Zhukov, Manstein, and their Masterful Battles of the Eastern Front

by Cheezy the Wiz

Wars are started by politicians, fought by men, and dictated by generals. To understand
the course of a war, it is important to understand its generals. On the Eastern Front of
the European Theater of World War II, two generals came to the fore as being the most
capable, the most influential, and most studied of the conflict: Marshals Erich von
Manstein of Germany, and Georgy Zhukov of the Soviet Union. Through these men, their
political masters ambitions on the battlefield were sought. Three specific battles in
particular are worthy of examination in any prudent comparative study of these two
men: for Marshal von Manstein, the Third Battle of Kharkov, in February and March 1943,
stands above the rest as his greatest field maneuver; for Marshal Zhukov, his defense of
the Russian capital of Moscow during the fall of 1941 and winter of 1942. However, these
men also had the fortune of directly opposing one another on the field of battle in July
and August 1943, at the climactic battle of Kursk, in the heartland of the Soviet Union.
By examining these three battles and the genius behind them, we hope to gain a better
understanding of these two pivotal figures in military, and world, history.
The military history of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov begins in the First World War.
Zhukov fought as a non-commissioned officer in a cavalry unit: the Novgorod Dragoons.
During his service he was awarded two Orders of St. George, the highest Czarist military
decoration. When civil war broke out in 1918, Zhukov joined the Red Army, and fought at
Tsaritsyn in 1919. It was here that he first met two men who would become pivotal in his
life: Josef Stalin and Semyon Timoshenko, who would be his senior officer both during
the civil war, and in 1941 at the outset of the German invasion.
During the civil war, Zhukov rose to the position of squadron commander. After the war,
in 1928, he entered into the Frunze Military Academy, the Soviet General Staff School.
While there, he studied under the German general Hans von Seeckt. During the 1930s,
he was sent to Spain to observe German, Italian, and Russian armored tactics in combat;
he also was part of a delegation sent to China to study Japanese military techniques.
These two experiences, in addition to his staff schooling, would greatly aid Zhukov in
expanding his understanding of battlefield tactics and strategy, but would also expose
him to the battlefield habits of other nations he would one day face on the field.
In July 1938, Marshal Zhukov took command of the Soviet 1st Army Group in KhalkhinGol, on the Mongolian frontier with Japan. There he commanded the Soviet forces in an
undeclared war with the Japanese for several weeks. It was here that he was able to
develop and refine his strategic style. The definitive Zhukov style
is a time consuming, yet effective method, if certain circumstances are provided. While
maintaining a defensive posture, Zhukov stockpiled vast reserves of men and materiel
until he obtained a definitive superiority of fire and manpower. When this buildup was
complete, he threw his enormous numerical superiority into the fray, quickly smashing
the enemy and scattering them. It is this pattern that Zhukov would use again and again
throughout his military career.
At Khalkhin-Gol, Zhukov demonstrated another of his defining traits: a willingness to
take human losses. If we come to a minefield, he said, our infantry attack exactly as if
it were not therethe losses we get from personnel mines we consider only equal to
those we would have gotten from machine guns and artillery if the Germans had chosen
to defend the area with strong bodies of troops instead of minefields. Historian John
Erickson described the Khalkhin-Gol operation as brilliant but costly. Unfortunately for
his men, this was another of Zhukovs battlefield patterns.
When the Winter War with Finland broke out, Zhukov was sent to be Marshal

