CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that
the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of
action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased
plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main,
that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as
husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at
1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among
others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses,
and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be
completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the
petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death
of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that
the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of
action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15
September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic
relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and answer thereto
was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the
court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order
that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be
null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute for the lower court did not act on the motion for
substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity
of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his
counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the
nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action
for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid
marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no
absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by
allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot
even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The
action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding
brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence
of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death
has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the
persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost
unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1
Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89
N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v.
Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal.
155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1
Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of
legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of
the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in
the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession.
Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation
of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community
of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of
the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are
vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a
party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the
deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section
1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is
that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do
not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either
party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil
Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive
years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the
three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment
should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal
partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
ARELLANO, J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina
Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of
Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed,
one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son
named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his fathers death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on
July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his
mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan ? that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan ? appeared in the case to oppose the
registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, or that if granted to her the right reserved by law
to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel. (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property
required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother
and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land which are
the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved ? a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired
them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by
inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition
of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so
characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives;
and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a
valuable consideration ? that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation
of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez,
whence the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is
therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of law,
and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the
allegation in first instance was merely that Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of
the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence,
prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it
(p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land
from her son Pedro, who died unmarried and without issue. The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection
on the appellants part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her
right to her sons legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of
collaterals.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her possession
by free disposal in her sons will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from
the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her sons wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels
of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334,
No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be
required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children and
descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836.
(Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation
of law could full to the mother from her sons inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all
that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are required by
law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free
disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablans
inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired
by operation of law ? that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the
interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the mans wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible ? that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law
to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant
deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands
were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong
to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in
such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the
opponents right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right
required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law,
it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by
force of law has not been invoked. (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance,
where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law
to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that
right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in
the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that
right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the
property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage
imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of
action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has
such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by
virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July,
1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was
such independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil
Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is
reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the
enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right

reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of
the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though it
be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has
prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said
two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the
registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that
further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief
disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in
the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the
Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the
law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where
it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set
apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from
the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration.
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any
provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In
those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first
marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for
the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be reserved in the
property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to
the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the
construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with
inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be
contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: As the supreme court has already declared, the
guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are
applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of
the provisions of the chapter in which they are found.
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right
required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant
who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a
first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are:
Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real
property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case
of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of
jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over
the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in
whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally
represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the same
requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father.

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads
as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be reserved, upon the
property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of
action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be
reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not
prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: If ninety days pass without the fathers instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing
article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person
obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father.
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings
to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of
the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require
the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives.
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be
reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if
the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property
registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of
prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place,
because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496
of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the
registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of
land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan,
and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in
himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and
enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law,
act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the
fee simple ? that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into
full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellants brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the
reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in
whose favor it must be reserved, with the formers consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to
be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of
June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: This opinion only looks at two salient points ? the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the
arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two

things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons. (Manresa, VII,
189.)
In another place he says: We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained ? that is, that the surviving spouse
(the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants
immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code. (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latters wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively ?
use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the
least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant
heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to
the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this
limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which
makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right
of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he
has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference
between the case where a mans wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the
slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while
the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of
usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one
in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the
property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose
of the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover
it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case
cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property
itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving spouse after contracting a second
marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: If at his or
her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive.
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and
void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the
alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. Article 109 of this
Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always
that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the
validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must
reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person
in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and,
the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be
valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved
to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become
definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to
the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage
shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the
ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, Rights and obligations during the existence of
the right required by law to be reserved, in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction
thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an
expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.

