SANTOS, SALYMAR V

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
1. Read Constitution, Article III, Section 4; Article 18 (1) : Freedom of Expression
Revised Penal Code, Articles 353 and 358
ART III: Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.cralaw
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.cralaw
Revised Penal Code, Articles 353 and 358
ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
ART. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccional in its
minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos.
2. Read any textbook on Freedom of Expression.
Guide questions: (Try to look for answers to these questions in the textbook and in the assigned cases)
*NOTEBOOK*

Assigned cases:
25. Review PBM Employees Organization vs. PBM Co. Inc. 51 SCRA 189 (1973) on freedom of expression and assembly
and preferred position of these freedoms. What right(s) did Freedom of Expression and Assembly prevailed?
Issue: Whether or not the Government can curtail the Freedom of Expression of the people and when exercise of
rights conflict with one another, what right has preference over the other for the State to uphold.
Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles underlying a democracy.In a democracy, the preservation
and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of
our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his
thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles." The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts..."
Same; Same.The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more
than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the
liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
Same; Same.The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that
he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property
and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by
the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
1

shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchspolitical, economic or
otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position.In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the
rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such "priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than property rights disclosed.The superiority of these
freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means
employed by the law and its object or purposethat the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressivewould
suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of
human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely, existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Barredo in
Gonzales vs. Comelec, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of
speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed
against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interest test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable
danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration against police abuses did not violate CBA "no-strike nolockout" provision.Tested against the foregoing principles, the conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations that the
petitioners by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on March
4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm. Said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of
their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the
Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect employees against police abuses.As a matter of fact, it was the
duty of herein respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest of herein respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees,
so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of collective bargaining agreement.As heretofore
stated, the primacy of human rightsfreedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boonat once the shield and
armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilizationbecomes
Our Duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence
of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of
free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been enjoined by any court.The mass demonstration staged by
the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching
upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those belonging to a particular shift may join demonstration.The
respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order that loss or
damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by
a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum persuasive force that will gain for them not only public sympathy for the validity of their
cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they
raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by onethird, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. ... At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements
to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this
case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day shift employees who will join the demonstration. ... There was a lack
of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request... And to regard as a ground for
dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of
the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join demonstration against police abuse guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration
against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No.
875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concerted activities for xxx mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three." xxx The insistence
on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore state, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
Evidence; Lack of finding the company did not suffer any loss means not such loss was sustained.While the respondent
Court found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the said court
did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only means that
the firm did not sustain any loss or damage.
Constitutional and Political Law; Labor Law; Dismissal from work of leaders of demonstration against police abuses
constitutes denial of social justice. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor xxx". Respondent Court as
an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor
of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional
patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate
the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate that said court failed to implement this policy.xxx
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void.Having violated the basic
human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued
in the instant case are a nullity.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot prevail over basic constitutional rights.Does the
mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees for their
reinstatement? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules
of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the
basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations,
but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
court procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Same.It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against
them and in their defense to the said charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by
the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a CIR rule which impinges on such human rights.
Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has inherent
power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice requires."
Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that "Under this
authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice..." If we can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution
renders more imperative the suspension of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the CIR rules
with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR charter, which enjoins the Court of
Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms." [Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA
189(1973)]
26. Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzalez, 545 SCRA 441, [G.R. No. 168338] (Feb. 15, 2008)
What government action was assailed by Chavez as violative of the freedom of expression? What was the content of the act
sought to be prevented? What are content-based and content-neutral regulations? Was the law constitutive of prior restraint?
What test was used in determining whether the act of the government did not violate freedom of expression?
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice and NTC can warn media from playing a content-based restriction.

27. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 181 SCRA 529, [G.R. No. 90878] (Jan. 29, 1990)
What did the Comelec prohibit? Was it an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression? Why? Did the law pass
the test of overbreadth and vagueness? Was it an appropriate test for restrictions on free speech?
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec Resolution prohibiting columnists and announcers from using their columns ad
radio time to campaign for or against the issues in the plebiscite for the Organic Act for Cordilleras except through the
Comelec time and space.
Election Law; Political Law; Police Power; Prohibition regarding certain forms of election propaganda is a valid exercise of
police power of the state to prevent perversion and prostitution of the electoral process.In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec,
L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We
ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state to prevent the perversion and prostitution
of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws. The evil sought to be prevented in an election
which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special
political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the
electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Same; Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 prohibiting columnists, commentators or announcers from using their columns
to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues is a restriction of freedom of expression.Anent Respondent Comelecs
argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views
and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/ or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioners
freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Same; Same; Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is void and unconstitutional.Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The peoples right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times. Accordingly, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is
declared null and void and unconstitutional. [Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, 181 SCRA 529(1990)]
28. Osmena vs. Comelec, 288 SCRA 447 [G.R. No. 132231] (March 31, 1998)
What law was questioned in this case? What specific provision in the law? What were the arguments of the petitioners
in assailing the provision of the law? Did the law comply with the overbreadh and vagueness tests? Was the provision
assailed content-neutral or content-based? The case cited United States vs. O Brien. What was discussed in the O
Brien case? Was the Clear and Present danger test appropriate in resolving the issue in this case?
Issue: Whether or not Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646, which prohibited any person making use of the media to sell or to
give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other purposes, except to the Comelec, was valid.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Expression; Political Ad Ban; Words and Phrases; The term political ad ban,
when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleadingthere is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of
the time and manner of advertising.The term political ad ban, when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is
misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the
COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads
but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The validity of regulations of time, place and manner, under well-defined standards, is well-nigh
beyond question.On the other hand, the validity of regulations of time, place and manner, under well-defined standards, is
well-nigh beyond question. What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise
freely in the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give all candidates
equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the mass media skews the political process and
subverts democratic self-government.These decisions come down to this: the State can prohibit campaigning outside a
certain period as well as campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the mass
media skews the political process and subverts democratic self-government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by
certain candidates because of the views expressed in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any
compelling reason.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory, and any restriction on speech is only incidental, no more
than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political

advertising.The main purpose of 11(b)is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is
necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The
restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The notion that the government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative
voice of others may be foreign to the American Constitution but it is not to the Philippine Constitution, being in fact an
animating principle of that document.But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a
limit on campaign expenditure on the theory that money is speech. Do those who endorse the view that government may not
restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others also think that the campaign expenditure limitation
found in our election laws is unconstitutional? How about the principle of one person, one vote, is this not based on the
political equality of voters? Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as the voice of the peopleeven of God. The notion that
the government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others may be foreign to the
American Constitution. It is not to the Philippine Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of that document.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Well-settled is the rule that the choice of remedies for an admitted social
malady requiring government action belongs to Congress, and the remedy prescribed by it, unless clearly shown to be
repugnant to fundamental law, must be respected.It is finally argued that COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time are
ineffectual. It is claimed that people hardly read or watch or listen to them. Again, this is a factual assertion without any
empirical basis to support it. What is more, it is an assertion concerning the adequacy or necessity of the law which should be
addressed to Congress. Well-settled is the rule that the choice of remedies for an admitted social malady requiring government
action belongs to Congress. The remedy prescribed by it, unless clearly shown to be repugnant to fundamental law, must be
respected. As shown in this case, 11(b) of R.A. 6646 is a permissible restriction on the freedom of speech, of expression and of
the press.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The validity of a law cannot be made to depend on the faithful compliance of those charged
with its enforcement but by appropriate constitutional provisions.To be sure, this Court did not hold in PPI v. COMELEC that
it should not procure newspaper space for allocation to candidates. What it ruled is that the COMELEC cannot procure print
space without paying just compensation. Whether by its manifestation the COMELEC meant it is not going to buy print space
or only that it will not require newspapers to donate free of charge print space is not clear from the manifestation. It is to be
presumed that the COMELEC, in accordance with its mandate under 11(b)of R.A. No. 6646 and 90 of the Omnibus Election
Code, will procure print space for allocation to candidates, paying just compensation to newspapers providing print space. In
any event, the validity of a law cannot be made to depend on the faithful compliance of those charged with its enforcement but
by appropriate constitutional provisions. There is a remedy for such lapse if it should happen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions.In Adiong v. COMELEC this Court quoted the following from
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting of
campaign signs on public property: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent,
466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984]) This test was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien. It is an
appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like 11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are
not imposed because of the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are tests demanding standards.
For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from
campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster
under strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of
constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Content-neutral regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them,
and a deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity.It is apparent that these doctrines have no application
to content-neutral regulations which, like 11(b), are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need
only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Test; The clear-and-present-danger test is not a sovereign remedy for all
free speech problemsit is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws which are not concerned
with the content of political ads but only with their incidents.Justice Panganibans dissent invokes the clear-and-presentdanger test and argues that media ads do not partake of the real substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent and that
justifies the curtailment of the peoples cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access to information. The
clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a
thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free
speech cases. For the criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty
conspiracy or attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clearand-presentdanger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular
hammer is all that is needed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of
communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns.The
reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions distort
public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular
speech. No such reasons underlie contentneutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the OBrien test in this case, we find that 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information for the purpose
of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of
speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose
of promoting equality. [Osmea vs. Commission on Elections, 288 SCRA 447(1998)]
29. Lagunzad vs. Sotto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 [No. L-32066] (April 6, 1979)
What exhibition was sought to be prevented? Why? Did the court grant the petition? Why? Did it constitute prior
restraint? What is another term for prior restraint?
Judgment; Finality of Judment; Order for an accounting in a judgment does not affect its finality.Where there is complete
adjudication and determination of the rights and obligations of the parties, as in the instant case, an order for accounting in
that judgment does not affect its final character, said accounting being merely incidental to the judgment.
Property; Privilege and rights to protect memory of dead is also for the benefit of the living; Rights to publish a book does not
dispense with consent required to portray episodes in deceaseds life with that of deceaseds heirs.While it is true that
petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled The Moises Padilla Story, that did not dispense with the need for
prior consent and authority from the deceaseds heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceaseds life and in that of his
mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a
deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased.
Same; Right to privacy is subject to protection.Petitioners averment that private respondent did not have any property right
over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not
automatically destroy in toto a persons right to privacy. The right to invade a persons privacy to disseminate public
information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may
be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
Contracts; Duties must comply with contracts entered into where provisions thereof are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public orders or public policy.It is necessary to distinguish between real duress and the motive which is present
when one gives his consent reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it against his own wish
and desires, or even against his better judgment. In legal effect, there is no difference between a contract wherein one of the
contracting parties exchanges one condition for another because he looks for greater profit or gain by reason of such change,
and an agreement wherein one of the contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either case, he
makes a choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing Agreement has the force of law between
the contracting parties and since its provisions are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner should comply with it in good faith.
Constitutional law; Freedom of speech and of the press; These freedoms are limited by the clear and present danger rule and
the balancing-of-interests test.Neither do we find merit in peti-tioners contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes
on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right
to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression,
indeed, occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without limitations. x x x The
prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, in the
balancing-of-interests test. That principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interest observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Same; Same; Same; The limits of the freedom of speech and press are reached when it touches on matters of private concern.
The interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and
considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity such agreement will
have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters
of essentially private concern. [Lagunzad vs. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476(1979)]

