Military Operations Issue 7

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014
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The Journal of
Military Operations
Discussions On The Conduct of War
FEATURING
Eado Hecht
Philip Stack
Sebastian Langvad
Paul Easter
Gerry Long
John Arthur
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Colonel John Wilson
Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely
Lieutenant Colonel Egil Daltveit
Major General Julian Thompson
Lieutenant Colonel Jan Frederik Geiner
Brigadier Justin Kelly
Dr Eado Hecht
Professor Karen Carr
Major Gerry Long
Colonel Clint Ancker
Dermot Rooney
Colonel Mike Crawshaw
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Military Operations
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Discussions On The Conduct Of War
The Journal of
Military Operations
A Note From The Editor

July 2014 is notable across Europe (and more widely) for being the 100th anniversary of the July Crisis of 1914: the events
following the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand which led to the First World War. In the fifty months
of conflict that followed, the world probably learnt more about warfare than in any comparable period in history. That is
particularly true of land warfare. It is, however, sad that many armies seem to be relatively unaware of what was actually
learnt.
To be fair, that is history, and history is not the core business of armies. In many countries the history of warfare is largely
overlooked as a serious intellectual discipline, and the history of warfare in the First World War almost completely so. In Britain
and a few other nations there are a small number of historians, largely grouped in a small number of academic departments,
who do pay considerable attention to warfare in the Great War. But if serving soldiers often lack historic knowledge,
academic historians sometimes lack military insight.
In a sense, however, we may be looking at the wrong period. The centenary of the Great War is relevant mostly because of
commemoration. Whilst the British Army, for example, is commemorating the centenary of the Great War, it is also embarking
on a rare strategic pause. For the first time in many decades it now faces the prospect of not being deployed on operations for
a number of years. The Army, and its historians, might do better if they looked at the decade before the Great War.
In 1902 the British Army withdrew its forces (at their peak, nearly 500,000 men), from a short and messy war in South Africa.
There was an awareness that not all had gone well (a typically British piece of understatement). There was then an extensive
and (at times), heated debate, which lead to significant reform. A General Staff was created. Field Service Regulations (the first
high-level printed doctrine), were published. The volunteer reserve was reorganised and tied in to the standing army. Doctrine
was reviewed across the Army. For example, the cavalry doctrine of 1904 was highly perceptive and resulted in significant
debate, which served the Army very well in the Great War.
There were many such reforms. But perhaps the most important single aspect was a clear recognition that improvements were
needed and that now was the time to do it. What is worrying today is that there does not seem to be a clear recognition that
changes are needed, nor a willingness to put improvements in place. If anything, there seems to be a lack of self-confidence in
the Armys ability to reform itself. That might be because the Army is not the master of its own future to the extent it was in, say,
1910. I strongly suspect that much the same applies to several of the armies which are currently withdrawing from Afghanistan.
Seventy years ago this month, Britain was in the midst of a sustained rocket bombardment. About 3,250 V1s were fired at
England from continental Europe. In addition, about 1,000 of the larger, more deadly V2s were launched at England. The V1s
warhead contained 850kg of HE; the V2s about 1,000kg. V1s destroyed or damaged over a million structures. They killed or
wounded 22,892 people, mostly civilians. V2s killed or wounded a total of about 120,000 people.
Airpower alone was not effective in suppressing V1 and V2 launches. The offensive was brought to an end when the launch
areas on the Continent were overrun. To quote, [e]ven the most effective and efficient anti-rocket operation will need time to
achieve results. The home front must be prepared: not only physically, to live through bombardment; but also psychologically, to
understand that results will not be immediate or perfect. Some rockets will get through even at the last minute. That is not a sign
of the general failure of the operation. An operations success can be deduced only in retrospect: measured by the continuation,
reduction, or complete cessation of enemy attacks.
That quote, however, does not relate to V1 and V2 attacks. It comes from Eado Hechts analysis of Operation Defensive Pillar
in this edition of Military Operations. Defensive Pillar was Israels military response to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip
in November 2012. The Israelis have learnt that airpower alone was not effective in suppressing rocket launches. That often
requires the launch areas to be overrun. Please note that the article was written well before the rocket attacks of July 2014. As I
write this Editorial, Israeli armed forces have just entered the Gaza strip. Eado Hechts remarks seem remarkably prescient.
Military Operations
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The similarities between the German rocket bombardment of Britain in the Second World War and the ongoing bombardments
of Israel are marked. They tell us much about the importance of military history, both generally and specifically. No two wars
are ever the same, but important lessons can be found.
In a similar vein, Philip Stack observes that commanders and staff officers are developed through formal training and
experience. In todays under-exercised armies, the opportunities to learn from experience are limited, and those teaching in
staff colleges are themselves lacking in experience of conventional operations. If training and experience is lacking, there is a
temptation to over-impose control. His article on control measures also points out that unnecessarily restrictive control measures
can serve to calm the nerves of a higher commander.
It would be nice to think that such commanders could be identified (perhaps through the use of the sort of digital technology
used in training and on operations), and weeded out. The phenomenon of senior commanders promoted in peacetime being
found wanting in war was seen repeatedly in the Boer War, the First and the Second World Wars. It was by no means limited
to the British Army. Philip Stacks article looks at battlespace control measures, and traces their origins from the First World War.
There is still much we can learn from the events of a century ago.
The background to two of the articles in this seventh edition of Military Operations are quite remarkable. Sebastian Langvad
looks at one particular application of swarming tactics and considers how they might add considerable value in the context of
NATO and potential coalition operations. The article makes a valuable contribution to an area which Military Operations has
not yet explored. But what makes it remarkable is that the author is a cadet in a military academy. His article demonstrates that
good military ideas are not the sole preserve of greybeards of great experience.
Conversely, Paul Easter, the author of an article on Jihadist use of technology, is a serving lieutenant colonel. The article is a
shortened version of his masters dissertation, which was recently awarded the Imbert Prize by the UK Association of Security
Consultants. The Imbert Prize is awarded annually for the best dissertation submitted by a student at the four British universities
with the best reputation for postgraduate work in the field of security. What makes the work all the more remarkable is that it is
clearly relevant both to private consultants in the security sector and to a military audience. Military Operations congratulates
Paul Easter for his achievement.
In the fifth edition of Military Operations, William Owen sought to promote (or possibly provoke), a discussion about tactics,
and why people seem reluctant to discuss them in print. In this edition, Gerry Long continues the subject with a look at why we
wrestle with the basics. Tactics should, basically, be a simple issue; albeit one capable of infinite variation in practice. Gerry
Long suggests that, among other things, armies should trust their junior commanders particularly their NCOs to train their
soldiers for war. They should trust them when they innovate, and they should then validate and adopt the insights that emerge.
To be fair, the article presupposes a cadre of long-service NCOs capable of conducting such training; and who possess the
knowledge, experience or both to know what forms of innovation may be productive. Perhaps the article is really saying that:
a. Armies should seek to generate such a cadre of NCOs; and
b. Armies lucky enough to have them should trust them to do their job.
War is unutterably complex, yet effective commanders have repeatedly been able to bring about success on the battlefield with
remarkably short orders. Patton, commanding 3rd US Army of up to five corps and at times eighteen divisions, was in the habit
of writing orders for his Army on one side of one piece of paper (so that the other side could be used for a graphic or a sketch).
The sixth article in this edition of Military Operations, by John Arthur, focuses on orders at the lower levels of command (up to
battalion), and orders which are quick, rather than short. But there are clear similarities between Patton, writing in the 1940s,
and John Arthur writing in the 21st Century.
Jim Storr
Editor, Military Operations
July 2014
Contents
Operation Defensive Pillar or The Second Gaza War: A Year Later
Eado Hecht
The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of Battlefield Control

Measures 8
Philip Stack
Norwegian Swarm: How Unique National Doctrines Contribute to a

more Flexible NATO
13
Sebastian Langvad
Jihadist Use Of Technology
17
Paul Easter
Storming Back to the Future: Why We Wrestle With The Basics
22
Gerry Long
The Three Step Estimate
27
John Arthur
Military Operations
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Operation Defensive Pillar or The Second Gaza

War: A Year Later
Operation Defensive Pillar

Eado Hecht
The advent of cheap, simple-to-manufacture artillery rockets has

added an effective new tool to the arsenal of both state and nonstate armies. They out-flank the ground, sea and aerial defences
which block access to their opponents rear areas. Simultaneously,
the survivability of the shooter is significantly enhanced: they are
difficult to locate. This tactical capability has strategic repercussions,
enabling the organization procuring them to strike its rivals
supposedly safe strategic and national assets.
The first cross-border rocket attack by Palestinians on Israel occurred
on 16th September 1968. Eight rockets were fired by Palestinians from
northern Jordan into the Israeli town of Beyt Shean. Since then many
thousands of rockets of various ranges and payloads have been fired
into Israel from Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai.[i]
Over the decades Israel has responded variously with: preventative
or retaliatory aerial, artillery and ground raids; temporary invasions
of launch areas; and development of counter-rocket defences.[ii]
Strategically, offensive responses to rocket attacks have rarely been
different from those against other cross-border attacks on Israel.
Collectively they are termed Deterrence Operations.[iii] They do
not aspire to achieve a final, lasting solution to the conflict; only to
reduce or temporarily stop those bombardments. As such, Operation
Defensive Pillar in Gaza (November 2012) was the latest in a long
succession of Deterrence Operations conducted by Israel. Some of
these operations were limited to stand-off fire only (Accountability in
1993, Grapes of Wrath in 1996). Others also included greater or
lesser involvement of ground forces (Days of Repentance in 2004,
the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Cast Lead in 2008-2009).
Operation Cast Lead achieved some months of relative calm on

Israels border with Gaza. Later there was a gradual re-escalation
in rocket attacks. Then, between 1st January 2012 and 14th
November 2012 Palestinians fired approximately 725 rockets and
mortar-bombs into Israel and conducted 23 cross-border raids and
ambushes. On 14th November 2012 Israel retaliated by killing the
commander of Hamas military forces and destroying the majority of
Hamas and other groups long-range rocket launchers and rockets.
Both these actions were intelligence successes of the first order,
since both the commander and the rockets were well hidden, but the
immediate consequence was an escalation in Palestinian attacks.
Over the following week Israel and Hamas engaged in a small war,
named Operation Defensive Pillar by Israel and the Second Gaza
War by the Palestinians. During that week, Hamas and its smaller
rivals in the Gaza Strip fired approximately 1,500 rockets and mortar
bombs at Israeli towns and villages. Most of the rockets missed their
intended targets, landing in unpopulated areas. About 150 rockets
failed to cross the border and landed on Palestinian territory some
of them on Palestinian homes causing local casualties. 422 rockets
were intercepted by Israels Iron Dome anti-rocket defence system.
58 rockets landed in targeted areas, killing three Israeli civilians
and three soldiers and wounding 232 Israelis (approximately 210
civilians and 20 soldiers). Another 29 civilians were wounded when
a hand-delivered bomb exploded in a bus in Tel-Aviv.[iv] Israel
responded by dropping guided bombs on Hamas and other armed
groups launch-sites, headquarters, storage facilities, commanders,
launch teams and smuggling tunnels (a total of approximately 1,500
targets all told). Palestinian casualties amounted to approximately
120 combatants killed, 900 combatants wounded, 30 to 50 civilians
killed and 320 wounded.[v]
The war ended in a ceasefire mediated by Egypt, at the time headed
by Hamas Egyptian patron, the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas
To cite this Article: Hecht, Eado, Operation Defensive Pillar or The Second Gaza War: A Year Later, Military
Operations, Volume 2, Issue No. 3, Summer 2014, pages 4-7.
Military Operations
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Page 4

promised to cease attacks in return for more lenient border controls
at the Egyptian border and fewer Israeli restrictions on Palestinian
farmers and fishermen working close to the Israeli border.
A Year-Long Aftermath
The ceasefire was immediately followed by unarmed riots instigated
by Hamas, which attempted to break down Israels border fence and
test its political resolve to prevent Palestinians from entering Israeli
territory. In one case a Palestinian armed with a knife infiltrated an
Israel village near the border and attacked a woman in her home.
She managed to escape and called the security forces. Towards the
end of December, about five weeks after the ceasefire was declared,
the Palestinians fired two mortar bombs into Israel. There is also
an unconfirmed report that a rocket failed to cross the border and
landed in Gaza.
Later, Palestinians gradually returned to attacking Israel, albeit on a
much reduced scale. From the beginning of the ceasefire on 22nd
November 2012 until 22nd November 2013 Palestinians conducted
the following:

Fired 59 rockets and 14 mortar-bombs into Israel (including the

two mentioned above).
Conducted six small-arms attacks on Israeli patrols and civilians

near the border.
Conducted 6 IED attacks on Israeli border patrols.
Dug a number of tunnels into Israel. To date three tunnels have

been discovered. There may be more. They were intended
either to infiltrate attack teams into Israeli villages, or to place
large bombs to be exploded under Israeli targets.
Thrown two petrol bombs on Israeli border patrols.
Analysis
The arsenal of Hamas and its smaller rivals contained thousands
of rockets when the fighting ceased, and they have received more
since. So the reason for the reduced rate of attacks is not lack of
capability. Therefore, the question arises: what has maintained the
relative quiet deterrence (fear of Israels response), or other factors?
Without listening in on Hamas government discussions, it is impossible
to give a definite answer. However, as far as can be ascertained
from official Hamas statements, Palestinian media reports on the
situation in Gaza and information released by the Israeli authorities,
the answer is apparently both. Some attacks were by Hamas, but
most were by its smaller rivals. Hamas often tries to prevent attacks
by these other groups, though certainly not for love of Israel. In
addition to the heavy casualties they suffered they face a number of
serious problems which they prefer to deal with without suffering the
cost of Israeli military and economic retaliations:

Falling out with the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt.

