attention to
kinds of being. What exactly are they? For reasons that will become apparent later in the paper,
it is best if we split this question into two: (1) What is Daseins kind of being? And (2) what are
16

Of course this does not follow simply from the fact that structures of being are properties; there may very
well be uninstantiated properties. Rather, it follows from the extreme unlikelihood that uninstantiated properties
would play a central role in a theory of anything, let alone a theory of being.
17
See SZ 68.
18
See SZ 31.
19
This point is further supported by the many passages in which Heidegger refers to structures of being as
characteristics of entities and not of being. For example, he describes existentiality, facticity, and being-fallen as
characteristics of Dasein (SZ 191).

Tepley | 7
kinds of being other than Daseins? The present section deals with the first of these questions;
the following section deals with the second.
What exactly is Daseins being? If the structures of Daseins being are properties of
Dasein, then perhaps we can answer this question if we can first determine how Daseins being is
related to its structures. Heidegger repeatedly refers to Daseins being as a whole (Ganze) of
which its structures are parts.20 Thus, it would seem that the relation that holds between Daseins
being and its structures is a whole-part relationor at least close enough to such a relation to
warrant referring to its relata as wholes and parts.21 In that case, Daseins being is a whole which
some of Daseins properties are parts. What sort of whole could this be? More generally, what
sorts of wholes are there such that the parts of those wholes are properties (and only
properties)?22 There are two relevant possibilities: (i) properties are parts of concrete
particulars, and (ii) properties are parts of other properties.

3.1 Constituent Ontology

Advocates of wholes in the first of these senses are known as constituent ontologists.
They believe that in addition to whatever material parts a concrete particular may have, it also
has metaphysical parts. These parts are its properties. Thus, for example, a ball with the
properties being red and being spherical has these propertiesat least according to the
constituent ontologistamong its (metaphysical) parts.

20

See, for example, SZ 181, 191, 192, 196, 200, 316, and 350.
In what follows I will often speak of the relation between kinds and structures of being as if it just is a wholepart relation, but strictly speaking it is either a whole-part relation or something very similar to a whole-part relation.
This caveat will be especially important in 3.3.1.
22
The and only properties qualification is important, for there are a number of theories according to which
entities of some kind are wholes of which both properties and non-properties are parts, e.g., propositions (see, e.g.,
Russell 1912), states-of-affairs (see, e.g., Armstrong 1997), and events (see, e.g., Kim 1976). Since Daseins kind of
being is a whole of which only structures of being (existentials) are parts, none of these is relevant.
21

Tepley | 8
Whether or not constituent ontology is a plausible metaphysical position is an interesting
if well-worn issue. We neednt go into any of the details of this debate, however, in order to see
that it wont help us understand how Daseins being is composed of its structures. If existentials
are parts of Daseins being in the same way in which constituent ontologists think that properties
are (metaphysical) parts of the entities which instantiate these properties, then Daseins being
instantiates its existentials. And we have already seen that this is not the case: it is not kinds of
being which instantiate their structures but rather the entities which have these kinds being.

3.2 Complex Properties

This leaves (ii): Daseins being is a property of which other properties (its structures) are
parts. What kind of property can this be? What kinds of properties are wholes of which other
properties are parts?
Heres one example of such a property: being round and red. The putative parts of this
property are the properties being round and being red. Properties of this sort are called
conjunctive properties and the properties which are their parts their conjuncts. Accordingly,
one possibility is that Daseins being is a conjunctive property of which its structures are
conjuncts.23
While this is one kind of property that can be understood as a whole of which other
properties are parts, it is not the only kind: Consider the property being knowledge. The
traditional definition of knowledge is justified true belief (hereafter JTB). Since the
publication of Gettiers famous paper, a general consensus has emerged among philosophers that
these three conditions, though individually necessary, are not jointly sufficient for knowledge.
23

Of course not everyone believes that there are conjunctive properties or, if they do, that conjunctive properties
are wholes of which their conjuncts are parts. The first of these issues is relevant only if there is some better way of
understanding Daseins kind of being as a whole of which other properties are parts; I will address the second of
them below (see 3.3.1).

