ELSEVIER

Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470

Is there a history of pragmatics?

Anat Biletzki
Department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, IL-69978, Israel

Received July 1994; revised version February 1995

Abstract

Pragmatics, the last of the three levels (the others being syntactics and semantics) of linguistic analysis to attract widespread interest and systematic research, is still generally perceived as a newly born subject with no history to boast of. My working assumption is that
'new' theories of language may have roots in the past, and, furthermore, that the merit of
these theories can be, in part, checked by such philosophical roots. A methodology for seeking out these roots is suggested, profitably adopting the definition of pragmatics as 'explicit
and essential' mention of the user of a language. Examples of 'case studies' using this
methodology are presented in Various areas of historical language study. The traditional disciplines of grammar and rhetoric are first candidates for such research, but it is in philosophy
- and specifically, philosophy of language of the past - that true pragmatics is unearthed.
Such 'discoveries' raise the more fundamental question: what are the rationales for looking
for harbingers of pragmatics? A first approximation to an answer is entertained with its positive, and negative, implications for pragmatics today.

I.

Introduction

In thirty years pragmatics has advanced from the proverbial wastebasket to a full
grown academic field, replete with its own journal, conferences, research grants, and
comprehensive bibliography. Its maturity is attested to by both the number of practitioners in the field, and the variety of directions in which its branches grow out to
various disciplines. Yet sitting on any of the branches of this pragmatic tree - be
they philosophical, linguistic, psychological - one wonders if the tree mightn't topple over for lack of roots. For pragmatics seems to have no formal, institutionalized
history.
Subscribing to the received view that the term 'pragmatics' was both coined and
conceived by Charles Morris (1938: 84), the journal of the field, the Journal of
Pragmatics, in its seventeen years of publication, has printed only three articles that
have to do with the discipline's birth and past. One goes back a full ten years earlier
than Morris and discovers notes of speech acts in Koschmieder's work (Keck and
Stubbs, 1984); another turns even further back to C.S. Peirce and, in a more famil0378-2166/96/$15.00 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
SSDI 037 8-2166(95)00019-4

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iar vein, contrasts the ' O l d ' p r a g m a t i c s o f that venerable p h i l o s o p h e r with the ' N e w '
(Feldman, 1986).1 In fact, only in one very recent article (Nerlich and Clarke, 1994)
is anything like a historical grasp o f p r a g m a t i c s a t t e m p t e d and entertained with a
view to historical research in mind.
Likewise, a p r a g m a t i c s b i b l i o g r a p h y (Verschueren, 1978) lists no ' h i s t o r y o f pragm a t i c s ' in its subject index. The fourteen entries under 'historical linguistics' seem
to have been included on the basis o f being exercises in historical linguistics which
take p r a g m a t i c s into a m o r e or generally less conscious account. Similarly, all but
one o f the five entries under 'history: auxiliary and b e n e f i c i a r y d i s c i p l i n e s ' have
nothing w h a t e v e r to do with p r a g m a t i c s ' past. 2
Finally, when one turns to the multitudinous v o l u m e s on the history o f linguistics,
one m a y e n c o u n t e r sporadic m e n t i o n o f writings o f the past as being ' p r a g m a t i c a l ' .
This is m o r e often than not done in a perfunctory m a n n e r - either as lip service to a
perspective which, it is a c k n o w l e d g e d , is gaining h e a d w a y in the linguistic milieu,
or, for want o f a better term, as a general h e a d i n g under- which one can still group
together various aspects o f language use which seem to only merit a wastebasket. 3
P r a g m a t i c s is o b v i o u s l y perceived, then, as a n e w l y born subject with no history
to boast of. It is therefore p r o m i s i n g to encounter the recent treatment o f past pragmatic p h e n o m e n a that does, consciously, present itself as " a history o f p r a g m a t i c
ideas in Europe (and to a certain extent A m e r i c a ) during the 19th c e n t u r y " (Nerlich
and Clarke, 1994: 441). Nerlich and Clarke c l a i m to be tracing " c r o s s - q u o t a t i o n s "
as their m e t h o d o f research, admitting the possibility o f two other methods, a search
for the " u s e o f various p r a g m a t i c k e y t e r m s " , and a m o t e specific l o o k at " t h e
treatment o f m o o d s from Antiquity to m o d e r n t i m e s " to filad correlations with the
" d e s c r i p t i o n o f speech acts as s u c h " (ibid.: 440). 4 T h e y point to various " p r e l i m i -