That government was angry at Hamas for allowing Gaza to
be used by more extreme Sunni groups who attacked Egyptian
police in Sinai. In the most severe incident, prior to Defensive
Pillar, a group from Gaza crossed into Egypt, attacked an
Egyptian police station, killed 16 policemen, and stole their
weapons and vehicles (including an armoured vehicle). They
then used that vehicle to break through the Israeli-Egyptian
border fence, and attempted to drive to an adjacent Israeli
village. They were intercepted by Israeli forces. Most were
killed in the ensuing firefight without Israeli casualties.
The falling-out with the Muslim Brotherhood government in

Egypt was an internal family spat. After the Egyptian armed
forces reassumed control, Egyptian anger has had major
consequences. The mainstay of Hamas economic power and
military supply were the hundreds of supposedly clandestine
tunnels dug under the Gaza-Egyptian border. The Mubarak
regime pretended not to know their location (emphasis on
pretended), allowing uncontrolled import of civilian and
military goods into Gaza in violation of the Israel-Egypt Peace
Treaty. When the Morsi regime got angry with Hamas, the
Egyptian army suddenly located some tunnels, closed them,
and imposed other sanctions. The resurgent military regime then
suddenly discovered the rest of the tunnels and shut almost all
of them in a matter of weeks. Some were physically destroyed
and some were just blocked. This has precipitated a financial
crisis for the Hamas government in Gaza. No imports means
a severe reduction in income from customs taxation. Hamas
employees are suffering severe wage delays, public projects
are stopped half way through, etc. The Gaza population is
not pleased, and Hamas popularity has declined. This is not
a good time to start another war with Israel especially since
military imports are blocked as well.
To add to their troubles, Hamas also fell out with its former
allies, the Syrian regime and Iran. Both had supplied funds and
weapons to Hamas, but stopped after Hamas declared support
for its Syrian Sunni brethren fighting the regime in the Syrian
Civil War. Recently Hamas decided that, given its troubles with
the Egyptians, it has no choice but to change its tune on Syria
in order to reconnect with Iranian financial and military support.
Fortune smiled on the Israelis. In all these attacks only five soldiers
were wounded in a single IED incident. However, a month later, in
December 2013, an Israeli civilian was killed by a Palestinian sniper
and the frequency of rocket and ground attacks increased.[vi]
Until the shooting of the civilian, Israeli responses attacks were
intermittent and limited. On some occasions they did not respond;
on others they responded with economic sanctions (when the tunnels
were discovered, Israel refused to allow the import of building
materials of the kind used in the tunnels but also needed for other
civilian projects for a couple of months). In a few cases, Israel carried
out preventative or retaliatory air strikes on launch teams or bases.
Palestinian casualties are not clear: they have apparently been fairly
few. The majority of casualties were wounded when they attacked
the border fence or tried to cross it into Israel. IDF orders are to
first warn Palestinians off with megaphones, then shoot nearby to
scare, and finally shoot to wound. In some cases the wounds were
perhaps fatal: Hamas sometimes reports fatalities caused by Israeli
fire, but they are not reliable as a source. After attacks escalated in
December, Israeli responses have become more aggressive. Each
rocket or ground attack brings an air strike on the perpetrators, their
commanders, or arsenals.
Eado Hecht
Hamas is struggling. It has other, more pressing issues than fighting

Israel. It is also trying to recuperate its severely hurt armed forces.
The success of the initial Israeli air strike was a severe shock. How
Military Operations
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Page 5

did the Israelis know where all the long-range rockets and launchers
were located, as well as the other secret bases and sites that they
attacked? What other supposed secrets do they know? The success
of the Iron Dome negated their most powerful weapon. They need
to think of new tactics for the future war, tactics which will cause
more Israeli casualties. Hence the increased focus on digging tunnels
under the border towards Israeli villages.
Hamas rivals do not care about Hamas economic and political
woes. Their problem is getting the equipment they need. If Hamas is
hurt by Israel, they gain political and military points in their rivalry
with it. Also, by firing at Israel they get funds and support from other
international Sunni jihadi groups. They do have to tread a thin line
between doing something and doing too much, as that might goad
Israel into a big response that would hurt them or compel Hamas
into an all-out cleaning-up operation against them, in order to save
it from Israeli wrath.
So, to summarize: the relative quiet is the result of a mix of deterrence
and other unrelated issues.
The time has come to assess Israels actions in the war. Without
a doubt, the Israelis got what they wanted on the political level:
relative quiet. Relative quiet rather than complete quiet because
the Israelis are too experienced to expect more. As an Israeli joke,
loosely translated, goes: On coffee-breaks you drink coffee; on
lunch-breaks you eat lunch; on smoke-breaks you smoke cigarettes;
so why expect that on fire-breaks [the literal translation of the Hebrew
term for ceasefire] the fire should cease? In that sense Israels
strategy for Operation Defensive Pillar was a resounding success,
even though Hamas also made some minor face-saving political
gains (such as access to farming land and fishing areas adjacent
to the border). Those measures have since proved troublesome
for the Israelis, by facilitating attacks on Israeli patrols and Israeli
farmers working adjacent to the border. The attackers approach the
fence masked as innocent Palestinian farmers, to collect intelligence,
prepare ambush sites and place bombs near to the fence. As long
as they dont actually touch the fence or carry arms overtly, Israeli
troops have orders not to shoot.
However, individual Israeli tactics were less successful. There were
of course some successes. The initial surprise attack enabled the
destruction of the long-range rocket arsenal. Hamas and other groups
suffered approximately 1,000 killed and wounded, including some
30 senior commanders; not an insignificant percentage of casualties
and an excellent rate of exchange when compared to Israeli
casualties. But, the real measure of tactical (rather than strategic or
political) success or failure is that the attempt of the Israeli air force to
suppress rocket-launches failed miserably. Despite continuous aerial
surveillance and strikes, Hamas and the other groups still managed
to fire 1,500 rockets in seven days (double the average daily rate
fired by Hizbullah in 2006). Israeli air strikes seem to have barely
affected the rate of rocket launches. Admittedly, except for three or
four rockets, all those fired could reach only three major cities, a
dozen towns and several dozen villages in southern Israel (750,000
Israelis rather than the two million threatened by the bigger rocket
types), but launches continued unabated to the last minute. Had it
not been for the Iron Dome, approximately 480 of these rockets
would have hit Israeli civilians, instead of only 58. Israeli civilian
casualties would probably have been some eight times higher,
unless the population abandoned their homes and places of work
Military Operations
Eado Hecht
and fled out of range.

Given the cost of Iron Dome systems, and especially the interceptor
missiles, Hamas will probably simply try to acquire so many rockets
and launchers (costing only a fraction of Iron Dome) they can
inundate the Iron Dome with more than it can handle simultaneously,
and then keep on firing until Israel runs out of interceptor missiles.
Even if the Israeli air force doubles its launcher-hitting success rate
in a future war, it still will not be able to suppress the launches to a
bearable level. This teaches us that the stand-off aerial suppression
tactic will simply not work if Hamas or Hizbullah are determined to
conduct a lengthy exchange (as in the 34 day Second Lebanese
War), as opposed to a short strike which they then end of their
own volition. At the rate Hamas fired in Defensive Pillar (double
Hizbullahs rate of fire in 2006), Hizbullah (with its present stocks)
can maintain continuous fire every day for nine months without
resupply![vii] Without Iron Domes success in Defensive Pillar,
convincing Hamas to cease fire before incurring prohibitive Israeli
civilian casualties and damage to economic infrastructure would
have required either a ground invasion to capture the launch-areas
or political concessions tantamount to an Israel surrender. In a future
exchange, if Hamas or Hizbullah succeed in inundating or outlasting
Iron Dome this harsh dilemma will confront the Israel government.
In 1991 Iraq launched some 40 missiles in six weeks almost all
at night. The Patriot anti-missile defence failed and the Coalition
aerial missile-hunting campaign merely delayed launches. Tens
of thousands of Israelis left their homes in targeted areas to sleep
elsewhere, returning to work during the day. Israel chose not to
respond because casualties and damage were minimal and the
American-led Coalition was expected to defeat the Iraqis. In 2006
Hizbullah fired 4,000 rockets and mortar bombs into northern Israel
in 34 days, threatening about a million Israelis. Many moved south
temporarily. Then too the Israeli air force succeeded in destroying
most of the longer-range rockets but failed completely against the
shorter-range types. On 12th August 2006 the frustrated Israeli
government ordered the IDF to conduct a major ground offensive
into Lebanon but on the same day the UN declared a ceasefire to
begin within 48 hours, which Hizbullah accepted, so the offensive
was stopped.
Conclusions
Israels experiences are partly unique to its specific political,
geographic and strategic situation. They can, however, be used as
a basis for learning lessons relevant to others as well. Israel is a
small state located close to most of its enemies. The wars of the
USA and Europe are conducted overseas: their home front is not
exposed to rockets. However, conducting a war overseas makes
them logistically dependent on airports and seaports, requires them
to build large logistical and headquarter bases, and to defend the
infrastructure and civilians of the host state. These may not be as
politically important or militarily crucial as their own civilians, but
when facing an enemy capable of firing a couple of hundred fairly
accurate rockets a day, they do need to be defended.
Cheap, easily manufactured, long range rockets enable small military
groups to strike their enemys hinterland easily, but are simultaneously
a sign of military weakness. Conventional rocket warheads are
less effective at producing mass casualties than hand-delivered
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Page 6
Eado Hecht
suitcase bombs or close-range small-arms fire in a crowded civilian

setting. They are preferred when the attacker cannot penetrate the
enemys ground defences. The effectiveness of rockets is limited by
the compromise between survivability on the one hand and range
and payload on the other. Greater strategic effect requires longer
range and larger payloads, so the launchers need to be bigger. This
transforms them into easier targets for air power, thereby reducing
the actual number that can be fired before the enemy air force
locates and destroys the launchers. Smaller rocket launchers are
easily hidden and very cheap and easy to manufacture, making the
rocket force based on them almost impervious to air attacks.[viii] The
strategic effect of smaller rockets depends on how close important
targets are to the border and the number of rockets fired.
many scenarios, armies must retain the ability to rapidly capture

ground to a depth equal to the range of most of the enemys rockets
and then comb the entire area in order to locate and destroy
launchers and rocket stores. Even when facing guerrilla-style
enemies, this requires a regular mechanized offensive capability.
It needs to attack through the anti-armour and anti-personnel fire
that many of these groups are now acquiring;[ix] to advance
deeply; and then split up into self-contained battlegroups to conduct
combing and clearing operations. Rockets and launchers are easier
to replace than proficient personnel, so killing the manufacturers and
the launcher teams is more effective than destroying the launchers
and rockets, both for the short term (reducing the rate of fire) and for
the long term (achieving deterrence).
As Israels experiences have repeatedly shown, aerial power alone

is not an effective tactic except in a limited set of scenarios. Unless
overwhelmed by enormous salvos, anti-rocket defences can be
effective. However, being very expensive to manufacture, these
will probably be exhausted before the attackers store of rockets
is depleted. Before that happens the defender must either achieve
a favourable ceasefire agreement or conduct ground operations to
capture launch sites within range of ones civilians. Therefore, for
Even the most effective and efficient anti-rocket operation will need
time to achieve results. The home front must be prepared: not only
physically, to live through bombardment; but also psychologically,
to understand that results will not be immediate or perfect. Some
rockets will get through even at the last minute. That is not a sign of
the general failure of the operation. An operations success can be
deduced only in retrospect: measured by the continuation, reduction,
or complete cessation of enemy attacks.
Eado Hecht is a member of Military Operations Editorial Advisory Panel
References
[i] The exact number is moot, but is probably in the order of 25,000 more than half of them since 2000.
[ii] Preventative Actions are conducted when intelligence provides early warning; Retaliatory Actions are conducted after the fact to punish the group
launching the rockets or mortar-bombs.
[iii] For a brief description of the development of Israels strategy vis--vis these attacks see: Hecht, E., Israeli Strategy in the First Lebanon War, 1982-1985,
Strategic Misfortunes Infinity Journal Special Edition, October 2012, pp 16-20.
[iv] There were also a handful of attacks on Israel from other directions (the West Bank, Jerusalem, Syria and Lebanon) but only two more Israelis were wounded.
Both were civilians.
[v] The numbers are based on official Israeli and Palestinian accounts. There are discrepancies between the accounts as to the exact number of Palestinian
casualties, so the figures should be regarded as approximate.
[vi] Since then several dozen more rocket, mortar, sniping and border-ambush attacks have taken place.
[vii] According to published official Israeli intelligence figures Hizbullah has 80,000 to 100,000 rockets. Most of them are short-range types, but some thousands
are medium- or long-range types.
[viii] They are almost invariably hit only after launching and are extremely cheap and quick to replace. They can be regarded as single-shot launchers.
[ix] In 2006 Hizbullah fired a couple of hundred anti-tank missiles (mostly Sagger, but also Fagot, TOW and Kornet). Hamas too has a variety of anti-tank missiles
and so do the rebel forces in Syria.
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The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of

