Ramirez vs.

Court of Appeals
248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
FACTS:
Ester Garcia filed a criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 4200 (AntiWiretapping Act) against Socorro Ramirez, for secretly taping their
confrontation. Socorro filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay granted, agreeing that the facts
charged did not constitute an offense under R.A. No. 4200 since the
law refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. After which, Ester filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the
lower court. Hence, Socorro filed this instant petition where she raised
three ISSUES:
(2) That R.A. No. 4200 does not apply to the taping of the conversation
by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that R.A. 4200
only refers to unauthorized taping of a conversation of a person other
than those involved in the conversation.
(3) That the substance or contents of the cnvesation must be alleged
in the information; otherwise, the facts charged will not constitute a
violation of R.A. No. 4200.
(4) That R.A. No. 4200 penalizes the taping of private communication
not a private conversation and that, consequently, her act of secretly
taping her conversation with Ester was not illegal under the said Act.
RULING:
(1) R.A. No. 4200 applies to recordings by one of the parties to the
conversation. Section 1 of the Act clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any.
Consequently, the CA was correct in concluding that even a person
privy to a communication, who records his private conversation with
another without knowledge of the latter, will qualify as a violator under

R.A. No. 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,

moreover, supports such conclusion.
(2) The substance of the conversation need not be alleged in the
information. The nature of the communication is immaterial. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute
an offense under Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 As the Solicitor General
pointed out, Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one
can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well
as its communication to a third person should be professed.
(3) Private communication includes private conversation. The word
communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning to
share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes an act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation (process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols). These broad definitions are
likely to include the confrontation between Socorro and Ester.
Moreover, any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the
phrase private communication are put to rest by the fact that
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill used
communication and conversation interchangeably.