Disputed Land Ownership

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31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163271
January 15, 2010
SPOUSES PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF JULIAN SAMBAAN, namely: EMMA S. FELICILDA, ANITA S.
SAMBAAN, VIOLETA S. DADSANAN, ABSALON S. SAMBAAN,
AGUSTINE S. SAMBAAN, EDITHA S. MANGUIRAN, GRACE S. NITCHA,
CLODUALDO S. SAMBAAN, GINA S. SAMBAAN and FE S.
YAP, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A legal tussle among children is a nightmare for their parents.
Sometimes, this happens when pecuniary interests takes precedence
over family relationship. In the instant case, we are at the forefront of a
family squabble over a disputed land situated in Cagayan de Oro City
which was purportedly conveyed to the eldest child through a Deed of
Absolute Sale.1
Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis
Oriental2 rendered judgment in favor of the herein respondents, which
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals3 (CA). Alleging that the CA
Decision4 is not in accordance with law and jurisprudence, as well as the
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evidence on record, petitioners now come to us via the instant Petition

for Review on Certiorari.5
Factual Antecedents
Julian Sambaan (Julian), married to Guillerma Saarenas-Sambaan
(Guillerma), was the registered owner of a property located at Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City. The lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-142026 issued on March 8, 1972, and more particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 5947-A of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd138019, being a portion of Lot No. 5947, Cagayan Cadastre, LRC Cad.
Rec. No. 1572) situated in the Barrio of Bulua, City of Cagayan de Oro,
Island of Mindanao x x x containing an area of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FORTY THREE (3,643) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
The respondents herein and the petitioner Myrna Bernales (Myrna) are
the children of Julian and Guillerma. Myrna, who is the eldest of the
siblings, is the present owner and possessor of the property in question.
Sometime in 1975, Julian was ambushed at Merayon, Talakad, Bukidnon,
and was hospitalized due to a gunshot wound. On April 11, 1975, Julian
allegedly requested his children to gather so that he could make his last
two wishes. Julians first wish was for the children to redeem the subject
property which was mortgaged to Myrna and her husband Patricio
Bernales (Patricio), while his second wish was for his remains not to be
brought to the house of Myrna at Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, in
1982, respondent Absalon Sambaan (Absalon), one of Julians children,
offered to redeem the property but the petitioners refused because they
were allegedly using the property as tethering place for their cattle.
In January 1991, respondents received information that the property
covered by TCT No. T-14202 was already transferred to petitioners
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name. Whereupon, they secured a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale

dated December 7, 1970 which bore the signatures of their parents and
had it examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The
result of the examination revealed that the signatures of their parents,
Julian and Guillerma, were forged.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
Thus, on April 13, 1993, the respondents, together with their mother
Guillerma, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14204 with Damages
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction7 against herein petitioners. They
alleged that in spite of the forged signature of their parents, the
petitioners were able to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City and secure TCT No. T142048 on March 8, 1972. They prayed for an injunctive relief in order to
prevent the petitioners from selling, disposing, or mortgaging said
property. They further prayed that (i) the Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT
No. T-14204 be annulled; (ii) they be declared the absolute owners of
the property; (iii) all documents executed, made and entered into
relative to the said title be declared void; and, (iv) the petitioners be
ordered to pay them P300,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees plusP1,000.00 as appearance fee.
On May 6, 1992, petitioners filed their Answer,9 alleging that the subject
property (Lot No. 5947-A) used to be a portion of Lot No. 5947, which
was originally owned by Clodualdo Sambaan (Clodualdo) and Gliceria
Dacer (Gliceria). Lot No. 5947 is more particularly described as follows:
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more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 21421 and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 7921 issued on September 23, 1940.
After the death of Clodualdo and Gliceria in 1949, their heirs, namely,
Alicia Lago, wife of Pedro Gacusan; Bernardo Lago (single); Gloria Lago,
wife of Jimmy Angco; Dionesia Lago, married to Paulino Unat;
Prysbetero Sambaan, married to Rosario Zaragosa; Juanito Sambaan,
married to Renerio Galos; Leo Sambaan, married to Adeloisa Tambulian;
Renato Sambaan, married to Adelina Ablon; Aida Sambaan (single);
Julian Sambaan, married to Guillerma Saarenas; Paz Sambaan, wife of
Rufinito Lago; and, Bernie Sambaan, married to Alicia Sabuero, executed
an Extra Judicial Settlement and Sale10 dated April 10, 1970 involving the
abovementioned land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
7921.
It appears, however, that Juanito, Aida and Renato sold their share to a
certain Domingo Ebarrat (Ebarrat). Hence, a portion of the property
belonged to Julian while another portion belonged to Ebarrat. In view of
the co-ownership between Ebarrat and Julian, the former and the latter
executed a Deed of Partition11 dated September 8, 1970 whereby Lot No.
5947 was divided. The eastern half with an area of 3,643 square meters
was assigned to Julian, while the western half with the same area went
to Ebarrat.
Petitioners claimed that Julian subsequently sold his share to them by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale 12 dated December 7, 1970. The said
property is
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 5947 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan)

situated at Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No.
5984 and 5948; E., by Lot Nos. 5948 and 5946, SW., by Lot No. 5946; and
on the NW., by Lot No. 5984, containing an area of 7,286 square meters,
A Parcel of land (Lot No. 5947-A, being a portion of Lot No. 5947,
Cadastral Survey of Cagayan) situated at Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City.
Bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 5947-B and 5948, Cad. 237; South by
Lot Nos. 5946, Cad-237; East by Lot Nos. 5948 and 5946, Cad. 237; and
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West by Lot No. 5947-B, containing an area of 3643 square meters, more
or less, covered by OCT No. 7921 (now TCT No. T-14202) of the Registry
of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
Thereafter, on December 10, 1970, Ebarrat and Patricio executed an
Agreement13 wherein Ebarrat acknowledged that petitioners are the
owners of the 18 coconut trees planted in Ebarrats property and even
made Julian as a witness to the said Agreement.
In addition, petitioners alleged that the imputation of falsification of the
signatures of Julian and Guillerma is a product of respondents inflamed
imagination because the latter envy them for they have been successful
in managing their properties. Petitioners thus prayed that judgment be
rendered dismissing the complaint; affirming their title over the
controverted property and ordering respondents to pay
them P500,000.00 as moral damages;P300,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of litigation.
On July 27, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Document14 to compel respondents to produce and permit
them to inspect and to copy or photograph the Deed of Absolute Sale
subject matter of said examination. Thereafter, the trial court issued an
Order15 dated August 14, 1992 granting the motion and directing the
Regional Office of the NBI to bring the document to court so that the
same may be properly examined.
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs were able to

establish a strong preponderance of evidence in their favor. Accordingly,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14204 is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID, and is hereby CANCELLED. Let another title be issued in the name
of the late Julian Sambaan. The defendants are jointly and severally
directed to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,671.00 representing
actual expenses.17
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, alleging among others that the trial court erred in finding
that the signature of Julian on the assailed document was a forgery, went
to the CA by way of ordinary appeal. On August 20, 2003, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming the findings of the trial court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated August
2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, in
Civil Case no. 92-179 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellants.18
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 which was denied by the
CA in its Resolution20 dated March 17, 2004.
Issues
On August 11, 1992, Guillerma died in Cagayan de Oro City and was
accordingly dropped as co-plaintiff.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision16 dated
August 2, 2001 ruling in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners assail the Decision of

the CA on the following grounds:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PRESCRIPTION DID NOT BAR RESPONDENTS ACTION TO
RECOVER OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
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B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED

SETTLED PRINCIPLES ON THE ADMISSIBILITY AND
APPRECIATION OF OPINIONS OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN ITS
BLANKET ACCEPTANCE OF THE INADEQUATE TESTIMONY OF
THE DOCUMENT EXAMINER WHO WAS COMMISSIONED BY
RESPONDENTS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL CASE
NO. 92-179.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION
THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WAS A FORGED
DOCUMENT ON THE BASIS OF SPECIMEN SIGNATURES THE
GENUINENESS OF WHICH WERE NEVER ESTABLISHED.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED
LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON HANDWRITING COMPARISON IN USING
SPECIMEN SIGNATURES OF GUILLERMA SAMBAAN THAT WERE
MADE AT THE TIME AND FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE
HANDWRITING ANALYSIS OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH
FORGERY IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
SIGNATURE OF JULIAN SAMBAAN ON THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE WAS FORGED BECAUSE IT BELIEVED THAT GUILLERMA
SAMBAANS SIGNATURE WAS ALSO FORGED.
F. THE COURT OF APPEALS CONTRAVENED THE LEGAL RULES
GOVERNING THE APPRECIATION OF DOCUMENTS IN RULING
AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF JULIAN SAMBAANS SALE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY TO PETITIONERS DESPITE THE EXISTENCE
OF THE AGREEMENT DATED 10 DECEMBER 1970 CONFIRMING
THE SALE.
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G. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURTS AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
AND IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES.
Our Ruling
The core issue to be resolved in the present controversy is the
authenticity of the Deed of Absolute Sale which is a question of fact
rather than of law. In Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,21 we held that for a question to be one of law, it must involve no
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of
facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.22
In the case at bench, the issues raised by the petitioners are essentially
factual matters, the determination of which are best left to the courts
below. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight
and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by
substantial evidence on the record.23 Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,24 even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.25 But to erase any doubt on the correctness of the
assailed ruling, we have carefully perused the records and, nonetheless,
arrived at the same conclusion. We find that there is substantial
evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals and trial courts
conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of
Absolute Sale were forged.
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The examination conducted by the NBI disclosed that Julian and