Tepley | 9
This has led to a nearly half-century-long hunt for the so-called fourth condition and inspired
innumerable interpretations of the justification condition.
While the jury is still out on whether or not knowledge can be defined, let us suppose,
for the sake of argument, that (1) knowledge does indeed require JTB, but (2) there is no fourth
condition such that JTB plus this condition yields knowledge. In other words, although
justification, truth, and belief are indeed necessary for knowledge, there is no fourth, non-trivial
necessary condition such that it together with JTB is sufficient for knowledge.
If (1) and (2) are true, then one can argue that being knowledge is a property which has
other properties as partsnamely being justified, being true, and being believedbut is not
identical to the mere conjunction of these parts.24 Moreover, there is no other property such that
its conjunction with being justified, being true, and being believed is identical to being
knowledge. Thus, although the property being knowledge has parts and these parts are
properties, it is not a conjunctive property of which its parts are conjuncts.
Let us call properties of this sort, if such there be, irreducible complex properties.25
Such properties are complex because they involve other properties in roughly the same way in
which conjunctive properties involve their conjuncts: the latter are parts of the former. They
are irreducible because the properties they involve, taken together, are not sufficient for
composing that property. In other words, an irreducible complex property is not identical to the
mere conjunction of its parts. One reason to think that there are irreducible complex properties is
that there are a number of propertiessuch as being knowledgefor which we can identify clear

24

The properties being justified, being true, being believed, and being knowledge are properties of propositions,
whatever they turn out to be. It is also worth noting that these are probably best understood as relational properties,
the relata of which are propositions and epistemic agents. This makes no difference to the point I am making here.
25
More formally: x is an irreducible complex property only if (i) x is a property, (ii) x is a whole of which
properties y1yn are parts, (iii) the conjunction of y1yn x, and (iv) there are no properties z1zn such that the
conjunction of y1yn and z1zn = x.

Tepley | 10
necessary conditions but not jointly sufficient conditions. The existence of irreducible complex
properties would explain this phenomenon.
There are, then, two ways of understanding how Daseins being is a property of which
other properties (its structures) are parts: it is either a conjunctive property or an irreducible
complex property.26 Let us call properties of either kind complex properties. Thus, on this
view, Daseins being is a complex property of Dasein.27 Whether it is a conjunctive property or
irreducible complex property is an open question that I will not try to decide here.28

3.3 Problems with Complex Properties

This viewthat Daseins being is a complex property of Daseinavoids the problem
engendered by understanding the relation that holds between Daseins being and its structures in
terms of constituent ontology: the properties that are parts of a complex property are not
instantiated by that complex property, but rather by any entity which instantiates that complex
property. Nevertheless, this position faces some other problems. These are of two sorts: some
stem from the notion that that Daseins being is a complex property and others from the notion

26

There is, in fact, a third way of understanding properties as wholes of which other properties are parts: D. M.
Armstrongs theory of structural universals (Armstrong 1978; see David Lewiss Against Structural Universals for
a critical discussion of Armstrongs theory). Structural universals differ from conjunctive properties and irreducible
complex properties insofar as the parts of a structural universal are instantiated by proper parts of whatever entities
instantiate that universal whereas the parts of either a conjunctive property or an irreducible complex property are
instantiated by whatever entities instantiate that property (not those entities proper parts). For example, the
structural universal being an H2O molecule has the properties being a hydrogen molecule and being an oxygen
molecule among its parts, and these parts are instantiated by proper parts of whatever entities instantiate being an
H2O molecule (namely, hydrogen molecules and oxygen molecules, respectively). Since it is Dasein and not
Daseins proper parts (if it has proper parts) that instantiates the structures (existentials) making up its kind of being,
this kind of being cannot be a structural universal. Thanks to Alex Skiles for drawing my attention to this
possibility.
27
Strictly speaking, what I have shown is that Daseins being is a complex property (the parts of which are
structures of Daseins being), not that it is a complex property of Dasein. The latter follows from the former
together with the facts that (1) structures of being are instantiated by the entities that have the kind of being to which
those structures belong (e.g., existentials are instantiated by Dasein); and (2) a complex property is instantiated by
any entity that instantiates its parts (e.g., the conjunctive property being round and red is instantiated by any entity
that instantiates the properties being round and being red).
28
Nor will I try to decide what kind of property it is, e.g., whether it is a particular or a universal.