Peirce's Pragmatism is, in fact, recognized by many as having direct links to Morris's three-fold
description of pragmatics, syntactics, and semantics, and, indeed, Morris himself says that his program
is "an attempt to carry out resolutely the insight of Charles Peirce" (1946: 27). This self-alleged continuity is itself questionable and has come under attack. Nowhere does Peirce mention pragmatics (as
opposed to pragmatism) and his division of semiotic is rather into pure grammar, logic proper, and pure
rhetoric. It is not clear whether out of this distinction pragmatics, as Morris perceived it, can be gleaned.
Dewey, for instance, counters that "it is a complete inversion of Peirce to identify an interpretant with
interpreter" and feels that "Morris gives a radically new version of the subject matter, intent, and
method of pragmatic doctrine" ( 1949: 269).
2 Only one article (Schwarz, 1984) is described as an example of 'speech act history'.
3 An exception to this tendency, in its attempt to chart the history of language while taking pragmatics
seriously, is Apel (1963).
4 Were we to limit the history of pragmatics to, for example, a history of speech acts 'as such', we
would, by definition, have embarked on a different, yet relevantly related, enterprise. This project has
been undertaken by Smith (1984, 1988, 1990), who, noticing that most 'anticipations of speech act theory' have consisted in isolated remarks, lists ten conditions which make a theory of the past similar
enough to contemporary speech act theory to be characterized as such. (E.g.: Linguistics must be conceived of as a general universal science, language must be seen as primarily an instrument of communication, performative utterances must be more than expressions of acts! of will, speech actions must
involve an appeal to the hearer, etc.) I find such demands inappropriate for two reasons. First, even presupposing agreement with Smith on the possibility of specifying such conditions, one may still disagree
with the content of specific conditions. In other words, one has to be fully in agreement with Smith on

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457

nary studies" which have provided us with data concerning pragmatic "ideas and
insights", thus offering the beginnings of a history of the field (ibid.). 5 And finally,
after presenting their perceptive, historically and intellectually grounded list of pragmaticists, they point to further research agendas which "could lead to a direct crossfertilization between the past and the present" (ibid.: 455).
The crux of the present article's matter is precisely that last statement, phrased as
a question. The newness of pragmatics may be questioned via the theoretical underpinning that ' n e w ' theories of language may have philosophical roots in the past, and
furthermore, that the merit of these theories can be, in part, checked by their philosophical roots. Locating roots, however, is a euphemism for doing history; and such
doings must be advanced and constrained by methodological guidelines. The problem of methodology, moreover, in the humanities, poses problems of a profound
nature. By saying humanities, I am, finally, pointing to the philosophical and historical focus of this article (rather than the competing, yet definitely equal, linguistic
and psychological perspectives on pragmatics, which will not be dealt with here). So
any attempt to unearth roots, and thereby to write a history of pragmatics, 6 will have
to answer two preliminary questions, one methodologically essential, the other philosophically important: What should we look for, and why?

2. W h a t should w e look for ?

2.1. Definitions o f pragmatics
Various definitions of pragmatics alongside various pragmatical programs claim
the birthright bequeathed by (Peirce and) Morris. Delving into this confusing issue
involves the obligation to discuss the alternatives offered by Stalnaker, Allwood,
Kasher, Gazdar, Kamp, Martin, Verschueren, Leech and many others. The relatively
young age of pragmatics has had the further effect of a preponderance of attempts at
neatly demarcating pragmatics (as philosophico-logico-linguistic vs. psychological
study; or as differentiated from semantics; or as competence vs. performance; etc.).
Whether one wants to view pragmatics as the study of grammatically encoded
aspects of context, or as the study of constraints on the appropriateness of utterances,

the contemporary theory of speech acts (a situation which denies the legitimacy of current debates), in
order to apply his requirements to historical thinkers. Second, between 'isolated remarks' and a rigorous,
up-to-date theory lies the expanse of discussions within which fundamental recognition of speech acts
can be ascertained, and to which it is, therefore, possible and profitable to affix the term 'pragmatics'.
5 Nerlichand Clarke list an astounding array of books and articles which go far in providing evidence
of a history of pragmatics, but these sources are all 'data-oriented' (I owe this insight and terminology
to an anonymous referee for the Journal of Pragmatics). See, for example, Nerlich (1986, 1990) and
Neumann (1987).
6 Nerlich and Clarke emphasize that their exercise is 'a' history, not 'the' history. I similarly desist
from any dogmatism which would commit one to describing her research as 'the' history of pragmatics.
Yet this liberalism should not entice us to ignore a methodological basis which is necessary for 'any'
history.