Battlefield Control Measures
Philip Stack
The requirement for the coordination of units across wide frontages

has long been an essential condition for the successful employment
of ground forces. The key differences between an armed and violent
rabble (an urban riot mob) and a military unit include the execution
of a design for the use of force: feinting, blocking, attacking
in a coordinated fashion to achieve success. Once the span of
operations became too wide for a single commander supported by
a team of messengers to supervise, the design of operations required
increasingly sophisticated battlefield control measures. The structure
of the military commanders creative operational plan is built from
battlefield control measures. Used wisely, they enable it to unfold
as envisaged, in a scheme of manoeuvre and to be adaptable to
changing circumstances.
In this article I will look at the development of battlefield control, using
the British Army as my source of examples, and go on to look at how
the requirement for control can be met today and in the future. I will
argue that battlefield control measures are an essential part of the
design of an operation, and that well-designed controls should be
seen as permissive rather than restrictive factors in planning.
The Development of Battlefield Control Measures
The British Army entered the First World War with extensive
operational experience from the Boer War. That experience was
distilled into the Field Service Regulations of 1909, which provided
the doctrinal underpinning in the first years of the war. The small
professional pre-war Army emphasized the principles of delegation
and giving freedom of action (An operation order should contain
just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. It should
tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself).[i]
Where a superior commander felt it necessary to impose control
measures they would be brief and basic: (in the attack) the actual
limits of frontage should be specified as far as possible... the direction
of the attack to be made by each body should be distinctly stated.
[ii] At the Battle of the Aisne in September 1914, cooperation
was confined generally to that fortuitously arranged by commanders
on the spot.[iii]
By 1917, the necessity for the intimate coordination of indirect fire
and troop movement had been addressed through the use of the
rolling barrage. The need for precise coordination of movement and
fire created a requirement for clear control measures expressed in
space and time.
The essential tool for command in this system is the linear control
measure: a boundary; a line of departure; or a limit of exploitation.
The introduction of gridded maps in October 1914 had increased
the ability to refer to spatial features (before the War, locations
would be referred to as the wood 200 yds SW of the junction at
x). In doing this, and overlaying the timed artillery plan, the staff
laid down a combat clockwork: a design to be wound up by the
assembly of forces and supplies, and then unwound at the defined
time according to a pre-described direction and rate. Conditions
and technology combined to require a new and comprehensive set
of control measures.
The use of battlefield control measures developed through the
Twentieth Century. The Battle of Alamein of 1942 bears a close
resemblance, in terms of structure, to the opening battles of the
Passchendaele campaign in late 1917; but as advances in command
and control enabled more economical targeting of artillery, the preplanned element of battlefield control receded in prominence.
During the Battle of Normandy in 1944, large formations were
To cite this Article: Stack, Philip, The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of Battlefield Control Measures,
Military Operations, Volume 2, Issue No. 3, Summer 2014, pages 8-11.
Military Operations
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The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of Battlefield Control Measures

manoeuvring in close terrain. Despite the development of artillery
command and control, the timed barrage still played a role. It was
used for break-in operations, such as a 110 minute barrage on a
1.5 mile frontage fired during 8 Corps Operation BLUECOAT in
July 1944, advancing at 100 yds every 4 minutes. BLUECOAT also
shows the importance of land/air coordination, as can be seen by
the waves of heavy bombers that were sequenced throughout the
first day of the operation for each successive phase. At this stage of
the war, the point of land/air coordination was to ensure the safety
of ground forces, by designating safe distances from the targets.
Safety of air forces - obtained by the close control of ground-based
air defence - was not an issue that the ground force HQs sought to
control.
Heavy bomber sorties in close support of ground forces were very
difficult to amend. They required close control of movement for safety
purposes, as well as to support the exploitation of the shock effect
of the bombing. Terrain, narrow frontages and limited routes meant
that control of movement was now a critical aspect of overall control.
This required assembly areas, designated routes and a movement
control organisation to ensure effective use of road space.
The technology, organization and tactics of Allied forces at the
conclusion of the Second World War were subsequently adopted
by NATO ground forces. This process was supported by the
NATO standardization mechanism which ensured common terms
and interoperable doctrine. Allied interoperability required that
there was a common approach to battlefield control measures,
with common definitions being laid down in NATO publication
AAP-6, supported by common graphical symbols disseminated as
AAP-6A. However, command and control technology showed little
development for many decades. This lack of progress was most
pronounced at the lower tactical levels, implying that the techniques
for employing battlefield control measures remained little changed
from the close of the Second World War. Despite the fact that the
British Army introduced a step change with the introduction of
the WAVELL computer system from the 1970s, it was confined to
formation headquarters at brigade level and above. Battle groups
continued to use insecure combat net radio throughout the Cold War
(and beyond) with the implication that battlefield control measures
needed to be all-encompassing and established prior to the start of
an operation. Amendment was problematic with low confidence in
full and timely transmission.
Spatial battlefield control measures can be categorized as one of

several forms, imposing either permissive or restrictive control, or
being aimed at the synchronization of time and space.
Permissive and Restrictive Control
The corollary of giving a commander freedom of action is that
others must be restricted to avoid interference. Unit flank and rear
boundaries define a zone of freedom for the nominated commander,
while fire control measures, such as Restricted Fire Lines, reduce the
chances of engaging friendly forces. Other fire control measures
(such as the Fire Support Coordination Line) serve to designate
the lead authority for targeting and employing weapons systems.
The concepts of permissive and restrictive control are therefore
complementary, and one units freedom of action is anothers
constraint.
In employing spatial control measures the commander is actually
doing far more than merely avoiding fratricide or dividing up terrain.
Control measures are employed to bring a scheme of manoeuvre to
life. For example, unit sector widths (defined by lateral boundaries)
are the most straightforward way of concentrating or dispersing
firepower and therefore of adjusting the distribution of combat
power in space.
Similarly, the establishment of fire co-ordination lines can have
profound effects on the development of the battle. Northern Army
Group (NORTHAG) employed a well orchestrated planning process
(the Rover Group) that enabled planning staffs from five or six
Corps, a Tactical Air Force and the Army Group staff to produce
new plans in less than a working day. The location of the key fire
co-ordination lines, such as the Reconnaissance and Interdiction
Planning Line (RIPL) and Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL),
which designated the targeting responsibilities for the Land and Air
commanders, was often keenly discussed, as the staffs attempted to
fulfill the requirements of their respective commanders. This tension
tended to focus on the allocation of resources to the concurrent
conduct of Offensive Counter Air operations against opposing air
forces and Air Interdiction against second echelon ground forces.
This imbalance would normally result in different targeting priorities,
and the location of the coordination lines became critical in the
development of planning.
Synchronization of Time and Space
Controlling the Battlespace

Spatial battlefield control measures offer the advantage of being
simple to demonstrate on maps and traces, a shorthand notation
that permits rapid dissemination and enables the control measure to
be related to the mission and the terrain. Sectors of operation are
allocated to units to give them the space to achieve the allocated
mission and role in the higher commanders plan. Having decided
to give a task such as secure Hill Z to a unit, the lateral boundaries
should be drawn in a manner that gives the unit commander
sufficient freedom of action to execute that task as seen fit, rather
than constraining him or her to a single course of action. Having
allocated a mission in terms of a task and its purpose, and allocated
resources, battlefield control measures control the use of time and
space in the execution of the plan.
Philip Stack
Military Operations
Other control measures have the purpose of synchronizing movement

of forces with each other or with other activities. The purpose of a
Line of Departure is to enable activities, due to happen before and
after a certain point in time (the H Hour in NATO parlance) to be
coordinated, through the knowledge that at a pre-determined time,
forces will be in a certain place. This enables indirect fire and the
movement of forces to be coordinated. Other synchronizing lines
(often known as Phase Lines or Report Lines) are used for similar
purposes.
Although H Hours and Lines of Departure are fundamental to the
practice of battle procedure, other synchronizing lines have often
attracted adverse comment for constraining initiative by imposing
restraint. This is a criticism that should more correctly be laid at the
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scheme of manoeuvre rather than the control measures imposed.
Phase Lines are a means of maintaining control, enabling the
full weight of pre-planned combat power to be applied at each
stage of the battle. Whether this is appropriate is dependent on
the prevailing situation. For every example of the decisive use
of momentum and shock action by a small force, there will be a
countervailing example where it leads to failure (the destruction of
the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry during Operation GOODWOOD in
1944 being one notable example). The ability to judge the dividing
line between boldness and recklessness remains a key attribute of
successful military leadership. However, there can be little doubt that
over-imposition of control measures, to ensure synchronization, often
serves to calm the nerves of a higher commander, giving confidence
that his formation is operating coherently.
A commanders need for situational awareness can therefore have a
negative side, constraining subordinates and reducing momentum.
This is an area where modern command and control technology
enables battlefield control measures to be relaxed. With Blue Force
tracking, the commander can remain confident about the disposition
of his forces while maintaining the pace of the operation.
The widely used synchronization matrix provides a mechanism for
visualizing the coordination of resources, space and time, and a
very efficient form of communication of a plan. As a tool for planning
and for managing changes to a plan, it formalizes previous ad-hoc
methods to achieve similar ends.
Battlefield Control Today
Following the tactical euphoria, verging on irrational exuberance,
which followed the devastating turning movement employed by the
US Army and its allies in the First Gulf War, questions were asked
of the traditional battlefield control measures that had evolved, and
served well, for nearly a century. British officers returning from the
experience of the desert questioned whether unit boundaries were
in fact serving as constraints on creativity and the free flowing
development of operations. Could not operations be planned by
designating unit axes alone, leaving out the clutter of boundaries,
route networks and real estate control? These discussions centred on
the developing doctrine establishments. In HQ 1(BR) Corps, there
was a failure to notice the significant factors of environment and
context in determining the requirement for control measures on the
battlefield.
Philip Stack
In the two decades since the First Gulf War, battlefield control
has been subject to factors and influences that both complicate
and simplify the task. Technology speeds up the dissemination of
instructions and the situational awareness of all HQs in the network.
This enables more dynamic control of the operations, but also
increases the demands on HQs as expectations of real-time control
grow. The spread of UAV operations, in particular, has made the
integration of the land-air battle a key concern of HQs at all levels.
The land-air coordination task was formerly a concern of higher
formations that were dealing with air operations and battlefield
helicopters. However, the spread of UAV and mini-UAV operations,
and counter-rocket and mortar systems, has created the need for
HQs at all levels to operate in a network which coordinates land-air
operations on a short-term basis.
Conclusion
The range of command and control measures employed by
advanced armies has evolved from a requirement to deconflict
and coordinate multiple activities occurring in a turbulent and
dangerous environment. Once measures were set before the start of
an operation, it was difficult to make changes, since until recently,
command and control systems did not permit this level of dynamic
control.
The inter-unit boundary, rather than being seen as a constraint, can
be seen as an enabler. Within the given boundaries, the designated
commander has freedom of action, subject to any limitations
specifically imposed (such as areas of real estate being reserved
for certain users) and without the need for liaison with any flanking
units.
This article started with the British Field Service Regulations 1909,
and the guidance that it contained. It stated that operation orders
should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing
more. That phrase continues to resonate today, recognizing that
freedom of action cannot be given without also imposing some
constraint. Clarity and simplicity should be the aspiration of military
planners, following the maxim that if a plan cannot be drawn as
an unambiguous operational trace then it is unlikely to work as an
operation.
The relatively featureless area of operations of the First Gulf War