Tepley | 11
that Daseins being is a property, simpliciter. I shall consider three problems of the first type
here and problems of the second type later in the paper (see 5).
3.3.1 Properties cannot be Wholes of which Other Properties are Parts
To start, one might object that properties cannot be wholes of which other properties are
parts. Consider, for example, platonic realism, the view according to which properties are
transcendent universals. Can properties of this sort really enter into part-whole relations with
other properties of the same sort?
There are at least three replies to this objection: First, even if understanding complex
properties as wholes of which other properties are parts is incompatible with some theories of
properties (e.g., platonic realism), it does not follow that this is incompatible with all theories of
properties. So long as Heidegger understands Daseins being in terms of one of the latter
theories, he can simply sidestep this problem.
Second, if the reason why properties understood in terms of a theory like platonic realism
cannot be wholes of which other properties are parts is that such properties are abstract and
abstract objects cannot enter into part-whole relations, then this reason is contentious. A number
of prominent contemporary philosophers maintain that abstracta can enter into part-whole
relations. For example, Kit Fine argues that members of a set are parts of that set (sets are
abstract and so are some members of sets),29 and Kris McDaniel suggests that certain abstract
types can be parts of other abstract types (e.g., a measure can be part of a song).30 If some
abstracta enter into part-whole relations, then we cannot deny that platonic universals enter into
part-whole relations simply on account of their being abstract.

29
30

Kit Fine, Toward a Theory of Parts, pp. 561-564.

Kris McDaniel, Modal Realism with Overlap, p. 141.

Tepley | 12
Third, as we noted earlier, strictly speaking, Heidegger understands the relation between
Daseins being and its structures as either a whole-part relation or a relation close enough to a
whole-part relation that it makes sense for Heidegger to talk of Daseins being as a whole of
which its structures are parts. Even if the relation that holds between complex properties and
the properties involved in them is not, strictly speaking, a whole-part relation, surely it is close
enough to warrant referring to its relata as wholes and parts. Surely it is natural to refer to
being unmarried as a part of being a bachelor even if, strictly speaking, this isnt true. In
short, our reason for thinking that Daseins being is a complex property of which its structures
are parts does not require that such properties be literal wholes of which the properties
involved in them are parts, and thus our proposal is consistent with any theories of properties that
are incompatible with this.
3.3.2 Irreducible Complex Properties are Impossible
One might also object to our proposal on the ground that irreducible complex properties
are impossible. If there are irreducible complex properties, as I have defined them, then it is
possible for there to be two non-identical wholes which have exactly the same parts. For
example, the irreducible complex property being knowledge and the conjunctive property being
justified, being true, and being believed, though they share exactly the same parts, are not
identical. This arguably violates common sense and is clearly inconsistent with classical
extensional mereology.31 Moreover, it is doubtful that this problem can be solved by simply
pointing out that the relation that holds between a complex property and the properties
involved in it neednt be a literal whole-part relation, for if the relation that does hold between

31

According to classical extensional mereology, any two things which have exactly the same parts are identical.
For a detailed discussion of classical extensional mereology see Chapter 1 of Peter Simons Parts: A Study in
Ontology.

Tepley | 13
Daseins being and its structures is similar enough to a whole-part relation to warrant referring to
Daseins being as a whole of which its structures are parts, then it should be governed by the
same rules as literal whole-part relations; and these rules are putatively those of classical
extensional mereology.
Classical extensional mereology, as intuitive as it may be, no longer enjoys the currency
it once did. A number of prominent philosophers have advanced sophisticated philosophical
theories (e.g., of material constitution) that are inconsistent with it.32 And even if classical
extensional mereology is true, it does not follow that Daseins being is not a complex property.
All that follows is that it is not an irreducible complex property, and this is consistent with it
being a conjunctive property.
3.3.3 Daseins Being is not Pieced Together from its Structures
Finally, one might object that this position runs afoul of Heideggers repeated claims that
Daseins being (care) cannot be pieced together from its structures.33 As he puts it one place:
it is beyond question that the totality of the structural whole [of Daseins being] cannot be
reached by building it up out of elements.34 And elsewhere: The fundamental ontological
characteristics of [Dasein]are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which
might sometimes be missing.35 If complex properties are, at least in some sense, pieced
together or built up from their parts, then Daseins being is not a complex property of which
its structures are parts.
To begin, even if there is a sense in which conjunctive properties are pieced together or
built up from their conjuncts, it is not at all clear that this is true of irreducible complex
32

See, for example, Lynne Rudder Bakers Why Constitution is not Identity.
SZ 328.
34
SZ 181.
35
SZ 191.
33