Guillermas signatures were forged.
We find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly gave
probative value to the testimony of the NBI Senior Document Examiner
Caroline Moldez Pitoy, who categorically testified that the signatures of
Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged, viz:26
Atty. Dalisay: As Senior Document Examiner of the National Bureau of
Investigation, do [sic] you have [the] occasion of examining [sic] the
signatures of Julian Sambaan and Guillerma Saarenas by virtue of the
case of the Regional Director, Regional Office of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Cagayan de Oro City?
A: Yes sir.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the findings on the signatures of Julian
Sambaan and Guillerma Saarenas Sambaan appearing on the Deed of
Sale dated December 12, 1990.
A: After [conducting] comparative examinations x x x on the standard
specimen signatures of Julian Sambaan [and Guillerma Sambaan] as well
as the x x x questioned x x x signatures x x x we found out that [they
were] not written by one and the same person.27
xxxx
Q: What was the procedure which you have taken x x x in examining the
authenticity of the signatures of Guillerma Saarenas Sambaan?
A: Per Standard Operating Procedures, the first thing we did upon
receipt of the documents submitted to us is to check x x x the documents
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attached to the basic letter-request and then the questioned and

standard documents were classified as to the sufficiency and
appropriateness of the standards, and then these were evaluated, after
which, they were marked accordingly, then we go to examining all the
standard/specimens first, to determine whether the handwriting is done
by one and the same person before comparing with the questioned and
standard signatures. x x x After they were found to be written by one and
the same person, before comparing with the questioned documents, the
handwriting characteristics were properly observed in these two (2)
sheets of photographs, then, the final evaluation is made, after which, a
written report is made as a result of the examination, then the same is
forwarded to the Document Examiner for re-examination and this
Examiner affixes his signature and submits the same to the Chief of the
Division for approval and the said report passes to the office of the
Regional Director for final approval.
Petitioners failed to present any evidence to rebut the findings of the NBI
handwriting expert.
Moreover, the findings of the NBI document examiner were
corroborated by the trial courts own observation, as affirmed by the CA,
that "even a cursory examination of Guillermas questioned signature
from her specimen signatures in the enlarged photographs (Exhibits F
and F-1) would show that it needs no expert witness to notice the wide
difference in stroke, as well as the writing style in capital G."28 What is
more, Emma S. Felicilda, the daughter of then deceased Guillerma,
likewise testified that "in fact my mother was the one who filed the
complaint in this instant case because according to her, she did not sign
the said document".29
The fact that the examination was commissioned by the respondents did
not make said examination null and void.
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It is of no moment that the examination of the Deed of Absolute Sale was

commissioned by the respondents. In the end, it is the court which has
the discretion and authority on whether to give probative value to the
results of the examination. As held in Sali v. Abubakar,30 the fact that the
NBI conducted the examination of certain contested documents upon the
request of a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination
thus made:
x x x Its purpose is, presumably, to assist the court having jurisdiction
over said litigations, in the performance of its duty to settle correctly the
issue relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private individual
may examine the same, if there are facts within his knowledge which
may help the courts in the determination of said issue. Such examination,
which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private individual,
does not, certainly, become null and void when the examiner is an expert
and/or an officer of the NBI.
Indeed, any person, expert or not, either in his private or in his official
capacity, may testify in court on matters, within his personal knowledge,
which are relevant to a suit, subject to the judicial authority to determine
the credibility of said testimony and the weight thereof. [On] the other
hand, the question whether a public official may or shall be ordered or
permitted by his superior to examine documents and testify thereon in a
given case, is one mainly administrative in character, which is within the
competence of said superior officer, or the Bureau Director or Head of
the Office, or the corresponding department head to decide, and is
independent of the validity of the examination thus made or of the
credence and weight to be given by the Court to the conclusions reached,
in consequence of said examination, by the official who made it.
The procedures taken by the NBI document examiner did not violate
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
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We are not swayed by petitioners allegation that the comparisons made

by the document examiner, the CA and the trial court, of Guillermas
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale and her specimen signatures,
violated Section 22, Rule 13231 of the Rules of Court on the
authentication of private documents. It should be borne in mind that in
this case respondents were not presenting evidence to authenticate a
private document. On the contrary, they are challenging the signatures
appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The confluence of the following circumstances prove by preponderance of
evidence that the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.
Records show that Julian was unaware of any absolute conveyance of his
rights over the subject property in favor of petitioners. As found by the
trial court and affirmed by the CA, Julian even requested his children to
redeem subject property from the petitioners. In furtherance of his
fathers request, Absalon offered to redeem the subject property from
the petitioners in 1982, however, the latter refused because they were
allegedly using the same as tethering place for their cattle.32
The caretaker of the subject property, Eufronio Abrea, also testified on
cross-examination that there were times when the brothers and sisters
of Myrna went to the land and asked for coconuts.33 Petitioners take this
to imply that the respondents "never owned the subject property
because they had to ask for coconuts from petitioners, who were the real
owners of the property."34 We disagree with this interpretation.
Harvesting of coconuts requires specialized skills; an ordinary person
who does not know how to climb necessarily has to ask the caretaker to
get the coconuts for him or her.
In addition, Myrna admitted that she was not present when her parents
signed the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale.35 Neither was she cognizant of
who the witnesses were to the said deed.36 Interestingly, Guillerma, one
of the alleged signatories, would have been privy to the transaction that
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involved her husband. Yet, she joined herein respondents in filing an

action for the Annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of
forgery.
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the exception in the instant case, however, because the findings and
conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court.
The forged Deed of Absolute Sale is null and conveys no title.
Lastly, the trial court and the CA were one in proclaiming that
considering that the subject property belongs to Julians capital, the
execution of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale could be validly made by
Julian even without his wifes signature.37 As a matter of fact, the wifes
name was not typed in the assailed deed and her purported signature
merely appears next to the supposed signature of Julian. This only
confirms that the person who prepared the deed knew that her
signature was unnecessary for the assailed document.
The trial court and the CA further concluded:
x x x If such was the case, we are in a query why the signature of
GUILLERMA must have to be forged when her consent, as spouse of
JULIAN, is not necessary to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale?
The answer to this is simple: JULIAN never executed the assailed Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of MYRNA and such deed conveys no ownership in
favor of the appellants.38
Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and
cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine
real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case.39 The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact
of the trial court makes the same binding upon this court.40 In Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 41 we held that factual findings of the CA
which are supported by substantial evidence are binding, final and
conclusive upon the Supreme Court. A departure from this rule may be
warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court,42 or when the same is
unsupported by the evidence on record.43 There is no ground to apply
Having affirmed the findings of fact of both the CA and the trial court
that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma are forgeries, we now come to
the question of the validity of the transfer of title to the petitioners.
In Sps. Solivel v. Judge Francisco,44 we held that:
x x x in order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of
the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in
good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged.
When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the
owners duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not
thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed
acquire any right or title to the property.
x x x The innocent purchaser for value protected by law is one who
purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered
owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law expressly states. x x x
In Instrade, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,45 we reiterated the said ruling
maintaining that "[A]s early as Joaquin v. Madrid, x x x, we said that in
order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the
registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in
good faith and for value, the instrument registered should not be
forged". Indubitably, therefore, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale did
not convey any title to herein petitioners. Consequently, they cannot
take refuge in the protection accorded by the Torrens system on titled
lands.
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Thus, we hold that with the presentation of the forged deed, even if
accompanied by the owners duplicate certificate of title, the registered
owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the
forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property. The CA has
aptly arrived at the same conclusion in its August 20, 2003 Decision
affirming in toto the August 2, 2001 Decision of the RTC of Cagayan de
Oro City ratiocinating that:
It is significant to stress that the main thrust in the case at bench is the
regularity and validity of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 7, 1970 (Record p. 374, Exhibit "3") allegedly executed by
JULIAN in favor of the appellants. As such, we must not confuse the issue
at hand by averring that other documents should be considered in
determining the validity of the deed of absolute sale. The reason is
simple: the valid execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale will convey and
transfer ownership in favor of appellants title based on the rule that by
the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
to pay therefor a sum certain in money or its equivalent (Coronel vs.
Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 15). The fact that the assailed Deed was not
signed by JULIAN and the signatures of JULIAN and GUILLERMA were
forged per findings of the NBI Senior Document Examiner, it can
therefore be inferred that the subsequent issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-14204 has no basis at all since ownership was
not conveyed to appellants by reason of the forged Deed.1avvphi1
In addition, as to the issue that the Agreement dated December 10, 1970
(Record p. 375, Exhibit "4") executed between DOMINGO and PATRICIO
were excluded, we believe there is no need to delve on the said
Agreement since the same will not in any way give justification to the
forgery committed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. As explained by the
court a quo, to which we concur, appellees should not be faulted because
they are not lawyers, and as such they may not be able to appreciate the
legal logic between Exhibits "3" and "4".46
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Prescription did not bar respondents action to recover ownership of the

subject property.
Citing Article 145447 of the Civil Code, petitioners assert that since the
respondents admit that there was a mortgage transaction between Julian
and herein petitioners involving the subject property there is no dispute
that an implied trust was created by operation of law. In which case,
respondents right to reconveyance had already prescribed when they
filed the annulment case on April 3, 1992, or more than 10 years after
petitioners repudiated such implied trust.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the element of consent is
totally wanting in the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale because the
signatures of Julian and Guillerma, which is equivalent to their consent,
were forged by the petitioners.48 They maintain that the absence of
consent made the said document null and void.49 Hence, this case falls
under the purview of Article 1410 of the Civil Code which provides that
an action to declare the inexistence of void contracts does not
prescribe.50
We agree with the respondents. The supposed vendor's signature having
been proved to be a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent
as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code.51According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe". The
inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable which cannot be
cured either by ratification or by prescription.52
The award of moral damages and attorneys fees is proper.
On this aspect, we must consider the blood relations among the parties.
One of the respondents, Emma S. Felicilda, testified on cross examination
that they had high regard for Myrna, their eldest sister.53 The same was
echoed by respondent Anita Sambaan on cross examination.54 They
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could not believe that Myrna would keep and appropriate the land for
herself and transfer the title exclusively to her name.55 On direct
examination, respondent Emma S. Felicilda likewise testified that the
forgery caused them anger and bad emotions.56
Moreover, it was Julians dying wish for the property to be redeemed
from the petitioners.57 Hence, it is not unexpected that the sentimental
significance of the property and the anger and emotions caused by the
unlawful transfer of the same have moved the respondents to recover
the same through the instant action. We therefore hold that the award
of P20,000.00 as moral damages is proper.
In addition, in view of the complexity of the instant case and the multiple
levels of appeal that this case had gone through, we also affirm the
award of attorneys fees of P20,000.00 as well as the actual damages
of P1,671.00 incurred by the prevailing party which was substantiated
during trial.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the arguments raised by the
petitioners are essentially the same issues they put forward before the
CA which have been duly passed upon and considered by the appellate
court in affirming the RTC Decision in toto.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
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Records, p. 374.
18
Id. at 64.
Penned by Judge Edgardo T. Lloren.
19
CA rollo, pp. 144-155.
20
Id. at 186.
21
315 Phil. 805, 820 (1995).

