G.R. No.

L-1121

July 29, 1947

CONCHITA VDA. DE SALUDES, petitioner-appellant, vs.

GREGORIO PAJARILLO and VICENTE BAUTISTA, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, respondentsappellees.
MORAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Conchita Vda. de Saludes, petitioner and appellant, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 12, 1945, to annul a deed of sale a house and lot executed by her in favor of appellee,
Gregorio Pajarillo. During the pendency of the suit, respondent Pajarillo filed an action for ejectment in the
municipal court of Manila against petitioner Saludes to compel her to vacate said house and lot. Petitioner
Saludes filed in that case a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was another action pending between
the same parties and for the same cause and that the court had no jurisdiction over the case. The motion was
heard and submitted for resolution. The municipal court, however, presided over by Judge Vicente Bautista,
without acting upon said motion for dismissal, and without a trial upon the merits, rendered judgment ordering the
defendant Saludes "to vacate said premises, pay the rental at the rate of eighty pesos per month beginning July
1st, 1946, until she leaves the premises and surrenders possession thereof to plaintiff, plus costs of suit."
Whereupon, Saludes filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial mainly upon the ground that the judgment
was a patent nullity there having been no trial on the merits wherein both parties could introduce their evidence.
While this motion was pending, Judge Bautista, upon motion of Pajarillo, and without notice upon Saludes, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul said judgment. The petition was denied
upon the ground that the remedy was appeal. And Saludes appealed to this Court.
Issue: whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy?
Held:
Yes. Respondent contends that certiorari was improper because an appeal from the decision of the municipal
court was available. This contention is untenable. An appeal under the circumstances was not an adequate
remedy there being an order of execution issued by the municipal court.
A defendant is accorded by the rules the right to raise preliminary questions by means of a motion to dismiss
(Rule 4, section 7), and the court is powerless to deprive him of such right by ignoring completely the motion to
dismiss filed and argued by him and disposing of the case finally on other issues not submitted by the parties.
The court is bound to act on the motion, and in the event of a denial the defendant is given the other right to
answer the complaint and plead all defenses and counterclaims he may have (Rule 4, sections 6 and 7); and, in
case of counterclaim, defendant is bound to put it in writing (Rule 4, section 6).
It is only after the defendant has answered the complaint that the court may proceed to the trial of the case on the
merits. The court has no authority to hold the trial before defendant had an opportunity to plead, and has no
power to limit such trial to a mere questioning of the parties as to what their stand on the case is, particularly
when the questioning is made at a time when a motion to dismiss is being heard, the parties having no idea at
the moment that the trial of the case is already being held and confined to such interrogatory. Under such
circumstances, in answering the questions of the court, statements may be made by the parties which are not
intended as a pleading or testimony and may thus be devoid of accuracy and completeness; facts may have
been stated without care, with omission of important circumstances that may be of decisive influence; and since
the parties, or at least the defendant did not know that she was testifying in a formal trial, she may have failed to
mention other issues and other transactions that may affect or change the meaning of all the statements she has
actually made. We believe and so hold that such procedure is irregular and arbitrary, conducive to confusion and
injustice, and is null and void.
Judgment appealed from is reversed and the judgment rendered by the municipal court in the ejectment case is
set aside, with costs against appellee

G.R. No. L-3452

December 7, 1949

THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, petitioner, vs. FELIX ANGELO BAUTISTA, Solicitor General of the
Philippines, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner in this case respectfully prays that after due hearing a writ of prohibition issue commanding the
respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting member of the Commission on Election under
the designation rendered to him by President Quirino on November 9, 1949 unless he is legally appointed as
regular member of the said Commission on Elections.
On 9 November 1949, while the respondent held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor General of the
Philippines, the President designated him as acting member of the Commission on Elections, and on that same
date the respondent took the oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume and perform the duties of the
office; that at the time of the respondent's designation he had not resigned from the office of Solicitor General of
the Philippines nor does he intend to do so but continues to exercise all the powers and duties of the last
mentioned office. It is contended that such designation invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because there was on
9 November 1949 no vacancy in the Commission on Elections, for the acceptance, approval, or granting of the
application for retirement filed by Commissioner Francisco Enage on such date constitutes or amounts to abuse
of discretion and was done in bad faith by the President and therefore null and void; and because Commissioner
Enage is entitled to leave and until after the expiration of such leave he does not cease to be a member of the
Commission on Elections. The contention that the granting of the retirement application of Commissioner Enage
constitutes an abuse of discretion and was made in bad faith is based upon the allegation and claim that the
Commissioner "had voted to suspend the elections in Negros Occidental and Lanao and the Liberal Party fears
he might vote to annul said elections."
It is claimed, in the alternative, that even if there was on that date a vacancy in the Commission on Elections, still
the respondent's designation to act as such member of the Commission, in addition to his duties as Solicitor
General, pending the appointment of a permanent member, is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because
membership in the Commission is a permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and therefore, no
designation of a person or officer in an acting capacity could and can be made.
Issue: whether or not prohibition is the proper remedy?
Held:
Yes.
Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the Commission on Elections in the exercise of its judicial
or ministerial functions, which are being performed by it or without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of its discretion (sec 2, Rule 67). The only basis for the petition is that the designation of the respondent as
temporary member of the Commission on Elections is illegal and invalid because it offends against the
Constitution. This special civil action as our Rule call it, or this extraordinary legal remedy following the classical
or chancery nomenclature, is in effect to test the validity or legality of the respondent's designation in a temporary
capacity as member of the Commission on Elections pending the appointment of a permanent member or
Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo warranto, and as such it may only be instituted by the party who claims
to be entitled to the office (sec. 6, Rule 680 or by the Solicitor General (sec. 3,4, Rule 68). The authorities and
decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de
facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate
court (High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3d ed., p. 715; Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866, 871).
In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the respondent's designation to act temporarily a
member of the Commission on Elections is unlawful because it offends against the provision of the Constitution
creating the Commission on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny and deprive the parties that are
affected by such designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is entitled now to the office and a party who
is not entitled to the office may not institute quo warrant proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor General,
the only other party who may institute the proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In these
circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a remedy. There are cases involving a
situation similar to the one under the consideration wherein it was ruled that the remedy of prohibition may lie.
In view of the peculiar and extraordinary circumstances obtaining in this case already referred to,
prohibition may lie, to wit: that as no one is entitled to the office there is no party who in his name may

