Time in Patajali's "Yogastra"

Author(s): Klaus K. Klostermaier

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 205-210
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Klaus K. Klostermaier Time in Patanijali's Yogasitra

INTRODUCTION

The few scholars who have dealt at any length with the notion of time in
Patanjali'sYogasutra seem to have been guided by an effort to prove that
Patanijali'sideas are in line with "modern"(that is, contemporary)Western
conceptions.Most of them speakof time in one breathwith space (and, quite
frequently,with causalitytoo) as we are used to speakingin the West today:
philosophicallysinceKant, physicallysince Einstein.
Sir Brajendranath
Seal, writingbeforeEinsteinhad developedhis Theoryof
view of time and space close to Kant'sconceptof
Relativity,movedPatanijali's
the a prioriformsof apperception.1FritjofCapra,a modernphysicist,triesto
suggestthat "OrientalThought,"as he calls it, had developedmore than two
thousandyearsago the ideaof a four-dimensionalspace-timecontinuum.2Both
viewsappearto be mistaken.It is my contentionin this essaythat the notion of
time in patanijali'sYogasutrais not intrinsicallyconnectedwith the notion of
spaceand can (and should)be treateddifferently.
The Yogasitra,as is well known, has much in common with the Samkhyadarsana as far as basic concepts are concerned. Now Samkhya is neither
"physics"in the modernsense,nor "psychology,"nor "metaphysics"-but it is
somethingof all of them.The Yogasutrasharesthis holisticapproach,wherean
overridinginterestin the practicalgoal of emancipationis coupledwith great
theoreticalconcernto offeran explanationof realityin termsof an evolutionary
hierarchyof realprinciples.
In Patanijali's
treatmentof time,theseaspectshaveto be keptin mindtoo: he
does not distinguishbetweenpsychologicaland physicaltime, nor does he shy
away from extrapolatingmetaphysicalconclusionsfrom a basis of physical
observations.
This is not the place to go into the very importantquestionof the relation
betweenthe Yogasutraand Buddhism.3In spiteof some polemicsagainstsome
Buddhistschools, both the terminologyand the underlyingphilosophyof the
Yogasutrasuggestclose connections.An understandingof this interdependence
wouldgreatlyhelp to clarifyalso the notion of time, whichPatanjaliacceptsor
presupposes.GeorgFeuerstein,in whatmightbe the most thoroughand critical
recentstudy of the Yogasutra,writes:"It is highly probablethat in his metawas directlyinspiredby the high-poweredspeculations
physicsof timePatanijali
of the SautantrikaBuddhists."4 Sincenot enoughresearchis availableon this,
theattemptundertakenhere,to studythe notionof timein the Yogasutra,
mayin
its own way contributeto a clarificationof this issue.
An analysisof the "scientific"basis of Yoga is crucial:the success of the
methodof emancipationdepends,on the one hand, on the correctnessof the
Klaus Klostermaier is Professor in the Department of Religion, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg,
Canada.
Philosophy East and West 34, no. 2 (April, 1984). by the University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.

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206 Klostermaier

scientificexplanationof the physicaland psychic structuresof the universein

whichwe live,and,on theotherhand,on the correctnessof the methodsuggested
to transcendthis materialuniverse.5
THE TEXTUALBASIS

Severalsutra in connection with the classical commentaries,provide informationon Patanijali's

view of time.Othersyieldadditionalinformationinsofar
as they provideinsightinto the applicationwhichthis notion of time has in the
contextof Yoga.Others,again,presupposethe notionof time;thenotionof time
itselfis embeddedin a pre-notionof the universalityof changand flux.
(a) ksamatatkramayohsamyamad vivekajamjndnam (III, 52)

Vyasa comments:7"Just as the atom (paramanu)is the smallestparticleof

matter(dravya)so a moment(ksana)is the smallestparticleof time(kala)."He
then gives a physicaldefinitionof ksana by equatingit with the time which a
paramanuin motiontakesto leaveone pointandreachanotherpointor, in other
words,to movethrougha spaceequalingthe spaceit occupies.The continuous
flow of theseksanascannotbe combinedinto a vastu.Whatwe call "hours"or
"days"are mentalcombinations.Thus time as such (kala) is not a real thing
(vdstusunya)but is based on changes in the mind (buddhinirmana)and known