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properties. An irreducible complex property is not identical to the mere conjunction of its parts.
Accordingly, if what you get from piecing together properties are conjunctive properties, then
you cannot get an irreducible complex property from piecing together its parts. This is
precisely why they are called irreducible. Whereas conjunctive properties may be understood
as nothing over and above their conjuncts, irreducible complex properties are by definition
something over and above their parts.
Of course this solution works only if we admit that Daseins being is an irreducible
complex property and not a conjunctive property. Since understanding Daseins being as a
conjunctive property seems to be the only way of being able to avoid denying classical
extensional mereology, we can adopt this solution only if we are willing to accept such a denial.
There is, however, one other way of solving this problem. It is possible to understand these
sentences of Heideggers as saying, not that Daseins being is something over and above its
parts, but rather that these parts cannot, in some sense, exist separately from the whole of which
they are parts.36 The second of these quotations is especially suggestive of this reading, for
Heidegger writes that the structures of Daseins being are not pieces belonging to something
composite, one of which might sometimes be missing.37 And if building [something] up out of
elements implies that these elements can exist prior to and so independently of the thing built up
out of them, then the first quotation can be understood in similar fashion. This reading finds
further support in the work of Einar verenget, who makes a compelling case that Heidegger
models the relation between the structures and being of Dasein on Husserls notion of
dependent parthood as articulated in the third of his Logical Investigations.38

36

Better: these parts cannot be instantiated unless the whole is co-instantiated with it.
Ibid. My emphasis.
38
Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity, Chapter 1. See also Husserls Logical Investigations, Volume II,
Investigation III.
37

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4. Other Kinds of Being

Having argued for and defended the position that Daseins being is a complex property of
which its structures (existentials) are parts, let us turn our attention to the other thick kinds of
being Heidegger countenances, such as presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. Are these also
properties? More specifically, are these also complex properties of which their structures
(categories) are parts?

4.1 Are they Properties?

Nowhere does Heidegger claim that thick kinds of being other than Daseins are wholes
of which their structures (categories) are parts. Accordingly, we cannot use an argument
analogous to the one given above to show that these kinds of being are properties. There is,
however, some other evidence in Being and Time that Heidegger understands these thick kinds
of beingin particular presence-at-hand and readiness-to-handas properties (though not
necessarily as complex properties):
First, Heidegger describes presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand each as a
characteristic (Charakter).39 If characteristic and property are synonyms, then Heidegger
himself says that presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are properties.
Second, without saying anything substantial about the nature of properties, we can say
that they characterize the entities of which they are properties. After all, properties is just
another word for characteristics, and it is perfectly trivial to say that characteristics
characterize, just as it is to say that runners run and swimmers swim. Since Heidegger states that

39

See SZ 74 for presence-at-hand and SZ 73 for readiness-to-hand.

Tepley | 16
presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand characterize (charakterisieren) other entities,40 it
seems to follow that these kinds of being are characteristics, i.e., properties, of those entities.
Third, Heidegger refers to readiness-to-hand as a determination (Bestimmung).41 Since
determination, like characteristic, is synonymous with property, it follows that Heidegger
understands readiness-to-hand as a property.
And fourth, just as characteristics can be innocently understood as characterizing the
entities of which they are characteristics, so too can determinations be understood as determining
the entities of which they are determinations. Since Heidegger writes that presence-at-hand and
readiness-to-hand determine (bestimmen) entities, he seems to think of them as determinations,
i.e., properties, of entities.42
In sum, keeping in mind the synonymy of characteristic, determination, and
property as well as the truisms that characteristics characterize and determinations determine,
there is some evidence in Being and Time that Heidegger understands presence-at-hand and
readiness-to-hand as properties of the entities which have these kinds of being. Since Daseins
being and these two kinds of being are properties, we can reasonably infer that all thick kinds of
being are properties.