The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner
and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can
dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion
General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for
they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the
relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right
reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and
the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition. (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time of his death
relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such
relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can
freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and
encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and
nothing more because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and
revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant
lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be
reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the
death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and
usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent.
Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition,
reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine
owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property,
first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in
the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in
said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is
reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December
30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right,
because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for
it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person
die.
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to
reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights
inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the
registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an
act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got
the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: To prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein. (Decision
of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the
person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law
requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third
party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized
by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that
the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be
transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic,
sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner,
by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of
and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a
condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of
disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation
must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law
provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in
its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed ? that the alienation the purchaser may make will be
terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the
obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon, that is, if he recovers the thing sold by
repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all
doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged ? that is to say, the latter
with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the
acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much
more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit
some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make
the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more
power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to
register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the
right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they
survive her; without special findings as to costs.

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants
from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said
marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the
parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned
passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein
defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of
the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the
same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva,
instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly
described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of
Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to
the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the
deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on
March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal
certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her
said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her
publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto
Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil.,
697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here the law
and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See
also In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third
degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo,
who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was
Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third
degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was
entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811
the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to
be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a
lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.

This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or tribunal. However, eminent
commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult
problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous
in the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. One of such commentators,
undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions,
in deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather
reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it
speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that
exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the
article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only
upon the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not recognize the existence of
the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established by acknowledgement between the father or mother
who acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that in
said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the
reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents, of ascendants or
descendants, and in them reference is of course made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a
provision applicable only to natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it
does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural
ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944
and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to
legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included
as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of
this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly included in the
eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and
846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants.
And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the provisions of
article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the
text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847,
treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits
of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of
new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva
troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is
intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article
968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate
parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to
lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised just as the question
whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no
remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the
legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate points in the
interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parentswho are within
the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It
could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other,
by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of
the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a
descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question,
because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the
reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate

family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents
the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the
right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families;
properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)
Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La
reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate
family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would
be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So
ordered.

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity
as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A,
entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely:
Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second
marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died
without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In
Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the onehalf (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the
other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias
chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion
de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion
de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966,
Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and
sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias
Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case
No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon
the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the
complaint of petitioners4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which
said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following
requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister
by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by
operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In
the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the
second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was
acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal whether the property in question
was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent
Court said:

It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la
Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and
cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is
not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to areserva troncal under
Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva,
44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters
not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient;
and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without
requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No.
4816 which estates in express terms;
(Spanish,)
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre
and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the
court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free
from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does
not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the
amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case
the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed
upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that
the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was
admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate
Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua
has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated
there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself
could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua
getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his death his mother Consolation
de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property
was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from
whom the property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias
Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the
petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March
1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in
time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador
Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of
Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion;
Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