throughverbalconnotation.
Themoment(ksana),however,is a realthing(vastu)in itselfand constitutive
of the sequence(kramavalambin).
The sequenceis constitutedby an uninterruptedsuccessionof moments.The Yogis, who trulyknow the natureof time,
call this "time"(kala). Two moments(ksana) cannot exist togetherbecause
betweentwo simultaneousmomentsthere cannot be a sequence.A sequence
arises when a later moment succeedsan earlierwithout interruption.In the
present(moment)no earlieror later(moment)is contained.Thereis, therefore,
no combinationof them. The explanationof the (reality)of past and future
momentsliesin the natureof change.Theworldwhichexistsin thisone moment
undergoeschange.All dharmasaresuperimposedon thisksana.Bysariyamaon
this moment and the sequence(of moments)these are caused to be visibly
present.
And thus arisesmetaphysicalknowledge(vivekajam
jndnam).8
(b) atlta anagatam svarupato 'sti adhvabheddddharmanam(IV, 12)9

"Futureis thatwhosemanifestexistenceis stillto come;past

Vyasacomments:10
is that, whose manifestexistencehad been experienced;presentis that upon
which experiencenow is superimposed.This three-foldreality(vastu)is the
objectof knowledge.If they did not have theirown formsof existence,knowledgeof themwouldnot ariseby whichtheyaredistinguished.It followsthatpast
and futuredo existin theirown right."Further,if the resultsof karman-either
that productiveof experienceor of liberation-were without existenceof its
own,thenthe actionsof the sageswithregardto thiswouldbe pointless.Efficient
causalitycan renderan entitypresent,not produceit from nothing.
Unlikethe present,past and futuredo not exist in manifestform.The future
the past its having-alreadyhas as its characteristicits coming-to-be-manifest,
existence.While one
manifest
The
alone
possesses
been-experienced. present
time-formis present,past and futuredo exist (in theirown subtleway) in the
suppositum. The three time-forms do not come into existence out of
nonexistence.

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207

(c) tatah krtarthanamr

parinamakramasamaptirgunamam (IV, 32)11
Vyasa comments: 2 "As a result of the rising of the dharmameghathe gunas,
having served their function, the sequence of changes comes to an end. After they
have exhausted their karman and exhausted their sequence they can no longer
sustain even a ksana."
kramah (IV, 33) 3
(d) ksanapratiyogiparinama-parantanirgrahyah
Vyasa comments:14 "a sequence is an uninterrupted series of moments (ksana)
perceived as such at the end of a (process of) transformation."
ANALYSIS OF THE TEXTS

The conception of time in these texts appears to be very close to the Buddhist
ksanikavada.15By pointing out this closeness to Buddhism it is implied that the
notion of time is not, as might seem, marginal to the Yoga system but very
central. The attainment of the goal of Yoga depends on the theory as well as the
reality of ksana. The Buddhists haye defended very vigorously the reality of
ksana against the contention of their enemies that, if they were consistent, they
would consider the ksana a mere name without any corresponding reality-as
they are wont to do with regardto every other thing. The Buddhists maintain that
the shortest time, the mathematical point-instant is something real, since the
astronomer makes it the basis of all his computations. It is an indivisible timeparticle;it does not contain any parts standing in the relation of antecedence and
sequence. The only thing in the universe which is a nonconstruction, a nonfiction, is the sensible point-instant: it is the real basis of all constructions. It is true
that it is a reality which cannot be represented in a sense-image, but this is just
because it is not a thought-construction. The absolutely unique point-instant of
reality, as it cannot be represented, can also not be named. Consequently, it is no
name at all; it has no name: reality is unutterable. What is utterable is always a
thought construction. Thus it is that the mathematical point-instant is a fiction
for the Realist and a reality for the Buddhist, and vice versa, empirical time or
"gross time," "substantial time," is a reality for the Realist and a fiction for the
Buddhist. Just as the mathematician constructs his velocities out of differentials,
so does the human mind, a natural mathematician, construct duration out of
momentary sensations.
Though the Yogasutra does not explicitly mention it, it seems to assume an
identity of the ksana that becomes the object of direct experience in samyama
(constraint) on time and the interval between (and the duration of) individual
vrttis (modifications). There is reason to mention this point because there is a
(Hinayana) Buddhist theory which calculates the "external-world" ksana to be
equal in length to seventeen thought-ksanas.16
There is reason, then, to speak in connection with the Yogasutra'snotion of
time not only of an (objective) time-quantum (close to ideas of 'chronons'
maintained by some physicists today) but also of a consciousness-quantum as
unit of change.

