Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Contributors:
Dr. Jzsef dm
Gyrgy Bnvlgyi
Dr. Gyula Dura
Dr. Gyula Grenerczy
Dr. Nra Gubek
Dr. Ildik Gutper
Gergely Simon
Zsolt Szegfalvi
Dr. Andrs Szkcs
Prof. Dr. Jnos Szpvlgyi
Dr. Eszter Ujlaky
***
Department of Geodesy and Surveying at the Budapest
University of Technology and Economics (BME)
Satellite Geodetic Observatory of the Institute of Geodesy,
Cartography and Remote Sensing (FMI-KGO)
Research Group for Physical Geodesy and Geodynamics
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) and
Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME)
Research Institute for Soil Science and Agricultural
Chemistry at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA)
Greenpeace Hungary
Clean Air Action Group
Contents
Foreword
Executive Summary
9
13
1. Antecedents
1.1. Aluminium industry and alumina production in Hungary
1.2. Privatization in the aluminium industry
1.2.1. Selling the productive companies of the sector
1.2.2. Transferring environmental responsibilities
1.2.3. Omitting recultivation of the red mud reservoirs
1.3. Hazardous waste disposal
1.3.1. Hazardous waste in Hungary
1.3.2. Red mud disposal sites in Hungary
1.4. Technological deficiencies
1.4.1. The condition of the dam before the accident
1.4.2. Outdated technology at MAL Co. Ltd.
1.5. Civilian concerns and recommendations
1.6. Expert proposals
1.7. The role of the authorities
1.7.1. Dismantling the authorities
1.7.2. Lax authorities, lack of inspections
Summary
Recommendations
19
19
21
21
23
25
26
26
28
30
30
33
35
36
38
38
42
46
47
48
48
53
53
53
54
54
55
57
3. Damage control
3.1. Actions by the authorities
3.2. Anomalies of central communication
3.3. The communication of MAL Co. Ltd.
3.4. Communication steps by LMP and social organizations
3.4.1. LMP
3.4.2. Clean Air Action Group, Greenpeace and other NGOs
58
58
61
63
65
65
69
74
76
77
4. Contamination reports
4.1. Initial reports based on earlier tests
4.1.1. Statements of MAL. Co. Ltd.
4.1.2. Initial reports and statements of the National Public
Health and Medical Officer Service (NTSZ)
4.1.3. Initial MTA statements and results
in light of the Greenpeace investigation
4.2. Greenpeace test results
4.3. Water testing
4.3.1. Results from MTA (KFKI, MAFI, TAKI)
4.3.2. Test results from University of Pannonia
4.4. Air/dust test results
4.5. WHO and EU reports
4.5.1. WHO red mud report
4.5.2. EU experts red sludge report
4.6. Information on the presence of further pollutants
4.7. Evaluating the test results
4.7.1. Pollution of the areas land and water
4.7.2. Alkalinity
4.7.3. Air pollution
4.7.4. Confusing the population
4.7.5. Water pollution during the emergency
Summary
Recommendations
78
78
79
5. Legislation
5.1. Overview of legislation in Europe and Hungary
5.1.1. The adoption and implementation of legislation
in the light of the environmental licenses of MAL Ltd.
5.1.2. The problem of the hazardous character of red mud waste
5.2. The licenses of MAL Co. Ltd. in the context
of the Mining Directive, IPPC and BAT regulations and Seveso II
5.3. The Role of Authorities
5.3.1. The dam break
5.3.2. Caustic effect and irritating nature of the spilled material
5.3.3. The extraordinary amount of material and financial
means to required for damage control
5.3.4. Other significant anomalies in the operation of the environmental protection
system (incentives for prevention and the means of damage control)
6
79
81
82
84
84
86
87
89
89
90
91
92
92
94
94
95
96
97
98
99
99
99
104
105
111
111
112
113
113
117
117
117
118
118
119
119
120
120
121
122
123
6. International comparison
6.1. Alumina production in other parts of the world
6.2. Red mud storage methods
6.2.1. Red mud storage worldwide
6.2.2. Developments at MAL Co. Ltd. after the accident
6.3. Red mud utilisation worldwide
6.4. Similar major industrial accidents
6.4.1. Disasters worldwide
6.4.2. Disasters in Hungary
6.5. Environmental hazards, proposals of civil
and green organisations in other countries
6.6. Compensation after industrial disasters all over the world
Summary
Recommendations
124
124
126
126
128
129
132
132
134
144
144
146
146
147
147
148
148
149
149
149
150
8. Conclusion
152
7
139
140
142
143
Foreword
It was 6th October, early in the afternoon. Wearing rubber boots covered knee deep in red
mud, we were standing in the main street of Kolontr with Simon Gergely, an expert working
for Clean Air Action Group. We had just finished an interview given to Al Jazeera Television
on the red mud disaster, and we were waiting for the broadcasting van to make contact with
the studio of ABC News. Everywhere around us, tree trunks, house walls and garden fences
were all stained waist high by the permanent trace of the flood which took place two days
before. Next to the railway, bulldozers were pulling apart the remains of what used to be the
bridge of the Torna creek, swept away by the flood. In the gardens, the professionals from
Disaster Management were trying to collect and remove red mud. It all looked hopeless for
no matter where you looked, the valley of Torna creek was covered with red mud. On Arany
Jnos street, vans of TV channels formed a line reaching as far as the cultural centre. They
were all there: the great press syndicates along with Austrian, German, French, Canadian,
American and Arabic television crews. The world was watching Kolontr.
By now, the first shock is gone. So are the crews. News programmes stopped broadcasting images of Kolontr and Devecser, but the attention that was focused on Hungary last
9
October has not disappeared. The answers to all the questions raised then are still expected
by many. What caused the dam break? Could the disaster have been avoided? Had MAL Co.
Ltd. acted with due and proper care? Was monitoring on the part of authorities satisfactory?
Are the regulations governing activities with similar levels of risk suitable, are European
regulations sufficient? Who will pay for the compensation of damages and from what funds?
Neither domestic or international public opinion has received satisfying answers to a large
share of these questions so far. Information reported in the media was often contradictory.
Official bodies, NGOs, parties including LMP tried to answer a number of particular questions. An exhaustive study, however, has not yet been not provided to the public, and a proper
assessment of events calls for a thorough analysis of facts, causes and correlations. This was
encouraged by the delegation of the European Green Party visiting the disaster site one week
after the spill took place. The very idea of the present report was formed back then, and now
the report is offered to the reader as a result of the cooperation of the European Green Party,
LMP, NGOs and expert groups.
***
The Kolontr disaster was, without a doubt, one of the most severe environmental disasters
ever experienced in this country. Not only was it shocking because it left ten people dead, and injured one and a half hundred directly, leaving behind long term environmental and health impacts
which are currently impossible to assess. But it is especially depressing to face the events when
one realizes that the disaster could have been avoided. What we're dealing with is not a natural
disaster, an earthquake, an inundation or a raging storm which cannot directly be prevented or
avoided (even if the paramount responsibility of the consumer society as the engine of global climate change might well be recalled when speaking of the latter two). The Kolontr disaster, on the
other hand, can be directly linked to human negligence, to ignoring signs, severe omissions and
issues of liability. It wouldn't have happened if... if the company had switched to the dry disposal
technology previously, just as it had done in the case of the Mosonmagyarvr plant. If anyone,
whether on the part of the corporation or of the competent authorities had taken the trouble to
monitor the structural engineering condition of the dam and its dislocation, now proven to have
been happening for years. Or if the authorities had not given permission, in 2006, for depositing
ordinary waste which in fact had a pH value of 13. If the competences regarding construction
authorization and inspection had been clarified. One could go on and on. The fact however is
that none of these measures were taken, and as a result of these omissions, Kolontr, Devecser,
Somlvsrhely, the Torna creek and the Marcal river were flooded by red mud. Nevertheless,
the issue of what could and should have been done for prevention is still of some interest. We can
learn, and we must learn from the Kolontr disaster. The conclusions need to be drawn and the
systematic errors leading to the disaster need to be elucidated. Naturally, there is need to identify
who committed what errors and who bears moral or legal responsibility for the omissions and
bad decisions. It would, perhaps, be even more important to ensure that in the future, the same
mistakes and the same deficient systems do not lead to similar events in different circumstances.
In Hungary there are three further red mud reservoirs beside the one in Ajka, and several dozens
10
of hazardous industrial sites or deposits. It is the task of the judicial bodies to allocate liability for
the events. The issue of weather we learn from the disaster at Kolontr and whether we rectify
the errors that had lead to it is our shared responsibility, including political decision makers, state
authorities, NGOs and professional organizations.
With this report, we volunteered to sketch, based on the information available, the reasons
behind the red mud disaster, and to identify the steps to be taken, if we are willing to learn from
the lesson, in Hungarian and EU legislation concerning state monitoring and authorization as
well as the functioning of institutions in order to minimize the risk of the occurrence of a similar
disaster. Our findings indicate that there is a lot to be done. One has to face the fact that all
parties concerned had committed severe omissions, including the governments and Parliaments
of the past one and a half decades, Mal Co. Ltd., as well as the environmental, construction and
mining authorities. The measures to be taken involve a similarly large group of stakeholders.
EU regulations need to be revised, and the same holds for the Hungarian regulatory framework
and legal practice.
We do not think that our report answers all the questions. We are confident that further
similar reports will be made by other expert groups and governmental circles, and that these will
shed light on issues which escaped our attention. The conclusions of the Report, however, call for
serious action to be taken immediately. Legislators have only carried out a tiny fraction of these
tasks so far. (Basically, certain provisions of Act 2010/CLXXXI can be regarded as such.) We
hope this Report may contribute to rectifying omissions as soon as possible so that the risk of
further disasters of a similar nature can be significantly reduced both in Hungary and in the EU.
Benedek Jvor
LMP Politics Can Be Different
Chairman of the Sustainable Development Committee
of the Hungarian Parliament
11
Executive Summary
Regarding the spatial extent, duration and severity of impact, the dam break at 12:25 pm on
04. 10. 2010 and the red mud disaster in its wake turned out to be the greatest environmental
crisis ever of Hungary and of the whole region. The spilt slurry reached the municipalities of
Devecser, Kolontr, Somlvsrhely, Somljen, Tskevr, Apcatorna and Kisberzseny. The
red mud contaminated the valleys of the Torna creek and the Marcal river, almost reaching
the river Rba. Through the Torna, Marcal, Rba and the Moson branch of the Danube, the
alkaline slurry entered the Danube, causing destruction in all the affected waters. Along the
Torna and the impacted section of Marcal, practically all aquatic life was destroyed.
The disaster left 10 people dead and almost 150 injured, including local residents and
the participants in the rescue operations.
The spilt mud and alkaline slurry polluted about 1,000 acres of land. The amount of
the emitted pollutants was about 0.91 million cubic meters.
The fact that the devastation wrought by the dam break significantly exceeded the
expected impact as specified in the disaster management plan can be accounted for in
physical terms by the exceedingly large water content of the slurry stored in Basin X, and
13
from a chemical perspective by the alkalinity of the spilt liquid, which approached pH 13.
The relatively high concentration of metals (arsenic, mercury, etc.) in the pollutant mix has
also presented further health and environmental problems.
The Bayer process is globally the most widespread method of producing aluminium, and
leads to the formation of red mud practically everywhere it is used. Currently, no economically
viable and efficient solutions are available for the recovery of this slurry or tailings-like material.
It is most often deposited (dumping it in the sea or in reservoirs surrounded by dams). Attempts
have been made to find ways of recovering the material: red mud is used both as a raw material or
an additive e.g. in manufacturing bricks, road construction and soil improvement. Furthermore,
the technology for extracting metals is practically available but it is too costly. In an international
context, the trend is shifting away from wet disposal technologies towards dry disposal, which
poses lower risk. (Dry disposal was used in Mosonmagyarvr until production was discontinued there.) The alkalinity of the deposited slurry is typically lower internationally than it is in
Hungary. On the other hand, the dry technology about to be temporarily introduced in Ajka,
a technology which involves blending in power plant gypsum, has not yet been implemented at
an industrial level anywhere.
Following this unprecedented accident the authorities responded with the expected rapidity and decisiveness, but not always efficiently in the defence of human health, the environment
and material assets impacted by the disaster or at risk. One reason for the fact that intervention was not efficient enough was lack of information (local residents and participants in
the rescue operations were not informed as to the composition and pH value of the red mud,
the biological effect of the slurry, the list of materials to be used in restoration and whether
they were available). The defective communication structure was a further reason (crucial
information on environmental health issues was published with a delay of several days, with
significant initial inaccuracies). As a result, for several days the people impacted were on
several occasions forced to make decisions potentially influencing the rest of their lives based
on confl icting information (e.g. the red mud is not harmful vs. the red mud is toxic and/or
radioactive). The deficiencies of governmental information characterising the first days after
the accident were primarily mitigated by non-governmental organisations (Greenpeace, Clean
Air Working Group, etc.), as they were the sources of communication regarding measurement
data and useful health advice.
The red mud contained chromium, mercury, lead and nickel contaminants several
times the limit values for ground water and drinking water, also exceeding intervention
levels no longer in force. The majority of tests indicated arsenic concentration levels beyond
the limits values defined for soil and sewage sludge.
In the first few days, public authorities and institutions stated, citing test results obtained
decades earlier, that the composition of the red mud poses no significant health risk or environmental hazard. In the first week of damage control, the population received no factual
information about either the potential radioactive impact of the pollutants or the health consequences of airborne dust pollution. The long-term effects of soil pollution on the environment
and agricultural production were not communicated to residents until February 2011. Official
communications involving conflicting and often unsubstantiated information was a constant
feature of the remediation process.
14
At the same time, the first measurements made by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences clarified what environmental authorities had managed to ignore for years: based
on analysing samples taken at different locations, the reservoir spillage takes pH values in
the range 11 to 14. Consequently, the red mud should be considered as an environmentally
hazardous substance.
***
Possibly the most important statement of the Kolontr Report is that all Hungarian authorities with a role in licensing and monitoring the accident-stricken red mud reservoir
had committed errors.
The Central Transdanubian Environmental, Nature Protection and Water Management
Inspectorate had endorsed the classification of the deposited material as non-hazardous
waste, thus significantly relaxing requirements on disposal and subsequent monitoring.
The authorities endorsed the uncorroborated disaster management plan handed in by MAL
Co. Ltd.
The Inspectorate failed to engage the competent District Mining Inspectorate in the
licensing process.
The notary of Ajka had prohibited the depositing of hazardous waste in the reservoir, but
failed to take steps when hazardous waste was in fact deposited in the area.
Although the licensing of mining waste deposits has been the competence of the Mine
Supervision since 2008, the competent District Mining Inspectorate did not check the
structure of the disposal site for technological compliance, and failed to enforce use of
the best available technology with regard to disposal (conversion to dry technology).
None of the authorities substantially considered the risk of a dam break.
When the privatisation contract was concluded, IPPC and BAT requirements were not taken
into consideration. Neither was compliance with these requirements subsequently enforced
in an exhaustive manner by either the environmental or the construction authorities.
Regarding the occurrence and the severity of accident, a decisive factor was the Hungarian authorities failure to treat the red mud deposited together with the slurry as hazardous waste in the course of the licensing and inspection process, even though the alkalinity
of the material in the reservoir that was later damaged would have justified this. Licensing
hazardous waste disposal entails imposing stricter standards and the participation of more au15
thorities than is required for treating non-hazardous waste. A more thorough procedure might
have shed light the technological risks of the landfi ll and the deficiencies of the emergency plan.
The company acting as the landfill operator bears liability for classifying the deposited
material as non-hazardous at the time of applying for the integrated environmental permit,
even though the alkalinity levels clearly met the criteria for hazardous waste. The company
also bears partial liability in failing to meet the environmental requirements specified in
the privatisation contract fully and on time. Similarly, the company bears partial liability for
failing to ensure the transition (or the preparation for the transition) to a dry depositing technology, at the latest, by the time of requesting the integrated environmental permit. Though it is
at present an open question, local reports suggest that the company might have become aware
of the stability problems of the reservoir (local residents reported works carried out in August
and September to reinforce the wall of Basin X), but failed to notify any of the official bodies.
***
Furthermore, the occurrence of the accident can be linked to regulatory anomalies owing to
the fact there had been deficiencies in adopting and properly implementing EU legislation.
The relevant Hungarian legislation only partially matches Directive 2008/98/EC on
waste requirements. Though it should have entered into force by 12.12.2010, the Directive
was not fully implemented in Hungary. An important fact concerning the issue of the responsibility of authorities is that the waste treatment plant belongs to the competence of
the Mine Supervision under Hungarian legislation. The directive cited imposes an obligation of regular monitoring on the operator, to be carried out at least annually with regard
to both the condition of the built structure and of the waste, but this obligation was not
fulfi lled in practice.
According to the Act on the Environment, the permit-holder (along with the owners and
managers of legal entities which cause harm) has increased responsibility for damages incurred
through use of the environment, a responsibility which may only be limited, or transferred
under very strict conditions. However, these general rules apparently come short of providing
for adequate and available financial means needed to cover for the damage incurred. According
to the Act adopted in 1995, the rules governing the obligation to provide a security deposit
and to establish dedicated reserve funds in the course of the environmental licensing process and the rules on liability insurance policies shall be laid down in a government decree.
Th is objective has only been formally met so far.
On the whole, the EU legislation examined in the present analysis, provided it is
adopted and implemented in line with the intent of the legislator, seems suitable for the
prevention of similar accidents and for managing the consequences thereof. At the same
time, there is a need to adopt uniform classification criteria for hazardous waste, unified
EU-wide regulation governing security deposits and liability insurance (at least for reasons
concerning competition law), and a common EU environmental emergency fund set up to
cover environmental damage that can not be remedied otherwise.
16
***
It is not possible to account for the Kolontr red mud disaster by means of a single cause.
Among the potential causes and preceding events, the following should by all means be
noted:
The conditions of privatization: it was with reference to the obligations of environmental
protection that the buyer was able to acquire the Ajka Aluminium plant at a very low price.
However, these obligations were not properly regulated within the contract, and there were
also gaps in monitoring implementation. Moreover, the authorities allowed on more than
one occasion for the owner to postpone meeting these obligations.
Deficiencies in monitoring environmental damage-limitation: the privatisation contracts
contained an obligation to provide for environmental damage-limitation, but the monitoring
of how this was implemented was deficient. No detailed documentation is available, except for
written records to the effect that invoices were presented as evidence for compliance without
technical inspection having taken place;
Outdated disposal technology: when the first red mud reservoirs were established, the
technology of wet disposal for red mud was still widespread, but much safer dry processes
were already available by the time the permit for Basin X was granted, and the integrated
environmental permit for the reservoir was granted;
Incorrect classification of red mud waste: when the integrated environmental permit was
granted, red mud was not classified as hazardous waste, even though it clearly counted as
such on the basis of its pH value under the Hungarian and EU legislation then in force;
licensing and monitoring malpractice on the part of administrations: following the disaster, a court ruling was required to clarify which authority should have granted a permit for the
dam building at the reservoir and carried out static stability inspection of the built structure;
the sinking of the dam (which could also be related to posterior slurry walling): satellite
images clearly show that the barrier sank in certain places at a rate of 1 cm / year, creating
maximum shear stress precisely at the section where the dam finally broke, while the sinking itself might have occurred because of the slurry walling, or because of the dam base
and subsoil becoming soaked due to the slurry walling. However, no use was made of the
satellite imagery in the structural engineering inspection of the dam, even though they were
continuously available;
Negligence on the part of company management, the authorities and government officials: several NGOs had previously protested about the lack of environmental protection
developments and the failure to carry out inspections. Their comments had no practical
consequences at all.
17
***
The Ajka red mud disaster was unique due both to its nature and its dimensions. At least part
of the lessons learned from similar industrial accidents remain valid:
The costs of remediation are eventually borne by the state, with the companies responsible
for incidents almost always backing out of the process to a greater or smaller extent,
Compensation for damages only takes place in the long run, with both the range of individuals eventually receiving compensation and its extent far more limited than that originally
promised,
Personal and institutional responsibility is identified in the rarest of cases,
The impact of environmental damage typically lasts longer than was originally estimated.
18
1. Antecedents
1.1. Aluminium industry and Alumina production in Hungary
On the territory of historical Hungary, intensive research for ores started in the beginning of
the 1900s. The mining of bauxite, first reported in Bihar county, reached an industrial scale
as early as the first World War. Around 1920, large quantities of bauxite were found in the
Vrtes and Bakony mountains. Mining at an industrial scale started in 1926 at the bauxite
quarry at Gnt.
The first Hungarian alumina plant, constructed in Mosonmagyarvr, started operations
in 1934. Before this time, Alumina was manufactured with Hungarian bauxite as raw material
in Germany. Within a few years, aluminium was also manufactured in Csepel. Partly as an
answer to heightened demand for Alumina and aluminium as a consequence of the German
war effort, construction of the Alumina plant and aluminium furnace at Ajka was started in
1941. The planned capacity of the Alumina plant was 20 kt/year, that of the aluminium furnace
was 10 kt/year. The Ajka thermal power plant was constructed next to the aluminium company,
providing water vapour for the aluminium furnace and electric energy for the Alumina plant.
19
The plant and the furnace started to operate in 1943, though neither reached the planned
capacity levels before the reconstruction following the second World War.
At the time of forced industrialization and the war economy, aluminium was a metal of
strategic importance: one of the most important raw materials for (partly, military) airplane
construction. The whole of this priority industry was covered by MASZOBAL Ltd. (Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite Aluminium Ltd.), established on January 1, comprising by the bauxite
mines at Gnt, Iszkaszentgyrgy, Halimba and Nyird, the Alumina plant and aluminium
furnace at Ajka, the light alloy rolling mill at Szkesfehrvr, the Almsfzit Alumina plant,
the Bauxite Research Lab at Balatonalmd, the Viktoria Chemical Plant,to which were added,
from 1952 on, the Aluminium rolling mill at Kbnya, the Aluminium furnaces at Tatabnya
and Inota, as well as the Alumina and Alundum (Borolon) Plant at Magyarvr. MASZOBAL
was dismantled at the end of 1954, as the Hungarian State redeemed the totality of the property
of the Soviet state, and went on to establish the Aluminium Trading Company, controlled by
the Ministry. Its supervision was exerted by the Ministry for Heavy Industry (NIM), then by
the Chief Department for Non Ferrous Metals in the NIM until June 1963. The main tenet
of the Hungarian-Soviet Treaty on Alumina and Aluminium was that further exploitation
of the Hungarian Bauxite riches, needs to be secured by joining one of the most favourable
alumina production opportunities in the socialist camp with the cheapest and most efficiently
available electric energy base, in a way that it is an optimal solution for both the countries
participating in the co-operation and the whole of the socialist camp. According to the treaty,
Hungary accepted to ship a continuously growing amount of Alumina between 1967 and 1980,
gradually reaching 330,000 tons to the Soviet Union. According to the plans, the alumina is
processed there, and the aluminium produced is shipped back to Hungary. Soviet metal shipments equally growing gradually reached 165 thousand tons by 1980. In the framework of
the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty on Alumina and Aluminium, it was not the electricity required
for processing, as it could have been more rational, but the alumina was shipped to the Soviet
Union. Simplifying somewhat, the construction can be described as outsourced smelting. The
price of alumina and aluminium was accounted for the Hungarian-Soviet border, the Soviet
party financing the transportation within the Soviet Union. Most of the costs of smelting were
paid for with Hungarian industrial products, creating a market for Hungarian industry goods.
The heavy industry minister in 1963 founded a single organization for Hungarian Aluminium Industry, the Hungarian Aluminium Industry Trust (MAT), which integrated the
constantly growing firms in the sector until the regime change. In September 1988 an agreement was reached that abolished the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty on Alumina and Aluminium
in 1990, and cooperation in the MAT in the period 1991-1995 was carried out as a business
venture. ON 31 March 1991, trust were transformed into corporations, and the MAT was
transformed into 100% state owned joint-stock HUNGALU on 31 December 1991. On June
30 1991, State Property Agency (AV Rt) became the owner of MAT. In 1990, the Nyird
Bauxite mine closed, while the aluminium furnaces at Tatabnya and Ajka stopped production in 1991. Similarly, production was stopped at the Ajka furnace in 1992, and capacities
were decreased in other alumina plants in the country during 1993, with the Almsfzit
Alumina Plant closing down in 1994. Privatization seemed to be the only option to prevent
the total collapse.
