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FACTS:

Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo (the daughter, grandson,


and widow, respectively of the late Celestino Arbizo)
extra-judicially settled a parcel of land. Directos share
was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square
meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went
to Maria Arbizo. On the same day, Directo donated 625
sq.m. of her share to her nephew.

However, a few months later, another extra-judicial


settlement-partition of the same lot was executed. 3/5
of the lot was awarded to Arbizo (widow) while Directo
and Noceda (daughter and grandson) got only 1/5 each.

Sometime on the same year when the partitions


happened, the nephew (donee) constructed his house
on the land donated to him by Directo. On the other
hand, Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the
extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion,
and constructed thereon three huts.
Around 3 years later, the nephew removed the fence
earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the 3 huts, and
fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent.
The latter demanded Noceda to vacate her land, but
Noceda refused.

Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of


possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of
donation, against Noceda before the lower court. A
survey was conducted and it was found that the area
stated in the settlement was smaller than the actual
area of the lot. The TC declared the second extrajudicial settlement-partition and the deed of donation
revoked (because of ingratitude). The court ordered the
nephew (done) to vacate and reconvey the property to
Directo. CA affirmed.

The nephew contends that there was no real partition


and thus, there is no basis for the charge of usurpation
and ingratitude. He also contends that granting

revocation is proper, the 1 year period for such


revocation has already lapsed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the deed of
donation

RULING: NO
The court held that:
We find unmeritorious petitioners argument that
since there was no effective and real partition of the
subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of
usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding
ingratitude against him.

It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not


only the portion donated to him by Directo but he also
fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to
Directo; thus, petitioners act of occupying the portion
pertaining to Directo without the latters knowledge
and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense
against the property of the donor and considered as an
act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law
does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough
that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

Donee alleged that he usurped donors property in the


1st week of September 1985 while the complaint for
revocation was filed on September 16, 1986; thus, more
than one (1) year had passed from the alleged
usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share
in Lot 1121.
Article 769 expressly states that:

a. the donor must file the action to revoke his donation


within one year from the time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the done; and that;

b. it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to


institute the said action within the same period.
The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown
by the donee in order to bar the present action, which
he failed to do so. He reckoned the one year
prescriptive period from the occurrence of the
usurpation and not from the time the latter had the
knowledge of the usurpation. He also failed to prove
that at the time Directo acquired knowledge of his
usurpation, it was possible for him to institute an action
for revocation of her donation.
nfante v. Aran Builders, GR 156594 Aug 24, 2007;
F: Aran Bldrs filed complaint for specific performance
for Infante to issue deed of sale in lot in Ayala Alabang;
RTC Makati (no courts yet in Muntinlupa) ifo of Aran
Builders. Judgment not executed w/n 5 year period, so
petition for revival, this time w/ RTC Muntinlupa.
Infante filed MTD for venue improperly laid.
H: RTC Muntinlupa has jurisdiction - proper venue.
Property located in Muntinlupa. So Action to Revive
judgment would now depend on the nature of the
action. Initially a personal action but was transformed
into a real action as the execution involved real
property.
*what if the property involved is located on the
boundary. Where would you file? Either is proper.
Allowed under the rules.
Revival of Judgment, Venue
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment
determine whether it is a real action or a personal
action. x x x If the action for revival of judgment affects
title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with
the court of the place where the real property is
located.
(Adelaida Infante v Aran Builders, GR 156596, August
24, 2007)
648 SCRA 772 Civil Law Family Code Ownership,
Administration, Enjoyment, and Disposition of Conjugal
Property

Mortgage of Real Property Mutually Exclusive


Remedies
In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan amounting
to P400k from Arturo Flores. To secure the loan, Edna
executed a deed of real estate mortgage on a property
which is however part of the conjugal property (it was
both in her name and her husbands name Enrico
Lindo). Only Edna signed the deed. But in November
1995, Enrico executed a special power of attorney
authorizing Edna to mortgage the property.
Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated
demands from Flores. Flores then filed an action to
foreclose the mortgage.
The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the
action for foreclosure cannot prosper because it
appears that there was no valid mortgage between
Edna and Flores. Edna mortgaged the property without
the consent of her husband and the special power of
attorney executed by Enrico a month after the
execution of the deed did not cure the defect. The trial
court however ruled that Flores can instead file a
personal action (collection suit) against Edna.
Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of
money against Edna and Enrico (raffled to RTC Manila,
Branch 42). The Lindo spouses filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the
motion. The spouses then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when
Flores filed an action for the foreclosure of the
mortgage, he had abandoned the remedy of filing a
personal action to collect the indebtedness. These
remedies are mutually exclusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a mortgage-creditor
has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor,
that is, to recover the debt; and that he has the option
of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of
money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the
mortgage security. These remedies are indeed mutually
exclusive. However, in this case, the Supreme Court
made a pro hac vice decision (applicable only to this
case and as an exception to the rule) which allows
Flores to recover via a personal action despite his prior
filing of a real action to recover the indebtedness. This
procedural rule cannot be outweighed by the rule on

unjust enrichment. Here, Edna admitted her liability of


indebtedness.
Further, the ruling of the Manila RTC Branch 33 is
erroneous when it ruled that the mortgage between
Edna and Flores is invalid. It is true that a disposition (or
in this case a mortgage, which is an act of strict
dominion) of a conjugal property by one spouse without
the consent of the other spouse is VOID. However,
under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family
Code:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus it is clear, the mortgage was void at the outset but
it was ratified when a month later, Enrico executed a
special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage
the subject property. (So I guess this is an exception to
the rule that no void act can be ratified.)

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