lacked clutter and significant high points or obstacles and had few
routes. In such an environment, the ability to move dispersed across
multiple axes of advance, then concentrate for combat actions, as
well as protect open flanks is key. Friendly fire incidents can be
reduced by good recognition measures. Axes do indeed become
more important than boundaries, providing the centre line for
movement. The situation is very different in the cluttered environment
that prevails elsewhere, in areas where the natural or man-made
landscape constrains movement and visibility. The problems of cross
country movement and inter-visibility require more positive controls in
order to deconflict space and reduce uncertainty in the identification
of forces.
Well-crafted battlefield control measures continue to have an essential

place in operations. If they are carefully structured, they offer
freedom of action by imposing the minimum necessary constraints
on battlefield activities. Experience shows that there is a further
category of control measures beyond this: controls that are imposed
for the benefit of the controlling headquarters to aid it in imposing
order. Until recently, this form of control had a purpose, due to the
limitations of technology. It was necessary to monitor the activities
of forces in order to maintain a clear picture; preventing fratricide
and ensuring that the full force of available combat power was
deployed at each stage. However, as command and control systems
have developed, this form of control can now move from positive to
negative control: by automatically tracking forces the controlling HQ
can intervene only when necessary. The same technology offers the
ability to make changes in the control measures as required, with
confidence that the changes will be transmitted throughout the force.
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There is a clear vulnerability in relying on unconstrained use of the
electro-magnetic spectrum for blue force tracking and the ability
to amend control measures. The likelihood of enemy exploitation,
interference or denial implies that an operation should still be set
up with battlefield control measures. These should be robust to the
loss of the free use of the EM spectrum. If EM superiority or parity
is maintained, battlefield control measures can then be treated as
dynamic, and amended as the operation develops, if this offers
benefits.
Philip Stack
Commanders and staff officers develop through formal training and

experience. In todays under-exercised armies the opportunities to
learn from experience are limited and those teaching in staff colleges
are themselves lacking in experience of conventional operations. If
training and experience is lacking, there is a temptation to overimpose control. This implies a need for careful attention by trainers
and doctrine writers to historical examples, studies and experience;
realizing that well-applied battlefield control measures are key
elements of the commanders toolbox.
Philip Stack is a recently-retired infantry officer in the British Army. He is now a political risk analysis.
References
[i] The War Office, 1909, Field Service Regulations, p 27. His Majestys Stationery Office, London
[ii] The War Office, 1909, Field Service Regulations, p132. His Majestys Stationery Office, London.
[iii] The War Office, 1934, Battle of the Aisne - Tour of the Battlefield, p 40. His Majestys Stationery Office, London.
Military Operations
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Norwegian Swarm: How Unique National

Doctrines Contribute to a more Flexible NATO
Photo: courtesy of PRT Meymaneh.

Image unchanged and found at, http://bit.ly/1pEPTvu, in accordance with Creative Commons.
Sebastian Langvad
NATO is not as flexible as it could be when preparing for future

contingencies. In a recent article, Gerry Long raised the issue
of western military traditions obsession with achieving tactical
decision, i.e. winning the battle[i]. He is not the first to do so, but
insights like his tend to go unheeded. It is disconcerting that western
nations seem to be lagging behind potential and current adversaries
in understanding this important topic. Both widely recognized and
largely unrecognized shortcomings in the application of force by
western militaries can be traced back to this intellectual failure. The
following article will highlight these shortcomings. It will then present
a concrete, albeit nationally specific, example of how to address
them. The motivation is to inspire a broader debate among those
concerned with improving the utility of military capability.
Expeditionary quagmire
The widely recognized shortcoming alluded to above needs little
elaboration. The wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan are well known
examples of conflicts where the weaker side avoided pitched battles.
In this article, what is meant by the terms tactical decision or winning
a battle is what Jim Storr refers to as causing the withdrawal of
participation by the enemy[ii]. The local enemy in question believes
himself defeated and either retreats or surrenders. The weaker side
in Vietnam and Afghanistan were not geared towards this effect, as
they opted for light infantry forces employing raiding tactics. They
avoided presenting their enemy with concentrations that could be
readily fixed. Their actions were too limited to cause a perception
of defeat in their immediate opponent. These limited engagements
did, however, result in cumulative strategic effects. The perception of
defeat and the resulting withdrawal of participation then occurred

on the strategic level. Thus, the materially far superior military was
unable to bring its weight to bear in a relevant way. A historical
study has shown that when a significantly smaller actor achieves
this asymmetry, there is a 63.6% probability of the smaller party
achieving its war aims[iii]. To current military professionals, this
result probably comes as no surprise. Indeed, a significant portion
of military theoretical discourse during the last decade has focused
on how to counter this phenomenon. What is puzzling, though, is
that western militaries seem to have arrived at the answers to this
question several times. Yet they are forgotten in time for the next
war. The Congressional report on the conduct of the Vietnam War
provides a telling example. It formulated the conclusion that rather
than conventional forces designed to fight for a tactical decision,
what was needed were small, mobile, lightly equipped units of the
ranger or commando type. It requires different weapons, command
systems, communications and logistics[iv]. Such changes in both
training and equipment would counteract the elusiveness of light
infantry who employ raiding tactics. When these opponents can be
fixed in battle, material, technological and professional superiority
remain deciding factors. It is logically inescapable that, with all
other factors being equal, success will most likely go to the stronger
side. Gerry Long refers to a similar observation of how guerrilla
tactics augmented by [superior] firepower would produce tactical
success[v].
With the need identified, and knowledge of that type of warfare
abundantly available, why are western armies not better at it? The
answer, of course, is that unconventional forces are not the only
challenge facing these militaries. Direct, conventional threats to
national sovereignty, though more infrequent, are rightly seen as the
defining task for these organisations. Historically, focus has tended
to oscillate between defeating symmetric and asymmetric opponents.
And so, timeless lessons are forgotten only to be relearned when the
need arises once again. Unfortunately, this process of rediscovery is
marked by a hefty human, material and strategic price. Expeditionary
To cite this Article: Langvad, Sebastian, Norwegian Swarm: How Unique National Doctrines Contribute to a
more Flexible NATO, Military Operations, Volume 2, Issue No. 3, Summer 2014, pages 13-15.
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Norwegian Swarm
Sebastian Langvad
commitments are now drawing down and (re)emergent great

powers are shaping an increasingly multipolar world. The pendulum
of doctrinal focus might, thus, very well be swinging towards more
direct, national defence. At the same time, western intervention
abroad is by no means an unlikely scenario in the coming decades.
Our enemies in these conflicts must be expected to strive for the
same asymmetry that has proven so effective in the past.
National defence
The solution to this seemingly contradictory doctrinal challenge can
be found in a less recognized consequence of western obsession with
the decisive battle. Gerry Long, among other military thinkers, focuses
on how this cultural disposition inhibits the West from responding
relevantly to an opponent avoiding pitched battle. However, a
different angle to the problem has gone largely unmentioned. The
supposition that an operational concept is somehow tied to culture is
as illogical as it is uncritically accepted in many circles. A superficial
glance at history, from Catholic Spaniards through Communist
Vietnamese to Muslim mujahedin, reveals that culture is a weak
predictor of when unconventional warfare is seen as a rational
choice. This, at least, is commonly accepted; unconventional war is
the way the weak fight the strong. An obvious implication has been
ignored in western military thought. The size and strength of western
nations and their militaries are as varied as any such relationship
in other parts of the world. Why, then, is it obviously assumed
that all western militaries should be trained and equipped to fight
a conventional opponent with symmetric capabilities in search of
a tactical decision. The root cause of this assumption is easy to
imagine. The ideas and theories that make up the military portion of
western cultural heritage build almost exclusively on the experiences
made by great powers with strategically offensive ambitions. John
Lynn points out that the western army style has evolved after the
pattern of one nations army gaining notoriety, causing other nations
to emulate that model[vi]. The most recent role model was the
Prussian/German army, before the role was assumed by the US
Army. For smaller nations, however, it might not be in their best
interest to match so completely an organization resting on a wholly
different resource base. Granted, they would maintain a breadth of
capabilities not far removed from their bigger counterpart. Depth of
capacity, on the other hand, would approach (or even fall below)
critical mass. The result is a military that is unacceptably fragile
on its own. Smaller nations should therefore seek greater capacity
for national defence by ruthlessly cutting capabilities that are only
necessary for the political ambitions of the bigger role model. The
resources released should then be channelled into capabilities
that have proven to benefit small, defensive actors. Raiding forces
have already been mentioned as such a capability, and this will be
considered below.
doctrines should be compatible, not identical. Compatibility comes

from common terms and procedures and interoperable technology. It
should not come from superimposing concepts of operation unsuited
for a given context.
From this line of reasoning it should now become apparent that a
critical look at the value of winning the battle reveals how to handle
an unconventional opponent. Additionally, it tells us that NATO can
expand its capacity to do this without compromising its members
capacity for direct national defence. This article will now present an
example of how a small NATO member, in this case Norway, might
design its land power to contribute to this more flexible alliance.
Maladapted doctrine
Current Norwegian military doctrine is in every meaningful way a
copy of the American AirLand Battle concept. In this regard, the
country has gone the same way as most other NATO members.
Doctrines that have proven informative to its practitioners are the
ones designed to counter a specific threat in a specific operational
context. In the case of AirLand Battle, the threat and context was
the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. It is interesting to note that the
Americans themselves considered ALB to be an unsuitable option
in the Norwegian context[vii]. That opinion is well founded. When
you push heavy, mechanized forces into the canalizing valleys and
coastal roads of northern Norway, you are left with combat that
diverges fundamentally from the principles of manoeuvre warfare.
Rather than avoiding strength and striking weakness, mechanized
forces are locked in a frontal confrontation with a numerically
superior opponent. They are unable to access the enemys flank
or rear, except at the lowest tactical levels. The whole endeavour
devolves into a material slugging match, one which a small country
like Norway is likely to lose on its own. This last point highlights the
burden one members maladapted doctrine places on the alliance.
For Norways doctrine to achieve the goal of protecting the countrys
territory, the alliance must divert sufficient resources to allow the
force to prevail in this slugging match. This ties up resources which
might be needed elsewhere. What is needed is a Norwegian
doctrine that sets its military up to pursue a strategically defensive
ambition with minimal allied support. Any assistance the alliance
is able to provide would be valuable, but its absence would not be
decisive. The fundamentals of such a doctrine are likely to be found
in Norways historical light infantry-tradition. Here, rugged terrain
and a harsh climate are turned to an advantage, not an obstacle.
Norwegian Swarm
Finland and Switzerland are prominent examples of small states that

have not gone the way of bigger contemporaries. That these are
alliance-free nations illustrates the most common, current counterargument to small NATO-members developing unique doctrines;
small alliance members must align their military forces with those of
their larger partners. By preparing to fend for one self it is feared
that that contingency will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. While
this might appear eminently logical, it is a flawed assumption caused
more by a lack of military creativity than by objective necessity.
Fundamentally, it is questionable for a sovereign state to design its
military in such a way that it is likely to fail should it have to stand
alone. What is more, by conforming to the operational concept of
the strongest alliance partner, the alliance as a whole is deprived
of the flexibility that a new breadth of capability would yield. Allied
Swarming behaviour has gained increased attention during the