20
21
The present ownership structure in the Hungarian aluminium industry was established in a
relatively complicated process. According to the first privatisation contract, in 1995 HUNGALU
Magyar Alumniumipari Rt. (HUNGALU) sold its stake in Balassagyarmati Fmipari Kft. (Balassagyarmat Metal Industry Ltd.) to Altus Befektetsi s Vagyonkezel Rt. (Altus Investment
and Property Management Plc.) (Altus) and Tz-M Szervezsi, Vagyonkezelsi s Szolgltat
Kft. (Organisation, Property Management and Service Ltd.) The second contract was concluded
on December 21, 1995, in which HUNGALU sold 90 per cent stake of Magyarvri Timfld s
Mkorund Kft. (Motim) to Altus and GPS Vagyonkezel s Gazdasgi Tancsad Kft. (GPS Property Management and Business Counselling Ltd.), established by the heads of MOTIM at the time,
in fifty-fifty per cent. The third contract was concluded in spring, 1996, in which HUNGALU sold
Metalucon Fmszerkezeteket Gyrt s Forgalmaz Kft. (Metalucon Metal Structure Manufacturing and Trading Ltd.) to MMB Finance Befektet s Kereskedelmi Kft. (MMB Finance Investment
and Trade Ltd.). The fourth contract was concluded on May 8, 1996, in which HUNGALU sold
90 per cent of Inotai Alumnium Kft. (Inota Aluminium Ltd.) to Magyar Aluminium Kft. (Hungarian Aluminium Ltd.) (MAL). The fifth contract was concluded on August 16, 1996, in which
HUNGALU sold a 72 per cent stake of Bakonyi Bauxitbnya Kft. (Bakony Bauxite Mining Ltd.)
to Fak-Top Kft.- MAL, MOTIM (actually Altus) and Metalservice Rt. According to the sixth
contract, also on August 16, 1996 HUNGALU sold 90 per cent of Kbal Kbnyai Knnyfmm
Kft. (Kbal Kbnyai Light Metal Works) to MAL. With the seventh contract signed on December
19, 1996 HUNGALU sold a 90 per cent stake of Almsfziti Timfld Kft. (Almsfzt Alumina
Ltd.) to HUNGALUmina Vagyonhasznost s Kereskedelmi Kft. (HUNGALUmina Property
Exploitation and Trade Ltd.), which had been renting the plant stopped in 1994 since 1995, and later
the complete machinery of the company. In July 1997, an eighth contract was concluded by which
HUNGALU sold a 90 per cent stake of the Ajkai Alumniumipari Kft. (Ajka Aluminium Industry
Ltd.) to Inotai Alumnium Kft. (Inota Aluminium Industry Ltd.) (or actually, to MAL. The last
contract, the ninth, signed on November 17, 1997 HUNGALU sold HUNGALU Kereskedelmi
Kft. (HUNGALU Trade Ltd.) to MAL and Motim (Altus). Each contract contained business
(employment, capital increase, development) and environmental commitments.
In the times of the Orbn government, the supervisory committee of the State Privatisation and Property Management Plc. compiled a report about the privatisation of the aluminium
industry, which claimed the Hungarian state suffered a significant loss in the course of the
sale of the company [a HUNGALU], worth approximately 25 billion HUF. The damage was
mostly attributed to the sale of the companies below their actual price.
The privatisation contracts were classified during the Horn government, and they have
just been disclosed, after the accident, on the urge of Politics Can Be Different, following
several addresses in Parliament1 and press releases.2 For the experts the contracts themselves
and the conditions of the conclusion of the contracts are controversial.
1
2
See: http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_szoveg?P_CKL=39&p_uln=35&p_felsz=116&p_szoveg=&p_stilus=
Lets start the revision of privatization contracts with MAL Co. Ltd.
http://lehetmas.hu/sajtokozlemenyek/8293/privatizacios-szerzodesek-felulvizsgalata-kezdjuk-a-mal-zrt-vel/
On whose behalf keeps Government the MAL contract a secret?
http://vorosiszap.lehetmas.hu/hirek/108/kiert-titkolja-a-kormany-a-mal-szerzodest/
22
a) The contracts were compiled by the law firm Ersi and partner (the firm of former SZDSZ
MP Ersi Mtys). The texts are quite similar, they often overlap, contain repeating turns,
when the texts were compiled, the peculiarities of the companies were not taken into consideration (especially with respect to environmental commitments, where almost all the
contracts contain the same paragraphs).
b) The contracts published have not been signed. It seems for the Orbn government the protection of personal rights is more important than the public interest to know who and why
decided about the wording of these contracts.
c) A returning element in all the contracts is that a report has to be compiled each year until
March 31 about the progress of the environmental damage management (and in case the
rate of the progress is behind the rate set forth by the environmental authority, a penalty
shall be paid). In the meantime, based on the documents available it cannot be found whether anybody obeyed this requirement (only the fact at the environmental authority in charge for the region the companies concerned presented invoices proving they had worked on
damage repairs, which was approved by the authority as a performance certificate).
d) From all the contracts, the third (about the sale of Ajkai Alumniumipari Kft.) contains
the most controversial elements. On one hand, HUNGALU remitted a 2.7 billion loan.
On the other hand the price was actually only 10 million HUF (namely 90 per cent of the
equity, a stake with a nominal value of 1591.040 million HUF was given to the buyer for
10 million forints). Based on point 6.2 of the contract, the Company (Ajka), based on the
agreement with the Buyer shall act as bailer. The Seller (HUNGALU) shall decide, whether it will validate its claim towards the Company and/or Buyer. In the meantime, the
debt of Ajkai Alumniumipari Kft., which was bigger than the equity was released, and
took over the debts towards third parties as a commitment, and also took up that in case of
the dissent of outsider parties, and in order to able to pay its overdue loans, almost on stock
market level. In other words, the buyer took over a 90 per cent stake of a de facto sound
company, for 10 million forints.
The contract estimates the costs of the damage remedy in the given circle at 3.3 billion
HUF, in the meantime claims that this includes a 2,200,000 ECU (approximately 400 million
forints on the exchange rate of 1997) PHARE project, and the biggest project, the recultivation of the abandoned depositories (together with the depositories), stayed at HUNGALU,
therefore MAL should not spend much on environmental protection HUNGALU. From the
contract it does not turn out why the price was decreased to such an extent eventually.
loyment levels of the companies and keeping them functioning as well as on environmental
damage control. So finally the state made no profit from privatisation while it was stuck with
a range of environmental obligations and risks for decades. On 1996 price levels the privatised companies took an obligation to invest 11 million HUF n the form of the environmental investment, which would add up to HUF 30 million on 2009 price levels. The impacted
companies on the other hand didnt even approach this amount in their actual environmental
investment. The environmental obligations related to Ajka were specified in the Privatisation Contract, but in a vague form that would not faster accountability, without any specific
details. The main environmental items of the privatization contract of Ajka Aluminium Industry ltd. could be found in section 4.2 of the contract. All environmental damage in fact
identified so far or in the future, shall be eliminated following consultation with the environmental authority (to the extent and pace agreed upon) on its expense or at the expense of
the Association the buyer agrees to accept the sanctions as well as the provisions of point 3
of Government decree 2263/1995. (IX.08.) with respect to the purchaser. (This government
decree went out of force from 01 July 2001. {Government decree 2166/2001. (VI. 29.) on
annulling decrees from the series 2000. 1. The government terminates regulations made by
the Council Of Ministers and government decrees specified in the appendix to this decree.}
In the privatisation contract of the Ajka plant, among others, references are often made
to point 3 of government decree2263/1995. (IX.08.), as a text where the environmental obligations are defined, but in fact this point failed to include specific details.
24
The environmental audit identified environmental damage amounting to HUF 3.3 Billion,
over and beyond the PHARE project (a reference to the construction of a slurry wall to avoid
further damage), added as the appendix of the contract. Failing to adhere to the programme
endorsed by the environmental inspectorate, the company shall pay a penalty amounting to 10
percent of the value of the damage.
Yearly damage control reports shall be sent to the privatisation authority or it legal successor.
The PHARE project amounting to ECU 2.2 million shall be implemented by the seller.
a national quality award in 2000. In a message the prime minister sent for the celebration at
the award ceremony, he used the following words: the owners and employees of the company
can be proud to be the stakeholders of an enterprise that represents the state of the art of
Hungarian economy. Through their quality performance, they show the path for others. In
the case of MAL this quality performance was made possible by only partially carrying out
the remediation of hazardous waste produced in the past or during every day production, and
due to the fact that not having to cover this significant part of the expenses, it was provided a
competitive advantage compared to other companies taking their environmental obligations
more seriously.
This naturally required cooperation on the part of the company and the environmental
authority and, in addition, very liberal inspection and licensing behaviour on the part of the
latter. It is a characteristic example that the Central Transdanubian Environmental Inspectorate gave permission in 2009, i.e. one year preceding the accident to raise the height of the
dams of basin 8 which had already been closed and recultivated, and basin 9, closed but still
kept under water and furthermore gave permission to reopen them as active reservoir basins.
There are different systems for the administration and processing of the data that are only
partially harmonized, and are at times incomplete. The most complete information system
on hazardous waste is operated by the ministry for rural development, based on mandatory
comprehensive reporting on the part of producers and managers of hazardous waste. In the
case of non hazardous waste that can be stored together with hazardous and municipal waste,
the polluter plays principle is realized in theory: the costs are paid for by the producers of the
waste. The Kolontr disaster has shown, however, that it is not fully realized in practice: the
producer of the waste in Ajka has not paid for secure depositing and storage (using a cheaper
and less secure technology) and it fell on the state (i.e. the community of taxpayers) to pay for
the disaster, the impact of which was more serious than expected. The same was proven by
chemical residues in Gar, waste with heavy metal content in Nagyttny, gas mass in Budafok
and rm, dye production residues in jpest and galvanic sludge in Csepel. The number and
volume of cases indicates that the present regulatory environment concerning the licensing and
inspection practice of authorities is not suitable for the prevention of hazardous waste related
disaster with serious health and environmental impacts, while damage control calls for billions
of Forints of expenses on the part of the state.
For the sake of prevention, the issues of mandatory liability insurance and the introduction of the institution of the provision of a security deposit have been regularly raised since the
1990s (last when the Ministry of Environmental was under the direction of Mikls Persnyi).
The governments of all times, however, always refused the proposals, invariably on the grounds
that Hungarian economic actors would not be able to bear such an extra burden. Not only
does this attitude raise concerns owing to creating a similar burden for the state without
undemocratically, but it is also problematic from the point of view of EU competition policy,
since these environmental costs are quite common in the European economy.
ling 3.7 tons in terms of solid content) is much more dense than the substance deposited in
Ajka. After filtering, the fi lter cakes with 55-60% solid content were deposited in a red mud
refuse by means of a special pump system. This method of storing red mud was introduced
in the first half of the 1980s. The closed reservoirs were covered by 20 cm of clay and 50 cm
of soil, on top of which special acacia shrubs were planted. The company spent about HUF 2
Billion on recultivation so far.
According to information published after the Kolontr disaster, the greatest environmental risk is posed by the Almsfzit deposits in the direct vicinity of the Danube flooding
area. Out of seven slurry basins located in the area, Basin 7 remains still partially uncovered,
while the others are covered and recultivated. Several tons of other hazardous wastes were also
deposited (Tatai Krnyezetvdelmi Ltd. executed various experiments in waste neutralization.)
Basin 7 was partly covered with the flying ash from the Dorog hazardous waste incinerator.
Tatai Krnyezetvdelmi ltd. developed new technology for the recultivation of red mud reservoirs
by other hazardous waste which solves the isolation of hazardous materials in the reservoir
from the environment, along with biological treatment and neutralization of organic material
and waste with metal content, taken over from various waste producers.) The compost material
generated through the process is similar to natural soil with regard to its structure and composition, while being resistant to highly alkaline sludge with an elevated metal content, and thus, it
is perfectly suited for covering reservoirs and planting recultivation vegetation. This technology
fulfils the following objectives:
The elimination of the production of surface dust on top of the reservoirs.
Making reservoirs fit the landscape, that is, creating conditions as close to the original as possible form the biological and visual points of view. The growth of vegetation results in living
organisms gradually returning into the covered areas.
The production of large quantities of a recultivation mixture suited for covering the red mud
reservoirs and planting vegetation, requiring minimal long term intervention.
Reducing the proportion of water filtering through, thus preventing the ablution of heavy
metals chemically fixed in the red mud.
The processing and utilization of organic waste through placing it in an environment where
its hazardous content is significantly or completely reduced through biological decomposition.
The North Transdanubian Environmental Inspectorate, as the environmental authority
of first instance issued an integrated environmental permit along with an environmental operation permit to the Tatai Krnyezetvdelmi Ltd. for the application of this technology. The
permits cover the red mud reservoirs of Almsfzit and allow for the biological neutralization of
132,000 tons of hazardous and 280,000 tons of non hazardous waste a year through composting.
29
The real environmental risk of the Almsfzit red mud reservoirs is however inherent in
their location. The environment of the present slurry reservoirs had been a swampy area before
the river management works. This area is now separated by a 10 km long flood protection embankment along the Danube that is identical to the red mud reservoir dam over several sections.
At times of flood, the slurry reservoirs stand out of the water the way islands do. The residential
areas of the villages of Kiskolnia and Nagykolnia are located near the slurry reservoirs.
At the time of establishing the red mud reservoirs, no clay layer was spread, thus the
reservoirs constructed without proper protection could contaminate ground waters. When the
level of the Danube is low or moderate, this contaminated water could get into the Danube
due to the direction of flow of the ground water. The Territory of the present slurry reservoirs
had previously been river and stream beds that still define the direction of groundwater flow.
These same causes significantly reduce the stability of the dams. In the groundwater monitoring
wells, situated around the slurry reservoirs, concentrations in toxic metals and fluorides have
been measured several times surpassing limit value.3
Furthermore, the area is exposed to the threat of earthquakes. At the nearby municipalities of Komrom and Dunaalms, several earthquakes took place resulting in entire buildings
collapsing. Potential major earthquakes happening in the area could cause an environmental
disaster due to the red mud getting into the Danube which could threaten the provision of
drinking water to the municipalities located along the river.
http://www.ekoku.hu/vorosiszap_sajt.pdf
30
carried out on site, and one needs to wait for a given period of time unto the dislocations are
significant enough to be indicated. In this case however, instead of establishing local points on
site and carrying out measurements, the satellites themselves have carried out all the necessary
measurements years or even almost two decades ago. Thus the history of dislocation can be
examined post facto, without on site work or measurement. A further advantage is that there
is no need to request permissions for entering the grounds. What the satellite sees from space
can be investigated regarding its movements. With this method, one can learn of the dislocation history or the stability going back eighteen years until 1992.
Regarding the red mud reservoir, the researchers first investigated the radar images made
by the ASAR sensor of the ENVISAT satellite of the European Space Agency from 2001.
All the images made of the impacted area were drawn into the analyses. The first image was
made in March 2003, while the last one was made one and a half months before the disaster.
The interferometric technology makes it possible to analyse the dislocations occurring between
individual images, and thus the movement of the reflecting surfaces can be condensed in a
time series. Such reflecting surfaces are for example, human structures and buildings. On the
other hand, the surface of agricultural land, forests and fields, as well as water surfaces are
not suitable for the examination of dislocation with the above mentioned sensors. Geometry
is equally an important factor for detection, since it is necessary for reflected signal to arrive
back to the antenna of the satellite. The satellite can measure the movement in the direction
of observation between different moments of taking the pictures.
The satellite follows an orbit approximately North-South in direction. It has a sensor
looking to the right. It sends signals at 23 degrees approximately, and detects reflected waves.
If the configuration is not appropriate, the radar signal will move in a different direction, and
thus will not be detected by the satellites antenna. First images from north to south were
drawn in the investigation. At a later stage of the research, the other direction will also be
investigated. Since reflections can arise from other places in the case of images made from
a different direction. Thus the movement will be analysed regarding more points with more
details, enabling researchers to isolate horizontal from vertical movements.
Within the surface investigated, the researchers managed to identify speed and dislocation
history at more than 15000 points based on the data. The analysis showed that the system
of the red mud reservoir dam has been moving significantly for years. These dislocations
are not only intensive, with their extent reaching and exceeding one centimetre yearly, but
also they are uneven along the dam. Some parts of the dam moved more, others moved less,
and this lead to the building up constant mechanical pressures in the system of the dam.
Large differences of movement concentrated in a small area could equally have resulted
in the fatal rupture and burst of the dam. The dam broke at the point of both the largest
demonstrated movement and the largest differentiated movement. At a distance of 120
metres from the point of rupture, the western dam was almost stable, while its southern part
showed significant dislocations as well. The results of the investigations have demonstrated that
through monitoring the stability of the dam, these movements could have been demonstrated
years ago. Large scale, spatially differentiated dislocations clearly indicated that it was only
a matter of time until this structure bursts and breaks. Thus its stabilisation could have been
provided for. The first data demonstrate that these movements went back as early as 2003. On
31
all the points measured, the history of movements can be reconstructed, going back 7.5 years,
recorded in total in 32 different moments in time.
An investigation going back even further in time could potentially indicate whether
technological interventions in the past similar to the slurry walling mentioned above could
have contributed to the deterioration of the dam and to the formation of sinking leading to
the exertion of shearing stress.
This series of observations provides no information on the dislocations of the northern
dam which was subject to a critical worsening of conditions due to the dam break, since that
structure is not located in a direction suitable for use of the satellite signalling technology.
And thus no meaningful enough reflection arrives back to the satellite antenna. This however
can be helped by another geometry of observation. In the next phases of the investigation,
the distant past will be examined based on radar data going from 1992 to 2000, obtained by
satellites ESR1 and ESR3 of the ESA. The use of a different direction of satellite orbit, and
the examination of satellite images from other frequencies is also planned for. However, the
highest number of observations, with the highest reliability as well as the most detailed time
series are provided by the Envisat satellite presented here.
Conclusions:
The data obtained by the Envisat satellite radars prove that the surroundings of Ajka, Devecser, and Kolontr, as well as the red mud reservoir is generally very stable The points have
a speed of less than 2 mm yearly.
On
the sections of the dam system of red mud reservoir 10, mapped by a series of satellite radar
detection images, the data show significant and large-scale movement with a speed over -1 cm
/ year, in the 2003 to 2010 period. The ENVISAT satellite radar detection direction differs
from the vertical by 25 degrees and from the western direction to the north by 12 degrees
Data show spatially unevenly distributed movement along the dam, which indicates the
continuous build-up of shearing stress within its structure. The series of observations by satellite radar show that the dam parts of which images were made moved to the largest extent
in the past in the north western corner of the reservoir (-12.2 mm yearly, in the direction
of the satellites, - 13.5 mm/year for sheer sinking, and -28 mm yearly for the dam moving
horizontally outwards, i.e. westwards.)
In the dam system of the red mud reservoir Basin 10 showed significant movement observed over the past years, exceeding -12 mm yearly, which equal more than -9 cm dislocation
in the direction of the satellite, if the sinking itself is 10 cm, and the horizontal movement
itself is 10 cm during the 7 and half years observed. These values are much higher than
the margin of error of 0.3 m yearly. The speed and extent of the dislocation are significant
enough to ensure that they could have been detected years ago either through on-site measurements or by space geodetic means.
32
Monitoring the movements of the embankment could have drawn attention to the danger of
a potential rupture in the structure, thus creating an opportunity for prevention.
Once the researchers demonstrated the PSI satellite technology allows remote monitoring
of the deformation, without any field work, not only in the present, but - going back in time,
based on historical data - in the past. This technique makes it unique, and the only one that
can be applied even if the threat is undervalued, the lack of control, or other reasons, measurements have been performed previously.
The results highlight the importance of monitoring and the need for its statutory requirement.
Outlook:
These results were established based on the measurements of ENVISAT satellites. In our
case, they provide the most trustworthy, and the highest number of observations, with the
most detailed time series. Further investigations will shed light on the distant past based on
the data as observed by previous ERS satellites, going back from 2000 until 1992. The data
observed by Envisat satellite, in the other direction of flight, represents an opportunity and
better resolution. And provide more precise knowledge of the spatial direction of movement of
the dam, while also separating the movement components, vertically (sinking) and horizontally.
This entails that the primary focus was on horizontal movement pushing the dam outwards,
and creating pressure at the corners. This horizontal movement was due to the layers of sludge
and water on top of one another. The investigation of the distant past is especially important,
since the communication of MAL Co. Ltd. indicates that the state obliged the company in
1997 to construct a watertight wall around the reservoir. This wall reaches 10 to 18 meters
in depth below the ground, reaching the first impermeable layer, and creates an obstacle to
the natural flow of (ground) waters, thus changing the stability of the soil. The movement of
the dam, which varies in time, could have led to water soaking into the separating layers of
the basin below the ground, making the subsoil watery and loose. The analysis of ERS data
can answer whether the stability and the history of movement of the dam has in fact changed
since the events of 1997.
900.000 to 1M m3 of spilled material. To the contrary, the disaster management plan only calculated with 300-400.000 m3, (consisting of 200.000 to 3 of water and 50.000-100.000 of red
mud. Working with a minor margin of error, this only equals half or less of the material that
in fact escaped. This entails that if the scenario sketched in the disaster management plan had
been realised, the height of the flooding liquid would have only been half of what was in fact
observed.)
Instead of a flood reaching 2 metres in height some places, the experts only calculated
with a height of one metre, which would have been less dangerous to people. It is also likely
that the extent of the damage wrought would not have been reduced in a linear fashion. But
to a much higher extent, because the water would not have been able to enter so many houses,
and would have flooded a smaller area etc. The larger quantity of water meant that the spilt
liquid and the flood it generated was more diluted and flowed much more easily, which also
contributed to the destructive impact and the size of the forces involved.
It is an equally important question why there was more liquid material in the reservoir.
The construction of slurry walls, built to prevent the contamination of ground waters created
in practical terms a closed pool around the reservoir. Given the fact that the water seeping
away from the reservoir basins as well as the precipitation falling between the banks and the
slurry walls would in the end return to the active basin, due to its alkalinity, entailing, that if
the active plant does not exclude this quantity of water, the whole basin will include more and
more liquid water or solution in the active basin. This extra quantity of water should have been
extracted by the company from the system, and neutralised and channelled into either a natural
river bed or the technological system itself. This measure would have reduced the extent of the
destruction by an order of magnitude at least as far as the loss of human lives is concerned.
Two further facts support the special role of the liquid phase. First of all, at the time
of the second dam break, experts indicated that instead of an escaping flood, what should be
expected will be sludge slowly flowing out, which will not be able to reach the villages. On
the other hand, the government intends, an is fully justified to do so, to force the alumina
plant to switch to a dry disposal technology, which is an admission of sorts that the disposal
technology used increased the risk and the severity of the accident.
It seems that MAL Co. Ltd. did not seriously consider a potential dam break at all, nor
its consequences, since the disaster management plan, as far as we know, deals with this most
important of issues in a rather vague manner. The potential effects, as enumerated, are on
the one hand imprecise, lacking the important depth. Firstly, experts should have calculated
with a potential dam break in any direction. Secondly, they estimated that the sludge would
only be able to reach the village as far as the railway embankment. But even in this case there
does not seem to be a reason for not relocating the residents living between the stream and
the reservoir. And a further point, which contributes to this is as follows. The fact that local
residents received no information and no preparation on what should be done regarding red
mud in case of a potential disaster also makes it likely that the disaster management plan was
in fact unsubstantiated.
If we consider the damage wrought and the other factors which require further investigation then it becomes clear that the reason of such a severe disaster was not the dam break
itself, but the excessive water content of the liquid escaping with the red mud flood. Its sheer
34
volume was about the double or triple of what had been estimated in the disaster management
plan. To this contributed a very strong alkalinity, with a pH value of 12.87. A significantly
smaller quantity of water would have meant an impact lower y at least an order of magnitude
concerning human lives, the damage, and spoiled human livelihoods.
and Water Inspectorate files, it concluded that all of the proceedings and adjudications having
to do with the operation of either MOTIM or its predecessors, were founded and conform with
the judicial rulings valid at those times. Concomitantly, none of the adjudications listed in the
answer letter of the prosecutors office deals with the placement of MOTIMs hazardous waste
storing basins, neither do they discuss in what extent those meet legislations warranting the safety of aquifers. According to the Clean Air Action Groups position, the prosecutors office was
misinformed by the environmental protection authority, presumably following governmental
expectations (in 49 percent the ownership of MOTIM belongs to the Altus Corporation, the
company of the prime minister of the time, Ferenc Gyurcsny).
Otherwise the Clean Air Action Group notified the government as early as 2003, that
the environmental remediation of the reservoirs containing about 30 million tonnes of red
mud was a pressing matter. The organization recommended making a modification to the
Criminal Code according to which the legal person who yields unlawful advantage to the
operation of another, commits crime regardless whether the fact of bribery or other unlawful influencing could be proven. This would be a major step forward in order to put a stop
to the present practice where decision makersstate agencies, civil servants, representative
boardsmake unlawful decisions with no personal consequences. It is that much more urgent, because the anti common interest adjudications that serve the self interest of a few, often
have the argument of the decision, withdrawal only being possible accompanied by compensation, which there is no available budgetary source for.
In regard to the environmental hazards of the Almsfzit waste disposal site the Esztergom Association of Environmental Culture and Vlaszton Foundation strove to step
up to the authorities (see the summary of their concerns in chapter 1.3.2.). Following the Kolontr accident, the organizations involved asked the environmental protection and disaster
relief authorities to perform a special inspection at the Almsfzit tailings reservoir as well as
to inform the public of the potential environmental hazards. They also proposed that tailings
reservoirs and their remediation be controlled by a civilian supervisory committee formed of
local citizens and experts.
Geology. Thus, at present, the original file is to be found in the archives of this last office. This file
would be important, because based on this it would be clear who violated the licensing order, when
and in what way that person did it. It can be speculated that the environmental protection authority
was not aware of the fact, that for certain cases of dam remodelling (e.g. for elevating the dams
of the reservoir already in use) it would be necessary to have a geological administrative licence.
According to Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Jzsef dm, chair of the
Faculty of Geodesy and Surveying at the Department of Civil Engineering, Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME), looking for the technical causes of the Kolontr
dam rupture belongs primarily to the sciences of the field of civil engineering, secondarily to
the topic of geological sciences. The professors main propositions are the following:
a) The safe operation of such large scale engineering establishments entails the continuous
monitoring of the condition of the establishment. Naturally, this encompasses the continuous examination of the sturdiness and motion testing of the reservoir dams.
b) Geodesic motion testing is indispensable for preventing similar accidents:
For the safe operation of the reservoir (reservoirs) a continuous /repeated/ motion testing is needed.