4.2 Are they Complex Properties?

While the foregoing gives us a reason to think that thick kinds of being other than
Daseins are properties, it does not give a reason to think that they are complex properties. In
fact, we have one reason to believe that at least one of themnamely, presence-at-handis not:
According to Heidegger, substantiality is a structure (category) of presence-at-hand. If presence40

SZ 230.
SZ 71.
42
See SZ 183. It is worth noting that Macquarie and Robinson translate this sentence as saying that presenceat-hand and readiness-to-hand are aspects of entities; aspects is just another word for properties.
41

Tepley | 17
at-hand is a complex property the structures of which are parts, then all present-at-hand entities
are substances. But this is doubtful, for Heidegger frequently speaks of present-at-hand
properties,43 and if this expression refers to properties which are present-at-hand, then some
present-at-hand entities are not substances.44
One response is simply to deny that the expression present-at-hand properties refers to
entities which are present-at-hand. Consider, by way of analogy, the expression material
properties. This does not refer to properties that are material, but rather to properties that are
distinctive of material entities (e.g., being extended, being located, having mass, etc.). In other
words, something is a material property, not in virtue of being a material entity, but in virtue of
being a certain kind of property of material entities. Likewise, Heideggers uses of the
expression presence-at-hand properties might refer, not to properties that are present-at-hand,
but rather to properties that are in some way distinctive of present-at-hand entities.
The main problem with this line of reasoning is that it leaves us completely in the dark as
to what kind of being these present-at-hand properties have. If they are not present-at-hand,
then what are they? One might suggest that they subsist (bestehen), i.e., have the kind of being
of abstracta (subsistence, Bestehen). But this is plausible only if Heidegger understands these
properties as platonic universals or the like, and this is doubtful. He claims, for example, that
some present-at-hand properties can be sensed, which clearly places them in concrete world.45
Alternatively, one might suggest that these properties have some other thick kind of being not
mentioned by the early Heidegger. After all, nowhere does Heidegger provide a systematic list
of which thick kinds of being he thinks there are. While this is admittedly possible, it does not

43

See, for example, SZ 42.

I am assuming, of course, that no properties are substances (and vice versa).
45
Ibid.
44

Tepley | 18
seem very likely. Given how often he identifies the kinds of being of different kinds of entities,
it would be very strange for him to never mention this particular kind of being.46
To sum up, although we have a good reason to think that all thick kinds of being are
properties, we have a least one reason to think that some of them, unlike Daseins being, are not
complex properties. This should not surprise us, for Heidegger suggests that there are important
differences between Daseins being and other kinds of being.47 What relation holds between
such kinds of being and their structures is an open question that I will not pursue here.48

5. Objections
Despite the reasons given above, the claim that Heidegger understands thick kinds of
being as properties will almost certainly meet opposition from Heidegger scholars. Regarding
Heideggers theory of being, Taylor Carman writes that being is not a property of entities,49
and Stephen Mulhall writes that it is not a property of beings.50 Hubert Dreyfus argues that
what Heidegger means by the being of entities is their intelligibility and goes on to say that
[i]intelligibility is not a property of things.51 Kris McDaniel argues that it is inappropriate to
represent the various kinds (he calls them ways) of being countenanced by Heidegger in firstorder logic by means of predicate letters, for this procedure assimilates attributing a way of
being of a thing to predicating a property of that thing, and [w]ays of being are not merely
special properties that some entities have and other entities lack.52 Frederick Olafson writes

46

A third possibility is that such properties have no thick kind of being. This also seems very unlikely, given
the fact that even abstracta have a thick kind of being.
47
See, for example, SZ 181.
48
Though I will say that I think it plausible that they are disjunctive properties of which their structures are
disjuncts.
49
Heideggers Analytic, p. 200; cf. p. 124.
50
Heidegger and Being and Time, p. 9; cf. p. 10.
51
Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heideggers Being and Time, Division I, pp. xi and 257.
52
Ways of Being, p. 302.

Tepley | 19
that Heidegger makes it clearthat [being] is not a property or attribute of entities.53 In light
of these quotations, one might even say that there is a consensus among Heidegger scholars that
Heidegger does not understand kinds of being as properties.
This view is not entirely groundless. A number of reasons can be given for thinking that
Heidegger doesnt think that kinds of being are properties. I will examine four of these reasons
here. As we will see, none of them is conclusive.

5.1 Being is not a Being

One might object to the position defended in this paper on the basis of what we might call
the Thesis of Ontological Difference, the claim that the being (Sein) of an entity is not itself a
being (Seiende).54 Heidegger endorses this claim repeatedly throughout Being and Time and the
contemporaneous lectures.55 If being is not a being, then clearly it is not a property, for all
properties are beings.
The reply to this objection is simple: If Heidegger can consistently say that being is not a
being, then he can also consistently say that certain properties are not beings.56 Whatever
reasons we can give for thinking that (all) properties are themselves beings can also, mutatis
mutandis, be given for thinking that being is itself a being. Since Heidegger will reject the latter
reasons, he will also reject the former reasons. Of course it might turn out that Heideggers

53

Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 135-136.