Id.
Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and

concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis
and Rosmari D. Carandang.
3
Rollo, pp. 45-64.
22
Id. at 10-43.
23
Records, pp. 5-6.
Xentrex Motors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 258, 262

(1998).
24
Page 10 of 57
Judge Espaol v. Judge Mupas, 484 Phil. 636, 657 (2004).
Id. at 1-4.
Id. at 7.
Bascos, Jr. v. Tagahanan, G.R. No. 180666, February 18,

2009.
Id. at 34-40.
26
Rollo, pp. 369-372.
25
10
Id. at 41-42.
27
Emphasis supplied.
11
Id. at 372-373.
28
Rollo, p. 53.
12
Id. at 374.
29
TSN, April 13, 1994, p. 7.
13
Id. at 375.
30
124 Phil. 444, 447-448 (1966).
14
Id. at 73-74.
31
15
Id. at 84.
16
Id. at 538-547.
17
Rollo, pp. 265-266.
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The

handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
person. Evidence [in respect to] the handwriting may also be

given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
32
33
34
35
Page 11 of 57
41
341 Phil. 624, 633 (1997).
42
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 1, 13 (1999).
Alba Vda. De Raz v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 710, 725

(1999).
43
Rollo, p. 47.
44
252 Phil. 223, 231 (1989).
45
395 Phil 791, 801 (2000).
46
Rollo, pp. 60-61.
TSN, February 11, 1997, p. 33.

Rollo, p. 362.
TSN, July 5, 1996, p. 20 reads on cross-examination:
Article 1454. If an absolute conveyance of property is
made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of
the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is
established. If the fulfilment of the obligation is offered by
the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand
reconveyance of the property to him.
47
Q: But you were not present when the alleged

signature was affixed. Is that correct?
A: I was not present.
36
TSN, August 21, 1995, p. 16 reads on direct examination:

48
Rollo, p. 425.
Q: Did you know who were the witnesses to the

signing of this document?
49
Id. at 427.
A: No, sir.
50
Id. at 425.
37
Records, p. 59.
51
38
Id.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, June 21,

1991, 198 SCRA 472, 479.
39
Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., 221 Phil. 65, 78 (1985).
Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on

the Civil Code of the Philippines Volume IV, p. 633.
40
395 Phil 791, 801 (2000).
53
52
TSN, April 13, 1994, p. 26.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
54
TSN, March 28, 1995, p. 13.
55
TSN, April 13, 1994, p.26; March 28, 1995, p. 13.
56
Id at 8.
57
Id. at 47.
Page 12 of 57
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Prof. Avena

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 187752
November 23, 2010
IRENE K. NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K. NACU,

and NEJIE N. DE SAGUN, Petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated December 24, 2008
and Resolution2 dated May 6, 2009. The assailed Decision held that Irene
K. Nacu (Nacu), Enterprise Service Officer III at the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA), assigned at the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ),
was guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and imposed upon her the penalty of
dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties.
The case arose from the following facts:
On December 17, 1999, PEZA issued Memorandum Order No. 99-003,
prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees
from PEZA-registered enterprises. The pertinent portions of the said
regulation read:
Page 13 of 57
Effective immediately, PEZA shall provide processing/documentation

services required by economic zone export-producers for incoming and
outgoing shipments x x x FREE OF OVERTIME FEES/CHARGES x x x.
xxxx
Economic zone export producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders,
truckers and other service providers and enterprises are strictly
prohibited from offering financial and/or non-financial tokens,
compensation, etc. to any PEZA official and/or personnel, in connection
with PEZA overtime services rendered and/or other transactions.
In addition, economic zone export-producers, customs brokers, freight
forwarders, truckers and other service providers and enterprises are
enjoined to notify ranking PEZA officials (Administrator, Manager,
Officer-in-Charge, Deputy Director Generals and the Director General) on
any difficulties or problems they encounter, particularly those
pertaining to lack of service-orientation or improper behavior of any
PEZA officer and/or personnel.3
Sometime in September 2001, Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration
Corporation (EBCC) filed a complaint against Nacu for allegedly charging
it overtime fees, despite Memorandum Order No. 99-003.
Acting on the complaint, PEZA immediately conducted a preliminary
investigation, during which Atty. Norma B. Cajulis, PEZAs lawyer,
interviewed Rey Ligan (Ligan), a document processor at EBCC. Ligan
attested, among others, that the overtime fees went to Nacus group, and
that, during the time Nacu was confined in the hospital, she pre-signed
documents and gave them to him.
On November 21, 2001, Atty. Procolo Olaivar (Atty. Olaivar) of PEZA
Legal Services Group requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to verify the genuineness of Nacus signatures appearing on the
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Prof. Avena
Statements of Overtime Services (SOS).4 Original copies of 32 SOS and a

specimen of Nacus signature were then sent to the NBI for comparison.
On January 25, 2002, the NBI informed Atty. Olaivar that "no definite
opinion can be rendered on the matter" since "the standards/sample
signatures of the subject submitted [we]re not sufficient and appropriate
to serve as basis for a specific comparative examination." The NBI then
requested that, should PEZA still want it to conduct further examination,
it be furnished with additional standard/sample signatures, in the same
style and pattern as that of the questioned document, appearing in
official/legal documents on file, executed before, during, and after the
date of the questioned document.5
PEZA referred the 32 SOS, together with the same standard specimen of
Nacus signatures/initials, to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP Crime Lab) for determination of the genuineness of
Nacus signature appearing therein.
In Questioned Document Report No. 052-02 dated May 3, 2002, Rosario
C. Perez, Document Examiner II of the PNP Crime Lab, stated her
findings, thus
Page 14 of 57
19" inclusive reveal significant similarities in the manner of

execution, line quality and stroke structure.
xxxx
CONCLUSION
1. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU
marked "Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19 to Q-21, Q-23
to Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32" appearing in the twenty-two (22) pieces
[of] Statement of Overtime Services and the submitted standard
initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19"
inclusive WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME
PERSON.
2. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU
marked "Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" appearing
in the ten (10) pieces of Statement of Overtime Service and the
submitted standard initials/signatures [of] Irene K. Nacu marked
"S-1 to S-19" inclusive WERE WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME
PERSON.6
1. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the

questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19, Q-20, Q-21, Q-23, Q-24, Q25, Q-27 to Q-32" and the submitted standard initials/signatures
of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" inclusive reveal significant
divergences in the matter of execution, line quality and stroke
structure.
Finding a prima facie case against Nacu, PEZA Director General Lilia B.
de Lima (Director General De Lima) filed a Formal Charge against her for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. It was alleged that Nacu unlawfully
charged P3,500.00 overtime fee from EBCC on ten occasions (covered by
the ten SOS which the PNP Crime Lab found to have been written by
Nacu), for a total amount ofP35,000.00.
2. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the

questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" and the submitted
standard signatures/initials of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-
Nacu denied that the signatures appearing on the ten overtime billing
statements were hers. She averred that it was impossible for her to
charge EBCC overtime fees as the latter was well aware that PEZA
employees may no longer charge for overtime services; that she had no
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Prof. Avena
actual notice of Memorandum Order No. 99-003; and that she caused no
damage and prejudice to PEZA and EBCC.
During the hearing, PEZA presented the following witnesses: Rosario
Perez, the document examiner who examined the SOS; Atty. Dante
Quindoza, Zone Administrator of BEZ, who testified that Nacu was one of
the officials authorized to sign the documents; Romy Zaragosa,
Corporate Relations Manager of Covanta Energy, who attested that
meetings were held on November 17, 2001 and January 25, 2002,
wherein Ligan testified that he gave the payment for overtime fees to
Nacu; Roberto Margallo (Margallo), Enterprise Service Officer III of
PEZA, who testified that he knows Nacus signature and that he was
certain that the signatures appearing on the SOS were hers; Omar Dana,
EBCC plant chemist, who testified that EBCC paid, through Ligan,
overtime fees to Nacu and some other persons; Elma Bugho, PEZA
Records Officer, who testified on the issuance of PEZA Memorandum
Order No. 99-003;7 and Miguel Herrera, then Division Chief of PEZA at
the BEZ, who testified that he was responsible for the implementation of
PEZA rules and regulations and for assigning examiners upon the
request of zone enterprises and brokers.8
On February 8, 2005, the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation,
and Discipline (CBIID), with the approval of Director General De Lima,
found Nacu guilty of the acts charged, thus:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Central Board of Inquiry,
Investigation and Discipline (CBIID)
1. resolves that Irene K. Nacu committed an act which
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action and finds her guilty
of dishonesty, grave misconduct[, and conduct] prejudicial to the
best interest of service pursuant to Section 46(b)(1), (4) and
(27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and hereby
Page 15 of 57
2. recommends that respondent be dismissed from service

pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV, Revised Uniform Rules in
Administrative Cases in Philippine Civil Service with accessory
penalties of:
a) cancellation of eligibility;
b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and
c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the
government service.9
Nacu moved for a reconsideration of the CBIIDs findings, but the motion
was denied. By way of appeal, Nacu elevated the case to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
On February 19, 2007, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 070327,
affirming the CBIIDs resolution, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Irene K. Nacu, former Enterprise Service
Officer III, Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 08, 2005 issued by
Director General Lilia B. de Lima finding Nacu guilty of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with the
accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and disqualification from being re-employed in the government
service is AFFIRMED.10
Nacu filed a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 070327,
but the motion was denied in Resolution No. 071489 dated August 1,
2007.11
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Nacu forthwith filed a petition for review with the CA, assailing the CSC
resolutions. On September 17, 2007, while the case was pending
resolution, Nacu died and was substituted by her heirs, Benjamin Nacu
(husband), Nejie N. de Sagun (daughter), and Ervin K. Nacu (son), herein
petitioners.
The CA, in the assailed Decision dated December 24, 2008, affirmed the
CSC resolutions. The CA could not believe Nacus claim that she was not
aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003, considering that the order
was issued almost two years earlier. According to the CA, as a PEZA
employee, Nacu had the obligation to keep herself abreast of everything
that transpires in her office and of developments that concern her
position. It stressed that even if Nacu had not actually received a copy of
the memorandum order, such circumstance will not foreclose the orders
effectivity; and that it is merely an internal regulation which does not
require publication for its effectivity.12
The CA brushed aside Nacus objections to (a) Ligans written statement
because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as
witness during the hearing; (b) the PNP Crime Labs findings for being
unreliable in light of the NBIs own finding that the samples were not
sufficient; and (c) Margallos testimony identifying Nacus signatures on
the SOS, on the ground that he was not presented as an expert witness.
The CA pointed out that proceedings in administrative cases are not
strictly governed by technical rules of procedure and evidence, as they
are required to be disposed of summarily.
In particular, the CA found pointless Nacus criticism of the PNP Crime
Labs findings based on the NBIs opinion on the samples given. To
counter the same, the CA highlighted the fact that the NBIs opinion did
not conclusively state that the signatures were not that of Nacu. It
stressed that Nacu failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to
contradict the PNP Crime Labs findings, relying merely on the NBIs
opinion which, to the mind of the CA, did not actually absolve petitioner.
Page 16 of 57
According to the CA, Memorandum Order No. 99-003, the PNPs findings,
and the witnesses testimonies, taken together, were sufficient to hold
Nacu administratively liable for the acts complained of. Nacu was not
denied due process, considering that she was given the opportunity to
explain her side and present evidence, and that she had, in fact,
participated in the hearing.
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.13
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners, but the CA denied
the motion in its Resolution14 dated May 6, 2009. They then elevated the
case to this Court through this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners submit to this Court the issue of whether the finding that
Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service is supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioners arguments focus largely on the weight given by the CA to the
PNP Crime Labs report, which, they insist, should not be given credence
as it is unreliable. Firstly, it was not shown that the questioned
document examiner who examined the SOS was a handwriting expert.
Secondly, the signature samples were, according to the NBI, insufficient
references for a comparative examination. Thirdly, the sample
signatures used were obtained in violation of Nacus right against selfincrimination. And lastly, the report merely states that there were
similarities in the manner of execution, line quality, and stroke
structures of the signatures, and that such conclusion does not translate
to a finding that the signatures appearing on the SOS are genuine.
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Prof. Avena
Petitioners also object to the CAs reliance on the statements made by