The frequency of motion testing and the accuracy of measurements (the necessity and
method of operational or strengthening interventions can be decided upon depending on
this, as a result of potential changes in measurements) are to be designed on the basis of
geotechnical experts opinions.
c) As examples to the safe operation of large mechanical establishments, the repeated motion
testing of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, the Danube river bank at Budapest or the valley
dams of water reservoirs in the Mtra Mountains could be mentioned.
d) Todays modern geodesic motion testing methods of measurement (employing conventional
geodesic measuring procedures and the modern satellite techniques, with GPS-method and
satellite radar interferometry) assure detection of changes both in a horizontal and vertical
sense, if necessary, even in the millimetric range of accuracy.
e) For conducting such studies, in Hungary there is an adequate scientific capacity available.
At the Budapest University of Technology and Economics most similar expert tasks are
performed by the faculties of the Department of Civil Engineering. The staff of the Department can give expert answers to questions that concern the planning, calculus, error
detection and motion testing related to the disaster of the dam rupturing.
37
http://www.vedegylet.hu/index.php?page=news&news_id=651
38
the these laws should have been changed. However such changes did not happen obviously
for the reason that the laws assign those duties to the NTSZ, that in the favour of citizens
health and safety it needs to fulfil. The government stepped in against the bureaucracy afflicting
businesses, by not reducing the assigned duties, just the money and the staff ! By doing so the
NTSZ became incapable of taking care of its duties provided by the law. This is what became
apparent during the red mud disaster, when the NTSZ concluded that the Ajka red mud
was non-toxic based on 1987 (!) measurements data. According to this data the sludge has a pH
of 11.8, which is one order of magnitude less than the value of 12.9 pH measured in reality (the
pH shows acidity/alkalinity based on a logarithmic scale, thus the 12.9 pH means an over ten
times stronger lye concentration, than the pH of 11.8). This is how it could happen that the first
up-to-date data following the disaster was not let known to the public by a state institution or
authority, but chiefly from the measurements of an international environmental organizations,
the Greenpeaces office in Hungary.
A modern state cannot do without the state-run inspection organs that function effectively and that are well prepared. As a result of the accelerated scientific-technical and
economic development we have to face an increasing amount of risks. The large number of
new chemical substances, the nuclear products spreading wide, the increasing transportation
capacities, surfacing of the genetically modified products, the operation of the many hazardous industrial facilities constitute such risks, that require severe regulations and authorities
performing their activity on a professionally high level of competence. In Hungary, in recent
times the inspection organsthe environmental protection and nature conservancy authorities, the NTSZ, the hydrological organs, the plant protection service, the traffic monitoring
authorities, the Consumer Protection Main Inspectorate and othershave been dismantled
in an ill-considered way, continuously and at a large scale.
Financial austerities at the state inspection organs cause much larger damages, than the
benefits they bring forth, amounting to: crime increases, societal injustices and tensions grow
stronger, the health status of the citizens and the quality of the environment worsen, the
countrys assessment changes unfavourably, moreover, the state revenue decreases. Dismantling of the inspection organs only favours those, who are striving to bypass legislature. Such
complaints are continuously registered coming not only from the citizens, but those multinational and smaller domestic companies that take regulations seriously, as well.
Undeservingly little attention was given to the fact that authority dismantlings lead to prolonged case processing, a decrease in service quality and to juridical uncertainty. Procedures are
slow, non-transparent, deflecting responsibilities right and left, symptoms which mostly stem
from the overloadedness of the clerks, unpredictability, the constant reorganizing, rationalizing.
The European Union stated even before our accession, that at the environmental protection and nature conservancy local organs there would be a need for more than one thousand
additional employees in order for us to comply with the communitys requirements, whereas
GDP-proportional financing of the domestic environmental protection sector brings up the
rear in the OECD, being approximately at the level of Turkey as it was also shown by a
Protect The Future-study.5 On the contrary, since then, staff of these organs has been decrea5
http://www.poltudszemle.hu/szamok/2008_3szam/2008_3_javor.pdf
39
sed continuously and the process only stopped in the last one or two years. Presently, at the
environmental protection inspectorates a case is often allotted only a few minutes to be taken
care of. Apart from few exceptions, the individual cases are approved without considerate
review. Year after year, citizens complaints arriving to the civil organizations are more and
more numerous. Illegal waste disposal, the different activities that pollute the air and emit
substantial noise, green area destructions are often due to the lack of authority inspections
and measurements, as well as the fact that on-site inspections have become extremely rare
and the quality of those is not always adequate because of the overloadedness of the employees. Delay of cases also happens frequently, which may discourage honest investors. Even
certain leaders of the previous environmental protection ministry stressed it occasionally as
an important consideration, that authorities shall not be in the way of them, but rather help
business activities as smoothly as possible, referring to the fact that they do not need to fully
comply with environmental laws.
The situation is especially worrisome in the activity of the building authorities. According
to the Green Economic Stimulus, the study put together by the Llegzet Foundation in 2010,
right nowas a caricature of the statev21 people are inspecting constructions in Hungary,
out of which ten percent are inspected (the European average is sixty percent). Giving building
permits out is the competence of the clerk and the departments of building authorities. The
latter ones however cannot be regarded independent of the local governance, the mayor. This
practice takes an expensive apparatus and at the same timeespecially in the jurisdiction of
the smaller governancesthe adequate expertise is not assured. It is very common, that they
administer building processes where regulations are infringed upon and they fail to represent
the interest of the public versus the infringing builders. From societal and national economy
standpoint the danger runs at least this high, that the infringing constructions too often are
not stalled and they are not inspected adequately. Edifices built unlawfully, are practically never
brought down. The reason behind failing to deconstruct is often simply financial governances
do not have the money to prepay for the official deconstructions, the costs of which are only
redeemable later as it was stated by the 2nd report of Protect The Futures Representation of
Future Generations program in 2001.6
Local governances get numerous tasks as environmental protection authority of first instance (permitting related to woody plants, air protection authority, building authority, etc.),
that legislation deploys to the clerk, who typically delegates related duties to the environmental
protection department or the executive. It is especially true about these organs that in many places
the needed expertise is not available and on top of all, due to the local connections and system
of influences, the chance for biasedness, in more severe cases corruption, is quite significant. In
many instances governances themselves are interested (e.g. via the local taxes) in carrying out
certain environmentally burdensome projects, that also elevates the risks of corruption.
http://www.vedegylet.hu/doc/jonek_2.pdf
40
The study of the Breath Foundation spelled out some recommendations as for how to
strengthen the activity of authorities, too:
The practice of environmental protection licensing has to be made more strict. In cases of projects that take up huge masses of land, attract heavy loads of traffic, not to be possible for the
environmental protection authority to come to such absurd conclusions as the one saying that
the project does not have significant environmental impacts.
In the cases of projects, the practice of impact zone delineation should be changed, broadened. So that thereafter it could not happen for example, that the impacts of a linear
construction project generating significant traffic across a huge area are only assessed right
alongside the new trace.
The correctness of the key elements, measurements of the case study and impact assessment
documentations handed in by the investor, should be assessed by the authority with the revision of the inspectorate in every instance.
Both the available financial and human resources have to be expanded at the environmental
protection, nature conservancy and hydrological inspectorates, the hydrological boards and
the nature conservancy watch. Furthermore, a transparent organizational framework should
be created that assures the most effective use of resources possible. For operating the environmental protection authorities, the best practical experiences should be implemented from the
extremely rich international specialized literature. First, for instance, the recommendations
made by Impel (European Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law) should be naturalized in the domestic practice.
It needs to be specified in law, that the environmental protection, nature conservancy and
hydrological authorities cannot hire an independent expert in a specialty issue that belongs
to their area of competence. Expert opinions requested from partner authorities, the specialized authoritys position and the own experts have to provide sufficient professional background for the decision making.
The process in which authorities regard civil organizations expressing an opinion about their
procedures as obstacles, instead of seeing the participants in improving effectiveness, the quality level of professional decisions and the social acceptance of those, needs to be reversed.
Public hearings related to environmental protection licensing procedures always need to be
held after work hours, at the closest possible location to the planned project, in order to allow
as many people as possible to participate (at the moment in many cases efforts are reversed).
41
42
Based on the environmental protection licence, MAL Co. Ltd. also had to provide the
Inspectorate with the data and documents listed below:
a) annual summary report of the operation of the waste disposal site by April 30th following
the current year, including the status description of the waste disposal site, data about sinking of the waste disposal site level, the results of underground water testing.
b) water quality studies as part of the monitoring system, on quarter, half year basis at the
specified wells, as well as water level observations, also by April 30th.
The licence prescribed MAL further reporting, revision, operational, managerial obligations from the monitoring wells to sound protection, data that is also the responsibility of the
authority to inspect. The company had the obligation to report to the environmental protection
inspectorate all changes listed in the licence, the day following the observation. (Meeting this
obligation, was also the authoritys duty to inspect.)
On February 17th 2006, the aluminium oxide sector of MAL received an integrated environmental permit (MAL-EKE) from the inspectorate (valid through February 28th 2011).
This licence included (sz. 10897/05) the dilution method using reclaimed water and lifting
the water into basin X. Points 9.xx and 11.xx deal with the issues of waste management, and
also cover the report of change obligation. The issue of the reservoir the licence does not touch
upon any more, delegating that into the competence of local building affairs.
Ensuing the Kolontr accident, the Society of Conservationists of Eastern Hungary
initiated a criminal complaint at the Supreme Court against an unknown perpetrator or
perpetrators in suspicion of reckless endangerment due to professional negligence resulting
in manslaughter. According to the legal position of the civilian organization, the environmental protection authority concerned, according to the ruling of the 22 (3) of Government
decree 314/2005. (XII.25.) about the environmental impact assessment and the integrated
environmental usage licensing, during its on-site inspection performed on September 23rd
2010, did not do justice to the 219/2004. (VII.21.) Government decree about the protection
of underground water tables and to the pertaining instructions of the 2001/331/EK (2001.
IV.4.) proposal about determining the minimum requirements of environmental protection
inspections conducted in the member states (in other words it did not perform a veritable
inspection, resorting to the data provision of the operator).
Following the accident, Politics Can Be Different (LMP) immediately brought up the
issue of authorities responsibility as well. According to the position of the ecological party,
both the flaws in the Hungarian and the Union regulations played role in what made the
disaster possible. In the European Union the bauxite residues (red mud)the solid phaseis
not considered hazardous waste, in Hungary however, based on their alkalinity resulting from
the employed technology, they are clearly to be listed among hazardous wastes. (It is worth
mentioning here, that the solution phase accompanying the bauxite residues that leave the
aluminium oxide factory have a pH exceeding 11.5, not only in Hungary, but in other parts
within the EU as well.) In practice, however, authorities adapt the softer regulatory threshold
in our country, too, treating red mud as non-hazardous waste.
43
LMP also pointed out that alongside the potential technical causes, the accident clearly
raises the inadequacy of the administrative inspection, too: the environmental protection inspectorate does not have the competence of performing structural engineering examinations
and not even weeks after the dam rupturing was it obvious which authority would have the
duty to examine the technical status of the similar dams. Based on the final decision of the
Capital High Court in December 2010, the waste can be rendered harmless by depositing the
red mud and the creation of the waste disposal site requires integrated environmental permit.
The ruling closed up the competency dispute of the Central Transdanubian Environmental
Protection, Nature Conservancy and Water Inspectorate versus the clerk of Devecser. The court
did not challenge the fact that the regulation is ambiguous, but stated: based on the ruling
currently in effect, the red mud reservoirs undoubtedly belong under the effect of the waste
management law. Such a structure can be built only by complying with the rulings of the
specialized legislation and with the licence of the environmental protection authority. One of
the conditions is to undergo the procedure necessary to be given the integrated environmental
permit, that clearly belongs to the competence of the environmental protection inspectorate,
according to the high court. From the order it becomes apparent, that the clerk exercising the
power of general building affairs authority, does not have any duty in relation to such establishments whatsoever. Nonetheless, following the disaster, the inspectorate still conjured the
clerk to conduct the administrative procedure, who refused to act, however, arguing that he
did not have the competence.
In LMPs opinion, the inspection permits of the green authority that has been systematically weakened throughout the past years need to be strengthened, which requires both legal
measures and staff expansion. The case warrants a Union level revision of the environmental
protection regulation system of the state of Hungary (and presumably of the other states in the
region). In the case of high environmental risk industrial operations, a system of mandatory
financial collaterals and liability insurances has to be implemented that conform with the EUguidelines that pertain to environmental responsibility. The system of environmental protection
licensing and revision also has to be transformed. Finally, at the level of the European Union
there is a need to create a guideline governing the mandatory liability insurances of hazardous industrial plants, as well as the establishing of shared funds filled by the deposits of the
hazardous industrial plants and aimed for covering those damages that otherwise (based on
the insurances and the damaging companies assets) could not be paid for.
The same opinion was shared by the European Commission in its stand at the beginning
of December, according to which the red mud that flooded Devecser and Kolontr should
have been classified hazardous waste (that is, Hungarian authorities let the MAL Corporation
operate based on erroneous licences).
Following cautioning of the Union, the ecological party demanded a thorough and unbiased investigation to find out what professional errors were committed in the licensing procedure. Earlier, LMP had already drawn the attention to the fact that for the event of the red
mud disaster not only the MAL Corporation is to be held responsible, but all of the authorities
concerned, furthermore the legislation in effect and the governments that had failed to create
the adequate legislation since 1995. In the instance of the authorities, it is incomprehensible,
how they could give out licence in 2006 for regular waste disposal in the case of a material
44
having a pH of 13. The Basel Convention is clearly classifying bauxite residues (the red mud)
hazardous waste, as long as their pH is higher than 11.5. This criteria features exclusively
in relation to the red mudnot surprisingly, based on this, the European Commission also
came to the conclusion that the red mud causing the disaster is considered hazardous by
the European Waste Catalogue (EWC), therefore the Hungarian authorities committed
an error when they did not classify it as hazardous waste.
LMP believes that it is the responsibility of governments of the past fifteen years, that as
a result of the continuous changes dotted with cut-backs and dismantlings inflicted upon the
administrative system, such an administrative system has been created that is insecure even
in its own competencies, that is weak, susceptible to political influencing and that practically
does not have on-site presence. In relation to this case, the ecological party called upon the
government once again, to strengthen the administrative system, to bring to a halt the political
influence and to lead a thorough and unbiased investigation of the red mud disaster, naming
those found responsible.
45
Summary
It is not possible to account for the Kolontr red mud disaster by means of a single cause.
Among the potential causes and preceding events, the following should by all means be noted:
The conditions of privatisation: it was with reference to the obligations of environmental protection that the buyer was able to acquire the Ajka Aluminium plant at a very low
price. However, these obligations were not properly regulated within the contract, and
there were also gaps in monitoring implementation. Moreover, the authorities allowed
on more than one occasion for the owner to postpone meeting these obligations.
Deficiencies in monitoring environmental damage control: the privatisation contracts contained an obligation to provide for environmental damage-limitation, but the
monitoring of how this was implemented was deficient. No detailed documentation is
available, except for written records to the effect that invoices were presented as evidence
for compliance without technical inspection having taken place;
Outdated disposal technology: when the first red mud reservoirs were established, the
technology of wet disposal for red mud was still widespread, but much safer dry processes were already available by the time the permit for Basin X was granted, and the
integrated environmental permit for the reservoir was granted;
Inappropriate classification of red mud waste: when the integrated environmental permit
was granted, red mud was not classified as hazardous waste, even though it clearly counted
as such on the basis of its pH value under the Hungarian and EU legislation then in force;
Licensing and monitoring malpractice on the part of administrations: following the
disaster, a court ruling was required to clarify which authority should have granted a
permit for the dam building at the reservoir and carried out structural engineering inspection of the built structure;
The sinking of the dam (which could also be related to posterior slurry walling): satellite images clearly show that the barrier sank in certain places at a rate of 1 cm / year,
creating maximum shear stress precisely at the section where the dam finally broke,
while the sinking itself might have occurred because of the slurry walling, or because of
the dam base and subsoil becoming soaked due to the slurry walling. However, no use
was made of the satellite imagery in the structural engineering inspection of the dam,
even though they were continuously available; neither was the stability of the structure
monitored in any other way.
Negligence on the part of the authorities and government officials: several NGOs had
previously protested about the lack of environmental protection developments and the failure to carry out inspections. Their comments had no practical consequences at all.
46
Recommendations
Privatization documents of the industrial plants with great environmental risks, the environmental protection compliances and the inspection thereof all have to be revised. In
the event that a clear connection is shown between the improper privatization practice
and the large increase of the environmental risks, then the personal responsibility also
has to be investigated among the participants of the privatization process.
The licensing practice of the environmental protection authorities has to be revised, with
special attention to industrial processes resulting in large amounts of hazardous waste,
to the disposal of hazardous wastes, to the integrated environmental permits relating
to these and within the IPPC guidelines to the enforcement of the BAT instructions.
In the case of authorities taking part in (and those avoiding taking part in) the inspection and licensing, the exact institutional and personal responsibilities need to be
investigated.
It needs to be assessed whether the administrative capacity presently at hand is proportionate to the truly existing industrial hazards and the inspection demands relating to
them, as well as the institution system needs to be reinforced where justified.
There is need for regulation to be passed specifying the frequency of structural engineering and environmental safety inspections of similar structures and the distribution
system of responsibilities (see the pertaining LMP bill).
In order to prevent similar disasters, client rights of the civil organizations have to be
strengthened, not taken away.
47
and alkaline slurry pollutes about 1.000 acres of land. The amount of the emitted is was about
0.91 million cubic meters.)
Fire-fighters reach the scene in about 8 minutes and start rescuing the inhabitants trapped
or injured, amounting to about 60 victims in Kolontr and nearly 720 people in Devecser.
Minister of the Interior Sndor Pintr and Gyrgy Bakondi, the director of the National
Directorate General for Disaster Management immediately travel to the scene.
The commanding unit of the Directorate for Disaster Management is set up by 2 pm. The
Local Defence Committee starts to operate.
Action is taken immediately to accommodate the inhabitants whose homes have been flooded.
Accommodation is organised for 40 people in Kolontr, while temporary night shelters are put
up for 500 people in Devecser. Only 31 of the night shelters are used since the vast majority
of affl icted chose to lodge with relatives and friends in neighbouring villages.
The Directorate for Disaster Management (OKF) sends four members of the Crisis Intervention Team to the scene to provide mental health care and manage the rescue operations.
At 4 pm on 4 October 2010, the regional offices of the Central Agricultural Office declare a ban
on fishing and hunting. Sales and use of contaminated fodder and food is prohibited through an
official intervention by the Chief Veterinary Officer.
5 October 2010
In order to protect the water quality of the Marcal River and to prevent pollution of the
Danube, the calcium nitrate and magnesium nitrate delivered on the scene is deployed in the
river by fire fighters and military forces under the supervision of water management professionals from early dawn.
340 people are mobilised and deployed on the scene by the Police. Acting on oral instruction,
the Army arrives on the scene as well.
Shipping the collected pollutants starts back to the premises of the company having caused
the incident, into an intact basin.
Secretary of State for the Environment Zoltn Ills suspends production at MAL Co. Ltd.
with immediate notice, simultaneously ordering the company to start restoring the reservoir
damaged in the area of Ajka. The Ministry of the Interior calls upon the company to allocate
HUF 100.000 as emergency aid to the each owner whose homes have been damaged.
49
The Prime Minister requests the Minister of the Interior to investigate the issue of personal
and material liability. The Government calls on the Minister for Rural Development to assess the damage to producers to and its consequences. The Ministry for Rural Development
initiates a revision of other similar red mud reservoirs until 15 October.
The Army and the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service (NTSZ) assess
radiological threats. Both laboratories conclude that there is no hazardous radiation exposure
in the area.
With the cooperation of the Central Agricultural Office, the collection and disposal of
animal carcasses starts.
The Veszprm County Defence Commission decides to ban the consumption of contaminated
food products and animal feeds, as well as on involving public workers and municipal forces
in the works in the municipalities.
6 October 2010
The disaster is discussed as the first item on the agenda of the Government meeting. The
comprehensive report of the Minister of the Interior is heard. The government declares a state
of emergency.
The Minister of the Interior announces that the Police will give first priority to investigating the
issue of liability. The investigation is to be taken over by the National Bureau of Investigation.
Professionals address the problem of alkaline red mud escaped from the reservoir at Kolontr
flowing into the Marcal river. The Minister of the Interior states that round the clock, 24
hour long guards or monitoring shall be started on the dam of the reservoir.
The government announces that staying in Hungary is completely safe, the collapse of the dam
in no way threatens people and tourists. The disaster of the sludge reservoir is local, without
the risk of adverse health effects outside the impacted areas.
As a consequence of the disaster, the Government Accountability Commissioner speeds up the
investigation regarding MAL Co. Ltd., the owner of the alumina plant. For the time being, information is gathered on the contracts concluded between the group and the state in recent years.
The Army constructs a temporary bridge to replace the bridge destroyed at Kolontr. The
maintenance of the replacement bridge will be continually secured.
50
At a press conference by the Government Spokesperson, the Minister of the Interior states
that the professionals are able to treat the alkalinity of the red mud released from the reservoir
in the Marcal River.
Benedek Jvor, the President of the Sustainable Development Committee of the Parliament,
delegated by LMP, investigates conditions at Kolontr and Devecser. At a local press conference he urges the Minister for National Development to disclose the privatization contracts
of the Ajka plant.
7 October 2010
Early in the morning, the Prime Minister conducts inquiries about the situation on the
ground. He walks along the streets among the destroyed houses of Kolontr, personally
assessing the damage wrought by the red mud flooding the village on Monday afternoon.
He ensures the injured that they will not be left alone. The elimination of damage in the
surrounding damaged or partially destroyed homes is carried out depending on whether
their owners declare they are willing later to remain in their houses or the flooded district.
At 3 pm, the County Defence Commission meets in Devecser, followed by a residential
hearing with the participation of the county director of disaster management.
Sanitary tents are set up by the government in Devecser and Kolontr in order to ensure
that the participants in the rescuing operations in direct contact with the material may immediately be washed, while they are still wearing the protective garments.
The Kolontr fish pond is drained in the hope of finding the three missing persons, but the
bodies are not found.
The three-part dam designed to stop further leakage from the damaged basin is constructed.
A new reservoir is built to store the collected sludge and debris.
The National Directorate of Disaster Management entrust experts from Kroly Rbert College, Gyngys to carry out aerial damage assessment of the areas flooded with red mud as
a result of the breaking of the dam of the Ajka caustic waste reservoir.
The National Bureau of Investigation initially stated they the original investigation into
the suspected crime of reckless endangerment due to professional negligence resulting in
manslaughter was reclassified as endangerment due to professional activities resulting in a
lethal mass disaster.
The Army constructs a temporary bridge to replace the bridge destroyed at Kolontr. The
maintenance of the replacement bridge will be continually secured.
51
More gypsum is deployed in order to uphold protection and to mitigate alkalinity at Kolontr
village, followed by Devecser and Somlvsrhely, the Marcal, and the bridge of the public
road connecting the settlement of Szergny and Vinr.
Fidesz MEP Jnos der proposes the establishment of an EU disaster fund at the plenary
session of the European Parliament in Brussels.
8 October 2010
Gypsum is spread from the air at Marcal. This water is further diluted with water from the
Rba and the Moson branch of the Danube, only entering the Danube at this stage. Further
water quality problems and adverse health effects are not expected.
After cleaning the residential areas, mitigation starts in the peripheral areas of the towns
flooded by red mud.
At 6 am on 8 October, a pH value of 8.8 is registered at the Petfi Bridge section of the River
Rba, and a pH value of 8.34 is registered at the Szchenyi Bridge section of the Moson
branch of the Danube. Measured pH levels reach 8.5 at the point where the Marcal meets
the Rba, and approx. pH 8 on the Danube. Along the Marcal, pH below 9.0 is reported at
several measuring points. No further fish death is observed on the impacted river sections.
The water management agency continually measures water pH values at the Budapest Danube
section, but so far there is no indication of increase. Thus it is not likely that the contamination would reach the capital.
Eighty police officers constantly maintain safety in the disaster-stricken area and emergency
ambulance teams continue the search for missing people.
A mentsben 400 ember s tbb szz munkagp vesz rszt.
9 October 2010
The evacuation of residents from Kolontr, in a state of emergency, is ordered impacting a total
of 715 people, as The dam of Basin 10 of the Ajka reservoir weakened further during the night.
12 October 2010
The construction of the third protective barrier is constructed at Kolontr to keep the resident
safe. In Devecser, the location of new residential block is identified, to be constructed for
those who used to live in the areas flooded with red mud flooded.
52
13 October 2010
The number of deaths in the disaster reaches nine, as on of the injured dies in the Ajka
hospital. The evacuation order is lifted after the construction of the new barrier in Kolontr
safeguards the security of the residents of Devecser.
15 October 2010
The first of the residents evacuated can move back to Kolontr.
it is likely that no loss of life would have occurred if the flood wave had been only half as high.
At first sight it is not easy to understand how the authorities could have permitted production
to be resumed with the same wet disposal technology especially with regard to the fact that
according to the first declarations, the plant had only a limited capacity for disposal, barely
enough for a few weeks or one or two months at most. With hindsight, the primary reason
for that seems to be related to the intention to avoid the plant getting into an untenable situation and losing its markets. Thus environmental and environmental security considerations
have played a limited part in the decision making process. At the same time it is a fact that
simultaneously with resuming production, the company started to take preliminary steps to a
shift to the dry depositing technology.
is nevertheless not used. The reason is that it is still significantly more expensive and energy
intensive than producing iron from mined ores. Thus it is dumped as non useful waste in
reservoirs, and stored there until better days come.