last decade, parallel to the advances in information technology.
Sean Edwards has studied a range of historical cases where
swarming was observed on the battlefield[viii]. His conclusion was
that with the right combination of the factors elusiveness, superior
situational awareness and stand-off capability, a swarming force
can defeat a heavier opponent. The defining characteristic of a
swarming force is one composed of small, semi-autonomous units
that rely on dispersion for protection while they conduct aggressive
reconnaissance to locate vulnerable targets. When a target has
been acquired, the locating unit informs nearby units that then
converge on the target from multiple directions. Jim Storr has
referred to simulations that demonstrate that such tactics greatly
increase the likelihood of achieving surprise against the enemy[ix],
with the attendant positive effects on combat outcome. When the
element of surprise is expended, however, the units in contact should
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Norwegian Swarm
Sebastian Langvad
disengage. Thus, they do not exploit the surprise with the aim of
instilling systemic shock in the enemy organization. The swarm will
maintain surveillance of its opponent, and if the opportunity arises
it pulses in for additional attacks along new axes. This behaviour
puts the swarming force clearly in the raiding category according
to Archer Jones model referred to by Storr[x]. When Storr raises
doubts about the effectiveness of relying solely on forces unable to
conduct decisive shock action on the enemy[xi], we return to this
articles initial argument: the need for a tactical decision primarily
belongs to the strategically offensive side. The materially weaker,
defensive side can, and indeed should, aim to achieve its political
goals by avoiding decisive battles.
In the Norwegian context, the same factors that hinder the effective
implementation of AirLand Battle greatly favour a swarming force
fighting a mechanized opponent. A Norwegian swarm will use
helicopter or small boat insertion of light terrain vehicles with
signature-reducing technology into the mountains of its northern
province. The force will use dispersed manoeuvre to mitigate a
likely enemy air threat. It will infiltrate to positions which threaten the
few roads available to the mechanized enemy. Superior situational
awareness is gained through a combination of aggressive ground
reconnaissance, a sympathetic local population and higher level, or
allied, intelligence support. All this is connected by real-time network
communications. Based on the resulting information superiority, the
swarming units will avoid the enemys main combat units. They will
seek out vulnerable targets in the tactical or operational rear instead.
When suitable targets are located, available forces converge and
engage them with portable, precision guided munitions from multiple
directions. Manually portable air defence systems are employed to
counter potential enemy vertical envelopment. Before the enemy
can mount a concerted response, the swarming units disengage
to preserve combat power and seek out new opportunities for
attack. The enemy is faced with a seemingly amorphous and
ubiquitous[xii] adversary, both tactically and strategically. He will

experience increasing frustration as casualties mount without being
able to respond relevantly. Eventually, his offensive ambitions are
abandoned as the price starts to exceed the value of the goal.
Conclusion
If the last paragraph appears to describe what many term guerrilla
warfare, that is because the fundamental principle is the same:
refuse to fight a stronger enemy on his own terms. However,
swarming involves a higher degree of coordination, albeit
decentralized self-coordination. Hence, its effect is more controllable.
In addition, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue that modern
advances in information technology, both in weapon systems and
communications, are poised to reveal an unprecedented potential
for dispersed, networked units[xiii].
With its swarming force, Norway would possess the means with
which to deter attacks even when operating with minimal allied
support. Another aspect of this force might, however, be more
relevant in the near future. It would contribute to NATOs solution to
the challenge of defeating enemies that refuse to enter into decisive
battle. The Norwegian swarm would consist of personnel trained
to operate independently in small teams, with weapons to make
these teams a formidable threat and with mobility support allowing
unpredictable courses of action. This highly mobile force would not
offer its raiding opponent the warning time he needs in order to
refuse a battle that is not to his liking. In short, the swarm would
be able to confront unconventional opponents symmetrically, bring
superior equipment and training to bear and defeat them at their own
game. Both as direct contributors to allied operations, but also as
concept and competence developers in the alliance, this nationally
adapted doctrine could be one piece of a more flexible NATO.
Sebastian Langvad is a cadet at the Norwegian Military Academy.
References
[i] Long, Gerry,The Edge of Glory: The Western Way of Combat and the Search for the Elusive Decisive Battle in an Age of Terror, Military Operations, Volume 2, Issue
no. 1, Winter 2014, pp 13-1.
[ii] Storr, Jim, 2009, The Human Face of War, London: Continuum Publishing, p.51.
[iii] Arregun-Toft, Ivan, 2006, How the Weak Win Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[iv] The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam (Senator Gravel Edition: 4 vols), Boston: Beacon Press, 1971,
p.435.
[v] Long, Gerry, The Edge of Glory: The Western Way of Combat and the Search for the Elusive Decisive Battle in an Age of Terror, Military Operations, Volume 2,
Issue no. 1, Winter 2014, pp 13-16.
[vi] Lynn, John A., The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West. I: The International History Review XVIII 3, August 1996, s 505545.
[vii] Sveraas ,Torgeir E. og Henriksen, Kjetil, Et militrt universalmiddel- Amerikansk Maneuver Warfare og norsk doktrineutvikling, IFS, 2007, s 147.
[viii] Edwards, Sean J.A , Swarming and the Future of Warfare. RAND, 2005.
[ix] Storr, Jim, 2009, The Human Face of War, London: Continuum Publishing, p.87.
[x] Ibid. p.66.
[xi] Ibid. p. 128.
[xii] Arquilla, John, Ronfeldt, David, 2000, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, RAND Corporation, p.45.
[xiii] Ibid.
Military Operations
TJOMO.com
Page 15
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Islamic extremism is not a new phenomenon. In the 1100s, the

Nazari Ismaili sect later known as the Assassins started a 200year terrorist campaign, murdering Crusaders and Muslims to further
political ends and exact vengeance on unbelievers or Muslims
apostates[i]. While the Assassins weapon of terror was the dagger,
for the modern Islamic extremist, technology has progressed.
between the Coalition and the insurgents, much of the literature

alludes (again through generic language) that entire insurgent
groupings adopt sweeping change in their tactics simultaneously.
Also possible, however, is that just one experimental attack by
a local sub-group was the only example of the innovation which
authors subsequently credit to all terrorists. In the current literature,
it is common for a single incident to be interpreted as a terrorist
capability.
Jihadist Use of Weapons and State Sponsorship
Much has been made by governments, non-government agencies and

the media of Jihadist[ii] groups ability to conduct effective attacks,
particularly how they use technology within their modus operandi.
As a consequence, technological innovation is regarded by many
researchers as central to how Jihadists redress the imbalance in
combat power of the conventional forces facing them.
Like everyone, Jihadists have been shaped by advances

technology. Terrorists groups have traditionally been good
improvising weapons, as often (particularly for campaigns
their infancy) they found themselves unable to source sufficient
appropriate weaponry for their needs.
This article focuses solely on the Jihadists use of technology in

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). It will show that, despite the
hype, their use of technology remains conservative and mirrors
common usage trends. It will also demonstrate that technological
advances have largely been driven by state intervention or intragroup transfer (often with state origins) rather than local invention.
Of note is that location can improve a groups access to weapons.

In the last twenty years, small arms and conventional military
explosives have been available to Middle Eastern and Asian groups
as a legacy of conflict. In 2003 in Iraq, US forces securing arms in
the newly liberated state learned that nearly 380 tonnes of high
explosive had been looted from a single facility, which represented
less than one percent of Iraqs stockpile[iii].
in
at
in
or
In reviewing the huge range of literature on this subject, ranging

from government sources to self-produced Jihadist material, it
is notable that the majority seeks to play up the capability rather
than provide a critical assessment. Much of this literature appears
credulous regarding the threats, routinely presenting worst case
scenarios as most likely. Additionally, the literature on Iraqi and
Afghan insurgents attack methods is often too generic for an in-depth
analysis of how quickly they adapted to technological advances by
the Coalition.
The problem of weapon and component procurement is more acute

for groups based in countries with stricter weapon-control laws. In
Britain and Europe, for example, the requirement to modify civilian
technologies for military use is more pressing, and Jihadists here
have become skilled at exploiting new technology by:
Describing this game of cat and mouse for technological supremacy
Using the technology as intended.
Adapting the technology for military use.
Creating a device using the technology as a base component.
To cite this Article: Easter, Paul, Jihadist Use Of Technology, Military Operations, Volume 2, Issue No. 3,
Summer 2014, pages 17-21.
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TJOMO.com
Page 17

It is also noteworthy that the use of technology to execute attacks
varies geographically and within networks. Reasons for these
variations include the ability of the designers and modifiers, the
availability of material and tools, and the type of attack required.
The latter, more than other factors, has driven design requirements,
particularly with adapting existing technologies and employing new
technologies. Successful adoption of this technology depends on two
factors:

Explicit knowledge such as blueprint, designs and recipes and

protocols.
Tacit knowledge i.e. that derived from experience.
The first can largely be transferred by knowledge disseminators such

as the internet. The second is more difficult to codify as it is borne
from the practical of experience of the bomb makers and operators.
By this we mean the understanding of the nuances of operation that
come from carrying out a function as opposed to merely studying it.
This requires a more hand-on approach by direct transfer between
individuals or within a specific training programme.
Use as Originally Designed
In conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of conventional
weapons for military set-piece confrontations has occurred, but these
routinely result in defeat for the insurgents. Consequently, they have
learnt that fighting symmetrically is ineffective and that conventional
weapons are more effective in support of adapted technologies in
an asymmetric fight.
Insurgents in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan have staged
complex attacks using a mix of conventional weapons and IEDs.
The typical approach is to swarm an installation to overwhelm its
defences. This approach requires little training (other than basic
tactics) and the devices can be rudimentary and intergroup in origin
or taken from internet type designs.
Paul Easter
purpose not envisaged by the original equipment manufacturer[iv].
They can be constructed from conventional, military or civilian
explosives. Many use military munitions such as shells and mines, but
they can employ homemade explosives (HME), typically from nitrate
fertilisers or hydrogen peroxide. Where conventional munitions are
available, they are preferred, given their more powerful TNT[v]
equivalence.
IED Usage and Typology
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there has been a well-documented
arms race between Jihadist insurgents and Coalition Forces. This
occurred first in Iraq but later spread to Afghanistan. IEDs are
the most effective weapons used by Jihadists. From July 2003 to
October 2007, they caused 1,600 Coalition fatalities in Iraq.[vi]
In Afghanistan, they are responsible for more Coalition fatalities
than any other weapon[vii]. Several individuals have been jailed
in the West for disseminating IED construction techniques using the
internet. Typically these are would-be Jihadists[viii], or seek to
profit financially[ix]. The majority of the devices described on the
Internet are at the more rudimentary end of development and lack
the sophistication of many of the devices described below.
Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) have become a common method of IED
emplacement. Devices range in size from bicycle-borne through to
tanker trucks. While the 9/11 aircraft represent the largest device
but threat reporting has detailed plans to hijack commercial shipping
to use as floating bombs. In Iraq, VBIEDs have also carried chemical
material such as chlorine. From 2006 to 2007, at least 16 attacks
employed chlorine-gas canisters with conventional explosives.
However, such innovation does not always produce the intended
effect. A study by the New America Foundation identified that the
16 chlorine attacks caused no fatalities by chlorine inhalation but
only by the explosive effect of the devices[x].
Boat-borne IEDs have been used with some success. In Iraq, US
and UK troops have been killed using this method, and the attacks
off Yemen against the USS Cole[xi] and tanker MV Limburg[xii]
demonstrate their effectiveness.
Aside from VBIEDs, the other common delivery method is personborne IEDs, i.e. suicide bombers. The device itself is usually a
waistcoat or a backpack with fragmentation provided by ball
bearings or junk metal.
Figure 1: US Stryker vehicle post IED attack in Iraq 2003

(Source: Wikipedia)
In an effort to circumvent increased security protocols, particularly

on aircraft, Jihadists have devised increasingly sophisticated
concealment methods, such as Richard Reids attempt to hide a nonmetallic IED in his shoes on a US airliner. Other attempts have seen
devices hidden in everyday objects like photocopier cartridges[xiii],
laptops or toys. Another plot in 2006 sought to bring liquid explosives
on board commercial aircraft in an attempt to bring down several
aircraft simultaneously[xiv].
IEDs are a cornerstone of the Jihadist arsenal. UK military doctrine

defines an IED as an explosive device, constructed using noncommercial methods, usually in a domestic setting; or a device using
ammunition modified to be initiated in a non-standard way and for a
Jihadists have also staged attacks by implanting IEDs in a bombers

body cavities. A Saudi prince and an Afghan intelligence officer
were targets of such attacks[xv]. In both cases, the low amount of
explosive, the absence of shrapnel, and the blast-dampening effects
of the bombers bodies reduced the effectiveness. These devices
have been seen in limited numbers, suggesting that they have not
been adopted across the whole network.
TJOMO.com
Jihadist Adaptation of Technology The IED
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Page 18