Timoshenkos Chief of Staff. After that short but disastrous war was over, many office
positions were shuffled around as the Soviet military leadership realized its outdated
system of warfare. Through this restructuring, Timoshenko became Defense Commissar,
and Zhukov received Timoshenkos position in Kiev. It was here that that Zhukov met
Nikita Khrushchev, the future Premier of the Soviet Union, who was at the time merely in
charge of the Party branch in the Ukrainian capital. In January 1941, Marshal Kiril
Meretskov botched a report to Stalin on a previous war games session and so, in Stalins
famous way of doing things, he appointed Zhukov as the Chief in Staff of the High
Command, immediately depriving Meretskov of this position. It was this position which
Zhukov occupied on June 22, 1941, when Operation Barbarossa began.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was destined to be a general before he was born. Not
only were his father and uncle generals, but his grandfather had commanded an army
corps during the Franco-Prussian War. He was also closely related to Paul von
Hindenburg, the Prussian Generalfieldmarschall and second President of the Weimar
Republic. The young Manstein entered the corps of cadets at Pln in 1900, and the War
Academy in 1913, having been commissioned and promoted to lieutenant in that time
period. While serving on the Western Front, he was severely wounded and returned to
service in 1915 as a staff officer, where he remained for the duration of the war. After
the war was over, he helped in the formation of the Reichswehr, and began to rise
through the ranks. In 1938, he attained the rank of brigadier general. In 1939, he served
as Chief of Staff to Karl Rudolph Gerd von Rundstedt during Operation Fall Wei. After
the invasion of Poland, he then cooperated with von Rundstedt and Guderian in forming
and reforming the plans for Operation Fall Gelb, the invasion of France. The strategy
their work produced came to be called the Manstein Plan. Because of its enormous
success, Hitler had him promoted to General, and placed him in command of the 56th
Panzer Corps.
When Operation Barbarossa began on 22 June, 1941, Mansteins corps enjoyed
considerable success, penetrating deep into Russian-occupied Poland. In September, he
was given command of the 11th Army, and charged with the task of taking the Crimean
Peninsula and the impregnable fortress-city of Sevastopol. After his completion of this
task in July 1942, he received a promotion to Generalfieldmarschall, and sent to produce
similar results in the siege of Leningrad. His stay in the north would not last long,
however, as he was then sent south to command the newly organized Army Group Don.
Here he was charged with two orders of duty: first, he must aid in the salvation of Hoths
4th Panzer Army, imbedded deep in the Caucasus range but quickly making for the Don
River; second, he must relieve Paulus 6th Army trapped inside Stalingrad. While he was
unable to reach Paulus in time to prevent capitulation, he prevented the capture of
Rostov until most of Hoths forces were evacuated, preventing an even greater tragedy
than that which had befallen the Stalingrad front. His work with Army Group Don was
widely acclaimed, and may have kept Germany in the war.
In the towns surrounding Moscow in the fall of 1941, Zhukov prevented catastrophe by
saving the Russian capital, and bringing the Germans juggernaut to a halt. The costs in
manpower and machines were astounding, but their sacrifice bought the Russian valuable
time, and saved the Soviet Union from collapse during the first winter of the Great
Patriotic War.
Marshal Zhukovs entry into this theater began on July 30, 1941, one month after the
German invasion began. Zhukov was placed in command of the Reserve Front, many
miles behind the active front. Such a creation is a common Russian military practice. The
function of this force was to act a breakwater to enemy penetrations of the main front
and, if there were no penetrations, to deliver a counterthrust. Zhukovs forces constituted
six full armies, centered on the town of Rzhev. These forces were to halt a German
advance toward Moscow should the city of Smolensk, the gateway to Moscow, fall. On