Ligan during the preliminary investigation, which were not given under
oath. They contend that Nacu was denied due process when Ligan was
not presented as witness during the trial, and that there were
inconsistencies in Ligans statements.
And finally, as an affirmative defense, they reiterate that Nacu was not
aware of the issuance and implementation of Memorandum Order No.
99-003. They point out that there was, in fact, no showing that the said
order had been published in a newspaper, posted at the BEZ, or a copy
thereof furnished to Nacu.
Page 17 of 57
We do not agree. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the
findings of one are not binding or conclusive upon the other. Moreover,
as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment, the
NBIs finding referred only to the insufficiency of the samples given; the
NBI did not actually make a determination of the genuineness of the
signatures. While the NBI may have found the samples to be insufficient,
such finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime Labs own
findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of the signatures
found on the overtime billings matched the sample signatures. The
difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of the samples could
only mean that the PNP Crime Lab observes a standard different from
that used by the NBI in the examination of handwriting.
We find no merit in this petition.

Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in
administrative proceedings, means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.15 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.16
Overall, the testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made by Ligan
during the preliminary investigation, and the findings of the PNP Crime
Lab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS, amounted to
substantial evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that Nacu
was guilty of the acts complained of. Petitioners allegations of
unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies of the evidence neither
discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu.
For one, petitioners cite the PNPs findings as unreliable in light of the
NBIs opinion that the samples utilized by the PNP Crime Labthe same
samples submitted to the NBIwere not sufficient to make a
comparative examination.
Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Labs findings, Nacu should
have channeled her efforts into providing her own proof that the
signatures appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all,
whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same by clear and
convincing evidence.17 Nacu could not simply depend on the alleged
weakness of the complainants evidence without offering stronger
evidence to contradict the former.
In any case, the CA did not rely solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in
concluding that the signatures appearing on the ten SOS were Nacus.
Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu, also
identified the latters signatures on the SOS. Such testimony deserves
credence. It has been held that an ordinary witness may testify on a
signature he is familiar with.18 Anyone who is familiar with a persons
writing from having seen him write, from carrying on a correspondence
with him, or from having become familiar with his writing through
handling documents and papers known to have been signed by him may
give his opinion as to the genuineness of that persons purported
signature when it becomes material in the case.19
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Prof. Avena
Petitioners also posit that Nacu was denied her right against selfincrimination when she was made to give samples of her signature. We
do not agree. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection
does not come into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at the
appropriate time, or else, it may be deemed waived.20 In the present
case, it does not appear that Nacu invoked her right against selfincrimination at the appropriate time, that is, at the time she was asked
to provide samples of her signature. She is therefore deemed to have
waived her right against self-incrimination.
Next, petitioners assail the credibility of Ligans statement because it
was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during
the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due process when she was
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan.
It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.21 In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the nonpresentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the said witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held that
the contention was unavailing, stating that In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating that
the petitioner therein could not argue that she had been deprived of due
process merely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing
Casimiro v. Tandog, 459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in
administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.22
Page 18 of 57
The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals

allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of
due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely
on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted by
the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimonies.23
In addition, petitioners claim that there were inconsistencies in Ligans
statement. While Ligan allegedly stated that Nacu gave him pre-signed
documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that these
pre-signed documents referred to the ten overtime billings referred to in
the formal charge, the record does not show that Nacu was confined in
the hospital on the dates indicated in the said billings.
To set the record straight, Ligan did not specifically mention that the
dates indicated in the pre-signed documents were also the days when
Nacu was confined in the hospital. He merely said that Nacu pre-signed
some documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that
she gave these documents to him. Neither did he state that these presigned SOS were the same ten SOS cited in the formal charge against
Nacu. It was petitioners own assumption that led to this baseless
conclusion.1avvphi1
In Nacus defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of
the existence of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They aver that there
was no evidence showing that Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was
posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be said that the
order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the BEZ.
Petitioners claim that Nacu had, in fact, no actual knowledge of the said
order as she was not furnished with a copy thereof.
Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the said order. As
correctly opined by the CA, it is difficult to believe that Nacu, one of the
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Prof. Avena
employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum order, was not in any

way informedby posting or personal noticeof the implementation of
the said order, considering that over a year had lapsed since it had been
issued. From the testimonies of the other witnesses, who were
employees of PEZA and PEZA-registered enterprises, it was evident that
the prohibition against charging and collecting overtime fees was
common knowledge to them.
At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take effect.
Memorandum Order No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that clearly
falls within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from the
publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing case of Taada v.
Hon. Tuvera:24
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.25
At the very least, Nacu should have been aware that collecting payments
directly from PEZA-registered enterprises was strictly prohibited.
Months before Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was promulgated, PEZA
had already put a stop to the practice of collecting direct payments for
overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises under Office Order No.
99-0002 dated March 8, 1999. The latter specifically provides that
"overtime shall be paid only through the regular payroll system," and
that overtime claims shall be supported by the required
documents.26 This was followed by PEZA General Circular No. 99-0001
(Prescribing New Rates of Overtime Pay Payable by Zone Enterprises,
Customs Brokers And Other Entities Concerned) dated August 10, 1999,
providing that
Page 19 of 57
4.5. All payments to be made by requesting parties shall be

covered by official receipts. IN NO CASE SHALL PAYMENT BE
MADE DIRECTLY TO ZONE/PCDU PERSONNEL.
4.6 No additional charges or fees shall be paid by requesting
parties, nor shall they offer gifts, "tips" and other
financial/material favors to PEZA employees rendering overtime
services.
4.7 At the end of the month, all claims of personnel for payment
of overtime services shall be supported by the following
documents:
4.7.1. Copies of written requests by enterprises and other
parties;
4.7.2. Certificate of service or DTR;
4.7.3. Authority to render overtime services; and
4.7.4. Certificate of accomplishment.27
Petitioners desperately argue that Nacu could not have charged and
collected overtime fees from EBCC as it was well aware of Memorandum
Order No. 99-003. The contention is puerile. Petitioners are, in effect,
saying that knowledge of the existence of a rule prohibiting a certain act
would absolutely prevent one from doing the prohibited act. This
premise is undeniably false, and, as a matter of fact, judicial institutions
have been founded based on the reality that not everyone abides by the
law.
All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and penalized with dismissal from the service and its accessory
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Prof. Avena
penalties. The general rule is that where the findings of the

administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such
findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding
on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute
its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency
of evidence.28
Page 20 of 57
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Nacus length of service or the fact that this was her first offense has not
been clearly established. We cannot reasonably take them into
consideration in reviewing the case. At any rate, these circumstances
cannot serve to mitigate the violation, considering the gravity of the
offense and the fact that Nacus act irreparably tarnished the integrity of
PEZA.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated December 24, 2008 and its Resolution dated May
6, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
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Prof. Avena
Footnotes
*
Page 21 of 57
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175451, April 13, 2007,

521 SCRA 357, 362.
15
On official leave.
Marcelo v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008, 552
SCRA 589, 608.
16
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate

Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and
Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 55-71.
1
Aznar Brothers Realty v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 95, 112

(2000).
17
Id. at 72-74.
18
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 50 provides:
Id. at 118-119.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 121-122.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 60-61.
SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of

a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding
xxxx
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity.
FRANCISCO, R.J., Evidence, Rule of Court in the Philippines,
Rules 128-134 (1996 ed.), p. 366.
19
10
Id. at 61-62.
People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989, 175 SCRA 216,
228.
11
Id. at 62.
21
12
Id. at 65-66.
22
13
Supra note 1, at 71.
20
14
Ocampo v. Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21, 28 (2000).
Donato, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 1,

G.R. No. 165788, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 48, 60.
23
Marcelo v. Bungubung, supra note 16, at 603-604.
24
230 Phil. 528 (1986).
Supra note 2.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
25
Id. at 535.
26
Rollo, p. 98.
27
Id. at 94.
Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601

(2001).
28
Page 22 of 57
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
32. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Page 23 of 57
The CGA is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 315 square
meters located in Manila, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 42417.

SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177-CA-J
Sometime in 2008, Romualdo dela Cruz (dela Cruz) filed a petition for
the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417, claiming
that the old owners duplicate copy had been misplaced. This petition
was assigned to the sala of then Judge Inting, presiding Judge of Branch
IV, RTC Manila.
April 12, 2011
RE: COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED MEMBERS OF CHINESE GROCERS

ASSOCIATION AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS
RESOLUTION
We pass upon the unsigned letter complaint for administrative action
and disbarment sent by the Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers
Association (CGA) to the Office of Chief Justice Corona against Court of
Appeals Justice Socorro B. Inting on November 25, 2010 for gross
neglect of judicial duties in deciding Case No. P-08-132 GLRO CA.D
Record No. 84, entitled "In Re: Petition for Issuance of a New Owners
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42417 of the Registry
of Deeds of Manila" while she was still Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch IV, Manila. Specifically, the complainants allege that
Justice Inting acted with gross negligence when she turned a blind eye to
the suspicious circumstances surrounding the petitioner in the case,
Romualdo dela Cruz, and granted the petition.
Factual Antecedents
In the petition, dela Cruz claimed that: (a) the Office of the Register of
Deeds had already been notified of the loss through an Affidavit of Loss;
(b) TCT No. 42417 issued in the name of the CGA is still valid and
subsisting; (c) copies of the Notice of Hearing have been duly posted, as
evidenced by the Sheriffs Certificate of Posting; and (d) dela Cruzs
interest in filing this petition is based on his right as a vendee of the
property, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 19,
2008, allegedly executed between CGA, represented by Ang E. Bio, and
dela Cruz.1
On June 16, 2009, Justice Inting issued an order granting dela Cruzs
petition. The dispositive portion of this Order stated:
WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered upon
payment of the prescribed fees of his office to issue a new owners
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42417 in lieu of the lost one
which is hereby cancelled and declared of no further force and effect and
to annotate on said title a memorandum of the issuance of a new owners
copy thereof in lieu of the lost one upon Order of the Court and to deliver
said new owners copy of the title to the petitioner or his counsel or duly
authorized representative provided that such new owners copy of the
title to be issued shall be made subject to the same terms and conditions
as the original thereof and that no document or transaction registered or
pending registration in his office shall be adversely affected thereby.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
SO ORDERED.
Since no motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed
challenging Justice Intings June 16, 2009 Order within the reglementary
period provided by law, the order became final and executory, and the
new owners duplicate title was given to dela Cruz.
The Letter Complaint
In their letter complaint dated November 15, 2010, the Concerned
Members of CGA claimed that Justice Inting acted with gross neglect
when she granted dela Cruzs petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417. To recall, dela Cruz filed the petition as
the alleged vendee of the property. However, the complainants point out
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 15, 2008, the basis for
dela Cruzs interest and right to file the petition, should have aroused
Justice Intings suspicion as it was allegedly signed on behalf of CGA
by Ang E. Bio, who died on August 28, 2001. The complainants also
found it suspicious that Justice Inting did not question dela Cruz on the
particulars of the sale i.e, what the basis was of Bios authority to
represent CGA in the sale, whether dela Cruz had paid the applicable
taxes in relation to the alleged sale, and why the land was sold for
only P5,500,000.00 when it was worth at least P50 million before
granting the petition. The complainants further faulted Justice Inting for
not asking dela Cruz why he, and not CGA, filed the petition.
Page 24 of 57
comment. The Court en Banc resolved to grant this request in its

February 1, 2011 resolution.
In her comment filed on February 23, 2011, Justice Inting averred that
there was nothing suspicious in dela Cruz filing the petition as a vendee
since Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) allows another person in interest to file a petition for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate title. She further explained that on
May 8, 2009, the Acting Chief of the Clerks of Court Division issued a
Notice of Hearing addressed to dela Cruz, the Register of Deeds of Manila
and the CGA, setting the case for hearing on June 3, 2009. The courts
process server also posted this Notice of Hearing on May 13, 2009 at
three conspicuous public places in Manila. However, no representative
of CGA appeared to participate in the proceedings or oppose the petition
at the initial hearing on June 3, 2009. Accordingly, Justice Inting allowed
dela Cruz to present his evidenceex-parte before Atty. Cheryl Morales,
the Chief of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration
Authority. Based on the evidence presented, consisting of the notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale between CGA and dela Cruz, and the Affidavit of
Loss registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of
the original title in the possession of the Register of Deeds of Manila, and
given CGAs lack of opposition, Justice Inting granted the petition.
On December 7, 2010, the Court en Banc issued a resolution requiring

Justice Inting to comment on the letter complaint within ten (10) days
from notice of the resolution.
Justice Inting further emphasized that she did not transfer title over the
land to dela Cruz; rather, she merely issued an order granting the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417, with
the same terms and conditions as the original. She also denied the
complainants claim that she knew dela Cruz prior to this case, stressing
the fact that she only met dela Cruz when he appeared before her court
with his attorney to comply with the petitions jurisdictional
requirements.
Responding to our Order, Justice Inting filed a letter with the Court on
January 28, 2011 asking for an additional thirty (30) days to file her
Justice Inting also questioned the complainants failure to take the

necessary remedial actions against the order, such as filing a petition for
Justice Intings Comment
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
relief of judgment within the reglementary period, as well as their failure

to file any criminal action against dela Cruz, the instigator of the alleged
fraudulent sale.
OUR RULING
The only issue we have to resolve is whether Justice Inting, in granting
dela Cruzs petition, is guilty of misconduct. To answer this question, we
examine the procedure in petitions for the issuance of new duplicate
certificates of title.
The applicable law is Section 109 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree), which states:
Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In case
of loss or theft of an owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice
under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as
the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a
new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn
statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the
registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the
court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new
duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that
it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all
respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and
shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
The above-quoted provision clearly allows a person who is not the
owner of the property to file the petition for a new duplicate certificate,
provided the person has interest in the property.
Page 25 of 57
The next logical question is was dela Cruz a person in interest to the
subject property? We find that he was, given the fact that he had what
appeared to be a validly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property in his favor. As a public document, the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict it, one
must present evidence that is clear and convincing; otherwise, the
document should be upheld.2
In the present case, however, no one from CGA appeared during the
proceedings to oppose dela Cruzs petition or to bring to Justice Intings
attention the fact that Ang Bio was already dead at the time the deed of
sale was allegedly executed. Given the lack of any evidence to assume
otherwise, Justice Inting correctly relied on the notarized Deed of Sales
presumption of regularity.
As for the complainants allegation that Justice Inting had the duty to
inquire into the details of the alleged sale, we reiterate that in a petition
for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title,
the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction,
has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the
land covered by the lost owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of
title.3 Questions involving the issue of ownership have to be threshed out
in a separate suit where the trial court will conduct a full-blown hearing
with the parties presenting their respective evidence to prove
ownership over the subject realty.4 After all, the objective of a petition
for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy is merely to determine
two things (1) that the owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title
was actually lost; and (2) that the person who filed the petition has
sufficient interest in the property covered by the title to acquire a copy
of the same. It was thus not for Justice Inting to question dela Cruz on the
specifics of the purported sale (i.e., why the land was sold to dela Cruz at
such a low price, whether dela Cruz paid the applicable taxes for the
transfer of the property, etc.) during these proceedings.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of

proving the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.5 We set the applicable standard in
deciding cases involving accusations of misconduct leveled at judges in
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Villalon-Pornillos, where we said:
The burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative
proceeding against court officials and employees falls on the
complainant, who must be able to prove the allegations in the complaint
with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the presumption that respondent regularly performed her duties
will prevail. Moreover, in the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations
of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. In fact, an administrative complaint
leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating
eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such
that the respondent stands to face the sanction of dismissal and/or
disbarment. The Court does not thus give credence to charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation.6
Apart from the questionable nature of the Deed of Absolute Sale in dela
Cruzs favor, brought to light only now upon the presentation of the
Certificate of Death, the complainants have not presented any other
evidence to support the charge of misconduct leveled against Justice
Inting.
Significantly, however, the complainants attached a mere photocopy of
Ang Bios Certificate of Death to their letter complaint. While the
Certificate of Death is indeed a public document, to prove its contents,
there is a need to present a certified copy of this document, issued by the
public officer in custody of the original document.7 Since the Certificate
of Death is not a certified copy, it is inadmissible as proof, and is
Page 26 of 57
considered a mere scrap of paper without any evidentiary

value.1avvphi1
Given the lack of any evidence to prove that Justice Inting acted with any
bad faith or ill-motive in acting on the petition, or even committed any
error in issuing the assailed order, we dismiss the complaint against her.
As we stated in Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico:8
When an administrative charge against a Judge or court personnel has
no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to
protect them against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial
processes. In short, this Court will not shirk from its responsibility of
imposing discipline upon all employees of the judiciary, but neither will
it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint against
Justice Socorro B. Inting, Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
As the Ministry denied respondents request for reconsideration, she

returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air
fare.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 178551
Page 27 of 57
October 11, 2010
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY

OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners,
vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist
under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary
period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board
Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated
from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed
the probationary period.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner
ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia
Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that
petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant
respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular
employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly
ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for
the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiters decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution5 of April
22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their
principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune
from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period as required under
Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal
should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC
Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent of
the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable
with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private
employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker,

hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for
any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency
for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because
respondents employment contract specifically stipulates that her
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations
of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor
tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions
governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas
Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts
(Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the
"customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of
the host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor
laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government
agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any
document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner
ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministrys liability
had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over
it.
Page 28 of 57
The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)
which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its
foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from
suit, or that such foreign principals liability must first be established
before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment
agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely
affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so
that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under
the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.Otherwise, this
will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing
the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.
(emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of
the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily,
to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its
foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign
principals liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law
on joint and solidary liability inutile.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
Page 29 of 57
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary

employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into,
that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord
respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the
same was not substantiated.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on
the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor
laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the
parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to
govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they
must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law,
the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which
reads:
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application

of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of
processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Intl., v.
NLRC10 illuminates:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents

referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically

states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures,
etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply
to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to
the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The
foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA

between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which
provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1)
year and that the host countrys Civil Service Laws and Regulations
apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to
respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without
specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate
of termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr.
Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of
Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and
respondents letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she
noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a
rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently
prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary
employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a
copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the
Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications
attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and
the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil
service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such
Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject
certifications read:
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the
same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on
money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement
agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and
several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to
English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for
review and certification and the same was/were found to be in
order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the
contents of the document/s.
Page 30 of 57
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
Page 31 of 57
Footnotes
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Annex "C" of the petition, rollo, pp. 59-60.
CA rollo, p. 197.
Id at. 32-36. Penned by Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro Franco.
Id. at 26-29. Penned by Commissioner (now CA Associate

Justice) Angelita A. Gacutan and concurred in by Presiding
Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R.
Calaycay.
4
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 95-104. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas

Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz
and Normandie B. Pizarro.
6
Id. at 137. Ibid.
G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 639, 645 citing
Catan v. NLRC, 160 SCRA 691.
8
Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower And Promotion