Mortar Devices
In another technological offshoot, insurgents in Iraq have
experimented with Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortars (IRAM), also
known as Lob Bombs. Constructed from propane-gas tanks packed
with explosives and powered by 107-mm rockets, they are similar
in construction to the improvised mortars called Barrack Busters
designed and used by PIRA in Northern Ireland. While relatively
inaccurate and with a limited range, their ability to overcome static
defences like blast walls makes them devastating. Shia groups
have used such devices, and it has been suggested they originally
received construction assistance from Iranian state organisations.
[xvi] This represents a step up in technological sophistication that
requires tacit as well as explicit knowledge, which only external
support is likely to bring.
Paul Easter
and has since spread among other Jihadist groups. The most
effective use of this technology has been as an off-route mine. The
use of EFPs was most prevalent in Iraq, and it was highly effective
against Coalition armour. At one point, EFPs were responsible for
the greatest number of Coalition casualties. At the time, the UK and
US made it clear they knew the technology had been transferred
from Iran[xviii] with state support. Accordingly, well-machined EFPs
became a clear fingerprint of Iranian state support, and this is
a possible reason why EFPs did not proliferate in any meaningful
numbers into Afghanistan.
IED Initiation Methods

Many Jihadist insurgent groups have become skilled at using a
range of IED-initiation methods. In early campaigns, initiation was
generally by command wire. Here an operator was remoted from
the IED by a long wire. The operator triggered the IED by completing
a circuit. It was simple and impervious to ECM, but risky to set up.
Coalition Forces quickly learned to detect activities associated with
IED emplacement, such as hostile reconnaissance, use of spotters,
and disturbed ground. As a result, groups moved to wireless
initiation methods, such as infrared car alarms and garage openers.
Devices with GSM initiation soon followed, but the majority were
defeated by Coalition advances in ECM. As bombers used radiofrequency detectors and trial and error to find unjammed parts of
the radio spectrum, so Coalition technology moved to counter it.
As the Coalition developed jammers for low-powered devices like
garage-door openers, the Jihadists moved to higher-power devices.
This battle for electronic supremacy also spanned two-way radios,
extended-range cordless phones and mobile phones from 1G to 3G.
As devices increased in sophistication, explicit knowledge gained
solely from the internet is unlikely to have enabled groups to climb
the technological steps needed. While it is conceivable that those
with appropriate skills could innovate effective changes on a limited
scale, it is doubtful this could be disseminated organisation-wide, not
least because of the disaggregated nature of the groups involved. As
has been seen repeatedly in business management studies function,
dissemination of new technology effectively across an organisation
requires significant human resources. Given the small size and
limited survivability of many of the organisational structures being
discussed, it is doubtful this could be achieved internally. It is more
probable that such changes were effected with external support.
Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs)
Explosively Formed Projectiles (or Penetrators) (EFPs) employ a
shaped charge, which comprises a concave metal hemisphere (the
liner) backed by high explosive shrouded in a steel or aluminium
casing. When the explosive detonates, the liner compresses and
squeezes forward, forming a hypersonic molten jet. Moving at
Mach 10, it strikes with enough energy to transform armour to liquid
by a process called hydrodynamic penetration. If aimed correctly,
it penetrates the armour and hits the crew.
Figure 2: EFP
(Source: CIA)
schematic
and
illustration
of
use[xix]
Low Metal or Non-Metallic Mines (NMM)

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of rudimentary victim-operated
mines is commonplace. However, most mines are metallic and are
susceptible to metal detectors. Therefore, insurgents developed
mines with less metal content to render the Coalition route-clearance
teams detectors less effective[xx]. In 2009, NMMs were introduced.
With no metal whatsoever in their construction, NMMs rendered
metal detectors completely ineffective.
However, NMMs had a technical flaw in that the initiator was
extremely unstable and required careful emplacement to avoid
premature detonation. After a few Jihadists were killed burying
them, emplacement became unpopular, and those tasked did it
badly. Consequently, the devices were easily spotted by search
teams and defused.
Another facet in this devices development was the influence of Iran.
Intelligence showed that the technical know-how and training for
NMMs was provided to insurgents by Iranian Republican Guards
Corps (IRGC) members. The US subsequently sent a demarche to
Iran demanding an end to manufacture, and the activity ceased
soon after. Since, other variants with less-volatile initiators have been
seen in small numbers.
Initially developed in WW2[xvii], EFPs were first used by terrorists

(Red Army Faction) in 1989. Subsequently, the technology was
utilised by Hezbollah (with Iranian state sponsorship) in the 1990s
Western weapons-intelligence organisations know that technology

transfer has been occurring for a number of years, among groups
and between states and groups. The current techniques of Jihadist
bomb-makers appear to be the product of two interlinked processes.
The first is the technology exchange between terrorist organisations
and insurgent groups (e.g., innovation by the Provisional IRA (PIRA)
in the 1970s which was disseminated to ETA and subsequently
appeared in Iraq). The second is state sponsorship.
TJOMO.com
Military Operations
Page 19

State Sponsorship - the Root of All Evil?
State sponsorship of terrorist groups is terminology originally
applied by the US State Department to countries that repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism. While a
number of countries (like Syria and Iran) remain on the USs list,
this does not tell the whole story. Pakistan has long aided a range
of Islamic terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a
major sponsor of the Taliban fighting the Coalition-backed Afghan
government. Additionally, governments in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen,
Somalia and the Palestinian territories create security vacuums,
either by active support or passive inaction, which allow Islamic
groups to operate. This sponsorship can take many forms, such
as providing safe havens, financing, training, equipment and,
ultimately, direction. There appears to be a qualitative link between
group allegiance to state organs and the level of technology transfer.
Often it is the direct transfer of explicit and more importantly key
tacit knowledge that enables effective organisational adoption of the
technology. Perhaps unsurprisingly studies have indicated that state
support makes terrorist organisations more effective[xxi].
Direct state sponsorship of Islamic terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah
by Iran, has resulted in the direct transfer of military technology
in areas such as providing Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)[xxii],
training in infiltration techniques like diving[xxiii], and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). However, this level of technology transfer
and control is unique and probably due to Hezbollah being a quasiorgan of state rather than an autonomous group. Irans support of
other groups (e.g. Taliban or Palestinian Islamic Jihad) is typically
less generous, covering areas such as training and IEDs.
The competition between terrorists and state-backed countermeasures
has been running for years. Whilst the Jihadists pace of development
has been marked, claims that they have survived due solely to their
technological agility (despite the huge financial, technological and
material resources available to the Western states) overstates the
case.
Occasional observers of the battle between Western security services
and Jihadists might believe the fight for technological superiority in
Iraq and Afghanistan is taking place in high-technology laboratories
(for Western players) and makeshift kitchen laboratories (for
the Islamic fundamentalists). This is unlikely to be an accurate
description. While some simple, local evolutionary modifications
(principally in the IED field) have occurred in kitchen laboratories,
the major revolutions in design and wider usage have flowed from
external sources such as state sponsorship.
Paul Easter
We must also guard against crediting Jihadist designers with
an impressive pace of development, since as this ignores other
variables. Claims that Jihadist groups have taken 18 months
to do what took PIRA 30 years to achieve in developing the RF
spectrum are overblown.[xxiv] Such claims do not recognise that
PIRA was innovating as the digital age began. Jihadists were in
a fortuitous position where they could replicate past achievements.
Whilst it is true that the internet has assisted with the proliferation
of ideas and that ideas have bled across theatres on foot, it is
likely that state sponsorship has been behind the speed at which
Jihadists have evolved. Explicit knowledge will only take you so far
in development terms. Iran, Syria and Pakistan are all known to have
provided training and material to Islamist groups, and the degree of
allegiance to the state appears correlated to the level of capability
transfer.
As has been previously stated, there is a considerable body of
literature describing Jihadist groups as innovative or early adopters of
technologies that have been used to give them the edge against state
counter-terrorist capabilities. In actuality, as for all organisations, the
effective adoption of a new technology is not a simple matter. While
the internet has been a useful disseminator of explicit knowledge, it
is also often riddled with errors (some accidental, some deliberate).
Given the subject matter, this can have fatal consequences. It also
remains a poor mechanism for responding to technical innovation
and ensuring this is disseminated through existing organisational
blockages.
A more effective mechanism for addressing both these issues is
external support (sometimes by experienced terrorist groups, but
more usually through state support). Here explicit and key tacit
knowledge can be disseminated in a more structured and deliberate
way throughout the organisation. This, coupled with material supply,
can create effective organisational change and develop or enhance
a capability.
To conclude: even with IEDs (which remain a highly lethal
technology for Jihadists) revolutionary improvements and their
effective dissemination occur through state support. Even then, given
the disaggregation of their structures and their limited survivability,
Jihadists often struggle to percolate developments across their
organisations. Lastly, it should be recognised that, outside combat
theatres, Mumbai-style and Kenya Mall-style attacks have proven the
most effective recent tactic used by Islamists. Ironically, these were
low-tech attacks. This supports the notion that governments and the
media routinely overstate Jihadist technological abilities in order to
secure funding or sell newspapers. Looking forward, less hype and
more-rigorous research (which is more specifically directed at state
influence) are needed to uncover the true state of Jihadist capability.
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Easter is a British military intelligence officer.
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Page 20
Paul Easter
References
[i] Lewis B, The Assassins, A Radical Sect in Islam, (Phoenix 2003).
[ii] The terms Islamic extremist and Jihadist are used interchangeably within this document and are used for both Sunni and Shia groups proscribed under UK
anti-terrorist legislation.
[iii] Bradley, G and Thomas R. Munitions Issue Dwarfs the Big Picture. Washington Post 29 October 2004, p. A01.
[iv] British Army Ammunition Technical Officers Course.
[v] Tri-Nitro Toluene, a measure of explosive force
[vi] Wilkinson, A, Bevan J Biddle I, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): An Introduction Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference Guide, (Small Arms Survey
2008) (p136)
[vii] Combating the No. 1 killer of troops in Afghanistan. Afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com. 2010-05-06. Retrieved 2012-05-11
[viii] US Citizen Emerson Begolly jailed for posting The Explosives Course online http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_
Purposes.pdf (p40)
[ix] UK citizen Terence Brown jailed for selling copies of the Anarchists Cookbook, Ibid (p34)
[x] http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21578111-prospect-al-qaeda-getting-chemical-weapons-drawing-closer-other-red
[xi] Wright, L, Looming Tower, (Penguin 2006), (p 325)
[xii] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2334865.stm
[xiii] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8101107/Cargo-plane-bomb-plot-computer-printer-shows-al-Qaedas-sophistication.html
[xiv] Corera, G Bomb plot the al-Qaeda connection. BBC News. Retrieved http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7606107.stm 11 October 2013.
[xv] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/asia/attacker-in-afghanistan-hid-bomb-in-his-body.html?_r=0
[xvi] http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Jul12/0,4670,IraqEliteBombers,00.html
[xvii] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/bullets2-shaped-charge.htm
[xviii] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4312516.stm
[xix] http://laststandonzombieisland.com/2013/08/30/explosively-formed-penetrators-for-dummies/ Retrieved 17 October 2013.
[xx] http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/07/ff_roadside_bombs/all/1
[xxi] Hoffman, B. Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities, RAND Report P-7801
[xxii] Beeston , Blandford N, Hezbollah Threat Stronger than Ever, The Australian, (6 Aug 2009).
[xxiii] http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1760.htm Retrieved 13 June 13.
[xxiv] This despite PIRA having one of the most consistent and sophisticated research and development capabilities of all terrorist groups
Military Operations
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Page 21
Storming Back to the Future: Why We Wrestle With