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or as defined ostensively as a list of topics (to name just a few alternatives) will
make a great difference, in the final analysis, to what one is looking for in a history
of pragmatics.
Definitions (of concepts, domains, investigations, relations) m a y be intensional or
extensional. One may either characterize the definiendum by some general trait
which purports, at least theoretically, to limit us to all and only those aspects which
are relevant, or one m a y give a list which attempts to be exclusive of those aspects.
Both types o f definitions are legitimate; each involves different kinds o f insight into
the subject at hand.
Examples o f intensional definitions o f pragmatics are: "the study of the relations
of signs to interpreters" (Morris, 1938: 84); "the study o f indexical rules for relating linguistic form to a given context" (Bates, 1976: 3); " a theory that has as its
subject matter the relationship between a language, its subject matter, and the users
o f the language" (Martin, 1971 : 138); "the theory of the relation between the language users and the language structure" (Apostel, 1971: 33); "the science of language use" (Haberland and Mey, 1977: 1). Examples o f extensional definitions:
"Pragmatics is the study o f deixis, implicature, presupposition, speech acts, and
aspects o f discourse structure" (Levinson, 1983:27); "Pragmatics, for a natural language, concerns 'illucutionary force', 'implicature', 'presupposition', and 'contextdependent acceptability'" (Gazdar, 1979: 2). 7 Often, of course, intensional definitions are augmented by a list, in order to better illustrate what it is we are dealing
with; and conversely, extensional definitions are given some tentative overall framework for those who do not have the insight to find the c o m m o n denominator. 8
A historical quest which is limited, for instance, to the search for a "study o f
indexical rules for relating linguistic form to a given context" seems a foolhardy
proposition due to the narrowness of such a definition - it simply does not cover
most o f the phenomena which are conceived as pragmatic. On the other hand, if the
search for pragmatics be led by definitions as general as "the study of the relations
o f signs to interpreters", or as "the science of language use" one could, almost a pri-

7 Recent encyclopedias and dictionaries of linguistics proffer similar definitions, many times quoting
past formulations. Thus, Bright (1992: 260) introduces the entry 'Pragmatics, implicature and presupposition' while quoting Morris, Carnap, Peirce and Stalnaker. Crystal (1991) begins his entry by describing pragmatics as "[a] term traditionally used to label one of the three major divisions of Semiotics ....
In modem linguistics it has come to be applied to the study of language from the point of view of the
users.' In like fashion, Malmkjaer (1991: 354) and Fraser (Asher, 1994: 3255) explicitly define pragmatics (respectively) as "the study of the rules and principles which govern language in use", and as
"the study of the system which underlies the ability of language users to interpret utterances". Notwithstanding these definitions being oriented to linguistics - as opposed to the philosophical perspective of
this article - they are, nevertheless, in general, a summation of a 'young' tradition. (But see fn. 8 for
Mey on the problem of definition.)
8 Mey (1993, 1994) addresses the problems I have encountered of intensional vs. extensional definitions, as did Levinson (1983). Both supply us with, literally, lists of definitions while analyzing the
advantages and shortcomings of all aspects. While Mey's perspective is scientifically linguistic ("Pragmatics is the science of language seen in relation to its users" (1993: 5)) it progresses, finally, to a definition which can serve a philosopher as well: "[P]ragmatics is the study of the conditions of human language uses as these are determined by the context of society" (ibid.: 42).

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459

ori, claim the existence of pragmatics in virtually any treatise that mentions language. 9 So, if we do need some intensional guideposts in order to localize ourselves,
we must find a characterization of pragmatics which is not too sophisticatedly narrow as to thwart any research, and not too generally diffuse to make that research
tautological.
Kasher (1977: 106) paraphrases, and enlarges on, Morris's and Carnap's definition of pragmatics, saying that "an investigation in the field of language study is
assigned to Pragmatics if reference is made in it, explicitly and essentially, to the
user of a language". The two words, explicitly and essentially, are the crucial element of the definition and that which makes it methodologically relevant and of
practical use for historical research. Analyzing historical texts, one may take these
elements - explicitness and essentiality - as adequacy criteria for labeling a concept,
a theory, an investigation or a philosopher pragmatic.

2.2. Criteria of necessity and adequacy

Explicitness seems to be the easier of the two to identify. Its importance lies in its
evidential function. The modern pragmaticist, honestly believing in the essentiality
of the user of a language, may be prone to identify such reference to a speaker or
hearer, even when this reference is implicit or simply not there. Yet the facility in
finding explicit mention of the speaker, when it is there, must put us on guard
against simply sliding into the pitfall of claiming pragmaticality for too many
philosophers or practitioners of language. Since language is seen by virtually all in
the linguistic-philosophical tradition as being a human artifact, reference to the language user may often be trivial, but not essential. In other words, explicitness is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for identifying pragmatics.
The other side of the coin, essentiality, is far more complex and profound.
Whereas explicitness is a matter of reading correctly, essentiality is a matter of interpreting (where correctness does not apply). Supposing a tract on language has made
explicit mention of the speaker (or hearer) - when may we say that this mention is
essential? When and how do we decide that the analysis of language which is being
interpreted construes the speaker as fundamental? Beyond the rare circumstance in
which the author or philosopher might explicitly talk of the essentiality of the
speaker, the answer lies in the claim that the analysis would change dramatically if
mention of the speaker were omitted. In other words, we must have recourse to further, practical guidelines which locate differences between analyses, thus establishing essentiality, and accordingly pragmaticality.
These guidelines, in order to pinpoint pragmaticality, must do more than indicate
a reading of a pragmatical 'atmosphere' of texts. A fruitful first step to take is to turn
to the extensional renderings of pragmatics - as representing the intensional under9 For instance, Charles Morris ascribes pragmatics to everyone who has done language philosophy
since pre-history. More recently,philosophers of language as variegatedas Davidson and Rorty (in a private communication)have attestedto the inherentpragmatics involvedin any discussion which sincerely
treats of the speaker of a language.