Services, Inc., G.R. No. 156029, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 41,
42.
9
10
G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 409, 430.
11
Annex D" of the petition, rollo, pp. 61-63.
12
Annex "D-1" of the petition, id. at 64-66
Law 126 Evidence

13
Prof. Avena
Annex "E" of the petition, id. at 67.
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
Page 32 of 57
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Page 33 of 57
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 232.
SECOND DIVISION
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
G. R. No. 183622
February 8, 2012
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 and Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly
obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas
Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec.
Proc.) No. 228.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground
of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same
estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not
considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support
of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy
was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that
petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial
court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and
since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas
Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending
action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner
for the crime of bigamy.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
Page 34 of 57
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never
been married to Eusebio Bristol.
Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on
the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed

the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage
between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when
she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her
acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the
trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.4
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For
litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must
be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the
two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special
proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in
contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no
defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the
petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition
for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending
petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions
are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a
party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner
that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former.
The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the
petitioner must perforce fail.
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration,

petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her
Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent
should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also
insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been
filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the
appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to
determine who has a better right to administer the decedents
properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present
their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it
held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have
instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari.
Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the
fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render

nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of
administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for
that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate
sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as
long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of
the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
xxx
33. OFFICIAL RECORD

xxx
xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for
letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a
marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had
been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper
proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the
petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent
marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her.
There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the
findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a
contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to
the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters
of administration by the trial court is in place.
xxx
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack

of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that
the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she
was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her
marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of
the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
Page 35 of 57
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to
appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that
petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows
that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing
to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage
between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner
was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim.
Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early
as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
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Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the

same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in
Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well
lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have
enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,9 to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Page 36 of 57
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to
its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code
is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of
their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him
to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law

falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of
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Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the

original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in
the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.1wphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged
and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
(Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the
validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to
remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of
evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may
be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin
Page 37 of 57
of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules

of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we
said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file
the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized
in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance
with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for

further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of
the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
Page 38 of 57
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution
dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to
Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with

Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle and Ramon R. Garcia
concurring; rollo, pp. 20-30.
1
Id. at 49.
Id. at 38-45; penned by Judge Jules A. Mejia.
As narrated by the Court of Appeals on p. 3 of its Decision.
Rollo, pp. 26-29.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Id. at 31-36.
223 Phil. 357, 362 (1985).
399 Phil. 342, 355-356 (2000).
418 Phil. 723, 723-735 (2001).
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 294,
313-314.
10
Page 39 of 57
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Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171136
October 23, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, represented by CLAUDIA C.
ARUELO, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision1 dated January 13 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84125, which affirmed the Decision2 dated October 18, 2004 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig City, Branch 74 in LRC Case
No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-701 08). The MeTC confirmed the title of herein
respondent, Lydia Capco de Tensuan Tensuan), to the parcel of
agricultural land, designated as Lot 1109-A, located at Ibayo, Sta. Ana,
Taguig City, with an area of 4,006 square meters subject property), and
ordered the registration of said property in her name.
Page 40 of 57
2. That Applicant is the absolute owner and possessor of those two (2)
paraphernal parcels of land situated at Sta. Ana, Taguig, Metro Manila,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, bounded and described
as Lot 1109-A and 1109-B in Conversion Subdivision Plan Swo-00001456 as follows:
(a) Lot 1109-A, Swo-00-001456
"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-A of the Plan Swo-00-001456,
being a conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig,
[Cadastral] Mapping, L.R.C. Record No.), situated in Brgy. Sta.
Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
x x x x"
(b) Lot 1109-B, Swo-00-001456
"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-B, of plan Swo-00-001456, being a
conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, L.R.C.
Record No.), situated in Sta. Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of
Luzon.
x x x x"
3. That said two (2) parcels of land at the last assessment for taxation
were assessed at Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Pesos
(P60,820.00), Philippine currency, under Tax Declaration No. D-01301563 in the name of the Applicant;
The following facts are culled from the records:

On August 11, 1998, Tensuan, represented by her sister, Claudia C.
Aruelo (Aruelo), filed with the MeTC an Application for Registration3 of
Lot Nos. 1109-A and 1109-B, docketed as LRC Case No. 172. In her
Application for Registration, Tensuan alleged that:
4. That to the best of the knowledge and belief of Applicant, there is no

mortgage, encumbrance or transaction affecting said two (2) parcels of
land, nor is there any other person having any interest therein, legal or
equitable, or in adverse possession thereof;
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Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
5. That Applicant has acquired said parcels of land by inheritance from

her deceased father, Felix Capco, by virtue of a "[Kasulatan] ng
Paghahati-hati at Pag-aayos ng Kabuhayan
" dated September 14, 1971, and Applicant specifically alleges that she
and her deceased father, as well as the latters predecessors-in-interest,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the said lands under a bonafide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, and many years earlier, as in fact since time immemorial,
as provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529;
6. That said parcels of land are and have been, since the inheritance
thereof, occupied by Applicant herself;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due notice, publication
and hearing, the paraphernal parcels of land hereinabove described be
brought under the operation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and the
same confirmed in the name of Applicant.4 (Emphasis ours.)
On August 20, 1998, Tensuan filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw Lot 1109-B from the Application for Registration and to
Amend the Application.5 According to Tensuan, she was withdrawing her
Application for Registration of Lot 1109-B because a review of Plan Swo00-001456 had revealed that said lot, with an area of 338 square meters,
was a legal easement. The MeTC, in its Order6 dated September 30, 1998,
granted Tensuans motion.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
Opposition to Tensuans Application for Registration on December 28,
1998. The Republic argued that (1) neither Tensuan nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June
Page 41 of 57
12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniment/s of title and/or tax
declaration/s and tax payment receipt/s attached to the application
do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the subject property or of Tensuans open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
(3) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant can no longer be availed of by Tensuan who failed to file an
appropriate application for registration within the period of six months
from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree No. 892; and
(4) the subject property forms part of the public domain not subject of
private appropriation.7
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) also filed its own
Opposition8 dated February 12, 1999 to Tensuans Application for
Registration, averring as follows:
2. That projection of the subject lot in our topographic map
based on the technical descriptions appearing in the Notice of
the Initial Hearing indicated that the lot subject of this
application for registration is located below the reglementary
lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to datum 10.00 meters
below mean lower water. Site is, therefore, part of the bed of
Laguna Lake considered as public land and is within the
jurisdiction of Laguna Lake Development Authority pursuant to
its mandate under R.A. 4850, as amended. x x x;
3. That Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850, states that,
"whenever Laguna Lake or Lake is used in this Act, the same
shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the
lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level
of elevation of 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.0 meters
below mean lower low water (MLLW). Lands located at and
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed
of said lake (Section 14, R.A. 4850, as amended, x x x);
4. That on the strength of the oppositors finding and applying
the above-quoted provision of law, herein applicants application
for registration of the subject land has no leg to stand on, both in
fact and in law;
5. That unless the Honorable Court renders judgment to declare
the land as part of the Laguna Lake or that of the public domain,
the applicant will continue to unlawfully posses, occupy and
claim the land as their own to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in general and the Laguna Lake Development
Authority in particular;
6. That moreover, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable and indisposable in the absence of declaration by the
Director of Lands as required by law.9
During the initial hearing on February 18, 1999, Tensuan marked in
evidence the exhibits proving her compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements for LRC Case No. 172. There being no private oppositor, a
general default against the whole world, except the government, was
declared.10
To prove possession, Tensuan presented two witnesses, namely, her
sister Aruelo and Remigio Marasigan (Marasigan).
Aruelo, who was then 68 years old, testified that Tensuan and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property
even before the Second World War. The subject property was originally
owned by Candida de Borja, who passed on the same to her only child,
Socorro Reyes, and the latters husband, Felix Capco (spouses Capco).
The subject property became part of the spouses Capcos conjugal
Page 42 of 57
property. Aruelo and Tensuan are among the spouses Capcos children.
During the settlement of Felix Capcos estate, the subject property was
adjudicated to Tensuan, as evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Paghahati at
Pag-aayos ng Kabuhayan11 dated September 14, 1971.12
Marasigan claimed that he had been cultivating the subject property for
the last 15 years, and he personally knew Tensuan to be the owner of
said property.13 Marasigans father was the caretaker of the subject
property for the Capcos for more than 50 years, and Marasigan used to
help his father till the same. Marasigan merely inherited the job as
caretaker of the subject property from his father.
Among the evidence Tensuan presented during the trial were: (1) the
Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati at Pagaayos ng Kabuhayan dated September
14, 1971;14 (2) Tax declarations, the earliest of which was for the year
1948, in the name of Candida de Borja, Tensuans grandmother;15 (3)
Real property tax payment receipts issued to Tensuan for 1998;16 (3)
Blueprint copy of Plan Swo-00-001456 surveyed for Lydia Capco de
Tensuan;17 (4) Technical description of the subject property, duly
prepared by a licensed Geodetic Engineer and approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);18 and (5)
Certification dated July 29, 1999 from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office of the DENR (CENRO-DENR) which states that
"said land falls within alienable and disposable land under Project No.
27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141
dated January 3, 1968."19
Engineer Ramon Magalona (Magalona) took the witness stand for
oppositor LLDA. He averred that based on the topographic map and
technical description of the subject property, the said property is located
below the prescribed lake elevation of 12.5 meters. Hence, the subject
property forms part of the Laguna Lake bed and, as such, is public land.
During cross-examination, Magalona admitted that the topographic map
he was using as basis was made in the year 1967; that there had been
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Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
changes in the contour of the lake; and that his findings would have been
different if the topographic map was made at present time. He likewise
acknowledged that the subject property is an agricultural lot. When
Magalona conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property, said
property and other properties in the area were submerged in water as
the lake level was high following the recent heavy rains.20
On May 26, 2000, an Investigation Report was prepared, under oath, by
Cristeta R. Garcia (Garcia), DENR Land Investigator, stating, among other
things, that the subject property was covered by a duly approved survey
plan; that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable
zone classified under Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623; that the
subject property is not reserved for military or naval purposes; that the
subject property was not covered by a previously issued patent; that the
subject property was declared for the first time in 1948 under Tax
Declaration No. 230 in the name of Candida de Borja;21 that the subject
property is now covered by Tax Declaration No. D-013-01408 in the
name of Lydia Capco de Tensuan; that the subject property is
agricultural in nature; and that the subject property is free from adverse
claims and conflicts. Yet, Garcia noted in the same report that the "the
applicant is not x x x in the actual occupation and possession of the land"
and "LLDA rep. by Atty. Joaquin G. Mendoza possesses the legal right to
file opposition against the application x x x."22 The Investigation Report
was submitted as evidence by the Republic.
In its Decision dated October 18, 2004, the MeTC granted Tensuans
Application for Registration, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, from the evidences adduced and testimonies presented by
the parties, the Court is of the considered view that herein applicant has
proven by preponderance of evidence the allegations in the application,
hence, this Court hereby confirms the title of applicant LYDIA CAPCO DE
TENSUAN married to RODOLFO TENSUAN, of legal age, Filipino and a
resident of No. 43 Rizal Street, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City to the parcel
Page 43 of 57
of agricultural land (Lot 1109-A, Mcadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral

Mapping) located at Ibayo-Sta. Ana, Taguig, Metro Manila containing an
area of Four Thousand Six (4,006) square meters; and order the
registration thereof in her name.
After the finality of this decision and upon payment of the corresponding
taxes due on said land subject matter of this application, let an order for
issuance of decree be issued.23
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the MeTC
should not have granted Tensuans Application for Registration
considering that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed,
hence, is not alienable and disposable. The appeal was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 84125.
In the herein assailed Decision of January 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the MeTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision
dated October 18, 2004 is AFFIRMED.24
Hence, the Republic filed the present Petition with the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN]
DESPITE HER FAILURE TO PROVE OPEN, ADVERSE,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN
THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR
THIRTY YEARS.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF

LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN]
BECAUSE THE SUBJECT LAND BEING PART OF THE LAGUNA
LAKE BED IS NOT ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.25
The Republic contends that Tensuan failed to present incontrovertible
evidence to warrant the registration of the property in the latters name
as owner. Aruelos testimony that her father possessed the land even
before the Second World War and Marasigans claim that he and his
father have been tilling the land for a total of more than 65 years are
doubtful considering that the subject property is located below the
reglementary lake elevation and is, thus, part of the Laguna Lake bed.
Also, the CENRO Certification is not sufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption that the subject property still forms part of the public
domain, and is not alienable and disposable. On the other hand, Tensuan
asserts that the Petition should be dismissed outright for raising
questions of fact. The findings of the MeTC and the Court of Appeals that
the subject property is alienable and disposable, and that Tensuan and
her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the same for the period required
by law, are supported by preponderance of evidence.
Page 44 of 57
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence
on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.27 In Reyes v. Montemayor,28 we did not hesitate to apply the
exception rather than the general rule, setting aside the findings of fact
of the trial and appellate courts and looking into the evidence on record
ourselves, in order to arrive at the proper and just resolution of the case,
to wit:
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law shall be
raised in a Petition for Review before this Court. This rule, however,
admits of certain exceptions, namely, (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
We find the instant Petition meritorious.

The Republic asserts that the assigned errors in its Petition are on
questions of law, but in reality, these questions delve into the sufficiency
of evidence relied upon by the MeTC and the Court of Appeals in
granting Tensuans Application for Registration of the subject property.
It is basic that where it is the sufficiency of evidence that is being
questioned, it is a question of fact.26
While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower
courts findings of fact, unless said findings are not supported by or are
totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such
finding must of necessity be modified to conform with the evidence if the
reviewing tribunal were to arrive at the proper and just resolution of the
controversy. Thus, although the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts, if said
factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record, this Court will
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
not hesitate to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower
courts. In the instant case, the Court finds sufficient basis to deviate from
the rule since the extant evidence and prevailing law support a finding
different from the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC.
(Citations omitted.)
Tensuan anchors her right to registration of title on Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The aforequoted provision authorizes the registration of title acquired in
accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, which provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
Page 45 of 57
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: (1) that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.29 In Heirs
of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,30 we affirmed our earlier ruling in
Republic v. Naguit,31 that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.
We proceed to determine first whether it has been satisfactorily proven
herein that the subject property was already alienable and disposable
land of the public domain at the time Tensuan filed her Application for
Registration on August 11, 1998.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of
ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
registration. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified and

alienated by the State to a private person, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain.32
As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, we turn to our pronouncements in Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap33:
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving the
government great leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. x x x
Page 46 of 57
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application

for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
As proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, Tensuan
presented a Certification dated July 29, 1999 issued by the CENRO-DENR
which verified that "said land falls within alienable and disposable land
under Project No. 27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968." However, we have declared
unequivocally that a CENRO Certification, by itself, is insufficient proof
that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable. As we held in Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.34:
xxxx
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In
fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to
those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is

alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the

certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who
issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to
testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the
contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if
the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence,
they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents
referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of
the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: "Sec. 23.
Page 47 of 57
Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in

public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications
do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect
"entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook. The certifications
are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original
official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents. The
certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus
have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications
do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable
land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the
facts stated therein.1wphi1 Such government certifications may fall
under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of
the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein. Here, Torres, a private individual and respondents
representative, identified the certifications but the government officials
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the
certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value.
The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
certifications. Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an
officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification
survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. (Emphases ours, citations
omitted.)
cases35
While we may have been lenient in some

and accepted
substantial compliance with the evidentiary requirements set forth in
T.A.N. Properties, we cannot do the same for Tensuan in the case at bar.
We cannot afford to be lenient in cases where the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) or the DENR oppose the application for registration on
the ground that the land subject thereof is inalienable. In the present
case, the DENR recognized the right of the LLDA to oppose Tensuans
Application for Registration; and the LLDA, in its Opposition, precisely
argued that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed and,
therefore, inalienable public land. We do not even have to evaluate the
evidence presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine. Since
Tensuan failed to present satisfactory proof that the subject property is
alienable and disposable, the burden of evidence did not even shift to the
LLDA to prove that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed.
Page 48 of 57
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84125 and
Decision dated October 18, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Taguig City, Branch 74 in LRC Case No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-70 1 08) are
SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Lydia Capco de Tensuan
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Given the lack of evidence that the subject property is alienable and
disposable, it becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other issue
in this case, i.e., whether Tensuan has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and that such
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Regardless of the character and length of her possession of the
subject property, Tensuan cannot acquire registerable title to inalienable
public land.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P A SERENO
Chief Justice
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Prof. Avena
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
Page 49 of 57
15
Id. at 235-256.
16
Id. at 257-258.
17
Id. at 25-27.
18
Id. at 6.
19
Id. at 270.
20
TSN, September 5, 2001, pp. 5-6, 12-14.
Footnotes
Rollo pp. 27-36; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso
with Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Amelita
G. Tolentino, concurring.
1
Id. at 72-74.
Id. at 37-41
An actual perusal of Tax Declaration No. 230 reveals that the
name appearing thereon is "Candida de Borja." (Records, p. 255.)
21
Id.
Records, pp. 29-30.
22
Records, p. 309.
Id. at 38.
23
Rollo, p. 74.
Id. at 39-41.
24
Id. at 36.
Id. at 229-233.
25
Id. at 18.
Id. at 229-230.
26
10
Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 179905, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA
481, 491.
Id. at 223-224.
11
Id. at 16-22.
Republic v. De la Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010,

634 SCRA 610, 618.
12
TSN, March 16, 1999, pp. 7-9.
28
13
Id. at 11-12.
29
14
Records, pp. 16-22.
27
G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 61, 74-75.
Lim v. Republic, G.R. No. 158630, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA

247, 257.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
30
G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, 203.
31
489 Phil. 405, 414 (2005).
32
Zarate v. Director of Lands, 478 Phil. 421, 433 (2004).
33. OFFICIAL RECORD
G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164,
184-192.
33
34
G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477, 489-491.
Republic v. Serrano, G.R. No. 183063, February 24, 2010, 613

SCRA 537; Republic v. Vega, G.R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011,
639 SCRA 541.
35
Page 50 of 57
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Prof. Avena
34. ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Page 51 of 57
affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Guagua, Pampanga, in favor of private respondents, and its resolution
dated 14 August 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.
This petition which originated with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga involves two (2) cases, namely: Civil Case No. G-1190 and
Civil Case No. G-1332. 1
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 79597-98 May 20, 1991

HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA, represented by: BIENVENIDO CABAIS,
VIRGINIA CABAIS, LEONOR CABAIS-PENA and DOLORES CABAISMAGPAYO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURELIO D. SONGCO, ANGEL D. SONGCO
ENCARNACION D. SONGCO, LOURDES D. SONGCO, ANGELA S.
SONGCO, LUDIVINA S. SONGCO, JOSEPHINE S. SONGCO, ALBERT S.
SONGCO, INOSENCIO S. SONGCO, JAIME S. SONGCO, MARTIN S.
SONGCO, and BERNARD S. SONGCO, Being Heirs of Inocencio
Songco, respondents.
Norbin P. Dimalanta for petitioners.
Dante S. David for private respondents.
PADILLA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 08397-08398 dated 16 July 1987
Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession with

damages and preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioners, the heirs
of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John Doe based on the
principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria
Lacsa who, during her lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land
consisting partly of a fishpond and partly of uncultivated open space,
located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title No. RO-1038 (11725); that the principal respondent and his
predecessor-in-interest who are neither co-owners of the land nor
tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination,
succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land
and caused the open space therein to be cleared for expanded occupancy
thereof, and refused to vacate the same despite petitioner's demands on
them to vacate. 2
Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action also by herein petitioners against
private respondents before the same lower court for cancellation of title,
ownership with damages and preliminary injunction, based on the
allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was the owner
of the land also involved in Civil Case No. G-1190; that the herein private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, thru stealth, fraud and
other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the
fishpond of the said parcel of land, and later abandoned the same but
only after the case was filed and after all the fish were transferred to the
adjoining fishpond owned by the private respondents; that on 31
October 1923 and 15 March 1924, by presenting to the Register of Deeds
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Prof. Avena
of Pampanga certain forged and absolutely simulated documents,

namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE
PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA",
respectively, and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation,
Inocencio Songco, the private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his name, to the
damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary
injunction was necessary to prevent the private respondents from
disposing of said property. 3
Page 52 of 57
profits, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and serious anxiety which

entitled them to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees and P500.00 appearance fee for every hearing. 5
On 20 January 1985, the parties assisted by their respective counsel filed
in Civil Case No. G-1332 a joint stipulation of facts, alleging:
1. That on June 9, 1982, the plaintiffs, being heirs of
Demetria Lacsa, filed Civil Case No. 1190;
Private respondents denied the material allegations of both complaints

and alleged as special and affirmative defenses, petitioners' lack of cause
of action, for the reason that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038
(11725) was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April 1983 upon
petitioners' expedient claim that the owner's duplicate copy thereof had
been missing when the truth of the matter was that OCT No. RO-1038
(11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled and
superseded by TCT No. 794 in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan
Limpin by virtue of the document entitled "TRADUCCION AL
CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-JUDICIAL"
entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter TCT was in
turn superseded by TCT No. 929 issued in the name of Inocencio Songco
(father of private respondents) by virtue of a document entitled
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by spouses Juan Limpin
and Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo. 4
2. That after the defendants filed their Answer in the said