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208 Klostermaier

This again has a twofold function. In the applicationof sariyamaon "the

pointof time"theyoginis enabledto perceivethatwhichis vastu(a realthing)in
time-a mutualcorroborationof the realityof consciousnessand its object,
whichis responsiblefor it. In the stageof dharmameghasamadhi
the quantumnatureof time again offersthe explanationfor the possibilityof totally transcendingit. Becauseit is a dharma,it is at one andthe sametimean "ultimate"on
the levelof sense-perception
and cognitionderivedfromit and also nonultimate
on the levelof the realitywhichemergesafterthe gunas(qualities)collapseinto
themselves.Thisseemsto suggestthattimein the formof the moment(ksana)is
fundamentalin the physicaluniversewhichrestson the interactionbetweenthe
gunas.

It wouldfollowthen,that it is intrinsicto samsaricexistenceto considerkala

(grosstime)as vastu-whereas in realityit is an "imagination,"a creationof the
buddhi(intellect),based on the constantly changing vrttis. To perceive the
of
of timein that senseand to realizethe vastu-character
emptiness(vastusunya)
thethreemodesof theexistenceof ksanais at one andthe sametimeindicationof
a high degreeof insight into the true nature of things and also a means of
transcendingsamsaricexistence.The insightinto the true natureof time, so it
seems,is the borderlineinsight:sinceksanais the dharmawhichis most elementary (all other dharmaspresupposeit and inherein it, and beyond it-in the
processof resolutionof dharmas-thereare,as it were,thegunasin their"raw"
forms the
forms) its dissolution,or the recognitionof its dharma-character,
viveka
both
result
and
essentialbreakthroughand is
of,
(discerngenerating,
ment). When vivekajnanaarises, it leads to dharmameghasamddhi,which almost

by itselfglidesover into the conditionof kaivalya("isolation,"namely,of the

hasnot yet beenstudiedproperlyin this
spirit).Althoughthe termdharmamegha
to
translate
it
context, wouldfit into the picture
meghanot as cloud(as is usually
done) but as "field"in the sense of modern physics.18It would then be a
conditionin whichthe dharmas,which on a lowerlevel of consciousnesshave
into a greatnumberof specificdharmas,now are
beenperceivedas differentiated
as a "field"surroundingultimate
in
dharma-character:
their
(unified)
perceived
realityratherthanas "things."Again,the crucialfunctionwouldbe givento the
ksanadharma.

of time,a problemwhich
the irreversibility
In theworldviewof the Yogasuitra,
has greatlytroubledmodernphysics,would find a plausibleexplanation.The
wholecosmicprocess(samsara)can be seen-after it has come to an end-as a
krama: a sequence of ksanas. The constituents of krama, the ksanas, have-

amongstthemselves-an irreversibleorder:the ksana of the past is once and

Thatmeansit can never
forevercharacterizedby its havingbeenexperienced.19
revertto a mode of existenceof a momentto be experienced(future)nor to a
modeof beingexperiencedjust now (present).It is inherentin the irreversibility
Also in the kaivalya
of orderitself,orderbeingconstitutiveof time-experience.
state, the state of freedomfrom the bondageof samsaricexistence,when the

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209

gunashave collapsedintoprakrtiwithoutdifferentiation,thereis no reversalof

time:it is an existenceoutsidethe dharmasaltogether,and thereforea timeless
existence.But also heresamsaricpast and futureare not interchangeable.
That wouldalso serveanotherproblem.The yogin is, by the developmentof
siddhis(extraordinaryattainments),capable both of looking into the past
(comingto know his own past births)and of looking into the future(divining
thingsto come).Sinceall ksanasaredifferentiated
by thedifferenceto thepresent
ksana,thereis no dangerof confusingpast with future,or vice versa.It is only
givento the yoginto haveinsightinto the vastuthatarethe ksanas:insofaras he
knowsa ksana,he also knowsits positionin the sequencewhichis establishedby
them.
as zero-time exFurthermore,the key function of dharmameghasamadhi
periencewouldappear.If kala is saidto be vastusunya,that seemsto suggestnot
a mere negation but a transition:correspondingto the function of zero as
transitionalratherthan terminalin the differentiationof experienceand reality.20The vastusunyarealizationis essentialas point of transitionbetweena
buddhi-centered
consciousnessandthepurusa-awareness.
Sincekala is the most
basic of the forms createdby buddhi,the realizationof its emptinessimpliesa
radicalreversalof the directionof activityof the buddhiand a withdrawalof all
support for buddhi-baseddharmas.