Red mud is not classified as hazardous waste in Hungary, even though it clearly is hazardous due to its alkalinity. The water generated in the course of the sedimentation of red mud
in the wet disposal process used at Ajka is mostly put to technological use. The utilization
of useful ingredients by the manufacturer or operator is required by law in any case. As the
bauxite residue (red mud) is not as yet the raw material of any other process, whatever is done
to it appears as no more than wasted costs for the aluminium industry. Therefore it remains
in the reservoirs. The reservoirs are typically recultivated, that is, covered with a surface organic
material, such as sewage sludge, and an attempt is made to grow plants on top.
is whether living organisms (plants, animals, humans) are exposed to these heavy metals,
considered toxic. In this regard, test results published by MTA (relating to solutions in water
and ammonium acetate of 4,5 ph value ) fail to provide sufficient answers.
d) Red mud entering rivers and the soil has a highly alkaline ph level that needs to be neutralised
or at least mitigated. Acidic substances are suitable for this goal. In practice, acidic acid and
sulphuric acid was used. For neutralization or mitigation purposes, gypsum (CaSO4) was
also used, spread in the contaminated area. Gypsum was poured in the Torna creek and the
Marcal river in the emergency circumstances. Caustic soda and acidic acid react to form
sodium acetate. This substance hydrolyzes in an alkaline manner, but it is much less alkaline
than the original sodium hydroxide was. Gypsum is suitable for neutralising because CaSO4
though, it is a salt dissolving badly in water, still enters Ca 2+ ions in the system. In the presence of such a high OH ion concentration, based on the - the products of solubility - the
Ca(OH)2 dissolves even worse than the gypsum does. Thus, part of OH ions , responsible
for alkalinity react with Ca 2+-ions to form a precipitation, and this decreases the alkalinity.
e) What happens to the spilled red mud once it dries up? The dry dustlike substance can be
carried by the wind, and be inhaled by organisms. When inhaled, the red mud causes the
same damage as it does to the skin, only more severe, since the breathing surface of the lung
is far more delicate and vulnerable. This is why the residents moving back into the area were
forced to wear dust filter masks as well as the participants in the rescue operation. The dried
dust is a potential alkali since NaOH present in the original solution phase is contained in
small crystalline form, thus the inhaled dust immediately creates a strong alkali reacting with
the water content of the lungs. In order to reduce the formation of dust in the contaminated
area, calcium chloride powder was originally planned to be scattered, as it has an absorbent
quality, extracting moisture from the air to prevent the spilled red mud from drying out.
The CaCl 2 is hygroscopic, i.e. absorbs humidity, thus a solid crystalline material gradually
liquidifies (i.e. is transformed into a concentrated solution). Moreover, this salt is hydrolyzed
in slightly acidic manner, neutralizing the lye to a limited extent.
56
Summary
The accident took place at 12:25 pm on 04. 10. 2010. The red mud spill following the
dam break reached the municipalities of Devecser, Kolontr, Somlvsrhely, Somljen,
Tskevr, Apcatorna and Kisberzseny. The red mud contaminated the valleys of the
Torna creek and the Marcal river, almost reaching the river Rba. Through the Torna,
Marcal, Rba and the Moson branch of the Danube, the alkaline slurry entered the
Danube, causing destruction in all the affected waters. Along the Torna and the impacted
section of Marcal, practically all aquatic life was destroyed.
The disaster left 10 people dead and almost 150 slightly or severely injured, including
local residents and the participants in the rescue operations.
The spilt mud and alkaline slurry polluted about 1,000 acres of land. The amount of the
emitted pollutants was about 0.91 million cubic meters.
The fact that the devastation wrought by the dam break significantly exceeded the expected impact as specified in the disaster management plan can be accounted for in
physical terms by the exceedingly large water content of the slurry stored in Basin X, and
from a chemical perspective by the alkalinity of the spilt liquid, which approached pH
13. The relatively high concentration of metals (arsenic, mercury, etc.) in the pollutant
mix has also presented further health and environmental problems.
Recommendations
Based on the experience of the Kolontr accident and the inundation models derived
from it, the disaster management plans for facilities with high environmental risk should
be urgently and thoroughly revised.
Differentiated limit values for metals and other toxic substances need to be established
with respect to soils contaminated through industrial activity (mining, ore processing,
chemical industry, galvanic industry, leather manufacturing etc) and accidents. These
limit values shall also be adapted to later land use. Breaking with current practice, these
requirements should ensure that it is not only sewage sludge related limit values that are
used as benchmarks when assessing environmental health risks or fulfilling recovery
objectives.
When the occurrence of an accident proves that a given technology is hazardous, general regulation should be adopted to ensure that no permission is granted to resume the
industrial activity unless the technology used is significantly modified in a way that effectively reduces the environmental risks entailed.
57
3. Damage control
3.1. Actions by the authorities
As indicated above, the competent county offices of the Central Agricultural Office immediately declared a ban on hunting and fishing on the day of the disaster (at 16 o'clock in the
afternoon). The sales and use of contaminated food and feed products was prohibited through
official action by the Chief Veterinary Officer. In the wake of the disaster, Secretary of State
for the Environment Zoltn Ills suspended production at MAL Co. Ltd. with immediate
effect, simultaneously directing the company to restore the reservoir in the area of Ajka.
Based on the decision of the Defence Committee, the construction of four stone barriers
between the red mud reservoirs and the village of Kolontr was started so that they could slow
down sludge spill and reduce its destructive power in the case of a potential further breach
of the reservoir dam. The fourth barrier was built on the territory of the municipality itself.
On 5 October, the first response of the government to the disaster was to issue a government decree declaring a state of emergency and defining a range of organizational, financial
and communications tasks related to damage control.
58
Acting upon the authority defined by Article 35, section (1), point i) of the Constitution, and
based on Article 149, section (3) of Act CV of 2004 on National Defence and the Hungarian
Defence Forces, the Government issues the following Decree:
1. (1) The Government declares a state of emergency according to Article 2, section (2), point f)
of Act XXXVII of 1996 on Civil Protection in the administrative area of Gyr-Moson-Sopron,
Veszprm and Vas counties.
(2) In the area impacted by the state of emergency, the measures stipulated by Article 159.
(1) - (3), Article 165, Article 168, Article 169, Article 173 (1) - (2), (3) a)-c), (4), Article 186
and Article 195 of Act CV of 2004 on National Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces
(hereinafter referred to as NDA) shall be applied.
(3) On the basis of Article 8, point b of Act LXXIV of 1999 on the Management and
Organisation of Disaster Protection and the Prevention of Major Accidents Involving Hazardous Substances, the Hungarian Defence and Police Forces may be called in to assist with the
elimination of the state of emergency.
2. (1) The Minister for Rural Development shall perform ministerial duties relating to the
rectification of environmental damage according to relevant regulations. The Defence Working
Committee shall function within the Ministry for Rural Development. The Minister for Rural
Development shall direct the activities of the Working Committee.
(2) Governmental communication activities related to the elimination of threat in relation
to the state of emergency referred to in the present Decree shall be coordinated by the Minister Of
Public Administrative And Justice .
(3) Government shall provide funding for reasonable defence-related expenses occurring
after 12.30 pm on 4 October 2010 from the general reserve of the budget or otherwise for the
participants in the activities of protection.
3. The present Decree enters into force at 3 pm on 6 October 2010.
A few days after the disaster, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority learned
from several sources that a number of disaster victims with mortgage loans in the red mud
disaster stricken communities received a formal notice from their credit institution. For the
majority of mortgage contracts, the contract is immediately terminated by the bank if the
mortgaged property is destroyed. The Authority drew the attention of the banks to points
IV. a) and b) of the Code of Conduct, which clearly define the procedures to be applied to
handling payment difficulties. The institutions subscribing to the Code had undertaken to
develop bridging solutions for these cases, and to notify customers through a letter or infor59
mation brochure. As terminating the contracts of clients having lost the loan collateral in the
disaster would have disastrous consequences on these debtors, the Authority took the firm
position that developing bridging solutions is the only solution sufficiently taking into account
the multifaceted aspects of the present case. The Authority sent an executive circular to the
financial institutions concerned, specifying the behaviour expected. The Financial Supervisory
Authority set up a dedicated legal aid customer service operating during opening hours to
address mortgage problems related to the red mud disaster.
On 11 October, the police took the CEO of MAL Co. Ltd. under custody and initiated
pre-trial detention. The company's assets were seized. The same day, National Emergency
Director General Gyrgy Bakondi was appointed Government Emergency Commissioner.
Parliament adopted an amendment to the NDA to the effect that the operation of business
enitities may in the future be brought under the supervision of the state through a Decree,
with the Minister or the Government Commissioner acting on behalf of the state.
The Governmental proposal was voted for by the majority of parties in Parliament, with the parliamentary group of LMP abstaining from the vote. The ecological party did not object to placing
MAL Co. Ltd. under the state supervision, but warned that the proposed amendment was too
vague as the scope in which it would enable placing companies under state supervision was too
broad and not sufficiently clearly defined. Furthermore, it was less accurate in its provisions on the
conditions and duration of maintaining supervision than would be required by the rule of law.
The Emergency Commissioner was granted the following competences: a right to overview the financial condition of the business entity, to endorse and countersign financial obligations the business entity would take on and to take decisions on matters within the competence
of the entity's main decision making body with a view to directly eliminate the conditions that
have lead to the adoption of the extraordinary measures or to mitigate their consequences.
The Hungarian State shall notify, in writing, with immediate notice, the entity's senior officials and members of the Supervisory Board regarding decisions taken on matters within
the competence of the entity's main decision making body. This right of decision making does
not otherwise affect the competences of the highest decision making body of the entity. The
Hungarian State owes the business entity or its owner compensation amounting to the value
of the damage in effect incurred by decisions of the Commissioner in its competence for the
period when a decree is in force that the Constitutional Court would later annul.
On 12 October, the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service (NTSZ)
published its findings concluding that drinking water quality is suitable and access to drinking water is secure in the area flooded with red mud. In the preceding week, the public health
authority carried out a detailed analysis of 68 drinking water samples taken from 8 settlements
of the area impacted. The samples included seven samples taken from drilled wells. The values
did not deviate from the usual indicators of water quality, indicating appropriate water quality. Based on the results, Disaster Management added that the drinking water bases were not
acutely impaired from any direction by the disaster. The National Public Health and Medical
60
Officer Service and the Central Transdanubian Environmental, Nature conservation and Water
Management Inspectorate jointly performed air quality tests in Kolontr and Devecser. Based
on data obtained by common standardised measurement methodologies, the concentration of
airborne fine articulates did not exceed limit values between 7 to 10 October, i.e. the period
for which airborne fine articulates were an increasing problem due to drying of the red sludge.
Nevertheless, based on the test results the bodies communicated that wearing FFP2D dust
masks was deemed secure and generally recommended. Eight air pollution measurement points
were established, in the municipalities of Ajka, Devecser, Kolontr, Tskevr and Somlvsrhely, among others. According to measures by the National Public Health and Medical Officer
Service, dust concentration in the air only exceeded the limit values in the disaster impacted
area (in proximity of the dam break). In this area, wearing a dust mask was made compulsory
for participants in the rescue operations.
Minister for Rural Development Alexander Fazekas announced on 5 November in Kolontr that Csaba Szab was commissioned to oversee tasks of coordination and consultation
related to restoration activities and the exchange of real estate plots in the region flooded by
the red mud. The mandate of the Ministry Commissioner ran from 5 November 2010 to 5
May 2011. Csaba Szab coordinates activities and acts on behalf of the Ministry in all areas
of competence of the Ministry of Rural Development, consults with producers in the area on
exchanging real estate plots or participation in the cultivation of energy crops. His tasks also
include keeping contact with local governments and businesses, as well as to ensure accuracy
in damage assessments. At the same time, works to plant the material dudarit into the soil
was begun under the supervision of the Central Agricultural Office to neutralize alkalinity
on the 150 hectare site that was covered by a thin layer (1-2 cm) of red mud.
out in 1987! The Hungarian Academy of Sciences reached essentially the same conclusion on the
third day. Similarly, the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service confirmed this one
week after the accident, based on recent measurements. Meanwhile, the lungs, skin, and mucous
membrane of thousands of people in the zone were exposed to contact with an unknown mixture
of toxic substances. In order to avoid suffering serious damage to health, they should have been
provided accurate and honest information and adequate protective gear. They received neither.
Greenpeace was the first to inform the public of the results of effective measurements on
the fourth day of the disaster. A high concentration in arsenic was measured, about 25 times
the authorised limit for groundwater in the drainage ditches. The two other noxious heavy
metals they tested, mercury and chromium were also significantly over the limit.
The official communication channel of the Ministry of the Interior, i.e. the website vorosiszap.bm.hu went online on 5 October. However, it was only on 8 October, viz. four days
after the dam broke that the first summary appeared on the site including the most important
(but by no means exhaustive) health related information concerning the contamination, crucial both for the local population and for those taking part in the damage rectification efforts
(http://vorosiszap.bm.hu/?p=50).
In the most critical period, the regionally competent environmental authority provided no
significant information relevant to the general public at all. Even at the time the present report
is being compiled, i.e. February 2011, the website of the Inspectorate (kdtktvf.zoldhatosag.hu)
contains nothing more on the disaster than the authorizations and decisions concerning the
functioning of Mal Co. Ltd.
Following the accident, a series of reports appeared in the media on the health effects of
red mud, indicating that the contaminant is potentially radioactive. Nevertheless, ANTSZ
failed to provide comprehensive information about the actual impacts and risks earlier than
25 October, that is, three weeks after the accident (http://www.antsz.hu/portal/down/kulso/
kozegeszsegugy/iszaptarolo_szakadt_at/lakossagi_tajekoztato_20101025.pdf).
In its decision dated 5 November, the government declared that it was Mal Co. Ltd. that
caused the disaster. In an official communication, the legal representative of the company responded that The concept of the government stipulating the identity of the party which caused
the damage in any case is shocking by any means, as well as unprecedented from a legal point
of view. Furthermore, the governments taking sides regarding the issue of liability would be
utterly unacceptable, given the fact that final expert advice was not even given on the causes of
the disaster themselves. It is up to the judicial bodies, and ultimately to the court to declare a
decision on both the issue of harm and that of liability, and that only following an appropriate
and fair procedure exploring the causes of the event.
In addition, it was a striking deficiency of communication that the residents of the area
affected by the accident did not have any substantive knowledge of the potential risks of the
dams breaking, of the consequences of exposure to red mud, or of the actions capable of reducing the effects of the disaster, even though there is a strong tradition of providing preliminary
information in areas characterised by industrial activities with high environmental risk (for
example, the Paks Nuclear Power Plant) in Hungary. This lack of information significantly
contributed to the severity of the damage wrought on human lives, health and finances.
62
large amounts of precipitation getting and fi ltering through here would change the behaviour
of the subsoil, in particular the soil solidity. Thus on the basis of known prior expertise, the
responsibility is shared: a reservoir began to be constructed in the mid-80s, upon order by the
Hungarian Aluminum Industry Trust, owned by the Hungarian state. The reservoir design
and construction was also implemented by state-owned firms. The building permits as well as
the 1990 use permit were also issued by public authorities. When the company was privatized
in 1997, the purchaser was justified to believe in good faith that there was nothing wrong with
the reservoir since the constructing party, the seller and the company formerly operating the
reservoirs each had all the required licenses. In addition, in the contract dossier amounting
to nearly 100 pages including annexes, the buyer was nowhere informed that Basin 10 or the
subsoil below the reservoirs would present any special features (e.g. different soil structure, etc)
that needed to be addressed on their own. Construction of the slurry walls was required and
the company did indeed construct them as there was a statutory obligation to do so.
Consequently, the company purchased the reservoir in good faith, though the reservoir
had hidden faults in all certainty, as shown by the recent events. In addition, the competent
public authorities constantly monitored the operation of the reservoirs and found it satisfactory in all cases.
On October 10, the company considered it timely to express once more its sympathy to
the victims' relatives. The Management and all employees of MAL Co. Ltd. were all deeply
shaken by the disaster that occurred. We wish once more to express our deepest regret to all
victims, the injured and the impacted and their families. The outmost efforts are made to rectify the damage. We work closely with all bodies involved in order restore normal conditions
in the region as soon as possible.
On this day, the company issued a further notice denying that it had been aware of the
Winkler soil study. As far as we know, this was the only document of expertise which drew
attention to the risks imposed by the geo-morphological characteristics of the reservoir area
prior to the accident.
As reported by the press, physicist dr. Gusztv Winkler (a senior lecturer at the Budapest
University of Technology) conducted environmental studies in the region of Mosonmagyarvr
and Ajka at the end of the 1980s, i.e. at around the time when the foundations of reservoir 10
of the alumina plant were laid. The study states that soil of the region mostly consists of the
floodplain meadow of Torna creek, an area with a flooded, swampy, meadow-like character
without water outlets, enclosing a block of clay right at the northern wall of the reservoir. When
saturated by precipitation or groundwater, this soil will move, but in a way that the different
blocks of soil with dissimilar composition and structure are likely to show displacements to
varying degrees. These displacements of several centimetres might be probing for the wall of
the reservoir. The expert behind the study argues that this assumption is supported by the
fact that the dam broke on Monday at the meeting point of two kinds of soil, and not only
at the corner as shown by aerial photographs, but in another section of the wall as well. The
block of clay was likely home to a phenomenon reducing the rate of friction which could have
contributed to the disaster. According to the studies conducted by MAL Co. Ltd., its staff
was not aware of the findings of the study. The management stated that they had no knowledge of negative circumstances regarding the design phase or subsequent construction. The
64
representatives of MAL Co. Ltd. which had purchased the shares of the Ajka alumina plant
added that the privatization documents or the published tender did not include this kind of
information, thus they received no warning or information about the existing risk factors. The
company also denied allegations in the media suggesting that it had contacted senior lecturer
Gusztv Winkler concerning the research. Since then, the company had consulted Gusztv
Winkler with respect to the document. The investigation by MAL Co. Ltd. also addressed
the issue of who abused the company name when approaching the senior lecturer in search of
the construction design.
A summary of the results of the Winkler study is currently available on the Internet
(http://www.pannonpalatinus.hu/up/pdf/185.pdf). The study itself, however, is not available
in its entirety.
Concerning the environmental and health effects of the red mud spill, MAL Co. Ltd. only
repeated the communication of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (referred to in detail below).
65
66
LMP is convinced that measures in line with these twelve points are crucial both for the
remediation effort and for preventing accidents in the future.
The European Green Party (EGP) unanimously passed an emergency resolution at its
Council Meeting on 10-11 October, supporting the demands formulated by LMP concerning the ecological disaster caused the dam break in the region of Ajka. The EGP referred to
the event as clearly one of the most severe ecological disasters of the past decades. Over 300
delegates from 55 countries called on the Hungarian state to ensure that the upper layer of
the soil covered with red mud is replaced as soon as possible, thus preventing the toxic dust
containing heavy metals and other hazardous components from spreading in the area. In addition, they also joined LMP in urging the authorities to examine the condition of similar
alumina reservoirs and to enforce that appropriate disaster management plans be implemented,
to be financed by the owners. Representing the fourth largest group in the EP, the European
Greens also requested the Hungarian Government to comply with the demand of LMP to
make public the privatisation contract of MAL Co. Ltd.
On 12 October, Benedek Jvor submitted six questions to competent government officials:
1. Had Mal Co. Ltd. in fact implemented the HUF 3 Billion environmental investment included in the privatisation contract for the alumina company, which it acquired for a grossly
undercut price (HUF 10 Million) during the late 90s? What were the millions of Euros
spent on, that Mal Co. Ltd. received as environmental investment subsidies, apparently still
unaccounted for in Brussels?
2. Why is Hungarian red mud far more alkaline than would be considered normal in other
countries, and why is there no regulation for neutralizing sludge prior to depositing it?
3. How could the Central Transdanubian Inspectorate for Environmental Issues, Nature
Conservation and Water Management issue a permit for normal waste disposal when red
mud has a pH of 13, and is therefore unquestionably a hazardous substance?
4. How could Mal Co. Ltd. neglect to inform the public or the authorities regarding the issues
that have, as unanimously established by local residents, plant employees and a WWF report
with photographic evidence, been present for weeks, indeed for months? Why is there no
appropriate construction inspection to encompass architectural and structural engineering
tests as well as environmental ones?
5. How could the plants disaster management plan reckon with a 300 thousand cubic meter
red mud spill, when spillage thus far amounts to 600 to 700 thousand cubic meters, and
in all due probability will approach 1 million cubic meters, with a significant additional
quantity still contained in the reservoir? Who ratified the obviously unrealistic disaster
management plan?
67
6. How could government neglect its duty to ensure an appropriate environmental responsibility insurance system, as prescribed by the Environmental Law of 1995, for some 15 years?
Government has not provided reassuring answers to these questions since.
In its October 14th statement, ecopolitical party LMP declared that relocating the evacuated population to the red mud contaminated settlements of Kolontr and Devecser is premature, as official Greenpeace test results report excessive airborne dust contamination in
the area, posing a long term health risk. LMP called on competent authorities to exercise far
greater caution when resettling the residents, who have already had more than their share of
suffering. The statement also makes it clear that there is none of the agencies involved in the
disaster fulfilled their duties appropriately. Neither the business corporation nor the competent
authorities had taken appropriate measures to prevent the reservoir rupture and the ensuing
ecological and property damage. Authoritative legislation had been overdue since 1995, and
neglecting its development is a responsibility of the government.
On October 20th, president of Sustainable Development Commission Benedek Jvor,
member of LMP, informed representatives of the EU Parliaments Green Group about the
disaster via a video conference. He made it clear to members of the Green Group participating
an the meeting preceding the Tuesday evening EP session with the Ajka disaster on its agenda
that this was the single greatest ecological disaster in Hungarian history, both in terms of human casualties and injuries, and the magnitude of environmental contamination. Immediate
and longer term environmental damage was due primarily to the muds extreme alkalinity, as
well as its high concentrations of heavy metals. Jvor also called attention to the deficiencies of
both Hungarian and EU regulations that contributed to the event. Under EU regulations, red
mud is not classified a hazardous substance, without regard to its alkalinity and heavy metal
content. However, due to the alkalinity of the technical process, red mud definitely meets the
criteria for hazardous substances in Hungary. In practice, though, Hungarian authorities apply
lax regulatory limits, and treat red mud as practically non-hazardous waste.
On October 29th, the party submitted a complex set of legislations to prevent future
disasters in light of the Kolontr accident. According to LMP, the most urgent measure is
a re-evaluation of hazardous and industrial waste containment, as there is no definitive upto-date information available on such potential health and environment hazards. Left unchecked, potential sources of contamination may cause immense damage, and the financing
of compensation and damages may fall on public funds. LMP wishes Parliament to call on the
government to prepare an inventory of the countrys hazardous and industrial waste dumps,
the substances deposited there, and an estimate for their environmental impact, including
alternatives for their elimination and a calculation for expenses.
The recommendation includes a re-evaluation of the recently downsized National Environmental Damage Prevention Programme, an immediate allocation of public funds for
rehabilitation costs, and a warranty for the disaster prevention expenses of privately owned
hazardous entities. The government ordnance for subterranean water protection needs to be
modified, as does the government resolution regarding government responsibility for the
rehabilitation of neglected environmental damage.
68
The ecopolitical party drafted a new legislative proposal for defining environmentally hazardous entities, their annual official inspection, and an independent investigation conducted
by an expert appointed by the environmental authority, not the investigated establishment
of impact, via a modification of the Act on the Environment (Ktv.). Rules of environmental
rehabilitation warranties and environmental insurance for third party compensation would
also be modified in the Act on the Environment. LMP also moves for modifying the Criminal Code (BTK) to ensure that neglect of supervision duties can be penalized. A category of
endangering through official procedure would be included in the BTK.
Clean Air Action Group had repeatedly submitted its recommendation to several government representatives, but has not received meaningful replies.
Red mud reservoirs pose a threat to drinking water catchments in several locations. The
situation is especially worrying at the MOTIM reservoir in Mosonmagyarvr, where red
mud is contained right above the water catchmenta place restricted even for communal
waste disposal. An expert from Clean Air Action Group had fi led suit at the prosecutors
office, and received the following response: Due investigation was given to all the processes
and decisions concerning MOTIM Co. and its legal predecessors. It is hereby declared the
decisions are sound and comply with the laws then in force. Accordingly, no action from the
prosecutors office was necessary. It is not so much the prosecutors office that was responsible
for the erronous reply and for the failure to take action as the competent environmental authority, whichaccording to reportswas put under considerable political pressure and did
in fact misinform the prosecutors office.
Clean Air Action Group had also repeatedly called attention to the issue of limited responsibilitylikewise to no avail. The immense environmental, health and property damage
is usually suffered by the injured parties, and compensated by taxpayers, as the companies
responsible for the damage are unable to cover damages. To this end, Clean Air Action Group
encourages the obligation of companies conducting hazardous activities to take out insurance,
as well as for their allocating a fund for full compensation for possible damages.
Clean Air Action Group also demands that the government immediately publish the
relevant privatisation contracts, to clarify who and to what degree bears responsibility for the
disastrous situation.
This event and its cost in human lives, serious injuries, immense material damage and
ecological devastation all underscore that government must adopt a far more responsible attitude toward environmental organizations, their experts and their warnings.
Assessment of environmental damage and impact must begin immediately, and results
must be made public. Remediation must also commence without delay, before the contamination spreads any further.