30. SWS vs. Comelec, 357 SCRA 496, [G.R. NO. 147571 (May 5, 2011)
What provision in the law was questioned to be violative of the freedom of expression? Why? What was sought to be
done by the questioned provision in the law? What were the arguments of the petitioners? How did the court rule on
the petition? Why?
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and Press; Section 5.4 of Republic Act 9006 (Fair Election Act) lays a prior restraint on
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.To be sure, 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and
the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen
(15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the preferred status
of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of
invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. . . . The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such
restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
Same; Same; There is no basis for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) claim that this petition for prohibition is
inappropriate; Prohibition has been found appropriate for testing the constitutionality of various election laws, rules, and
regulations.On the other hand, the COMELEC contends that under Art. IX-A, 7 of the Constitution, its decisions, orders, or
resolutions may be reviewed by this Court only by certiorari. The flaws in this argument is that it assumes that its Resolution
3636, dated March 1, 2001 is a decision, order, or resolution within the meaning of Art. IX-A, 7. Indeed, counsel for
COMELEC maintains that Resolution 3636 was rendered by the Commission. However, the Resolution does not purport to
adjudicate the right of any party. It is not an exercise by the COMELEC of its adjudicatory power to settle the claims of parties.
To the contrary, Resolution 3636 clearly states that it is promulgated to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 9006. Hence,
there is no basis for the COMELECs claim that this petition for prohibition is inappropriate. Prohibition has been found
appropriate for testing the constitutionality of various election laws, rules, and regulations.
MELO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and Press; The prohibition against surveys within the specified period is a prior and
unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of expression.To reiterate, the prohibition against surveys within the specified
period is a prior and unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of expression which is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
purpose of clean, honest, orderly and peaceful elections. For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition for prohibition
and to declare Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 unconstitutional. [Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 357
SCRA 496(2001)]
31. National Press Club vs. Comelec, 207 SCRA 1 [G.R. No. 102925] (March 5, 1992)
What law or regulation was assailed by the NPC as against the freedom of expression? How was the doctrine in the O
Brien case applied? How did the court rule in this case?
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; The Constitution has expressly authorized the Comelec to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information.The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental
purpose of such supervision or regulation has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities,
in connection with public information campaigns and forums among candidates.
Same; Same; Same; Rule applicable is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that a party asserting its
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.The technical effect of
Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of
supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among
candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech
and free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such
accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored onethat a statute is presumed to be
constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly
proving that assertion.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.Firstly, Section 11 (b) is
limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution,
Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the
Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from
12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates
themselves.Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates
themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in
Article IX (C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio

and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. [National
Press Club vs. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 1(1992)]
32. Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529 [G.R. No. 119673] (July 26, 1996)
Concentrate only on freedom of expression. Do not touch on freedom of religion. What agency of government was
questioned in this case? Why? Did the act constitute a prior restraint? What test was applied?
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; P.D. 1986 gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television
programs.The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television programs. By the clear terms of
the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x
x x television programs x x x. The law also directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard to
determine those which are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of
violence or of a wrong or crime.
Same; Same; Freedom of religion is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good.We reject petitioners submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage
towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws,
past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. We have also laboriously defined in our
jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and worship.
Same; Same; The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantial evil which the State is duty bound to prevent.We thus reject petitioners postulate that its
religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings
it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates
the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding
interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
Same; Same; Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed
brows.Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious
speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed
brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Ruling of respondent court clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion.The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking other
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits A, A-1, B, C, and D will
show that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under Section
3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion.
Same; Same; The ground attack against another religion was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules.The
respondents cannot also rely on the ground attacks against another religion in x-rating the religious program of petitioner.
Even a sideglance at Section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the
broadcast of petitioners television program. The ground attack against another religion was merely added by the
respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and
regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
Same; Same; Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.The records show that the
decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify
the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
PADILLA, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; There can be no prior restraints on the exercise of free speech, expression or
religion.It should by now be undisputably recognized and firmly rooted in this country that there can be no prior restraints
on the exercise of free speech, expression or religion, unless such exercise poses a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right and even the duty to prevent. The ban against such prior restraints will result, as it has

resulted in the past, in occasional abuses of free speech and expression but it is immeasurably preferable to experience such
occasional abuses of speech and expression than to arm a governmental administrative agency with the authority to censor
speech and expression in accordance with legislative standards which albeit apparently laudable in their nature, can very well
be bent or stretched by such agency to convenient latitudes as to frustrate and eviscerate the precious freedoms of speech and
expression.
MELO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; Any prior restriction upon a religious expression would be a restriction on the right
of religion.The enjoyment of the freedom of religion is always coupled with the freedom of expression. For the profession of
faith inevitably carries with it, as a necessary appendage, the prerogative of propagation. The constitutional guaranty of free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship thus denotes the right to disseminate religious information
(American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 [1957]). Any prior restriction upon a religious expression would be a
restriction on the right of religion.
Same; Same; The State can exercise no power to restrict such right until the exercise thereof traverses the point that will
endanger the order of civil society.Freedom of religion and expression is the rule and its restriction, the exception. Any prior
restriction on the exercise of the freedom to profess religious faith and the propagation thereof will unduly diminish that
religions authority to spread what it believes to be the sacred truth. The State can exercise no power to restrict such right
until the exercise thereof traverses the point that will endanger the order of civil society. [Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals,
259 SCRA 529(1996)]
33. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan. 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
What right or rights did the respondent invoke in this case? How did the court discuss the different tests for a valid
government interference? The case mentioned visible tendency rule. What was this?
Courts; Attorneys; Contempt; Disbarment; Authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the Count and members of
the bar.We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the
Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys.
The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Courts constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law,
which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper
administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent
power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including
lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court The power to punish for contempt is
necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice [it] is not
dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Two inherent powers of the Court Power to punish for contempt, and power to discipline attorneys;
explained.There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here, the
Courts inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and nonlawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a
lawyer, however, the Supreme Courts disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct
with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not
exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is but corollary to the Courts exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also
an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious
conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time in the
exercise of its inherent power to discipline attorneys; Case at bar.It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power
to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended
party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some
members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little
later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass
on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due
process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the IBP or to the Solicitor General, not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court; Reasons; Case at bar.It should not
be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would
prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court