TEODORO DE LOS REYES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAXIMINO PATERNO, administrator of the estate of Tomas G. del Rosario deceased, defendant-appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 7th of February, 1914. The purpose of the
action on the part of the plaintiff was to be declared the owner of one-half of two lots or parcels of land located in the district of
Santa Cruz in the city of Manila, to require the defendant to render an account of the administration of said lots or parcels of
land, and to obtain a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for whatever amount said rendition of accounts
shows the plaintiff was entitled to.
To the petition the defendant filed a general and special answer. In his general answer he denied each and all of the material
allegations alleged in the complaint. In his special defense he alleged that the said Tomas G. Del Rosario, at the time of his
death, was the sole and only owner of said lots or parcels of land.
Upon the issue thus presented and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the court a quo rendered a
judgment in which he ordered the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff one-half of one of said parcels of land, together with the
one-half of the rent which it produced or might produce until the delivery of the same, and to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P8,000 and the half of the rent which the other piece of property may have produced or may produce up to the time of the death
of the deceased, Tomas G. del Rosario.
From that conclusion the defendant appealed to this court and made several assignments of error the most important of which,
and the one which is our judgment shows that the lower court committed an error in its conclusions, is assignment No. 5. Said
assignment is that the lower court "erred in not holding that the decree of the Court of Land Registration, copied in plaintiff's
Exhibit C, is res judicata against the plaintiff; and that the two certificates of title of the properties that are the subject matter of
the complaint, issued in behalf of Tomas G. de Rosario by virtue of said decree, are conclusive and decisive proof against the
plaintiff."
If it is true that during the lifetime of Tomas G. del Rosario he obtained a Torrens title for the lots or parcels of land in question,
and if that judgment or decree of the Court of Land Registration became final, or if more than one year had elapsed after the
decree then his title is unimpeachable and can not be annulled or set aside, even for fraud.
As was noted above, the present action was commenced on the 7th of February, 1914. During the trial of the cause the
defendant presented as proof Exhibit C. An examination of Exhibit C shows the following facts:
First. That the said Tomas G. del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration on the 24th of April, 1909, for
the registration under the Torrens system of two parcels of land. There is no dispute that the two parcels of land described in
said petition for registration are exactly the same parcels of land in litigation in the present action.
Second. Said Exhibit C further shows that on the 21st of September, 1909, the judge of the Court of Land Registration, after
considering the petition, rendered the following decree, ordering said parcels of land to be registered in the name of Tomas G.
del Rosario, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496:
Two properties are described in the application, both urban; the first is a parcel of land situated on Calle Curtidor, district
of Santa Cruz, city of Manila, and includes the building thereon constructed of strong materials; and the other is a piece
of land on Calle Asuncion, district of San Nicolas, city of Manila, which includes the building, also of strong materials,
thereon.
The applicant has presented documentary and parol evidence, the former consisting of the documents, all of which are
public, on file in this case, and the latter, of the testimony of witnesses. From the said documents and from the certified
copy issued by the register of deeds of Manila on July 17, 1907, of the entry made in the old property registry, it is
deduced that these properties have been the subject of successive and legal conveyances since the year 1879, until
they were acquired by the applicant in August and September, 1891, by purchase, during his conjugal partnership, now
dissolved, with his wife, Juana Reyes y Reyes, and that the ownership of both properties was recorded in the said
property registry in the name of the aforementioned Tomas G. del Rosario, as the representative of the said
partnership.
Upon the death of Juana Reyes y Reyes, who died intestate, Concepcion Crispina Dorotea Severina del Rosario y
Reyes, a daughter of the marriage of the deceased with the applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario, was declared to be the
sold heir of decedent by the Court of First Instance of the district of Quiapo in a decree of February 20, 1892.

On June 3, 1900, the said Concepcion del Rosario y Reyes also died, at the age of nine years, according to the death
certificate Exhibit F, and was succeeded in all her rights and actions, and in respect to one-half of the property, by the
said applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario, who was already the owner of the other half of the property.
After general notice of default, the adjudication and registration of the property in question is decreed (10 a. m.) in the
name of the applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario.
Let a translation be made of the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the witnesses, and attached to the record
of the proceedings.
In the margin of the entries of registration, which, on folio 34 of volume 4 of the section of Quiapo, and 9 of the register,
property No. 131, registration No. 3, and folio 115 of volume 7 of the section of Binondo, property No. 314, appears in
the names of Tomas G. del Rosario y Tongco and his daughter, Concepcion Crispina Dorotea Severina del Rosario y
Reyes, let record be made by the register of deeds of the city of Manila, that the properties to which said entries
refer have been adjudicated to Tomas G. del Rosario, in accordance with Act No. 496.
MANILA, September 21, 1909.
From the 21st of September, 1909, until the 7th of February, 1914, much more than one year elapsed. The title, therefore, of
Tomas G. del Rosario was absolute and complete. The failure of the plaintiff, if he ever had any interest or title in said land, to
appear and oppose the registration of the same in the name of Tomas G. del Rosario or to question the registration in his name
during a period of one year after the certificate of title had been issued, operates to exclude him forever from questioning the title
granted under the Torrens system. (Sec. 38, Act No. 496; Cuyugan and Lim Tuico vs. Sy Quia, 24 Phil. Rep., 567; Maloles vs.
Director of Lands, 25 Phil. Rep., 548.)
The plaintiff having lost his right to claim any interest in the lots or parcels of land in question, by virtue of his (a) failure to
present any opposition to the registration of the same under the Torrens system in favor of Tomas G. del Rosario, or (b) to
question the validity of such registration within a period of one year thereafter he has forever lost his right therein, if he ever had
any.
Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed and the defendant is absolved from all liability under the complaint,
and without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Torres, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
Araullo, J., dissents.
July 22, 1916.