August 9, this function was put to the test. Zhukovs front successfully stemmed the
German advance, and bogged down Army Group Center just west of Rzhev.
The German offensive on the Bryansk Front, to the south of Rzhev, was renewed on
September 30, when several tank units arrived from the Leningrad front. The Russian
forces assigned to halt this offensive numbered twelve armies. The total Russian forces in
the region constituted a force of 800,000 men, 770 tanks, and 9150 guns. This incredibly
massive concentration of forces constituted 40% of all Russian troops at the time, and
35% of all tanks and planes. Fedor von Bocks Army Group Center was clearly superior,
however, totaling more than one million men, 1,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, and
19,000 artillery pieces, complimented by the Second Air Fleet under Kesselring. In
anticipation of this massive assault, Zhukov began the construction of massive
fortifications on the approaches to Moscow, in the city itself, and on the outskirts.
On October 3, the Bryansk Front collapsed when Heinz Guderian took the undefended
city of Orel, spreading chaos through the Russian lines. The night of October 4-5 Zhukov
described as being the most alarming of the war This was because the Russian High
Command had no contact with the front lines at all; by the time contact was reestablished, the Germans had wedged between the 43rd and 24th Armies, and a 15-mile
long armored column was moving east unmolested towards Moscow. At this time, there
were no Russian units between them and Moscow. Stalin and Zhukov realized something
must quickly be done, so reserve units were quickly brought up to defend the most
essential roads to the city; however, these units only totaled 14 infantry divisions, 16
tank brigades, and 40 artillery regiments, a decidedly inadequate force for proper
defense. This would have to do, though, until more reserves could be raised, or the
troops from the Far East arrived, and for the fortifications around Moscow to be
completed.
By mid-October, four new armies had been raised, creating an additional 90,000 men for
defense. These new forces were concentrated around the flat westerly approaches to
Moscow. The time to raise these units had been bought by the extended resistance of the
surrounded field armies on the Bryansk and Western fronts, holding on for dear life.
These stubborn units tied up vast numbers of German forces that could have otherwise
been used to hasten the drive against Moscow. They bought Zhukov valuable time to
organize a real defense of the city.
The German advance inexorably continued, however. The eastern end of Army Group
Center advanced to the city of Tula, on the southern approaches to Moscow. Fiery and
stubborn defense prevented German occupation of the city and tied down their right
flank. The resistance of Tula, Zhukov argued, saved Moscow more than anything, and
Moscows title of Hero City is just as much deserved by Tula. When Guderian failed to
take the city in December, he ordered his forces to establish defensive positions, writing
that The offensive on Moscow has ended. All the sacrifices and efforts of our brilliant
troops have failed. We have suffered a serious defeat.
Through the end of October and beginning of November, Zhukov was able to organize
another 5 divisions purely from the Muscovite populace. An additional 100,000 were
trained to fight, but not organized into units. The Russians obtained valuable time for
reorganization during the muddy season at the end of October. However, rapidly falling
temperatures yield snowfall, and the muds freeze in early November. This mud, however
short-lived, was responsible for the loss of huge numbers of mechanical equipment,
especially tanks and trucks. By mid-November, a double-echeloned ring of defenses
surrounded Moscow, and the troops occupying them, including remnants of the
surrounded armies to the west, held a much more defensible position than before; this
was fortunate, for they first encountered German forces on the 16th of November.
These defense lines included 1928 artillery emplacements, miles of barbed wire, and