This name derives from the Ontological Difference, Heideggers name for the difference between being and
beings. Though I translate Seiende as entity elsewhere in this paper, I shall give it the more literal translation of
being in this section and the next. (An even more literal translation of Seiende would be that which is or that
which has being.)
55
See SZ 4, 6, 38, 230; GP 22.
56
It is worth pointing out that Heidegger would not have been the first to believe that some entities are not
beings (or at least do not have being): Alexius Meinong held this view at the turn of the century (see his The
Theory of Objects; for a more recent explication of this view, see Roderick M. Chisholms Beyond Being and
Nonbeing). Heidegger was aware of Meinongs work (see Heideggers Neuere Forschungen ber Logik,
published in 1912).
54

Tepley | 20
rejection of these reasons is unjustified, but this would be a problem, not with our interpretation
of Heideggers theory of being, but with this theory itself.57

5.2 Being is not a Property

A second objection to the proposal defended in this paper is that Heidegger himself
apparently denies that being is a property. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that Being and
the structure of being lie beyond every being (Seiende) and every possible existent property
(seiende Bestimmtheit) which a being may possess.58 The point is repeated in his Postscript to
What is Metaphysics?, where he states that Being is not an existent property (seiende
Beschaffenheit) of beings.59
To start, each of these quotations appears in a context in which it is natural to understand
being as referring, not to thick kinds of being, but rather to the super thick kind of being, i.e.,
being in general (Sein berhaupt). Since the thesis of this paper is limited to thick kinds of
being, the claims made in these quotations are, on this interpretation, irrelevant.
But even if we allow that these quotations do concern thick kinds of being, a careful
examination of them reveals an important ambiguity: Heidegger writes in both cases that being
is not an existent (seiende) property of beings.60 This is perfectly consistent with it being a
property of beings, so long as its a non-existent (nicht-seiende) property of them. Since we have
57

This reply gives us the grounds to quickly rebut another possible objection to our interpretation of Heidegger,
namely that we are treating him as engaged in an ontic rather than an ontological enterprise: if ontic inquiries are
concerned with beings and ontological ones with being, then our interpretation treats Heidegger as engaged in the
former, for (all) properties are beings. The flaw in this objection is obvious: it presupposes that Heidegger thinks
that all properties are beings. He need not think this, and if kinds of being are properties then he does not think this.
58
SZ 38. Determination is probably a better translation of Bestimmtheit than property, but what are
determinations if not properties?
59
Wegmarken, p. 101. It is worth noting that this quotation comes from a text published in 1949 and so is
arguably irrelevant to the present discussion, being well beyond the scope of what reasonably counts as the early
Heidegger.
60
The word seiende is translated here as existent because there is no verbal adjective of the English verb
to be. Instances of the word existent in the following discussion should be understood as having the meaning of
such an adjective, if there were one.

Tepley | 21
already seen that Heidegger can countenance properties which are not beings (nicht Seiende),
surely he can countenance properties which are non-existent (nicht-seiende). Assuming that
these quotations are indeed about thick kinds of being and not merely the super-thick kind of
being, Heidegger is expressing essentially same point as the Thesis of Ontological Difference,
namely that the being of an entity is not itself a beingincluding, of course, any being which is a
property. But this is consistent with it being a property, so long as its not one of the properties
which is also a being.61

5.3 Structures of Being are not Properties

One might also draw our attention to the many places in which Heidegger appears to say
that structures of beingin particular, the structures of Daseins beingare not properties.
While this is not tantamount to denying that Daseins being is a property, it would undermine our
reason for thinking that this is true, one premise of which is that Heidegger understands
structures of being as properties.
Here is a paradigmatic statement of this sort: those characteristics (Charaktere) which
can be exhibited in [Dasein] are not present-at-hand properties (vorhandene Eigenschaften) of
apresent-at-hand entity (vorhandenen Seienden)62 While at first glance this sentence seems
to say that the characteristics (structures) of Daseins being are not properties of Dasein, a careful
examination reveals another crucial ambiguity: it says that the characteristics (structures) of
Daseins being are not present-at-hand properties. If this refers to properties that are presentat-hand (i.e., have presence-at-hand as their kind of being), then Heideggers statement is
consistent with the claim that the characteristics (structures) of Daseins being are properties, so
61

I want to emphasize once again that whether this position is ultimately justifiable is a separate issue from
whether it is an accurate representation of Heideggers thought. My primary interest in this paper is the latter not the
former.
62
SZ 42.