that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the
Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to
the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to
the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 138-B of the Revised Rules of Court,
especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts
in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he
did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in
the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and
the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court in gross disrepute and to cause
public scorn for and distrust in the judicial institution of the Republic; Case at bar.A second charge that respondent Gonzalez
hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have improperly pressured him to render decisions favorable to
their colleagues and friends, including dismissal of cases against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly
deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3)
members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) will show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend
otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This
charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first
accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who
had, with great fortitude, resisted pressure from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made
by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and
distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondents statement that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting rich and powerful
persons are suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the
Court was preventing him from prosecuting rich and powerful persons, that the Court was in effect discriminating between
the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing rich and powerful accused
persons to go scot-free while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation
can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred
against the Supreme Court, it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; There is no denial of procedural due process where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings is accorded.Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly dismissed
judges without rhyme or reason and disbarred lawyers without due process. The Court notes that this last attack is not
without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was
trying to paint of the Court is that of an unjudicial institution able and willing to render clearly erroneous decisions by way
of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law.
Once again, the purport of respondents attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the peoples faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later identified in
one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity
to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for
and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the
judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a
constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, that the essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense.
To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court, one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is compelled to hold that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for its exercise of disciplinary authority; Reasons.Considering the kinds of statements of
lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of
disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondents statements,
especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions,
necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That respondents
baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of
a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the
centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision
as an act of reprisal against the respondent.

10

Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and Expression; All constitutional freedoms, not absolute
and freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests.Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him
that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for
a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.Respondent Gonzalez also defends
himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for
Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19
May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding
of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are
concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his
much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed
resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress.
What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme
Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will
surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence
of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high
level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government. [Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez, 166 SCRA
316(1988)]
34. Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 351, [G.R. No.159751] (Dec. 6, 2006)
What is obscenity? What is the test of obscenity? What happened in this case? Who should determine when obscenity
should be curtailed?
Criminal Law; Obscenity; As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing
its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation
or limitation.As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or
limitation. One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that (a)
the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such
materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
Same; Same; The court defined obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy.Almost a century
has passed since the Court first attempted to define obscenity in People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352 (1923). There the Court
defined obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence of
obscenity is, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test
according to Kottinger is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. But, Kottinger hastened
to say that whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the
question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.
Same; Same; No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict
or describe patently offensive hard core sexual conduct.There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the latest word is
that of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person,
applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious
misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is patently offensive.
No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe
patently offensive hard core sexual conduct. Examples included (a) patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper
for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound discretion.

11

Same; Same; The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials
to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public.We emphasize that
mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article
201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any
of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person be caught in
the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale,
displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene
materials. [Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 351(2006)]
35. United States vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352 [No. 20569] (Oct. 29, 1923)
What happened to Kottinger? What was his business? What was he charged of? How did the court define obscene and
obscenity/ What is the test to determine whether something is obscene?
1.PICTURES, WHETHER OBSCENE OR INDECENT; SECTION 12 OF THE PHILIPPINE LIBEL LAW CONSTRUED; "OR OTHER
MATTER," MEANING OF.Section 12 of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, provides punishment, among other things, for
any person who keeps for sale, or exhibits, any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book or other matter. The phrase in the law
"or other-matter," was apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." While limited to that which is of the same kind as its
antecedent, it is intended to cover kindred subjects. The rule of ejusdem generis is by no means a rule of universal application
and should be made to carry out, not to defeat, the legislative intent.
2.ID.; ID.; "OBSCENITY" DEFINED.The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something
offensive to chastity; decency, or delicacy.
3.ID.; ID.; "INDECENCY" DEFINED.Indecency is an act against good behaviour and a just delicacy.
4.ID.; ID.; TEST OF OBSCENITY.The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular publication or
other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other
article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of
men as an indecency.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.Laws penalizing obscenity are made for society in the aggregate and not in particular. The test, therefore, is:
What is the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by the publication or other matter? What is the
probable reasonable effect on the sense of decency, purity, and chastity of society extending to the family?
6.ID.; ID.; RULE UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES.Federal statutes prohibit the use of the mails for obscene matter and prohibit
the importation into the Philippine Islands of all articles, etc., of obscene or indecent character. "Obscene" as here used
signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity. (Swearingen vs. U. S. [1896], 161 U. S., 446.)
7.ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE.Held: That pictures which depict the nonChristian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as they
actually live, without attempted presentation of them in unusual posture or dress, are not offensive to chastity, or foul, or
filthy.
8.ID.; ID.; GENERAL RULE.Pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be
seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent. [People vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352(1923)]

N.B. We will be on our third to the last meeting before the Final Examinations. On our last class on March 17th, 2014 we shall a
class selfie. We will have class from 4:00pm to 6:30pm only. Then we will have some snacks.
I will also use these last class days to see to it that each one knows how to digest a case. Sample/suggested issues are provided in
the first four cases.

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