anti-tank ditches and obstacles. When German forces finally met these works in midNovember, they succeeded in holding the line against the Nazis. As soon as they were
stopped, Stalin asked Zhukov to go on the offensive. Zhukov insisted on more men,
though, as his reserves were depleted. He requested 2 more armies and 200 tanks,
which Stalin delivered to him by the end of November. This is again fortunate, for the
final German assault began on 1 December.
The German thrust for Moscow from the northwest was finally halted on 4 December,
after taking heavy losses from artillery and minefields on the very outskirts of the city.
Heavy snows further inhibited movements, albeit for both sides. Having once again
stopped the Germans, Stalin ordered a counterstroke, knowing the Germans were illequipped to deal with the harsh Russian winter, and that they had sustained enormous
losses. Of the forthcoming weak offensives, the only one which achieved any success is
on the Northwest Front, beyond the city of Ostrashkov, and there only due to the lack of
a contiguous German defense line.
Through the cold January on 1942, the Western, Kalinin, and Istra fronts slowly
advanced west towards Rzhev, fueled by new levies and reserves from the East. In March
and April, a final push for Rzhev failed, bringing the Russian advance to a halt. Over the
course of the winter, Zhukov slowly pushed the Germans back a distance of 65 miles.
German losses sustained in the campaign were staggering: 500,000 men, 1300 tanks,
2,500 gun, and 15,000 trucks.
Zhukov employed many of his characteristic tactics in this battle. The most apparent of
these is the pressing advance, forcing forward without regard for losses sustained. He
believed human life to be the necessary price to win a war. While that is true, it is
possible that Zhukovs understanding of this maxim was too literal. It is also true;
however, that Zhukov received an extraordinary amount of pressure from Stalin during
the operations around Moscow, especially to go on the offensive immediately upon
halting the German advance. While Zhukov protested this insistence, it appears to be due
to strategic realities, rather than humanitarian sympathy for his men. It is true that
Zhukovs actions saved the capital, and arguably the Soviet Union, but to argue that the
ends justify the means is to disregard the value of the individual; in this light, these two
have more in common with their nemesis in Berlin than with their comrades on the
ground.
The Third Battle of Kharkov is often cited as being Marshal von Mansteins crowning
strategic achievement, though it is not his most widely known in the West. His operations
during March 1943 are characteristic of classic Manstein tactics: swift, decisive, and
exact, delivering a deadly blow to the enemys most vulnerable point, though inferior in
numbers to that enemy.
The Third Battle of Kharkov, hereafter referred to simply as The Battle of Kharkov, began
with the Soviet Operation STAR, a drive south from Voronezh aimed at establishing
bridgeheads across the Dnepr River near Denepropetrovsk and Zaprozhye, in the central
Ukraine. The ultimate goal of this was to reach the Black Sea and outflank most of Army
Group B, who was deeply dug in on the Mius River. These forces driving southwest from
Belgorod were outflanked, however, by Mansteins Army Group Don, driving west from
the Mius River area, and forced back to positions around Kharkov. Even though the
Russians had been forced back into their salient, their forces were still drastically
overextended; they possessed no significant reserves to back up their line, and the
troops that were available were stretched very thinly, and assigned to areas much too
large for them to properly defend. The only remaining Russian hard point lay in a small
salient immediately south of Kharkov, containing the 3rd Russian Tank Army. It was
around this hard point, and the city of Kharkov, the fourth largest city in Russia, that
Manstein would construct victory.

Mansteins plan first involved amassing forces in a manner similar to Zhukovs at

Khalkhin-Gol, though with considerably more urgency time-wise. The new units he
received were not only fresh and well-rested units; their ranks also included Waffen-SS
divisions, including the Leibstandarte and Das Reich panzer grenadiers. When Manstein
began his counteroffensive on 16 February, 1943, his drive consisted of two main
thrusts: one to drive north and west of Kharkov, and one east. Normally, this westerly
maneuver would have been precisely where 3rd Soviet Tank Army was, but instead, it
found the 3rd Tank Army trapped inside a salient, having been moved southeast in
preparation for an offensive of its own, and was thus flanked on both sides and
pummeled into oblivion. Meanwhile, the left thrust made easy headway north, flanking
Kharkov as the Leibstandarte entered the city to subjugate it. This northwesterly stroke
also served to cut both 3rd Tank Army and Kharkov off from the 38th and 40th Armies
deeper in the salient to the west. With Mansteins quick penetration north, these two
armies were faced with the possibility of being completely isolated and encircled, and,
being unable to coordinate a strike with the 3rd Tank Army against Mansteins left arm,
were forced to hastily withdraw north and east, towards Kursk.
Within days, the 3rd Tank Army was outflanked, surrounded, and liquidated. Mansteins
outstretched left arm, however, continued to march north, aiming for the city of
Belgorod, an excellently defendable position if being attacked from the east, and thus a
valuable prize for Manstein and the Germany Army. As the 38th and 40th Armies
rejoined their comrades in the Kursk salient, a number of variables allowed the front to
stabilize just north of Belgorod, and along the North Donets River. The Spring thaw was
beginning, and the roads become very muddy and inhibit all forms of travel. In addition,
by this time both sides had sustained considerable losses, and momentarily retired to lick
their wounds. The Germans were also forced to consolidate their forces after the costly
occupation of Kharkov. The front thus stabilized ironically at roughly the same position it
was in the winter of 1941-42, before the German drive for Stalingrad began.
Manstein was successful at Kharkov for a number of reasons, many of which were
beyond his control. First, the morale of the German troops was much higher than their
Russian counterparts. The German units were well-rested, while the Russian units had
been on the front line since the breakout around Voronezh, months before. These units
were tired, under-equipped, and far from their supply depots. In addition, several of the
German units were elite units, including Hitlers personal bodyguard, the Leibstandarte
SS Adolph Hitler.
Mansteins victory at Kharkov was also very much of his own design. Manstein
commanded in a manner similar to that of other German generals: a swift, decisive,
penetrating blow often separated into several prongs, like a fork stabbing into the
enemys lines. These prongs created mini-salients and allowed the creation of multiple
pockets of resistance, isolating one unit from another and disrupting their ability to
effectively counterattack. Further, because of the location of his strike, at the base of the
Kharkov salient, he was able to place large numbers of Soviet troops in immediate
danger; this was only exacerbated by his deep penetration movements. The ability to
recognize the vulnerability of the enemy in conjunction with the presented opportunity
such as that found in the Kharkov salient, and to then deliver the decisive blow needed to
counteract the enemys advance and disrupt his forward momentum, is why Manstein
stands head and shoulders above the vast majority of men who have ever commanded a
fighting force. In his memoirs, Manstein traced his victory at Kharkov to the failure of
Operation STAR. with the exception of Stalingrad, he states, the Soviet command
never managed to coordinate strength and speed when hitting a decisive spot. The
Soviets invited disaster by being too ambitious in their advance west. Mansteins riposte
delivered a sobering blow to the Soviet command, and forced them to re-evaluate their
goals for the upcoming year. It also isolated the Kursk salient, and set the stage for the
climactic battle there in July and August 1943.
The Kursk offensive, designated Operation Citadel by the German High Command, was