Tepley | 22
long as they are not properties which are present-at-hand.63 In fact, on the plausible assumption
that characteristic and property are synonyms, something like this had better be what
Heidegger is saying, for otherwise he straightforwardly contradicts himself by saying that certain
characteristics are not properties. The other places in which Heidegger appears to deny that the
structures of Daseins being are properties contain similar ambiguities: all of them can be
understood as denying, not that the structures of Daseins being are properties, but that they are
properties of a certain kind.64

5.4 Being Depends on Dasein

Finally, one might object that the account defended in this paper is at odds with
Heideggers repeated claims that the being of entities other than Dasein depends upon Dasein
(or, as he sometimes puts it, upon the understanding of Dasein). As Heidegger writes: Of
course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically
possible), is there being.65 And later on the same page: Being (not entities) is dependent
upon [Daseins] understanding of being.66 Since the properties of entities other than Dasein do
not depend upon the existence of Dasein, let alone its understanding (whatever Heidegger might
mean by this term), it follows that the being of entities must be something other than some of
their properties.
Granting the prima facie plausibility that some properties of entities other than Dasein do
not depend upon the existence of Dasein, it is hardly plausible that none of them do. Consider,
for example, the relational property being loved by a Dasein. Surely nothing has this property if
63

This is also true if present-at-hand properties refers to properties of present-at-hand entities in the same way
that material properties refers to properties of material entities.
64
See, for example, SZ 133. The same is also true of those passages in which Heidegger appears to deny that
specific structures of Daseins being are properties of Dasein. See, for example, SZ 56-57, 176, and 179.
65
SZ 212.
66
Ibid.; cf. SZ 183, 226 and 230.

Tepley | 23
there are no Daseins. Accordingly, if the kinds of being other than Daseins are properties like
this one, i.e., relational properties one relata of which is necessarily a Dasein, then there is no
problem in both understanding these kinds of being as properties and insisting that they depend
on Dasein (in the sense that they are instantiated only if Dasein exists).
One might object that some structures of kinds of being other than Daseins are not easily
understood in this way. Recall substantiality, a structure of presence-at-hand. If kinds of
beingand their structuresdepend on Dasein in the sense that none of them are instantiated
unless Dasein exists, then there are no substances unless Dasein exists. And this is surely false.
Here is a quick reply (there may be others): What Heidegger means by substantiality is
not being a substance but rather being understood as a substance, in Heideggers particular
sense of the word understood. In this case, it makes perfect sense that this structure depends
on Dasein (in the sense that it is instantiated only if a Dasein exists), and this can be true even if
there are substances that exist independently of Dasein. More generally, we can say that
structures of being (of kinds of being other than Daseins) are all properties of the form being
understood as such and such. If Dasein is the only kind of entity that can understand in the
relevant sense, then nothing has these properties unless Dasein exists. This interpretation is
supported byand even makes sense ofHeideggers claims that being depends, not just on
Dasein, but on Daseins understanding.

6. Conclusion
This paper provides a partial account of the early Heideggers theory of being. As
partial, it leaves unanswered a number of questions, including: Which thick kinds of being are
there? Which kinds of entities have these different kinds of being? Which structures do these

Tepley | 24
different kinds of being possess? And what is the relation that holds between each of these kinds
of being (except care) and its structures?
If kinds and structures of being are properties, then the answers to these questions should
be of interest, not just to Heidegger scholars, but also to contemporary analytic philosophers who
are interested in the truth about the most fundamental properties of entities in the world,
especially human beings. Moreover, since the answers to these questions can be put in terms of
properties and not in terms of being, analytic philosophers can engage with Heideggerians
over the truth of these answers even if they are convinced that talk about kinds and
structures of being is fundamentally misguided. Whether or not the properties Heidegger
identifies and describes make up the being of entities is an entirely separate issue from whether
or not anything instantiates these properties.67

67

Thanks very much to Robert Audi, Gary Gutting, and especially Alex Skiles for comments on earlier drafts of
this paper.

Tepley | 25
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