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standing above - and use them in the interpretative reading o f historical texts.
Instead o f sifting through the specific definitions mentioned above, we can rather
turn to the multifaceted list o f frequently cited concepts in modern pragmatics. A
tentative list would look like this: context, indexicals, communication, use, implicature, presupposition, speech act, convention, intention (and their affiliates). These
concepts are what pragmaticists talk about when they do pragmatics; in this context,
too, these concepts are considered essential to pragmatics. Yet the list should not be
viewed as an incidental gathering o f modern catchwords. Its essentiality resides in
the contribution o f its parts to a theory o f language use.l Such a theory exhibits
essentiality via its analysis, mention, or explicit discussion o f these concepts, by
relating them to a system of universal rules o f use.
The working hypothesis of a history o f pragmatics should then be that a philosophical or linguistic treatise on language which deals with these concepts (by these
or any other names) is essentially pragmatical. And just as modern philosophers do
not subscribe to a fixed, exhaustive, agreed upon list, so neither do we have to find
all o f the above in any one treatise of any historical period in question.ll Rather, the
list should be conceived as a cluster which points in the direction of pragmaticality;
and any philosopher who seriously addresses a number o f these concepts can be seen
as making essential reference to the user and hence be accepted into the circle o f
pragmatics. The criterion o f essentiality, via pragmatic concepts, is strong enough to
overshadow explicitness, for whereas explicit mention o f the user does not ensure
pragmaticality, a convincing essential treatment of user (by analysis o f context,
intention, speech acts, etc.) does so by presupposing the user.
It follows that the search for pragmatics should be guided by an attempt to interpret texts o f other times in the light of modern pragmatic catchwords. Looking at
philosophers, grammarians, rhetoricians, or any thinkers dealing with language in
other centuries it is, o f course, easy to get carried away and say that the overall
atmosphere of a certain text or treatise is pragmatical, meaning that it is similar in

l0 This remark is fraught with difficulties. Not coincidentally, different definitions of pragmatics turn
to this same list to buttress their respective theories; and, in fact, it is not quite clear that these concepts
are systematically used to illustrate their particular contribution to a particular theory. Thus, for instance,
Kasher and Lappin (1977: 34) define pragmatics as "the theoretical discipline which describes and
explains the systematic connections between sentences, their meaning, and the appropriate circumstances
of their utterance", but then noncommittally (and unsystematically, not to mention not essentially)
explain: "We shall now indicate several central subjects which are treated by pragmatics ..." (ibid.: 37).
Levinson (1983: 32), who emphasizes the problematics in defining pragmatics, caves in to a similar
extensionality. "... if one really wants to know what a particular field is concerned with ... one must simply observe what practitioners do. The rest of this book will largely be concerned with an overview of
some of the central tasks that pragmaticists wrestle with". The remaining chapters of his book do just
that; they elucidate the contemporary issues of deixis, conversational implicature, presupposition, speech
acts, and conversational structure. It follows that there is an implicit awareness of the essential contribution of the above list to a theory of pragmatics, but that the systematics of this contribution is hazy. I do
not pursue this point in detail, but note that for methodological (and consensual) reasons such a list is
conducive to the essentiality clause in Kasber's definition.
~ One must, however, be wary of using too few, or too obvious, concepts, on the penalty of finding
talk of communication, for instance, in any philosopher of language, without ensuring pragmaticality.

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461

some basic, yet amorphous, way to modem pragmatics. It is here that a 'definition'
such as Kasher's (of explicit and essential reference to user) becomes crucial, and
that its extensional parallels (catchwords) act as constraints. To be pragmatic in a
historical context is, therefore, to explicitly deal with context, or to explicitly analyze
speech as act, or to fundamentally treat of implicatures or presupposition as inherently important to language study, and so on.

3. S o m e case studies

The methodology outlined above instructs us to look for explicit and essential
referrals to the language user in the search for roots, precursors, predecessors, and
ancestors of positions which, being labeled 'pragmatic', are confined to the house of
modernity. Such a search is a historical enterprise harboring certain implications
which, in turn, concern its ends (or, alternatively, its futility). A number of (positive
and negative) examples of the ongoing search for roots of pragmatics in earlier centuries will serve, for the moment, to point to insights which will then be instrumental in answering the 'why' question posed above.
3.1. Early grammatical categories