the follow-up operation to Mansteins fantastic riposte at Kharkov-Belgorod. However,

much had happened since the German victory in March 1943. Tunisia had been lost, and
the threat of an Allied landing in the West appeared more real than ever before. One of
Germanys chief allies, Rumania, had suffered the horrific loss of two field armies, and
was in danger of soon seeking to quit the war. Germany and the Axis were in desperate
need of a morale boost, and a new offensive operation in the east was demanded if they
were to regain their lost prestige. This was the last year the Germans could hope to
operate freely in Russia without being harassed by a large-scale mainland assault by the
Allies in the West, and both Hitler and the OKH were desperate to improve their position
as best they could during the upcoming summer offensive season.
There were two possibilities of action for the German Army in the summer of 1943. The
first was what is termed a defensive-offensive action. This required letting the Soviets
strike first; when this happened, the Germans should conduct an elastic defense and give
ground to the Russians, hoping to let them overextend, and then counterattack in turn,
what Manstein referred to as the backhand blow, and beat them in open combat. The
most likely place for this to occur was in the area of Army Group South, where Manstein
was in command. The Russians had tried before to outflank the Mius River line and take
the industrial heartland of the Donets-Dnepr basin, and it remained their most likely
avenue of attack.
There were two major disadvantages of this plan, however. First, it was entirely
dependent on the Russians to act first. If the Russians took too long to attack, the
Germans ran the risk of an allied landing in the west drawing valuable troops away from
the front. In addition, waiting allowed the Russians time to consolidate their forces,
replenish and re-arm, and to switch out beaten units for fresh reserves. Regardless, this
was the course of action that much of the high command favored. However, Hitler was
less than fond of giving up land, fearing it could turn into a rout, and so favors a different
plan. Hitlers plan was the other possibility: to go on the offensive, and take the initiative
in the fight. This served to throw the Russians off-balance, if done so in a timely manner,
and prevent an offensive by them. The best location of this attack was determined to be
the Kursk salient, a large bulge in the Russian lines produced by the Kharkov operation,
and centered in the industrial town of Kursk.
Hitler decided to take the latter course of action. However, the Germans had first to reequip their tired and depleted units; the Kharkov operation and cold winter months
having taken their toll. This also gave them time to collect more of the new Panther and
Tiger tanks, the only armor capable of toeing up to the Russian T-34s. Estimates given in
March estimated the time for Citadel to come in mid-late May.