On October 7th, major Hungarian environmental organizations made a joint statement
regarding the disaster.
Environmental organizations statement regarding the red mud disaster
October 7th, 2010
The undersigned environmental NGOs consider the preservation of public health, healing the
injured, remedying damage and preventing further damage to be of topmost priority in the
red mud contaminated settlements. We call on the general public, NGOs, corporations and
institutions to join forces with government bodies to aid these operations. We also extend our
sympathy and solidarity to those affected.
However, this disaster plainly calls for further action.
It is necessary to conduct a far more detailed national survey of potential environmental
70
threats, as well as expediting the remediation of existing damage. Though the process had
initiated after the system change, it has since slowed to a near halt. However, as this present
case proves, nature is less indulgent. At the present rate of remediation, we are risking further
disaster and loss of life, and compensating damages costs us far more money than remediation would.
It must be avoided that innocent victims and taxpayers bear the costs of damage, instead
these should be fully compensated by the injurious party. To this end, companies conducting
hazardous activities should be required by law to take out insurance for all possible damages,
as well as to allocate funds for full compensation. A further option is for a state tax on relevant
activities to ensure funds for possible damage management.
State subsidising of heavily polluting activities and exploitation of non-renewable fuel
must be stopped. One form of subsidization is when the injurious party is not held financially
responsible for environmental damage caused. It would seem an efficient measure to raise the
currently moderate mining annuity.
Expanding and improving environmental and health care vocational training is essential.
A majority of the population is currently incapable of protecting their environment or health,
and is uninformed of what to do in case of an environmental disaster.
Affected settlements and companies everywhere must compose disaster management
plans, which they must be capable of carrying out. Competent authorities must supervise this
rigorously!
Furthermore, injurious parties must be penalized in a strict and exemplary manner.
Environmental NGOs have voiced these suggestions in the past. We are hopeful it will
no longer be necessary in future, when government implements the measures listed above.
In their joint letter of October 12th, Clean Air Action Group and Greenpeace asked the
Minister of Interior the reason why, more than a week after the accident, there was still
no clear information available regarding the composition of the mud spilled, or of the
particulate air contamination.
For instance, it seems incomprehensible that even though tests are reported by the press
to be conducted on a daily basis, it is still not known exactly what kinds of toxic materials are
inhaled by and absorbed through the skin of the workers on site and local residents. How can
it be possible that the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service issues a reassuring statement on the basis of tests conducted at the Ajka Alumina Plant in 1987? As long as
no comprehensive public data are made available about the exact nature, concentration and
territorial dispersion on the polluting materials, the appropriate level of protection and of the
proper protective wear cannot be determined for the people staying in the contaminated area.
The NGOs are committed to the view that residents must be informed continuously,
coherently and in detail, and presently we are quite far from that. Deficient information endangers peoples most precious treasure, their health. All the local people and rescue workers
are rightly concerned about it in the swirling red clouds of dust.
That is why it is important to test the chemical composition of the contamination at a sufficient number of locations, with regard to the oxidation state of the metals involved since, for
71
example, chrome (III) is not particularly toxic, chrome (VI) represents a serious health hazard.
In terms of neutralisation, composition is particularly important for while alkali absorbs toxic
metals, they could get off the environment under the effect of acid causing a long-term problem.
On the day following the accident, the Disaster Management very properly drew up
strict regulations, preparing for the worst: For the protection of the health of all those, who
take part within the endangered area in the rescue and cleaning operation of the grounds and
the properties, shall wear Wellington boots, closed clothing, acid and alkali-proof protective
gloves and safety goggles in case of the risk of spillage. According to information reported by
the press, several firemen and disaster management employees suffered injuries and possibly
health damage due to insufficient preparation. Because the composition of the toxic materials
is still unknown, it cannot be concluded for certain that they had received the proper types
of safety masks.
Greenpeace and the Clean Air Action Group suggested in addition that the enrichment of toxic materials in the system of rescue workers and local residents should be equally
checked. Dry red mud getting into the air is a health risk if inhaled or if it gets into contact
with the eyes or skin. Measures must therefore be taken in order to ensure the protection of
the residents of the region as well, as wind can carry the toxic dust away, even 10-15 kilometres
far. Red mud must be cleared away the fields as soon as possible to prevent the wind spreading
it around the neighbouring villages.
Not only the people but animals in the region inhale the dust which may contain toxic
metals. Therefore, measures must be taken to protect animals from disease, and, furthermore,
to prevent the production of food out of these animals as it could be a health hazard for people
who might consume it.
On October 15, Greenpeace protested against the hastily issued permission which allowed
residents to return:
Greenpeace, the international environmental organisation protests against the return of the
residents and the re-opening of the Ajka Alumina Plant of MAL Co. Ltd. The exact causes of
last weeks red mud disaster are still not clear, but, in spite of the fact, the government decided
to let the production restart.
Greenpeace regards the permission on the return of the residents of Kolontr as an utterly
irresponsible decision. Up to the present, there is no reassuring data published by anybody
which would prove the safety of staying in Kolontr in the long term, and nobody provided
exact information about the short-term and long-term health effects of the high concentration
of fine dust particulates in the air.
Wearing dust masks and local damage limitation can only be a solution for a short-term stay.
But the presence of dry red mud in the form of dust or otherwise is a threat to the health
of local residents. Do decision makers seriously think that the people of Kolontr have to
wear dust masks from now on in 24/7? asked Zsolt Szegfalvi, the Director of Greenpeace
Hungary.
72
According to the information of Greenpeace, the technology applied by MAL Co. Ltd. in
its Ajka Alumina Plant does not meet todays requirements. The red mud made during the production here is highly alkaline. This fact only increases the risks if another accident takes place.
How can it be possible that the German red mud is less harmful than the Hungarian one?
In our opinion, we deserve the same safety levels as enjoyed by citizens of Western Europe
have, Mr Szegfalvi added.
As a result of a political decision the operation of MAL Co. Ltd. was placed under the
control of the Hungarian state and the restart of the production was permitted by state authorities. However, the opinion of an independent international committee of experts is required
as presently the operator and the licensor are in a hierarchical relationship which does not
guarantee proper safety.
Greenpeace Hungary asks the government to suspend re-opening the plant until the
circumstances of the disaster are elucidated and environmental and health hazards are significantly reduced.
The statement of Csaln Environmental and Conservation Association (Csaln Egyeslet)
drew attention to a number of fundamental legal and environmental issues:
Csaln Environmental and Conservation Association is seriously concerned about the events
of the red mud disaster which flooded Kolontr, Devecser and five other villages of Veszprm
county and expresses deep compassion for the citizens of the affected region whose life were
destroyed overnight by the poisoning.
The association finds it outrageous that fate of people is turned to the worst due to careless
and irresponsible industrial activities in our immediate environment. This raises the question who
could set limits to the hazards of industrial activities and what is the point in the various laws
and regulations considered as strict if such ecological disasters can destroy the lives of thousands?
Who will pay for the damages caused by irresponsible behaviour? In fact, is it possible at all to
compensate for the destruction of peoples homes? Do residents living near the reservoir have the
right to know the nature of the risks in their environment and what to do in case of a disaster?
We all know the answers to these questions. We have the right to know what exactly
the continuation of industrial activities in our environment entails even if the state authorities
have an obligation to monitor them and ensure all precaution is taken to prevent such disasters
in the future. And yes, the residents of the red mud affected municipalities have the right to
accurate information about the composition of the red mud flooding their homes and gardens
so that the proper precautions be made even in these degrading circumstances.
73
74
The remediation of agricultural fields was started with delay and without a clear strategy;
The distribution of the aid collected from public contributions has not been started yet (until
February 2011);
Local residents reported to have observed abuse in the distribution of material goods offered
by individual donors or companies;
The compensation for damages to real estate started in ways that were unjust and contrary to
the promises originally made. However, the claims raised were redressed later on;
The transportation of contaminated soil and the spilled red mud was organised on public
roads, although sufficient railway capacity was available in the contaminated area.
75
Summary
Following this unprecedented accident the authorities responded with the expected
rapidity and decisiveness, but not always efficiently in the defence of human health, the
environment and material assets impacted by the disaster or at risk. One reason for the
fact that intervention was not efficient enough was lack of information (local residents
and participants in the rescue operations were not informed as to the composition and
pH value of the red mud, the biological effect of the slurry, the list of materials to be used
in restoration and whether they were available). The defective communication structure
was a further reason (crucial information on environmental health issues was published
with a delay of several days, with significant initial inaccuracies). As a result, for several
days the people impacted were on multiple occasions forced to make decisions potentially
influencing the rest of their lives based on conflicting information (e.g. the red mud is
not harmful vs. the red mud is toxic and/or radioactive).
The deficiencies of governmental communication characterising the first days after the
accident were primarily mitigated by non-governmental organisations (Greenpeace,
Clean Air Working Group, etc.), as they were the sources of communication regarding
measurement data and useful health advice.
The activity of the authorities in such extreme cases should be characterised exclusively
by professional objectivity and based on firm legal foundations in order to preserve the
trust of the public. This was however contradicted by the temporary arrest of the CEO
of MAL Co. Ltd., which later turned out to be untenable; the assurance given by the
Prime Minister on the issue the detention; the act of placing the company under state
control and the allocation of liability for the accident to MAL Co. Ltd. (too early, without
genuine investigations).
On the 6th day after the accident, LMP drew up a comprehensive package for the government on the disaster management measures. The proposals did not fail to consider
ecological concerns, and have since been substantiated as relevant and accurate. On the
next day, The European Green Party declared support for LMPs claims. LMP raised
the issues that have been at the focus of investigations ever since (e.g. the privatisation
of the aluminium industry, the responsibility of the authorities regarding permission
for alkaline sludge disposal, technological shortcomings of the reservoirs dam detected
previously and the unsuitability of the disaster management plan). On 29 October, the
party presented a proposal for legislation which could significantly reduce the chances
of and the risks posed by similar disasters, however, the proposal was not supported.
76
Recommendations
The official communication for major environmental disasters should be organised, including creating the legal background, clarifying responsibilities, communication channels and deadlines. When disaster strikes, it is especially important to provide adequate
information to the residents in line with regulations such as the Aarhus Convention, the
Act on Data Protection, the Act on the Environment, the Act on Freedom of Electronic
Information etc.;
All governments should adhere to rule of law standards even at times of environmental
disaster. The problems encountered should be tackled within this framework;
There is need for statutory authorities to implement a yearly compulsory audit of environmentally high-risk facilities, including substantive testing, with the participation of
experts independent from the authority;
In the procedure of issuing environmental permits, environmental impact assessment studies need to be prepared by experts working independently from the issuer of the permit;
An EU-wide security fund needs to be set up, financed form the contribution of hazardous plants for damages that cannot otherwise be covered;
There is need for an EU Directive on compulsory environmental liability insurance policies.
77
4. Contamination reports
4.1. Initial reports based on earlier tests
A range of confl icting data and statements had been aired following the red mud disaster,
pertaining to the constitution of the sludge, its toxicity and environmental impact. Immediately
after the disaster, information was published on the official website of the National Directorate
General for Disaster Management at the Ministry of the Interior about the red mud spill.
RED MUD
A by-product of alumina production. The material is thick like sour cream, strongly alkaline, thus has a caustic effect on the skin. The
mud contains heavy metals, including lead, is mildly radioactive, and inhaling the dust may cause lung cancer.
A by-product of alumina production (the first phase of the of aluminium production), red mud has severe adverse health effects,
thus it is classified as a category 2 hazardous substance. It is highly alkaline and contains large quantities of toxic metals including
lead. Due to its alkalinity, red mud produces a caustic effect on the skin, and should be washed off immediately with plenty of water
in order to neutralize it. The substance is radioactive, but because of its low activity, the direct risk of radiation is negligible. However,
the wind may carry radioactive materials from areas nearby, so inhaling the substance may even cause lung cancer. On average, producing one ton of aluminium results in three tons of highly alkaline red mud produced. (Source: Directorate for Disaster Management)
78
According to the communication, [the] mud contains heavy metals, including lead, is mildly
radioactive, and inhaling the dust may cause lung cancer. This information was replaced on
October 5th with data supplied by the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service
(NTSZ) (4.1.2). Later tests disproved the claims of high lead concentration and hazardous
radioactivity. Lead and radioactivity warnings w ere therefore misleading.
What should we know about red mud?Background material NTSZ Orszgos Krnyezetegszsggyi Intzet NTSZ
Kommunikcis Fosztly http://www.antsz.hu/portal/down/kulso/kozegeszsegugy/iszaptarolo_szakadt_at/Mit_kell_
tudni_a_vorosiszaprol_20101005.pdf
79
Institute of Public Health (OKI) in 1987, and comparing it to the 2009 maximum soil
contaminant values. (6/2009.(IV.14.) KvVM-EM-FVM joint regulation).
Red mud test results
Components measured
Red mud
Moisture content, %
30,2
From HNO3extract
Cu mg/kg
23
Cr mg/kg
8,0
Ni mg/kg
29
Pb mg/kg
13
Cd mg/kg
Zn mg/kg
11
As mg/kg
4,3
11,8
Table 1: Data from the NTSZ document What should we know about red mud?, published October 5th, 20103
Furthermore, this document published by NTSZ states that the red muds composition
is determined by properties of the bauxite mined, and the discharged, added and residual materials
from its treatment. According to the document, the sludge awaiting containment contained
10-30% dry matter and had a pH level of approximately 12-13, which contradicts the pH 11.8
featured in the table. In fact, pH levels of approximately 13 had been measured, exceeding
both values specified, and far exceeding the pH 11.8 referred to in the NTSZ table. According to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) publication, the material leaking
from the storage pool had a pH level varying from 11 to 14. 4
The ecotoxicity data published by NTSZ are incomprehensible, lacking any specification
of what the tables data actually pertains to (% toxicity), nor is there indication of the sample
preparation/solution method used, as well as the lack of a solvent control for the DMSO extract. Nitric acid solution doesnt yield an all-around metal content assessment for the sludge,
e.g. arsenic has lower nitric solubility, therefore these values are only partially indicative of
the sludges composition. However, following the disaster, the tables publication caused a
communicational disturbance.
http://www.antsz.hu/portal/down/kulso/kozegeszsegugy/iszaptarolo_szakadt_at/Mit_kell_tudni_a_vorosiszaprol_20101005.
pdf
http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/index2.php?pageid=lakossag_kolontar_vorosiszap2
80
http://index.hu/belfold/2010/10/07/vorosiszap_mta/
Sludge disaster: soil replacement or special use of soil put to consideration; 2010. 10. 7.
http://www.vilaggazdasag.hu/vallalatok/mezogazdasag/iszapkatasztrofa-talajcsere-vagy-a-fold-specialis-hasznositasa-johetszoba-329782
Sludge far more toxic than official report informed 2010.10.08 http://greenpeace.hu/hirek/p1/rkezdo/i272
Greenpeace: Sludge far more toxic than reported so far; Index; 2010. October 8th
http://index.hu/belfold/2010/10/08/arzen_es_higany_az_iszapban/
81
test results from 2003, and even then there had in fact been no tests for arsenic or mercury
concentrations. Regardless, the MTA statement long served as a basis for challenging the
results of Greenpeace tests. Later on however, MTA removed its October 7th statement was
removed from their website10 Later tests conducted by MTA after the disasteralthough using different methods11had by and large similar results as Greenpeace tests, though a larger
sample size obviously led to greater variance.
As
Cd
Cr
Hg
Ni
Pb
Zn
218
3,55
377
3,18
167
79,3
84,3
Greenpeace 2010.10.05.
filtered water (Blint Analitika)
250
0,94
104
1,09
26,5
5,26
106
Maximum Contaminant
Levels for sewage sludge12
100
200
500
50
500
500
1000
10
50
20
10
Contaminant (B)
limits for groundwater
10
500
20
10
200
2075
610
100
200
1,53
50100
40100
300
1000
11
12
28/2004. (XII. 25.) KvVM regulation for maximum water contaminant levels; ch.32 Metal production
http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0400028.KVV
82
decontamination. Samples from the Torna stream were used to determine the quality of its
water quality 3 weeks after the contamination. Samples were also taken in Kolontr, from the
remaining red mud, as well as plaster and dudarit, to test the materials used to neutralize the
sludge for contamination.
2010.11.11. Tap water samples were taken in Kolontr and Ajka to test for contamination.
Additionally, red mud was sampled from Basin X, and hydrochloric acid used for neutralizing was taken from a feed pipe to Basin X/a. to determine what further water pollutants may
come in contact with the water system from these sources. A further sample was taken at a
measuring well connected to the catchment basin so that the old reservoirs are also beneath
it in terms of fluid mechanics, in order to establish whether the entire drinking water supply
might be polluted.
2010.11.0212. Analysis of dust gathered by the organizations own dust collector device, in
order to test the size of airborne particles and their contents, as well as to record dust concentration data.
2011.01.26. Sampling of leachate discharge pipe, the sewer above and below the pipe, and
below the acidifying station. In order to establish what is being discharged into the sewer, and
what detectable change the acidification process brings. Also to determine what materials flow
directly into the Torna stream, this inflows comparison to maximum contaminant levels, and
an assessment of short and long term impact.
According to Greenpeaces test results, the red mud concomitant water phase contained high levels of the metals arsenic, nickel and lead several times higher than maximum contaminant levels for soil and drinking water, as ordained by regulations 6/2009.
(IV. 14.) KvVM-EM-FVM joint regulation and 201/2001. (X. 25.) government decree,
as well as the groundwater intervention levels specified in the now defunct 10/2000.(VI.2.)
KM-EM-FVM-KHVM joint regulation. Established and defunct limits were exceeded,
in the case of chrome, mercury and nickel. Only arsenic levels were in excess of maximum
sewage sludge contamination levels.
83
13
Jnos Szpvlgyi: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DISASTER CAUSED BY THE AJKA RED MUD SPILL
http://www.matud.iif.hu/2010/12/07.htm
14
Committee members: Attila Anton and Jzsef Szab (MTA TAKI), Attila Demjn and Pter Spos (MTA GKI), Pter Br
and Lajos Vrs (MTA BLKI), Jnos Szpvlgyi and Lszl Ktai (MTA KK AKI) and Jnos Podani (ELTE)
15
A summary of test results for the Ajka red mud spill based on samples analyzed up to October 12th, 2010
http://mta.hu/data/HIREK/iszap/AKI_eredmenyek_osszefoglalasa.doc?wa=emun1021h
16
84
Samples
As
Cd
Cr
Hg
Ni
Pb
135144
n.d.
632677
1,648,59
192219
189195
33,435,7
n.d.
83,485,8
n.d.
64,373,1
43,253,9
43,644,5
2,302,42
689721
0,540,67
281289
80,9-83,2
27,932,3 0,240,34
57,674,5
0,180,28
26,336,4
7,5211,8
Greenpeace 2010.10.05.
(Blint Analtika)
40,8
1,2
191
0,76
59,5
47,5
81,6131
0,821,44
360694
0,612,83
143322
96,2177
Maximum Contaminant
Levels for sewage sludge
75
10
1000
10
200
750
Contaminant (B)
limits for soil
15
75
0,5
40
100
2060
210
150800
110
150250
150600
MFI 2010.10.06.
Dry red mud has therefore been tested both by MTA and Greenpeace to contain levels
of arsenic, chrome, mercury and nickel all far in excess of the levels limited by joint regulation 6/2009. (IV. 14.) KvVM-EM-FVM18 as Maximum Contaminant Levels for the soil.
Several MTA samples tested lead concentration at approximately double the maximum
soil contaminant level, and some samples contained cadmium concentrations slightly
over the maximum level. The since defunct joint regulation 10/2000.(VI.2.) KM-EMFVM-KHVM soil intervention level was only exceeded by arsenic concentrations in nearly
every sample. These concentration levels were diminished with soil dispersion. Maximum
sewage sludge contaminant levels were also only exceeded by arsenic concentrations. In
comparison to the earlier regulation 10/2000, the successive regulation 6/2009 omitted the
so-called action (C) levels that vary according to an areas sensitivity. We are specifying these
intervention levels for comparison.
17
http://mta.hu/data/HIREK/iszap/AKI_eredmenyek_osszefoglalasa.doc?wa=emun1021h
18
http://www.complex.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0900006.KVV
85
Samples
As
Cd
Cr
Hg
Ni
Pb
k.h.a
k.h.a
k.h.a
k.h.a
190
60
Maximum Contaminant
Levels for sewage sludge19
100
200
500
50
500
500
Maximum Contaminant
Levels for drinking water
10
50
20
10
Maximum Contaminant
Levels (B) for groundwater
10
50
20
10
Table 4: Red mud solutions and their metal content (g/l) Source: MTA 20
Tests for distilled water soluble metal content in the red mud was carried out by MTA
AKI. Concentrations of nickel and lead were several times higher than the maximum
contaminant levels for groundwater allowed in joint regulation 6/2009. (IV. 14.) KvVMEM-FVM, and fro drinking water in government regulation 201/2001. (X. 25.), also
several times more than the minimal risk levels for groundwater, and chrome, mercury and
nickel concentrations occasionally in excess of intervention levels specified in the defunct
joint regulation 10/2000.(VI.2.) KM-EM-FVM-KHVM.
Environmentally diff used red mud and sludge concomitant water pollution is difficult
to measure against any limit values, given how the material mixes and disperses in the soil,
rainwater and living waters, thereby diminishing in concentration. Industrial sewage sludge
contaminant limits are thus hardly applicable, since they are for application under well-known
and controlled circumstances. The solubility of toxic metals alters as alkalinity changes. While
arsenic is more likely to enter an aqueous phase in an alkaline environment, other toxic metals
are only mobilized in acidic media.
regulation 28/2004. (XII. 25.) KvVM on maximum contaminant levels for water pollutants and applicable rules; ch. 32.Metal
production http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0400028.KVV
20
http://mta.hu/data/HIREK/iszap/AKI_eredmenyek_osszefoglalasa.doc?wa=emun1021h
86
arsenic in excess of permitted levels, but this was not brought in direct connection with the
spill, considered a local contamination instead.
Experts recommend an investigation of the basin and mud of the Torna stream and the
river Marcal, to assess the effect of de-alkalizing plaster on the river sediments.
Greenpeace and Clean Air Action Group petitions Minister of Interior Sndor Pintr for clarification of data and increased
protection for the population http://levego.hu/hirek/2010/10/az_adatok_tisztazasat_es_az_emberek_fokozott_vedelmet_
keri_a_greenpeace_es_a_levego_mu
22
23
Red mud: only thorough testing will lead to good decisions; October 15th, 2010.
http://levego.hu/hirek/2010/10/vorosiszap_csak_alapos_meresek_utan_hozhatok_jo_dontesek
87
to compare the local air quality data with general airborne particulate contamination levels,
while permissible limits for carcinogenic substances found in red mud are one thousand to ten
thousand times lower than those for airborne particulates.
Results for testing the dust pollutions constituents were published by Greenpeace on
October 13th, 2010.24 According to the Greenpeace report, the presence of fine grain PM10
dust is extremely high, and anyone in the area exposed without adequate protective equipment
faces serious health hazards. Th is statement proved to be a mild overstatement, considering
that though high PM10 concentrations are a health hazard, this is the same concentration level as Budapests air contains in nearly 80 days of each year, and in fact most of the
countrys large towns had 30-60 days with pollution levels in excess of limits, in the year
2010. The report 25 also called attention to the importance of wearing dust masks: in the areas
affected by dust pollution, it is advised to wear minimum FFP3 (also known as P3) particulate filter
(or ideally, combined filter) equipped masks that have separate exhalation valves. Filters should be
replaced every four hours, or in accordance to respiratory irritation and/or heavy breathing. A later
in-depth Greenpeace report however, stated 26 that based on a week long sampling, airborne
fine dust contaminant levels were within permissible limits.
It was only weeks after the disaster that authorities gave public notification of toxic metal
levels in airborne dust around the affected area. According to data published weeks after the
disaster, 27 though the total quantity of airborne particulates (PM10) exceeded minimal risk
levels, the concentration of individual carcinogenic substances in the air did not exceed
annual minimal risk levels.
As to the question of the health risk posed by alkaline dust, no appropriate and professionally founded statements were published. According to the Greenpeace report, when inhaled,
the alkali irritates the mucous membranes and causes intense burning, and extensive exposure may
lead o serious respiratory injury. An expert from the NTSZ stated, wearing the so-called ftp
2-3 protective dust mask, air pollution is no worse than in heavily dust-polluted Budapest. 28 The
expert reassured the general population, saying this dust is not as dangerous as we first thought,
after all this wasnt a chemical plant meltdown.
Experts from University of Pannonia modelled the gradual dehydration and dispersion
of the red mud affected surface and its impact. Modelling experiments showed that inhalable
airborne dust constitutes nearly one-thousandth of the red muds total mass, which is a high
ratio compared to breathable dust yields of other flowing substances and natural soils.
24
Greenpeace tests fine dust contamination around Devecser and suggests protective measures; 2010.10.13
http://greenpeace.hu/hirek/p1/rkezdo/i274
25
Greenpeace results for fine dust contamination and recommended protective measures for affected residents
http://greenpeace.hu/up_files/128696757420101013_porszennyezes.pdf
26
Red mud: More tests, better results; Vienna/Budapest, November 26th 2010.
http://greenpeace.hu/hirek/p1/rkezdo/i287
27
28
Wounds rotting with alkali: We are to be lab rabbits the game is up in Devecser; 2010.10.26.
http://hetivalasz.hu/itthon/lugtol-rohado-sebek-kiserleti-nyulak-leszunk-all-a-bal-devecseren-32804
88
When mobilized, red mud releases a reddish, smoke-like emission which shows copious
visible fine grain dust content. Airborne dust grain size distribution ranges from fine to large.