Two contextual, i.e. historical, considerations lead specifically to the early grammar textbooks of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as potential candidates for
pragmatic awareness. First, a natural intuition says that the move from classical
Latin grammar to vernacular grammar may contain explicit mention of the vernacular speaker. Second, because of the confusion between logic, grammar and rhetoric
characteristic of those times, it behooves us to inspect grammarians vacillating
between logical and rhetorical leanings.
The textbooks of grammar of these centuries display a bewildering array of continuity and change, unity and diversity - all within a general constructive ambience
conserved since Quintilian. Indeed, the introductory definitions of grammar at first
seem promising, but in the end they prove disappointing. Perusing the literal definitions of grammar in the textbooks, and going on to the pedagogical debate on how
to teach grammar, one finds the word 'use' in various, multifarious quarters. An
optimistic researcher may, in taking explicitness to the extreme, pursue such occurrences in the hope of finding a theory of use. However, a more realistic interpretation of numerous,very similar definitions, leads to a dead end, since the use of 'use'
does not point to anything resembling a theory of use. There is neither an intention
of, nor a pretension at positing rules of use. The word 'use' is standardly, commonly
used with no commitment to the modem profundity we ascribe to it, but rather as a
synonym for 'exercise'.
Going beyond the generally uniform definitions, it is rather within the details of
grammar textbooks that one meets real diversity, and with it, some glimmerings of
pragmatics. One outstanding case is that of the relatively original, yet truly pragmatic treatment of the category of mood encountered in Richard Johnson's Gram-

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matical Commentaries of 1706. Johnson supplies a detailed and copious meta-discussion of all elements grammatical to be found in any contemporaneous grammarian (Biletzki, 1991). He poses the question of formal vs. other criteria of grammatical categories, thereafter dedicating over 80 pages to the analysis of mood. In
attacking the standard Lilyan grammar text, ~2he presents definitions of mood hauntingly reminiscent of modem speech act theory, with moods being construed as separate speech acts. Furthermore, and far more importantly, on a high theoretical level
Johnson satisfies the two methodological demands of explicitness and essentiality
posited above, for instance when he says: "It must therefore be understood at least,
that there is no necessity, that the Mood should be in the Word itself, ... it is not
requir'd that it should be in the Verb .... and so cannot be distinguished by that [termination] alone, but by the sense of the Sentence, or by the Context" (Johnson,
1706: 254). Nothing could be more explicit, yet to drive the matter of essentiality
home, Johnson adds: "He that understands when they may be used, together with
the use of the other Moods, knows as much as is requisite of this Matter" (ibid.:
278). An exceptionally long list of uses follows, as Johnson sets out to define, by
way of these uses, several different moods. This divergence from other grammars
may be viewed, prima facie, as a quantitative difference - but it is indeed the quantity (which was formerly absent) that leads to better explanations. The list is oriented
to action in speech and is seen to enrich the traditional 'semantics' of moods. Instead
of representing 'inclinations of the mind', as the Lilyan moods were explicated in the
standard way, moods stand for 'modes of predication' which are dependent on the
'occasions of mankind'. The meaning of moods becomes, then, a function of their
use, and their use, in turn, a function of context, circumstance, prior knowledge,
intention and attendant inference. An early eighteenth-century grammarian does
pragmatics.
3.2. The debate about rhetoric

Moving on to rhetoric - textbooks of which were no less bountiful in those eras we must tread more warily, for rhetoric involves pragmatics almost by definition, as
it recognizes explicitly and essentially the speaker, the hearer, and the context of
(specific) discourses. Indeed, it becomes mandatory to ask of the gain obtained by
turning to pragmatic ideas (or terminology, or theory) instead of to (merely) rhetorical ones. My example will be used to present one such profitable endeavor - the turn
to pragmatics as touching off advances in the theory of interpretation.
There is, in current literature, a basic dissent among interpreters of the rhetoric of
the English renaissance, representatives of the respective sides of the debate being
Howell (1956, 1971) and Vickers (1970, 1981). The dispute hinges on the relative
importance and significance of the classical parts of rhetoric. While Howell is intent
on locating a (positive) trend, from the classical, stylistically extravagant rhetorics of
~2 Lily's Grammar was actually the accumulated work of more than one author - mainly Colet and
Lily. Originally published in 1510, it underwent various changes and editions. In 1540 it was officially
authorized as the official grammar in the schools by royal induction.