Cheezy the Wiz

Feb 26, 2009 09:31 PM

Interestingly, the German OKH correctly guessed the Soviet strategy. Since the Kursk
salient was such an obvious point for a military operation, and because the Soviets knew
the precise locations of German attack, thanks to extensive intelligence, they estimated
that the Russians would put considerable energy into fortifying the area, probably with
many layers of defenses, and would hold a large force in reserve with which to
counterattack, or to hold the line as a secondary defense, should the Germans punch
through and drive for Voronezh.
The German plan was a simple one: by attacking from the north and south with two
pincers, they aimed to isolate the forces in the Kursk bulge and liquidate them. By doing
this, they would destroy huge numbers of men and equipment, force considerable
redistribution of Russian forces to compensate for the deficit, eliminate any chance of a
large Soviet offensive in the summer of 1943, and perhaps force the Russians into
accepting a stalemate, and into entering peace negotiations.

When May came, however, the Germans were not ready as anticipated. A new date was
set: 5 July. When the German forces were finally amassed, they numbered 59 divisions,
most of which were Panzers, including Panzer Vs and VIs. During this time, the sizable
forces massing near the two areas of intended penetration readily alerted the Russians to
German intentions. This time delay allowed them considerably more time to construct
their massive defensive works that would ultimately prove to be the doom of the
operation.
The offensive began as planned on 5 July, 1943. Hans von Kluges force, containing two
corps and driving south from the Orel bulge, encountered stiff resistance, and only
penetrated nine miles before becoming bogged down in one of the Soviet defensive rings.
Mansteins group driving north from Belgorod, which contained five corps, made
considerable headway and, though slowed by Zhukovs defenses, succeeded in breaking
through the last defensive ring on 11 July. By this time, Manstein had inflicted
considerable losses on the enemy, including taking 24,000 men as prisoners and
destroying 1,800 tanks, 267 field pieces, and 1,080 anti-tank guns.
With victory in their grasp, Hitler was forced to call off the operation. Operation Husky
had begun: the Allied invasion of Sicily, just what the OKH had feared would doom their
operation. However, other realities had also doomed the operation: in addition to Kluge
making no headway in his pincer, his base of operations, the Orel bulge, faced
tremendous pressure from a Soviet counterattack; all of Kluges energy was diverted to
staving off disaster at Orel, and could not be concentrated on the Kursk salient; his
armored forces were bled dry. Hitler orders the immediate end to Operation Citadel, and
a withdrawal of both Mansteins and Kluges forces from the salient to more defensible
positions.
The Soviet counterattack followed thereafter, falling upon a severely beaten enemy. On 3
August, the attack begins; by 8 August, a gaping hole 35 miles wide opened up in
Mansteins lines. Continued pressure during August forced further holes, and Manstein
was forced to abandon all the gains of the Kharkov operation, including the city itself, by
the end of August to stave off total disaster in the South.
The Soviet story of Kursk begins after the resolution of the 3rd Battle of Kharkov. As
noted earlier, Zhukov correctly predicted the location and method of German assault.
Zhukov elected to follow the same rule he did at Moscow and Stalingrad: let the enemy
attack first, bog them down in considerable defensive works, and then strike with
stockpiled reserves in the rear. It is Zhukovs distinct style, and though it is slow and, as
noted above, predictable because the OKH was able to predict his precise plan, it is
nonetheless an effective strategy, perhaps even more so than the trademark German
blitzkrieg, for reasons to be explained later.
Helmut Von Moltke the Elder observed that no battle plan survives contact with the
enemy and his maxim rings true at Kursk. Being fully aware of the German plans for
attack, Zhukov was able to plan the whole operation from the start, down to the smallest
of details. Zhukovs plan was to turn the salient into a massive fortress of trenches, tank
traps, artillery positions, minefields, and barbed wire. These fortifications, which ran six
ranks and 60 kilometers deep, ran concentrically around the central city of Kursk, and
were designed not to bring pause to the German attack, but to stop it outright, and to
keep them bogged down while reserve units struck at the enemys exposed flanks.
Included in these concentric fortifications were machine-gun positions which provided
overlapping fields of fire, pillboxes, pre-sighted artillery and mortar positions, anti-tank
and ant-personnel obstacles, and the wiring of all bridges in the area for demolition,
should push come to shove. Not only did he plan out the defenses, he also pre-planned
all axes of advance, and all units knew not only where they were advancing from, to, and