JOHNSON, J.:
On the 27th of March, 1916, a decision was rendered in the above entitled cause, in which the decision of the lower court was
revoked. The purpose of the action was to recover a portion of certain parcels of land "como un derecho reservable" (as a
reservable right). In the decision the court held that by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, the plaintiff had lost
his right to the property by reason of his failure to present any opposition to the registration thereof under the Torrens system,
and had presented no objection to the registration of the same within a period of one year after the decree of registration had
been entered.
On the 1st of April, 1916, the attorney for the appellee presented a motion for a rehearing. In his motion for a rehearing he calls
our attention to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, the commentaries thereon by Manresa, as well as to the decision
of this court in the case of Edroso vs. Sablan (25 Phil. Rep., 295).
It is true that in said cause (Edroso vs. Sablan) we held that the owners of "el derecho reservable" were entitled to have said
right noted in the certificate of registration as a valid lien against the property. In that case (Edroso vs. Sablan) the persons
holding the reservable right presented their opposition to the registration of the land in question during the pendency of the
action in the Court of Land Registration. In the present case the land in question was registered in the month of September,
1909. No objection was presented to the registration of the property. The property in question was registered without objection.
No question is now raised that the proceedings for the registration of the land in question were not regular and in accordance
with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Moreover, the plaintiff presented no claim whatever for a period of six years and
not then until after the death of the person in whose name the same had been registered under the Torrens system. The

provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496 seem to prohibit absolutely the raising of any question concerning the validity of a title of
land registered under the Torrens system, after the expiration of one year. We are of the opinion that the prohibitions contained
in said section apply to every claim, of whatever nature, which persons may have had against registered land.
In the case of Edroso vs. Sablan (supra) the parties interested went to the Court of Land Registration during the pendency of the
action there and fully protected their rights. In the present case the plaintiff did not, thereby losing his right given him under the
law to the land in question. Whether he has any other remedy for the purpose of recovering damages to cover his loss is a
question which we do not now discuss or decide. The appellee apparently has the idea that the decision in the present case
destroys "el derecho reservable." That was not the purpose of the decision. The effect of the decision simply is that unless such
right is protected during the pendency of the action for the registration of the land, or within a period of one year thereafter, such
right is lost forever. We are of the opinion that there is no conflict between the decision in the present case and that in the case
of Edroso vs. Sablan (supra).
For the foregoing reasons the motion for a rehearing is hereby denied. So ordered.

DIONISIA PADURA ET AL, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES

V.
MELANIA BALDOVINO, ET AL, OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
GR NO L-11960 DECEMBER 27, 1958
REYES, JBL,J.,
SV: Fortunato Padura without any heirs, hence the four parcels of land he received from his father were transmitted to her
mother. After her mother died, Fortunatos nephews and nieces from his full sister and half-brother took possession of the
property. The court ruled that these nephews and nieces will have equal shares over the property.
SC: Rule on Reserva troncal should be applied, meaning the relatives of Fortunato up to the third degree will get the reservable
property after his mother dies. The children of such relatives (the reservatarios) can receive the property by way of right of
representation. But after applying the rule, the reservatarios and their relationship will be considered in determining their shares.
The rules on ordinary intestate succession would be followed after the reservatarios have been determined.
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Agustin Padura married twice. His first wife was Gervacio Landig with whom he had one child named Manuel
Padura. His second wife was Benita Garing with whom he had 2 children named Fortunato and Candelaria Padura
He died leaving a last will and testament duly probated wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children,
Manuel, CAndelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse Benita (2nd wife). Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels
of land
a. Fortunato died unmarried and without having executed a will; and not having any issue, the 4 parcels of
land were inherited exclusively by Benita. Benita applied for an later was issued a Torrens Certificate of
Title in her name, BUT subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives
within the 3rd degree belonging to the line from which the property came (Fortunato)
b. Candelaria (Fortunatos full sister) died leaving as her heirs her 4 legitimate children (the appellants)
Melania, Anicia and Pablo all surnamed Baldovino
c. Manuel (Fortunatos half brother) also died. His heirs were his legitimate children (the appellees) Dionisia,
Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana and Severino, all surnamed Padura
Benita Garing (the reservista) died. The children of Candelaria and Fortunato took possession of the 4 parcels of
land (the reservable properties).
a. CFI Laguna issued a resolution declaring the legitimate children of Manuel and Candelaria are the rightful
reserves and as such entitled to the 4 parcels of land
The Baldovinos filed this present petition wherein they seek to have the properties partitioned suh that one-half of
the same be adjudicated to them, the other half to the Paduras on the basis that they inherited by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reserves.
The Paduras opposed, arguing that they should all (all 11 of them) be deemed inheriting in their own right hence,
they should have equal shares.
TC rendered judgment declaring them all reservees without distinction and have equal shares over the properties
as co-owners, pro indiviso.