The large particles may be deposited inside the respiratory system, developing a strongly alkaline fluid. This dust-developed alkaline solution is a serious health hazard, especially in case
of massively inhaled red mud. The fine particles enter the alveolar sacs, resulting in yet more
severe alkaline poisoning. Those entering the secured area around Kolontr and Devecser were
required to wear protective clothing. Dust pollution in the Devecser area was not critical. A
mobile air pollution testing station was set up in the Castle Park of Devecser, so that should
airborne dust levels increase, immediate notification may be sent to Disaster Management
authorities.
30
http://www.greenfo.hu/upload/WHO%20v%F6r%F6siszap%20jelent%E9s.doc
31
32
89
urgent analysis of the remaining sludge still in the reservoir is of crucial importance, as well as a
study of the geohydrologic stratification beneath the reservoirs. They also suggest investigations
of the relocated red sludge and the reservoir used for storing contaminated soil.
Further suggestions include an investigation of possible mid to long term health effects of
contacting locally produced food and water possibly contaminated by direct contact with red sludge.
WHO experts stress that though drinking water quality remained stable in the disasters
aftermath, the general population must be cautioned that wells should be used for irrigation
only, and water from private wells should only be imbibed after appropriate testing.
They also suggested the setting up of a local regular screening network for general health,
reports and investigation of unexpected symptoms, with special attention to sensitive demographic
groups. Residents must be appropriately notified of the programme. A suggestion was made
to develop the analytic capacity and equipment of NTSZ to enable better reaction in
similar future events.
Evaluating the remediation, the WHO report states that contamination of the river Danube was successfully averted. A suggestion was made to drain the surface water from red sludge
reservoirs in order to decrease pressure as well as to enable further dehydration of the red sludge.
A suggestion was made for assessing the environmental risk factor of similar facilities
along the river Danube. The report proposes an investigation of various industrial facilities and
landfills for their resistance to extreme weather conditions, and updating emergency plans with
the participation of all parties concerned.
34
90
36
MAL. Co. Ltd. Ajka Plant (8401 Ajka-Gyrtelep, Hrsz. 598.) Environmental Permit Full Environmental Review; November 2010; Szkesfehrvr http://kdtktvf.zoldhatosag.hu/upload/File/I_kotet_Tanulmany.pdf
91
remediation was performed in the year 2000, removing 7.2 m 3 and 9.0 m3 of soil contaminated with
mercury and PAH, respectively.
The technology reprocesses the mercury both from amalgam separation and alkali sedimentation. According to the study, purified mercury is held in the mercury container, then fed
back into the electrolytic cells. Fresh mercury making up for the amount lost in technology is also fed
into the mercury container. Alkali separated during mercury purification is added to the sedimented
alkali exiting the electrolytic cells, and are reused in aluminium oxide production. These words make
it obviously clear that there is a constant loss of mercury, and that reprocessed alkali are also
contaminated with mercury. Mercury emission is included in the plants environmental
permit, but its also possible that some of the mercury used finds its way into the red sludge.
NTSZ published a document entitled, What should we know about red sludge?
which makes no mention of possible mercury content. The test results produced by Greenpeace
after the disaster found 0.76 mg/kg mercury dry mass concentrations in a Kolontr ditch, while
associates of the Geological Institute of Hungary (MFI) analyzed 10 sludge samples in the
Kolontr and Devecser area, also on October 6th 2010, and found mercury concentrations of
0.61-2.83 mg/kg.37 These levels exceed the maximum mercury limits of 0.5 mg/kg for soil,
but are under the 10 mg/kg limit set for sewage sludge.
A summary of tests related to the Ajka red mud spill conducted on October 12th 2010 http://www.geol.hu/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72:voeroesiszap-mta-vizsgalatok&catid=30:spektrumkoenyvtar
38
Ills: Wed all better kneel and pray! MTI; October 5th, 2010
http://index.hu/belfold/2010/10/05/illes_mindenki_terdre_imahoz/
39
www.greenfo.hu/hirek/hirek_item.php
92
uninhabitable for up to 30-40 years.40 In comparison, test results both foreign and domestic
prove that even cash crops may be grown on neutralized red sludge, or soil containing such
sludge, on the condition that toxic pollutants are within minimal soil risk levels.
Later, on November 24th, ministerial director Csaba Szab stated41 that the red sludge
had covered 1017 hectares of topsoil, and caused contamination below the level anticipated.
Even in the very first days of the disaster, MTA chief secretary Tams Nmeth stated that
topsoil replacement or special use are possibilities for the nearly 800 hectares of sludge contaminated land.42 According to the MTA, once the alkalinity is neutralized, the area will remain
unsuitable for farming, not even after the contamination is removed. These areas will be exempted
from farming and may be used instead for energy crop production or possibly forestry. Subsequently,
in light of new test results from MTA following the disaster, he stressed that toxic metal
contamination levels are within maximum limits for sewage sludge.
NTSZ issued a statement declaring the areas water potable, based on 120 tests. Greenpeace found no pollutants in the drinking water catchment, though one Devecser well was
found to contain 4200 micrograms of arsenic per litre, as opposed to the permissible 10.43
Local provider Transdanubian Regional Waterworks gains regional drinking water from deep
karst basins. Drinking water contamination risk is thereby minimal, though drilled wells are
prone to contamination.
Tests conducted since the disaster have shown arsenic concentrations in the Torna stream,
the river Marcal and inland waters exceeding groundwater and drinking water risk levels,
often significantly. Red sludge contained chrome, lead and nickel contaminants exceeding
now defunct intervention levels, as well as maximum contaminant levels for groundwater
and drinking water.
Dry red sludge arsenic concentrations tested by both MTA and Greenpeace were
found to significantly exceed maximum contaminant levels for soil and sewage sludge.
According to tests, these extreme arsenic levels are only present in wells, which after due
notification are hopefully only used for irrigation. According to available test results, the
contamination has stopped spreading, the drinking water catchment is unaffected; no red
sludge pollution is present in drinking waters. Further effects of high arsenic concentrations however may present further problems.
40
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20101005-megtalaltak-a-vorosiszapkatasztrofa-negyedik-halottjat.html
41
www.hirado.hu/Hirek/2010/11/24/15/Jo_hir_A_vorosiszappal_elontott_foldeken_a_talaj.aspx
42
Sludge disaster: topsoil replacement or special land use in view 2010. 10. 7. http://vg.hu/vallalatok/mezogazdasag/iszapkatasztrofa-talajcsere-vagy-a-fold-specialis-hasznositasa-johet-szoba-329782
43
93
4.7.2. Alkalinity
Several days were to pass before it was determined that the main hazard posed by red sludge
is its alkalinity.44 The media featured many confl icting statements regarding alkalinity and
its risks. Initial reports stated that hosing off the red sludge constitutes sufficient protection,
are partly correct, as washing is the most effective way to combat alkali, however, due to the
extent of the contamination, hosing was inadequate protection in cases where skin had become
exposed to the alkaline liquid at length.
According to the NTSZ publication brought out on the second day of the disaster, the
sludge awaiting containment was pH 12-13, and an attached chart cited the sludge pH at 11.8,
which is lower than the actually tested pH 13.45
Media repeatedly stated that the Ajka red sludge is not significantly alkaline. Following
the disaster, Clean Air Action Groups call for international aid was met with puzzled responses
whereby the pH 13 was considered an error, in light of far lower results. For example, the Aluminium Association of the USA opined that after 5-7 washes, the sludge couldnt possibly be
so alkaline. In an interview on Hungarian news portal Index, chemical engineer and aluminium
oxide technician Gyrgy Bnvlgyi stated46 that pH 12.8 is a maximum contaminant level for
red sludge in developed countries. For example, red sludge in the VAW Stade-plant is pH 12.1.47
However, after the disaster, most published test results reported a maximal pH level of 13. This
pH value was, however, measured in diluted concomitant liquid following the heavy rainfall.
With a 700.000-900.000 m3 spill, dilution takes considerable time to set in. It therefore appears
that the Ajka red sludge and the concomitant reddish liquid was more alkaline than average.
Several experts made similar statements on the second day of the disaster: Olga Klmn and Gyrgy Bnvlgyi converse,
Egyenes beszd, 2010.10.05. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XUPkndMtSSA
45
46
http://index.hu/belfold/2010/10/13/vorosiszap-ph/
47
www.aos-stade.de
94
48
http://mta.hu/mta_hirei/tajekoztato-a-kolontari-vorosiszap-tarozo-kornyezeteben-vegzett-vizsgalatokrol-125761/
95
49
50
http://greenpeace.hu/hirek/p1/rkezdo/i302
51
regulation 28/2004. (XII. 25.) KvVM on maximum contaminant levels for water pollutants and applicable rules; ch. 32.Metal
production http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0400028.KVV
96
Summary
In light of known pollution data, it is understood that the loss of life and injuries were
caused not only by the flooding but by the alkalinity of the liquid flowing with the red
sludge. Besides high alkalinity, certain heavy metals may mildly contaminate soil, groundwater and water. There is no information to determine whether the plaster and acid used
to treat the spillage has led to further ecological damage.
Red sludge contained contaminations of chrome, mercury, lead and nickel that several
times exceeded maximum levels for soil and drinking water, and occasionally exceeded now
defunct intervention levels. Arsenic concentrations for dry red sludge tested by MTA and
Greenpeace showed contamination in excess of soil and sewage sludge levels. According
to tests by Greenpeace, arsenic concentration in samples of Kolontr ditch water measured
0.25 mg/l, which is 25 times the amount permissible in drinking water or groundwater,
and 2.5 times the plants maximum sewage sludge contamination level. High arsenic
concentration mostly affected drilled wells. According to existing test results, the contamination has not spread further, and the drinking water catchment is unaffected. High
arsenic concentration may cause further problems in the long term.
Besides arsenic, red sludge also contained a significantly high concentration of mercury. This is due to gallium production processes, a known fact and documented in the
plants environmental permit. Regardless, the mercury content of red sludge was not mentioned in the NTSZ publication What should we know about red sludge.
During the first days of the disaster, authorities cited test results several decades old
to back up claims that red sludge poses no serious health or environmental hazard. During
the first week of rescue operations, residents received no factual notification of possible
radioactive contamination, or the health risks of airborne dust contamination. Affected
residents were not informed of long term environmental impact or farming related consequences until February, 2011. Authorities communicated conflicting and often unfounded
allegations throughout the entire remediation process.
The very first MTA results clarified what for years had been unclear for environmental authorities: that analysis of samples taken at various locations indicate the substance
spilled from the reservoir has a pH level that varies between 11-14. Therefore the red sludge
classifies as an environmentally hazardous substance.
That results diverge from earlier years can be partly due to the fact that the aluminium oxide plant had in recent years switched from domestic bauxite to Bosnian
and Montenegrin bauxite sources.52 The imported bauxite may differ slightly from
domestic bauxite. However, this does not explain high arsenic concentrations, given
that bauxite is not characterized by high arsenic content. Another possible explanation
for divergent results is the fact that red sludge was spilled over a considerable area, and
therefore is sure to be of heterogeneous constitution.
52
http://index.hu/ gazdasag/magyar/2010/10/07/kik_allnak_az_iszapkatasztrofa_mogott/
97
Recommendations
In order to investigate long term environmental and health impact, and to lower risk
as advised by WHO and EU expert groupsextensive, continuous and prolonged
monitoring is necessary.
Further testing must clarify the reason for the red sludges unusually high arsenic content.
The population must be provided scientifically verified information about the contaminated soils future use for food and crop production.
Legislation must be passed declaring maximum contamination levels for soil, groundwater, and surface waters, in accordance with various soil and water utilization forms.
Presently there are only standards that are guidelines of a non-binding nature, and the
ambivalence of relevant comparison levels leads to uncertainty in government communication as well as rescue operations.
98
5. Legislation
5.1. Overview of legislation in Europe and Hungary
5.1.1. The adoption and implementation
of legislation in the light of the environmental licenses of MAL Ltd.
The legal foundation for MAL Co. Ltd. to engage in the activities it took over and was licensed
to carry out according to the privatization contract such as the production of alumina and
gallium, as well as red mud waste disposal was the environmental operating license no.
30.010-120/98. and its continued modifications. According to the terms of the license, the
company was authorised to performing the operations referred to above until 31 December
2005. The present legal analysis concerns the treatment and disposal of red mud as a manufacturing waste product, thus the other manufacturing activities are not analyzed.
The relevant legislation in force at the time when the license was issued concerned, firstly,
the classification of the waste, secondly, on the basis of that classification, the regulation of the
landfill as a built structure, and thirdly, performing the activity concerned.
99
Member States are obliged to comply with EU Directive until 12. 12. 2010. Th is did
not happen in Hungarian law.
MAL Co. Ltd. was granted permission to deposit red mud in reservoir 10 in 2004,
through a modification applied to the operating license described above. By this time, however,
it was Directive 16/2001. of the Ministry of the Environment, based on Government decree
98/2001, that was in force. This Directive contains the list of wastes that has been in force
ever since. Unlike the earlier definition cited above, the new list, has a dedicated indication
for red mud (among others), with an asterisk indicating hazardous waste:
01 03 07* other waste containing hazardous substances extracted through physical or
chemical processing of metalliferous minerals
01 03 09 red mud from alumina production, different from 01 03 07
The directive containing the waste list complies with the Commission Decisions 2000/532/
EC, 2001/118/EC and 2001/119/EC.
According to the definition of the waste list quoted above, however, the red mud resulting
form alumina production, can in fact be hazardous as, depending on the technology used to
extract the mineral raw materials and on the treatment the residue was subjected to, the waste
to be treated may contain hazardous substances in concentrations which amount to having
hazardous characteristics according to both Decision 2000/532/EC and Directive 16/2001
of the Ministry of the Environment.
However, the classification of the waste is not only a compulsory requirement at a
given static moment, i.e. at the time of licensing, but it an act to be repeated periodically,
since the waste disposed and its properties change depending on its chemical constituents
and the method of treatment. It is not assumed that this autonomy is abused by applicants;
nevertheless, it would be justified to require the Authority to carry out regular, independent testing on the question of whether the waste designated in the license is actually the
same as the waste treated, and further to determine whether the current state and properties of the waste designated in the license meet the hazardous characteristics as a result of
depositing and the passage of time. Furthermore, there is need for creating the appropriate
legal environment in compliance with the regulations set forth in Directive 2008/98/EC,
along with the implementation of the Directive into national law.
101
102
Regulation 22/2001. KM does not comply with the provisions of the European directive regarding wastemore accurately, mining wastenot falling under its scope, and
thus the regulations mistakenly failed to govern red mud landfi lls for disposal of red mud
classified as non hazardous.
The same exclusion is contained within regulation 20/2006. KvVM. that has entered into
force since then. A legitimate explanation is that these kinds of waste should be managed and
regulated separately based on the EU directive on the treatment and disposal of mining waste
adopted later on. This separate regulatory area was taken over by Hungarian law in 2008 according to the regulation to be analysed later on.
c) Regulation on landfills as built structures:
Directive 1999/31/EK and its appendices contain detailed provisions on the placements, technical criteria, environmental security and regular inspection of similar facilities. Due to a faulty implementation of the directive, the disposal of mining waste classified as non hazardous in international law and on the design of the built structure was not
covered by special rules, only by the general construction rules.
The landfi ll as a built structure fell under the scope of regulation 12/1986. VM in
procedures that started before 1 January 1998, whereas they fell under the scope of regulation
46/1997. KTM in procedures that started after. The construction of basin 10 was granted permission in 1993, and its construction was finished in 2001. In the context of the legislation in
force at the time of both the permission granting and the takeover, the two regulations above
each use the rule of general scope. Thus every activity of construction and every built structure
fall under the scope of the regulations except for the ones specifically specified within it. The
exceptions do not include waste disposal sites and facilities, and thus, they fall under the
scope of construction permits according to the general rules, and the responsible authority
is the general construction authority. Because the construction permit had to be assessed
with the participation of the environmental inspectorate until November 2005. Following this state, the participation of the inspectorate is not required in the case of activities
linked to environmental or integrated environmental permit as these permits specify the
conditions falling under their scope, making duplication unjustified.
Besides the procedure of permission, the construction authority keeps its important
role concerning inspection obligation. At the time when the structure is first put to use,
the authority inspects whether the structure was built according to the terms of the permit
and whether it otherwise conform to the function intended. After this, the authority checks
for stability and the obligation for proper maintenance. This post inspection obligation
is defined by 47. (2) of the Act LXXVIII. of 1997 on the Built Environment. Under the
legislation referred to, the authority must act and although for the restructuring and refurbishing the built structure if in its present state it poses any risk.
103
d) The fulfi lment of the obligation for proper maintenance and, as well as the revision,
restructuring, refurbishing, restoration or deconstruction of the built structure if its
condition poses any risk to life or health, public security or that of material assets.
In the case at hand, the construction authority under obligation to monitor the condition of basin X would have had an important role to play. Construction authorities mistakenly took the position that did not have competence. Th is circumstance is clearly an
anomaly of public administration, that will be eliminated by a modification of construction
law since passed. Nevertheless, the obligation for post inspection will only be effective if
it is carried out regularly by the authority. In any case, it is justified to make the act more
precise, and to make it mandatory to regularly check buildings causing potential risk.
104
This statement is important on two scores. Firstly, because pH value of red mud exceeded
11.5 at the time of the accident, clearly making it hazardous under the EU directive. Otherwise the hazardous and non hazardous substance enumerated, altogether that the company
constantly receive permission for (with modifications) could have played a part in the severity
of the accident. Thus it should be investigated how much this practice, considering the technology, influenced the material and/or the red mud deposited in the reservoir.
In addition, it has to be investigated if the reservoir basin only contained the material
as per the permission. The documentation and the permission keep referring to the red mud
as non hazardous substance. Though Hungarian regulations treated red mud as hazardous
material before 1 January 2002, later it could be classified non hazardous depending on
the technology used. Here, the omission of the legislation can be identified. Material that
is classified as hazardous by the Act XLIII. on Waste Management of 2000 (all waste shall
be classified hazardous that is characterised by one ore more qualities defined in Annex 2, or
contains such substances or components, posing a risk to health or the environment due to its
origin, composition or concentration.) The appendix referred to classifies irritating and caustic
materials (categories H4 and H8 respectively) based on this definition. Alkaline substances
above pH value 9 also belong here.
Classifying red mud as non hazardous was initiated by the licensee in 2003. At this point,
the inspectorate could have used the opportunity to classify the substance in the deposit as
hazardous. However, due to the fact that the classification procedure was prolonged, a change
in the law took place. As a consequence of the modification in force from 4 December 2003, the
obligation on classification of the waste was transferred on its owner (ART. 4, section 1: the
obligation on classification of the waste in terms of its hazardousness is borne by its producer,
and if the latter could not be located, by the proprietor of the waste with notice being taken
of the provisions of separate legislation.)
However, the permit prescribes the waste proprietor to keep up to date registry documentation on the waste and send a summary of it yearly to the authority (quarterly in the
case of hazardous waste). It also specifies that the authority should be notified of any serious change concerning the waste. The fact of becoming hazardous is clearly a significant
change. The omission on the part of the licensee is obvious due to failing to fulfil the
obligation to maintain constant registry documentation and/or the obligation to report
changes.
these activities. The termination of the original license and the obligation of inspection made
the company request an integrated environmental permit which it in fact received.
The concluding provisions of the decree say it includes regulation compatible with Regulation 96/61/EC (IPPC). The Regulation referred to specifies a separate reference to landfills
indicated in points 5.1 and 5.4 in terms of the rules of their technological compliance:
Without prejudice to the provisions of this directive, the technological requirements concerning landfills falling under the scope of points 5.1 and 5.4 of Appendix I. shall be defined
by the council; acting on the basis of the recommendation of the council, according to the
procedure defined in the Contract.
The quoted Council regulation is Regulation 2003/33/EC, containing detailed regulation on the technical and compliance parameters of all kinds of landfi lls, as well as the
obligation to provide regular and independent tests on the waste accepted, and the procedure of classification. The government decree on the integrated environmental permit does
not contain this reference. On the other hand, the Council Regulation itself was adopted
in Hungarian law, in the form of regulation 20/2006 KvVM cited above, which, however,
due to the characteristic rules on entering into force does not cover the red mud disposal
facility under investigation. For a specific situation developed to the effect that the landfi ll
granted permission based on a Government Decree and provided operating permit on
the basis of interim rules was not covered by an important regulatory item, the Council
regulation. Yearly independent testing of the wast continuously deposited in the landfi ll
could have shown that the west concerned has hazardous features owing to its treatment,
its disposal or external conditions, and consequently its classification is not valid.
The practice of the inspection by the inspectorate raises further questions as well. That
is, the indicative data provided in the permit regarding the pH value of the solidified waste
material indicate that specimen 530/01 had pH value of 11,8, whereas that of 531/01 was
11,3. Though the data were merely indicative, the Inspectorate nevertheless clearly learned
that based on its pH value, the red mud should have been classified hazardous already at
the time of granting the permit. Based on the data, the significant difference or confl ict
between the tested data and the contents of the documentation should have been clarified
by the inspectorate before granting the permit itself.
In the course of carrying out IPPC inspections, the authority has the right to check
in terms of any of the data or aspects featured in the permit. True, this is not an obligation.
only an opportunity. But it is beyond a doubt that the authority would have had to clarify the
contradiction it learned from the indicative data.
Furthermore, the role of the concerned district mining directorate also needs to be
investigated regarding the concerns raised by the treatment of the red mud waste. For the
scope of ministry regulation 14/2008. (IV.3.) GKM on the treatment of mining waste, as
per Par. 1. (1) is as follows: the scope of the regulation covers the treatment of the prospecting, extraction, processing and storage of mineral raw materials (hereinafter: mining
waste). It is exactly the processing of a mineral raw material (bauxite) that is processed by
an alkaline treatment by MAL Co. Ltd. (at its Ajka site), red mud being the waste product
of this process.
106
107
The extension of the Directive and the Act onto other facilities such as landfills described
by the above-mentioned criteria affects the obligations falling on other facilities as well. The
Directive systematically adheres to the principle that existing facilities coming to fall under
its scope after the modification shall have to comply with its provisions over a short period.
Hungarian law deals with the modification of Directive 2003/105/EC not among the
provisions of the Act but within a separate regulation. Due to the extended scope of the Act,
Government decree 18/2006 contains detailed rules compatible with the directive for existing facilities that will come under the scope of disaster protection regulations owing to the
extension of the scope.
Special rules governing mining wastes
The deficiency, referred to above, of ministerial regulation on landfi lls, i.e. the rules governing non hazardous mining waste is rectified by regulation 14/2008 GKM, in force since 11.
04. 2008. The scope of the regulation covers all hazardous and non hazardous waste the are
directly related to the extraction or processing of the raw material, and does not fall under the
scope of any other waste management regulation. The provisions of the regulation are rather
strict. Only waste products with limit of hazard levels might be excluded from its jurisdiction,
e.g. inert non polluted soil, and these only under special circumstances.
Defining the hazard level of waste is very important. It is used in the widest sense and
does not link it to being part of or registered in a list or inventory.
Hazardous waste: waste characterised by one or more attributes specified in Appendix 2 of the Act on Waste Management, or containing such substances or components, that
poses a risk to health or the environment due to its origin, composition, concentration.
According to the rules defined by the regulation. the permission granting authority is
the mining directorate. The process combines the requirement of the best available technology
(IPPC) taken from the integrated environmental use procedure, the requirements of the protection against serious industrial accidents (Seveso II), the rules of liability for environmental
damage and financial security deposit, the participation of the public (Aarhus). Altogether, it
is an integrated piece of legislation with a sophisticated perspective.
It is an important regulatory item that the waste management facility also belongs
under the authority of the mining directorate in terms of being a special kind of built
structure. The deficiency referred to above that is that pos inspection on the part of the
permission granting authorities is not a characteristic of Hungarian law is rectified by
this regulation. It expects the operator to carry out regular monitoring activities at least
yearly, in terms of the condition of both the built structure and the waste. The results of the
monitoring activity are revaluated by the authority which may decide to initiate supervision by independent experts. Over and beyond yearly inspection, the operator is obliged
to supervise all such facilities every five years. Furthermore, it is a noteworthy provision
of the regulation is not of a static, but rather a flexible reactive character: thus the authority can modify the permit of the functioning facility not only upon request, but in its own
competence of arbitration, if that is justified by the results of the monitoring report, or if
the best available technology, as registered by the EU, has changed.
108
109
110
tion 4.3.4.), nevertheless, the possible consequences of hydraulic pressure are not further
elaborated. The role of wind in propagating dust is taken into account, whereas the wave
generating effects of wind on the 2-acre water surface are not. Although in Point 16.05. of
the Permit, the relevant authorities set forth the preparation of an annual status survey
concerning the red mud reservoirs, which has to include data on their sinking, still the
possible degradation of the reservoirs as constructions, etc. is not considered otherwise.
Neglecting the risk of dam break is rather surprising given that the operators had
direct experiences of such events. According to the Documentation (6.1., p. 160), a dam
break occurred during the construction of Reservoir 10 on November 3, 1991, resulting in
43,200 m3 of alkaline (pH = 10-11) slag water escaping into the environment, thus polluting
the rivers Marcal and Rba through the Torna stream to a traceable extent.
Government decree No. 193/2001. (X. 19.) was applied upon the granting of the Permit, and it sets forth the identification of sources of pollution, as well as of solutions for the
disposal of non-recoverable waste in a manner excluding environmental pollution or damage
(appendix 3, point k) ). Anyways, an enormous reservoir, designated to retaining thousands
of tons of mud, towering 21 to 25 meters above ground level (Documentation, table 4.3.4.b.,
page 101), is a danger to its environment, however thick a dam it is girdled with.