how to get there, but were provided with up-to-date maps of the location of minefields,
blockaded roads, and the myriad fortifications addressed above.
As noted above, part of Zhukovs plan involved a considerable buildup of reserves. He
placed these units deep behind their lines, along the Don River and in front of Voronezh.
Here they would be safe from German reconnaissance, but would also give the Russian
units closer to the salient room to maneuver, should they need to. This defensive line,
called the Reserve Front, could also serve as a secondary line of defense to stem the tide
of German advance, should some miracle occur in the salient and the Germans bust
through. This reserve force constituted seven full armies, six corps, and an air army.
In addition to collecting his reserve armies, Zhukov applied a lesson quickly learned from
the Kharkov operation: ordering all the units in the Voronezh front (the name for the
troops in the Kursk salient) brought to full-strength, re-equipped and re-armed, and
provided with considerable numbers of anti-tank weaponry, as well as the engineering
materials they required constructing their fortifications. Anti-tank strong points were
focused on the areas deemed most likely avenues of armored advance. These areas were
reinforced with extra tanks, artillery, anti-tank rifles, and machine gun nests. Zhukov
also saw to it that all civilians were removed from the area.
In addition to preparing the land for the upcoming assault, Zhukov also had his men
trained in the art of defensive combat procedure. Infantry were taught how to use
Molotov cocktails more effectively, and more importantly, to stand up to tanks, rather
than withdrawing. If they stood up to tanks, they could engage the infantry that
advanced behind them, isolate them from the tanks, and systematically eliminate them.
Artillery gunners were bestowed with knowledge of a Tiger tanks weak spots, as well as
effective ways of engaging the German heavy tanks. All soldiers in the area were
provided additional protection by gas mask and chemical ponchos, should the enemy
resort to more morally questionable military tactics.
When the attack finally came on 5 July, Zhukovs plans worked perfectly, with the
exception of von Mansteins momentary penetration in the south. The Germans sustained
huge losses, though inflicting many themselves. When the Germans finally began to
withdraw on 15 July, the Russians were right on their heels. Zhukov misinterpreted the
withdrawal as the culmination of failure of Citadel, when in fact Manstein possessed the
tools to continue his penetration and perhaps link up with Kluge. Though the operation
was indeed a failure for the Germans, their withdrawal was not entirely due to Russian
resistance, as Zhukov implied, but rather to the manpower demands placed upon the
Germans by the Allied invasion of Sicily.
Zhukov also noted that the front where Mansteins penetration was made was more
lightly defended than the rest of the Voronezh front, possessing a ratio of 41 guns and 4
tanks per mile instead of 57 guns and 11 tanks. Mansteins penetration was nonetheless
impressive, although he enjoyed a numerical superiority to Kluges force, which must be
taken into account.
Even before the German advance was halted, Zhukovs counterstroke had begun. As
noted above, part of Kluges pincers failure was attributed to the massive flanking
maneuver on his rear, pressing hard on his lines, and threatening the German salient in a
manner similar to that which the Germans had hoped to achieve in Kursk. In the south,
the pre-Kursk line was restored near Belgorod by 23 July. However, Manstein, always the
master of a fighting withdrawal, inflicted considerably more damage on his Russian
pursuers than was expected. In addition, the Reserve Front armies took longer than
expected to reach the Voronezh front, simply as a result of confused orders and
planning; these two factors combined to create an eight-day delay in the Russian answer
to Citadel in the south. When the offensive finally began on 3 August, enormous gains