The Basics
Gerry Long
War is an option of difficulties

- General James Wolfe
... much of modern military tactics is geared toward
maneuvering the enemy into a position where they can
essentially be massacred from safety
- Sebastian Junger
All armies of the world learn, in peace time, how to write
beautifully constructed orders but we must never lose sight
of the fact that, in a war of movement, our orders will be brief
and simple.
- Adolf Von Schell
In his article The Tactics Gap[i] Wilf Owen started a debate as
to why we seek equipment solutions rather than training solutions
to the problem of basic tactics. In my view, Wilf is correct in his
assumptions that we struggle to have a coherent debate over tactical
doctrine. Like most decisions, its easier to look to technology for the
answer rather than look within ourselves or to the past. Many armies
are like teenage boys at heart; looking to a quick fix of technology
rather than going through what is perceived as a long, boring study.
However, on the eve of the hundredth anniversary of the Great War,
we need look no further than the German application of infiltration
tactics to understand how to fill the tactics gap in the training of
infantry in the twenty-first century. As always, in order to advance
we should understand where we have come from; and how we got
here.
The importance training infantrymen in tactics so as to be first

rate, highly motivated and competent has never been higher. To
paraphrase Clausewitz, everything in war is simple, its just that
the simplest things become very difficult. This is never truer than for
training infantry in tactics in a transforming environment. Tactical
innovation is often unruly, spasmodic, and to a certain extent
uncontrollable. That is the opposite environment from that which
directorates and arms of service schools like to work in. Service
schools and headquarters tend to prefer a lull in the battle before
embarking on transformational change; especially when budgets
are tight and when flexibility is liberally used in budget managers
vocabulary to mean be prepared to do more with less.
To effectively link doctrine and current in-theatre tactics, techniques
and procedures (TTPs) one must overcome and then combine the
dynamism of the modern battlefield with the natural caution of
conservative military culture. This is not a condemnation of the
military mind: soldiers are inherently cautious because the stakes
in their profession are usually very high. Success or failure is often
measured in human lives. Operational doctrine and organizations
must be flexible enough to embrace new TTPs arising from operations
in complex terrain. Taking practical battlefield advantage of new
ideas is the responsibility of all those involved in the development of
doctrine. To do this, the military culture must at times be prepared
to take a leap of faith with tactical innovation. They should establish
meaningful paradigms for frontline soldiers to employ, from starting
points that may appear unreachable at first. At the same time, the
prevailing military culture should be discerning enough to reject
irrelevant or unnecessary tinkering around the edges, when only
bold innovation is required.
In this environment, why turn to the innovation of an army defeated
nearly 100 years ago? Firstly, like pornography, good tactics is
often hard to define but when you see it you know what it is. The
basis of all modern light role infantry doctrine was born out of the
hard lessons learned in the Great War. On the British side this led to
To cite this Article: Long, Gerry, Storming Back to the Future: Why We Wrestle With The Basics, Military
Operations, Volume 2, Issue No. 3, Summer 2014, pages 22-25.
Military Operations
TJOMO.com
Page 22

the development of the combined arms battle of the Hundred Days.
On the German side it led to the development of elastic defense
and stormtrooper tactics. That involved seeking of gaps in the
enemys defense and attacking from a flank, fixing the enemy by
fire (either direct (machine gun) or indirect (artillery) or then closing
with the enemy under that fire. That has been the mainstay of lowlevel infantry doctrine ever since. The training employed to deliver
that doctrine was just as dynamic as the resulting change in tactics.
It was built on distributed training, trust at the lowest levels, and
(above all) high standards of personal soldering skills.
Germany Tactical and Training Innovation
Like most wartime marriages of doctrine and strategy, German
stormtrooper tactics were driven as much by military necessity
as by a desire of the military elite to embrace change. Out of
the broken strategy of 1914 came the establishment of position
warfare, which yielded slowly but inevitably to trench warfare.
This strategic stalemate characterized most of the conflict until
1918. Although the battlefield was static it was, paradoxically, a
hotbed of innovation and tactical hybrid warfare, where low-level
commanders grappled with the necessity of holding ground whilst
maintaining offensive spirit. It became obvious that the doctrine the
German Army went to war with in 1914 was suicidal when opposed
by modern weapons[ii]. A solution was needed that would decrease
the vulnerability of the infantry unit whilst increasing its firepower.
Accordingly the Germans fielded new weapons, developed new
infantry tactics, and emphasized coordination with supporting arms.
These new aspects first came to the fore in the Argonne sector of
the Western Front. The Argonne was the true crucible of the war:
never at peace, always at strife.[iii] The most intense period was in
the summer of 1915. This heavily wooded area would, at first sight,
seem to negate the Germans advantage in artillery and machine
guns. Small-unit tactics were the norm, and initially the Germans
found it tough going. New tactics took time to develop. At first they
were conducted on a small scale, but the tactics developed were
simple. A small section of the front was selected as the target. The
artillery bombardment was massive but very short in duration. Then
a mixed force of engineers and infantry infiltrated into the pulverized
position, followed by more infantry and machine gunners. When the
new light mortar entered service, mortar crews followed along.[iv]
This innovation, largely unnoticed by the Allies, gave the Germans
the opportunity to develop new tactics to go with their new weapons.
[v]
Gerry Long
increasingly grenadiers rather than riflemen. That is to say, they no

longer paid much attention to the rifle as an offensive weapon.
This test-bed infantry unit with its increased firepower led to infantry
divisions being decentralized. The resulting storm troops or assault
troops would operate almost independently. Just as revolutionary
was the use of these units to disseminate these new tactics. They
were promptly rotated and passed on their experience to other units,
in effect creating mobile battle schools. In the Vosges, the French lost
more than vital territory and their best troops. Conceptually, they
lost the war (and the next one) by failing to grasp that the nature of
combat had been changed dramatically, and irrevocably.[vii]
At the lowest level, the assault squads modified their personal
weapons to meet their unique situation. They also made excellent
use of the hand grenade as a close-quarter weapon.[viii] The
stormtroopers also conducted live-fire training exercises using the
new tactics behind the lines in carefully-constructed copies of the
objectives of future operations. Assault squads conducted extensive
rehearsals with live-fire, including supporting artillery, prior to any
attack. Independent sub-unit movement was demanding, and the
NCO in charge was empowered to make battlefield decisions.
This harsh, exacting training took a toll on the soldiers, and some
could not meet the physical requirement.[ix] Nevertheless, it was
precisely that training which gave assault troops confidence in their
supporting artillery and their individual weapons. Most importantly,
it gave NCOs the confidence to become battlefield leaders. The
tactics were totally dependent on initiative at their level. Without a
confident NCO leading the assault, the new tactics were doomed
to failure.[x]
After World War I, General Hans von Seeckt, commander of
Germanys much-reduced post war army, set out a plan to extend
those successful tactical innovations. It resulted in the formalization
of stormtrooper infiltration tactics. Debate ensued inside the officer
corps, which ultimately produced tangible reforms. These reforms
reshaped training, modernization, organization and personnel
management. This climate of institutional reform was made possible
by a military culture that encouraged real innovation and out-ofthe-box thinking amongst junior officers.[xi] It led directly to the
successes of the German Army in the early stages of the Second
World War.
Training the Infantry: Future Battle Drill
Having initially stumbled into combined arms tactics as a result of the

need to neutralize the French and Belgian fortifications in 1914, the
German Army embraced the result. The necessity of invention forced
the infantry, for the first time, to be organized around the application
of enormous amounts of high explosive delivered by an array of
platforms. The Germans were perfectly aware that linking the
infantry to the application of high explosives was solving only part
of the problem. As long as the infantry were armed with bolt-action
rifles there was not much they could do when they ran into small
fortified positions or dug-in opposition. And, as any infantryman can
attest, at ground level the precision delivery of high explosive is an
oxymoron. The Germans had already reintroduced hand grenades.
German assault troops in the Argonne were scuttling along the
ground carrying spades and sacks of grenades early on. The
French positions were a great stimulant for innovation because the
terrain was too rough to allow easy movement of heavy weapons.
The resulting unit was a sort of hybrid of Jaeger and Pionier[vi],
consisting of a machine gun detachment, mortar detachment and
a flamethrower detachment, as well as a lot of infantry who were
In response to Wilf Owens article on The Tactics Gap, what

have Great War German infiltration tactics to do with the training
of infantry in the twenty-first century? Does their application have
any relevance to any armys current tactical doctrine? Lessons of the
past are as relevant as they were nearly a hundred years ago: the
essence of tactics is the technique of employing the resources of war
in battle. The actual functions performed in war are quite simple.
They are the same whether it is one man engaged in mortal combat,
or an entire army. The simplest weapons system of all is the man
himself. An effective weapons system must locate its target, transmit
its characteristics through a communications system, set in motion
the force available to destroy the target, follow with an evaluation of
the results achieved, and prepare for the next action. In their simplest
forms, these functions may be defined as a communications system,
firepower and mobility. Their application in battle may become
complex,[xii] but training for them is just as simple as it always been:
TJOMO.com
Military Operations
1. Trust Leaders to Train their Soldiers: The need is to deliver

quality training wherever it is required, regardless of where the
Page 23

directorate school or the centralized training facility is located.
The answer lies in the combination of demanding, distributed
training delivered by experienced soldiers. Any army which fields
light role infantry can take the basic tactical template and use
it to deliver competent individual soldiers. The key requirement
is capable and highly-motivated NCOs who are also competent
instructors.
2. Training for War: Explicitly this means you have to train for a
war, not the war. Unless combat formations continually and
systematically exercise for combat, they will always be found
wanting come the day.[xiii] SLA Marshall observed in Men
Against Fire,
In the whole of the initial assault on Omaha Beachhead, there
were only about five infantry companies which were tactically
effective at their backs was the power of the mightiest
sea and land forces ever to support an invading army in the
history of the world. But in the hour of crisis for these infantry
companies, the metal, guns and bombs of these distant
supporters were not worth three squads from that small band
of men which had gone to work with grenades and rifles.
This has been reinforced by recent experience on many
battlefields. Warfare in Afghanistan has reoriented soldiers to
fight in small, cohesive, self-contained groups that possess all the
arms of combat (or can call on them). It demands a high standard
of personnel battle drill, and robust tactical discipline. Both war
and transformation require subordinate initiative which pulls
soldiers into the fight, not fighting via detailed plans which mean
we miss opportunities to exploit success on the battlefield. Effective
action in the confusion of battle requires independent judgment
and initiative at the lowest level. Otherwise, army formations will
become inert masses: paralyzed, rather than empowered, by
new technologies.[xiv]
3. The band of brothers approach: The surest way to reduce
casualties among close-combat units is to place in harms way only
soldiers trained through a band of brothers approach: groups
who, over a period of years, have worked collectively to achieve
physical fitness, emotional maturity, technical competence, and
confidence in their leaders.[xv] Nothing nurtures confidence
more than the sense of belonging to a band of brothers. That
requires the ingraining the habits, built on battle drill, that when
conducted day in, day out with the same team builds invisible
ties of cohesion. Battle drill, the physical act of responding to
a situation, minimizes the randomness of battle and gives the
soldier a familiar point of reference in an uncertain environment.
As von Seeckt observed: true military discipline extends not from
Gerry Long
knowledge, but habit.

Battle drills should be robust, practiced frequently, and above all
simple. We dont see much of any of that today.
Tactics Gap or a Gap of Trust?
New doctrine should be integrated with tactical organization,
techniques, and procedures. This is easy to articulate in the lecture
hall or classroom but more difficult to accomplish in practice.
Prevailing attitudes, service and regimental rivalries along with
sheer bloody mindedness go hand in hand with the fog of war,
which sometimes undermines common understanding and tactical
development. It requires strongly-managed and directed interaction
of positive leadership linked to an open tactical forum within an open
military culture to deal with the realities of the modern battlefield.
Common-sense doctrine is usually driven from the bottom up, based
on combat imperatives and lessons learned. Cumulatively, they
shape two key expectations. The first is: does the current or planned
model for the infantry add value? Does it result in equipping the
man for the role, or merely manning the equipment? The second is
then: what are the implications for training and education? Can, for
example, 90% of a mortar platoon revert to being a rifle platoon,
given three weeks notice, or one week of in-theatre emergency
training? If this cannot be done, what does it tell us about a concept
predicated on the need to adapt?[xvi]
Tactics are proven on the ground, but its how we got to the current
tactical employment of men and equipment that is often forgotten.
The innovation in training, the flexible nature of that training, and the
ability to adapt that training quickly is often lost in the peace time.
Bureaucracy stifles most modern armies, even though the armies
involved in the coalition of the willing have been at war for over
10 years. A plethora of overlapping HQs which all have a stake in
the training of soldiers and exercise centralized control hamper the
development of low-level doctrine. The maxim of modern military
training should be he who controls everything controls nothing,
and produces very little. The amount of paper and time needed to
produce a change to tactics and training negates a basic principle of
war: flexibility! The basic tenet lost in the training environment today
is trust: trusting subordinates to get on and train soldiers. No leader
wants to train bad soldiers nor train them badly. That is the biggest
lesson to be learned from the German innovation of stormtrooper
tactics. The Tactics Gap that Wilf Owen identified at the start of this
debate is largely a gap of trust between those soldiers with recent
tactical experience and those of the Cold War generation of soldiermanagers who hold the doctrinal and training purse strings.
Gerry Long is a member of Military Operations Editorial Advisory Panel.
Military Operations
TJOMO.com
Page 24
Gerry Long
Principal References
Samuels, Martin. Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War, (New York: Greenwood Press) 1992.
Lewis, J. Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy 1919-1941, (New York: Prager Publishers) 1985.
Gudmundsson, Bruce, Stormtroop Tactics. Innovation in the German Army 1914-1918, (New York: Praeger Publishers) 1989.
Lupfer, Timothy T.The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute), l981.
Von Schell, Adolf. Battle Leadership Marine Corp Assn Bookstore 1987.
Stackpole, Patrick. German Tactics in the Michael Offensive 1918, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1981.
Condell, Bruce & Zabecki, David T (Eds). On the German Art of War: Truppenfhrung, Stackpole Books, 2001.
References
[i] Owen, William F., The Tactics Gap: Why We Wrestle With The Basics, Military Operations, Volume 2, Issue No. 1, Winter 2014, pages 17-19.
[ii] Stackpole (1981) p 17.
[iii] Boucheron, G. (1917) LAssaut: LArgonne et Vauquios avec le 10e Division, Perrin Paris, p 95-6.
[iv] Mosier, J. (2001) The Myth of the Great War, Profile Books, London p155-7.
[v] Ibid p173.
[vi] Literally light infantryman and pioneer respectively, but pionier has overtones of sapper (as in combat engineer) as well - Ed.
[vii] Ibid p173-7.
[viii] Ibid. p 48.
[ix] Samuels (1992) p 29
[x] Stackpole (1981) p 23-24.
[xi] Macgregor, D.A., (2003) Transformation Under Fire, Praeger, Westport, p 93.
[xii] Gavin, J.M., (1958) War and Peace in the Space Age, Harper & Brothers, New York, p 212.
[xiii] Owen, loc cit.
[xiv] Macgregor, op cit, p 55-6.
[xv] Scales, R, H. (2003) Yellow Smoke, Rowman, New York, p 162-.3
[xvi] Owen, William F. The Universal Infantry, Australian Army Journal. Volume VII (2010), Number 3, p143-9.
Military Operations
TJOMO.com
Page 25
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Military Operations
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Page 26
John Arthur
This article describes a method for planning military operations