In case of concerns, the Inspectorate has to contact the authorities in accordance with
appendix 4, chapters 1. and 2. of Government decree No. 193/2001. (X. 19.). A special expert
building authority has to be consulted, still there is no expert opinion concerning the dam
mentioned in the resolution. The Notary of Ajka specifies only that disposal of hazardous
waste on the abandoned landfills is forbidden.
In summary, neither Mal Co. Ltd. requesting the Permit, nor the Inspectorate granting
the Permit (or the relevant building authority) took into account the inherent risk of breaking of dams as a source of notable hazard to the environment, which is an elementary fault.
hazardous waste, quarterly). In accordance with point 4.01., important changes have to be
reported to the authorities within 15 days, and the wastes becoming hazardous is positively
an important change. Omissions by the Licensee are unequivocal, either for the omission
of the obligation of continuous record-keeping and/or for the omission of the obligation
of reporting important changes.
In the course of investigating the anomalies in the management of red mud waste,
repeated note must be made of the liability of the District Mining Inspectorate. Their argument, stating that their authority is effective if a permission has been requested (letter No.
MAL-171/2010. by the Government Commissioner to Soledad Blanco, page 6), is simply
incorrect. According to 5. (1) of Law No. XLVIII of 1993 on mining, which provides the
legislative framework for the decree, the mining inspectorate allows the management of
waste arising in the course of mining activities (point h), and is otherwise introduced authority with procedural obligations not only in the case of permitted activities, but also if
they detect the carrying-out of unauthorised activities.
It cannot be assumed that the competent District Mining Inspectorate was not aware
of the activities of Mal Co. Ltd. at Ajka, given the latters history going back to approx. 60
years, as well as its national ecopolitical importance, not to mention the mining permissions granted for its activities by the District Mining Inspectorate.
5.3.4. Other significant anomalies in the operation of the environmental protection system (incentives for prevention and the means of damage control)
According to point 11. of the Permit, the Licensee is obliged to employ a commissioner for
environmental protection and to make him available for contact to inspectors of the Inspectorate at any time. It is not known whether the company met this obligation or not. The selfassessment plan or the contents of worklogs (which, by the way, are to be cleared at the end
of each calendar year and kept for 5 years) are not known either.
113
Point 12. of the Permit disposes of the obligation of the Licensee to report the following
towards the Inspectorate:
operational status other than designated (in case of malfunction)
in case of non-permitted emissions resulting from the activity
in any and all cases that may result in threatening or contamination of surface water or ground
water, of air or soil, and requires/may require acute intervention.
At the same time, in all these cases, the assigned authorities to be informed are (point 13.):
the Inspectorate,
Veszprm county Directorate for Disaster Management (in case of fire and disaster),
Veszprm county Institute of the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service (upon
occurrence of accident and operational status that threatens human health)
No legal references are made, the Directorate for Disaster Management is not listed under
point 18. as an expert authority.
That is, neither the District Mining Inspectorate or any other state organ is listed among
the authorities.
Recordsobligations of reporting
The Permit disposes of obligations of continuous reporting, the completion of which is due
within 8 days of the end of the actual fiscal quarter in concern of hazardous matter, and on
March 1 of the year following the actual fiscal year in concern of non-hazardous matter.
Within the framework of reporting, the Permit disposes of the Licensees obligation of
data supply towards the Inspectorate with a deadline and data content as per appendix 1. Reporting frequency for each report type is treated in the appendix in a resolution in accordance
with effective regulations this obligation has been met by the company.
Appendix 3 specifies emissions limit values in concern of cleaned industrial water released
into the Torna stream. This value in concern of the pH rate is set between 6 and 9.5, which
contradicts point 9.02. of the Permit, wherein the same value is between 8.0 and 8.5 pH. The
textual amendment emphasizes the necessity of measuring the volume and pH rate of the
cleaned industrial water prior to its release into the Torna stream.
However, it is expressly set forth in the Permit that the weaker limit value set in appendix
3 is to be applied in concern of waste water emissions, i.e. a pH rate of 9.5 is also considered
acceptable. The justification for this remains unknown as well.
It is set forth that an overall report on the supervisions conducted and the observations made
114
during the operation of the landfill (red mud reservoir basins) is to be submitted by the Licensee
to the Inspectorate annually (prior to April 30 of the year following the actual fiscal year).
This report is to include the following:
Site description of the landfill along with data thereon
Status description of the landfi ll
Data on the sinking of the levels of the landfi ll
Results of ground water analyses
Based on the available documents, such continuous reporting has been concluded only
partially.
In case of emergency occurring at the Site, the measures set forth in the water quality
damage control plan are to be taken. Therefore, the damage control plan shall be considered
part of the Permit.
Point 18. refers to altogether two provisions made by expert authorities:
Provision by Veszprm county Institute of the National Public Health and Medical Officer
Service: The activities must not generate hazardous impact on human health in employees
and the surrounding residential area.
Provisions by the Notary of the City of Ajka: Landfills for hazardous waste must not be
established on the area of abandoned slurry reservoirs. The abandoned slurry reservoirs must
be continuously recultivated and strengthened.
The two provisions by the expert authorities are rather evasive. In addition, the one by
the Notary is intriguing since all through the Permit, provisions were made in concern of nonhazardous slurry reservoirs, while at this point hazardous landfills are mentioned.
In the section concerned with ground water protection: During the activities, selfcontained technologies are utilized, during the operation of which raw materials, end- and
by-products may not contaminate the soil directly. Contamination may occur only in case of
malfunction emergency, as well as during the transport, loading, or storage of accessory and
raw materials. Red mud is transmitted to the storage basins through a closed piping system,
therefore, besides the environmental impact of the basins, the red mud may cause soil contamination only in case of a failure in the transmission piping system.
Point 22. of the Permit, and the later references made to the monitoring results and to
6 (1) b) and c) of the law on environmental protection in the justification section imply that
the basin that met the accident is in order. Moreover, the passage stating that besides Basin
10/a, a new reservoir is to be erected in the area on the northern side of Basins 9 and 10 can
be interpreted as proving the security of the technology. References are made to investigations conducted in 2003 as vertical enclosures (curtains) were built to protect the Kolontr
area against contamination.
Due to the construction of the vertical enclosures the state of the red mud reservoirs
environment saw significant improvement. (Note that posterior evaluations partly associate
the construction of the curtains with the soaking of the soil under the dam base, and thereby
indirectly, with the dam break.)
In the light of the above it can be stated that even within the framework of the integrated
environmental permit it is possible to miss the evaluation of important risk factors (possibility
of dam break), and moreover, clarification of obvious contradictions (pH rate of 11.8 along with
qualification as non-hazardous), and such shortcomings cannot be remedied by the monitoring
options of the authorities.
Changing the monitoring options of the authorities to obligations would upset the system,
in which the licenseeand not the authorityexecutes risk identification and is responsible
in case of realization of the risks.
However, the systemalso in its current formis deficient. Obligation of self-assessment
may be introduced to the licensee along with collateral cost bearing and liabilities, nevertheless it remains a void commitment until (financial) liability of the licensee is not warranted.
If financial liability of the licensee remains voluntary for the lack of regulation, then neither
damage prevention or even damage control is motivated by economic interests.
Legislative ruling of the financial conditions of the licensees liability may be the sole
resolution. Deposit of a security motivates for damage prevention (supplying real input data
upon the licensing application, complying with the provisions set out in the permit to avoid
immediate financial liability, and for the subsequent narrowing of liabilities), provides latitude
in damage control for both the licensee and the state, which is at times forced to act on behalf
of the former, the insurance covers the damages made to third parties and the environment.
116
such information qualified by the effective laws as being of public interest. The organization in
2003 advocated the initiation of a comprehensive international campaign for the elimination and
development of the red mud reservoir areas, suggesting that Hungary ask for contributions by the
EU and other developed countries to an environmentally non-destructive way of development
of such matter, as well as to the neutralization thereof. The Clean Air Working Group solicited
this suggestion to a number of government members and government officials several times, still
no substantive response has been given.
Likewise, an expert at the Clean Air Working Group filed a complaint to the Prosecution
Service in 2006 due to the red mud reservoir areas endangering drinking water bases at several
locations. The situation at the Mosonmagyarvr reservoir of MOTIM is especially distressing as
in this case, the red mud is disposed over the water basewhich is a place where also the disposal
of the citys communal waste is forbidden, exactly in order to protect the water base. However,
no investigation was initiated by the Prosecution Service, since their audit confirmed that the
measures taken by MOTIM complied with the effective regulations of the law. According to
the Clean Air Working Group, it is not the Prosecution Service that is primarily responsible
for the lack of taking action, but rather the competent environmental protection inspectorate,
whichreportedlymisinformed the Prosecution Service under heavy political pressure.
Since inappropriate official monitoring may have contributed to the red mud disaster in
Ajka, the Debrecen-based Society of Conservationists of Eastern Hungary fi led a criminal
complaint to the Chief Prosecution Service against an unknown perpetrator or unknown
perpetrators in the subject of the suspicion of reckless endangerment due to professional activities resulting in a lethal mass disaster after the accident in Kolontr. The legal position of
the non-governmental organization is that the competent environmental protection authority did not comply with the applicable provisions of the government decree on ground water
protection, as well as of the recommendation on determining the minimum requirements for
environmental monitoring executed in member states during the on-site investigation carried
out on September 23, 2010 on the basis of the decree on the environmental impact monitoring
and the integrated environmental licensing procedures. Laws for environmental protection set
forth rigorous on-site monitoring of activities to be carried out by the environmental protection
authorities exactly to allow for the avoidance of such ecological disasters.
118
The same environmental protection inspectorate accepted as part of the Permit the unrealistic disaster management plan by Mal Co. Ltd., which allowed for the maximum spillage
of 300.000 m3 of matter in case of disaster, whereas in reality, the volume of escaped matter
was approximately three times larger. The signing of this disaster management plan is listed
among the charges against Zoltn Bakonyi, general manager of Mal Co. Ltd., yet the possibility of the liability of the authority in connection with that was not raised.
The Inspectorate failed to involve the competent District Mining Inspectorate in the licensing procedure.
Although the Notary of Ajka prohibited the disposal of hazardous waste at the landfi ll,
nevertheless no action was taken against de facto disposal of hazardous waste in the area.
Although from 2008 on, licensing of the disposal of waste from mining is within the scope
of authority of the mining inspectorate, the competent District Mining Inspectorate did not
check the technical appropriateness of the structure used for disposal, and did not enforce
the application of the best available technology in concern of the disposal (i.e. switching to
dry technologies).
ENone of the authorities involved paid substantial consideration to the risk of dam break.
Upon the conclusion of the contract of privatization, provisions of BAT and IPPC should
have been considered. In Mosonmagyarvr, the so-called dry storage has been applied since
the mid-80s, which is far more secure. Mal Co. Ltd. has only been recently obliged to do so
by the permit issued by the authority after the disaster.
119
120
121
Summary
All Hungarian authorities with a role in licensing and monitoring the accident-stricken
red mud reservoir had committed errors.
The Central Transdanubian Environmental, Nature Protection and Water Management Inspectorate had endorsed the classification of the deposited material as nonhazardous waste, thus significantly relaxing requirements on disposal and subsequent
monitoring.
The environmental authorities endorsed the unsubstantiated disaster management
plan handed in by MAL Co. Ltd.
The Inspectorate failed to engage the competent District Mining Inspectorate in the
licensing process.
The notary of Ajka had prohibited the depositing of hazardous waste in the reservoir,
but failed to take steps when hazardous waste was in fact deposited in the area.
Although the licensing of mining waste deposits has been the competence of the
Mine Supervision since 2008, the competent District Mining Inspectorate did not
check the structure of the disposal site for technological compliance, and failed to
enforce use of the best available technology with regard to disposal (conversion to
dry technology).
None of the authorities substantially considered the risk of a dam break.
When the privatisation contract was concluded, IPPC and BAT requirements were
not taken into consideration. Neither was compliance with these requirements subsequently enforced in an exhaustive manner by either the environmental or the construction authorities.
Regarding the occurrence and the severity of accident, a decisive factor was the Hungarian authorities failure to treat the red mud deposited together with the slurry as hazardous
waste in the course of the licensing and inspection process, even though the alkalinity of the
material in the reservoir that was later damaged would have justified this. Licensing hazardous waste disposal entails imposing stricter standards and the participation of more authorities
than is required for treating non-hazardous waste. A more thorough procedure might have
shed light the technological risks of the landfill and the deficiencies of the emergency plan.
The company acting as the landfill operator bears liability for classifying the deposited
material as non-hazardous at the time of applying for the integrated environmental permit,
even though the alkalinity levels clearly met the criteria for hazardous waste. The company
also bears partial liability in failing to meet the environmental requirements specified in
122
the privatisation contract fully and on time. Similarly, the company bears partial liability
for failing to ensure the transition (or the preparation for the transition) to a dry depositing
technology, at the latest, by the time of requesting the integrated environmental permit.
Furthermore, the occurrence of the accident can be linked to regulatory anomalies
owing to the fact there had been deficiencies in adopting and properly implementing EU
legislation.
The relevant Hungarian legislation only partially matches Directive 2008/98/EC on
waste requirements. Though it should have entered into force by 12.12.2010, the Directive was not fully implemented in Hungary. An important fact concerning the issue of the
responsibility of authorities is that the waste treatment plant belongs to the competence
of the Mine Supervision under Hungarian legislation. The directive cited imposes an
obligation of regular monitoring on the operator, to be carried out at least annually with
regard to both the condition of the built structure and of the waste, but this obligation
was not fulfilled in practice.
According to the Act on the Environment, the permit-holder (along with the owners
and managers of legal entities which cause harm) has increased responsibility for damages
incurred through use of the environment, a responsibility which may only be limited, or
transferred under very strict conditions. However, these general rules apparently come
short of providing for adequate and available financial means needed to cover for the damage incurred. According to the Act adopted in 1995, the rules governing the obligation
to provide a security deposit and to establish dedicated reserve funds in the course of the
environmental licensing process and the rules on liability insurance policies shall be laid
down in a government decree. This objective has only been formally met so far.
The documents available demonstrate that authorities in charge of granting permits
and inspection have not at all reckoned with the possibility of dam break.
On the whole, the EU legislation examined in the present analysis, provided it is
adopted and implemented in line with the intent of the legislator, seems suitable for
the prevention of similar accidents and for managing the consequences thereof. At the
same time, there is a need to adopt uniform classification criteria for hazardous waste,
unified EU-wide regulation governing security deposits and liability insurance (at least
for reasons concerning competition law), and a common EU environmental emergency
fund set up to cover environmental damage that can not be remedied otherwise.
Recommendations
The suggested measures conclusive of the legal analysis are included in point 5.6.2. of the chapter.
123
6. International comparison
6.1. Alumina production in other parts of the world
The basic raw material of aluminium production, i.e. alumina is produced out of bauxite. Bauxite is one of the (not very common) components of the earths crust. It is produced by surface
mining which means the mineral can be produced after stripping off the upper surface of the
earths crust. The worlds bauxite reserve is estimated at 55 to 75 billion tons.1 The worlds
three top bauxite producer countries are Australia, China and Brazil. In 2003, Hungary was
ranked as 16th largest bauxite producer in the world.2
Bauxit, http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bauxit
124
The countrys annual bauxite production was estimated at about half a million tons in
2005.3 However, this value dropped by half since then as today only MAL Co. Ltd. produce
bauxite in Hungary, altogether 240,000 tons in 2009.4
Country
1) Australia
65,2
2) China
40
3) Brazil
28,2
4) India
16
5) Guinea
15,6
6) Jamaica
7,8
7) Russia
5,8
8) Kazakhstan
5,1
9) Suriname
10) Venezuela
2,5
Altogether
199
Table 1: The worlds bauxite production in 20095
At least half of the industrial bauxite consists of aluminium oxyhydrates and minerals
(gibbsite, boehmite, diaspore) along with a significant level of iron oxides (hematite, goethite),
and silicic acid and titanium minerals as well. The two main types of bauxite is the karst bauxite which is formed on carbonate rocks and the so-called lateritic bauxite which is formed on
alumonisilicate rocks. Lateritic bauxites can be found in tropical or subtropical areas.
Composition
Karst bauxite
Laterite bauxite
Al2O3
4860
5461
SiO2
37
16
Fe2O3
1523
210
TiO2
23
24
CaO
13
04
1014
2028
Table 2: The composition of karst and lateritic bauxites (% on waterless base) Source: Wikipedia6
3
http://www.hirado.hu/Hirek/2010/10/07/15/Gorcso_alatt_a_MAL_Zrt__Tudjon_meg.aspx
http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bauxit
125
Through the Bayer process (which is commonly used all over the world now) aluminium
oxyhydrates are dissolved from bauxite ore at a relatively high temperature along with a sodium
hydroxide (NaOH) solution. During the decomposition process, gibbsite bauxites are normally
heated up to 140C, while boehmite bauxites, which can be found in Hungary, are processed
at a temperature of 240C. After separation of ferruginous residue (red mud) by fi ltering, pure
gibbsite is precipitated when the liquid is cooled, and then seeded with fine-grained aluminium
hydroxide. The water content of aluminium hydroxide is removed by a thermal treatment process at about 1100C (the so-called calcination). The clean (in a technological sense) aluminium
oxide is called alumina. In case of bauxites processed in Hungary, the production of each ton
of alumina results in about 1,2-1,3 tons of (solid) bauxite residue (red mud).
Finally, in the so-called Hall-Heroult process cryolite (Na3AlF6) is added to the alumina
to decrease its melting point, then aluminium is made out of this molten substance by electrolysis. This technology results in a 99 to 99.7% clean aluminium.
It is worth to mention that in Ajka Alumina Plant alumina production for metallurgical
purposes added up to about 98% of the whole production in 1990, with the rest consisting of
were non-metallurgic (special) products. As a result of intense development in non-metallurgic
products (and due to the closure of the Hungarian aluminium furnaces) Ajka Alumina Plant
has not produced alumina for metallurgical purposes since 2006.
Biggest Ever Red Mud Disaster in the World, Source: Index, 5 October 2010.
http://index.hu/tudomany/kornyezet/2010/10/05/nem_volt_meg_a_vilagon_ekkora_vorosiszap-katasztrofa/
126
Composition
Characteristic percentage
Al2O3
1519 %
Fe2O3
3340 %
SiO2
1015 %
TiO2
46 %
CaO
39 %
MgO
0,31,0 %
Na2Ofixed
711 %
V2 O5
0,20,4 %
P 2 O5
0,51,0 %
CO2
23 %
SO3
0.81.5 %
0.10.15 %
0.150.20 %
Heating loss
~9%
The big alumina producer countries evidently have large red mud reservoirs. Utilisation
and exploitation of red mud made all over the world adds up only to a few thousandths. There
is no red mud utilisation or processing in Hungary, too. There are red mud storages in the
country next to the closed down Mosonmagyarvr Alumina Plant and near the Almsfzit
Alumina Plant (also closed down) and by the still working Ajka Alumina Plant. (At the Mosonmagyarvr Alumina Plant the so-called dry red mud storing was in use.)
The biggest challenge for every alumina producer is the proper red mud storage. Some
countries, such as France, Greece and Japan, still dispose washed red mud slurry into the sea,
saying that alkali contents of red slurry is neutralised by certain components of seawater. This
solution is not allowed by EU laws, however, France has gained a permission for sea disposal
until 2015. According to data provided by Red Mud Project9 today only 7 out of the worlds
84 alumina plants dispose red mud into the sea. The dissolved alkali (that is, in this case sodium
hydroxide and sodium aluminate) contents of red mud is normally reduced by washing in every
alumina plant. During this process, the concentration of dissolved sodium hydroxide and sodium
aluminate is reduced to the thirtieth or fortieth part, to the fraction of the original value by clean
water through a multi-stage counter-current washing procedure. The washed red mud can be
treated by different filtering methods. Filtering by vacuum filters is the most common procedure.
Through this process, the quantity of concomitant fluid of the bauxite residue (red mud) can be
reduced to a great extent and, on the other hand, it equals to a washing of 2 or 3 stages.
8
Gyrgy Bnvlgyi: Failure of the embankment of a red mud pond in Hungary: The most serious accident of the Bayer process
http://icsoba.org/images/Newsletter2011.pdf
127
Mainland storing technology depends on environmental conditions to some extent. Previously, only pumped diluted red mud was pumped out and it was left to thicken and dry by itself,
however, without proper protection towards the subsoil, it could easily result in the contamination of the environment, particularly of the ground water. That is why reservoirs with double,
membrane polymer and clay isolation are widespread, as this way toxic materials cannot leak out
to the environment. During the thickening process, the alkaline fluid, which accumulates on the
surface as a surplus, is normally driven back to the alumina plant. Dry red mud storing which
poses less environmental risk, is also becoming more and more common. The main principle
of dry red mud storing technology is the dehydration of the red mud. There are two common
methods to do this: one is thickening in special washing facilities and the other is filtration.
For example, several Australian companies10 reduce alkalinity of red mud down to pH 9 by a
relatively new process using seawater. In the three alumina plants of the United States (in Texas
and Louisiana)11 they use more modern but expensive technology. It is a widespread drying method
in the US to settle red mud and remove water from the surface continuously. According to experts,
in the United States an industrial disaster similar to the one happened in Hungary cannot occur
even in case of a breach in the dam, as the dry material could flow out. In the US, they also wash
the red mud through several times in order to remove alkaline. In the Sherwin Alumina Plant in
Gregory, Texas 80 percent of the red mud disposed to the reservoir is solid. According to American
experts, red mud must be damp but not mud-like. If it was too dry, it could easily give off dust, so
they spray it with water if necessary. The embankments of the reservoirs are checked at least two
times a year and extreme weather conditions are also taken into consideration at planning. These
reservoirs, for instance, could even stand up to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Besides the USA, dry
storing is also widespread in some Australian and Brazilian alumina plants.
In China, about 10 percent of the red mud is reused (however, it is not clear whether the
so-called brown sludge derived from pyrogene technology is included here as well) they produce
bricks out of it. In Japan, bauxite is enriched before the Bayer process in order to reduce the
quantity of red mud produced at the end. In Greece, red mud was disposed into the sea until
2006, however, since then filtration through high pressure filters and dry storing technology
have been introduced gradually.
Queensland Alumina Limited, Rio Tinto Alcan Gove alumina plant and Yarwun plant
11
128
In the second stage, red mud formed on the drum fi lters with 55s% solid density ratio
would be filtered by newly set pressure filter thus a sludge with 65-70s% solid density ratio is
made. This dry sludge can be transported by lorries and can be spread at the storing place and
does not need further drying to become easily handled. They plan to add (a reduced quantity
of) 17 % power plant gypsum to this sludge until studies cannot prove that a further reduction of gypsum ratio is possible, or even a technology without using gypsum can be realised.
The planned deadline for putting this technology (which is regarded as final) into operation
is 1 November 2011
The applied gypsum technologyas far as we knowhas never been used before. The
application of gypsum also changes the chemical structure of red mud, during the neutralisation process sodium sulphate is formed. However, there is an element of risk in the
technologyas with any new invention.
Switching to the new dry technology cost HUF 500 million, while safety investments
such as building embankments, clearing out canal belts, closing down the damaged Basin
X, building water systems, neutralisation facilities and roads cost further HUF 1.5 billion.12
According to the new licence the change of technology must be completed by the end of the
test operation, during the test period fluid sludge will be disposed into Basin X/a. According
to the licence13 fluid red mud can be disposed into Basin X/a until 30 April 2011. Until 31
October 2011 dehydrated sludge with solid density ratio of 60% will be disposed, then, as of
1 November 2011 only the disposal of dehydrated sludge with solid density of 60-70% will
be possible.
Filtered and gypsum treated red mud will be transported to the appointed Basin X,14
mainly on an internal route by lorries, the new technology will increase delivery traffic by 4 or
5 lorries per hour. After switching to the dry red mud storing technology, the licence is valid
for alumina production of 300.000 tons/year.
13
Announcement by the Central Transdanubian Inspectorate for Environmental Issues, Nature Conservation
and Water Management: http://hirdetmeny.magyarorszag.hu/hirdetmeny?id=388860
14
Sludge disaster: Green Authority says MAL may continue operations, conditionally; 22 January 2011
http://nol.hu/belfold/a_zoldhatosagi_szerint_feltetelekkel__de_mukodhet_a_mal
15
129
in Hungary (out of which 15 million tons is moisture content) is 15 to 18 million tons. Besides
this, red mud contains vanadium, gallium, titanium and other rare earth metals16 as well.
Practically, extraction of all the metals is possible in terms of technology, however, it
is very expensive thus not profitable17 in most cases. Utilisation of red mud with the present
technology could only become profitable with much higher raw material rates and cheaper
energy prices. In some countries bricks and other building materials are made out of the red
mud without the extraction of any metals. As a trial, red mud is used in agriculture to improve
the quality of soil.