institute quo warranto proceedings, and that the respondent the only other party who may institute the
proceedings in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, would not proceed against himself. Were it not for this
anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a constitutional transgression, we would adhere
strictly to the time-honored rule that to test the right to an office quo warranto proceedings is the proper remedy.
The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real parties
in interest for it (the petitioner), or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings.
Otherwise, or of the petitioner does not amend its petition or does not show that it is a juridical entity, the petition
will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall have been made, the writ prayed for will
issue, without costs.

G.R. No. L-46218 October 23, 1990

JOVENTINO
MADRIGAL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PROV. GOV. ARISTEO M. LECAROZ, VICE-GOVERNOR CELSO ZOLETA, JR., PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBERS DOMINGO RIEGO AND MARCIAL PRINCIPE; PROV. ENGR. ENRIQUE M. ISIDRO, ABRAHAM T.
TADURAN AND THE PROVINCE OF MARINDUQUE, respondents-appellees.
MEDIALDEA J.:
FACTS:
On November 25, 1971, public respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta,
Jr., Provincial Board of Marinduque members Domingo Riego and Marcial Principe abolished petitioner-appellant
Joventino Madrigal's position as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer from
the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 by virtue of Resolution No. 204. The abolition
was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position was not
essential. On April 22, 1972, Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On August 7, 1973, he
transmitted a follow-up letter to the Commission regarding his appeal. On January 7, 1974, the Commission in its
1st Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal from the service illegal. On April 26, 1974, public respondent
Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz moved for a reconsideration of said resolution. On February 10, 1975, the
Commission denied the motion for reconsideration. On August 4, 1975, Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial
Board requesting implementation of the resolution of the Commission and consequently, reinstatement to his
former posistion. On August 18, 1975, the Provincial Board, through Resolution No. 93, denied Madrigal's
request for reinstatement because his former posistion no longer exists. In the same resolution, it ordered the
appropriation of the amount of P4,200.00 as his back salaries covering the preiod December 1, 1971 up to June
30, 1973. On December 15, 1975, Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Marinduque against public respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta, Jr.,
Provincial Board Members Domingo Riego and Marcial Principe, Provincial Engineer Enrique M. Isidro, Abraham
I. Taduran and the Province of Marinduque for mandamus and damages seeking, inter alia, (1) restoration of his
abolished position in the Roads and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province; (2) reinstatement to such position; and
(3) payment of his back salaries plus damages. On March 16, 1976, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
petition on the ground that Madrigal's cause of action was barred by laches.
Madrigal alleges that the one (1) year period prescribed in an action for quo warranto is not applicable in
an action for mandamus because Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not provide for such prescriptive period.
The declaration by the trial court that the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the
period of one (1) year within which to file the petition for mandamus, should be confined to actions for quo
warranto only. On the contrary, he contends that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition sine qua
non before one can petition for mandamus.
On the part of public respondents, they aver that it has become an established part of our jurisprudence,
being a public policy repeatedly cited by the courts in myriad of mandamus cases, that actions for reinstatement
should be brought within one year from the date of dismissal, otherwise, they will be barred by laches. The
pendency of an administrative remedy before the Commission does not stop the running of the one (1) year
period within which amandamus case for reinstatement should be filed.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus and damages on the ground of
laches?
Held:
The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo
warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the
petitioner is ousted from his position as held in the following cases: Galano, et al. v. Roxas, G.R. No. L-31241,
September 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8; Cornejo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA
663; Sison v. Pangramuyen, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-40295, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 364; Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L18727, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 755; Villaluz v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. L-22754, December 31, 1965,15 SCRA
710; Villegas v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-23752, December 31, 1965,15 SCRA 720; De la Maza v. Ochave, G.R.
No. L-22336, May 23, 1967,20 SCRA 142; Alejo v. Marquez, G.R. No. L-29053, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA
762.
The reason behind this being was expounded in the case of Unabia v. City Mayor, etc., 99 Phil. 253
where we said: ...[W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be

instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been
originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an
expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of
one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons
of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to
positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may (sic) be unduly
retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged.
The fatal drawback of Madrigal's cause is that he came to court out of time. As aforestated, it was only
after four (4) years and twenty (20) days from the abolition of his position that he file the petition for mandamus
and damages. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor. And this one (1)
year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy (Torres v. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436).
Actually, the recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case where
pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because
issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of
orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such
issues with finality (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Drilon, et al., G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989, citing
Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466; Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143). In the present case,
only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not the abolition of Madrigal's position was in
accordance with law.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is hereby DENIED.