quickly and effectively at battlegroup level and below. This planning
method enables orders to be delivered within 60 minutes of the
receipt of orders from the higher formation. It is intended for all
combat operations, regardless of enemy, own ORBAT or terrain. It
will appeal to anyone who needs to produce simple and effective
plans quickly.
The Three Step Estimate is not new. It is essentially the product of
historical research. It is an updated and re-worked version of the
planning and orders process which would have seemed completely
normal in British and Commonwealth infantry battalions in the
1940s. Commanders from the 1970s and even the 1980s would
be more familiar with this method than they would be with current
practice. This is because it is focused on outcome, not process.
All the elements of the Three Step Estimate have been successfully
employed on operations. Why they fell from grace is unclear. There
is no evidence that they did not work, and significant evidence that
they did. It seems that fighting third-rate enemies, and long periods
of peace (during which battalion-level combat operations were not
routine) led to the over-thinking of processes. This commonly occurs
in peacetime training. Intuitive decision making gradually died
under the weight of Staff College Directing Staff (DS) reinventing
the wheel.
In Britain, children are taught to cross roads safely using the Green
Cross Code. Imagine allowing the Health and Safety Executive
to constantly revise the Green Cross Code for thirty years without
ever crossing a road; or occasionally crossing a road which has no
traffic. The resulting code would be forty pages long, cover every
eventuality, and be totally impractical. Something similar seems to
have happened to the British orders process.
The motivation to develop the Three Step Estimate comes from
historic evidence, which stresses rapid planning in order to deliver
quick and effective orders. Contemporary military operations may
lack motor rifle or panzer regiments, but that does not negate the
need to plan quickly and effectively.
The Three Step Estimate uses the 5-Paragraph orders format as an
aid to planning. It enables a single officer, working alone, to plan an
operation and then give orders quickly and effectively. Those orders
should typically be no more than one page long, supported by a few
annexes, such as a map overlay and the fire plan. The Three Step
Estimate dispenses with all but absolutely essential process.
Possible courses of action are tested against a simple question about
the enemy, and possibly against a few quick and simple mnemonics.
The Three Step Estimate explicitly does not seek to predict the
enemys course of action, because you cannot predict what the
enemy will do. (If you are confused about that last sentence, please
read it again.)
It also makes no attempt to synchronise complex activities.
Coordination is delegated to subordinates as far as possible. It
avoids explaining the obvious to subordinates. It aims to allow the
maximum possible cooperation at lower levels of command.
To cite this Article: Arthur, John, The Three Step Estimate, Military Operations, Volume 2, Issue No. 3,
Summer 2014, pages 27-29.
Military Operations
TJOMO.com
Page 27
John Arthur
The Three-Step Estimate

The process uses the 5-paragraph orders format in order to both
make the plan and generate the orders, as simply as possible. The
5-paragraph orders format is:
1. Situation
2. Mission
to reflect on the chosen option as a set of orders. If the result is

materially longer than one page it is pruned. Often there will be
nothing, or little, in Paragraphs 4 and 5. Orders are then given.
The content of the orders will vary, depending on the type of
operation. River crossings will require headings not used for a relief
in place operation, etc. This suggests the need for an Aide Memoire
to provide the relevant headings and to guide planning. That means
a short and simple one-page card to cover each type of operation.
3. Execution:
a. Concept of Operations
Testing
b. Mission Statements
This looks simple. It is. It, or something very much like it, worked for
decades. It would be simple to trial it against other methods. But
remember: the Three Step Estimate can produce battlegroup orders
within 60 minutes. To compare like with like requires a trial which
requires commanders (with their staffs where necessary) to do just
that. If the Three Step Estimate produces broadly the same plans as
more lengthy and complex processes, then this method is all you
need.
c. Coordinating Instructions
4. Command and Signal
5. Combat Service Support
Step 1: Extraction. This identifies the relevant detail from the superior
commanders orders. The situation is written down, as it is known,
or judged by Intelligence. It is not an Intelligence summary. It is a
brief description of the emerging situation, which implicitly explains
why new orders are needed. Locations of boundaries, objectives
and enemy and friendly forces are marked on maps. The mission
given by the superior commander is written into Paragraph 2.
Stated timings are written down in Paragraph 3c. Essential details
for Paragraphs 4 and 5 are copied down.
Step 2: Planning. This has three stages, which will tend to overlap.
a. Mission analysis. The commander writes down what his
superiors plan is, and his own part in it. He lists stated and
implied tasks. He then lists freedom and constraints. Finally, he
asks himself if anything has changed since his superior gave his
orders. If something has, he considers the consequences.
b. Reconnaissance. The commander creates three options. He
does so at an OP if possible. If not, he does so from an aircraft,
or using a map or a digital battle management system. His three
options may be alternatives of place (for example, left flanking,
right flanking or frontal), time (for example, night or dawn attack,
or sequence), activity (ie, attack, infiltrate or bypass); or some
combination.
c. Decision. He compares those three options. He then asks
himself: based on the situation as I understand it, what could
the enemy do to prevent me from achieving my mission? He
does this for each option. He might compare his options against
the core functions, functions in combat, an aide memoire for a
particular task, or similar.
The Three Step Estimate was tested in a planning exercise set

by a retired officer who had no knowledge of the process. The
people who took part in the exercise had very varied military
backgrounds in terms of rank and experience. They worked alone
and independently. They all produced broadly the same plan. Two
did so in under 60 minutes. The least experienced member of the
team took roughly 70 minutes .
A critical aspect of the process is the question based on the situation,
as I understand it, what could the enemy do to prevent me from
achieving my mission? This question does not seek to predict enemy
action. It is very different from what is the enemy trying to do and
why? It is designed to examine the consequences of actions which
the enemy is thought to be capable of, and likely to carry out, based
on experience. It does not ask what is the enemy doing, because
until and unless the enemy is observed doing something, you cannot
know what they are trying to do. You should have no interest in why
the enemy would do anything. You are only interested in what he
might do to prevent you from achieving your mission. You bend the
enemy to your will. You do not bend to his.
Answering the question what could the enemy do to prevent me
from achieving my mission? should also prompt you to consider the
possibility that Intelligence about enemy strengths or locations, or
both is wrong. Because of that possibility, simple but flexible plans
are best. Simple, flexible plans need less planning than plans which
are not.
So What?
None of the three options will be perfect. Comparing them will

indicate which is the most promising, and what modifications need
to be made in order to achieve the mission. At the battlegroup level,
this comparison should be made in discussion with a subordinate,
such as the 2ic or battery commander. An option is selected and
modified, verbally, as the basis of the plan.
If you need a quick and simple method to plan and write battlegroup
orders in less than an hour, the Three Step Estimate is all you need.
The weight of history and some simple testing tells us that it can do
just that. However, it needs repeated practice before being used.
History tells us that, with practice, battalions could write and give
orders in an hour, with complete confidence in the results.
Step 3: Production of orders. The orders are the plan. The commander
writes Paragraph 3a. and b. in person. Each subordinate grouping
is given a mission statement which is one (repeat: one) task, together
with its purpose. Each paragraph is then completed, or re-written,
Exercises to test and practise the Three Step Estimate are extremely
simple to plan and conduct. DS should not dissect each and every
plan that officers submit. Instead, they should explore how students
saw the problem and what they chose to do as a result.
TJOMO.com
Military Operations
Page 28
John Arthur
Trials have revealed a fairly natural and intuitive process of planning

which asks: what have I been told to do? (the mission); how will
I do that?(the plan); then what can the enemy do to stop me?
(modify the plan). That process generates the orders directly.
Practice will transform the Three Step Estimate into second nature. It
contains almost no explicit process, and is judged entirely by output.
Providing that the method is carried out broadly as described, the
precise details of how anyone does it are irrelevant. They will, and
should, vary from person to person. Students learn by doing. They
learn to do it well through practice, and by comparing their plans
with their colleagues. They quickly find out what works and what
does not; what is good and what is not; and whose ideas to listen to.
If one officer seems to be good at it, and others want to learn from
him, they should do so over a couple of beers: not through Death
by PowerPoint.
John Arthur served in the British Territorial Army for almost 20 years and commanded an infantry company. This article is published
posthumously.
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Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

The Journal of Military Operations

The IJ Infinity Group, Ltd.

Editor Dr Jim Storr

Editorial Advisory Panel

Colonel John Wilson

Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely

Lieutenant Colonel Egil Daltveit

Major General Julian Thompson

Lieutenant Colonel Jan Frederik Geiner

Brigadier Justin Kelly

Professor Karen Carr

Major Gerry Long

Colonel Clint Ancker

Colonel Mike Crawshaw

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Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

Discussions On The Conduct Of War

A Note From The Editor

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of Battlefield Control

Norwegian Swarm: How Unique National Doctrines Contribute to a

Jihadist Use Of Technology

Storming Back to the Future: Why We Wrestle With The Basics

The Three Step Estimate

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

Operation Defensive Pillar or The Second Gaza

Operation Defensive Pillar

The advent of cheap, simple-to-manufacture artillery rockets has

Operation Cast Lead achieved some months of relative calm on

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

Operation Defensive Pillar or The Second Gaza War: A Year Later

Fired 59 rockets and 14 mortar-bombs into Israel (including the

Conducted six small-arms attacks on Israeli patrols and civilians

Conducted 6 IED attacks on Israeli border patrols.

Dug a number of tunnels into Israel. To date three tunnels have

Thrown two petrol bombs on Israeli border patrols.

Falling out with the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt.

The falling-out with the Muslim Brotherhood government in

Hamas is struggling. It has other, more pressing issues than fighting

Operation Defensive Pillar or The Second Gaza War: A Year Later

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

and fled out of range.

Operation Defensive Pillar or The Second Gaza War: A Year Later

suitcase bombs or close-range small-arms fire in a crowded civilian

many scenarios, armies must retain the ability to rapidly capture

As Israels experiences have repeatedly shown, aerial power alone

Eado Hecht is a member of Military Operations Editorial Advisory Panel

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of

The requirement for the coordination of units across wide frontages

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of Battlefield Control Measures

Spatial battlefield control measures can be categorized as one of

Controlling the Battlespace

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

Other control measures have the purpose of synchronizing movement

The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of Battlefield Control Measures

The relatively featureless area of operations of the First Gulf War

Well-crafted battlefield control measures continue to have an essential

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014

The Commanders Toolbox - Use and Abuse of Battlefield Control Measures

Commanders and staff officers develop through formal training and

Volume 2 / Issue 3 / Summer 2014