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463

the sixteenth century to the empirical and rationalistic ones of the late seventeenth
century, Vickers insists on the centrality of the theory of style - elocutio - in all its
subtlety and functionality during the same centuries. The question, then, is: was
English renaissance rhetoric a view on 'form and content' born of questions about
language and influenced by the approach of science and rationalism (as Howell
would have it), or was it a literary theory having to do with the intricacies of style as
the be-all and end-all of the efficacy of language (as Vickers claims)?
My proposal is to view these two opposing rhetorical strands as participating in a
pragmatic view of language. It then remains to show that English renaissance
rhetoricians were pragmatic in the sense that they upheld both these views consistently. Checking the issue through pragmatic lenses thus leads to an enlightening
synthesis attested to by the texts on rhetoric themselves: a theory of rhetoric cognizant of rationality as motivating the use of language (~ la Howell) does indeed lie
at the basis of the intricacies of style so prevalent in the texts (as Vickers insists).
Two pragmatic insights stand out in particular: style and specific figures of speech
as a functional, purposive enterprise (as seen in the works of Peacham, 1577;
Hoskins, 1599, and Puttenham, 1589), meshing well with the constitutive purpose or
goal afforded to speech acts; and the flexibility of figures of speech as integral to a
view of language which recognizes its inherent context-dependency. Only by using
a pragmatic framework can one offer an explication of the seemingly paradoxical
tension between a generalizing, rule-governed basis for rhetoric and a viewpoint
located in the specificities of particular styles, both of which are explicitly present in
the rhetoric texts. But it is, indeed, the forte of pragmatics that it can account for the
vagaries of specific contexts by using rules of rational speech-action. Though usually
not explicitly presented by rhetoricians of the past as a theoretical framework, their
rhetorical 'theory' is deserving of the label of pragmatics in no trivial sense. It is in
Thomas Wilson's very early Art of Rhetorique (1553) that we come upon one of the
rare explicit expositions of the essentiality of context: "Not onely it is necessarie to
knowe, what maner of cause wee have taken in hande, when we firste enter upon any
matter, but also it is wise done to consider the tyme, the place, the man for whom we
speake, the man against whome we speake, the matter whereof we speake, and the
judges before whome we speak, the reasons that best serve to further our cause, and
those reasons also, that maie seine somewhat to hynder our cause, and in no wise to
use any such at all, or els warely to mitigate by protestacion, the aiall that is in them,
and alwaies to use what soever can be saied, to wynne the chief hearers good willes,
and perswade theim to our purpose" (ibid.: 21). Nowhere has a more pragmatical
introduction been given to rhetoric.
3.3. A pragmatic philosopher of language

Searching through textbooks of grammar and rhetoric is a decoding enterprise: we

pretend to discover the grammarian's or rhetorician's thoughts on language through
his words on grammar and rhetoric. Philosophy is more conducive to our research,
for we may ask the explicit question about a philosopher: What has he to say about
language? A fascinating case is that of Thomas Hobbes, father of political science,

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and a virulent philosopher with positions of significance on several other subjects,

and in particular marking off a pivotal viewpoint on speech. The secondary, interpretive work undertaken by academia on Hobbes's philosophy (dare we say theory?)
of language is tantalizing in its extremes, for it moves from those who characterize
him as providing an original speech theory to those who claim he has no consistent
position regarding language. 13 A historical reading of Hobbes, from the early Human
Nature, through the Leviathan, and on to the "most complete and definitive statement" (Hungerland and Vick, 1973: 459) of language, found in De Corpore, presents a philosophical development of the constructs of language and speech. His
writings exhibit an awareness of the difference between speech, which is a function
of use, and language, which is a structure consisting of names and propositions. A
nominal semantics (termed by others 'referential' and 'ideational'), while exhibiting
the seeds of a formal and rigorous presentation, when read in a larger context, is seen
to be only a part of his language theory, which encompasses a far more comprehensive view of language and speech (sharply delineated) than hitherto recognized) 4 It
is the focus on the latter (rarely present in the secondary literature) that unearthes a
pragmatic philosophy; one which is not only not at odds with his well-recognized
nominalism but indeed goes well beyond it. One must then reformulate Hobbes's
philosophy of language in pragmatic terms and, in fact, posit this 'pragmatics' as his
definitive theory of language. Although it appears in his early works (esp. chapter 5
and 13 in Human Nature), the systematic presentation of a virtual 'theory of use' can
provide an overall grounding for his later, more scientifically oriented, semantics.
A direct consequence of such a novel analysis of Hobbes's intricate discussion on
speech and language is the ascription to Hobbes of a theory of meaning which
encompasses the meaning of moral and political terms) 5 The somewhat enigmatic
proposal, well recognized, but rarely explicated before the advent of pragmatics, that
the sovereign fixes the meaning of words can now be better understood by use of the
performative intuition; i.e. that the sovereign, while legislating, endows terms with
meaning. This elegant analysis now supplies a lever with which to newly approach
Hobbes's moral and political philosophy) 6 One can, and should, furthermore deal
more directly with the implications of pragmatics for his writings on rhetoric; these
arise both in his direct treatment of rhetoric as an independent subject, and in his
stance towards, and use of, rhetoric in his political writings. Rhetoric is, in fact, one
of the stepping stones which enable Hobbes to make the explicit move to politics, as

13 See, e.g., Hungerland and Vick (1973), Hacking (1975).

~4 Analysesof Hobbes's theory of language are rather sparse, but a representative list of the past few
decades would, conceivably, begin with Martin (1953/54) and Krook (1956) and advance up to De
Jong(1990).
J5 This perspective on Hobbesian moral concepts has been with us for several years, see, e.g., Parry
(1967), Weiler (1970), Von Leyden (1973), Bertman (1978).
16 On the direct relationship between Hobbes's theory of language and his politics, see Bertman (1988).
Also of notice, concerning pragmatics in Hobbes's thought on language, is Isermann (1991). Isermann
sees pragmatics as one of the elements of Hobbes's philosophy (along with cognition, semantics, definition, truth, nominalism, and others), and devotes entire chapters to the practical-political dimension of
language, to language and communication, and to performative language in the state of nature.