ISSUE: should the properties be apportioned among the nephews of the whole blood and nephews of the hald-blood equally?
Or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood? The nephews of
the whole blood get twice the share.

The Baldovinos contend that notwithstanding the rule on Reservable character of the property under Art. 891, the
reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others pursuant to Arts.
10061, 10082 on intestate succession.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by
their relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista)
o Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired
by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may
have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to
the line from which said property came. (871)
o The motives for such rule were explained by D. Manuel Alonso Martinez in his book El Codigo Civil en sus
relaciones con Las Legislaciones Forales 3

Article 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the
former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. (949)
2 Article 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the
rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood. (915)
3 Passage was in Spanish. Google translate was not much help.
1

The purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of
origin. After that, Art. 891 has nothing to do with the relations between one reservatario and another of the same
degree. Their shares should be foverned by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. Upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all reservatarios as a class, but only to those nearest
in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reseravatarios more remote in degree.
o

Summary of not so good translation: consider this sample case: father dies leaving his wife and lone
son as heirs. Wife remarries and had children with 2nd husband. Lone son dies and his mother (wife)
inherits whatever he got from the father. In case the wife dies, the relatives of the lone son are
prejudiced since the wifes children from the second marriage will inherit the properties of the lone son
as opposed to his uncle (fathers brother)
The code commission chose to give more importance to lineal succession than the presumed affection
of the deceased.
The commission settled with the suggestion of Manresa, among others, to reserve the property in case
the ascendants inherit in favor of relatives up to the third degree. No reason was given why 3rd degree.
Aside from the sample case, another reason why this rule was adopted was to make it the law more
democratic (Democracy was becoming a trend when the civil code was being made by the Spaniards,
so fetch).

The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same as a reservatario of the property
is not among those relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
Relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such
But there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by
law as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of intestate succession so is the rule that whole
blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.

In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should
likewise be operative.

Reserva Troncal merely determines the group pof relatives to whom the property should be returned. Within the group,
the individual right to the property should be decided by applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession (since art. 891
is silent on the matter).

Reserva Troncal is an exceptional case and its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the
purpose of the law

Even during the lifetime of the reservista, the reservatarios could compel the annotation of their right (over the property)
in the registry of property. The reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose them
by will so long as there are reservatarios existing. The reservatarios are in fact inheriting from the descendant
prepositus from whom the reservista inherited the property.

If the nephews of whole and half-blood inherited the prepositus directly, the whole bloods would receive a double share
compared to those of the half-blood. Why then should the half-bloods inherit equally just because of the delay in the
transmission of the property (when it was with the reservista)? The hereditary portions should not change

Philippine (and Spanish Jurisprudence) agrees with this despite the contrary opinions of authors such as Sanchez
Roman and Mucius Scaevola.

Appealed order REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Whole blood nephews will get twice the share of those who are nephews of Halfblood.