Civil Case No. G-1190, and learning the land subject of the
two (2) abovementioned cases (sic), said plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended and/or
Supplemental Complaint.
Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against

petitioners based on allegations that the latter headed by Carlito
Magpayo, by force and intimidation, took possession of a portion of the
fishpond in the land and occupied a hut therein, that at that time, private
respondents had 3,000 bangus fingerlings left in the fishpond which
upon petitioners' harvest thereof left private respondents deprived and
damaged in the amount of P50,000.00 more or less; that such illegal
occupancy caused private respondents to suffer unrealized income and
5. That in view of the foregoing, and in order to avoid

duplicity of action by repeatedly presenting the same act
of evidences and same set of witnesses, the parties
mutually agreed as they hereby agree and stipulate that
any and all evidences presented under Civil Case No.
1190 shall be adopted as evidences for both parties in the
above-entitled case, and upon submission for resolution
of Civil Case No. G-1190, the above-entitled case shall
3. That the said motion was denied by the Honorable

Court, hence, said plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. G-1332,
the above-entitled case, with the same cause of action as
that of the proposed Amended and/or Supplemental
Complaint;
4. That the evidences of both parties in Civil Case No. G1190 and in the above-entitled case are practically and
literally the same;
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Prof. Avena
likewise be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis

of the evidence presented in the same Civil Case No. G1190. 6
On the basis of this joint stipulation of facts, the lower court held that:
. . . the fishpond in question was originally owned by
Demetria Lacsa under Original Certificate of Title No.
11725. After Demetria Lacsa died her two daughters
Alberta Guevarra and Ambrocia Guevarra with their
respective husbands Juan Limpin and Damaso Cabais
entered into an extrajudicial partition of the properties
left by Demetria Lacsa under the document "Traduccion
Al Castellano de la Escritura de Partition Extra-judicial"
dated April 7, 1923 (Exhibits "3","3-A" and "3-B")
wherein the fishpond in question was adjudicated to
Alberta Guevarra and which deed was duly registered in
the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as
evidenced by the certification of the Deputy Register of
Deeds marked as Exhibit "3-C". Aside from the
"Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" written in the Spanish language, the
spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin and the
spouses Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais executed
on April 7, 1923, another deed of partition in the
Pampango dialect marked as Exhibit "3-D" "wherein the
fishpond in question was adjudicated to Alberta
Guevarra. As a consequence, Original Certificate of Title
No. 794 (Exhibit "4") was issued to spouses Alberta
Guevarra and Juan Limpin. On January 20, 1924, the
spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra sold the
fishpond in question to Inocencio Songco under the deed
entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" (Exhibits "7" and
"7-A") which was duly registered in the Office of the
Page 53 of 57
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the
certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds marked
Exhibit "7-B". As a result of the sale, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") in the name of the spouses
Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin was cancelled by the
Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 929 was issued to Inocencio
Songco." 7
The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to the
private respondents, having been inherited by them from their deceased
father Inocencio Songco. 8
The dispositive portion of the judgment in favor of private respondents
reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
In Civil Case No. G - 1190
(A) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case
No. G-1190;
In Civil Case No. G-1332
(B) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case
No. G-1332;
In Both Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332
(C) Ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria
Lacsa;
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Prof. Avena
(D) Ordering the plaintiffs to restore possession of the

fishpond in question located in Bancal, Guagua,
Pampanga, to the defendants (sic);
(E) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally,
the defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for
moral damages;
Page 54 of 57
II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT
THE SIGNATURE OF JUAN LIMPIN AND THUMBMARK OF
ALBERTA GUEVARRA APPEARING ON THE EXCRITUA
DE VENTA ABSOLUTA (EXHS. 7 & 7-A) WERE FORGED;
III. IN APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES
THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESS JESUS CRUZ
WHEN THEIR SOURCES COULD NOT BE ACCOUNTED
FOR AND THEIR AUTHENTICITY IS IN QUESTION;
(F) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the

defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for
exemplary damages;
IV. IN HOLDING THAT INOCENCIO SONGCO, THE

PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE APPELLEES WAS
AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE;
(G) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally,

the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;
V. IN HOLDING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

NO. 929 WAS ISSUED TO INOCENCIO SONGCO BY THE
REGISTERED TRY OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA;
(H) Costs against the plaintiffs.
VI. IN HOLDING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

NO. RO-1038 (11725) WAS ISSUED BY THE COURT (CFIIII PAMPANGA) IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT
JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE NULL AND VOID;
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the respondent
Court of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly committed by
the lower court:
I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS (EXHS. 3 & 7
AND THEIR SUB-MARKINGS) WERE FORGED AND
ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED DOCUMENTS. HENCE, NULL
AND VOID;
VII. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE VOLUNTARY

ABANDONMENT OF THE FISHPOND IN QUESTION BY
THE APPELLEES WAS A RECOGNITION OF APPELLANTS'
TITLE TO IT;
VIII. IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEES. 10
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the appealed case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
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Prof. Avena
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with the modification that appellants are not
liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 11
Petitioners flied a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals
but the same was denied in its resolution dated 14 August
1987. 12 Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following alleged errors to the Court of Appeals:
I. IN APPLYING THE "ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE" ON
THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ENTITLED "ESCRITURA
DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND "ESCRITURA DE
VENTA ABSOLUTA; AND MARKED DURING THE TRIAL
AS EXHIBITS "3" AND "7", RESPECTIVELY, FOR THE
RESPONDENT HEREIN;
II. IN DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT
OF THE NOTARIAL LAW WHICH TOOK EFFECT AS
EARLY AS FEBRUARY 1, 1903;
III. IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON PROOF OF PUBLIC
OR OFFICIAL RECORD, (SEC. 25, RULE 132, RULES OF
COURT) 13
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the
"ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. 14 The rule states that:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. Were a
private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced
Page 55 of 57
from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given.
It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be

classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least thirty
(30) years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is
unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from
suspicion. 15 Thus, according to petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled
"Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the
foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said
documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this
constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations. 16
We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document
rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due
execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty
(30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are
fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any
alteration or circumstances of suspicion. 17
The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la
Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923
whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled "Escritura de Venta
Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are,
therefore, more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the
aforementioned documents were certified as exact copies of the original
on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the
Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to
the Pampango translation of the document of extrajudicial partition
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Prof. Avena
which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records

Management of the Department of General Services. 18
Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third
parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The
documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with
the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper
custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient
document rule" were met.
As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to
be genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to
support their allegation of falsification of the said documents. They
merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2)
pages could have easily led to their substitution. We cannot uphold this
surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract
apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one
who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive
evidence of falsification. 19
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a
document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of
suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack
of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that
the documents in question, which were certified as copied of the
originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and
free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in
Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Further proof of their due
execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having held that the
documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty
(30) years old, come from the proper repository thereof, and are
Page 56 of 57
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is no

further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903
Notarial Law. Hence, the other contentions of the petitioners that the
documents do not fulfill the mandatory requirements of the Notarial
Law 20 and that the proper person or public official was not presented to
testify on his certification of the documents in question, 21 need not be
resolved as they would no longer serve any purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
Footnotes
* Penned by Justice Gloria C. Paras, with the concurrence
of Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Conrado T. Limcaoco.
1 Rollo, p. 57.
2 Rollo, p. 57.
3 Rollo, p. 58.
4 Rollo, pp. 57-58.
5 Rollo, p. 59.
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Prof. Avena
6 Rollo, p. 59.
7 Rollo, p. 60.
8 Ibid.
9 Rollo, pp. 60-61.
10 Rollo, pp. 61-62.
11 Rollo, p. 65.
12 Rollo, p. 8.
13 Rollo, p. 8.
14 Rollo, p. 8.
15 Rollo, pp. 8-9.
16 Rollo, p. 9.
17 Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines. Volume III, Part II, 1973 Edition, p. 432.
18 Exhibit "3-D", Original Folder of Exhibits for the
Plaintiffs and Defendants.
19 Dy vs. Sacay, G.R. Nos. 78535-36, September 19, 1988,
165 SCRA 473.
20 Rollo, p. 9.
21 Rollo, p. 10.
Page 57 of 57

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Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

Republic of the Philippines

January 15, 2010

SPOUSES PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES, Petitioners,

evidence on record, petitioners now come to us via the instant Petition

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

name. Whereupon, they secured a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale

A parcel of land (Lot No. 5947 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan)

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs were able to

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners assail the Decision of

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED

G. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

The examination conducted by the NBI disclosed that Julian and

attached to the basic letter-request and then the questioned and

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

It is of no moment that the examination of the Deed of Absolute Sale was

We are not swayed by petitioners allegation that the comparisons made

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

involved her husband. Yet, she joined herein respondents in filing an

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

Prescription did not bar respondents action to recover ownership of the

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

Penned by Judge Edgardo T. Lloren.

CA rollo, pp. 144-155.

315 Phil. 805, 820 (1995).

Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and

Rollo, pp. 45-64.

Records, pp. 5-6.

Xentrex Motors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 258, 262

Judge Espaol v. Judge Mupas, 484 Phil. 636, 657 (2004).

Bascos, Jr. v. Tagahanan, G.R. No. 180666, February 18,

Rollo, pp. 369-372.

TSN, April 13, 1994, p. 7.

124 Phil. 444, 447-448 (1966).

Rollo, pp. 265-266.

Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The

Law 126 Evidence

31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE

person. Evidence [in respect to] the handwriting may also be

341 Phil. 624, 633 (1997).

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 1, 13 (1999).

Alba Vda. De Raz v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 710, 725

252 Phil. 223, 231 (1989).

395 Phil 791, 801 (2000).

Rollo, pp. 60-61.

TSN, February 11, 1997, p. 33.

Q: But you were not present when the alleged