NOTES
1. Sir BrajendranathSeal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, (reprint, Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass: 1958), p. 18ff.
2. Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics (Berkeley, California: Shambhala Publications, 1975), p.
161ff.
3. In a general way the question of the relation between the Yogasutraand Buddhism had been
treated already by Louis de la Vallee Poussin in his essay "Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patafijali,"
Melanges chinois et bouddhiques5 (Louvain: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinois, 1936/37):
223ff.
4. Georg Feuerstein, The Philosophy of Classical Yoga (Manchester University Press, 1982), p.
95.
5. An observation by Tilman Vetter is quite pertinent here: One is getting out from the world only
by going to the ground of things, and not by going anywhere else. One is not getting to the ground of
things by an analysis of any kind of stupidity, but by an analysis and a transcendence of the most
important concepts and truths which can be found about the world....
"Zum Problem der Person in Nagarjuna's Mula-Madhyamaka-Karikais." In Walter Strolz and
Shizuteru Ueda, eds., Offenbarungals Heilserfahrung im Christentum,Hinduismus und Buddhismus
(Freiburg-Basel-Wien, Herder, 1982), p. 171.
6. James Haughton Woods, The Yoga System of Pataijali, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 17
(Harvard University Press, 1914), p. 287, translates: "As a result of constraint upon moments and
their sequence (there arises the intuitive) knowledge proceeding from discrimination." I. K. Taimni,
The Science of Yoga (Wheaton, Illinois: Theosophical Publishing House, 1967), p. 368, translates:
"Knowledge born of awareness of Reality by performing samyama on moment and (the process of)
its succession" (in his ed. III, 53). It is presupposed here that the reader knows (or is being informed
about it in some other section of this book) what the basic term samyama (translated by Woods as
"constraint") means.

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210 Klostermaier

7. The edition used is that by Swami Vijfianasrama (Ajmer: Madanlal Laksminivas Chandak,
1961) which, besides the Vydsa-bhasya,also contains the Bhojavrtti.For convenience sake, one-word
English translations have been added to the technical Sanskrit terms. For more detailed information
on the meaning of these notions and the various translations adopted by Western scholars see
Feuerstein, Philosophy, especially on guna: 33ff; vrtti: 61ff.; sarhyama: 104ff;kaivalya: 51ff; siddhis:
10lff.
8. My translation of vivekajamj]dnarh as "metaphysical knowledge" should indicate that it is
considered to be true and certain knowledge but not yet identical with the objectless awareness
characteristic for the condition ofpurusa in kaivalya.
9. Woods, Yoga, p. 315: "Past and future as such exist; (therefore subconcious-impressions do
not cease to be). For the different time-forms belong to the external-aspects."
I. K. Taimni, Science, p. 403: "The past and the future exist in their own (real) form. The differenceof
Dharmas or properties is on account of the difference of paths."

10. Op.cit., pp. 449f.(relevantportionsonly).

11. Woods, Yoga, p. 343: "When as a result of this the aspects (guna) have fulfilled their purpose,
they attain to the limit of the sequence of mutations.
12. Op. cit., p. 505.
13. Woods, Yoga, p. 343: "The positive correlate to the moment, recognized as such at the final
limit of the mutation is a sequence."
Taimni, Science, p. 439: "The process corresponding to moments which become apprehensible at the
final end of transformation (of the gunas) is kramah."
14. p. 507.
15. In the following exposition of the ksanikavddaI am closely following Theodore Stcherbatsky,
BuddhistLogic (Reprint, Dover, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 78ff.
16. See Shwe Zan Aung, Compendiumof Philosophy (London: Pali Text Society, 1972), p. 26.
17. Also according to the Bhdmati the nitydnityaviveka is the most crucial adhikdra for
brahmajijnafsa.
18. G. Feuerstein, Philosophy (p. 98ff), after examining a great many suggested translations for
dharmamegha,adopts the view of J. Hauer, who wrote: "The meditator is in this state enveloped by
the supporting primal power of the world; he has become a dharma-kdyalike 'the great Muni'. This is
an expression for the Buddha who has entered Nirvana." Feuerstein goes on, stating that "the
concept ofdharmameghadoes not appear to be mentioned by any Hindu authority prior to Patafijali,
though it is evidently an integral part of early Mahayana-Buddhism."
19. P. C. W. Davies, in The Physics of Time Asymmetry (Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1974) discusses the peculiar phenomenon that observation in quantum physics
introduces a time asymmetry into natural processes. Could the difference between macroscopic and
quantum physics be set in parallel to the ancient Indian laukika and vivekajajnnam? (This is not to
suggest, of course, the possibility of observation of subatomic processes, but the possibility of a
development of a corresponding theoretical framework.)
20. See Betty Heimann, "The Discovery of Zero and Its Philosophical Implications in India" and
"Counter-Tension of the Zero-Point," in Facets of Indian Thought(London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1964), pp. 95-104.

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