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465

are his interpretations of religious language and his use of the narrative of the state
of nature. In all these discussions, pragmatics opens up options of a fascinating,
more comprehensive, analysis of Hobbes's philosophy, far beyond his (supposedly)
delimited philosophy of language.

4. Why do a history of pragmatics?

Why is it at all enlightening or explanatory or important to find pragmatics in
thought about language in past centuries? I will tackle these three questions - about
enlightenment, explanation and importance - in succession.
4.1. Enlightenment (or: understanding the past)

Three points come to mind. First, if we are bent on convincingly relating the content of language study in past centuries - what people had to say about language to modem pragmatics, then if these thinkers did say something of a pragmatic
nature, any account which does not report these elements and turns is missing the
point. Notice the terms 'relating' and 'account'. If what is needed is a historical
description of the treatises about language in the past, and if it is required that this
description be true to the texts, then the lack of recognition of pragmatic details may
simply 'misinform' the historian. But we are dealing here with the history of ideas what is being recounted is not just a historical tale - and a 'relating' of what was said
about language must be checked under the rubric of understanding. It then becomes
crucial that a real understanding of language study take into consideration, and
report on, pragmatic elements (if these indeed are present). A case in point is that of
Richard Johnson: understanding his 'animadversions' involves, in principle, taking
account of his theory of moods as a theory of language use.
Second, and far more importantly, in order to understand historical views on language in their times, one may profitably turn to pragmatics. That is, one will be better enabled to point to changes in the understanding of language, in the conceptions
of the relations between thought and language, in the analysis of man, in the status
of language in philosophy, etc. The presence (or absence) of pragmatic awareness, or
the explicit pragmatical renderings of these thoughts, or the weakness or strength of
the pragmatical element in such discussions, can all be utilized in the explanation of
historical developments. This point is illustrated convincingly by the story of
rhetoric in post-renaissance England, which is given a developmental dimension (in
the move from classical elocutio to a rationalistic science of speech) through adoption of pragmatical terminology.
The third point which arises is our use of pragmatics to solve our problems of
understanding in dealing with older texts, or problems of understanding which we
think the writers of those texts may have had. These are the question marks, contradictions, and even dead ends which have been numerous in the analyses of past
thought and older treatises. Such existing question marks and dead ends are arrived
at either because the philosopher in question found himself up against insurmount-

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able philosophical or linguistic problems, or because our tools of analysis thus far
have not allowed us to account for what appeared to be his solutions to the problems.
In other words, the dead end may be his as well as our own. Both situations are
amenable to an attempt at a renewed deciphering, using pragmatics, and the results
may be manifold. We may find that former ignorance of, or inattention to, that
writer's pragmatic emphasis was the cause of our question mark; we may discover
that using pragmatic tools, we can better explain the reason for his question mark; or
we may hypothesize that, perhaps, through lack of such tools he did indeed come to
a dead end. Or again, we may realize that full recognition of pragmatic elements in
those writings (even if the original writer did not recognize them as such) leads the
way to a different, perchance better, understanding of what he had been saying. (This
is actually a point of convergence with the first point made above.) Pragmatics, then,
can be perceived as a recourse to better understanding and problem solving with
regard to these texts. Nowhere is such added value more prominent than in the case
of Hobbesian scholarship. The apparent double-edged analysis of his works, moving
in the seemingly opposite directions of science and politics, can be synthesized
mediating his views on language. These make sense, concerning both Hobbes the
scientist and Hobbes the politician, when seen through pragmatical, linguistic
glasses.
4.2. Pragmatic explanation ?

What can the discovery of pragmatics (or the discovery of its absence) contribute
to the current debates surrounding pragmatic theories and constructs? 17 When using
pragmatics for the analysis of texts we are actually putting our m o d e m theories and
concepts of pragmatics to the test. It is, however, quite difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the criteria for failing or passing the test. Our theoretical framework aims
at better explaining those texts, and it is hard to see at what point we may say that
our explanation is indeed better. If we have used pragmatics to pull us out of a dead
end and have succeeded in our endeavor, then we may surely claim some practical
value (of pragmatic terms) for explanatory purposes. But most cases are not so clearcut - and so we land again at the question of 'better understanding'. The fruitful
re-examination of older texts in a new light is of value per se, and our ability to make
pragmatic terms relevant to the study of language in other times is sufficient justification and exoneration. There is an intrinsic value in a fresh analysis of some text
(which was hitherto unclear, or whose interpretation perhaps even seemed misguided), in that such an analysis yields results of a productive nature when questions
asked in that same text are apprehended as pragmatic questions. Quite clearly, this is
a contribution to the history of ideas, or the history of linguistics or philosophy. Our

~7 Again,there is the purely historical interest one may have - especially in something that is currently
popular. Just as books are sprouting up in the history of semiotics, semantics, linguistics - so it is reasonable to expect that, on reaching the heyday of pragmatics, we should be engaged in the history of
pragmatics. The question is one of value rather than of interest - and in that sense it deserves an honest,
deeper - not just an ad hoc - answer.