Dr Katalin Gruiz, Reader of Budapest University Technology and Economics (BME) and
Delegate of Hungary in the Committee for Risk Assessment of ECHA (European Chemicals
Agency) compiled a list of the possible red mud utilisation opportunities:18
1. Utilisation in the construction industry as a building material
Cement production
Aggregate production
Brick, block brick, building element production
Geopolymers: aluminium silicate based geopolymers to replace cement:
Si-O-Al-O-Si-O- structure
2. Usage in the chemical industry
Catalysts (TiO2 and Fe2O3 content, and for the large specific surface)
Absorbents
Ceramics
Coating
Plastics
Pigment production
3. Environment technology
Treatment of sewage and other waters
Treatment of acidic mine waters
Treatment of polluted soil
Treatment of acidic smoke gases and end gases:
SO2 absorption in alkaline red mud for neutralisation purposes,
CO2 eabsorption in alkaline red mud: to neutralise carbonisation and improve solidity
16
Rare earth metals in red mud (g/ton) Berilium (518), Gallium (3643), Nibium (3577), Molibdn (1932), Szeln (11),
Vandium (490730), Raterfordium (80100), Thorium (4550), Urn (32), Cirkon (340540) (forrs: Kiss Jnos: rcteleptan.
Tanknyvkiad, Budapest, 1982.)
17
18
130
4. Usage in agriculture
General soil supplement
pH normalisation of soil
Improve phosphorus content, phosphorus holdback
To treat soil contamination
5. Metal industry, metal production
Metal extraction from red mud
Steel production
Extraction of micro components
Gyrgy Bnvlgyi and Tran Minh Huan summarised the most important red mud utilisation opportunities in 2009:19
To improve acidic soil;
Absorb heavy metals in soil;
Keep nutrients such as phosphorus in agricultural soil;
ceramics (tiles and floor tiles) production;
brick production;
road building; particularly the coarse fraction of red mud
component in cement industry;
additive material in iron metallurgy;
filling material in tyre and plastics industry;
pigment in paint production;
absorption of CO2 and SO2 content of smoke gases
raw material for absorbent and catalyst production
raw material for chemicals to treat water and sewage water
Redmud.org made a compilation of the biggest red mud utilisation projects in the world.20
According to 2004 estimations in China 10 % of the produced red mud was utilised for metal
extraction or for brick production, although in this number the so-called brown sludge produced by plants using pyrogen technology might have been included. In Australia, there have
been attempts to utilise red mud in the construction industry since the 80s. Alcoas plant in
Kwinana, West-Australia produces bricks from red mud and residential buildings have already
been built out of these bricks. However, the usage of these materials for houses have triggered
fierce debates as according to the Health Ministry the radiation of bricks made out of red mud
exceeds the acceptable level for residential buildings.21 Red mud is also utilised as a secondary
raw material in Japan, it is mainly used in the cement industry as an additive.
19
http://icsoba.org/images/newsletter-09.pdf, Gyrgy Bnvlgyi and Tran Minh Huan: De-watering, disposal and utilization of
red mud: state of the art and emerging technologies
20
21
131
There have been several attempts for red mud utilisation in Hungary too. Gyrgy Dobos
and Lajos Bartha invented the Dobos-Bartha process which aimed at the complex utilisation of
red mud (iron extraction and cement production out of the remains). The process had reached
the stage of half operational implementation by the early 70s, but after the oil price explosion
it has not proved to be profitable. Ferenc Pusks conducted cultivation tests in Hungary and
in India in the 80s and 90s on different plants and vegetables on artificial soil containing 50
% to 80 % red mud. Klra Blint Egyedn and Andrs Terp have also done cultivation tests
at the University of Horticulture. The Pannon University and the Agricultural College of
Nyregyhza have also studied the selection of plants able to grow on recultivated red mud
surface. There are several Hungarian inventions for red mud utilisation. For example, Bla
Venesz from Mosonmagyarvr has invented eleven types of soil improving agents containing
red mud and took out a patent on them.22
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20101007-nemzetkozi-jelentesek-nyilvantartottak-a-veszelyes-helyek-kozott-a-vorosiszaptarozot.html
23
The people responsible got away with a sludge spill 30 times tougher than the one in Ajka 06 October 2010
http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20101006-buffalo-creeki-katasztrofa-egy-1972es-amerikai-iszapolmes-tanulsagai.html
132
peared, 502 houses were destroyed and further 943 houses were damaged. Property damage
was estimated at USD 50 million. However, the company blamed everything on the weather,
the heavy rains, several investigating committee claimed that the company had not met several
safety and environmental regulations. Despite the facts the company has not been called to
account for the disaster.
A tragedy in Bhopal
On December 3, 1984 in Bhopal, India forty tons of methyl-isocyanate gas leaked out of the
Union Carbide pesticide plant resulting in the worlds worst industrial disaster. The leakage
caused the immediate death of about 8.000 people and further 20.000 people died in a few
years. About half a million people were affected by the pollution and more than 120.000 have
suffered permanent damage. According to a study published in 201025 a significant level of
contamination can be measured in the region of Bhopal even now. Most of the local women
have no regular period as pesticides cause hormone related diseases.
Those who responsible for the chemical disaster were only prosecuted in 2010, twenty-five
years after the disaster. Seven Indian employees of the Union Carbide were sentenced for two
years in prison, however, the then CEO of the company, the American Warren Anderson is
still at liberty and lives a luxury lifestyle in the USA.
24
25
133
26
The extent of the red mud damage is not clear; 21. October 2010
http://ozonenetwork.hu/ozonenetwork/20101021-olajkatasztrofa-bp-kar-mexikoiobol-meg-nem-vilagos-mekkora-kart.html
27
134
Nagyttny
(Metallochemia)
Ajka - Kolontr
(MAL Co. Ltd.)
Instantaneous
10 cm > 1 m
35 cm
Geographical extent
of the aected areas
3500 ha >
10 cm 3.500.000 m3 soil
3 cm 1.050.000 m3 soil
Main pollutants:
Pb, Zn, Cu, Ni, Cd
Main pollutants:
As, Hg
Mercury (Hg)
1132 mg/kg
117 mg/kg
Chromium (Cr)
52670 mg/kg
14134 mg/kg
Nickel (Ni)
4450 mg/kg
767 mg/kg
Arsenic (As)
86 mg/kg
654 mg/kg
Duration of contamination
Dierent thickness
of (contaminated) soil
Partial dierences
in the nature of land use
Soil has been replaced in about a thousand of private gardens in Nagyttny between 2004
and 2009. The region had been polluted by the Metallochemia factory for a century with different heavy metalsdirectly through the soil, the subsoil water and the smokestacks. Because of
the slag products 800.000 cubic metres of field80 hectareshas been spoiled and have to be
replaced. A minor part of the material was used for the building of M6 motorway, and a waste
hill was built out of the rest. As a first step, they piled up a hill of 300300 metres basic area
and insulated it with foil and felt. A layer of pebbles and arable land came on the top of that, and
finally landscaping. The hill was equipped with an electric monitoring system of wire netting, too.
The 800.000 cubic metres land which was carried away from the residential area of
Nagyttny had to be replaced. This was followed by the restoration of the vegetation of the
gardens. The whole compensation project cost HUF 12 billion.
After the Ajka accident highly alkaline, caustic industrial waste spread out on about a 1435 km2 area. If an average 3 cm thick red mud spread out on a 35 km2 area that means about 1
million m3 soil. It could be the real contamination, however, there is no available technology for
replacing soil in a thickness of 3 cm. If the upper 10 cm of the soil will be replaced that means
3.5 million m3 soil has to be carried away and brought back.
At the Nagyttny contamination the main polluting heavy metals were: lead (Pb), zinc
(Zn), brass (Cu), nickel (Ni), cadmium (Cd). Pb 65-1320 , Cd 1-26, Cu 121-1500, Zn 6932828, Hg 11-32, Cr 52-670, Ni 44-50, Sn 340 and As showed 86 mg/kg ratio at some places
in the upper layers of soil. Except of Ni these mean enormous enrichments compared to the
normal or even to the acceptable values.
135
In the region of Kolontr arsenic (As) and mercury (Hg) were the most significant polluters. According to the studies As 6-54, Cr 14-134, Hg 1-17, Ni 7-67 and Pb 18-110 mg/
kg toxic content of elements was found in the upper layer of soil contaminated with red mud.
To sum up, a smaller level of contamination was found in the Kolontr region compared
to the one in Nagyttny (about 50-75%) (which is not surprising due to their different characters), however, the geographic area of the contamination is much larger.
The occurrence of heavy metals in a soil layer 0-10 cm deep around Nagyttny with cc. HNO3 solution:
Cd
Cr
Cu
Ni
Pb
Zn
Sample ID
mg/kg
N-NE/NE
1,52,6
5260
49100
44
61112
106122
N-NW/SE
2,83,3
60
127
48
196898
264755
S-SE
4,06,6
5464
224389
4346
404665
493845
SW/SE
3,05,5
5860
46284
4749
65951
121838
E-SE/SE
2,04,7
52
22
40
70958
87846
SE/E
6,17,2
50106
271581
4150
11001321
11061244
Sample
ID
As
Ba
Cd
Co
Cr
Cu
Vf3-004
5,67
4,30
42,7
0,129
3,69
14,0
5,80
Vf3-006
25,9
4,10
37,6
0,234
4,13
21,4
Vf3-008
30,9
17,4
120
0,378
9,28
Vf3-010
53,9
8,02
47,9
0,523
Vf3-012
23,9
7,46
46,8
0,235
Hg
Mo
Ni
Pb
Se
Sn
Zn
0,907
0,5
7,36
17,5
< kh
< kh
20,8
7,63
2,26
2,55
10,5
27,2
< kh
< kh
21,0
33,4
20,1
16,77
4,39
20,8
110
1,13
2,39
71,3
15,7
134
19,6
1,04
5,84
67,1
47,8
< kh
8,1
48,6
4,66
18,7
9,34
2,50
2,03
11,9
29,6
< kh
1,50
42,6
mg/kg
(Source: MTA TAKI, Studies on the Environmental Effects of the Red Mud Spillage in the
Kolontr Region in 2010 Professional Report, 2011)
Comment: There are no suitable limit values related to the concentration of pollution in
red mud or the in the sediment contaminated by red mud and in the contacting surface waters.
To apply these values to the soil or the drinking water would be too strict and unprofessional.
136
The accident at Baia Mare and the cyanide contamination of the river Tisza
In January 2000, a cyanide pollution took place in Baia Mare, Romania, during the reexploitation of mine dumps. During the process cyanide technology was used to extract the remaining noble metals (gold, silver). This activity requires plenty of water, the washing waters with
cyanide content get back to the system after settling. The embankment of the settling pond
broke in a 30 metres section because of the high pressure and 100.000 to 120.000 m3 sewage
water highly polluted with heavy metals and cyanide got to the streams Zazar and Lpos and
from there through the Szamos to the river Tisza causing a significant contamination on the
Hungarian section of the river too. Since the main contractor had no plans for disaster management at all, efforts made to stop the spreading of the pollution were limited and inefficient.
Although, there have been subsequent attempts to reduce the poisoning with the addition of
sodium-hypochlorite but this then proved to be ineffective.
About a month after the first pollution a second significant contamination happened in
Romania during the heavy metal and non-ferrous metal production and preparation for metallurgy. The embankment of the companys cleaning plant suddenly broke through due to the
rapid melting of snow in March 2000, and about 20.000 m3 sludge polluted with heavy metals spilled into the valley under the reservoir. Due to the continuous rainfall, this sludge was
washed into the stream Novac from where the pollution reached the river Tisza through the
river Vis. The pollution at this time reached the section of the Tisza above the river Szamos
which was intact at the time of the cyanide pollution. On the evidence of the investigations
28
Dr. Ern Fleit: A Hungarian Example of Industrial Accidents: Cypermethrin pollution at the CHINOIN plant in Nagyttny
in 1998, Department of Sanitary and Environmental Engineering, BME
http://www.epito.bme.hu/vcst/oktatas/feltoltesek/BMEEOVKASH2/chinoin_2006_harom.ppt
29
In the band not further than 1000m from the coast of lake Balaton
137
it can be stated that the polluted sludge contained lead, brass and zinc, mainly in a state of
bonded to floating materials.30
30
31
Source: http://www.terra.hu/cian/cian2.html
Open letter of NGOs concerning the Danube pollution at Esztergom [2004. aug. 11. 14:53]
http://www.gordiusz.hu/hirek/hirek_item.php?hir=8483
32
Ministry of Environment and Water - Report for the Environmental Committee of Hungarian Parliament on
the extraordinary event occurred at the Dorog Waste Incinerator run by ONYX Magyarorszg Kft.
http://www.kvvm.hu/cimg/documents/Tajekoztato_Kornyezetvedelmi_Bizottsagi_ulesre_08.17.doc.
33
http://www.bebte.hu/documents/kisduna.htm
34
138
Brazil: The double role of Norway in conserving and destroying the Amazon By Chris Lang, 26th May 2010
http://www.alcoa.com/brazil/en/custom_page/environment_juruti.asp
36
http://www.redd-monitor.org/2010/05/26/brazil-the-double-role-of-norway-in-conserving-and-destroying-the-amazon/
37
38
139
according to the tests, the building materials made out of red mud had a radiation level above
the limits. The red mud contained radioactive thorium and uranium.
140
The people responsible got away with a sludge spill 30 times tougher than the one in Ajka, 06 October 2010
41
http://wvgazette.com/static/series/buffalocreek/Commission/commission.html
http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20101006-buffalo-creeki-katasztrofa-egy-1972es-amerikai-iszapolmes-tanulsagai.html
42
43
141
may multiply to 4300 Dollar per barrel if BP is condemned for culpable negligence or deliberateness.44 Thus, the company might be required to pay a total of 5 billion-dollar compensation.
Summary
The Bayer process is globally the most widespread method of producing Aluminium. In practical terms, this technology leads to the formation of red mud wherever it is used. Currently,
no economically viable and efficient solutions are available for the recovery of this material.
It is most often deposited (dumping it in the sea or in reservoirs surrounded by dams).
Attempts have been made to find ways of recovering it: red mud is used both as a raw
material or an additive e.g. in manufacturing bricks, road construction and soil improvement. Furthermore, the technology for extracting metals is feasible, but it is too costly).
In an international context, the trend is shifting away from wet disposal technologies
towards dry disposal, which poses less risk. (The latter method was used in Mosonmagyarvr until production was shut down there.) The alkalinity of the deposited slurry is
typically lower internationally than it is in Hungary. On the other hand, the dry technology about to be introduced in Ajka, a technology which involves blending in power plant
gypsum, has not yet been implemented at an industrial level anywhere.
The red mud disaster in Ajka is unparalleled in both its volume and its character.
Nevertheless, at least part of the lessons learned from similar industrial accidents remain valid:
The costs of remediation eventually are to be paid by the state, with the companies responsible for the accidents almost always backing out of the process to a greater or smaller extent,
Compensation for damages only takes place in the long run, with both the range of
individuals eventually receiving compensation and its extent much more limited than
was originally promised,
Personal and institutional responsibility is most rarely identified,
The impact of environmental damage typically lasts longer than was originally estimated.
44
142
Recommendations
In order to reduce the risk of similar incidents and to be able to manage the resulting damage, a common EU environmental emergency fund should be established, to be financed
from payments by companies responsible for the risks.
Setting up such a fund and specifying the required level of financing calls for a review of similar industrial accidents and the subsequent compensation procedures. (As a
typical example, the BP oil disaster in the Mexican Gulf required establishing a USD 20
Million compensation fund. This was made possible by the companys financial resources,
however, as indicated above, the general rule is that there are no funds available to cover
for damage and compensation.)
In the field of regulation and supervision, the factors enforcing the application of safer
solutions posing less environmental risk should be strengthened.
143
7. Long-term eects,
further necessary measures
7.1. Future of impacted areas
Following the rupture of the dam, the spilled sludge and the alkaline slurry contaminated
an area of about 1000 hectares. The affected landmass, however, was even larger, as autumn
floodings went on to spread out the slurry on lands not impacted in the October accident. According to data from the Central Agricultural Office (MgSzH), approximately 1000 hectares
(based on March 2011 data, nearly 1300 hectares) of arable land was contaminated. According
to the first surveys, 600 hectares will need soil replacement and mandatory special (limited)
land use methods. The red mud cover can be considered 5-10 cm deep on average (min. 3 cm
max. 45 cm). The affected cultures included 300 ha of grassland, approx. 310 ha of prepared
arable land, 30 ha alfalfa, 150 ha corn, 15 ha millet. In Vas county, the contaminated water
stepping out of the Marcal riverbed flooded agricultural areas of significant size in the section
bordered by Nemeskocs and route no. 8.
144
For the benefit of an accurate assessment of the damage, The Central Agricultural Office
created an orthophoto map demonstrating the span of the red mud contamination. Besides this,
in order to perform radioanalitical and heavy metal examinations, the institution took samples
of grapes, carrots, lettuce and sunflower. These, however, are only suitable for assessing immediate and short-term impacts, providing little base for estimating long-term consequences.
One way of regenerating the arable lands and grasslands utilized as pastures is to neutralize the contaminants with dudarit and leave the clean-up of sludge residues up to biological
processes. This is only conceivable where the red mud cover is thinner. In areas covered by
thicker (greater than 5-10 centimetres) sludge layers, the only solution is to remove the red
mud, though this results in damage to part of the topsoil and in turn, the degradation of the
soil, as well. This is a sensitive loss on lands covered with less than average quality alluvial soil.
The pace of cleaning up the agricultural lands is slow. By the time of releasing the report,
the sludge removal had only been completed on 50 hectares between Kolontr and Devecser
while a 25 hectare area was treated and tilled in with dudarit.
Thus far, there is no reliable information available on what can be produced in the affected areas following the damage control. The production of food and feed crops definitely
runs into obstacles, in part due to judicial, in part to market factors (a typical example is that
in the wine region of Soml mountain, considered historic, wine tourism practically came to a
halt to the news of the disaster, although the sludge did not physically reach the wine producing areas). It has been suggested that the production of energy crops could be the solution, but
this solution equally raised expert concern since the toxic metals absorbed by the crops might
be released into the atmosphere during the incineration of the biomass.
A further source of problems is the affectedness of hobby gardens and farmsteads in
the vicinity of Devecser, Kolontr, Somlvsrhely, Somljen, Tskevr, Apcatorna and
Kisberzseny. Th is is where soils and groundwater testing, as well as a continuous monitoring would be the most urgent, since without the ability to produce garden vegetables, the
traditional lifestyle and livelihood of dwellers in these settlements are also at risk. Besides
rapidly carrying out investigations, the most important task would be to properly inform
the residents and to organise a service providing consultation and advice. Agricultural
work in the gardens starts as early as March, but without sufficient information, the residents will not be able to decide whether they should be concerned by the vegetables they
have grown themselves, and to know what restrictions or security measures shall govern
their traditional activities of production. The production lost to a lack of information and
legitimate precaution may lead to serious social and nutritional problems at the local level.
The third critical issue is the question of polluted riverbeds and riparian areas in the valleys
of Torna Creek and Marcal River. Secondary damage control (removing the sludge deposited
onto the banks) has already started in these areas. Nevertheless, the work advances illogically
(dredging was begun at the mid section of the Marcal, entailing the risk of recontamination
in the lower river section while carrying out the clean-up of the upper section later on).
145
is especially important, because whereas lye binds toxic metals, it can release them into the
environment when exposed to acids, causing problems in the long run.
147
Similar to the WHO-experts, the EU-experts drew attention to the need for further measurements and analyses, indispensable for carrying out long-term measures. In their report they
stated that drinking water quality is excellent, safe for human consumption. EU Experts called
on Hungarian authorities to do everything in their power to prevent the contaminated alkaline
water still seeping out of the reservoirs in large quantities from getting into the fresh waters.
present, partly imported raw material is however unknown. All what is clear is that half of the
bauxite processed at Ajka is of domestic origin, the other half coming from Bosnia.
In the damaged agricultural areas there would be a need for a more detailed heavy metal
analysis: to reveal in part the ecotoxicological, in part the biological effects of the contamination
(presumably, the alkaline liquid destroyed a large portion of the organisms living in the soil).
An analysis conducted at the request of Benedek Jvor, the chair of the green committee
in Parliament by the MTA TAKI Ecotoxicological Research Group in January 2011 repeatedly indicated high mercury and arsenic content. In addition it proved, thet concentration data
merely with reference to individual contaminants are not sufficiently informative. Ecotoxicological tests conducted with the indicator species (Daphnia magna) have demonstrated that
the complex pollution has an impact on living organisms (as measured by the mortality rate)
which is significantly higher than originally expected.1 Water analysis seems to constitute
a task that is even more complex, among other things because besides the aforementioned
toxic metals, the effect of the acids and gypsum used for neutralization, as well as the organic
micro contaminants of the sedimentation need to be assessed (and in spring, as the ground
thaws out, further contaminants can be expected to leach in). On top of all, the flood gushing
through the built-in areas carried away huge amounts of pollutants of unknown composition
(the contents of toilets and septic tanks, plant protection products, paints, used oil, etc.), thus
the emergence of compounds of these can also be expected.
150
necessary precautionary steps can be taken. As we have seen, in the reopening of the factory
and during its operation, concerns related to keeping the market share and saving jobs had
priority over environmental considerations, and it is not unlikely that this remains the case in
the future as well.
151
8. Conclusion
The Kolontr red mud disaster was the greatest environmental crisis ever of the Central and
Eastern European region. It was an accident that in terms of the presence of large amounts of
accumulated contaminants often without a clearly identifiable owner, deficient regulations and
insufficient control on the part of the authorities and civil society, could easily happen again in
any of the countries of the region. This justified the preparation of an exhaustive report that
would retrace the recent history of the company involved in the accident, MAL Co. Ltd. and
the Hungarian aluminium industry, the process of privatization, the reasons for the accumulation of waste products like slurry and tailings, the technologies widely used for their treatment,
would introduce the legal context, the practice of the authorities and all relevant factors which
might help to understand events, draw the conclusions and identify the steps that can reduce the
occurrence of similar accidents in the future.
The Baia Mare cyanide pollution in 2000 was the only environmental disaster of comparable dimensions in the region. At that time, it was the EU that provided assistance in collecting accurate information, clarifying the consequences, in damage control and the revision
of regulations. That incident has exerted a strong influence on the development of European
152
environmental law, not in the least owing to the work done be the Baia Mare Task Force and
the detailed and thorough documentation they prepared. Since the present case and objectives
are of a similar nature, we thought it wise to follow the example set by the Task Force in preparing our study. Thus we set out to present how the differences in the legislation of Member
States and the EU, the difficulties of applying the relevant regulations, and deficiencies in the
legal framework and the work of authorities can lead to the similar accidents and what tasks
the legislators should derive from the lessons of the recent disaster.
We think that most of the added value of the present report owes to the high level of
uncertainty observed in the public opinion and at the political level regarding the disaster.
Thus, there is need for a comprehensive study that will give an accurate image of the causes
and extent of the pollution, the consequences to be reckoned with, and the legal, institutional,
technological and financial conditions required to be met for damage limitation and prevention. As the manuscript of our report is being finalised, six months after the disaster, it is
clear that neither the causes nor the environmental and health effects or the liability issues
have been presented to the wider public in a lucid manner. No reliable information is available on establishments posing similar environmental risk; nobody knows if prevention and
the remediation of damages should be the task of the state or the owners, and it is not clear
which authorities should be inspecting slurry and tailings reservoirs. It is furthermore not
widely known what existing technology should be used for neutralising industrial hazardous
waste or its utilisation. These dilemmas are clearly explained by the study we aimed to prepare
with investigative thoroughness, with references made to the relevant documents and with
contributions by experts.
The most important finding of the report is thatthough relevant Hungarian regulation
in force still differs significantly from EU legislationthis accident would not have happened in
this form and with such a severe impact, had all the authorities involved as well as the company
adhered to existing regulations and carried out the tasks derived from the latter in the course
of authorising and monitoring the reservoir at Ajka. The factors leading to the gravest results
(excessive water content and alkalinity of the slurry in the reservoir, the sinking of the dam of
the reservoir) can be traced back to omissions and faults in interpreting and applying the law
which could, without a doubt, have been prevented. At the same time, politics also contributed
to preparing the disaster by failing to include environmental guarantees in the privatization
contracts, sabotaging the decision taken one and a half decades ago to work out policies of
environmental liability insurance and by tolerating lax behaviour on the part of the authorities.
We put priority on elucidating the European dimensions of the case. We have presented
how EU legislation deals with structures like red mud reservoirs, whether Hungarian environmental, construction and mining regulations comply in this respect with European rules
(where is further need for legal harmonization) to what extent is the European legal framework
suitable for managing environmental risk of such an order of magnitude, and where the law
needs to be changed (both domestically and in the EU) to prevent disasters like the one in
Kolontr and to alleviate efficient remediation should they nevertheless occur. We concluded
that the Community acquis contains, for the most part, the provisions necessary for prevention, while the EU should exercise firmer behaviour regarding the implementation of the
regulations concerned, as well as in controlling the proper management of the institutional
153
framework overseeing and enforcing regulations. Finally, the regulatory and financial background (including financial resources) for the rectification of the damage wrought should be
established at the European level in the nearest future.
The report was edited by LMPs Sustainable Development Cabinet. Experts from Hungarian scientific institutions and NGOs who played a definitive part in investigating the
accident (e.g. Greenpeace, Clean Air Action Group) as well as scholars of environmental
law contributed to writing individual chapters. We organised two specialised conferences for
initiating dialog among conflicting points of view and to find the consensus hoped for. We
conducted several field trips at the disaster site, talked to the representatives of the residents of
the affected areas, to the staff of national parks, officials of disaster management and the authorities concerned. All of this contributed to the preparation of a detailed document complete
with quotations and references, verified several times scientifically, that experts, researchers,
students and interested laymen can use as a reliable work of reference in the future both in
Hungary and in other Member States. Finally, the report wishes to provide opportunities for
decision makers to derive legislative and other tasks from the lessons of the disaster.
154
www.lehetmas.hu