were made, and by the end of August, Belgorod and Kharkov in the south were taken,
and in the north Bryansk and Orel were liberated. By the end of the operation, German
losses included 500,000 men, 2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 3,000 field
pieces. The result of this massive counterstroke was the end of German hopes for a
victory in the East, and a massive flanking maneuver requiring the evacuation of the
long-held Mius River line, and thus the liberation of occupied Ukraine.
While it is true that Zhukov emerged victorious in this epic clash of fates, it is well worth
noting that his success was largely due to the fact that he was not only able to correctly
guess the axes of German advance, but also because the construction of his fortifications
did not begin in earnest until May 1943; had the Germans been ready as they expected
to be at that time, they might well have broken through and isolated the salient. This can
be considered quite likely, given Mansteins depth of penetration even after the defensive
echelons had been completed. It is well worth noting that, although the Germans were
able to inflict massive casualties on the Voronezh front, so were the Russians in return.
While the Russians were able to replenish their losses, the Germans were not, and so this
strategic victory becomes even greater for the Russians, as the German capacity to
conduct offensive operations, or even defensive ones, becomes significantly strained.
Zhukov and Manstein came from two very different schools of military thought. Manstein,
in the Old Prussian tradition, favored making swift, bold moves at the enemys weak
points. Though he took many risks, greater risk often entails greater benefit if you are
successful; Manstein was successful many times, and so his risks seem justified.
Manstein preferred to think and act quickly and independently; while this had the
wonderful benefit of keeping the enemy on his toes, it in many ways inhibited the ability
to cooperate in large groups of like-minded commanders; he was fortunate that such a
development never came to fruition.
Zhukov, on the other hand, favored a more careful and calculated style of warfare. While
not as strictly linear as Montgomery or Eisenhower, Zhukov still operated in an older
frame of mind. His trademark strategy of maintaining the defensive while organizing a
massive buildup of forces to deliver the finishing blow is reminiscent not only to
Montgomerys strategy at El Alamein in October-November 1942, but also Petains during
the Second Battle of the Marne in July-August 1918, though Petain teamed his with an
elastic defense similar to Mansteins favored method, but not much different from
Zhukovs strategy at Kursk. There was a distinct advantage to Zhukovs style of war. It
was cold, calculating, and precise. It seemed to violate von Moltkes maxim that No
battle plan survives contact with the enemy in that, even though the Germans correctly
guessed the presence of Zhukovs extensive reserves, his plan was nonetheless just as
effective as if the Germans never knew of it at all. This stands in stark contrast to
Mansteins style, and that of most German generals of the war; their strategy relied on
the elements of surprise and secrecy; when these elements are ensured, as at Kharkov,
so was victory; when deprived of these elements, as at Kursk, Moltkes maxim held true.
Each of these strategies was effective within its own ideal environment; which of these
strategies is better is a matter left to personal preference. That decision can perhaps be
made through this method of study; to compare and contrast two men who epitomize
these schools of thought, and to examine and evaluate how they compare in their ideal
environments, and finally, when pitted against one another on the field of battle. To
quote Otto von Bismarcks aphorism: Fools say they learn by experience. I prefer to
profit by others experience; so can students of war learn the lessons of war as
experienced by the great captains of history, and apply them in modern or future
theaters.
Works Cited
Busse, Theodore. Operation Citadel Overview. In Kursk, the German View, edited by

Steven H. Newton. Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002.

Glantz, David M. From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December
1942-August 1943. Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR. 1991.
Glantz, David M. and Harold S. Orenstein, trans. and ed., The Battle for Kursk 1943: The
Soviet General Staff Study. Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR. 1999
Liddell Hart B.H. The Classic Book on Military Strategy. First Meridian Printing, New York,
1991.
Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Bernard and Graefe Verlang, Munich, 1982.
Zhukov Georgy. Marshal Zhukovs Greatest Battles. Harper and Row Publishers, New
York, 1969.