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467

present challenge, however, is directed at the proposal of 'pragmatics as a true theory' and to the claim that delving into texts, using pragmatics, can do something for
the present state (rather than status) of the art (of pragmatics). My answer, at this
point, can be no more than an intuitive hint.
Emphases, contexts, and stylistic disciplines are no mean matter. We turn to older
thinkers' weaknesses in order to strengthen our own. But we can tum to their
strengths for the same purpose. In places where their emphases were different from
ours, in disciplines where they dwelled while we have dawdled, in contexts which
they revered and which we virtually ignore - we can begin the search for new things
to say about pragmatics. Thus, for instance, our theories of persuasion (now
addressed by modern pragmaticists) stand to learn from the full-blown rhetorical theories of other times; our efforts at explaining linguistic categories such as mood
(now influenced by pragmatic theories) may be enriched by the intricacies of past
grammatical efforts.
Finally, the discovery or interpretation of pragmatic content in past thinkers must
lead to queries concerning the overall status of pragmatics in linguistic and philosophical study. But this becomes the question of importance, actually a meta-question, as presented above.

4.3. History as meta-pragmatics

Extreme positions on the issue of language (talking animals and talking machines)
notwithstanding, it is a safe philosophical bet to assume that one essential trait of
man is his possession of language; thus the question of language is lent a legitimate,
perennial nature.
Saying 'the question of language' amounts, in this context, to more than the leading question 'What is language?'; the additions being questions of thought, of meaning, of truth, of language use, of communication, of mutual human understanding.
Pragmatics claims that sufficient answers, or essential answers, to these questions
cannot be secured unless one takes into account pragmatic factors. So this is really
the meta-theory of pragmatics. It is the same meta-question that any philosopher of
language must answer if he is to be regarded as addressing a perennial question.
Consequently, he who undertakes to point out pragmatical considerations in texts
of all times - whether such considerations be explicit or implicit, conscious or
unconscious, of a theoretical or practical nature - is rephrasing the perennial question in the following way: Is pragmatics necessary for the essential analysis of language? Can it provide satisfactory tools for undoing the conundrums and untying the
puzzles which the philosopher of language faces? Is it explanatory in the sense of
supplying a theory of language use under which we can subsume phenomena hitherto unexplained? Seen in this light, the search for pragmatics in other times is of
value to the philosopher of language and is justified via the external issue of language at large.
A new question now crops up which has been thus far ignored. Do the evidential
results of historical research contribute to this meta-question, or are they relevant
only on their own research levels? That is, what is the theoretical effect of different

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A. Biletzki /Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470

returns to the above questions: discovery o f obvious pragmatical elements in some

writing vs. lack o f such elements, and productive use o f pragmatic tools for analysis vs. texts that do not lend themselves to such analysis? M y assertion here is that
even though, superficially speaking, the different results will lead to varieties o f
y e s - n o answers on the research level ( ' Y e s - Hobbes was a pragmaticist', ' N o there is no way o f analyzing Bacon in a pragmatic light'), they will affect the metaquestion of the status o f pragmatics in a far more complicated, intricate, and interesting manner.
If pragmatics can be found in former times, and if texts o f other centuries are analyzed productively with the aid o f pragmatics, then we m a y trivially state that pragmatics, at least thus far, has been useful by providing an illustrative, even essential,
viewpoint on language. However, the converse does not hold. The fact that pragmatics is absent in texts o f the past does not undermine its use or its usefulness in
language analysis. Rather, we must at this point try to explain this lack and perhaps
even show that the want o f pragmatic tools was the cause of the lacunae and shortcomings that we observed on the part of language philosophers o f former centuries.
This sort o f contention is not easily upheld, and its defense is beset with theoretical
difficulties. Nevertheless, it does provide a point o f departure for discussions on the
current status o f pragmatics.
It has b e c o m e obvious, in the course o f the last paragraph, that an answer to the
meta-question o f the importance of pragmatics in the philosophy o f language
depends on the results o f the research on pragmatics in other eras, even though it is
not straightforwardly determined by them. So, in any case, such substantive research
should be carried out before we can attempt to deal with its presumed philosophical
repercussions. And, if we do meet predominantly negative evidence, we can then
proceed to a different, more troublesome, question - w h y is there no 'real' history o f
pragmatics?

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